COMBINED ABNORMAL PROCEDURES- A320

(Revised June 2021)

compiled by Capt.S.Sabu

1) Engine Failure in Cruise – Standard Strategy

2) Engine Failure in Cruise – Obstacle Strategy
3) Emergency Descent
4) Practise Stall & Recovery
5) Dual RA Fault
6) TCAS
7) Unreliable Speed Indication
8) Fuel Leak
9) Smoke & Fire Protection
10) Electrical Emergency Configuration
11) Green + Yellow Hydraulic Failure
12) Green + Blue Hydraulic Failure
13) Engine Failure After Take-off
ENGINE FAILURE IN CRUISE –
STANDARD STRATEGY
An engine failure can occur due:
- Mechanical failure
- Fuel starvation or Contamination
- Flame Out
 DETECTION STOP
CONTINUE ECAM REACHING LRC CEILING
ECAM ACTIONS ECAM

STRATEGY ?
ENGINE
FAILURE

LRC CEILING
 DETECTION
FLY THE AIRCRAFT
THRUST LEVERS MCT
A/THR OFF

NAVIGATE LAND ASAP ----Short Term Decision

ECAM ACTIONS
ECAM PROCEDURE

STOP ECAM actions when:

THRUST LEVER AT MCT and ENG MODE SEL – IGNITION Or Reaching Green Dot Speed

DO NOT DECELERATE BELOW GREEN DOT SPEED

THRUST LEVERS ------- MCT
A/THR ------- OFF
A/THR is set to OFF immediately in order to avoid any thrust reduction when selecting
Speed or when pulling OPEN DESCENT
The PF will:
Set Both Thrust Levers to MCT
Disconnect the A/THR. The speed is now controlled by
the elevators and the thrust is fixed at MCT.
If in Radar environment and in contact with ATC, turn
towards an alternate. If not in contact with the ATC, turn
off the airway or track at 90 degrees or towards an
alternate. Consideration should be given to aircraft
position relative to any critical point.
Select appropriate Speed (M 0.78/300 Kts or Green Dot depending upon
situation)
Select Engine Out Altitude
The FMGS computes an engine-out maximum altitude at Long Range Cruise
Speed, and displays it on the PROG page. It assumes Engine Anti-ice OFF.
The crew can also determine the engine out ceiling from the Performance
section of the QRH.

If Green Dot speed is selected, when speed reaches Green Dot speed, select
OPEN DES.
QRH – OEI GROSS CEILING QUICK CHECK AT LRC SPEED

LRC GROSS CEILING

Gross Weight at Engine Fail

 STRATEGY

STANDARD
• Select M 0.78 or 300 Kts in FCU speed window and PULL. This ensures that
the aircraft is within the windmill engine relight envelope
• Select LRC Ceiling in FCU Altitude and PULL.
• Descend to Engine Out Altitude

No Obstacle and Time Constraint

 STANDARD STRATEGY

PF PM
For descent
M 0.78/300 KTS -------------------SET AND PULL
EO LRC CEILING ------------------- SET AND PULL
On PROG page REC MAX = LRC Ceiling

When V/S < 500 ft/min:

V/S – 500 ft/min ----------------- SET AND PULL

A/THR ---------------- ON

During the first part of the descent

Thrust MCT
Speed controlled by the elevator
Confirm the EO LRC Ceiling using QRH
 When V/S < 500 ft/min
When the rate of descent becomes lower than 500 ft/min, the flight crew selects the V/S mode in
order to maintain rate of descent in compliance with the performance computation.

The A/THR must be re-engaged in order to maintain 300 kts.

 PF PM

ORDER: “CONTINUE ECAM” CONTINUES ECAM ACTION

ECAM ACTIONS
ECAM PROCEDURE DAMAGE ?
SYSTEM DISPLAY
STATUS ENGINE RELIGHT

SITUATION ASSESSMENT
DECISION

Consider APU Start Performance Computation down to Landing

APU Normal Flight Envelope
 If no damage
suspected, a relight
may be considered
Refer to QRH ENG
RELIGHT IN FLT

A relight attempt
should only be
considered after
completion of ECAM
actions
 The ENG SHUTDOWN
procedure is applied if
the crew believes there
is damage or after an
engine relight in flight
is unsuccessful.
Refer to PRO ABN ENG
1(2) SHUT DOWN
 PERFORMANCE CHECK
FCOM PER OEI DES 10 FCOM PER-OEI –ICQ or QRH
DESCENT - STANDARD STRATEGY IN CRUISE QUICK CHECK LONG RANGE
(Cruise at Long Range Speed down to Landing)

TIME (MIN) TIME (MIN)

FUEL (KG) FUEL (KG)
DIST (NMS)

Based on remaining AIR DIST to Diversion Airport

INITIAL FL

LRC CEILING
 DESCENT TO LRC CEILING
COMPUTATION BY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INITIAL FL DATA AND LRC CEILING DATA

INITIAL FL
TIME (MIN)
FUEL (KG)
DIST (NMs)
LRC CEILING
 LONG RANGE CRUISE DOWN TO LANDING

LRC Ceiling

Remaining Air Distance

Fuel used at LRC FL Fuel corrections Fuel used at LRC

down to Landing according to Delta FL down to
based on REF weight with REF Landing
weight weight
 REACHING LRC CEILING

SPEED ------------- MANAGED

EO LRC SPEED TOP OF DESCENT

Performance Check (N1, Fuel Flow, Mach ,IAS):

QRH FPE – OEI FCOM PER- OEI - CRT

CRUISE AT LONG RANGE CRUISE SPEED or LONG RANGE CRUISE
Fuel Management
- The fuel on board has to be managed to ensure that remaining engine has a
continuous fuel supply.
- The regulation of an imbalance within operating limits is the responsibility of the
flight crew
- The Fuel Cross Feed valve must NOT be opened if a leak or any possibility of leak
exists.

On the FUEL Page, note down the quantity of fuel in each tank. After about 5
minutes check the FUEL Page again to see if the tanks on the failed engine has
depleted. If the quantity is still the same, then there is no fuel leak. This can also be
backed up by the normal Fuel Check formula.
FOB + Fuel Used = Fuel On Departure
Cross Feed Closed
Pros:
-Ensures that you will never cross feed into a leak.
- Fuel is isolated in the opposite wing from the live engine

Cons:
- If the fuel is not managed adequately, fuel supplying the live
engine can reduce to a dangerously low level.
-Fuel remains isolated in the opposite wing.
Cross Feed Open

Total fuel on board will be available to the live

engine at all times.
- Opening the Cross Feed will not necessarily
reduce the rate at which the imbalance occurs
because the fuel pump's pressure can vary upto
10 psi between pumps.
Summary- Fuel Management
Fuel management after an Engine Shut Down is crew
responsibility.
- The Cross Feed valve must remain closed until it has been
positively established that no leak exists nor is it likely to occur.
- Fuel balancing must always be done with the QRH Checklist
- Opening the Cross Feed will not necessarily reduce the rate at
which the imbalance occurs.
- With the Cross Feed open, the total fuel on board is available to
the live engine at all times
ENGINE FAILURE
IN CRUISE –
OBSTACLE
STRATEGY
The Obstacle Strategy is used when flying over high ground /
obstacle.

If an engine failure occurs at any point on the route, the net

flight path must clear the high ground/obstacle on the drift down
path by 2000 ft and during climb by 1000 ft.

Once clear of high ground/obstacle revert back to Standard

Strategy.
 DETECTION STOP CONTINUE
WHEN OBSTACLES CLEARED
ECAM ACTIONS ECAM ECAM

DECISION

STRATEGY ?
ENGINE
FAILURE

DRIFT DOWN CEILING

LRC CEILING
 DETECTION
FLY THE AIRCRAFT
THRUST LEVERS MCT
A/THR OFF

NAVIGATE LAND ASAP ----Short Term Decision

ECAM ACTIONS
ECAM PROCEDURE

STOP ECAM actions when:

THRUST LEVER AT MCT and ENG MODE SEL – IGNITION Or Reaching Green Dot Speed

DO NOT DECELERATE BELOW GREEN DOT SPEED

THRUST LEVERS ------- MCT
A/THR ------- OFF
A/THR is set to OFF immediately in order to avoid any thrust reduction when selecting
Speed or when pulling OPEN DESCENT
The PF will:
Set Both Thrust Levers to MCT.
Disconnect the A/THR. The speed is now controlled by
the elevators and the thrust is fixed at MCT.
If in Radar environment and in contact with ATC, turn
towards an alternate. If not in contact with the ATC, turn
off the airway or track at 90 degrees or towards an
alternate. Consideration should be given to aircraft
position relative to any critical point.
 STRATEGY

OBSTACLE
• Select Green Dot Speed and PULL.
• Select Green Dot Ceiling in FCU Altitude and PULL.
• Descend to Drift Down Altitude

Obstacle Constraint
 OBSTACLE STRATEGY

PF PM
For descent
Green Dot Speed -------------------SET AND PULL
Green Dot CEILING ------------------- SET AND PULL

During the first part of the descent to Drift Down Ceiling:

Thrust MCT
Speed controlled by the elevator
Confirm the Level Off Altitude from QRH
Select Green Dot Speed.
Select Drift Down Ceiling.
The FMGS computes an engine-out maximum altitude at Green Dot Speed, and
displays it on the PERF page.
The crew can also determine the engine out ceiling from the Performance
section of the QRH and the FCOM.

When speed reaches Green Dot speed, select OPEN DES.

 OEI GROSS CEILING QUICK CHECK AT G/DOT SPEED

PRECISE CHECK
QUICK CHECK

CRZ FL at
Failure

GREEN DOT
GROSS
CEILING GW AT FAILURE

Gross Weight at Engine Fail

 PF PM

ORDER: “CONTINUE ECAM” CONTINUES ECAM ACTION

ECAM ACTIONS
ECAM PROCEDURE DAMAGE ?
SYSTEM DISPLAY
STATUS ENGINE RELIGHT

SITUATION ASSESSMENT
DECISION

Consider APU Start Performance Computation down to Landing

APU Normal Flight Envelope
 If no damage
suspected, a relight
may be considered
Refer to QRH ENG
RELIGHT IN FLT

A relight attempt
should only be
considered after
completion of ECAM
actions
 The ENG SHUTDOWN
procedure is applied if
the crew believes there
is damage or after an
engine relight in flight
is unsuccessful.
Refer to PRO ABN ENG
1(2) SHUT DOWN
OBSTACLE NOT CLEARED – Maintain Green Dot Speed at MCT

The Level Off Altitude is

obtained here
OBSTACLE CLEARED
Revert to Standard Strategy
PF PM

EO LRC CEILING SET AND PULL AVAILABLE IN PROG PAGE

EO LRC SPEED CHECK AND SET QRH OEI CRUISE AT LRC Speed or FCOM OEI LRC

When V/S < 500 FT/MIN:

V/S – 500/MIN SET AND PULL

A/THR ON

REACHING LRC CEILING:

SPEED MANAGED
 When V/S < 500 ft/min
When the rate of descent becomes lower than 500 ft/min, the flight crew selects the V/S mode in
order to maintain rate of descent in compliance with the performance computation.

The A/THR must be re-engaged in order to maintain 300 kts.

 DESCENT TO LRC CEILING

Level Off Altitude TIME (MIN)

FUEL (KG)
DIST (NMs)
LRC CEILING
 LONG RANGE CRUISE DOWN TO LANDING

LRC Ceiling

Remaining Air Distance

Fuel used at LRC FL Fuel corrections Fuel used at LRC

down to Landing according to Delta FL down to
based on REF weight with REF Landing
weight weight
 REACHING LRC CEILING

SPEED ------------- MANAGED

EO LRC SPEED TOP OF DESCENT

Performance Check (N1, Fuel Flow, Mach, IAS):

FCOM PER-OEI-CRT or QRH PER

CRUISE AT LONG RANGE CRUISE SPEED
 PERFORMANCE CHECK
FCOM PER OEI DES 15 FCOM PER-OEI – ICQ or QRH
DESCENT – INITIALLY OBSTACLE IN CRUISE QUICK CHECK LONG RANGE
STRATEGY (Cruise at Long Range Speed down to Landing)
WHEN OBSTACLE CLEARED
- STANDARD STRATEGY TIME (MIN)
TIME (MIN) FUEL (KG)
FUEL (KG)
DIST (NMS)
Based on remaining AIR DIST to Diversion Airport
OBSTACLE STRATEGY STANDARD STRATEGY

INITIAL FL
Level Off Altitude
Obstacle Strategy
LRC CEILING
Standard Strategy
Fuel Management
- The fuel on board has to be managed to ensure that remaining engine has a
continuous fuel supply.
- The regulation of an imbalance within operating limits is the responsibility of the
flight crew.
- The Fuel Cross Feed valve must NOT be opened if a leak or any possibility of leak
exists.

