DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

EXPERIMENTS LIST

8EE5 COMPUTER BASED POWER SYSTEM LAB

1. Fault analysis (for 3 to 6 bus) and verify the results using MATLAB or any available
software for the following cases:
 LG Fault
 LLG Fault
 LL Fault and
 3-Phase Fault

2. Load flow analysis for a given system (for 3 to 6 bus) using

(i) Gauss Seidal
(ii) Newton Raphson
(iii) Fast Decoupled Method and verify results using MATLAB or any available
Software

3. Study of voltage security analysis

4. Study of overload security analysis and obtain results for the given problem using
MATLAB or any software.

5. Study of economic load dispatch problem with different methods.

6. Study of transient stability analysis using MATLAB/ETAP Software.

 DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

LAB ETHICS

DO’s
1. Enter the lab on time and leave at proper time.
2. Keep the bags outside in the racks.
3. Utilize lab hours in the corresponding experiment.
4. Make the Supply off the Kits/Equipment’s after completion of Experiments.
5. Maintain the decorum of the lab.

Don’ts
1. Don’t bring any external material in the lab.
2. Don’t make noise in the lab.
3. Don’t bring the mobile in the lab.
4. Don’t enter in Faculty room without permission.
5. Don’t litter in the lab.
6. Don’t carry any lab equipment’s outside the lab
We need your full support and cooperation for smooth functioning of the lab.
 DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING INSTRUCTIONS

BEFORE ENTERING IN THE LAB

1. All the students are supposed to prepare the theory regarding the present
Experiment.
2. Students are supposed to bring the practical file and the lab copy.
3. Previous experiment should be written in the practical file.
4. Object, Apparatus Table & Brief Theory of the current practical should be
written in the lab copy.
5. Any student not following these instructions will be denied entry in the lab
and Sessional Marks will be affected.

WHILE WORKING IN THE LAB

1. Adhere to experimental schedule as instructed by the faculty.

2. Record the observations in lab copy & checked by the faculty
3. Each student should work on his assigned table of the lab.
4. Take responsibility of valuable accessories.
5. Concentrate on the assigned practical and be careful.
6. If anyone is caught red-handed carrying any equipment of the lab, then he
will have to face serious consequences.
 EXPERIMENT NO.1

OBJECT: Fault Analysis for a 3 bus system with verification of results using MATLAB
for the following cases –

i. LG Fault
ii. LL Fault
iii. LLG Fault
iv. 3-phase Fault

APPARATUS REQUIRED:

THEORY: Short circuits occur in power system due to various reasons like, equipment
failure, lightning strikes, falling of branches or trees on the transmission lines, switching
surges, insulation failures and other electrical or mechanical causes. All these are
collectively called faults in power systems.

A fault usually results in high current flowing through the lines and if adequate protection
is not taken, may result in damages in the power apparatus.

SYMETRICAL FAULT: In power engineering, specifically three-phase power a

symmetric, symmetrical or balanced fault is an electrical fault which affects each of the
three-phases equally. In transmission line faults, roughly 5% are symmetric. This is in
contrast to an asymmetric fault, where the three phases are not affected equally. In
practice, most faults in power systems are unbalanced. With this in mind, symmetric
faults can be viewed as somewhat of an abstraction; however, as asymmetric faults are
difficult to analyze, analysis of asymmetric faults is built up from a thorough
understanding of symmetric faults.

ASYMETRICAL FAULT: In power engineering, specifically three phase power,

an asymmetric or unbalanced fault is a fault which does not affect each of the three
phases equally. This is in contrast to asymmetric fault, where each of the phases is
affected equally. In practice, most faults in power systems are unbalanced; however, as
asymmetric faults are difficult to analyze, analysis of asymmetric faults is built up from a
thorough understanding of symmetric faults.

Common types of asymmetric faults, and their causes:

 Line-to-line - a short circuit between lines, caused by ionization of air, or when lines
come into physical contact, for example due to a broken insulator.
 Line-to-ground - a short circuit between one line and ground, very often caused by
physical contact, for example due to lightning or other storm damage
 Double line-to-ground - two lines come into contact with the ground (and each
other), also commonly due to storm damage.

A. SINGLE-LINE-TO-GROUND FAULT

Fig:
Fig;1.1-Three phase fault Analysis
Faulted Phase : Phase to Ground
Transition state :101
Transition Time : 0 0.05 0.1 0.2
Nominal ɸ to ɸ voltage : 220 V
Active Power : 100 W
Nominal Frequency : 50 Hz

Let a LG fault has occurred at node k of a network. The faulted segment is then as
shown in Fig. 1.1 where it is assumed that phase-a has touched the ground through an
impedance Zf . Since the system is unloaded before the occurrence of the fault we have

……………………………………………2.1

Fig. 1.2 Representation of L – G fault.

