MARITIME CRITICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
(MCIP)
“MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)
IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT”

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Authors: Diren DOĞAN, Cdr. (TÜR N) Deniz ÇETİKLİ

First Edition, İstanbul, October 2023

Editor-In-Chief : Capt. (TÜR N) Nazif BOZKURT

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51 Pages;

ISBN: 978-975-6786-64-2

Edition: 1
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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

DIRECTOR’s REMARKS

In an era of increasing complexity and interdependence, the 21st century stands as a testament
to human progress, marked by remarkable technological advancements and societal transfor-
mations. Yet, alongside this progress, new vulnerabilities and threats have emerged, threatening
the very fabric of societies. Nowhere are these risks more evident than in the realm of critical
infrastructure, the backbone of modern societies and the lifelines of economies.

This infrastructure, whether physical or cyber, has become a prime target for various threats,
each with its potential to disrupt our way of life. A prominent domain under this umbrella of
critical infrastructure, and one that is of paramount importance to global trade and communica-
tion, is the maritime domain. Often referred to as the "blue economy," it is a vast network that
facilitates global economic activity, underpinning over 80% of international trade. The protection
and resilience of this maritime critical infrastructure have become an urgent priority, particularly
in an era where hybrid threats are the new norm.

In this comprehensive study, we delve deep into the intricacies of protecting maritime critical
infrastructure. The study is rooted in a qualitative research methodology, utilizing a wealth of
resources and literature, alongside expert insights drawn from the workshops conducted by the
Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (MARSEC-COE) in 2021 and 2022. Our focus is not only on
understanding the risks and threats but also on exploring practical solutions to ensure the
resilience of this infrastructure.

We begin by unraveling the concept of critical infrastructure, before zooming into the maritime
domain to understand its role and vulnerabilities. We examine key challenges, including cyber
threats, terrorism, hybrid strategies, and physical threats, and their implications for maritime
critical infrastructure. Drawing on the work of the MARSEC-COE, we also scrutinize areas such as
Maritime Critical Infrastructure, Critical Energy Infrastructure, Underwater communications
cables, and Harbour Protection.

While the threats we face are complex and multifaceted, this study seeks to emphasize the
power of cooperation and shared strategies in confronting these challenges. From NATO's
strengthened resilience commitment to the launch of the NATO-EU Task Force on Resilient
Critical Infrastructure, we highlight examples of collective efforts to enhance maritime critical
infrastructure protection.

We invite you, the reader, to journey with us through this important exploration. We hope this
study not only illuminates the importance of safeguarding maritime critical infrastructure but
also inspires further dialogue and action towards ensuring the resilience of our interconnected
world. We stand on the precipice of a "grey century," characterized by complexity. The challenges
ahead are formidable, but with clarity of understanding and collective resolve, we can navigate
these uncertain waters with confidence and resilience.

Mehmet Cengiz EKREN

Capt. (TÜR N)
DIRECTOR OF MARSEC COE

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

PROTECTION (MCIP)
IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
by
Diren DOĞAN1 – Cdr. ( TÜR N ) Deniz ÇETİKLİ2

2023

1-) PhD Candidate in International Relations is a lecturer in Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, International
Relations Department. [email protected]

2-) Commander Turkish Navy-OF-4, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Staff Officer of MARSEC COE,
İstanbul/Türkiye [email protected]

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE 06
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 07
1- Introduction to Critical Infrastructure and Maritime Critical Infrastructure 08
2- Ensuring Energy Security: The Vital Role of Protecting Critical Energy
Infrastructure in the Global System 15
3- Protecting the World's Information Super-Highways: The Importance of
Securing Underwater Communication Cables in the Digital Age 24
4- The Strategic Importance of Harbour Protection in the Maritime Industry 33
5- Conclusion 40
REFERENCES 42

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

“Because we are only as strong as our weakest link.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s speech at the event of NATO’S

outlook towards 2030 beyond (2021)

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

PREFACE

The twenty-first century represents the most advanced point in human history considering all
the technological and social changes. Societies have developed around geographical features,
natural resources, technological progress, and cultural values and have reached their current
position. From the invention of the wheel to the Industrial Revolution, from the invention of
writing to the beginning of the Internet age, developments inherited from the past have affected
lives and made them easier. However, the convenience of everything carried for generations has
increased dependence on them and brought new threats.

The security of nations and their overall functioning of the international system are all under
attack today from diverse types of threats, including physical, cyber, and hybrid. And the most
sensitive points of these attacks are critical infrastructure which refers to facilities, systems, and
networks that are vital to the functioning of a society. Another feature of the twenty-first century
is that it is a “grey century” characterized by complexity. This situation results in the emergence
of unpredictable threats, the origins, characteristics, and consequences of which are unknown
and cannot be predicted and can affect multiple areas simultaneously. The maritime environ-
ment is important for various critical industries such as communication, transportation, energy
transfer, trade, etc., and is vulnerable to these types of threats due to the world’s increasing
interconnectedness through globalization. The threats faced by this gigantic “blue economy”,
targeting the sustainable use and management of ocean resources for economic growth, job
creation, and the overall well-being of society. The oceans cover about 70 percent of the Earth’s
surface, and they have a significant impact on global trade, with more than 80 percent of the
world's trade being transported by sea and show the importance of the seas for the continuity of
the global economic system, while revealing how sensitive knots maintain the existence of an
interconnected world in every respect. In this direction, this study aims to address the protection
of “Maritime Critical Infrastructure”, understood simply as the systems and assets that are essen-
tial for the functioning of a society, economy, and country from a maritime perspective. In this
context, the concept of critical infrastructure will be discussed first, and then the role of maritime
critical infrastructure, the risks faced by critical infrastructure, and what needs to be done to
ensure resilience will be discussed under different sub-titles. Considering the above framework,
the sources used were primarily the workshops conducted by the NATO Maritime Security
Centre of Excellence (MARSEC-COE) in 2021 and 2022, publications produced by Centres of Excel-
lence working under the umbrella of NATO, and academic publications.

All these works are essential to produce a study paper written on a framework used to clarify the
notion of what constitutes Maritime Critical Infrastructure, which makes consistent use of
MARSEC-COE’s work done in this respect so far.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Methodology
This study aims to analyze the protection of critical infrastructure and critical energy infrastruc-
ture with a focus on maritime environment. The study utilizes a qualitative research methodol-
ogy, which includes the analysis of existing literature and resources, as well as data gathered
from presentations made by MARSEC COE’S workshops, conferences, and Exercise MARSEC
findings.
Literature Search
The literature search process involved conducting a comprehensive search for academic
articles, research papers, and reports related to critical infrastructure and critical energy
infrastructure protection in the maritime environment. The search was conducted using
various databases such as Google Scholar, JSTOR, ScienceDirect and NATO or its affiliated
centres. The keywords used in the search included “maritime critical infrastructure protection,”
“critical energy infrastructure,” “maritime security, “energy security,” “critical infrastructure
security,” “Maritime Situational Awareness and “CIP/CISR.”

MARSEC COE Activities

The MARSEC COE activities provided valuable insights into the current challenges and threats
facing critical infrastructure in the maritime environment. The presentations were analyzed to
identify the key issues, trends, and emerging threats. The information gathered from the
presentations was used to develop an understanding of the current state of critical infrastruc-
ture protection in the maritime environment. In this study paper, three separate workshops
held in 2021 and 2022 were analyzed. These workshops were held on the tittles of "Maritime
Critical Infrastructure Protection", "Protection of Maritime Transportation Infrastructures
(Pipelines, LNG Routes, and Subsea Cables)" and "Harbour Protection as a part of CIP&CEIP)".
For this reason, in this study paper, Maritime Critical Infrastructure, Critical Energy Infrastruc-
ture, Underwater communications cables, and Harbour Protection, which are more intensively
addressed by these workshops, are discussed as sub-headings. At the same time, MSA course
records were analyzed and included in the study.

Data Analysis
The data collected from the literature search and MARSEC COE presentations were analyzed
using content analysis. This method involved coding and categorizing the data to identify key
themes and patterns. The themes and patterns identified were used to develop a comprehen-
sive understanding of critical infrastructure protection in the maritime environment, with a
focus on critical energy infrastructure.

Key Findings
In conclusion, this study utilized a qualitative research methodology, which included a literature
search and analysis of discussions/findings MARSEC COE events, to analyze the protection of
critical infrastructure and critical energy infrastructure in the maritime environment. The study
identified various challenges and threats facing critical infrastructure in the maritime environ-
ment, including cyber threats, terrorism, hybrid strategies, and physical threats. The study also
highlighted the importance of cooperation and the need for a comprehensive and mutually
shared strategy to protect critical infrastructure in the maritime environment. NATO's strength-
ened resilience commitment and the launch of the NATO-EU Task Force on Resilient Critical
Infrastructure are examples of collective efforts that can enhance critical infrastructure protec-
tion in the maritime environment. The study also highlighted the importance of situational
awareness and risk analysis in developing a crisis early warning system for critical infrastructure
protection and suggested focusing on ensuring the safety and resilience of critical infrastructure,
beyond the protection of these fields. In this context, MARSEC COE's "Maritime Security Model-
ling Project" will enable decision-makers to better understand the MCIP issue in the coming
period.
(01)Announcement on MARSEC COE Maritime Security Modelling Project
www.marseccoe.org/2023/06/09/marsec-coe-maritime-security-modelling-project/

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

1.Introduction to
Critical Infrastructure and Maritime Critical Infrastructure

“We, as Allies, have committed to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of
energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. Any deliberate attack against
Allies’ critical infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response. ”

“We can theoretically withdraw from Lebanon; we cannot withdraw even in theory from our
reliance on the U.S. electric power grid, the computer and telephone communications systems,
or our internal transportation networks...” America’s Hidden Vulnerabilities Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), 1984

This quote reflects a common emphasis among the definitions of critical infrastructure (CI).
Although each actor, from individual to country even to international organizations, has a subjec-
tive definition of critical infrastructure, the fact that they cannot be dispensed with, let alone that
their inadequacy would cause serious problems, is the common content of the definitions of
critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure, which consists of systems that perform important
functions of a country or region and affect the life of a community, covers almost every area, from
a city's water network to the huge underwater communication cables that pass through the
Pacific. Although CI operating in such a comprehensive framework, in all areas of life and interde-
pendently, has a different sector for each country, generally accepted CI sectors are listed in
figure 1. Each CI sector is considered highly important in terms of its field of activity and the
sectors it affects. However, these include lifeline sectors usually defined as sectors that ensure
the continued operation of critical business and government functions and provide vital services
that, if compromised or not promptly reinstated, may put human health and safety or national
and economic security at risk. These industries offer products and services that are essentially
ubiquitous but can create life-threatening conditions in the event of a short-term absence. While
the four lifeline sectors may vary for each country or region, it is seen that especially the energy,
water, transportation, and communication sectors are common to many actors.

(2)Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the damage to gas pipelines’, accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.nato.in-
t/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_207733.htm .
(3)K. Ann Brown, Critical Path: A Brief History of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States, Critical Infrastructure
Protection Project, George Mason University (United States of America, 2006), 44, https://cip.gmu.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/CIPHS_CriticalPath.pdf
(4)Constance H. Lau and Beverly Scott, ‘Strengthening Regional Resilience: Final Report and Recommendations’, National
Infrastructure Advisory Council, 21 November 2013, 14. ; Carol V Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastruc-
ture Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)’, USAWC Press, November 2022, 3.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

Figure 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors

As mentioned before, each actor has a definition of CI within the scope of its own priorities and
agendas. However, specifically addressing the CI definitions of several important actors, and
NATO’s especially, is important.

“Within NATO, Critical Infrastructure is a general term describing a nation's infrastructure assets,
facilities, systems, networks, and processes that support the military, economic, political, and/or
social life on which a nation and/or NATO depends and from an Allied Command Operations
(ACO) perspective, critical infrastructure is categorized into three different sub-categories Critical
National Infrastructure (CNI), Mission-Vital Infrastructure (MVI) and Key Infrastructure (KI). ”

According to this definition, it is seen that NATO considers the concept of CI from the perspective
of allied countries on the one hand, on the other hand, it carefully focuses on CI that may create
a disadvantage for the operational power of the Alliance. Two key NATO documents published in
2022 also show traces of strategies for critical infrastructure: in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept:

“We will pursue a more robust, integrated, and coherent approach to building national and
Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges to our security,
as a national responsibility and a collective commitment rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. We will work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependen-
cies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains, and health systems.”

Similarly, the NATO 2030 document emphasizes that, in line with the CNI sub-category, neces-
sary support would be provided for the protection of CI upon the request of the allied countries
in order to increase the resilience of the alliance. Besides NATO, the EU defines CI as;

"a system or part thereof located in the Member States which is essential for the maintenance of
vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the
disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result
of the failure to maintain those functions." According to EU Council Directive 2008;

(5)‘Critical Infrastructure Facts Page’, accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.networkintegritysystems.com/critical-infrastructure.