On the FUEL Page, note down the quantity of fuel in each tank. After about 5
minutes check the FUEL Page again to see if the tanks on the failed engine has
depleted. If the quantity is still the same, then there is no fuel leak. This can also be
backed up by the normal Fuel Check formula.
FOB + Fuel Used = Fuel On Departure
Cross Feed Closed
Pros:
- Ensures that you will never cross feed into a leak.
- Fuel is isolated in the opposite wing from the live engine.

Cons:
- If the fuel is not managed adequately, fuel supplying the live
engine can reduce to a dangerously low level.
- Fuel remains isolated in the opposite wing.
Cross Feed Open

Total fuel on board will be available to the live

engine at all times.
- Opening the Cross Feed will not necessarily
reduce the rate at which the imbalance occurs
because the fuel pump's pressure can vary upto
10 psi between pumps.
Summary- Fuel Management
Fuel management after an Engine Shut Down is crew
responsibility.
- The Cross Feed valve must remain closed until it has been
positively established that no leak exists nor is it likely to occur.
- Fuel balancing must always be done with the QRH Checklist
- Opening the Cross Feed will not necessarily reduce the rate at
which the imbalance occurs.
- With the Cross Feed open, the total fuel on board is available to
the live engine at all times.
EMERGENCY DESCENT
An Emergency Descent should only be initiated on positive
confirmation that cabin altitude and rate of climb are
Excessive and Uncontrollable.
The flight crew MUST rely on the CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT
warning even if not confirmed on the CAB PRESS SYSTEM
page.
Difference between Explosive Decompression and
Rapid Decompression:

Explosive decompression is a change in

cabin pressure that occurs faster than the
lungs can decompress, which can cause
serious injury.
During rapid decompression, the lungs
can decompress faster than the cabin.
CABIN PRESSURE EXCESS CABIN ALTITUDE

A sudden uncontrollable and excessive Cabin Altitude which

requires an Emergency Descent to 10,000 ft or MEA.

Indications of Excessive and Uncontrollable Cabin Altitude:

The Cabin Altitude on ECAM will rise. It will start to pulse in

green at 8800 ft and turn to red at 9550 ft.
Master Warning is triggered
ECAM Message CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALTITUDE
CAB PRESS Page appears on Lower ECAM
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE

SUSPECT STRUCTURAL DAMAGE IN CASE OF A

LOUD BANG, OR HIGH CABIN VERTICAL SPEED
First Step - MEMORY ITEMS
• Both crew Don oxygen masks
• Both crew establish communication
• The PF will immediately initiate the descent
The use of AP & A/THR is strongly recommended for
an Emergency Descent

The FCU selections for an emergency descent are from

Right to Left
• ALT: Turn & Pull
• HDG: Turn & Pull
• SPEED: Pull
PF PM

CREW OXY MASK USE CREW OXY MASK USE

ALT TURN PULL SIGNS ON

HDG TURN PULL
SPD PULL

FMA ANNOUNCE FMA CHECK

It should be: THR IDLE, OP DES, HDG
If not “THR IDLE” - Move Thrust Levers to Idle
SPD BRK FULL
SECOND STEP – Perform the Read & Do procedure
from ECAM/QRH

PF PM

ALT : Turn to 10,000 ft or MEA Performs the Read & Do procedure from the
HDG : Turn 90 degrees. Consider terrain. ECAM or the QRH.
SPEED : If structural damage suspected
maintain current speed.
If not, accelerate by selecting Exp. Descent
OXY PAX MASK MAN ON CREW OXY MASK DILUTION
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The L/Gear can be lowered to increase the rate of descent.

However the aircraft has to be slowed to a VLO of 250 Kts, and
once lowered could accelerate to 280 Kts. However if
descending from higher Flight Levels like 370, 350 etc, the
speed may be 265/0.78 M and though Mach can be changed to
speed, there is a Mach limit of 0.6 M. It cannot be reduced to
0.59 immediately Therefore even if the speed can be reduced
to 250 Kts, lower the L/G when Mach reduces below 0.6 M. And
in case there is damage, do not increase to 280 Kts.
TCAS IN EMERGENCY DESCENT
➢ The TCAS Mode Selector must
remain on the TA/RA position.
➢ Avoidance of collision has priority
➢ Reduce the descent rate or
interrupt the descent maneuver if
required by the TCAS RA order.
➢ The TCAS AP/FD Mode will follow
an RA to Level Off.
 When Emergency Descent
completed:

➢ When ALT* engages retract Speed Brakes

➢ Confirm FMA that A/THR & AP are engaged
➢ Reduce Speed
➢ After taking off the Oxygen masks following
an Emergency Descent, Press to RESET the
Oxygen control slide in order to deactivate
the mask microphone and to cut off oxygen.
➢ Announce to the cabin that the descent is
complete
Calculate Fuel and Time to the
nearest airport by referring to the
QRH (Flight Without Cabin
Pressurisation)
PRACTISE STALL & RECOVERY FOR
STALL AWARENESS
ON SIMULATOR
To set up for a practise Stall:

INSTRUCTOR
AUTO PILOT -
FDs - OFF FPV (Bird) - ON ACTIVATES ALTN
OFF
LAW FROM IOS
To enter a Stall:

Thrust Levers – IDLE (A/THR Off)

Maintain V/S 0
As the speed reduces, a constant back
pressure on the sidestick will be required
to maintain a V/S of 0
 STALL INDICATION
Aural Stall WARNING
This is triggered when Angle of Attack exceeds a given threshold. It also depends on the
aircraft configuration. It provides sufficient margin to alert the crew in advance of the
actual Stall. The value of the AoA SW (Stall Warning) depends on the Mach number. At
high Mach numbers, the AoA SW is set at a value such that the warning occurs just
before encountering the pitch up effect and the buffeting.
It is available in all flight control law configurations and cannot be cancelled while the
Stall condition exists. It has priority over all other aural messages.
It is computed by the FACs and will activate provided one ADR is available.
Stall buffet is recognised by airframe vibrations. At some Mach numbers, buffet may
appear just before the aural stall warning.
There is no reason to overreact to a Stall Warning. The onset of the aural Stall Warning
does not mean that the aircraft is stalling. Only a gentle and smooth reaction is needed.
 STALL RECOVERY
Apply the Stall recovery technique as soon as the stall indications are recognised.
PF : “STALL, I HAVE CONTROL”
Unloading the Wing is the first priority. Pitch Down below the horizon
and Maintain Wings Level.
Reduce the AOA by applying a Nose Down pitch order with the side stick.
Ensure Speed Brake is retracted.
Minimising the loss of altitude is secondary to reducing the Angle of Attack and regaining lift.
When out of stall condition, increase pitch gently and smoothly
Be aware of the Secondary Stall condition.
Below FL 200, during Stall recovery the crew can select Flap 1 in order to increase lift. When Stall
indications have stopped, smoothly increase thrust to regain the aircraft’s energy.
(Some pilots are under the mistaken impression that the speed has to be out of VLS to take Flap 1. This
is not so. The only limitation to adhere to is, FL Below 200 to take Flap 1)
If the engines are at Idle thrust a considerable time may elapse before the actual thrust increases to the
thrust required by the Thrust Levers (Upto 8 seconds).
 Secondary Stall

A Secondary Stall may be triggered while attempting

to recover from a stall. This usually happens as a
result of trying to hasten stall recovery.
 • Do not apply maximum
thrust on Stall recognition.
• With under wing engines,
setting high thrust will
increase the Pitch Up attitude
preventing stall recovery.

USE OF THRUST
 SUMMARY

First the AOA must be reduced.

Second, when the stall clues have disappeared,
increase the speed if needed. Progressively
increase the thrust with care, due to the thrust
pitch effect.
CAUTION:

DO NOT CLIMB BACK TO THE INITIAL ALTITUDE

WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM ATC TO AVOID
TRAFFIC
STALL WARNING AT LIFTOFF
A damaged AOA probe may cause a spurious Stall
warning to sound in the cockpit at lift off.
Simultaneous apply TOGA thrust, fly a target pitch angle
of 15 degrees and keep wings level.
If the aural stall warning is still active when a safe flight
path and speed are established, then the Stall warning
can be considered as false.
STALL IN APPROACH CONFIGURATION
Establish the aircraft in a visual circuit, in downwind, abeam the runway in Config 1 with all
systems in normal configuration to commence the Standard visual circuit. Perform a visual
pattern and configure the aircraft in accordance with the SOP. The aircraft will be set up in
Alternate Law (Demonstration of Alternate Law) from IOS. When commencing the base turn,
reduce thrust to idle, maintain the circuit altitude and continue the approach visually.

Aircraft shall be configured as it is always configured:

i.e. Flaps 1
Flaps 2
Landing Gear Down
Flaps 3
STALL RECOVERY
Apply the Stall recovery technique as soon as the stall indications are recognised.
PF : “STALL, I HAVE CONTROL”
Unloading the Wing is the first priority. Pitch Down and Roll Wings Level.
Reduce the AOA by applying a Nose Down pitch order with the side stick. Add thrust.
Ensure Speed Brake is retracted.
Minimising the loss of altitude is secondary to reducing the Angle of Attack and regaining lift.
When out of stall condition, increase pitch gently and smoothly and reduce the flap by one step
as in Go Around
PF: “Go Around Flaps”
PM : Moves Flap Lever to Flap 2 position
When ‘Positive Climb’
PM : “POSITIVE CLIMB”
PF: “Gear Up”
PM : Moves the L/G Lever Up and announces “Gear Up”
Be aware of the Secondary Stall condition.
When Flight Path recovered climb back to the
Initial Altitude (Circuit Altitude) as there will not
be any other aircraft in the Circuit Pattern
DUAL RA
FAULT
 In Normal Law, Radio
Altimeters are used to activate
Location
the Flare Mode for landing. Location
of
Antennas
LO
A single RA Failure has minimal
consequences other than the
approach capability is reduced. The
GPWS is lost with RA 1 Fault.

A Dual RA Fault has more

consequences.

The Approach Capability is reduced

to CAT I with gear down.
ECAM AND
STATUS
DISPLAY
DISPLAY WITH LANDING GEAR UP
The aircraft reverts from Normal to Direct Law as
the systems cannot calculate the height above
the ground for Flare Mode
On approach, Flare Law becomes active
when L/G is selected down and provided AP
is disconnected.
At this point “USE MAN PITCH TRIM” is
displayed.
After landing Ground Law becomes
active when the Main Landing Gear
is compressed and pitch attitude is
less than 2.5 degrees.
It is not possible to capture the Glide Slope
using the APPR pb, however the Localiser
can be captured using the LOC pb.
As the autopilot gains are no longer updated
with the RA signal, the AP/FD behaviour may
be unsatisfactory when approaching the
ground.
The final stages of the approach must be
flown using raw data in order to avoid
possible excessive roll rates if LOC is still
engaged.
Calculate the
Landing
Distance from
the In-Flight
performance
Table in the
QRH.
Since the aircraft will be in Direct Law, apply
Direct Law checklist.
For landing use Approach Speed VREF + 10 Kts.
Flap 3
CHECK
MINIMA
DISPLAY WITH LANDING GEAR DOWN
No auto-callouts
on approach
No “RETARD” call.
Since GPWS is
inoperative, terrain
awareness is very
important.
 TCAS
This module describes the TCAS System and
its operation

It also covers the difference between the

conventional TCAS System and the AP/FD
TCAS System
The TCAS detects any aircraft equipped with a
transponder flying in its vicinity
The System displays potential and predicted collision targets
and issues vertical orders to prevent conflict.
 THE DETECTION CAPABILITY IS
9900 FT LIMITED TO INTRUDERS FLYING
WITHIN

A MAXIMUM RANGE OF 30
NMs ON EITHER SIDES AND
UPTO 80 NMs
LONGITUDINALLY
80 NM
AND

WITHIN A MAXIMUM RANGE 80

9900 FT OF 9900 FT ABOVE AND
40
BELOW THE AIRCRAFT.

30 NM 30 NM
DISPLAY SYMBOLS
 WHEN TA IS GENERATED

“ TRAFFIC TRAFFIC ”

“TCAS, I HAVE CONTROL ”

PF (Announces Bearing and Distance from the
ND)

If Range of ND
If the ND Mode is
above 40 NMs a
PLAN a “CHANGE
“REDUCE
MODE” message
RANGE” message
is displayed
appears.