Also the phase-a voltage at the fault point is given by

……………………………………………………2.2

From (2.1) we can

write

…………………………2.3
Solving (2.3) we
get

……………………………2.4

This implies that the three sequence currents are in series for the LG fault. Let us
denote the zero, positive and negative sequence Thevenin impedance at the faulted point
as Z kk0 , Z kk1 and Z kk2 respectively. Also since the Thevenin voltage at the faulted phase
is Vf we get three sequence circuits.We can then write

………………………………………2.5

Then from (2.4)

and (2.5) we can
write

…………………………………
………… 2.6
Again since

We get from (2.6)

………………………………………………….2.7
The Thevenin equivalent of the sequence network is shown in Fig. 2.3(a)

Fig. 1.3 Thevenin equivalent of a L – G fault.

Result: We have successfully studied the three phase fault on Line – Ground fault and
obtain the voltage and current waveforms shown below;
 Fig: 1.4 –Voltage Waveform of Line – Ground Fault

Fig: 1.5 – Current Waveform of Line – Ground Fault

B. LINE-TO-LINE FAULT

This is a type of the asymmetrical faults in this fault two different lines of three phase
line touch each other. In above case the line get touch with the line. It occurs in power
system due to various reasons like, equipment failure, lightning strikes, falling of
branches.
 Fig: 1.6 -Three phase fault Analysis

Faulted Phase : Phase B to C

Transition state :101
Transition Time :0 0.05 0.1 0.2
Nominal ɸ to ɸ voltage : 220 V
Active Power : 100 W
Nominal Frequency : 50 Hz

The faulted segment for an L-L fault is shown in Fig. 1.6where it is assumed that
the fault has occurred at node k of the network. In this the phases b and c got shorted
through the impedance Zf . Since the system is unloaded before the occurrence of the
fault we have

……………………………………..3.1
 Fig. 1.7 Representation of L-L fault.

Also since phase‟s b and c are shorted we have

3.2

Therefore from (3.1) and (3.2) we have

3.3

We can then summarize from (3.3)

3.4

Therefore no zero sequence current is injected into the network at bus k and hence the
zero sequence remains a dead network for an L-L fault. The positive and negative
sequence currents are negative of each other.

Now from Fig. 1.7 we get the following expression for the voltage at the faulted point
Again 3.5

3.6

Moreover

Since I fa0 = I fb0 = 0 And I fa1 = - I fb2 ,

We can write

3.7

Therefore
combining (3.5)
3.8
(3.7) we get

Equations (3.5) and (3.8) indicate that the positive and negative sequence networks are in
parallel. The sequence network is then as shown in Fig. 3.2(A). From this network we get

3.9

Fig. 1.8 Thevenin equivalent of an L – L fault.

Result: We have successfully studied the three phase fault on Line – Line fault and
obtain the voltage and current waveforms shown below;

Fig: 1.9–Voltage Waveform of Line – Line Fault

 Fig: 1.10 – Current Waveform of Line – Line Fault

C. DOUBLE - LINE -TO GROUND FAULT

This type of faults occurs when any two lines out of the three phases fell on
ground. It is also a type of the asymmetric faults. This type of faults occurs in power
system due to various reasons like, equipment failure, lightning strikes, falling of
branches etc.

Fig: 1.11 - Three phase fault Analysis

Faulted Phase : Double Line to Ground

Transition state :101
Transition Time : 0 0.05 0.1 0.2
Nominal ɸ to ɸ voltage : 220 V
Active Power : 100 W
Nominal Frequency : 50 Hz

The faulted segment for a LLG fault is shown in Fig. 1.11 where it is assumed that
the fault has occurred at node k of the network. In this the line to line got shorted through
the impedance Zf to the ground. Since the system is unloaded before the occurrence of the
fault for the phase-a
current. Therefore

4.1

Fig. 1.12 Representation of LLG fault.

Also voltages of
phases b and c are
4.2
given by

Therefore

4.3

We thus get the following two equations from (4.3)

4.4

4.5

Substituting (4.2) and (4.4) in (4.5) andrearranging we get

 4.6

Also since I fa = 0 we have

4.7

The Thevenin equivalent circuit for LLG fault is shown in Fig. 1.13 From this figure we
get

,……………….4.8

4.9

The zero and negative sequence currents can be obtained using the current divider
principle as

4.10
 Fig. 1.13 Thevenin equivalent of a LLG fault

Result: We have successfully studied the three phase fault on Double Line to Ground
fault and obtain the voltage and current waveforms shown below;

Fig: 1.14- Voltage Waveform of Double Line to Ground Fault

 Fig: 1.15 – Current Waveform of Double Line to Ground Fault

D.THREE PHASE FAULT

This type of faults occurs very rarely. These types of faults occur when all the three
phases get in touch with each other. These types of faults occur in power system due to
various reasons like lightning strikes, falling of branches or trees on the transmission
lines, , insulation failures and other electrical or mechanical causes. All these are
collectively called faults in power systems.

A fault usually results in high current flowing through the lines and if adequate
protection is not taken, may result in damages in the power apparatus.