(6)Ronald S Bearse, ‘Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Security And Resilience (CISR)’.
(7)‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’, accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pd-
f/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.
(8)‘NATO 2030: United for New Era’, 39, accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pd-
f/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.
(9)‘Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures
and the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection (Text with EEA Relevance)’, Text, https://webarchive.nationalar-
chives.gov.uk/eu-exit/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008L0114 (Queen’s Printer of Acts of
Parliament), accessed 3 January 2023, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2008/114/article/2.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

in order for the damage to the CI of an EU member state to be considered within the scope of
"European Critical Infrastructure (ECI)", the deterioration of the relevant CI must affect at least
two member states. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) uses an effective
definition of “Critical infrastructure as the life support system of our everyday existence.” and for
critical infrastructure, they emphasize that the monitoring/control facilities created by the
merger of the digital and physical worlds also pose a significant security vulnerability. For this
reason, the awareness of vulnerabilities in sectors of critical infrastructure, particularly in light of
the rising new generation threats of the current century, has prompted states to take a proactive
approach towards protecting themselves.

Within the context of the Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (MARSEC COE), CI can be
defined as the essential assets, facilities, systems, networks, and processes that support the
security, safety, and stability of maritime operations. It is possible to deal with this chain of defini-
tions initiated with international actors on the basis of countries, but these definitions will not go
beyond the repetition of similar statements since the core definition of CI in every country
includes physical/cyber systems and assets that are of vital importance to them and their inade-
quacy or destruction will have a negative impact on public health, safety, and social life, especial-
ly on the physical/economic security of the relevant country.

In other respects, similar CI elements exist with different risk potentials in various areas of the
state. One of these areas is the maritime environment. Maritime critical infrastructure (MCI) is
part of a country's national critical infrastructure. Maritime critical infrastructure protection
(MCIP) refers to measures taken to ensure the security and resilience of maritime infrastructure
essential to the functioning of a country or region. These measures include such as safeguarding
ports, shipping routes, chokepoints, offshore energy installations, Sealines of Communication
(SLOC) etc. along with ensuring the security of the information and communication infrastruc-
tures that underpin these operations. MCI constitutes one of the cornerstones of maritime
security because it plays a critical role in ensuring the safety and security of maritime operations,
and MCIP is held in a special position in the security strategies of countries since threats in the
sea area are more difficult to prevent than threats on land. Especially in the post-Cold War
period, the multidimensional transformation of security and the emergence of new threat
perceptions have necessitated the multidimensional consideration of maritime security.
Although analytically, there are three dimensions to maritime security: inter-state, maritime

(10)‘Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures
and the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection (Text with EEA Relevance)’, 2.
(11)‘The Protection of Critical Infrastructures against Terrorist Attacks: Compendium of Good Practices’, 11, accessed 4 January
2023, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.secu-
ritycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/compendium_of_good_practices_eng.pdf.
(12)Bearse, ‘Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Security And Resilience (CISR)’.
(13)Teodora Gechkova, ‘Security of Marine Critical Infrastructure’, KNOWLEDGE - International Journal 49, no. 5 (15 December
2021): 945.
(14)Salih Bıçakçı, ‘MARSEC-COE Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop’.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

terrorism, and blue crime, the complex nature of maritime security threats blurs the line
between these distinctions and requires a different perspective on maritime security. The
concept of maritime security has attracted attention in security studies after the 1990s in parallel
with the changing nature of international relations, and just like the concept of security itself, it
does not have a common definition. But, if there is a common judgment for maritime security, it
is that maritime security is not a given. In other words, it is not possible to talk about maritime
security in the natural situation and it is essential for states to monitor the maritime area for
constructing and ideally achieving Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) so that they can utilize
that awareness in pointing out and addressing potential threats or critical vulnerabilities in order
to ensure maritime security. Maritime security is also a framework concept because of the
sub-themes it contains. In this direction, maritime security has an inclusive quality that covers
the fight against all threats arising from state or non-state actors through maritime areas by
including many concepts which are defined as threats to lifeline CI in the maritime environment
such as energy security, maritime terrorism, climate change, etc. (Figure 2)

Figure 2: Threats to Lifeline Critical Infrastructure in the Maritime Environment

Along with the awareness of maritime security, the increase in academic studies and the taking
of important steps by international actors on maritime security have gained momentum,
especially in the current century. The main reason for this situation is that the incidents of
maritime terrorism, which increased in the 2000s, reinforced the collective awareness of
maritime areas. At the same time, the oceans, which have served humanity for millennia and
provided food and livelihoods to three billion people, have gained more importance, especially
with technological developments and globalization.

(15)Müge M. Akar, Aslıhan A. Kemer, and Murat Jane, ‘Good Practices in Counter Terrorism in Maritime Domain’, Seminar Report
(Istanbul, Türkiye: Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), 11 October 2022), 3–20.
(16)Arif Bağbaşlıoğlu, ‘NATO’nun Deniz Güvenliği Algısı: Süreklilik ve Değişim’, Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi 10, no. 1 (16 May 2021): 60,
https://doi.org/10.28956/gbd.843006.; ‘From Fragmented Sea Surveillance to Coordinated Maritime Situational Awareness’, 3,
accessed 6 January 2023, https://www.marseccoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/MSA_Study_Paper.pdf.; Mustafa Çakır,
‘Güvenliğin Dönüşümü ve Ulusal Güvenlik’, The Journal of Diplomacy and Strategy 3, no. 2 (2022): 264, https://dergi-
park.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2786023.
(17)‘From Fragmented Sea Surveillance to Coordinated Maritime Situational Awareness’, 3.
(18)M. Akar, A. Kemer, and Jane, ‘Good Practices in Counter Terrorism in Maritime Domain’, 23.; Arif Bağbaşlıoğlu, ‘NATO’nun Deniz
Güvenliği Algısı: Süreklilik ve Değişim’, Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi, 16 May 2021, 59, https://doi.org/10.28956/gbd.843006.
(19)Oktay Çetin and Mesut Köseoğlu, ‘A Study on the Classification of Maritime Security Threat Topics’, International Journal of
Environment and Geoinformatics 7, no. 3 (6 December 2020): 369, https://doi.org/10.30897/ijegeo.742336.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

And because of the importance placed on the maritime environment, several international
actors have placed the notion of maritime security at the forefront of their security strategies.
When NATO is analysed as one of these actors; Twenty member countries of NATO, a global actor
too, are coastal States that operate twenty ports of global relevance, and eight of the world's
twenty largest maritime countries in terms of tonnage are NATO members, four of the world's
ten largest shipping companies belong to NATO member countries, and therefore maritime
security is an existential priority of the alliance.

The evidence for this can be seen in the founding Treaty's Articles 5 and 6, which assign the
Alliance with the responsibility of collective defense and establish its area of jurisdiction. Accord-
ing to these articles, in the event of an attack on a member, their area of responsibility encom-
passes the maritime regions of the member states as well as the forces and vessels situated in
the North Atlantic area located north of the Tropic of Cancer. In parallel to this, the strategic
concept published in 2010 and the alliance's maritime strategy announced in 2011 are two
important documents showing the focus of the alliance's perspective on the maritime environ-
ment. The 2010 Strategic alongside transport Concept's wording and the title "Promoting
International Security through Cooperation" emphasize that the alliance recognizes its global
role and that NATO's core mission will remain the same as the world changes in the fight against
transatlantic global threats. The Alliance's Maritime Strategy which is announced in 2011 states
that the alliance aims to maintain flexible naval forces to counter the security threats of the 21st
century and defines the following four roles for NATO's naval forces.

1.Deterrence and collective defence;

2.Crisis management;
3.Cooperative security: Outreach through partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation;
4.Maritime security.

In fulfilling these four roles, Allies are expected to maximize the use of new technologies and
innovations, including enhanced MSA, encourage greater multinational cooperation and
resource pooling, as well as improve organizational structures, operational concepts, doctrine,
training, and education. Accordingly, in its Maritime Strategy adopted in 2011, NATO declared
that ensuring maritime security is one of the Alliance's main objectives. Similarly, in its 2022
strategic concept, maritime security is emphasized as a key to peace and prosperity and
deterring all threats in the maritime environment is set as a core mission.

In the light of all this information, the critical importance of maritime security for NATO includes
maritime critical infrastructure, as it refers to the facilities, systems, and networks necessary for
the safe and efficient operation of the maritime area. These assets include ports, shipping lanes,
oil and gas platforms, communications cables, and other infrastructure vital to the global econo-
my and the security of nations.

(20)‘While Oceans Cover 70 Per Cent of Earth’s Surface, Understanding Has Lagged, Speakers in Lisbon Dialogue Stress, Offering
Ways to Close Knowledge Gap | UN Press’, accessed 6 January 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sea2152.doc.htm.
(21)Magnus Nordenman, ‘The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century’ (Atlantic Council, June 2015), 2, https://ww-
w.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-naval-alliance-preparing-nato-for-a-maritime-century/; Bağbaşlıoğ-
lu, ‘NATO’nun Deniz Güvenliği Algısı’, 62.; Marcus Lu, ‘Ranked: The World’s Largest Container Shipping Companies’, Visual Capital-
ist, 26 July 2022, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-largest-container-shipping-companies-2022/.
(22)Bağbaşlıoğlu, ‘NATO’nun Deniz Güvenliği Algısı: Süreklilik ve Değişim’, 62–63.
(23)‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’.
(24)NATO, ‘Alliance Maritime Strategy’, NATO, accessed 6 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_-
texts_75615.htm.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

Strategies for the protection of these structures are included in the Maritime Security Operation
(MSO) concept, which is a sub-heading of the alliance's maritime strategy. (Figure 3)

Figure 3: NATO Strategic Concept and Alliance Maritime Strategy

In this direction, at the request of a NATO or non-NATO country and in accordance with
directions from the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO helps protect CI in the maritime
environment, including control of choke points. This mission, together with all its sub-core
areas of work and research (Figure 4), aims to develop an awareness of threats and hazards to
critical infrastructure, their early detection, rapid response to crises occurring at various choke
points, and the development of resistance/resilience for critical infrastructure.

Figure 4: Sub Research Areas in Maritime Critical Infrastructure 1

1. Security of supply: The strategic chokepoints of maritime energy transportation
2. Protection of maritime transportation infrastructure
3. NATO's maritime operations: Energy security in the maritime environment
4. Vulnerabilities of existing maritime infrastructure
5. Port protection as part of CIP/CEIP
6. Crisis management as Sea/Harbour

(25)‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’, 7.

(26)Sümer Kayser, ‘MARSEC-COE Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop’.
(27)NATO Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (MARSEC-COE), ‘MARSEC-COE Enlargement Brochure’, 2022, 16,
https://www.marseccoe.org/published-work/#single/0.
(28)Kayser, ‘MARSEC-COE Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop’.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

The strategies for the protection of national and international CI developed for this purpose
recognize that it is impossible to protect CI against all kinds of threats completely. In this sense,
the protection of CI is essentially a multidimensional risk management practice, and its main
objective is to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Likewise, the CI security and resilience strategy
is fundamentally based on sound risk management practices. The initial phase of Critical
Infrastructure Resilience (CISR) aims to evaluate the level of danger and subsequently imple-
ment protective measures meant to decrease that level of danger. When it comes to stakehold-
ers; CISR is first and foremost a national responsibility. Ensuring the security and resilience of
these primary functions, which ensure the basic functioning of government and society, is a
central responsibility of any state. However, in many countries, as can be seen in the case of ports
or power transmission lines, generally all sectors of national infrastructure have been privatized.
As a result, the most CI today is owned and operated by private sector businesses, so the primary
responsibility for maintaining their infrastructure lies with those businesses. Although operators
are primarily responsible for the implementation of safeguards, they usually do so in accordance
with instructions or frameworks set by public authorities. Therefore, this is an area where both
the state and the private sector need to work together. Due to the importance of the maritime
environment and its CI elements, this involves a more sophisticated process. For example, port
and maritime security is not only a maritime area security issue, but also part of a broad ecosys-
tem such as cybersecurity, energy security, and CI security. When CI in the maritime area is
considered, this ecosystem includes a much larger scale. (Figure5)

Figure 5: CIP on Maritime Environment

1. Mega-Ports & Mega Terminals
2. Offshore Platforms
3. Undersea Internet Cables
4. Oil Fields
5. Oil Rigs
6. Pipelines
7. Refineries
8. Tankers (Land and Sea)
9. Power Generation Plants
10. Chokepoints
11. Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)

As the table illustrates, MCIP is essential to ensure the security and resilience of the maritime
infrastructure that generally supports the economic activity and daily life of a country or region.
At this point, CI in the maritime area is listed mainly in the fields of energy, communication, and
transportation. Considering that more than a quarter of the oil and gas supply is produced
offshore today, 99% of international data is transported by underwater communications cables,
and 90% of international trade is carried out by sea, the importance of MCIP's focus on these
areas can be understood more clearly. In this direction, some of these points will be discussed
in detail in the following sections under the titles of Critical Energy Protection, Undersea
Communication Cables and Port Protection in parallel with the themes covered in the MARSEC
COE workshops.

(29)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)’,
7-9; Commission of The European Communities, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism’, 7.
(30)NATO, ‘Brussels Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2018)’, NATO, accessed 9 January 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.
(31)Deniz Çetikli, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection on Maritime Environment’ (Presentation, NATO MARSEC-COE, 5 December
2022).
(32)M. Akar, A. Kemer, and Jane, ‘Good Practices in Counter Terrorism in Maritime Domain’, 20.