NO EVASIVE MANOEUVRE SHOULD BE INITIATED

WHEN RA IS GENERATED

DISCONNECTS AUTOPILOT

“ AUTOPILOT OFF ”
PF
“ FDs OFF ”

PM SETS FDs OFF

PM
 PF PM
FOLLOWS V/S GREEN SECTOR TO ATTAIN A
MINIMUM V/S OF 1500 FEET WITHIN 5 MONITOR PF ACTIONS
SECONDS

PF TO AVOID EXCESSIVE MANOEUVRES AND

KEEP THE V/S JUST OUTSIDE THE RED AREA

IF V/S IS INSUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE SAFE

VERTICAL SEPARATION, A “INCREASE CLIMB”
OR “INCREASE DESCEND” MESSAGE IS
ANNUNCIATED TWICE INFORMS ATC “TCAS RA”

WHEN CLEAR OF CONFLICT FLIGHT CREW MUST RESUME NORMAL NAVIGATION IN

ACCORDANCE WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS.
RESUME A NOMINAL V/S TO REASSIGNED ALTITUDE

REQUESTS PERFORMS THE ACTIONS

“ FDs ON “ FDs ON
“ AUTOPILOT ON “ SETS AUTOPILOT ON
 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

IN RVSM AIRSPACE OR
IF CLOSE TO TARGET ADJUST VERTICAL REENGAGE NAV BY USING RESUME NORMAL
ALTITUDE USE V/S AND LATERAL DIRECT TO OR PUSHING OPERATIONS
1000. IN OTHER CASES NAVIGATION HDG ON FCU
SELECT OPEN CLB/DES
 A GO AROUND PROCEDURE
MUST BE PERFORMED
RA TRIGGERED
“CLIMB” OR WHEN A
“INCREASE RA
CLIMB” “CLIMB”
INITIATE OR
GO AROUND
PROCEDURE
“INCREASE CLIMB”
IS TRIGGERED ON
FINAL APPROACH
 TCAS INTRUDER
WITH NO
REPORTED ALTITUDE

THE RELATIVE ALTITUDE DOES NOT APPEAR ON ND

THE TCAS NEVER TRIGGERS ANY RA

THE TCAS INHIBITS THE TA WHEN OWN AIRCRAFT ALTITUDE IS ABOVE 15500 FT
 AP/FD TCAS
THE AP/FD TCAS MODE IS A VERTICAL GUIDANCE MODE OF THE
AP/FD.

IN CASE AN RA IS GENERATED, THIS MODE AUTOMATICALLY

ENGAGES TO ASSIST THE CREW TO FOLLOW THE RA ORDERS,
AND TO REVERT TO THE INITIAL TRAJECTORY:

AUTOMATICALLY IF THE AP IS ENGAGED

MANUALLY WITH THE GUIDANCE OF THE FDs, IF THE AP IS NOT

ENGAGED

WHEN TCAS IS OPERATING IN TA ONLY MODE, THE AP/FD TCAS

MODE IS INHIBITED
WHEN TCAS ESTIMATES A POSSIBLE
COLLISION THREAT
IT GENERATES A TA

THE AP/FD TCAS MODE AUTOMATICALLY ARMS

TCAS APPEARS ON FMA TO INFORM THAT AP/FD MODE WILL

BE AVAILABLE

IF TCAS IS NOT ANNUNCIATED BLUE ON THE FMA, REVERT

TO BASIC TCAS PROCEDURE IN CASE OF RA
 WHEN THE TCAS CONSIDERS THE
INTRUDER TO BE A REAL COLLISION
THREAT
IT GENERATES A RA

THE AP/FD TCAS MODE AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGES

TCAS APPEARS ON FMA

IF A/THR IS DISCONNECTED, IT AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES

ARMED OR ACTIVE DEPENDING ON THRUST LEVER POSITION

THE V/S SPEED SCALE ON THE PFD INDICATES THE VERTICAL

SPEED RANGE WITHIN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD FLY

IF AN RA IS TRIGGERED WHEN THE AIRCRAFT IS CLOSE TO ITS PERFORMANCE LIMITS,

THE RA VERTICAL SPEED TARGET MAY NOT BE ACHIEVED WITH THE AUTOPILOT. THE
CREW MUST TAKEOVER IF REQUIRED
WHEN THE TCAS CONSIDERS THAT THERE
IS NO MORE COLLISION THREAT

“ CLEAR OF CONFLICT ”
ALERT IS TRIGGERED

THE AP/FD SYSTEM REVERT TO THE VERTICAL SPEED MODE

AND

WILL CLIMB OR DESCEND TO THE FCU SELECTED ALTITUDE

 PRIORITY

GPWS
TCAS WINDHSEAR
STALL

ALWAYS RESPECT STALL , WINDSHEAR AND GPWS WARNING

 UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION

Causes and Symptoms Detection Level Off ADR Check ECAM Fly The
Threats Procedure ACTIONS Aircraft

➢ The causes need to be known and identified in order to avoid them and
their consequences

➢ Might be difficult to detect

➢ Good knowledge of the symptoms is important for:

- Early detection
- Taking appropriate decision
CAUSES AND THREATS
➢ Water (Heavy Rain)
➢ Severe Icing
➢ Loss of Heating
➢ Ice Crystals
➢ Radome Damage
➢ Dust, Volcanic Ash, Insect, Bee
Nests
➢ Covers not removed from the
probes
➢ Static/Pitot tubes misconnected
to the Air Data Modules
The most likely reason for erroneous
airspeed or altitude information is an
obstruction of the pitot or static
probes.
The ADRs detect most of the equipment failures
affecting the airspeed or altitude indications.

These failures lead to:

Loss of the associated speed or altitude

indications in the cockpit.

Trigger the associated ECAM Alerts.

 Depending on the affected probe, i.e. pitot or static probe, different indications in the cockpit
will become unreliable. The crew should be aware that some of the usual clues to fly could be
unreliable as indicated:

Data Pitot Obstructed Static Obstructed

Indicated Speed/ Mach Erroneous Erroneous

Altitude OK Erroneous
Vertical Speed OK Erroneous
FPV OK Erroneous
AP/FD Erroneous Erroneous
ATC Altitude Reporting OK Erroneous
There are cases where the ADRs do not detect a
discrepancy and no ECAM alert is triggered such
as blocked static or pitot tube. The cockpit
indications may appear to be normal when they are
actually false.
Erroneous speed or altitude indications can be suspected in the
following cases:

➢ Speed discrepancy between ADR 1, 2, 3 and standby indication

➢ The fluctuation of the indicated Air Speed or of the Pressure
Altitude
➢ Abnormal correlation between basic flight parameters (IAS, altitude,
pitch, thrust, rate of climb
➢ STALL and OVERSPEED warnings or FLAP RELIEF on ECAM that
are in contradiction with at least one of the indicated airspeeds
➢ Impossibility of extending the L/G by the normal L/G System.
 SYMPTOMS
Speed Related Cues:
➢ Abnormal large speed fluctuation
➢ Speed trend differences
➢ Unusual speed / Aerodynamic noise relationship
➢ Speed indication not coherent with the flight path

Autothrust / Autopilot Related Cues:

➢ Erratic A/THR behaviour
➢ Abnormal AP/FD behaviour

Altitude Related Cues:

➢ Positive or Negative V/S while in Level Flight
➢ Inconsistency Between Radio Altitude and Pressure Altitude
➢ Constant Indicated Altitude while in Climb or Descent

Warning Related Cues:

➢ Unexpected / Undue Warnings / Cautions
➢ Simultaneous Activation of Overspeed and Stall Warning

System Related Cues:

➢ Automatic Flap Retraction
➢ Slat Speed Lock Function
➢ Non-Extension of L/G via normal control
Some of the ECAM Warnings
 DETECTION
WHATEVER THE SITUATION,
RELY ON THE STALL WARNING

IF THE SAFE CONDUCT OF THE FLIGHT PATH IS :

➢ IMPACTED
i.e.:
➢ Pitch or Thrust not steady APPLY MEMORY ITEMS
➢ Pitch or Thrust unknown GPS Altitude--- Display on MCDU
➢ Flight Path Change
➢ Situational Awareness Lost
➢ Adverse Environment When at, or above MSA or
Circuit Altitude, LEVEL OFF
FOR TROUBLESHOOTING
NOT IMPACTED
i.e.:
➢ When Stable on an MAINTAIN PITCH AND THRUST
appropriate flight path
➢ When Pitch and Thrust steady
AND known
 MEMORY ITEMS
Simultaneously AP OFF, A/THR OFF and FDs Off
Below thrust reduction altitude: Pitch to 15 degrees and
set TOGA Thrust
Above thrust reduction altitude and below FL 100: Pitch
to 10 degrees and set Climb Thrust.
Above FL 100 set 5 degrees in Pitch and Climb Thrust.
Maintain flap configuration if in Flap 0 to Flap 3
If in Config Full select Config 3 and maintain
Speed Brake check retracted and L/G Check Up
PITCH / THRUST 5⁰ / CLIMB

FL 100

10⁰ / CLIMB

THRUST REDUCTION ALTITUDE

⁰
15 /TOGA
GPS ALTITUDE---- Display on MCDU
 LEVEL OFF FOR TROUBLESHOOTING

In situations where most primary flight data are erroneous, some indications may
still remain correct and should be used to help the crew stabilise the flight path.
This is the case for the FPV, reliable if the static ports are not blocked and for the
GPS altitude displayed on the MCDU.
The Radio Altimeter may be used at low altitude to determine altitude.
Flight Crew must apply the “ Unreliable Airspeed Indic/ADR Check Proc” from the
QRH.
Check the actual Slat/Flap configuration on ECAM since Flap auto-retraction may
occur.
Adjust pitch in order to fly the required flight path.
When target pitch is reached, adjust thrust to target.
When aircraft flight path is stabilised the crew can problem-solve.
Sometimes two or even all three ADRs might provide
identical but erroneous data (due icing, volcanic ash
etc) . Therefore do not instinctively reject an ADR that is
suspected to be affected.
If the troubleshooting procedure enables the crew to
identify the affected ADR(s), then a normal situation can
be resumed.
If the affected ADR cannot be identified, or all ADRs are
affected, then the flight crew will fly without speed
reference, using the pitch and thrust tables.
AFFECTED ADR IDENTIFICATION
PROBE/WINDOWS HEAT ON
ALL SPEED INDICATIONS CROSSCHECK

If at least one ADR confirmed reliable:

➢ RELIABLE AIR DATA USE
➢ UNRELIABLE ADR pbs OFF

IF affected ADRs cannot be identified, or

all ADRs affected:
➢ KEEP ONE ADR ON
➢ TWO ADR pbs OFF
FLYING USING PITCH /
THRUST TABLES
➢ First the crew has to turn OFF two
ADRs and keep one ADR ON, to
prevent the flight control laws from
using two consistent but unreliable
ADR data.
➢ Then the crew will fly the aircraft
without speed references, using
pitch and thrust settings.
➢ The crew will find in the QRH,
the tables relative to each phase of
flight, taking into account, the
aircraft weight, configuration and
altitude.
 FLYING TECHNIQUE (Back to basics)

➢ If the pitch is above the target pitch, increase the thrust and maintain the altitude.