Faulted Phase : L-L-L fault on phase A-B-C

Transition state :101
Transition Time : 0 0.05 0.1 0.2
Nominal ɸ to ɸ voltage : 220 V
Active Power : 100 W
Nominal Frequency : 50 Hz

Fig: 1.16-Three phase fault Analysis

Result: We have successfully studied the three phase fault ((L-L-L fault on phase A-B-
C) and obtain the voltage and current waveforms. The current waveform of
three phase fault and the voltage waveform of three phase fault are shown
below;

Fig: 1.17 –Voltage Waveform of three phase fault

Fig: 1.18–Current Waveform of three phase fault
 EXPERIMENT NO. 2

OBJECT:

Load Flow Analysis for a 3 to 6 bus system, in MATLAB, using the following methods:
(i) Gauss Seidal Method
(ii) Newton Raphson
(iii) Fast Decoupled Method

APPARATUS REQUIRED:

A. Gauss Seidal Method

PROCEDURE
1. Enter the command window of the MATLAB.
2. Create a new M – file by selecting File - New – M – File.
3. Type and save the program in the editor Window.
4. Execute the program by pressing Tools – Run.
5. View the results.
PROIGRAM:
%Gauss Sedial
clc;
data=[1 1 2 10-j*20 2 1 3 10-j*30 3 2 3 16-j*32]
elements=max(data(:,1));
bus=max(max(data(:,2)),max(data(:,3)));
y=zeros(bus,bus);
for p=1:bus,
for q=1:elements,
if(data(q,2)==p|data(q,3)==p)
y(p,p)=y(p,p)+data(q,4);
end
end
end
for p=1:bus,
for q=1:bus,
if (p~=q)
for r=1:elements
 if((data(r,2)==p&data(r,3)==q)|(data(r,2)==q&data(r,3)==p))
y(p,q)=-(data(r,4));
end
end
end
end
end
a1=input('enter p2 in MW:');
b1=input('enter q2 in MVAR:');
a2=input('enter p3 in MW:');
b2=input('enter q3 in MVAR');
pu=input('enter the base value in MVA');
p2=(a1/pu);
q2=(b1/pu);
p3=(a2/pu);
q3=(b2/pu);
dx1=1+j*0;
dx2=1+j*0;
v1=1.05;
v2=1+j*0;
v3=1+j*0;
iter=0;
disp('iter v2 v3');
while(abs(dx1)&abs(dx2)>=0.00001)&iter<7;
iter=iter+1;
g1=(((p2-j*q2)/conj(v2))+(-y(1,2)*v1)+(-y(2,3)*v3))/y(2,2);
g2=(((p3-j*q3)/conj(v3))+(-y(1,3)*v1)+(-y(2,3)*g1))/y(3,3);
dx1=g1-v2;
dx2=g2-v3;
v2=v2+dx1;
v3=v3+dx2;
fprintf ('%g',iter),disp([v2,v3]);
end
B. Newton Raphson

1. Consider the 3 bus system each of the 3 line bus a series impedance of 0.02 + j0.08
p.u and a total shunt admittance of j0.02 p.u. The specified quantities at the bus are
given below.
2. Verify the result using MATLAB
%NEWTON RAPHSON METHOD
clc;
gbus = [1 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0
3 1.5 0.6 0.0 0.0];
ybus = [5.882-j*23.528 -2.941+j*11.764 -2.941+j*11.764
-2.941+j*11.764 5.882-j*23.528 -2.941+j*11.764
-2.941+j*11.764 -2.941+j*11.764 5.882-j*23.528];
t= 0.001
v1=1.04+j*0;
v2=1+j*0;
v3=1.04+j*0;
del3=angle(v3);
del1=angle(v1);
del2=angle(v2);
%abs(ybus(2,1))
%abs(v2)
for i=1:10
p2=(abs(v2)*abs(v1)*abs(ybus(2,1))*cos((angle(ybus(2,1)))+del1-del2))+abs(v2)*abs(v2)*abs(ybus(2,2))
*cos((angle(ybus(2,2))))+(abs(v2)*abs(v3)*abs(ybus(2,3))*cos((angle(ybus(2,3))+del3-del2));

q2=-(abs(v2)*abs(v1)*abs(ybus(2,1))*sin((angle(ybus(2,1)))+del1-del2))abs(v2)*abs(v2)*abs(ybus(2,2))
*sin((angle(ybus(2,2))))-(abs(v2)*abs(v3)*abs(ybus(2,3))*sin((angle(ybus(2,3)))+del3-del2));

p3=(abs(v3)*abs(v1)*abs(ybus(3,1))*cos((angle(ybus(3,1)))+del1-del3))+abs(v3)*abs(v3)*abs(ybus(3,3))
*cos((angle(ybus(3,3))))+(abs(v2)*abs(v3)*abs(ybus(3,2))*cos((angle(ybus(3,2)))+del2-del3));

delp20=gbus(2,4)-gbus(2,2)-p2;

delp30=gbus(3,4)-gbus(3,2)-p3;

delq20=gbus(2,5)-gbus(2,3)-q2;
J(1,1)=(abs(v2)*abs(v1)*abs(ybus(2,1))*sin((angle(ybus(2,1)))+del1-del2))+(abs(v2)*abs(v3)* abs(ybus(2,3))*
sin((angle(ybus(2,3)))+del3-del2));