14 www.marseccoe.org
MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

2.Ensuring Energy Security:

The Vital Role of Protecting Critical Energy Infrastructure
in the Global System
Today, energy is a lifeline CI sector that turns the wheels of the global system and plays a leading
role in every aspect of our lives. If we deepen this definition, energy contributes to the delivery of
essential goods and services that support many homes, businesses, and governments at large.
The possibility of power interruption increases the risk of life-threatening situations. Energy
forms part of a physical and electronic network that includes interdependencies with other CI
sectors, and the disruption caused by this dependency has a high potential to create new
problems by affecting other sectors. (Figure 6) From this point of view, energy is a basic require-
ment for the continuity of not only a country or region but the entire global system.

Figure 6: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Four Lifeline Sectors

Ensuring the energy security, which is in such a vital position, is a prerequisite for its protection.
At this point, the definition of the concept of "Energy Security" ranges from the narrow issues of
physical supply interruption to broader issues, including the economic, environmental, and
political consequences of changes in energy markets. For instance, the International Energy
Agency (IEA) defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an
affordable price; achieving this requires efforts to reduce risks to both internal and external
energy systems and build resilience to manage residual risks.

At this point, the concept of critical energy infrastructure (CEI) comes to the fore. CEI, which
roughly represents all systems used in the generation, distribution, supply and storage of energy;
consists of all kinds of facilities that ensure that the materials used as electricity production-dis-
tribution-transmission and fuel [coal, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG),
petroleum, nuclear energy raw materials, renewable energy sources (wind, solar, hydroelectric)]
are produced in power plants, processed into end-user products and delivered to the consumer,
and systems that ensure the management/security of processes in these facilities.

(33)‘WEO-2018 Special Report: Offshore Energy Outlook – Analysis’, IEA, accessed 9 January 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/off-
shore-energy-outlook-2018; ‘Map of the week – Submarine telecommunication cables’, European Marine Observation and Data
Network (EMODnet), 23 August 2019, https://emodnet.ec.europa.eu/en/map-week-%E2%80%93-subma-
rine-telecommunication-cables; Kayser, ‘MARSEC-COE Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop’.
(34)Evans et al,‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)’,3

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

The elements of critical energy infrastructure are not limited to fixed facilities. Especially in coun-
tries like Türkiye, where there is a high percentage of consumers and transit lines, in addition to
the pipelines used in transmission, mobile transmission vehicles are also considered among the
elements of critical energy infrastructure. The abundance of components comprising Critical
Energy Infrastructure (CEI) in this way can heighten susceptibility to various types of threats,
rendering it more susceptible to dangers compared to other critical infrastructures. For instance,
a power grid may have multiple components, such as transmission lines, substations, and power
stations that are all essential to the functioning of the system. A malicious actor may target any
of these components, causing the entire grid to fail. Therefore, the complexity and interdepen-
dency of CEI components can pose significant challenges for their security and resilience, requir-
ing a comprehensive approach to safeguarding them against potential threats. In this direction,
in the report published by the US Department of Homeland Security, the energy sector ranked
first among the attacks affecting CI with a rate of 79.32. The main reason why CEI is targeted the
most among the threats to CI is that the area of influence and therefore the destructiveness of
attacks on energy critical infrastructure is much wider than other critical infrastructure. For
instance, a cyber-attack on a power grid can cause widespread power outages that affect homes,
hospitals, businesses, transportation, and other essential services. In contrast, an attack on a
financial institution may only impact the institution's operations, with limited spillover effects.
The scale and interdependency of CEI make it a high-value target for malicious actors seeking to
disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, which can have severe economic, social, and national
security consequences. Therefore, protecting CEI against threats requires a robust and multifac-
eted approach that includes cybersecurity, physical security, emergency preparedness, and
recovery planning. Especially today, as systems grow, become smarter, and become more
connected by crossing borders, new technologies included in energy grids have invited new
generation attack methods. Therefore, CEI also has a special role in other critical infrastructures
that provide cross-border or cross-border services and thus affect the interests of many states.

Basically, threats to all CEI sectors are directly related to the national security of states. However,
especially with modernization and the use of next-generation systems, electricity stands out a
few steps from other sectors. First of all, electricity is one of the three components of total energy
production/consumption, alongside transportation and heating. Today, all other CI sectors are
heavily dependent on electricity supply (drinking and wastewater systems, food, transport and
fuel, healthcare, communications, and financial services). In addition, the awareness of the grow-
ing impacts of the climate crisis, a major challenge of our time, has revealed a strong demand for
a transition to renewable energy, which has placed an extra role on electricity. Accordingly, world
electricity generation increased by 125% from 1990 to 2019, reaching approximately 27
petawatt-hour (PWh) in 2019. In the report presented by the IEA, in order to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions to zero by 2050 and limit the increase in global temperatures to 1.5 °C within the
scope of combating the climate crisis, renewable resources, which accounted for 29% of global
electricity generation in 2020, should reach 90% in 2050. In line with this target, electricity is
expected to meet half of the total energy consumption by 2040. As electricity is the key to global
energy transmission, it has also become a cornerstone of energy security for all countries. While
any supply disruption poses critical challenges, the vulnerability of electricity systems is more
urgent.

(35)‘European Commission SUCCESS Project Report’, accessed 11 January 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/docu-

ments/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5b7096f83&appId=PPGMS.
(36)Dimitrios Dalaklis, ‘Marine Energy Transport Infrastructure Conservation Challenges: Educated Predictions for the Future’;
‘Energy Security – Topics’, IEA, accessed 11 January 2023, https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security.
(37)Uğur Özker, ‘Türkiye’de Kritik Altyapı ve Siber Güvenlik’ (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Türkiye, November 2022), 11, https://ww-
w.kas.de/documents/283907/283956/KAS+x-
+EDAM_%C3%96zker_T%C3%BCrkiye%27de+Kritik+Altyap%C4%B1+ve+Siber+G%C3%BCvenlik.pdf/d9da96b2-8bdf-36d3-96d9-012b
929c9a88?version=1.1&t=1669892363991.
(38)Bilge Karabacak, ‘USAK Kritik Altyapı Güvenliği Projesi Sonuç Raporu’, 58, accessed 13 January 2023, https://www.aca-
demia.edu/21583796/USAK_Kritik_Altyap%C4%B1_G%C3%BCvenli%C4%9Fi_Projesi_Sonu%C3%A7_Raporu.
(39)Defender Project, ‘Defending the European Energy Infrastructures’ (Europian Commission, 7 November 2017), 7, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5b7096f83&appId=PPGMS.
(40)‘Grid Resilience: Priorities for the Next Administration’, 5, accessed 12 January 2023, https://gridresilience.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/11/NCGR-Report-2020-Full-v2.pdf.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

At this point, a confronting reality emerges; while electrification is more important in the twen-
ty-first century, including the West world’s electricity infrastructure global energy systems
remain a product of the twentieth century, posing new strategic challenges to collective thinking
about security and resilience. Of course, this sensitivity emphasized for electricity also applies to
other critical energy sectors. Herein, a dilemma emerges. In the pursuit of energy system
modernization and the establishment of interconnected industrial control systems (ICS), states
encounter a paradox. While aiming to align with the demands of the twenty-first century, they
inadvertently expose CI to a heightened risk of threats. These threats, capable of impairing the
security and functionality of critical energy infrastructure, can be categorized into two overarch-
ing domains: natural occurrences and human-made incidents. Examples of such threats encom-
pass information warfare, terrorist attacks, cyber-attacks, technology espionage, accidents, as
well as force majeure events including earthquakes, fires, floods, and other natural disasters.
(Figure 7)

Figure 7: Threat sources for critical infrastructure

When we evaluated the Colonial pipeline in the USA (2021), Triton in Saudi Arabia (2017), and the
blackout attacks against Ukraine's electricity systems, see that cyber threats were used more
intensively in activities related to critical energy infrastructure recently. This is mainly due to the
fact that electricity, oil, gas, and other services are becoming increasingly data-dependent on
automated controls to operate their grids.These infrastructure systems are nowadays managed
and included in automation with fully automated capabilities through interconnected network
systems with the support of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA)/ Distributed Control Systems (DCS) / Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLAC)] sensors.

(41)‘Critical Infrastructure Resilience: stronger rules’, Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed 12 January
2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_6238.
(42)Mithat Çelikpala, ‘Marine Energy Transport Infrastructure Conservation Challenges: Educated Predictions for the Future’
(43)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)’,
104.
(44)‘Net Zero by 2050 – Analysis’, IEA, accessed 14 January 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.
(45)NATO, ‘Energy security’, NATO, accessed 13 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm.
(46)‘Pathway to critical and formidable goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 is narrow but brings huge benefits, according to IEA
special report - News’, IEA, accessed 13 January 2023, https://www.iea.org/news/pathway-to-critical-and-formida-
ble-goal-of-net-zero-emissions-by-2050-is-narrow-but-brings-huge-benefits.
(47)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)’,
103–4.
(48)Hazar Strateji Enstitüsü Hasen, ‘Kritik Enerji Altyapı Güvenliği El Kitabı’, 13, accessed 14 January 2023, https://www.aca-
demia.edu/10027314/Kritik_Enerji_Altyap%C4%B1_G%C3%BCvenli%C4%9Fi_El_Kitab%C4%B1.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

Many modern power generation plants and organizations rely on data networks to manage
meters and analyze their customers' data. The operational processes, control rooms, substations,
instrumentation, refineries, and pipelines used to manage facilities now rely on fully digital,
video-enabled, high-speed data connections. To manage these processes, data and analyt-
ics-centric power generation facilities often use the digital capabilities and analytical tools they
have gained in recent years in their core processes such as resource allocation, production
optimization, safety control, preventive maintenance, and supply chain planning. For this reason,
digitalization is increasingly making the energy sector a more potential target for cyber-attacks.
Aside from the dilemmas posed by energy in our age, in a study which is analyzing energy securi-
ty, not mentioning maritime energy security and critical energy infrastructure in the maritime
environment leads to an incomplete handling of the subject. Maritime infrastructure has grown
in several new ways in recent decades. Among the most important changes is the seas’ increas-
ing role as a source of energy. In the past, the concept of energy security developed as a result of
the need to secure the physical infrastructure and resources of energy. Maritime energy security
is an important field that combines energy security and maritime security. Today, however,
energy security has taken on the shape of a multidimensional discipline that includes both
internal and external actions. Today, when maritime security and energy security are considered,
it is important to blend different dimensions and, therefore, to realize and implement political,
economic and security measures together.

At this point, the maritime environment includes trade routes, choke points, ships, ports, termi-
nals, pipelines, oil and gas platforms and other critical infrastructure. (Figure 5) Disruption of
maritime transport routes and the emergence of threats to maritime security also affect access
to maritime energy resources and the security of maritime transport of energy resources. An
increasing proportion of energy resources - both oil and liquefied natural gas - are produced
offshore and transported by sea. Today, fossil fuels account for more than a third of global
maritime trade and half of the world's oil is transported by tankers due to the containerization of
international trade. Likewise, LNG is being transported by increasingly larger ships and the
increasing share of energy in maritime transport has made maritime transport a cornerstone of
globalization. This means that countries are increasingly dependent on the security of
energy-critical infrastructure in the maritime environment, which is vulnerable to a range of
threats, including terrorist attacks, piracy, and natural disasters.

As in other CI sectors, there are many threat factors affecting energy security and critical energy
infrastructure in the maritime environment. Threat factors and threats are two related but
distinct concepts when it comes to critical energy infrastructure and energy security. Threat
factors are the underlying conditions or circumstances that create the potential for a threat to
occur. For example, a country with a history of political instability or terrorist activity might be
considered a threat factor to critical energy infrastructure because it creates an environment
where an attack on energy infrastructure is more likely to occur. On the other hand, threats are
specific events or actions that pose a risk to critical energy infrastructure and energy security.
These can include physical attacks, cyberattacks, natural disasters, or other incidents that can
disrupt energy supply or cause damage to energy infrastructure.

(49)Hasen, ‘Kritik Enerji Altyapı Güvenliği El Kitabı’.

Aurora Vulnerability is malicious use of a protective relay or other protection and control device to inflict an out of sync condition
that results in physical damage to rotational equipment. Abrupt opening and closing of the protective circuit changes the
behaviour of the relay from providing maximum protection to inflicting maximum damage. (Presentation, Energy Security
Awareness Course, PfP Training Centre)
(50)H. Ömer Tunca, ‘Defence Industry Infrastructure Protection from Terrorist Attacks: Turkish Experience’ (Presentation, Critical
Infrastructure Protection from Terrorist Attacks Course, COE-DAT, n.d.).
(51)Özker, ‘Türkiye’de Kritik Altyapı ve Siber Güvenlik’, 11.
(52)‘Maritime Trade: Embracing the Ocean: Delivering the Trade Benefits of the National Shipbuilding Strategy Refresh’, n.d.,
(53)Çetikli, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection on Maritime Environment’.
(54)NATO, ‘Emerging Threats to Maritime Energy Infrastructure’, NATO, accessed 14 January 2023, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/na-
tohq/news_124544.htm.
(55)Caner Öğütçü, ‘MARSEC-COE Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop’.
(56)Çelikpala, ‘Marine Energy Transport Infrastructure Conservation Challenges: Educated Predictions for the Future’.
(57)Çetikli, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection on Maritime Environment’.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

Terrorist attacks are among these threats. Terrorist attacks pose a serious threat, especially to the
waters where energy transport is carried out, areas where offshore energy is extracted, and
chokepoints. There is a certain order in the supply-demand process of energy in the world. In
order to deliver the energy leaving the supplier as soon as possible, routes with various strategic
transit points are used. The points of importance include a passage intensively used for the Asian
market, through which 16 million barrels pass daily, another passage connecting the Persian Gulf
and the Sea of Oman, through which 21 million barrels pass daily, and a third passage, which
plays an important role in the energy transported to Europe, 3.2 million barrels pass daily. (Figure
8) Any terrorist attack on the critical transit routes shown on the map carries a high risk of
causing a global crisis. An attack on a maritime chokepoint could disrupt shipping traffic, leading
to delays in the delivery of goods and increased transportation costs. This could also lead to a
reduction in global trade and a rise in commodity prices.