➢ If the pitch is below the target pitch, decrease the thrust and maintain the altitude
LANDING WILL BE IN CONFIG 3

If the failure is due to radome destruction, the

drag will increase and therefore N1 must be
increased by 5%. Fuel flow will increase by 27%
BACK UP SPEED SCALE (BUSS)

In order to decrease the workload in case of unreliable

speed, Airbus has developed the BUSS that replaces
the pitch and thrust tables. This indication is based on
angle of attack sensor information and the AOA
information is provided by the IRS and not through the
ADRs. This enables selecting all ADRs OFF without
losing the Stall WARNING PROTECTION.
When below FL 250, if the flight crew cannot identify
the affected ADR, or if the speed indications are still
unreliable, the flight crew turns OFF all ADRs and flies
the aircraft using the BUSS.
The flight crew must first apply the associated ECAM
actions.
When the ADRs are OFF, the PFD changes to BUSS.
ACTIVATION OF BUSS
REVERSIBLE BUSS

➢ On some MSN the BUSS is activated and deactivated with two BKUP
SPD/ALT pb on the Main Instrument Panel- Left of the Capt PFD and Right
of the F/O PFD. This BUSS is reversible.
ECAM MEMO : BKUP SPD/ALT

IRREVERSIBLE BUSS

➢ On some MSN the BUSS is displayed when all the ADRs are turned OFF.
The activation of this BUSS is not reversible.
The following occurs on both PFDs:
➢ The BUSS replaces the normal speed scale.
➢ It is based on Angle of Attack (AOA) information, and enables
the crew to safely fly the aircraft without any valid airspeed
indication.
➢ The GPS altitude replaces the barometric altitude but the last
two digits are replaced by amber lines (due to GPS
inaccuracies)
➢ The V/S indication in unavailable.
When the BUSS is active:

➢ The stall warning remains operative

➢ The flight control law is ALTN LAW (The high
angle of attack protection and VMO/MMO warnings
are lost)
➢ Direct Law when the gear is down
Follow ECAM actions, apply the ADR 1+2+3
FAULT QRH procedure.
The QRH procedure provides guidance to :
➢ Manually control the cabin pressure
➢ Prepare the Approach and Landing
FLYING TECHNIQUE

PF adjust the pitch and thrust to maintain the AOA in the

Green area of the speed scale.

CAUTION: WHEN FLYING USING BUSS, DO NOT USE THE

SPEED BRAKES
APPROACH

The flight crew should fly a stabilised approach and change the aircraft
configuration with the wings level.
Fly to the lower part of the Green band
Then extend Flaps
Again fly to the lower part of the Green band.
Then extend Flaps again
Landing Gear is extended by gravity after Flaps 2 using gravity extension
checklist. No retraction is available.
When L/G Down, Direct Law.
Landing is in Flap 3
Fly the Bug (indicated VAPP)
GO AROUND

There is no L/G retraction

Before retracting the next Flap configuration,
fly the upper part of the Green band.
FUEL LEAK
A leak may be detected by the following analysis:
1) The FOB in flight added to the ‘Fuel Used’ is significantly less than the fuel
on departure.

For example:

Fuel at Departure 18 T
FOB at present 13 T
Fuel Used 4 T

Result : 1 T discrepancy
2) Flight Plan discrepancy.

The FOB is significantly different from the estimated flight plan fuel.
Other Means of Detecting Fuel Leak:
ECAM Warning “FUEL: F USED/FOB DISAGREE” (in
some MSN)
Destination EFOB turns to amber on MCDU
“DESTINATION EFOB BELOW MIN” message on
MCDU
Passengers or crew observes fuel spray from
engine/pylon or wing
Fuel is smelled in the cabin
The fuel flow is excessive
A fuel imbalance is developing
FIRST PILOT WHO
NOTICES AN FUEL PAGE DISPLAYED
ADVISORY ---ANALYSE
ANNOUNCE:

“ADVISORY ON FUEL
SYSTEM” ECAM ADVISORY CONDITIONS
-- CHECK
 PF: ORDER “FUEL LEAK
PROCEDURE
WHEN FUEL
LEAK IS
SUSPECTED:
PM: FUEL LEAK
PROCEDURE APPLY FROM
QRH
LEAK LOCATION

A fuel leak can come from 4 possible areas:

1) Engine / Pylon
2) Wing Tank
3) Centre Tank
4) APU Fuel Line
The QRH guides the crew in determining which of
these 4 locations the fuel is leaking from.

A leak from the engine / pylon can be confirmed by:

- Excessive Fuel Flow indication
- A visual check
- QRH Actions
To be applied when the Leak is confirmed
LEAK FROM The QRH guides the shutdown of the engine
ENGINE/PYLON on the affected side.

CONFIRMED
Refer to the Engine Shutdown Procedure.

The Cross-feed valve can now be opened to

rebalance the fuel quantity or to enable the
use of fuel from both wings.

DO NOT RESTART ENGINE

To be applied when Leak from engine/pylon is
not confirmed or Leak not located
If a leak is not located, the QRH gives 2 methods to determine leak
location.

CASE 1

Determining if fuel leak is coming from engine / pylon or wing

tanks.

CASE 2

Determining if fuel leak is coming from the Centre Tank or APU Fuel
Line.
 FIRST TASK

Isolate Left and Right Fuel

systems.

The QRH guides you with the

following procedure:

The QRH calls for stopping

fuel transfer between the
Left and Right systems.
FUEL X FEED MAINTAIN
CLOSED)

Monitor the depletion

rate of each inner wing
tank.
CASE 1

(Determining if fuel leak is coming from the engine / pylon or wing tanks)
If one inner tank depletes faster than the other by at least 300 kgs in less than 30 minutes:
The QRH guides for the shutdown of the engine on the affected side.
Center Tank Pumps On
Monitor Fuel Leak

IF LEAK STOPS
- the fuel leak can be confirmed from the engine.
The cross-feed valve can now be opened to rebalance fuel quantity or to enable the use of fuel from both wings.
DO NOT RESTART AFFECTED ENGINE

If leak continues after the engine has shut down:

- a leak from the wing tanks may be suspected.
Consider engine restart
This will use some of the remaining fuel in the wing tank that is leaking.
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

One Tank Depletes Faster ?

Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes
One Tank Depletes Faster ? Case 1
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes Case 1
One Tank Depletes Faster ?

Shutdown the Engine

Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes Case 1
One Tank Depletes Faster ?

Shutdown the Engine

Leak Stops?
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes
One Tank Depletes Faster ? Case 1

Shutdown the Engine

Leak Stops? Yes

 Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes
One Tank Depletes Faster ? Case 1

Shutdown the Engine

Leak Stops? Yes

Use Fuel X Feed As Required

DO NOT RESTART THE ENGINES
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes
One Tank Depletes Faster ? Case 1

Shutdown the Engine

NO
Leak Stops?
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes
One Tank Depletes Faster ? Case 1

Shutdown the Engine

NO
Leak Stops?

CONSIDER ENGINE RESTART

Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

Yes
One Tank Depletes Faster ? Case 1

Shutdown the Engine

NO
Leak Stops?

CONSIDER ENGINE RESTART

- DO NOT APPLY FUEL IMBALANCE

PROCEDURE
- Maintain Fuel X Feed Closed
CASE 2

Determining if fuel leak is coming from the Centre Tank or APU fuel line)

If both inner tanks deplete at similar rates but the total fuel onboard is
depleting faster than expected:
- a leak from the Centre or APU fuel line may be suspected.
If fuel smell in cabin, and if APU On turn APU OFF
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

NO
Case 2 One Tank Depletes Faster ?
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

NO
Case 2 One Tank Depletes Faster ?

FUEL
SMELL?
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

NO
Case 2 One Tank Depletes Faster ?

FUEL YES
SMELL?
Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

NO
Case 2 One Tank Depletes Faster ?

FUEL YES
SMELL?

Switch Off APU

 Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

NO
Case 2 One Tank Depletes Faster ?

No FUEL
SMELL?
 Feed each engine by the respective wing tank

NO
Case 2 One Tank Depletes Faster ?

No FUEL
SMELL?
WHEN A LEAK IS LAND ASAP SIGNIFIES A TIME
CRITICAL SITUATION WHICH
CONFIRMED REQUIRES A LANDING AT THE
NEAREST AIRPORT AT WHICH A SAFE
LANDING CAN BE MADE.
When fuel quantity in any inner tank is less than 3 Tons, turn Centre tank pumps On.
( As the crew has been told by FUEL LEAK procedure to set the Centre Tank Pumps to
OFF, it has been considered that some flight crews might be confused, and would
disregard the ‘FUEL AUTO FEED FAULT’ and adhere strictly to the FUEL LEAK paper
procedure. So they would not start the Centre Tank pumps again when the “FUEL
AUTO FEED FAULT” caution triggers and leave them OFF.
The “3 Tons…” line has been introduced to cover this case. This line guarantees that
the flight crew will set the Centre Tank pumps back ON, even if they previously
disregard the ‘FUEL AUTO FEED “ caution. This will allow consumption of the fuel
remaining in the Centre Tank.
 Approach and Landing can be
done even with one wing full
and the other empty.
APPROACH
CONSIDERATION

DO NOT USE REVERSERS

Result of taking reversers

SMOKE AND
FIRE
PROTECTION
Smoke or fire is a critical situation and if the
source cannot immediately be identified and
extinguished, a diversion must be initiated.
 Smoke may come
from:
• Cargo & Avionics bay
• Cabin equipment & furnishings
• The bleed system following an
engine or APU failure
• Air conditioning malfunction
• Aircraft Electrical faults
 The smoke will be
detected by sensors
SMOKE triggering an ECAM
DETECTION warning OR identified
by the crew
 SMOKE
WITHOUT ECAM
WARNING
If smoke is detected by
the crew without any
ECAM warning, or if
the origin of the smoke
is in doubt, the flight
crew must refer to the
QRH
SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS
SMOKE procedure.
 If ECAM SMOKE warning is
triggered, the flight crew must
apply the ECAM procedure.
If the “AVIONICS SMOKE“
ECAM caution is activated, the
ECAM flight crew can apply the
ECAM actions first, or refer
WARNING directly to the
SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS
SMOKE procedure in the QRH.
If smoke is confirmed, the
following procedure must be
applied
QRH SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE Procedure

The procedure takes into

account three decisive
challenges common to non
immediately identified
sources of smoke:

The need for a two-

The difficulty to
The shortage of time way cockpit/cabin
identify the source
communication.
 TIME
In a smoke situation, timing is critical. A fire may become uncontrollable in
as little as 8 minutes and in this case the crew will have as little as 15
minutes to bring the aircraft to the ground.
For this reason the SMOKE/AVNCS SMOKE ECAM and QRH paper
procedures both start with a LAND ASAP message. In the frame of this
procedure, the LAND ASAP message requests crews to be prepared for a
diversion.
The “IMMEDIATE LANDING” term found in the QRH paper procedure
means: ‘Accept exceptional circumstances such as a tailwind landing,
ditching, off-airport landing etc’.
DIFFICULTY
 The smoke sources that are
easier to locate, because they
have an ECAM and/or a local
The known sources of warning, and for which there
Smoke can be classified are available means of fire
treatment:
into two different
categories:
CARGO
LAVATORY
The smoke sources that AVIONICS

are more difficult to

locate, which may, or AIR COND
may not, be covered by
an ECAM alert and that
CABIN EQUIPMENT
are considered more
difficult to deal with: These three smoke sources call for single
SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE
procedure.
The QRH SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE
paper procedure is to be applied whenever
the source of smoke is suspected to be
AVIONICS, AIR COND, CABIN EQUIPMENT
or in case of doubt about the origin. If
another smoke warning is triggered (e.g
LAVATORY SMOKE), the crew must apply
the dedicated existing procedure.
Need for Two Ways Cockpit / • Establishing good two-way
Cabin Communication communication with the cabin
crew is essential in a Smoke
situation.
• In case of smoke in the cabin
the cabin crew should inform
the flight crew as soon as
possible and should follow up
on smoke dissipation.
• In case of smoke in the
cockpit, the feedback from the
cabin crew may prove useful to
identify the source.
• It is so important that “
CKPT/CAB COM……ESTABLISH”
is an action step in the
procedure.
 The trigger of a smoke alert is either an
ECAM message, or a visual or olfactory
perception of smoke. As soon as an
alert is triggered for which there is no
dedicated procedure, the crew should
PROCEDURE apply the SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS
SMOKE procedure. Both ECAM and
PHILOSOPHY QRH paper procedure are totally
compatible with one another.

The LAND ASAP message alerts the

crew to anticipate a diversion.
 The procedure is designed around the
following action blocks:

IMMEDIATE ACTION AT ANY TIME ITEMS DIVERSION TROUBLESHOOTING

DECISION
 If Smoke is confirmed, the following procedure must be applied.
They have been designed to be quick, simple and reversible.