J(1,2)=-(abs(v2)*abs(v3)*abs(ybus(2,3))*sin((angle(ybus(2,3)))+del3-del2));
J(1,3)=(abs(v1)*abs(ybus(2,1))*cos((angle(ybus(2,1)))+del1- del2))+2*(abs(v2)*abs(ybus(2,2))*
cos((angle(ybus(2,2))))+(abs(v3)*abs(ybus(2,3))* cos((angle(ybus(2,3)))+del3-del2));

J(2,1)=-(abs(v3)*abs(v2)*abs(ybus(3,2))*sin((angle(ybus(3,2)))+del2-del3));

J(2,2)=(abs(v3)*abs(v1)*abs(ybus(3,1))*sin((angle(ybus(3,1)))+del1-del3))+(abs(v3)*abs(v2)
*abs(ybus(3,2))*sin((angle(ybus(3,2)))+del2-del3));

J(2,3)=(abs(v3)*abs(ybus(3,2))*cos((angle(ybus(3,2)))+del2-del3));

J(3,1)=(abs(v2)*abs(v1)*abs(ybus(2,1))*cos((angle(ybus(2,1)))+del1-del2))-(abs(v2)*abs(v3)*abs(ybus(2,3))*
cos((angle(ybus(2,3)))+del2-del3));

J(3,2)=(abs(v2)*abs(v3)*abs(ybus(2,3))*cos((angle(ybus(2,3)))+del2-del3));

J(3,3)=-(abs(v2)*abs(ybus(2,1))*sin((angle(ybus(2,1)))+del1-del2))-2*(abs(v2)*abs(ybus(2,2))* sin((angle(ybus(2,2)))) -
(abs(v3)*abs(ybus(2,3))*sin((angle(ybus(2,3)))+del3-del2));
end
J
inv(J);
A=[del2;del3;abs(v2)];
delA0=[delp20;delp30;delq20];
delA1=inv(J)*delA0;
delA1;
b0=abs(v2);
A1=[del2;del3;b0]+delA1;
A1-delA0;
if((A1-delA0)<=t)
break;
del2=A1(1,1);
del3=A1(2,1);
abs(v2)=A1(3,1);
end
A1
B. Fast Decoupled Method
As the FDPFM is derived from the Newton – Raphson we will start from the matrix
representation for NR, apply some simplification and approximation, to reach the
equation of the FDPFM. The matrix representation of the NR method is;
 P   H N    
 Q    J L    V 
  
(1)

Where

H ii   Vi V j Yij sin( ij   i   j)
i j

(2)

Hii   Vi V j Yij sin( ij   i   j) (3)

And

Nii  2 Vi Vii cos ii   V j V ij cos( ij  i  j) (4)

i j

Nij  V j Vij cos( ij   i   j )

(5)

J ii   Vi V j Yij cos( ij   i   j)
i j

(6)

jij   Vi V j Yij cos( ij   i   i)

(7)

Lii  2 Vi Yii sin ii   V i Y ij cos( ij  i  j)

i j

(8)

Lij  Vi Yij sin( ij   i   j )

(9)
Now, for typical power system branches:
where B' and B" are the imaginary part of the bus admittance matrix Ybus , such that B‟

contains all buses admittances except those related to the slack bus, and B" is B' deprived
from all voltage-controlled buses related admittances. Finally, all these approximations
and simplifications lead to the following successive voltage magnitude and voltage angle
updating equations:

CONCLUSION: We successfully have done the algorithm of Gauss Seidal Method,

Newton Raphson &Fast Decoupled Method.
 EXPERIMENT NO. 3

OBJECT:

Study of voltage security in power system

THEORY:

Voltage stability is the ability of a power system to maintain acceptable voltages at

all buses in the system under normal operating conditions and after being subjected to a
disturbance. A system enters a state of voltage instability when a disturbance, increase in
load demand, or change in system condition cause a progressive and uncontrollable
decline in voltage. The main factor causing voltage instability is the inability of the
power system to meet the demand for reactive power. Voltage collapse is the process or
sequence of events accompanying voltage instability which leads to a low unacceptable
voltage profile in a significant part of the system.
For maintaining voltage security within the system, the following need to be monitored
from time to time

1. Available voltage security margin

2. The most dangerous stresses in the system leading to voltage collapse
3. Worst-case contingencies resulting in voltage collapse and/or contingencies with
insufficient voltage stability margin
4. Contingency ranking according to a severity index for voltage stability related
system problems
5. Weakest elements within the grid and the regions most affected by potential
voltage problems
6. Controls to increase the available stability margin and avoid instability
7. Information about voltage problems at the look-ahead operating conditions and for
the worst-case contingencies (contingencies with large severity ranks) that may
appear in the future
MODES OF OPERATION

1. Real-Time Modes - Under the „Real Time Operations Mode‟, a real time assessment of
the most current state estimation is done.
2.On the other hand, in the „Real Time Look-Ahead Mode‟ we perform a 2-hour “look-
ahead” predictive assessment by applying planned outage information available and load
forecast over the next 2 hours.
1.Study Mode - Study mode offers off-line analysis capabilities on either the real-time
data or on modified version of real-time solved cases.
Such study cases are:
Real-Time Voltage Security Assessment (RTVSA) solved cases archived overtime within
the Flat Files Storage (under Central Server)
(i) Modified versions of the above mentioned real-time solved cases to study
hypothetical scenarios. For instance, a study mode user may extract a previously
archived RTVSA solved case from the Flat Files Storage, remove one or more
transmission lines, manually specify stressing directions, resolve using the RTVSA
simulation capabilities and perform a complete voltage security assessment, and
export this as a new “study case” to the central server if so desired.