Figure 8: The World's Key Maritime Chokepoints

For example, an attack on the Strait of Hormuz, which is a critical chokepoint for the transporta-
tion of oil from the Middle East to the rest of the world, could cause a spike in oil prices and have
significant economic consequences for many countries that rely on oil imports. Likewise, the
impact of terrorist attacks on offshore energy platforms will have a much larger multiplier than
an attack on land. In this context, special underwater acoustic systems are required to monitor
the sea area where the plant is located continuously. This monitoring activity should be carried
out both with the underwater acoustic systems of the power plant itself and with the elements
of the country's own navy as a whole. Another factor affecting maritime energy security is
climate. Climate is an important threat factor that makes its effects on CI felt more and more day
by day. One of the world's largest container ships crashed into the shore of the Suez Canal on 24
March 2021 due to poor visibility caused by sandstorms and bad weather conditions. The ship
named Ever Given, owned by Evergreen, caused the traffic in the Suez Canal to be closed for six
days despite long efforts. During this period, approximately 400 ships waited for the opening of
the canal, and the ships that changed their routes traveled through Africa and reached their
destination ten days late. While this experience shows the necessity of an update in the content
of the critical infrastructure, it has also necessitated a review of the CI in the maritime environ-
ment. Because the climate is not the only factor in the Ever Given incident but also the narrow
channel and the lack of adjunct measures that can continue the process without interruption in
case of obstruction. Where threats to the security of the maritime environment are mentioned,
it is not possible to ignore piracy activities as a blue criminal element. On 15 November 2008, the
supertanker Sirius Star was carrying 2 million barrels (320,000 m³ ) of crude oil when it was
hijacked by Somali pirates 450 nautical miles (833 km) southeast of the Kenyan coast. The pirates
had set a 10-day deadline and demanded a ransom of USD 25 million.

(58)’Ever Given: an Example of How Complex International Liability for Damages Can Be’, accessed 14 January 2023, https://ww-
w.ibanet.org/ever-given-international-liability-damages.
(59)Öğütçü, ‘MARSEC-COE Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop’.
(60)M. Akar, A. Kemer, and Jane, ‘Good Practices in Counter Terrorism in Maritime Domain’, 3.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

The ship and crew were released after a ransom payment of USD 3 million. Similarly, on 18
January 2014, MT Kerala, a 75,000-tonne tanker, disappeared off the coast of Angola. A pirate
gang hijacked the vessel, disabled its identification system and communications equipment,
and painted over its identifying markings. More than a week later and 1,300 miles away, the
pirates released Kerala off the coast of Nigeria after unloading 12,270 tons of diesel cargo to their
other vessels. In addition to physical threats to energy critical infrastructure in the maritime
environment, emerging cyber threats actually represent a framework concept for threats to all
critical infrastructure. Therefore, given the breadth of maritime activities related to the energy
sector, cyber security concerns can be grouped in many different ways, just as in other areas. In
this study, cyber threats to critical energy infrastructure in the maritime environment are listed
as follows:

1. Human Error or Human Ignorance: This type of cyber-attack occurs when

crew members make mistakes or lack awareness of cybersecurity risks. For example,
they may click on malicious links or download untrusted software on ship systems,
leaving vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cybercriminals.
2. Fraud: This type of cyber-attack involves attempts to deceive crew members
into disclosing sensitive information or redirecting payments through phishing or scam-
ming. Cybercriminals may pose as legitimate entities and trick crew members into
giving them access to sensitive information or diverting payments.
3. Attacks to Facilitate Crime: In this type of cyber-attack, hackers gain unau-
thorized access to ship systems to steal data, funds, or resources for criminal purposes.
These attacks can include maritime theft or piracy and can have significant economic
and security implications.
4. Navigational Attacks: Navigational attacks involve manipulating or spoofing
computer systems to interfere with navigation. This can include altering Automatic
Identification System (AIS) data or Global Positioning System (GPS)of signals, which can
have serious safety implications for ships and crew members.
5. Operational Attacks: This type of cyber-attack involves disrupting systems to
impair a ship's functioning. For example, cybercriminals may take control of ship
systems or disable engines, which can prevent the ship from operating properly.
6. Indiscriminate Attacks: These attacks are large-scale malware or hacking
attempts that affect numerous ships or companies in a generalized manner. These
attacks are often used to create botnets or mine cryptocurrency using ship resources.
7. Hybrid Attacks: These attacks involve combining multiple attack techniques,
such as operational disruption, navigational manipulation, and ransomware. Cybercrimi-
nals may use these attacks to cause widespread damage to ship systems or steal sensi-
tive information.
8. Infrastructure Attacks: In this type of cyber-attack, cyber criminals target
foundational maritime technologies like AIS, GPS, or communication systems that ships
rely on. Disrupting these systems can cause significant problems for ship operations and
crew safety.
9. Future Concerns: Emerging attack techniques or technologies that may
become more prevalent in the future, such as AI-powered or quantum computing
attacks on ship systems. These attacks could have serious implications for the safety and
security of the maritime environment.
10. Hybrid Aggression: This type of cyber-attack refers to coordinated cyber and
physical attacks against ships or ports by an adversary. These attacks can have signifi-
cant economic and security implications and may involve multiple actors working
together to achieve their goals.

(61)Jo Adetunji, ‘Hijacked Saudi Oil Tanker Sirius Star on the Move’, The Guardian, 9 January 2009, sec. World news, https://www.-
theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/09/somalia-pirates-supertanker-ransom.
(62)Çetikli, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection on Maritime Environment’.
(63)A botnet is a network of compromised computers, controlled by a single entity, used for malicious purposes. Infected
computers, or "bots," receive commands from a central server to carry out various cyberattacks, such as spamming, DDoS
attacks, and data theft.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

The concept of cybersecurity threats is relatively new for both maritime and energy sectors. The
newness and complexity of the critical energy infrastructure in the maritime environment are
vulnerable to cyber threats. While the maritime environment is the new playground for cyber
attackers, computerized maritime systems are highly vulnerable to cyber threats. This situation
reveals cyber threats to the wider sector by focusing on various areas:

1. Harbour / Ports
2. Navigation
3. Rigs
4. Company’s Offices / Headquarters (HQ)
5. Threats to maritime vessels
All major systems on ships, submarines, and unmanned vehicles are networked to some extent.
Twenty years ago, ships were thought to be isolated, but today this threat is increasing. The
privatization of systems and the involvement of non-public actors in energy transport have
necessitated joint measures by governments and private sector stakeholders against cyber
threats. Cyber-attacks on the maritime sector's operational technology (OT) systems have
increased by 900 percent in the last three years, with the number of reported incidents
reaching record volumes by the end of the year. Cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly
common due to the attractive conveniences they offer, and the relatively low risks involved.
Developing resilience against cyber threats is becoming more and more important every day.

The bottom line, protecting offshore infrastructure, energy resources and the security of
shipping over the seas affects energy supply security. The security of world coastlines adjacent
to major sea lanes of communications necessitates the sustainment of maritime security and
they are the ways to have a better energy flow. Awareness is needed to ensure maritime
security in energy transportation. Thus, awareness and resilience toward potential risks and
threats will be developed. At this point, it is important to be aware of the following four hypoth-
esis:
1. No state or alliance has the capacity and capability to establish and maintain
maritime security alone,
2. Once lost, it takes a long and difficult process to restore and maintain,
3. International cooperation and coordination are a must,
4. And the global partnership of regionally provided securities is vital.

Looking at the analyzed concepts from a NATO perspective, it is seen that energy security plays
an important role in the collective security of NATO Allies. This situation was formally defined at
the Bucharest Summit in 2008 and has since been strengthened:

“We have noted a report ‘NATO’s Role in Energy Security’, prepared in response to the
tasking of the Riga Summit. Allies have identified principles that will govern NATO’s
approach in this field and outlined options and recommendations for further activities.
Based on these principles, NATO will engage in the following fields: information and intelli-
gence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional
cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of
critical energy infrastructure”.

(64)Ian Ralby and Bochman, ‘Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain’, Atlantic Council (blog), 6
December 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/is-
sue-brief/cybersecurity-concerns-for-the-energy-sector-in-the-maritime-domain/.; Deniz Çetikli, ‘Cyber Intelligence in MSO’.
(65)Dalaklis, ‘Marine Energy Transport Infrastructure Conservation Challenges: Educated Predictions for the Future’.
(66)Çetikli, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection on Maritime Environment’.
(67)Çelikpala, ‘Marine Energy Transport Infrastructure Conservation Challenges: Educated Predictions for the Future’.
(68)NATO, ‘Déclaration du Sommet de Bucarest publiée par les chefs d’État et de gouvernement des pays membres de l’OTAN
(2008)’, NATO, accessed 15 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm.
(69)NATO, ‘Riga Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2006)’, NATO, accessed 15 January 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm.
(70)‘NATO Strategic Concept 2010’, 17, accessed 15 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publi-
cations/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.
(71)Fresh Media, ‘Legal information | NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence’, Legal information | NATO Energy Security
Centre of Excellence, accessed 15 January 2023, https://enseccoe.org/en/legal-information/352.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

For NATO, energy security has gradually become a priority area. Although the alliance has
accepted the importance of energy security since the Riga summit, it has come to the forefront
of the Alliance agenda, in parallel with the developments in the conjuncture. In this context,
NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept underlined that the alliance will contribute to strengthening
critical energy infrastructure as a stakeholder in energy security. After the Chicago Summit in
2012, the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSEC COE) was established in Lithuania
in 2012. The Wales summits in 2014 was the summits that emphasized the importance of energy
security awareness, energy efficiency and protection of critical energy infrastructure for NATO as
well as energy security. In the Madrid Summit which convened in the shadow of Russia's
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and its energy challenge to NATO countries, addressed the
themes of energy security, diversification of energy supply and reliable energy supply to NATO's
military forces. In the Strategic Concept 2022 adopted at the Madrid Summit, the Allies agreed
to invest in capabilities to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of political,
economic, energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. After all these develop-
ments, it is possible to say that energy security constitutes a vital element of resilience for NATO.
Accordingly, NATO has divided its role in energy security into three main areas:

1. Raising energy security awareness includes intelligence-sharing on energy devel-

opment, political consultations among Allies, as well as among Allies and partners, and
exchanges with outside experts.
2. Supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure is mainly about sharing
best practices among experts, organizing training courses, and inserting energy-related scenar-
ios into exercises.
3. Enhancing energy efficiency in the military includes the sharing of national best
practices, demonstrations of energy-efficient equipment, and the development of military
energy efficiency standards.

CEI, is defined by NATO as one of the most vulnerable assets in conflict areas. While it is primarily
the responsibility of national governments, as in all critical infrastructure, NATO aims to develop
joint strategies to increase the awareness and resilience of its Allies regarding critical energy
infrastructure. In this context, the Alliance aims to increase its competence in supporting the
protection of critical energy infrastructure mainly through training and exercises. NATO also
conducts exercises and shares best practices with partner countries, international organizations,
and the private sector, many of which are major energy producers or transit countries. In this
regard, the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Regional Centre in Kuwait has been
hosting a course on the protection of critical energy infrastructure since 2018. “Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection in Maritime Domain Course (MOP-MO-25575)” is being held by the NATO-accred-
ited Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (MARSEC COE) in İstanbul/Türkiye, and “Advanced &
Basic Level Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Against Terrorist Attacks Courses
(ACT.397.1 / ACT.936.1)” are executed by the Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism (COE
DAT) in Ankara/Türkiye. When we consider maritime security, energy security and NATO's
perspective, a relatively new concept emerges: Hybrid threats. Hybrid threats, a concept of the
current century, are generally used to describe activities carried out by state or non-state actors
below the threshold of war in order to weaken or harm a target through various means. The
range of tools of hybrid threats is so wide that it includes a wide variety of elements ranging from
economic coercion, espionage activities and cyber-attacks to the use of paramilitary elements. In
this context, attacks on energy security and critical energy infrastructure also fall within the
scope of hybrid threats. Recognizing this, in 2020, the NATO Science and Technology Board
officially approved the creation of a research task group that will focus on energy security in the
era of hybrid warfare. Thus, it was aimed to identify implicit targets for critical energy infrastruc-
ture.