The purpose is to:

IMMEDIATE - Protect the flight crew

ACTIONS
- Avoid further contamination of the cockpit & cabin

- Avionics ventilation air is extracted overboard

- Establish communication with the cabin crew

If the smoke or fire has been
extinguished, then the crew
must decide whether it is safe
to continue with the flight or
divert.
If the smoke source cannot
be immediately identified
and isolated, a diversion
and descent must be
initiated before entering
the SMOKE ORIGIN
IDENTIFICATION AND
FIGHTING part of the
procedure.
BOXED
These itemsITEMS
may be
applied at ANY time
after the immediate
actions if the smoke
becomes the greatest
threat or if the
situation become
unmanageable,
provided that the
Immediate Actions
have been
completed.
DIVERSION DECISION MAKING

• The crew should consider the following two

questions, which constitute the core of the
SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS procedure:
• Is the smoke source immediately obvious,
accessible and extinguishable?
• If this is the case, can it be isolated?
If the answer to these questions is YES, then this
is the end of the procedure.
On the other hand, if the answer
to at least one of the two questions is
‘No’, then the diversion must be
initiated. In case of a doubt also, a
diversion must be initiated.

Once the diversion is

initiated, the troubleshooting may
be carried on in an attempt to
identify and fight the origin.
 The identification is
undertaken by isolating
different systems and
SMOKE ORIGIN assessing smoke dissipation.
IDENTIFICATION
AND FIGHTING The different smoke sources
listed for troubleshooting in
the procedure appear in the
most probable to the least
probable order.
• If Air conditioning
The crew will enter one of the
Smoke suspected
three paragraphs depending on
where they suspect the source of
the Smoke
• If Cabin
Equipment Smoke
suspected

• If AVNCS/Cockpit
Smoke suspected
IF AIR CONDITION SMOKE SUSPECTED

If smoke initially comes out of the cockpit’s ventilation outlets, or if smoke is detected in the cabin,
the crew may suspect AIR COND SMOKE. In addition, several other SMOKE warning may be
triggered (cargo, lavatory, avionics)
In paragraph one, the flight crew will attempt to isolate the air conditioning systems.
If APU is in use, ensure the BLEED is OFF.
Turn PACK 1 OFF to isolate the air source from the system.
(When BLOWER & EXTRACT are in the OVRD position, a single PACK may not be able to maintain
cabin pressure)
If smoke continues, isolate air source from PACK 2.
If smoke still continues, restore PACK 2, and place BLOWER and EXTRACT to OVRD. This will vent
air conditioning air directly overboard.
IF CABIN EQUIPMENT
SMOKE SUSPECTED

Generally, the cabin crew will

be responsible for the fire
fighting procedure in the
cabin. It is essential that the
cabin crew informs the
cockpit about the location,
density and severity of the
smoke or fire.
In paragraph two, the flight crew
will attempt to search and isolate
the cabin electrical systems.

• EMER EXIT LIGHT ON

• COMMERCIAL OFF
• SMOKE DISSIPATION CHECK
• FAULTY EQPT Search/Isolate
 If the application of paragraphs
one and two has been
unsuccessful, or if the source of
IF AVNCS/CKPT the smoke is still undetermined,
the flight crew will enter
SMOKE paragraph three.
SUSPECTED
The flight crew will consider setting the
Emergency Electrical Configuration to shed
as much electrical equipment as possible
Selecting EMER ELEC GEN 1
Line to OFF, allows one fuel
pump in each wing to remain
operational in Emergency
Electrical Configuration.
Selecting EMER ELEC PWR to
MAN ON will drop RAT and
power up the emergency
generator.
 Selecting GEN 2 OFF
now puts the aircraft
into Emergency
Electrical
Configuration. This
will shed 75% of the
electrical load. The
remaining systems
are powered via the
circuit breakers on the
overhead panel.
Two different procedures
can be displayed on the If AVNCS SMOKE is NOT triggered, apply the
ECAM depending if the ECAM actions for ELEC EMER CONFIG without
AVNCS SMOKE is resetting GENs 1+2. The purpose is to shed
triggered or the crew electrical load and not restore generators.
manually sets Emergency
Electrical Configuration.
If AVNCS SMOKE is
triggered, the ECAM The AVNCS SMOKE ECAM procedure guides the
displays a specific crew to restore generators before landing to
procedure that takes into perform the landing in normal electrical
configuration (and normal braking).
account the smoke
detection.
If ELEC EMER CONFIG was manually set, refer to
the QRH checklist to restore generators before
landing.
SMOKE/ FUMES
REMOVAL
If at any time smoke removal becomes priority-
Apply the following appropriate steps, while descending to FL 100 or
MEA. The smoke removal procedure does not stop the smoke source
but rather aims at removing the smoke from the cockpit.

If fuel vapours, leave Cabin Fans On to If no fuel vapours, the procedure

prevent fuel vapours from accumulating stops recirculation of the cabin
with the risk of explosion.
air, increases ventilation and sets
Fuel vapours may enter the cabin via the cabin altitude ready to
Bleed system. depressurise.
Turning the PACKS OFF would prevent
Initiate a Descent
this.
Notify ATC
Once the first step of the REMOVAL OF
SMOKE/FUMES procedure has been
applied, the flight crew will return to the
SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS Smoke procedure
At FL 100 or MEA

On reaching FL 100 or MEA, the remaining

REMOVAL OF SMOKE/FUMES procedure will be
completed.
In EMER ELEC CONFIG, putting the APU Master
Switch to ON connects the batteries for a
maximum of 3 minutes, allowing manual control of
the outflow valve
Control the Outflow valve manually by setting CAB MODE SEL to MAN
and V/S Control to FULL UP.
At FL 100 or MEA/MORA when differential pressure less than 1 psi,
open RAM AIR.
The most effective smoke removal is the use of RAM AIR
Turn APU MASTER SW OFF to conserve battery life.
Consider opening cockpit window (Max speed 200kts)
ELECTRICAL
EMERGENCY
CONFIGURATION
First pilot who notices
cancels the warning and
announces title of the failure.
With the loss of AC BUS 1+2,
the aircraft electrical supply
will be on batteries only.
Only PFD 1 and Upper EWD
are available and CM1
becomes PF.
ELEC EMER CONFIG

APPROACH PREPARATION

APPROACH

LANDING
 DETECTION

CM 1 CM2

FLY THE AIRCRAFT LOSS OF AP/FD and A/THR

NAVIGATE LAND ASAP Short Term Decision

Performs
PF : “ECAM ACTIONS” ECAM ACTIONS

COMMUNICATE : “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”

AP, FDs and A/THR are lost.
CM1 will have to manually fly the aircraft
The RAT automatically extends and
powers the Blue Hydraulic circuit which
drives the emergency generator. This will
take approximately 8 seconds.. Once the
RAT has dropped and powered up the
emergency generator, the AC and DC ESS
SHED BUSSES are powered.
ND 1 now becomes available.
SYSTEMS REMAINING TO FLY
• FLT CTL: Alternate Law until L/G Down
• FLT INS: PFD 1, ND 1, ECAM Upper DU, ISIS
• ENG: Thrust in Manual Control, FADEC, ENG A.Ice, Fuel Gravity Feeding
• AIR COND/PRESS/VENT: CPC 1 and Packs
• PNEU: BMC 1 and X Bleed Man CTL, Oxygen
Systems Remaining to Navigate
• AUTO FLT: FMGC 1, MCDU 1
• NAV : ADR 1, IR 1, VOR 1, ADF 1, DME 1, ILS 1
 Systems
COMM: RMP 1, ACP 1+2, VHF 1, HF 1, ATC 1
Remaining to
Communicate
All equipment that remains
powered is supplied via the
CBs on the overhead panel
(except for equipment that
is supplied by Hot Busses)

Turn FDs off (to remove the

flags) and select FPV.
The aircraft is in Alternate
Law
Once a safe flight path is
established, ECAM actions
should be carried out.
ECAM ACTIONS
As only the EWD is available, disciplined
use of the ECAM Control panel is essential.
Attempt a reset of GEN 1 and 2 by turning
OFF then ON. If unsuccessful, set BUS TIE to
OFF to isolate both generators.
With BUS TIE OFF, a further attempt to
restart the generators is performed.
As the engines are fed by gravity fuel feed,
select ENG Mode Selector to IGN.
Only VHF1 and HF1 are available for
transmission. Cockpit interphone and cabin
interphone remain available.
Both ACP 1 & 2 remain available.
Only Transponder 1 is available.
ADIRS 2 & 3 will automatically be lost after
5 minutes; switching them off will save
battery charge.
Resetting FAC 1 restores characteristic speeds
displayed on PFD and recovers rudder trim.
Rudder trim indication is unavailable.

Cooling air is supplied to the avionics bay by the

air conditioning system and exhausted
overboard through the extractor valve.
Flight Control Law will revert to Direct Law
when the Landing Gear is lowered.
A clear reading of the STATUS is essential to
assess the aircraft Status and properly sequence
actions during the approach.
FUEL GRAVITY FEED
The GRAVITY FUEL
FEEDING QRH procedure
should be followed. Fuel
consumption is
increased, and FMS fuel
predictions are
unavailable. The crew
should refer to the QRH if
an immediate landing is
not available.
Centre Tank Fuel is
unavailable.
Flaps and Slats are slow as only SFCC 1 is
supplied.
Spoilers 1+2+5 are inoperative which will
affect the landing distance.
Fuel Gravity Feed
Centre Tank Fuel unavailable
Normal Braking and Anti-skid are
inoperative. NW Steering is inoperative
Both Reversers inoperative.
NAVIGATION

FMGC 1 is lost
temporarily. It can be Only ILS 1, DME 1, ADF
regained by flight crew 1 and VOR 1 remain
passing through the available.
MCDU MENU Page.
 STATUS

CM 1 CM 2

ANNOUNCE : “STATUS”

CM1: “READ STATUS” STATUS Key on ECP----- Press and Hold

A Summary for handling the procedure is included in the QRH, which will be referred
to upon completion of the ECAM procedure and review of STATUS page.
The ELEC EMER CONFIG SYS REMAINING list is available in the QRH.
 The CRUISE section highlights:
• The remaining systems
• The main limitations
• The flight capability of the aircraft

This section may help you to assess the situation and to choose an appropriate
runway
SITUATION Refer to the QRH for:
• The In-Flight Landing Distance Computation
ASSESSMENT • The evaluation of an increased fuel consumption

USING QRH
SUMMARY
REMAINING SYSTEMS

Significant remaining systems in ELEC EMERGENCY CONFIG

FLY PFD 1, Alternate Law until L/G Down

NAVIGATE ND 1, FMGC 1, RMP 1, VOR1,ILS 1, DME1

COMMUNICATE VHF 1, HF 1, ATC 1

USE OF DECISION MAKING TOOL
Facts - Consider Remaining Systems
- Flight Capability
- Fuel

Options : Return Back ?

Continue ?
Divert ?

Risk - CONSIDER INCREASED LANDING DISTANCE

- DIRECT LAW

Decision

Execute
Communicate / Cross Check
APPROACH CONSIDERATIONS
The landing distance required is almost double that of a
normal landing and this should be taken into account
when choosing a diversion airfield.
Flaps and Slats are slow. To fly a long stabilised
approach.
The approach speed must be at least minimum RAT
speed of 140 kts to keep the emergency generator
supplying the electrical network.
Flap 3 for landing
Both Reversers are not available.
 The Approach preparation begins
by the review of the STATUS page
Then the APPROACH Section of the
Execute QRH may be used to prepare the
Approach
- by PM on
the CM1
Side MCDU
Communicate – Approach
Briefing

The Sections APPROACH,

LANDING AND GO AROUND
should be used to conduct
the approach briefing, cross
checking the associated
pages in the MCDU
Communicate

• To the ATC
• To the Cabin Crew using
the acronym NITS
• To the Passengers (PA)
• To the Company
 APU start is
unavailable for
USE OF APU 45 seconds
- maybe started below FL following loss of
250
both generators.
APPROACH
USING SUMMARY
The APPR PROC of the STATUS
page should be performed by
reading the APPROACH section
of the Summary
Before the Final Approach, the
PM should review the STATUS
page and check that all the APPR
PROC has been completed
The LANDING and GO AROUND
sections should be then referred
to in brief (braking, NWS,
reversers and L/G retraction in
case of Go Around)
 APPROACH
Decelerate and configure to Flap 3
The PM will need to check speed against
PFD 1 or standby instruments to select
Flaps.
Do not reduce speed below 140 kts as the
RAT will stall.
LANDING
The approach speed can now be reduced to VLS +10 KTS (Minimum 140 Kts).
RA 1+2 are lost with their associated call outs.
Call outs will be made by PM from Pressure Altimeter.
Flight Control law reverts to Direct Law.
All external lights will be unavailable.