REAL-TIME VOLTAGE SECURITY ASSESSMENT (RTVSA) CAPABILITIES

The RTVSA application shall offer the following categories of functional capabilities:
1) Contingency screening and ranking with respect to voltage limit violations or loading
margins associated with known stressing direction.
2) Wide area monitoring capabilities offering real time situational awareness to the
operators on key indicators that are closely associated with voltage security
3) Real time voltage stability analysis with known stressing direction
4) Quantify the efficacy of reactive power support at the most effective buses in terms of
their sensitivities
5) Rank available corrective controls based on their
6) Identify the weak elements within the system associated with the one-dimensional
stressing
a) Develop and update voltage security regions offline on demand based on a set of
predefined stressing
b) Real time voltage security assessment with respect to the multidirectional stressing
c) Suggest appropriate controls to enhance margin to the boundary
DATA DESCRIPTION
The following are details on the required list of data:
 Detailed Network Model : Contains information in a volume sufficient for
detailed power flow simulations, under the CA ISO standards, i.e., branch
information (connectivity data, line impedance), breaker status, etc.
 System Component Status Information : Includes current status of generators,
transmission circuits, transformers, switching devices, and other components.
 Available Power System Controls and their priorities : These include
information of -
- Tap Changers
- Static VAR Compensator (SVC)
- Fixed and Controllable Shunt
- Generator Redispatch, etc.
 Limits (Voltage, Thermal, MVar, Others) : Consists of operational limits of
system facilities/components that are to be specified in appropriate units, e.g.
transformer limits in MVA, line limits in Amps, etc
 Generator Model : Required information for generator modeling, such as:
- MVA ratings
- Qmax, Qmin values
- Leading and lagging power factor
 Distributed Slack Bus Information : Required for governor power flow
simulations
 Low Voltage Load Models : These models (static characteristics) should cover
 the low voltage load behavior and voltage collapse situations.
 HVDC Models & Control Schemes
 Contingency List : Consists of -
- All (N-1) and some (N-2) contingencies, or
- User specified contingency list
- Any Remedial Action Schemes (RASs) associated with these contingencies
 Stressing Directions & Descriptor Variables : Contains -
- Generator dispatch sequence & pattern
- Load stress pattern
SPECIAL PROTECTION SCHEMES/REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEMES
During the system stressing process and contingency analysis, it is required for the
RTVSA tool to automatically trigger Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) or Special
Protection Schemes (SPS) to provide realistic voltage stability margins.

VOLTAGE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

The display capabilities under this category demonstrate results of the Voltage Security
Assessment tool under the look-ahead scenario with respect to key stressing direction(s).
Such scenarios may be based on current operating conditions or under the worst case
contingency. These illustrate voltage security conditions and metrics that help users study
voltage stability and take decisions to prevent adverse situations. These capabilities
include, but are not limited to:
- Real and reactive loading margins
 Margin at base case to point of collapse (POC)
 Margin under worst case contingency base case to POC
- Contingency ranking based on severity index (voltage margin, loading margin,
etc.)
- Operating nomograms i.e. the chart representing numerical relationships.
CONCLUSION: We successfully study the voltage security in power system.
 EXPERIMENT NO. 4

OBJECT:

Study of overload security analysis and obtain results for the given problem using
MATLAB or any software.

THEORY:

The recent evolution of the electric power industry has brought about new needs in terms
of assessing the reliability of the transmission system. Perhaps the most important of
these include its accurate assessment and the need to integrate reliability into economic
decision making. These needs exist at the operational level. In this paper, we address
them in terms of the one year planning problem. There are today a number of commercial
software packages that include the influence of circuit overload in a reliability assessment
scheme. All programs develop probabilistic indices characterizing the power system
reliability level, although some use analytical approaches, sometimes called contingency
enumeration, while others use Monte Carlo simulation. Some of the most well known in
North America include TRELSS, TPLAN, PROCOSE, and CREAM. The approaches for
assessing circuit overload for planning purposes used in these and other programs have
rested on two main assumptions. These are:
1. The circuit overload reliability level is indicated by a measurement of the amount
of load shed necessary to avoid circuit overload; loss of load probability (LOLP)
and expected unsaved energy (EUE) are two of the most common measurements
used.
2. Measurements taken on one or a limited number of selected base cases are
sufficient to indicate the reliability of the system.