(72)NATO, ‘Chicago Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2012)’, NATO, accessed 15 January
2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm; NATO, ‘Wales Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of
State and Government (2014)’, NATO, accessed 15 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
(73)NATO, ‘Madrid Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2022)’, NATO, accessed 15 January
2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm.
(74)‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’
(75)‘NATO Review - Energy security: a critical concern for Allies and partners’, NATO Review, 26 July 2018, https://www.nato.in-
t/docu/review/articles/2018/07/26/energy-security-a-critical-concern-for-allies-and-partners/index.html.
(76)NATO, ‘Energy security’.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

The importance of critical energy infrastructure for NATO is hidden in the opportunities it
provides to allies, and the advantages it will provide to competitors in case of damage. At this
point, CEI presents potential targets, which could provide an adversary with tempting advantag-
es such as:
1. Disrupting the energy supply just when an unfriendly government does
something that is likely to draw NATO’s response;
2. Contributing to service disruptions in civilian infrastructure on which the
military depends and which may undermine social cohesion;
3. Showing their destructive capabilities to intimidate.

For another reference on critical energy infrastructure in the maritime environment, it is

sufficient to refer to NATO's 2011 maritime strategy document. The document emphasizes the
role of naval forces in contributing to energy security, including the protection of critical energy
infrastructure and maritime lines of communication;” The maintenance of the freedom of
navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, energy flows, protection of marine
resources and environmental safety are all in Allies’ security interests.” Furthermore, one of the
seven areas identified in the NATO Maritime Security Operations (MSO) Concept is the protec-
tion of critical infrastructure, and the planning and execution of NATO MSO-related activities in
support of CIP are considered in line with the principles and guidelines for NATO's role in
energy security. It is accepted that the protection of CI is a key component in the field of energy
security, and information management and sharing in this regard plays an important role in
determining the best practices to be applied within NATO. In addition, one of the characteristics
of maritime security operations organized by NATO is that they can prevent or deter hostile
actions that may affect energy security. In this context, Operation Allied Protector launched in
2009 to enhance maritime security in the waters off the Horn of Africa and Ocean Shield
launched in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean against piracy and armed robbery were
conducted. Currently Operation Sea Guardian, which has the potential to include all MSO
missions, has been carried out in the maritime environment by NATO member countries.
While NATO is a security alliance, energy-related developments such as supply disruptions can
change the international security environment and have far-reaching security implications for
some members. As a result, NATO closely monitors relevant energy trends and developments
and seeks to increase strategic awareness in this area. This includes consultations on energy
security among allies and partner countries, intelligence sharing, workshops, table-top exercis-
es, and specific activities such as briefings by external experts.

(77)‘NATO DERGİSİ - Hibrit savaş döneminde enerji güvenliği’, NATO Review, 13 January 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/re-
view/tr/articles/2021/01/13/hibrit-savas-doeneminde-enerji-guevenligi/index.html.
(78)‘NATO Review - Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare’, NATO Review, 13 January 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/re-
view/articles/2021/01/13/energy-security-in-the-era-of-hybrid-warfare/index.html.
(79)NATO, ‘Alliance Maritime Strategy’.
(80)NATO, ‘Counter-piracy operations (2008-2016)’, NATO, accessed 10 May 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/top-
ics_48815.htm; ‘Operation OCEAN SHIELD’, mc.nato.int, accessed 15 January 2023, https://mc.nato.int/missions/opera-
tion-ocean-shield.aspx.
(81)NATO, ‘Operation Sea Guardian’, NATO, accessed 15 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm.

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3.Protecting the World's Information Super-Highways:

The Importance of Securing Underwater Communication
Cables in the Digital Age

The world today is interconnected like never before, with the internet serving as the backbone of
global communication, commerce, and information exchange. However, hidden beneath the
vast oceans that span our planet's surface lies a critical yet often overlooked infrastructure that
enables this interconnectedness: underwater communication cables. These cables, also known
as the "Seabed Highways" or “The World's Information Super-Highways” with 552 active cables
today carry more than 98% of international data traffic, cover the globe like a spider web, play a
significant role in the transfer of this data and allowing us to send emails, make phone calls,
stream videos, and access information from anywhere in the world in milliseconds. (Figure9)
As our reliance on the internet continues to grow exponentially, the security of these underwater
communication cables has become paramount. In the digital age, where cyber threats loom
large, safeguarding these cables has become a critical task to protect economies, national
security, and daily lives from potential disruption and chaos.

Figure 9: Submarine Cable Map

Underwater communications cables are the technology of choice for rapidly transferring large
substantial amounts of data around the world. In addition to underwater cables, satellites are
also actively used in data exchange, which accounts for only 1% of data exchange, are costly, and
carry data much slower than underwater cables. When comparing underwater communications
cables to satellite communication systems, several significant differences become apparent.
Underwater cables offer substantial advantages in terms of cost and capacity, with costs estimat-
ed to be four times lower and capacity up to twenty times higher than satellite systems. These
advantages make underwater cables a popular choice for long-distance communication
networks.

(82)Jonathan Hillman, ‘Securing the Subsea Network A Primer for Policymakers’ (The Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), March 2021), 3, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publi-
cation/210309_Hillman_Subsea_Network_1.pdf?1c7RFgLM3w3apMi0eAPl2rPmqrNNzvwJ.
(83)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook
1)’, 93; TeleGeography, ‘Submarine Cable FAQs’, accessed 16 January 2023, https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-ca-
ble-faqs-frequently-asked-questions.
According to NATO, Critical Undersea Infrastructure defines some systems that underpin vital services, including communica-
tions and energy, connecting countries across the globe, mostly via undersea cables. In this direction, NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg announced on 15 February 2023 the creation of a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at NATO
Headquarters.
(84)‘Submarine Cable Map’, accessed 27 February 2023, https://infoworldmaps.com/submarine-cable-map.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

In recent years, satellite internet initiatives such as Starlink, Kuiper, or Telesat have emerged with
a primary objective of providing internet access to underdeveloped regions where underwater
cables are not feasible or to populations in places where the internet supply has been cut off.
These satellite systems can provide internet coverage in remote or underserved areas, including
rural or isolated communities, aircraft, and ships, bringing connectivity to areas that previously
lacked reliable internet access. This has the potential to bridge the digital divide and empower
communities with access to information, education, and economic opportunities. For instance,
satellite internet played a crucial role in Iran and Ukraine when their internet supply was disrupt-
ed due to political unrest or conflicts. Satellite internet systems provided a lifeline for communi-
cation, enabling people to stay connected, access critical information, and communicate with
the outside world during these challenging times.

On the other hand, in parallel with the increase in data and usage areas, especially after the
Covid-19 period, the laying of underwater cables has been focused on much more intensively
than ever before. In addition to a similar rate of data growth demand in the coming years, band-
width demand is expected to double every two years with the transition to cloud service and the
spread of 5G networks. This is because modern communications require substantially more
bandwidth than what telegram lines could offer in the nineteenth century. In order to transmit
such a massive influx of data, submarine, and terrestrial cables are now composed of fiber optics.
Information and data are transmitted as light pulses, which are rapidly emitted through glass
fibers across continental telecommunications lines and then between coastal landing stations as
the signal travels across the oceans. Such long-haul transmissions also require periodic signal
regeneration through amplifiers embedded in the cables’ couplers (where lengths of cable are
joined together) to ensure that the signal does not dissipate before reaching its destination. In
this process, the planning, production, laying, and maintenance of underwater cables are almost
entirely in the hands of the private sector. The four largest suppliers as of 2022 are Alcatel Under-
water Communications Networks (France), SubCom (USA), NEC (Japan), and newcomer Huawei
Marine Networks (China). While network operators have traditionally been the main investors in
underwater communications cables, more recently content providers GAFAMs (Google, Amazon,
Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) have also been expanding their investments in this sector to
enable the interconnection of data centers. Laying underwater communications cables is a very
costly process and processes are usually carried out by establishing consortia. An underwater
communications cable can pass through several countries at the same time, so the planning
process of cables that will pass through areas with territorial disputes such as the South China
Sea can be contentious. Climate change and natural disasters such as earthquakes which will
cause damage to the cable planning process, are other factors to be considered. As a result, it is
aimed to establish a flexible system that can transfer under all conditions and adapt to the
increase in demand.In this point, considering the confidentiality and importance of the data it
carries, underwater cables are as important as other CI such as oil, gas, or electricity. Almost all
government traffic, including sensitive diplomatic and military orders, use such cables to reach
officials in the field. This situation reveals the necessity of managing and protecting the global
underwater communications cable network. On the other hand, aside from the risks and vulner-
abilities of these cables, their potential to foster new forms of tension and conflict is too import-
ant to ignore.

(85)Rona Rita David, ‘Submarine Cables: Risks and Security Threats’, Energy Industry Review (blog), 25 March 2022, https://ener-
gyindustryreview.com/analysis/submarine-cables-risks-and-security-threats/.
(86)Alan Mauldin, ‘The Criticality of Submarine Telecommunications Cables’ (Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection
Workshop, NATO MARSEC COE, 30 March 2022).
(87)‘Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security’, accessed 16 January 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/in-
visible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlantic-security.
(88)‘Factsheet: Submarine Cables – Maritime Awareness Project’, accessed 16 January 2023, https://map.nbr.org/2018/07/subma-
rine-cables/.
(89)Jonathan Kim, ‘Submarine Cables: the Invisible Fiber Link Enabling the Internet’, Dgtl Infra (blog), 5 May 2022, https://dgtlin-
fra.com/submarine-cables-fiber-link-internet/.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

To date, networks have been considered mainly in narrow, technical terms, despite their impor-
tance for national and international security, geopolitics, state-building, and the development of
societies. For this reason, it is possible to say that similar sensitivities have not been shown to
underwater communications cables as other critical infrastructures when considering the
threats that arise at the point of protection of cables. At least 100-150 underwater cables with a
working life of about 25 years are damaged due to accidents or intentional attacks every year. In
other words, cable failure occurs on average every three days in any part of the world. Although
the number of these accidents, which are mostly caused by fishing and maritime activities, is
small, the effects of malicious activities such as piracy are significant.

Figure 10: Causes of Underwater Communications Cables Faults

As can be seen from the figure, damages to underwater communications cables are divided into
three categories environmental and human-activity induced and other related to technological
faults (component failure and other defects). (Figure 10) Climate and natural events, which are in
the environmental category, are one of the relatively low probability threats to underwater
communications cables, but the damage caused by earthquakes has had a devastating effect.
For example, the 6.7 magnitude earthquake on 26 December 2006 triggered a submarine
landslide near the junction of the Eurasian and Philippine tectonic plates. The epicenter of the
event called the Hengchun earthquake, was located in the middle of the heavily cable-lined
Luzon Strait off Taiwan. Submarine landslides following the earthquake severed 9 of the 11 cables
in the area, moving them away from their original routes. The work started with eleven cable
ships to repair the systems took 49 days to complete. During this period, especially the Asian
markets, where the economic flow was fast, remained without the Internet for a long time. This
event has been an experience for cable planners to consider seismic points before planning. One
of the most common concerns about the destruction of underwater communications cables is
the biting of cables by sharks. Although there have been a few biting incidents on cables on the
seabed, sharks do not pose a threat to underwater cables.

(90)‘Invisible and Vital’.

(91)Hillman, ‘Securing the Subsea Network A Primer for Policymakers’.
(92)‘Cyberspace In Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communication Cables’, 4, accessed 16 January 2023, https://www.belfer-
center.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/PAE_final_draft_-_043010.pdf.
(93)Ferhat M. Ertosun, ‘“Protection of Maritime Transportation Infrastructure” (Pipelines, LNG Routes and Subsea Cables)’
(Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection (MCIP) Workshop, NATO MARSEC COE, 30 March 2022).
(94)Alan Mauldin, ‘Cable Breakage: When and How Cables Go Down’, accessed 16 January 2023, https://blog.telegeogra-
phy.com/what-happens-when-submarine-cables-break.
(95)TeleGeography, ‘Submarine Cable FAQs’.
(96)‘Cyberspace In Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communication Cables’, 117.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

More than half of the damage to underwater communications cables is caused by ship anchors
and fishing nets. In the face of this high rate, cable planners prefer to bury cables on the seabed
in fishing grounds to minimize risks. At the same time, there are also actors who take measures
within the framework of their laws for the protection of underwater communications cables. For
example, Australia and New Zealand have introduced legislation to prevent fishing and damage
to cables in the areas through which the cables pass and have strengthened them with
sanctions. Disconnections in the event of a cable break are usually compensated for by the
supply from other cables; because in most places there are at least two cable systems connected
in a ring. However, the situation is not very encouraging for countries that depend on a single
underwater communications cable. For example, this happened in Pakistan on 27 June 2005,
when the only underwater communications cable connecting the country to the rest of the
world was cut due to the entanglement of the anchor of a fishing boat. In the absence of a
replacement cable or any recovery strategy, nearly 10 million online subscribers in Pakistan were
without internet for more than a week. As can be understood from this example, underwater
communications cables are like cotton threads that provide our communication with the world,
and if they break, the lack of another thread to replace them has the potential to cause irrevers-
ible damage. In addition to these unintentional human-induced activities, there are deliberate
cable-cutting activities, albeit at a lower rate, but their effects are high. These are divided into two
categories: sabotage and espionage.