Both Reversers are not available. So the guidance is NOT TO TAKE REVERSERS.
Alternate braking with Yellow hydraulic pressure.
The NWS and Anti-Skid are lost. Use differential braking to steer till aircraft slows down.
The Emergency Generator is not supplied if the RAT stalls (below 125 kts).
AC SHED ESS & DC SHED ESS BUS are shed.
The emergency generation network is immediately transferred to the batteries.
Below 50 kts, all CRTs will be lost and all local warning and caution switch indications are lost.
The Parking Brake is available.
Aircraft has to be towed to bay.
 Approach & Landing ALTERNATE LAW
Approach Flown Manually with Raw Data
No AP, FD, A/THR

Landing & Deceleration

Be aware of:
• No Reversers
F1 F2 • No NWS
F3 • No Anti skid
• No Auto Brake
L/G Down • Partial loss of Ground Spoilers

No Auto Callouts

Below 50 Kts Loss

of all DUs
GO AROUND

When L/G UP
ALTERNATE LAW
 GREEN + YELLOW
HYDRAULIC FAILURE
THE TASK SHARING BETWEEN PF AND PM IN
THIS MODULE IS AS PER THE AIRBUS POLICY

THE FCTM ALSO STATES THAT THE CAPTAIN

MAY DECIDE TO RE-ALLOCATE TASKS
DIFFERENTLY
 Red LAND ASAP displayed, guiding you to
land at the nearest suitable airfield

THIS IS AN A ‘MAYDAY’ should be declared

EMERGENCY
SITUATION
All ECAM actions should be completed prior
to the approach
 SIGNIFICANT
ITEMS TO
CONSIDER

LOSS OF AUTO PILOT

FLIGHT CONTROL LAW DEGRADATION

(ALTERNATE LAW, DIRECT LAW WITH GEAR
DOWN)

LANDING IN ABNORMAL CONFIGURATION

(SLATS ONLY)

LANDING GEAR BY GRAVITY EXTENSION

ALTERNATE LAW IS INDICATED BY THE AMBER
CROSSES ON THE PFD
 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

DETECTION SYSTEM
DISPLAY SITUATION
AND ECAM ACTION STATUS REVIEW DECISION EXECUTION
ASSESSMENT
CONFIRMATION REVIEW
THE FIRST PILOT WHO NOTICES THE FAILURE, CANCELS
THE WARNING AND ANNOUNCES THE TITLE OF THE
FAILURE

PF
TAKES MANUAL CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT AND
CANCELS AP DISCONNECT WARNING

“ ECAM ACTIONS ”

PM Performs ECAM Actions.

 ALWAYS CONFIRM

REVIEWS THE SYSTEMS DISPLAY AND THE OVERHEAD PANEL TO ANALYSE AND
CONFIRM THE FAILURE PRIOR TO TAKING ANY ACTION
PM
 LAND ASAP APPEARS IN RED

PF

DECLARE

“ MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY ”

IT IS PREFERABLE TO ASK ATC TO POSITION THE AIRCRAFT APPROX. 20 NMs ON LONG FINALS FOR EASE OF AIRCRAFT CONFIG MANAGEMENT
IF RADAR VECTORS NOT AVAILABLE, ASK FOR A PROCEDURAL INSTRUMENT APPROACH
 AFTER COMPLETING ECAM
ACTIONS
REVIEWS SECONDARY SYSTEMS FAILURES

PM

REVIEWS ALL AFFECTED EQUIPMENT IN AMBER

ANY EXTENDED SPOILERS WILL RESULT IN INCREASED
FUEL CONSUMPTION

STATUS Available
 ONCE STATUS IS DISPLAYED
CHECKLIST IF ANY
CONSIDER
COMPUTER RESETS IF ANY

PF PM

“ Read STATUS ”
Reads the STATUS starting at
the top left hand side.
Limitations, Approach
procedures, Landing
procedure and Information

Then reads INOP SYS

SITUATION
ASSESSMENT
USING QRH
SUMMARY
 READS THE CRUISE SECTION OF THE SUMMARY
THE CRUISE SECTION HELPS IN MAKING A SITUATION ASSESSMENT
IF AN IMMEDIATE LANDING IS NOT POSSIBLE, CONSIDER INCREASED FUEL CONSUMPTION
(REFER TO OPERATIONAL DATA IN QRH)

TO CALCULATE LANDING DISTANCE AND VAPP REFER TO THE QRH IN FLIGHT PERFORMANCE.
 DECISION MAKING TOOL
FORDEC

FACTS OPTIONS RISK DECISION EXECUTION COMMUNICATION

 FACTS FACTS

Spoilers 1+2+4+5 are inoperative which will affect the landing distance

The flaps are inoperative and slats are slow to extend.

Reversers 1 & 2 are inoperative

The THS is inoperative

L/G gravity extension. No gear retraction.

Nose Wheel Steering is not available.

Normal and Alternate braking are inoperative; braking by Accumulator

pressure only.

Cargo doors inoperative.

 OPTIONS
Return, Divert or
Continue

KEY POINTS TO CONSIDER:

• LAND ASAP IN RED - Emergency Situation.

• DEGRADED HANDLING OF THE AIRCRAFT
• LACK OF DECELERATION DEVICES
• INCREASED LANDING DISTANCE
• INCREASE IN MINIMUM RUNWAY LENGTH
REQUIRED
• WEATHER CONDITIONS
 APPROACH & LANDING RISK AND
DECISION
CONSIDERATIONS
CONFIGURE EARLY AS SLATS ARE SLOW AND FLAPS ARE JAMMED. AIRCRAFT WILL BE SLOW TO DECELERATE AS THE FLAPS ARE JAMMED AT ZERO.

AT LANDING GEAR EXTENSION, IN DIRECT LAW, THE AUTO TRIM FUNCTION IS LOST. THE MEAN ELEVATOR POSITION AT THAT TIME IS MEMORISED AND BECOMES
THE REFERENCE FOR CENTERED SIDESTICK POSITION. IN ORDER TO ENSURE PROPER CENTERED SIDESTICK POSITION FOR APPROACH AND LANDING. WAIT FOR
STABILIZATION AT VAPP, BEFORE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION. IF THIS PROCEDURE IS MISSED, THE FLARE AND PITCH CONTROL IN CASE OF GO-AROUND MAY BE
DIFFICULT.

LANDING GEAR IS GRAVITY EXTENDED USING THE PROCEDURE FROM THE QRH SUMMARY.

A HIGH PITCH ATTITUDE CAN BE EXPECTED ON LANDING WITH THE RISK OF TAIL STRIKE.

NO REVERSE THRUST: ADVICE IS NOT TO SELECT REVERSE ON ENGINES. BRAKING IS Y ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE ONLY USING MAXIMUM BRAKE PRESSURE 1000
PSI LIMITED TO 7 APPLICATIONS.
 DECISION MAKING TOOL
FORDEC

FACTS
DUAL RISK DECISION
HYDRAULIC OPTIONS DEGRADED
FAILURE DECIDE AS A
DISCUSS HANDLING OF
A/C STATUS THE AIRCRAFT, TEAM THE NEXT
OPTIONS TO
LONGER COURSE OF
LIST OF DIVERT
LANDING ACTION
AVAILABLE/
DISTANCE
UNAVAILABLE
EQUIPMENT
HANDS OVER CONTROL TO PM AND USES G+Y HYD SYS LO PR SUMMARY, STATUS, AND FMGS TO
EXECUTION
PREPARE THE AIRCRAFT AND BRIEF FOR THE APPROACH, LANDING & GO AROUND.

ENSURE GPWS FLAP MODE MODE OFF

ENSURE CORRECT

SELECTION OF LDG CONF

AND

VAPP MODIFICATION
 FIRST READ THE APPROACH SECTION OF THE QRH SUMMARY COMMUNICATION

BRIEFS THE APPROACH PROCEDURE

(ILS /VOR OR VISUAL APPROACH)
 BRIEF THE MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURE

IT IS PREFERABLE TO CLIMB ON RUNWAY HEADING TO MSA OR INITIAL APPROACH COMMUNICATION

ALTITUDE RATHER THAN FOLLOW THE PUBLISHED MISSED APPROACH FOR EASE OF HANDLING
BRIEF THE AIRPORT CHART (10-9) AND THE USE OF DECELERATION DEVICES
USING THE LANDING SECTION OF THE QRH SUMMARY
COMMUNICATION
 REVIEW
FROM THE QRH

LANDING WITH SLATS OR FLAPS JAMMED CHECKLIST

L/G GRAVITY EXTENSION CHECKLIST
AND
IF REQUIRED, OVERWEIGHT LANDING CHECKLIST
 COMMUNICATION
COMMUNICATE

TO THE ATC
N : NATURE
I : INTENTION
TO THE CABIN CREW USING THE ACRONYM N-I-T-S
T : TIME
S : SPECIAL BRIEFING
TO THE PASSENGERS (PA)

AND COMPANY (IF POSSIBLE)

 SELECT VFE NEXT -5, 195 Kts
PF: “FLAPS 2” PM: SELECTS FLAPS 2

SELECT VFE-5,180 KTS

PF : “FLAPS 1” PF: “ FLAPS 3” PM: SELECTS FLAPS 3
PM SELECTS FLAPS 1 NO FLAPS AVAILABLE. SLATS AT 2

APPROACH

PF : “SELECT SELECT VAPP

VFE -5”
PM : SETS
SPEED 225 Kts

(SPEEDS ARE INDICATIVE OF A320s AND NOT 321s)

 PF: “GEAR DOWN”
PM: LOWER THE L/G USING L/G
GRAVITY EXTENSION
DISREGARD THE
MAN PITCH TRIM IS UNAVAILABLE ANNUNCIATION ON PFD
DUE TO LOSS OF STABILIZER.

WAIT FOR
PM REVIEWS THE STATUS TO
STABILIZATION AT
CHECK THAT ALL APPROACH
VAPP, BEFORE
LANDING GEAR PROCEDURE ACTIONS ARE LANDING
EXTENSION. LOWER COMPLETE.
THE L/G USING L/G
GRAVITY EXTENSION
CHECKLIST
AFTER LANDING CHECKLIST PM TO BRIEFLY REVIEW THE
GO-AROUND & LANDING SECTIONS IN THE QRH
SUMMARY

HIGH PITCH ATTITUDE DURING FINAL APPROACH

AS NO REVERSERS ARE AVAILABLE, THE GUIDANCE IS NOT TO SELECT
REVERSERS ON LANDING
WHEN STOPPED PARKING BRAKE ON.
 FOR DIVERSION: IF FLAPS JAMMED AT ZERO SELECT CLEAN CONFIGURATION

FOR CIRCUIT: MAINTAIN SLATS/FLAPS CONFIGURATION IF FLAPS JAMMED ABOVE ZERO; MAINTAIN SLATS/FLAPS CONFIGURATION

GO - AROUND
NO GEAR RETRACTION
 GREEN + BLUE
HYDRAULIC FAILURE
THE TASK SHARING BETWEEN PF AND PM IN
THIS MODULE IS AS PER THE AIRBUS POLICY

THE FCTM ALSO STATES THAT THE CAPTAIN

MAY DECIDE TO RE-ALLOCATE TASKS
DIFFERENTLY
 Red LAND ASAP displayed, guiding you to
land at the nearest suitable airfield

THIS IS AN A ‘MAYDAY’ should be declared

EMERGENCY
SITUATION
All ECAM actions should be completed prior
to the approach
 SIGNIFICANT
ITEMS TO
CONSIDER

LOSS OF AUTO PILOT

FLIGHT CONTROL LAW DEGRADATION

(ALTERNATE LAW, DIRECT LAW WITH GEAR
DOWN)

LANDING IN ABNORMAL CONFIGURATION

(FLAPS ONLY)

LANDING GEAR BY GRAVITY EXTENSION

ALTERNATE LAW IS INDICATED BY THE AMBER
CROSSES ON THE PFD
 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

DETECTION SYSTEM
DISPLAY SITUATION
AND ECAM ACTION STATUS REVIEW DECISION EXECUTION
ASSESSMENT
CONFIRMATION REVIEW
THE FIRST PILOT WHO NOTICES THE FAILURE, CANCELS
THE WARNING AND ANNOUNCES THE TITLE OF THE
FAILURE