SEQUENTIAL MEAN VARIANCE (SMV) MODEL DESCRIPTION

The sequential mean variance (SMV) model first uses the expected annual load
curve, sampled hourly,1 to arrange the maintenance and unit commitment schedules, then
employs time invariant variances to represent normally distributed load uncertainties. The
expected annual load curve can be obtained from load forecasting, or it can be obtained
from the load curve of the previous year, with an appropriate scaling to account for load
growth. There are various methods to identify the maintenance, unit commitment
schedule and load forecasting error. We propose a feasible one for each in order to show
the effectiveness of our overall framework.
For the maintenance schedule arrangement, we apply the equal LOLP criterion by
utilizing the effective load carrying capacity. For the unit commitment, we employ the
priority list method based on the piecewise linear fuel consumption curve, considering
hydro-thermal coordination. Our method for unit commitment also results in an economic
dispatch calculation for the generators in each hour. This provides us an hourly base case
for which we can solve the power flow equations.
For load forecasting error identification, we first employ time series analysis to
identify the structure and parameters of an ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving
average) model used to represent the load series. This provides a load value for each
hour. We assume that each hourly load value used in our trajectory has associated with it
some error. This error characterizes the potential for deviation away from the load
forecast for which the system coordinator (perhaps the independent system operator) is
unable to make effective and economically efficient adjustments. We assume that such
adjustments would be possible given more than a one-day advance warning by using the
day-ahead electricity market, but they would not be possible for advance warning less
than one day. Therefore, we use the estimated error of a one-day forecast in our work.
This estimated error is computed by averaging the errors of a day-ahead load forecast as
compared with historical data, over one year. Other reasoning could be used to identify
this error, if appropriate.
For each hour, we use the load curve value as the mean load and the error as the
standard deviation of the load in order to represent normally distributed load uncertainty.
Allocation among buses is done according to assumed load sharing factors, but statistical
correlation between loads may also be employed if data is available.
 The result of this modeling effort is a series of 8760 samples, one per hour over a
year, for which we know the committed generation units, their dispatch and a probability
density function (pdf) for the load. We denote the series of 8760 samples, one per hour
over a year, for which we know the committed generation units, their dispatch and a
probability density function (pdf) for the load. We denote the series of 8760 samples as
Ω. Let‟s consider a single hour,h, a single contingency state,s, and a single branch,b,
denoted by and if we have a function which gives the expected
monetary impact of each flow Ib on branch b, the component risk, then we can compute
the thermal overload (TOL) risk for the particular contingency state, s, in hour,h, as

The total risk for this branch in hour over all contingency states is then

From (2), we may sum over all branches to obtain total risk for a particular hour,
or we may sum over all hours to obtain the cumulative risk for a particular branch. These
kinds of calculations reflect the decomposition capability of this approach and are
attractive for identifying the reasons for high risk. In addition, we may evaluate total
cumulative risk as

These calculations, together with those required to obtain, are referred to as

thermal overload risk assessment. Its use, together with the trajectory development, is
illustrated in Fig. 1. From this figure, we also observe that the results of assessing the risk
of a trajectory are used to update the unit commitment (or other operating policies) and/or
the facility plan as needed to reduce risk. These updates correspond to different decisions
and are therefore re-evaluated to determine their effect on risk.
COMPONENT RISK

Equation (1) requires , which is the expected monetary impact on branch due
to overload given the flow on branch, b. If branch b is a transmission line, then,
depending on the weather conditions, conductor type, and flow duration, the flow Ib
causes conductor heating which can result in one or both of the following:
 Loss of clearance due to sag: Here, the thermal expansion of the conductor results
in sag. In the worst case, the line can touch an underlying object, resulting in a
permanent fault and subsequent outage.
 Loss of strength due to annealing: Annealing, the recrystallization of metal, is a
gradual and irreversible process when the grain matrix established by cold
working is consumed causing loss of tensile strength. In [12], we have shown how
to use weather statistics to obtain f(θ ‫ ׀‬Ib), the pdf for conductor temperature, θ.
This can be used to obtain the desired risk expression as

Where ImL1(θ) and ImL2(θ) and express the monetary impact on the transmission
line of sag and annealing, respectively, as a function of conductor temperature, also
described in . Equation (4) can be evaluated for a range of flows, resulting in a
component risk curve for branch b, as shown in Fig. 2, where the pdfs for ambient
temperature and wind speed are typically chosen. The same pdf for ambient temperature
is also used in transformer risk assessment. The two curves for Fig. 2 are per unitized on
a base equal to the cost of reconductoring 1 mile of the line. This base value is estimated
based on discussions with utility engineers as $108 000 for a 230 kV line and $60 606 for
a 138 kV line.
If branch b is a transformer, then depending on the ambient temperature,
transformer type and aging rates of insulation materials (paper and oil), and flow
duration, higher flow Ib causes winding hottest spot temperature to increase which can
result in transformer loss of life and/or failure. We can then use an expression just like (4)
to evaluate the thermal overload risk, except here, θ represents the hottest spot
temperature, and ImL1 and ImL2 represent the monetary impact on the transformer of
failure and loss of life, respectively, as described in and . With these modifications, we
can evaluate eqt. (4) for a range of flows, resulting in a component curve for branch b, as
shown in Fig. 3. Here, 1.0 pu risk equals the cost to rebuild the transformer. It is chosen
to be $1 000 000 in and . The risk evaluation of both lines and transformers, as a function
of loading, must also account for the impact on the system caused by outage of the circuit
due to high loading. In some cases, circuit outage has very little system impact, but in
other cases, it results in cascading leading to islanding and/or