In 2007, an important example of sabotage was when Vietnamese fishermen cut an underwater
communications cable to buy and resell composite materials. Vietnam thus lost almost 90
percent of its connectivity with the rest of the world for three weeks. Unintentional threats to
underwater communications cables are repairable and their destructive effects are tolerable. The
main risk to them is the malicious and deliberate activities carried out by state or non-state
actors aiming to harm the direct security of states. Though intentional obstruction of connectivi-
ty is illegal under international law, today, these activities targeting underwater cables are
happening in struggles below the threshold of war under the umbrella of grey zone strategies
and hybrid threats. In general, hybrid threats conducted against democratic states by their
non-democratic rivals, are a set of corrosive activities that infiltrate the boundaries of internation-
al law and are highly deniable. Cyberspace and the maritime environment are potential places
for such strategies. This is because the breadth of these domains and the large number of differ-
ent public and private actors involved make attribution of attacks or damage difficult and blur
the line between activities. The threat potential posed by the secrecy and operational risk of the
data carried by underwater cables has also been taken seriously by NATO as an actor focusing on
hybrid threats. From NATO's point of view, underwater communications cables are a significant
risk, with the possibility of becoming a military target at any time. Aware of this situation, NATO
discussed the issues of underwater communications cables and critical maritime infrastructure
at the Defence Ministers meeting held on 22 October 2020, and Secretary General Jens Stolten-
berg made a press statement after the meeting and stated that threats to underwater cables
were taken seriously and closely monitored. In the declaration of the Brussels Summit held in
2021 NATO made this statement;

“We continue to reinforce our maritime posture and to protect our sea lines of communication.
We welcome the establishment of the NATO Maritime Security Centre of Excellence in Türkiye.
We will maintain awareness of any potential threats to our critical submarine infrastructure and
will continue to address them nationally and, where needed, collectively.”

(97)‘TeleGeography, ‘Submarine Cable FAQs’.

(98)‘ICPC International Call to Action for COVID-19’, 6 April 2020, https://subtelforum.com/icpc-international-call-to-ac-
tion-for-covid-19/.
(99)Hillman, ‘Securing the Subsea Network A Primer for Policymakers’, 8.
(100) ‘Cyberspace In Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communication Cables’, 113.
(101)‘Strategic Importance of, and Dependence on, Undersea Cables’, accessed 17 January 2023, https://ccdcoe.org/up-
loads/2019/11/Undersea-cables-Final-NOV-2019.pdf.
(102)David, ‘Submarine Cables’.
(103)Lane Burdette, ‘Leveraging Submarine Cables for Political Gain: U.S. Responses to Chinese Strategy’, Journal of Public and
International Affairs, accessed 18 January 2023, https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/leveraging-submarine-ca-
bles-political-gain-us-responses-chinese-strategy.

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 MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

In rapid response to the security sensitivity of underwater cables and emerging threats, NATO
reactivated the new North Atlantic Command - Joint Force Command Norfolk, based in Norfolk,
USA, which opened in September 2020. The Command, established to protect sea lanes
between Europe and North America, has been the first NATO headquarters dedicated to the
Atlantic since 2003. According to NATO sources, ‘one of the tasks of this new North Atlantic
Command is also to look into how to protect, how to monitor threats against it.’ NATO’s last
statement about the creation of a Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) Coordination Cell on 15
February 2023 is one of the most recent developments on the protection of CUI which includes
undersea communication cables. The most important practitioners of hybrid threat activities
against underwater cables, which are carefully monitored by NATO, are China and Russia. When
these two actors are compared with each other, it is seen that they focus on different areas and
perform a kind of job share. Russia pursues a strategy of gathering intelligence from existing
underwater cables and cutting them in the event of an escalation to disconnect allies. In addition
to the underwater cables visible on open-source maps, it also aims to find underwater cables
used for military purposes by conducting scanning activities. China, on the other hand, is pursu-
ing strategies to take part in the production of underwater cables on a larger scale and laying
them on the seabed. In this direction, firstly, Russia can access the data on fiber optic cables
without damaging it with its specially equipped submarines and thus can listen, scramble, and
possibly change the data passing through the cables. Russia's main assistants in achieving such
strategic goals are nuclear-powered submarines and oceanographic ships that can carry differ-
ent equipment or smaller submarine robots. (Figure 11) The names Losharik and Yantar stand
out here. The nuclear-powered U-boat "Losharik" is suitable for rescuing downed aircraft, install-
ing listening sensors, and manipulating or bombing underwater communications cables.
Losharik suffered a serious accident on 1 July 2019 and is out of service but is expected to be back
in service in the next few years. Yantar is a platform that is officially an oceanographic research
vessel but is actually the mother ship of surveillance equipment and manned/unmanned
deep-sea divers. Yantar entered service in 2015, and since then, the interest in underwater cables
by the United States and other NATO countries has aroused suspicion. In the same year, the
sighting of Yantar off the US coast near underwater cables caused tension between the two
states. Yantar, which carries out operations in many strategic regions from off the coast of Syria
to the Persian Gulf, was also reported to have been seen around underwater cables off the coast
of Ireland in 2021. Russia's submarine activities focus on gathering intelligence from underwater
communications cables as well as monitoring the systems on the seabed.

(108)NATO, ‘Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk declares Full Operational Capability’, NATO, accessed 17 January 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185870.htm; Christian Bueger, ‘Security Threats to Undersea Communications Cables
and Infrastructure – Consequences for the EU’, n.d.
(109)NATO, ‘NATO Stands up Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell’, NATO, accessed 16 May 2023, https://www.nato.in-
t/cps/en/natohq/news_211919.htm.
(110)‘Cutting the Cord’.
(111) Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite, ‘Seabed warfare is a “real and present threat”’, Naval Technology (blog), 20 December 2022,
https://www.naval-technology.com/features/seabed-warfare-is-a-real-and-present-threat/.
(112)‘What makes Russia’s new spy ship Yantar special?’, BBC News, 3 January 2018, sec. Europe, https://ww-
w.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42543712.
(113)‘Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables’, Lawfare, 5 March 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-rus-
sian-threat-undersea-cables.
(114)David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, ‘Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort’, The New York Times, 25
October 2015, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-pres-
ence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html.
(115)H. I. Sutton, ‘Russian Spy Ship Yantar Loitering Near Trans-Atlantic Internet Cables’, Naval News (blog), 19 August 2021,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/08/russian-spy-ship-yantar-loitering-near-trans-atlantic-internet-cables/.

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During Russia's invasion of Ukraine, gas leaks occurred in Russia's Nord Stream 1 and Nord
Stream 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea. While the gas leaks in the Swedish field raised the possibility
of sabotage on the one hand, they also brought to mind the uncertainty in the detection of
attacks on CI and the impact they would have.

Figure 11: Russian Seabed Warfare Capabilities

Secondly, when it comes to the People's Republic of China, it is essential to remember that we
are dealing with one of the best implementers of grey zone strategies and hybrid threats. China's
strategy regarding underwater cables appears to be much more long-term. Especially consider-
ing its patience and persistence in implementing a salami-slicing strategy, this can be said to be
an inference with a high probability of accuracy for China. At this point, China aims to be included
in the underwater cable laying system and to direct the system according to its own needs
instead of gathering intelligence by reaching the already laid cables or disconnecting the
connection like Russia. Therefore, in recent years, Chinese telecommunication companies have
started to invest heavily in owning and supplying submarine cables. At least 31 cables newly
deployed in 2021 had ownership stakes in these companies. Remarkably, many Chinese invest-
ments in the global underwater communications cable network are directly controlled by the
Chinese government, as the "big three" Chinese telecommunications companies that invest in
underwater communications cables and control 98.5 percent of China's international bandwidth
are fully state-owned. These are China Mobile (China Mobile, Zhongguo yidong), China Telecom
(China Telecom, Zhongxinguo) and China Unicom (China Unicom, Zhongguo liantong). (Figure
12)

(116)‘İsveç’ten Kuzey Akım 1 ve Kuzey Akım 2 Gaz Sızıntılarında Ağır Sabotaj Tespiti’, accessed 17 January 2023, https://ww-
w.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/isvecten-kuzey-akim-1-ve-kuzey-akim-2-gaz-sizintilarinda-agir-sabotaj-tespiti/2742068.
(117)Sutton, ‘Russian Spy Ship Yantar Loitering Near Trans-Atlantic Internet Cables’.
(118)‘Securing Asia’s Subsea Network: U.S. Interests and Strategic Options’, accessed 17 January 2023, https://www.csis.org/analy-
sis/securing-asias-subsea-network-us-interests-and-strategic-options.
(119)‘Beijing’s Growing Influence on the Global Undersea Cable Network’, Jamestown, accessed 18 January 2023, https://james-
town.org/program/beijings-growing-influence-on-the-global-undersea-cable-network/.; Justin Sherman, ‘Cyber Defense Across
the Ocean Floor: The Geopolitics of Submarine Cable Security’, Atlantic Council, accessed 14 April 2023, 11-12. https://www.atlan-
ticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Cy-
ber-defense-across-the-ocean-floor-The-geopolitics-of-submarine-cable-security.pdf .

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In addition to these companies, China has encouraged the private sector champion Chinese
companies to take possession of key markets, especially in the field of telecommunications, as
part of its "go out" strategy. In line with this strategy, in 2019, Hengtong Group, a private Chinese
company that has developed ties with the government, acquired Huawei Marine, the world's
fourth-largest underwater communications cable manufacturer, and renamed it HMN Technol-
ogies. At the same time, after the Belt and Road Initiative was announced in 2013, it announced
the Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative in 2015 and used these companies as the Trojan horse of its
project. China's strategy for underwater cables is basically expressed in these three objectives:

1. Global Sabotage (exploiting influence within DSR)

2. Global Espionage (Intelligence gathering using DSR cables)
3. Territorial Sabotage (Manipulating the connection in various territorial
disputes such as the South China Sea dispute.)

When China passed through a century of humiliation, left behind the century of recovery, and
entered the twenty-first century, it appeared on the stage of the international community with a
new image. This image opened a brand-new window to societies that had been exploited, humil-
iated, or pushed out of the international system due to their low democratic values in previous
centuries. China has promised these countries a new world order with attractive themes such as
"non-interference in internal affairs", "living together with peace", "win-win", and "common
future". Societies that have suffered from these themes in the past have been the first to follow
the sound of China's piper. In 2013, when Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced, the
societies that opened their doors to Chinese investments were mainly African, Central Asian, and
Middle Eastern countries. Similarly, China's DSR initiative has found more demand, especially in
developing countries. As a result, China has laid enough cables to encircle the globe, including
intercontinental links from Asia to Africa and from Africa to South America. By laying underwater
cables to underdeveloped countries, China has developed diplomatic relations with these coun-
tries on the one hand and created a digital dependency network against itself on the other. With
the DSR, China has sought to erode the dominance of the US, Japan, and Europe in the underwa-
ter cable market by turning it into a quest for underwater dominance, while propagating a loose-
ly defined policy directive directed by both bottom-up and top-down forces which blur the lines
between public strategy and private action.

These systems, which are being integrated not only in developing regions but also in the Europe-
an market at artificially low prices, are not only a bridge between the transmitter and receiver of
data but also a means of global espionage in peacetime and sabotage in wartime. The
statements of a Chinese official clearly summarize this situation; “Although submarine cable
laying is a business, it is also a battlefield where information can be obtained.” The main concern
with China's underwater cable laying activity is the ease with which data can be retrieved from
these cables. Data can also be siphoned from underwater communications cables. This is most
readily accomplished during the cable manufacturing process, when backdoors may be
installed to capture data. Similar vulnerabilities exist at onshore landing stations, where cables
connect to terrestrial networks, and there is a high probability of cyber security vulnerabilities
during the transfer of data.

(120)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook
1)’, 92.
(121)WJI staff and wire services, ‘Rebranded Huawei Marine Networks to supply the cable for Asia Link Cable System’, accessed
18 January 2023, https://www.wirenet.org/news-categories/item/855-rebrand-
ed-huawei-marine-networks-to-supply-the-cable-for-asia-link-cable-system.
(122)‘The Digital Silk Road: Introduction’, IISS, accessed 18 January 2023, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/12/digi-
tal-silk-road-introduction.
(123)Burdette, ‘Leveraging Submarine Cables for Political Gain’.
(124)Christoph NEDOPIL WANG, ‘Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi Ülkeleri (BRI) – Yeşil Finans ve Kalkınma Merkezi’, accessed 18 January
2023, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/.
(125)‘Mapping China’s Digital Silk Road’, Reconnecting Asia, 19 October 2021, https://reconasia.csis.org/mapping-chinas-digi-
tal-silk-road/.
(126)Burdette, ‘Leveraging Submarine Cables for Political Gain’; Yuen Yuen Ang, ‘Demystifying Belt and Road’, Foreign Affairs, 29
December 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-22/demystifying-belt-and-road; ‘Next battleground in
US-China tech war: undersea internet cables’, South China Morning Post, 14 December 2019, https://www.sc-
mp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3042058/us-china-tech-wars-new-battleground-undersea-internet-cables.