PF
TAKES MANUAL CONTROL OF THE
AIRCRAFT AND CANCELS AP DISCONNECT
WARNING
“ ECAM ACTIONS ”
PM Performs ECAM Actions
 ALWAYS CONFIRM

REVIEWS THE SYSTEMS DISPLAY AND THE

OVERHEAD PANEL TO ANALYSE AND
CONFIRM THE FAILURE PRIOR TO TAKING PM
ANY ACTION

BOTH PILOTS TO CONFIRM BEFORE SWITCHING THE BLUE

ELECTRIC PUMP TO OFF (GUARDED PB)
 LAND ASAP APPEARS IN RED

PF

DECLARE

“ MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY ”

IT IS PREFERABLE TO ASK ATC TO POSITION THE AIRCRAFT APPROX. 20 NMs ON LONG FINALS FOR EASE OF AIRCRAFT CONFIG MANAGEMENT
IF RADAR VECTORS NOT AVAILABLE, ASK FOR A PROCEDURAL INSTRUMENT APPROACH
 AFTER COMPLETING ECAM
ACTIONS
REVIEWS SECONDARY SYSTEMS FAILURES

PM

REVIEWS ALL AFFECTED EQUIPMENT IN AMBER

ANY EXTENDED SPOILERS WILL RESULT IN INCREASED
FUEL CONSUMPTION

STATUS Available
 ONCE STATUS IS DISPLAYED
CHECKLIST IF ANY
CONSIDER
COMPUTER RESETS IF ANY

PF PM

“ Read STATUS ”
Reads the STATUS starting at
the top left hand side.
Limitations, Approach
procedures, Landing
procedure and Information

Then reads INOP SYS

SITUATION
ASSESSMENT
USING QRH
SUMMARY
 READS THE CRUISE SECTION OF THE SUMMARY
THE CRUISE SECTION HELPS IN MAKING A SITUATION ASSESSMENT
IF AN IMMEDIATE LANDING IS NOT POSSIBLE, CONSIDER INCREASED FUEL CONSUMPTION
(REFER TO OPERATIONAL DATA IN QRH)

TO CALCULATE LANDING DISTANCE AND VAPP REFER TO THE QRH IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE.
 DECISION MAKING TOOL
FORDEC

FACTS OPTIONS RISK DECISION EXECUTION COMMUNICATION

 FACTS FACTS

SPOILERS 1+3+5 ARE INOPERATIVE WHICH WILL AFFECT THE

LANDING DISTANCE

THE SLATS ARE INOPERATIVE AND FLAPS ARE SLOW TO EXTEND

THE LEFT AND RIGHT AILERONS ARE INOPERATIVE WHICH WILL

AFFECT ROLL CONTROL

THE LEFT ELEVATOR IS INOPERATIVE WHICH WILL AFFECT PITCH

CONTROL

REVERSER 1 IS INOPERATIVE

LANDING GEAR GRAVITY EXTENSION WITH NO RETRACTION.

NORMAL BRAKING IS INOPERATIVE; ALTERNATE BRAKING WITH

ANTI-SKID IS AVAILABLE BUT NO AUTOBRAKES

EMERGENCY GENERATOR IS INOPERATIVE

 OPTIONS
Return, Divert or
Continue

KEY POINTS TO CONSIDER:

• LAND ASAP IN RED - Emergency Situation

• DEGRADED HANDLING OF THE AIRCRAFT
• LACK OF DECELERATION DEVICES
• INCREASED LANDING DISTANCE
• INCREASE IN MINIMUM RUNWAY LENGTH
REQUIRED
• WEATHER CONDITIONS
 APPROACH & LANDING RISK AND
DECISION
CONSIDERATIONS

LANDING GEAR IS EXTENDED BY GRAVITY EXTENSION

CONFIGURE EARLY AS FLAPS ARE SLOW TO EXTEND. AS ONLY THE RIGHT

ELEVATOR IS OPERATIVE, PITCH CONTROL IS DEGRADED.

REVERSER 2 ONLY

ALTERNATE BRAKING WITH ANTI-SKID

 DECISION MAKING TOOL
FORDEC

FACTS
DUAL
HYDRAULIC OPTIONS RISK DECISION
FAILURE DECIDE AS A
DISCUSS DEGRADED
A/C STATUS HANDLING OF TEAM THE NEXT
OPTIONS TO
THE AIRCRAFT COURSE OF
LIST OF DIVERT
ACTION
AVAILABLE/
UNAVAILABLE
EQUIPMENT
HANDS OVER CONTROL TO PM AND USES G+B HYD SYS LO PR SUMMARY, STATUS, AND FMGS TO
PREPARE THE AIRCRAFT
EXECUTION

ENSURE GPWS FLAP 3 MODE ON

ENSURE CORRECT

SELECTION OF LDG CONF

AND

VAPP MODIFICATION
 FIRST READ THE APPROACH SECTION OF THE QRH SUMMARY COMMUNICATION

BRIEFS THE APPROACH PROCEDURE

(ILS /VOR OR VISUAL APPROACH)
 BRIEF THE MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURE

IT IS PREFERABLE TO CLIMB ON RUNWAY HEADING TO MSA OR INITIAL APPROACH COMMUNICATION

ALTITUDE RATHER THAN FOLLOW THE PUBLISHED MISSED APPROACH FOR EASE OF HANDLING
BRIEF THE AIRPORT CHART (10-9) AND THE USE OF DECELERATION DEVICES
USING THE LANDING SECTION OF THE QRH SUMMARY
COMMUNICATION
 REVIEW
FROM THE QRH

LANDING WITH SLATS OR FLAPS JAMMED CHECKLIST

L/G GRAVITY EXTENSION CHECKLIST
AND
IF REQUIRED, OVERWEIGHT LANDING CHECKLIST
 COMMUNICATION
COMMUNICATE

TO THE ATC
N : NATURE
I : INTENTION
TO THE CABIN CREW USING THE ACRONYM N-I-T-S
T : TIME
S : SPECIAL BRIEFING
TO THE PASSENGERS (PA)

AND COMPANY (IF POSSIBLE)

SELECT VFE NEXT - 5, 180 Kts. SELECT SPEED 200 Kts. DISCONNECT A/THR. AT THE SELECTED SPEED OF
PF: “ FLAPS 3” 200 Kts LOWER LANDING GEAR USING GRAVITY EXTENSION CHECKLIST
FROM QRH SUMMARY.
PM: SELECTS FLAPS 3
THE AIRCRAFT IS IN DIRECT LAW.
SELECT VAPP.
DECELERATE TO VAPP
SELECT VFE NEXT -5, 195 Kts (SPEEDS ARE INDICATIVE OF A320s AND NOT
PF : “FLAPS 1”
321s)
PM SELECTS FLAPS 1
PF: “FLAPS 2” PM: SELECTS FLAPS 2
WITH NO SLATS NOTHING
AS THE LOAD FACTOR INCREASES WITH THE SELECTION OF FLAPS 2,
HAPPENS
IT MAY SET OFF A STALL WARNING WHICH WILL GO AWAY SOON

PF : “SELECT
VFE -5”
PM : SETS
SPEED 225 Kts
PM REVIEWS THE STATUS TO CHECK THAT ALL APPROACH PROCEDURE
ACTIONS ARE COMPLETE
AFTER LANDING CHECKLIST PM TO BRIEFLY REVIEW THE APPROACH
& LANDING SECTIONS IN THE QRH SUMMARY
 LANDING
BRAKING IS MANUAL
 FOR DIVERSION: SELECT CLEAN CONFIGURATION
FOR CIRCUIT: MAINTAIN SLATS/FLAPS CONFIGURATION

GO - AROUND
MAX PITCH 15⁰ DEGREES. RECOMMENDED
SPEED : MAX SPEED – 10 Kts.
NO GEAR RETRACTION
ENGINE
FAILURE AFTER
TAKE OFF
Airbus 320
FLIGHT PREPARATION

FROM EFB

NOTE DOWN MAXALT.

THIS IS THE ENGINE OUT
MAX ACCELERATION
ALTITUDE

EXAMPLE : 5127 ft
COMMUNICATION HOWEVER CREW SHOULD USE
THEIR DISCRETION DEPENDING
ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES

THE NORM
URGENCY DISTRESS

AVIATE

NAVIGATE PANPAN PANPAN PANPAN MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY

COMMUNICATE
 V1

ON THE CALL OF V1
THE CM1 SHOULD REMOVE
HIS/HER HAND FROM
THE THRUST LEVERS
WHEN ENGINE
FAILS
USE THE RUDDER TO
CONTROL YAW

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

ON CALL OF “ROTATE” BY THE PM
THE PF WILL ROTATE USING CONTINUOUS
PITCH RATE AND AIM FOR
A PITCH OF 12.5 ⁰
THE SRS ORDERS IF NO SRS MONITOR SPEED
SHOULD BE ORDERS; ROTATE – MINIMUM OF
FOLLOWED TO 12.5 DEGREES V2

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

PM ANNOUNCES:
“POSITIVE CLIMB”

PF: “GEAR UP”

PM: “GEAR UP”

TO REDUCE THE DRAG

AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

INTRUMENT SCAN-
INITIAL ACTION

PITCH TARGET- 12.5⁰

SPEED – MINIMUM V2

BETA TARGET – RUDDER

TO CENTER BETA TARGET

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

 RUDDER TRIM
TRIM OFF THE PRESSURE FROM THE FOOT WITH THE RUDDER
TRIM

TRIM MOVES AT THE RATE OF 1 DEGREE PER SECOND

 THRUST
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR A FLEX TAKEOFF , SELECTING THE OPERATING ENGINE
TO TOGA PROVIDES ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE MARGIN

THE APPLICATION OF TOGA COMES WITH A SIGNIFICANT

INCREASE IN YAWING MOMENT AND AN INCREASED PITCH
RATE

THE SELECTION OF TOGA RESTORES THRUST MARGINS, BUT

IT MAY BE AT THE EXPENSE OF INCREASED WORKLOAD IN
HANDLING
 The use of AUTOPILOT is STRONGLY
Recommended NEXT ACTIONS

Following an Engine Failure the Rudder

should be trimmed out prior to
Autopilot engagement

Once AP is engaged, the Rudder Trim is

managed through the AP and hence
manual rudder trim command is
inhibited.
 PROCEDURE INITIATION –
400 FEET ABOVE AIRPORT
ELEVATION

PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN TO

THE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT
TRAJECTORY
NEXT ACTIONS
ONCE PF HAS STABILIZED THE
FLIGHT PATH,

- PM CONFIRMS THE FAILURE

 TO CONFIRM THE
FAILURE – USE AS
MANY SOURCES
AS POSSIBLE

OVERHEAD PANEL
ENGINE GAUGES
INDICATIONS
 ONCE PM HAS
CONFIRMED THE
FAILURE

PF: “ ECAM ACTIONS”

 ENGINE SECURE CONDITIONS
An Engine is considered as SECURE when the Mode
Selector is at IGNITION, THRUST LEVER IS AT IDLE AND:

FOR AN ENGINE FAILURE WITHOUT DAMAGE : ENG MASTER OFF

FOR AN ENGINE FAILURE WITH DAMAGE : AGENT 1 DISCH

FOR AN ENGINE FIRE : FIRE EXTINGUISHED OR AGENT 2 DISCH

 INDICATIONS OF ENGINE
DAMAGE
THE CREW SHOULD OBSERVE TWO OR MORE OF THE
FOLLOWING SYMPTOMS

RAPID INCREASE OF THE EGT ABOVE THE RED LINE

MISMATCH OF ROTOR SPEEDS , OR ABSENCE OF

ROTATION

SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF AIRCRAFT VIBRATIONS OR

BUFFETING OR BOTH

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM LOSS

REPEATED OR UNCONTROLLABLE ENGINE STALLS.