widespread outages. There are various approaches that one can take to evaluate
this impact. For example, one could detect the extent of cascading overloads by
performing a series of power flow solutions, each time removing any additional
overloaded circuits. More rigorous analysis would require representation of system
dynamics. Here, we have accounted for this impact very simply, but conservatively, by
assigning any circuit failure, as represented by ImL1 in (4), to have an impact K times the
cost of replacing the equipment, where K is a very large number. In the component risk
curves shown in Figs. 2 and 3, we have assigned K=100. The practical result of this is
that circuit loadings causing any significant probability of failure contribute very large
risk. The component risk curves for both lines and transformers clearly depend on the
weather statistics. One can significantly enhance the analysis accuracy by using different
weather descriptions for different times of the day and for different seasons.
For example, one might divide the 24 hour period into four 6 hour intervals, late
morning, afternoon, evening, early morning, and one might divide the year into the four
seasons of winter spring, summer and fall. Of course, this would require 16 component
risk curves for every line and transformer. However, these curves may be computed and
stored in advance of the trajectory simulation, so that their number does not affect the
processing time. In our work, in order to illustrate the idea with the simplest approach, we
have used the same weather statistics for all component risk curves.

CONCLUSION

We have proposed the sequential mean variance (SMV) model together with a risk
index to assess power system reliability over a mid-term planning period. We have shown
that the SMV model enables assessment of loading periods and inter-temporal affects that
may not be captured by so-called snapshot models. Yet, it does so with reduced
computational requirements relative to the sequential Monte Carlo model.
The strength of the method lies in its ability to identify a-priori high-risk situations
encountered during an expected trajectory of yearly operating conditions, and then to
avoid or mitigate these conditions using short-term operational or reinforcement
measures (see footnote 1). This is in contrast to long-term facility planning needs, where
one thinks of performing design that is robust to a wide range of possible trajectories. The
risk index used in the hourly assessment provides a compact evaluation of the hour‟s
reliability level for

overload that does not require the representation of the operator‟s load shedding policy,
considered here to be a decision which could be assessed by the risk index. This risk
assessment is performed based on linearization around the operating point and
convolution between random variables. The risk index can be presented as cumulative
over time, it can be decomposed according to which agent incurs it, and it can be
assigned to the agent that causes it.

RESULT: We successfully study overload security analysis in power system.

 EXPERIMENT NO. 5

OBJECT:

Study the various methods of Economic Load Dispatch

THEORY:

Economic load dispatch (ELD) is an important function in power system planning

and operation. ELD solutions are found by solving the conventional load flow equations
while at the same time minimizing fuel costs. The resulting optimization problem has
nonlinear constraints from the load flow nodal equations and simple bound constraints on
the variables from the load bus voltage magnitudes. Methods of Economic Load
Dispatch:
1) Lambda Search : In 1962, Carpentier introduced a generalized nonlinear
programming formulation of the economic dispatch problem, including voltage
and other operating constraints. This formulation was later named the Optimal
Power Flow (OPF) problem.

2) Gradient Algorithm : In 1968, Dommel and Tinney introduced a reduced

gradient steepest descent algorithm to solve the optimization problem. This
algorithm has two drawbacks: slow convergence with the steepest descent
direction, and ill conditioning resulting from the penalty functions associated with
the inequality constraints.

3) Newton’s Method

For solving the problem with economic dispatch we first need to define or formulate the
problem.

Economic Load Dispatch (ELD) problem formulation

The ELD problem is considered as a general minimization problem with
constraints, and can be written in the following form:
Minimize f(x) (1)
Subject to: g(x) = 0 (2)
h(x) ≤ 0 (3)
f(x) is the objective function, g(x) and h(x) are respectively the set of equality and
inequality constraints. x is the vector of control and state variables. The control variables
are generator

active and reactive power outputs, bus voltages, shunt capacitors/reactors and
transformers tap-setting. The state variables are voltage and angle of load buses.

Objective function
The objective function for the ELD reflects the costs associated with generating
power in the system. The quadratic cost model is used. The objective function for the
entire power system can then be written as the sum of the quadratic cost model for each
generator:

(4)
Where, ng is the number of thermal units, Pgi is the active power generation at unit i
and
ai, bi and ci are the cost coefficients of the ith generator.
Equality constraints
The equality constraints g(x) of the ELD problem are represented by the power
balance constraint, where the total power generation must cover the total power demand
and the power loss. This implies solving the load flow problem, which has equality
constraints on active and reactive power at each bus as follows [4]:

where: i=1,2,..., n and θij = θi - θj

Pi, Qi: injected active and reactive power at bus I
 Pdi, Qdi: active and reactive power demand at bus i
Vi, θi: bus voltage magnitude and angle at bus i
Gij, Bij: conductance and susceptance of the (i,j) element in the admittance matrix.
Inequality constraints
The inequality constraints h(x) reflect the limits on physical devices in the power system
as well as the limits created to ensure system security:
 Upper and lower bounds on the active and reactive generations:

 Upper and lower bounds on the tap ratio (t) and phase shifting (α) of variable
transformers:

 Upper limit on the active power flow (Pij) of line i-j:

 Upper and lower bounds on the bus voltage magnitude:

The ELD problem formulated above can be solved by any of the above listed three
methods. This is explained as follows:

1) LAMBDA SEARCH METHOD:

This method can be described for 2 cases – neglecting or including losses.