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Finally, data can be retrieved from also cables at sea, though this is relatively difficult to do.
Underwater cable laying operations involving private sector partners are therefore more
controlled as they involve many actors involved in the process at the same time. Because the
companies that finance and own underwater communications cables are not the same as the
companies that actually produce them, but the financial backing of the cable owners gives them
the power to decide where in which part of the world a cable is laid. It determines where it is
connected and how fast (speed, bandwidth) the connection will be made. (Figure 13) As a result,
cable owners contribute to the reshaping of the physical layout of the global internet, i.e., the
continuous development of servers, cables and other man-made infrastructure that support the
operation of the internet. (Figure 14)

Figure 13: Risk Overview of Chinese State Influence through Cable Owner vs Cable Builder

Alongside DSR, China's flagship project is PEACE cable, which aims to provide a cost-effective
and diverse route for growing capacity demand between Asia, Africa, and Europe. The PEACE
cable, planned to be the shortest route between Asia and Africa, includes landing points in
Pakistan, where China recently launched its first direct terrestrial cable, and Djibouti, China's first
overseas military base. The entire planned route covers 15,000 kilometers and includes landing
points in Kenya and Seychelles, followed by a European connection point in Marseille, France.

From a different perspective, China's 2017 National Intelligence Law and the 2014 Counter-Espio-
nage Law further call into question the independence of companies such as Huawei. Article 7 of
the first law states that “any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the
state intelligence work in accordance with the law,” adding that the state “protects” any individu-
al and organization that aids it. And the 2014 Counter-Espionage law says that “when the state
security organ investigates and understands the situation of espionage and collects relevant
evidence, the relevant organizations and individuals shall provide it truthfully and may not
refuse.” This law creates the perception of living like a potential intelligence agent among the
Chinese people and companies. When China's prevalence in espionage activities is added to this,
it is inevitable for states to establish control over companies and reshape the internet through
them.

(127) Nadia Schadlow, ‘Protecting Undersea Cables Must Be Made a National Security Priority’, 3, accessed 18 January 2023,
https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/protecting-undersea-cables-must-be-made-a-national-security-priority.
(128)‘China builds undersea cable bases amid digital infrastructure rivalry’, South China Morning Post, 12 December 2021,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3159328/china-builds-undersea-cable-bases-amid-digital-infrastructure.
(129)Andrea Ratiu, ‘Cyber defense across the ocean floor: The geopolitics of submarine cable security’, Atlantic Council (blog), 13
September 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/re-
port/cyber-defense-across-the-ocean-floor-the-geopolitics-of-submarine-cable-security/.

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Figure 14: Cables Public-Private Ownership Breakdown (2020)

China can also use underwater cables on issues defined as its red lines. The South China Sea
dispute, the most complex territorial dispute in the international system with at least five claim-
ant states, is one of the most suitable areas for such Chinese behavior. Against China's sovereign-
ty claims in the South China Sea (SCS), which it aggressively defends with its historical U-shaped
map and Four Sha doctrine, easily sabotaged underwater cables would be a deterrent threat. For
other countries in the SCS, which China does not hesitate to punish through economic coercion
and sanctions, being ready for China's activities at any time is an important reflex. Similarly, a
scenario of sabotage to 14 underwater cables before China's possible invasion attempt against
Taiwan, which China recognizes as its own territory, would cause Taiwan to be cut off from
communication with the world and unable to call for help from its allies. The Asia-Pacific region,
which attracts more attention day by day, especially in the axis of great power rivalry, is also a
strategic place where hybrid threats turn into a field of activity with its micro conflict areas. Of
course, it is important to remember that underwater cables are the weak point of not only the
countries experiencing regional conflicts but also all sovereign and autonomous countries. It is
imperative for states to build resilience in this area to ensure their intelligence security and
strengthen their strategic communication capabilities. Diversification of underwater cables,
increasing intelligence sharing among allies, filling the missing areas in the context of interna-
tional law, producing emergency scenarios, developing resilience against the capital power of
foreign companies, strengthening the ability to monitor and track cables, and developing cyber
capabilities are elements that can contribute to the development of resilience.

(130)‘PCCW Global signs up to extend PEACE cable to southern Africa’, Capacity Media, 20 January 2020, https://www.capacity-
media.com/article/29otbyvgrerkbxkdezmrk/news/pccw-global-signs-up-to-extend-peace-cable-to-southern-africa.
(131)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook
1)’, 95.
(132)Arjun Kharpal, ‘Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government. Experts say it wouldn’t have a choice’, CNBC,
accessed 18 January 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-da-
ta-to-china-government-if-asked-experts.html.
(133)“Data is Revolution”, https://www.thestrategicfunds.com.pr/data-is-the-revolution/ (31 October 2022)
(134)Philip Heijmans, Cindy Wang, and Samson Ellis, ‘Taiwan tensions raise alarms over risks to world’s subsea cables’, The
Japan Times, 31 October 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/10/31/asia-pacific/taiwan-tensions-subsea-cables/.

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4.The Strategic Importance of Harbour Protection in the

Maritime Industry
Approximately 70 percent of our planet comprises oceans, which have been servicing humanity
for thousands of years. By technological improvements and globalization, the effect of the
maritime environment on lives is getting more important. Many important cities in the world
owe their origins and prosperity to ports. Ports and maritime trade are important drivers of
urbanization. By 2035, it is expected that more than half of the world's population will live in
coastal areas and depend heavily on the exchange of goods through ports. At the beginning of
2020, the total world fleet reached 98140 commercial ships and a capacity of 2.06 bl. dwt. The
fleet grew by 4.1 percent in 2020, the highest growth rate since 2014, according to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Reports. Such expansion and devel-
opments in the maritime field increase the strategic importance of ports and harbours. Due to
their importance, depending on their size, structure, and volume transshipped harbours can be
part of the CI of countries and require special treatment and attention when it comes to their
protection and security. Destruction of harbour infrastructure can not only adversely affect the
political, economic, or social life of a given community, but can also undermine the strategies
pursued by a state. Security and defence are, therefore, one of the most fundamental needs for
the normal and effective functioning of the harbour industry. In this respect, before examining
strategies for the protection of harbours, it is important to emphasize the difference between
harbour and port. A harbour is a place on the coast where ships, boats, and barges can take
shelter in stormy weather. A port, on the other hand, is a man-made infrastructure on the coast
that can be used to transport, load and unload cargo. A port is located inside a harbour, but a
harbour cannot be located inside a port. Therefore, the concept of "harbour protection" also
includes the security of the port inside the harbour. The protection of national critical infrastruc-
ture, especially harbour infrastructure, is a matter of strategic importance for ensuring the full
scope of the country's national security.

Figure 16: Types of Harbour

In a MSA scenario, two main areas of interest can be recognized, harbour protection and naviga-
tion safety. Harbour protection is currently the main concern and is intended to control the risk
related to possible attacks or illegal activities that may take place in maritime access areas.

On the other hand, the objectives of navigation safety are essentially linked to achieve improved
maritime navigation awareness by providing information on collision avoidance and general
guidance to mariners.

(135) ‘The Role and Relevance of the Maritime Domain in an Urban-Centric Operational Environment’, 8, accessed 18 January
2023, https://www.coecsw.org/fileadmin/content_uploads/projects/Role_and_Relevance_of_the_Maritime_Domain _in_an_Ur-
ban-Centric_Operational_Environment.pdf.
(136)‘Review of Maritime Transport 2020’, UNCTAD, 2020.
(137)Teodora Gechkova and Tiana Kaleeva, Harbour Infrastructure Protection – PESTLE ANALYSIS’, KNOWLEDGE - International
Journal 49, no. 5 (15 December 2021): 961–64.
(138) Ertosun, ‘“Protection of Maritime Transportation Infrastructure”(Pipelines, LNG Routes and Subsea Cables)’.

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The harbour, as a component of the critical infrastructure, is subjected to different negative

aspects that affect its everyday activities and provision of services. Harbour security encompass-
es security and law enforcement measures to safeguard a seaport from terrorism and other
unlawful activities, measures employed to ensure international codes and treaties are enforced,
and security of commercial areas in and around ports, coastlines, and beaches. A successful
attack on a harbour can cause serious economic and military damage, provide an enemy with
the opportunity to inflict mass casualties, and have serious long-term detrimental effects on the
national economy. The best-known example of this is the terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda on the
destroyer USS Cole, anchored in the Port of Aden on the Arabian Sea coast of Yemen, on 12
October 2000. In the attack, 17 sailors lost their lives, and 42 sailors were injured. This action,
which was carried out by two suicide bombers using fast fiberglass boats, has gone down in
history as the first terrorist attack on a warship in the world. Another example related to harbour
security is the Mumbai Attacks of 26-29 November 2008. The Mumbai Attacks carried out by the
Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist organisation were multidimensional attacks because they included the
Taj Hotel, CS Terminus, Trident Hotel, Colabai Ville Parle, Jewish Cultural Centre, Cruz Airport, and
several hospitals. In the 60-hour-long gunfight, 10 Lashkar-e Taiba militants clashed with security
forces, and nine out of ten were killed. Militants had killed about two hundred people in three
days of attacks. Despite these significant and high-profile attacks, terrorists rarely choose the sea
route due to limited resources and capabilities. Apart from the problem of resources and capabil-
ities, terrorists prefer buses, subways, and trains over maritime means of transport because they
attract media attention and are easy targets. In addition, maritime transport is not usually the
first choice or main source of transport for most people. And maritime transport is not regarded
as "iconic targets" in line with the general tenets of terrorism, like propaganda and resound.
Therefore, although maritime routes are generally not the first choice of terrorists, Harbour
security is also affected by this reality as digital transformation expands the scope of security. As
the examples illustrate, MCIP faces many challenges in an asymmetric environment.

Harbour and maritime security are not only related to maritime security issues, but also to energy
security, CI security and the efficiency of global trade. Therefore, cyber security, energy security,
harbour security and CI security are together parts of the maritime security eco-system.
Harbours, as one of these components, are highly vulnerable to many threats due to their size,
general accessibility by sea and land, heavy material and human traffic, being located in densely
populated areas, etc. At the same time, since they represent a large number of transport routes
(roads, railways, navigation channels), they are much easier targets for terrorist attacks than
other regions. The fact that terrorists have historically gained experience in land-based attacks
means that a terrorist group aiming to inflict damage in the maritime environment may target
areas that lack maneuverability and mobility, such as harbour facilities.

(139)Amerigo Capria et al., ‘Multifunction Imaging Passive Radar for Harbour Protection and Navigation Safety’, IEEE Aerospace
and Electronic Systems Magazine 32, no. 2 (February 2017): 30, https://doi.org/10.1109/MAES.2017.160025.
(140)Susan SIM, ‘Port Security’.
(141)Robert B. Watts, ‘Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric
Environment’, Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 2 (2005): 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA484165.pdf.
(142) M. Kağan Kozanhan and İbrahim Bayezit, ‘Terrorist Threat with Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in the Marine Environ-
ment and Its Effects on Maritime Security’, Güvenlik Stratejileri 16, no. 34 (2020): 341, https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.768616.
(143)‘Lessons From the Mumbai Terrorist Attacks’, accessed 21 January 2023, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pk-
g/CHRG-111shrg49484/html/CHRG-111shrg49484.htm.
(144)SIM, ‘Port Security’.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

Planning to protect harbours from terrorists should take into account attacks from a range of
platforms available to malicious actors, including divers, fast boats, jet skis, shipping containers
and remotely piloted boats. Although the main threat to harbour facilities is terrorism, other
categories of threats include:

Figure 17: General Threats for Harbour Infrastructure

• Thefts from ships and harbour installations;
• Terrorism, bomb attacks, hostage situations;
• Traffic of forbidden substances;
• Sabotages, intentional damage or destruction of harbour installations, of the
communications network, of the data communication network, of a part of a ship,
equipment or cargo, vandalism;
• Piracy and armed robbery;
• Threats against the environment: accidental spillage or intentional drainage of
pollutants;
• Proliferation and development of terrorist networks, transnational organized crime,
illegal traffic persons, etc.

As listed above, there is a wide range of threats to harbours. Especially with the acceleration of
globalization, the emergence of non-state actors and their targeting of harbours while carrying
out terrorist activities for ideological purposes has activated global actors. Foremost among
these is NATO, an Atlantic Alliance whose Members count also 26 coastal States. Many CI facilities
in NATO member states are located along the coastline, including oil and gas terminals. These
harbours provide a target rich environment for malicious actors; using the right target, in the
right place, at the right time, with the right threat vector, can cause great damage to port
facilities and the communities and economies they support.

This has driven NATO to focus its port protection strategy not only on protecting the harbours of
member states but also on protecting harbours in countries where the "host nation" is unable or
unwilling to protect NATO forces. For this reason, NATO established the Specialist Team on
Harbour Protection (STHP) in 2012. STHP started its activities under the leadership of Portugal
and in partnership with the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters
(COE CSW) accredited by NATO in 2009. The main objective of the Expertise Group is defined as
"enhance the ability of maritime forces to adequately cope with asymmetric threats in missions
abroad, especially when they are most vulnerable - while entering and leaving or staying in a
port." The work of the Expertise Team resulted in the Allied Harbour Protection Publication,
which was submitted for approval in 2016. The approval process was finalized with the Allied
Tactical Publication (ATP)-94 published in 2017.