 IF NO DAMAGE

PF : THRUST LEVER IDLE

PM: ENGINE MASTER OFF

PM: ANNOUNCE “ENGINE SECURE”

 THRUST LEVERS MUST BE MOVED BY
THE PF

MOVEMENT OF THE THRUST LEVERS,

ENGINE MASTER SWITCHES AND FIRE
PUSH BUTTONS MUST BE CONFIRMED
BY BOTH PILOTS

WITH THE MODE SELECTOR AT IGN AND

THRUST LEVER AT IDLE, THE FADEC WILL
ATTEMPT AN AUTOMATIC RELIGHT
 IF NO RELIGHT AFTER 30s - ENGINE
MASTER OFF
(THE 30s COUNTDOWN IS FROM THE TIME
THE ENG FAIL ALERT IS TRIGGERED)

THE ENG 1 (2) FAIL ECAM ALERT IS

TRIGGERED WHEN THE ENGINE SPEED
FALLS BELOW THE “ENGINE RUNNING”
HIGH SPOOL SPEED WHICH IS JUST BELOW
IDLE.
 IN CASE OF AN IN-FLIGHT ENGINE FAILURE, THE FADEC
WILL TRY TO RECOVER FROM SUB-IDLE CONDITION

IF THE COMBUSTOR IS NOT LIT, THE FADEC WILL COMMAND

BOTH IGNITERS ON AND SET START SCHEDULE FUEL FLOW
ACCORDING TO HIGH SPOOL SPEED.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE FADEC HAS AUTHORITY TO ATTEMPT

AN IMMEDIATE ENGINE RELIGHT BY:

• INCREASING FF
• SELECTING IGNITERS, IF REQUIRED
• MONITORING THE ENGINE ACCELERATION.
 NOTE
THE 30 SECONDS START AS SOON AS THE ENG 1(2) FAIL ECAM ALERT IS TRIGGERED, WHICH IS THE MOMENT
WHERE THE FADEC DETECTS THE ENGINE FAILURE IT ATTEMPTS AN IMMEDIATE ENGINE RELIGHT. THE
PURPOSE OF THE 30s IS TO LET TIME TO THE FADEC TO COMPLETE THE RELIGHT ATTEMPT.

IF AFTER 30s THE RELIGHT IS UNSUCCESSFUL, THE FLIGHT CREW HAVE TO SET THE AFFECTED ENGINE
MASTER TO OFF. IF 30 SECONDS ARE COMPLETED SINCE THE ALERT WAS TRIGGERED WHEN REACHING THE
ECAM ACTION LINE, THE FLIGHT CREW CAN STRAIGHTAWAY TURN THE AFFECTED ENGINE MASTER TO OFF.

IT IS ALSO TO BE NOTED THAT IT IS NOT COMPULSORY TO TURN THE ENGINE MASTER TO OFF IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE END OF 30 SECONDS, AND IT DEPENDS UPON THE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS DURING WHICH
THE ENGINE FAILURE OCCURS.
 NOTE

The FWC STANDARD H2-F6 now includes an Automatic Countdown (decreasing from
30s to 0s and displayed on the ECAM), so that the flight crew will easily know when the
30 seconds are completed after the ECAM alert is triggered. The condition “IF NO ENG
RELIGHT AFTER 30s” will automatically disappear from the ECAM when the 30 seconds
period is over and the flight crew can turn the affected Engine Master to OFF
 IF DAMAGE CONFIRMED

FIRE pb OF AFFECTED ENGINE – PUSH (ONLY AFTER

CONFIRMATION FROM PF)

AGENT 1 DISCH

PM: ANNOUNCE : “ENGINE SECURE”

ONCE ENGINE SECURE

PF : “STOP ECAM”

PF: “ PANPAN PANPAN PANPAN

….State Intention”

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND

 ACCELERATION SEGMENT

AT THE ACCELERATION ALTITUDE - 1500 FEET ABOVE AIRFIELD ELEVATION

PUSH V/S KNOB TO LEVEL OFF AND ALLOW THE SPEED TO INCREASE

RETRACT FLAPS AS NORMAL

WITH FLAPS LEVER AT ZERO, BETA TARGET REVERTS TO THE NORMAL SIDESLIP
INDICATION
IN CASE
ENGINE
SECURE BY At 1500 ft
SET V/S 0
1500 FEET AT GREEN DOT
PULL ALT
SET MCT
IF SECURE PULL GD SPEED
READ FMA

ENGINE FAIL
 ENGINE OUT MAX ACC ALT
IN CASE
ENGINE NOT
SECURE BY WHEN SECURE SET V/S 0
AT GREEN DOT
PULL ALT
1500 FEET SET MCT
PULL GD SPEED
READ FMA
1500 FT

CONTINUE CLIMBING BUT

DO NOT EXCEED
ENGINE OUT MAXIMUM
ACCELERATION ALTITUDE
(MAXALT from EFB e.g.: 5127 ft)
ENGINE FAIL
IF AT MAX ENGINE
OUT ACCELERATI0N
ALTITUDE AND ENGINE OUT MAX ACC ALT e.g. SET V/S 0
ENGINE NOT 5127 AT GREEN DOT

SECURE SET MCT CHECK A/THR

WHITE
IF REQD PULL ALT

1500 FT

CONTINUE CLIMBING BUT

DO NOT EXCEED
ENGINE OUT MAXIMUM
ACCELERATION ALTITUDE
(MAXALT from EFB e.g.: 5127 ft)
ENGINE FAIL
ENGINE FAILURE AFTER THRUST
REDUCTION ALTITUDE
SET TOGA

AIRCRAFT WILL CLIMB IN ‘SRS’ MODE

WHEN ENGINE SECURE

PUSH TO LEVEL OFF, WHEN ABOVE 1500 FEET

CLEAN UP AND ON REACHING GREEN DOT SPEED

SET MCT

CHECK A/THR ACTIVE & PULL ALTITUDE IF REQUIRED

 REACHING
GREEN DOT
ENGINE FAILURE WHENEVER ENGINE
SECURE & Above 1500 ft
- SET MCT
CHECK A/THR
AFTER THRUST SET V/S 0
ACTIVE
- PULL GD SPEED
REDUCTION - ALT PULL (IF
REQUIRED)
ALTITUDE 1500 FT

THE LIMITATION
OF 10 MINUTES OF TOGA
ENGINE FAIL SET TOGA (LIMITED TO 10 Minutes)
IS DEFINED HERE AS A LIMITATION OF
TIME
AND NOT BY ALTITUDE
THRUST REDUCTION
THR LVRs IN CLIMB DETENT
PF: “CONTINUE ECAM
ACTIONS”

PM: CONTINUES
ECAM ACTION
 COMMON MISTAKES
If the CLR pb is pushed the ECAM will clear all the items until the next underlined Title.

Some pilots try to remove the items that do not automatically clear, to try and move it up. Or if a boxed item
ENG 1(2) SHUT DOWN appears in Amber, some pilots try to get the box to the top. But since it is not
underlined, if the CLR pb is pressed the rest of the procedure will be lost. If it is accidentally done, just press
RCL to bring it back again.

The only time the CLR pb is pressed without the current procedure completed is if the page is full of
unclearable items. This will be highlighted by the Green overflow arrow. In this case, pressing the CLR pb will
bring up the next page.
 “ AVOID ICING CONDITIONS ”
The ECAM knows if the Fire pb is pushed or not.
It adjusts the procedure and the STS Page accordingly.

If Fire pb is pushed W/ Anti Ice is unavailable because the Cross

Bleed is closed.

If not, only one wing will get de-iced causing a potential

catastrophic lift differential.

The Cross Bleed can't be opened because it could lead to debris

from the damaged engine contaminating the healthy side of the
Bleed system.
 A SPURIOUS MESSAGE
"START VALVE FAULT, START VALVE NOT OPEN“
also may appear in some simulators
which has to be ignored
 SECONDARY FAILURES ARE LISTED IN THE LOWER
RIGHT- HAND SIDE OF THE EWD. SECONDARY
FAILURES ARE IDENTIFIED BY A STAR OR ASTERIX IN
FRONT OF THE TITLE OF THE AFFECTED SYSTEM.
THEY ARE ITEMS LOST DUE TO A PRIMARY FAILURE.

PM: “LAND ASAP IN AMBER”

PM: “SECONDARY FAILURES”

 PM GOES THROUGH EACH OF THESE SECONDARY
FAILURES READING EACH AFFECTED SYSTEM TITLE IN
TURN AND THEN USING THE SYSTEM PAGE TO
DESCRIBE EACH SYSTEM. AFTER DESCRIBING EACH
SYSTEM, PM SAYS "CLEAR" FOLLOWED BY THE TITLE
OF THE SYSTEM.

FOR EXAMPLE

PM: “ CLEAR HYDRALIC? “

PF: " CLEAR HYDRAULIC "

 PM analyses the BLEED page
Only one Bleed system available

PM analyses ELEC page

Only one GEN supplying the electrical
network. Consider starting APU

PM analyses HYD page

Failed engine hydraulic system powered by
PTU
PM continues to do this until the last
System has been cleared and the
STATUS Page appears.

Once the STATUS Page appears, PM

announces "STATUS"

PF then considers if there are any

Checklists, Computer Resets, or
considers Relight if the engine is not
damaged.
 CHECKLISTS TO CONSIDER

ENG RELIGHT OR ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE STRAIGHT–IN ENGINE SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST

APPROACH (QRH) (FCOM)
 Consider the use of APU bleed.

Main points in the If Engine 1 is damaged, DO NOT USE APU Bleed.

SHUTDOWN
If Engine 2 is damaged, select Cross Bleed to SHUT before
CHECKLIST selecting APU Bleed.

PF THEN ASKS FOR ' AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST'.

ENG 2 FIRE pb Pushed
USE OF APU BLEED ENG 1 FIRE pb Pushed
 ONCE THIS IS DONE

PF: "Read STATUS"

PM reads what is displayed and notes

down any item that requires action
later. For example, a VAPP increase or
a landing distance procedure.

The PM then reads the INOPS

Systems

Once completed

PM: " Remove STATUS?"

PF: "Remove STATUS"

PM: "ECAM Actions Complete"

 COMMON MISTAKES

1) POOR LATERAL CONTROL 6) TRYING TO ENGAGE A/P WITHOUT TRIMMING

2) LATE ROTATION - OBSTACLE CLEARANCE NOT PROPERLY
GUARANTEED 7) ENGINE SECURE AND ACCELERATION CONFUSION
3) PITCHING TOO HIGH ON ROTATION. - ENGINE NOT SECURE WHEN ACCELERATING
- ROTATE SLOWLY - ECAM ACTIONS CONTINUED AFTER ENGINE SECURE
▪ LESS ROTATION RATE TO ARREST 8) LEVELLING OFF BEFORE ACCELERATION ALTITUDE
▪ SPEED INCREASES SLIGHTLY; MORE MARGIN TO V2 9) FORGETTING:
4) FORGETTING THE "POSITIVE CLIMB" CALL - PACK ON
5) TRIMMING THE WRONG WAY OR NOT TRIMMING - LIGHTS OFF
ENOUGH. - SETTING STANDARD (BARO)
- POINT THE TRIM TOWARDS THE WORKING ENGINE.
 SINGLE ENGINE LANDING
A manual approach and landing with one engine inoperative is conventional. Maximum use of the Auto Pilot should be made to minimise
crew workload.

Auto Land is available with One Engine Inoperative

Auto Brake Medium is recommended for landing

If manually flying, the pilot should trim the rudder to keep the side-slip indication centered. It remains Yellow as long as the thrust on the
remaining engine is below a certain value.

The slip indicator becomes the Blue Beta target when flaps are selected and the aircraft is approaching it’s maximum thrust capability.

Do not select the L/G down too early as large amount of power will be required to maintain level flight.

Recommended technique is L/G down at G/S *

The rudder trim should be reset to zero in the later stages of the approach. Recommended procedure is to zero the rudder trim at the start of
the flare.

The use of Idle reverse can be considered for better control during the landing roll especially when strong crosswinds from the side of the
operative engine.
 SINGLE ENGINE GO-AROUND

Select TOGA thrust to initiate Go Around

If manually flying, apply rudder to compensate for the increase in thrust and try to keep the Beta Target centred. Full rudder may be needed.
If manually flying, pitch to 12.5 degrees and then follow SRS orders
PM selects 1 stage of Flaps up.
With positive rate of climb, select L/G Up
The lateral FD mode will be NAV. If it does not engage, the lateral mode will be in Go-Around track
Assuming the TO waypoint is correct, PUSH HDG to engage NAV and read FMA
The FMGC changes from Approach page to Go-Around page.
At the Engine Out Acceleration Altitude (1500’ AGL) select V/S 0 by pushing V/S Control to Level Off.
At F speed Flap 1
At S speed Flap 0
PF disarms Spoilers and turns Off Taxi and RWY Turn Off lights.
When speed reaches G/Dot, PULL OPEN CLIMB and set Thrust Levers to MCT
PF: “Climb Checklist”