ELD Neglecting Losses: Let us consider a system of N thermal-generating units

connected to a single bus-bar serving a received electrical load Pload. The input to
each unit, shown as Fi, represents the cost rate of the unit. The output of each unit, Pi,
is the electrical power generated by that particular unit. The total cost rate of this
system is, of course, the sum of the costs of each of the individual units. The
essential constraint on the operation of this system is that the sum of the output powers
must equal the load demand. That is, an objective function, FT, is equal to the total
cost for supplying the indicated load. The problem is to minimize F T subject to the
constraints specified above note that any transmission losses are neglected and any
operating limits are not explicitly stated when formulating this problem.

This is solved by Lagrangian multiplier method. Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier, then
the function becomes,

Finding the minimum value of the above function gives the following equation,

After solving the above equation it gives following condition for economic dispatch
neglecting losses

When we recognize the inequality constraints, then the necessary conditions may
be expanded slightly as shown in the following equations :

ELD Considering Losses: In this case the power generated will be equal to the sum of
power demand and power losses, Ploss. Thus the following equation follows:
 (11)
Now by Lagrange‟s multiplier method we get the following equation

(12)

(13)
Equations (11) to (13) are known as coordination equations.
The procedure for solution by this method is defined below:
Step 1: Pick a set of starting values for PI, P2, and P3 that sum to the load.
Step 2: Calculate the incremental losses dPL/dPi, as well as the total losses.
Step 3: Assume the value of λ greater than the largest intercept of the cost functions.
Evaluate values of Pl, P2…..Pn by (11), (12) and (13).
Step 4: Check whether generations P1, P2….Pn are within the prescribed limits.

If Pi>Pmax, then set Pi=Pmax, and distribute the remaining load between the remaining units
by equation (11), or

If Pi<Pmin, then set Pi=Pmin, and distribute the remaining load between the remaining units
by equation (11
Step 5: Check if value of equation (11) < € (defined tolerance), then increase value of λ
slightly by λ+Δλ, otherwise decrease it by λ-Δλ, and go to step 2.
If the solution of (11) is within specified tolerance limit, then go to step 6.
Step 6: Print the results of Pi and Ploss, and stop.

2) GRADIENT ALGORITHM METHOD :

Note that the lambda search technique always requires that one be able to find the
power output of a generator, given an incremental cost for that generator. In the case of
a quadratic function for the cost function, or in the case where the incremental cost
function is represented by a piecewise linear function, this is possible. However, it is
often the case that the cost function is much more complex, such as the one below:

In this case, we shall propose that a more basic method of solution for the
optimum be found. This method works on the principle that the minimum of a function,
f(x), can be found by a series of steps that always take us in a downward direction. From
any starting point, xo, we may find the direction of “steepest descent” by noting that the
gradient off, i.e.,

Always points in the direction of maximum ascent. Therefore, if we want to move in

the direction of maximum descent, we negate the gradient. Then we should go from x o
to x1 using:

Where α is a scalar to allow us to guarantee that the process converges. The best
value of α must be determined by experiment.
Economic Dispatch by Gradient Search
In the case of power system economic dispatch this becomes:

and the object is to drive the function to its minimum. However, we have to be
concerned with the constraint function:
To solve the economic dispatch problem which involves minimizing the objective
function and keeping the equality constraint, we must apply the gradient technique
directly to the Lagrange function itself. The Lagrange function is:

and the gradient of this function is:

The problem with this formulation is the lack of a guarantee that the new points
generated each step will lie on the surface φ. We shall see that this can be overcome
by a simple variation of the gradient method. The economic dispatch algorithm
requires a starting λ value and starting values for Pl, P2, and P3. The gradient for
is calculated as above and the new values of λ, Pl, P2, and P3, etc., are found from:

where the vector x is:

3) NEWTON'S METHOD

We may wish to go a further step beyond the simple gradient method and try to solve the
economic dispatch by observing that the aim is to always drive:

Since this is a vector function, we can formulate the problem as one of finding the
correction that exactly drives the gradient to zero (i.e., to a vector, all of whose elements
are zero). We know how to find this, however, since we can use Newton's method.
Newton's method for a function of more than one variable is developed as follows.
Suppose we wish to drive the function g(x) to zero. The function g is a vector and the
unknowns, x, are also vectors. Then, to use Newton's method, we observe:

If we let the function be defined as:

Then

which is the familiar Jacobian matrix. The adjustment at each step is then:

Now, if we let the g function be the gradient vector we get:

For our economic dispatch problem this takes the form:

and is as it was defined before. The Jacobian matrix now becomes one made up of
second derivatives and is called the Hessian matrix:
Generally, Newton's method will solve for the correction that is much closer to the
minimum generation cost in one step than would the gradient method.

CONCLUSION: We successfully study the various methods of Economic Load

Dispatch.