(145) M. Akar, A. Kemer, and Jane, ‘Good Practices in Counter Terrorism in Maritime Domain’, 20.
(146)Ferhat M. Ertosun, ‘Harbor Protection as Part of CIP/CEIP (Critical Infrastructure&Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection)’.
(147)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook
1)’, 33.
(148)Evans et al., 32.

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The purpose of ATP-94, NATO Harbour Protection, is to provide the philosophy, principles, and
background information on Harbour Protection Operations (HPO) and to give NATO Expedition-
ary Forces a common basis for its conduct to provide protection for units, facilities and infrastruc-
ture while keeping ports’ normal routine operations. The document is generally based on the
approach that NATO capacity to project and sustain operations directly affects its success.
Promptness and effectiveness of NATO operational responses rely heavily on strategic mobility,
which, in turn, is highly dependent on the unimpeded movement of supplies, equipment and
personnel along the sea lines of communication (SLOC). However, the protection of the SLOC is
not sufficient to ensure the safe and timely delivery of logistic support to military operations as
ports of departure and arrival are usually the most vulnerable points. As more than 90 percent of
all military cargo enters an Area of Operations (AOO) via Sea Port of Disembarkations (SPOD),
these spots are key for strategic mobility, requiring a non-threatening or substantially benign
environment. Ensuring essential port operating routines brings forward the need to carefully
address safety and security measures to cover for the landward and seaward protection of ships,
harbour approaches, and anchorages especially against asymmetric threats. However, Harbour
protection is not merely about the protection of ships in port. Although it is primarily aimed at
the support of forward-deployed NATO forces, it can also be employed to assist a third party in
keeping critical maritime services and infrastructures working normally. NATO would thus be
able to create favorable conditions to ensure the normal flow of goods into a troubled area, foster
the confidence of maritime operators and provide relief to local communities.

The doctrine introduces HP core elements and illustrates the HP organizational backbone
architecture, tasks and responsibilities of key players and legal considerations to be addressed in
host nation agreements.

(149)‘COE-CSW - CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters: Another Milestone in Harbour
Protection’, accessed 18 January 2023, https://www.coecsw.org/our-work/spotlights/archive/anoth-
er-milestone-in-harbour-protection/.

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Figure 18: Definitions from ATP-94

Integral parts of the doctrine are based on the availability of a Harbour Protection Module (Figure
19) is an integrated, deployable, modular, interoperable, and armoured system of systems and
can be employed ashore or embarked on a ship (berthed or at anchor). The HPM combines
sensors and C2 systems as well as effectors to detect, identify and counter threats in all domains
while at the same time providing interface function to communicate with own tactical units at
sea, on land and in the air as well as with civilian stakeholders. While the system itself is still in
procurement, a demonstrator HPM was provided by the Bundeswehr Technical Center for Ships
and Naval Weapons, Maritime Technology and Research (WTD 71) was tested in the summer of
2015 during a major Portuguese naval maneuver in Portimão, the largest port on the Algarve
coast. As well as in several Northern Coast Exercises in the Baltic Sea from 2013 to 2018. In a
complex scenario, the system was technically audited by WTD 71 but operated by the Portuguese
as well as The German Navy as a demonstration of its suitability for international use. These and
other findings, including identified shortcomings, were recorded and utilized in the further
development of the HPM and the associated technical regulation. Likewise, these findings have
also formed the basis for the development of ATP 94 and have been updated by the STHP in the
context of various workshops and conferences.

Figure 19: Harbour Protection Module (HPM)

(150)Audrius Venckunas, ‘Harbour Protection Doctrine’.

(151)Venckunas.

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The defence of a naval ship anchored in a harbour is a complex task influenced by many factors
a topic which is picked up in another NATO doctrine, ATP 74 (Allied Maritime Force Protection),
which focuses, among others, on threats against naval units at sea, in confined waters, harbour
and respective countermeasures. These mainly include the density of fishing vessels close to the
ship and the difficulty of separating neutral ships from threats. A naval ship anchored in harbour
is more vulnerable to attack than a ship on the high seas. The chances of detecting and counter-
ing a terrorist threat vary greatly depending on several factors, including early identification of
the attack and other measures that are currently ready. In this context, the protection of national
critical infrastructure, in particular harbour infrastructure, is a matter of strategic importance for
the comprehensive provision of national security. In order to achieve this, states need to carry out
an inclusive harbour protection strategy by utilizing all areas of technology. However, this also
means opening the door to new threats. For example, the digital transformation of ports leads to
an increase in cyber-attacks. The Antwerp attack in June 2011 based on malware infiltration into
the port system, the Rotterdam attack in June 2017 was related to the collateral damage caused
by a large-scale infection, the Long Beach attack in 2018, Barcelona attack in 2018 was related to
contamination of internal IT systems, highly sophisticated cyberattack to San Diego in 2018, the
cyberattack amidst geopolitical conflict in Shadid Rajaee on May 2020 were among these
cyber-attacks influence harbour security. The challenge of building and maintaining secure,
resilient harbours is undoubtedly compelling. However, significant investments of thought and
resources, the development of advanced situational awareness capabilities for a common
operating picture, and the deployment of effective threat countermeasures and state-of-the-art
protection systems are helping to ensure the security of major ports. This achievement
represents some of the best CISR efforts in several countries. Within the framework of the stated
threats, risks, and measures related to port security; it is becoming increasingly difficult to ensure
the necessity of achieving higher efficiency standards and sustainability. Because in the future,
attacks on the maritime transport system will be multimodal (i.e., hybrid) attacks that include
both cyber and physical components. In this context, it is clearly understood that technological
developments have changed all the dynamics of port security to ensure the balance between
trade facilitation and security. The responsibility of nations is to follow all developments sensitive-
ly, revise their security policies and strengthen the resilience of their critical infrastructure. Port
protection is also at the forefront of these.

Another important point is to emphasize the importance of the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code when discussing harbour and port security. The ISPS Code is a
global maritime security framework established by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It aims to provide a standardized, consistent
approach to maritime security, ensuring the safety of ships and port facilities worldwide. The
ISPS Code comprises two parts: Part A outlines mandatory security-related requirements for
governments, port authorities, and shipping companies, while Part B provides guidance on
implementing those requirements. The Code applies to all ships engaged in international voyag-
es, including passenger ships, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage or more, and mobile offshore
drilling units, as well as to port facilities serving such ships.

(152)‘European Security & Defence’, 44–47, accessed 18 January 2023, https://euro-sd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ES-

D_02_2019_WEB-1.pdf.
(153)Ertosun, ‘Harbor Protection as Part of CIP/CEIP (Critical Infrastructure&Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection)’.
(154)SIM, ‘Port Security’.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

Key aspects of the ISPS Code include:

1) Risk assessment: The ISPS Code requires a comprehensive security assessment to identify
potential threats, vulnerabilities, and risks at both the ship and port facility levels. This assess-
ment informs the development of a Ship Security Plan (SSP) for vessels and a Port Facility Securi-
ty Plan (PFSP) for port facilities.

2) Security levels: The Code defines three security levels, with Level 1 representing normal securi-
ty measures, Level 2 indicating heightened security measures due to an increased risk of a securi-
ty incident, and Level 3 requiring the implementation of additional security measures in
response to a specific security threat or actual security incident.

3) Security officers: The ISPS Code mandates the appointment of a Ship Security Officer (SSO) for
each vessel and a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) for each port facility. These officers are
responsible for implementing, maintaining, and updating their respective security plans.

4) Training and drills: The Code requires regular security training and drills for crew members
and port facility personnel to ensure their readiness to respond to security incidents.

5) Access control: The ISPS Code emphasizes the importance of controlling access to port
facilities and ships, implementing measures such as identification checks, restricted areas, and
security personnel to prevent unauthorized entry.

6) Monitoring and surveillance: Effective monitoring and surveillance systems, including the use
of CCTV cameras, security patrols, and alarms, are crucial components of the ISPS Code to detect
and deter security threats.

The ISPS Code plays a vital role in harbour and port security by providing a comprehensive and
standardized framework for assessing risks, implementing security measures, and ensuring the
preparedness of both ships and port facilities to respond to security incidents.

(155)Evans et al., ‘Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook
1)’, 34.
(156)The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
Convention (1974/1988) on Maritime security including minimum security arrangements for ships, ports and government
agencies.

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5.Conclusion
In conclusion, the protection of critical infrastructure (CI) in the maritime environment is a
complex and multifaceted challenge that requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach.
While the pursuit of perfect protection may be unattainable, governments and organizations
should prioritize increasing the resilience of CI against evolving threats. This can be achieved
through the adoption of flexible and adaptable strategies that focus on mitigating risks, ensuring
continuity of operations, and facilitating swift recovery from disruptive events.

The concepts of Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (CISR) and Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) play crucial roles in safeguarding CI. Both CISR and CIP are important elements
of overall CI security, and both are critical for ensuring the continued functioning of CI systems in
the face of disruptions. CISR refers to the ability of CI to withstand and recover from disruptive
events, such as natural disasters, cyber-attacks, or physical attacks. This includes measures to
ensure the physical protection of CI assets and enhance the resilience of CI systems to ensure
they can continue to operate in the face of disruptions. CIP, on the other hand, refers specifically
to the protection of CI against physical and cyber threats. This includes measures to secure CI
facilities, systems, and networks, as well as the development of incident response plans to deal
with security incidents affecting critical infrastructure. In general, there are three main require-
ments for a successful Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) policy for states: the identification
of risks to themselves, the identification of vulnerabilities, and the enhancement of their
resilience to uncertain future threats, such as pandemic disasters, climate-related events,
malicious activities, and more.

In the modern interconnected world, where almost all CI sectors provide essential services to
societies, the absence or disruption of these services can have far-reaching and unexpected
consequences. It is imperative, therefore, to recognize the significance of collective efforts in
protecting CI. The complexity and magnitude of emerging threats exceed the capabilities of
individual states, necessitating a collaborative approach among nations, international organiza-
tions, and other stakeholders. In this regard 16 March 2023, after the NATO-EU joint meeting, the
" NATO-EU Task Force on Resilient Critical Infrastructure" announcement shows the importance
that NATO attaches to collective security and resilience for CI effort with other stakeholders.

NATO, as a key player in ensuring collective security, has a vital role to play in protecting CI in the
maritime environment. The alliance's commitment to building resilience, as demonstrated by its
Strengthened Resilience Commitment in 2021, underscores its dedication to effectively carry out
its core missions of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. It should
also be noted that to see the importance of CI in maritime environment for NATO, four of the
twenty-eight centers of excellence accredited by NATO, including MARSEC COE, deal with
maritime issues. In this direction leveraging its deterrent value, NATO not only possesses credible
military capabilities but also works towards the protection of allies' CI during crises and proactive
crisis management in the event of damage.

To enhance the protection and resilience of CI in the maritime environment, NATO and its allies
should implement a series of key findings and recommendations. Experience sharing and joint
decision-making among allies will facilitate the exchange of best practices and the development
of unified strategies. Increased intelligence and information sharing will enhance situational
awareness, enabling proactive responses to potential threats. The establishment of a compre-
hensive and mutually shared strategy based on Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) will aid in
identifying and managing risks to maritime critical infrastructure.

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MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (MCIP)

Harnessing technological advancements, such as the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the
North Atlantic (DIANA) , will bolster the ability to detect, respond to, and recover from disruptive
events affecting critical infrastructure. Moreover, a multi-stakeholder approach involving govern-
ments and the private sector is crucial in developing and implementing a comprehensive CISR
policy that addresses cyber threats, maritime security challenges, energy security, and legal
aspects impacting critical infrastructure.

Addressing the impact of cyberspace on critical infrastructures is of paramount importance,

given the increasing reliance on digital systems and the sophistication of cyber threats. Similarly,
the effects of climate change on critical infrastructures must be taken into account to ensure
their security and resilience against environmental challenges. Emphasizing the legal founda-
tions of multinational decision-making and implementation within NATO will foster effective
and coordinated protection of critical infrastructures.

Furthermore, enhancing intelligence capabilities, conducting scenario-based studies, consider-

ing the impact of unmanned and autonomous systems on the protection of critical infrastruc-
ture and focusing on underwater communication systems are essential components of a
comprehensive approach. By proactively addressing these areas, NATO and its allies can better
understand and prepare for potential threats, thereby strengthening the overall resilience of
critical infrastructure. At this point, the announcement of establishing a Critical Underwater
Infrastructure Coordination Cell by NATO on 15 February 2023 is a new and significant develop-
ment.

Finally, the protection of critical infrastructure in the maritime environment requires a collabora-
tive and multidimensional effort. By implementing the recommended measures and focusing
on key areas of concern, NATO and its allies can enhance the protection, security, and resilience
of critical infrastructure, thus safeguarding societies, ensuring the continuity of essential services,
and bolstering the overall security and stability of the alliance and the global system. The recog-
nition that NATO is only as strong as its weakest link should serve as a constant reminder to
prioritize the protection of critical infrastructure as an indispensable element of collective securi-
ty.

(157)The establishment of DIANA was announced during the writing of the conclusion of this study paper and is therefore not
mentioned in detail in the text.
(158)Like DIANA, the establishment of the Critical Submarine Infrastructure Coordination Cell post-dates the writing of this
study paper and is only mentioned in the conclusion.

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