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05 - Luna EFT2 Operation

The document outlines the operations and functionalities of Luna EFT 2, including key generation, smartcard key transfer, and network key transfer. It details the processes for upgrading the EFT system and accessing its web UI, along with security measures like Key Verification Codes and PIN security settings. The document serves as a comprehensive guide for managing keys and configurations within the Luna EFT environment.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
92 views37 pages

05 - Luna EFT2 Operation

The document outlines the operations and functionalities of Luna EFT 2, including key generation, smartcard key transfer, and network key transfer. It details the processes for upgrading the EFT system and accessing its web UI, along with security measures like Key Verification Codes and PIN security settings. The document serves as a comprehensive guide for managing keys and configurations within the Luna EFT environment.

Uploaded by

amine.mamdouh
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Luna EFT 2

Operation

Assaf Cohen
Training Manager
Let’s talk about…
 Key generation
 Smartcard key transfer
 Network package transfer
 Upgrading the EFT
 The UI
Key Generation
Key Generation
 Luna EFT can generate two types of keys
 HSM keys
 Host keys
 HSM keys are stored inside the HSM
 Host keys are encrypted and stored on a remote host
 The master key is used to encrypt host stored keys
Key Generation
 You must login as the Partition Owner
 Keys are entered directly to the HSM
 Security standards dictate that keys cannot be created remotely
 A physical keyboard must be attached to the HSM
 All keys are entered via the console interface
Key Generation
Workflow

KeyMgmt

Generate

HSM Host

Key Type
Key Generation
Workflow

 Key generation requires specific input from the key owner

[local_host] Keymgmt generate hsm [KeyType] -index [INDEX]


-keybit [BIT SIZE]
-keylen [LEN]
-clearComp [NUMBER]
-encryptedComp [NUMBER]
-algo [DES/AES]

Keymgmt generate hsm km -index 1 –keybit 256 –keylen 2 –clearComp 2 –encryptedComp 0 –algo DES
Key Verification Codes (KVC)
 Key Verification Codes (KVC)
 Are used to verify, without compromising secrecy, that a key or a key
component has been entered correctly, or to confirm that the value of a
stored key is as expected.
 During key entry at the Luna EFT console, a KVC is automatically
calculated and displayed for each key component and for the resultant key.
 There are various methods used to calculate KVCs, consult the Console
User’s Guide for more info.

 Most popular, standardized KVC Algorithm (KL6):


Use the key (or key component) to encrypt a plain text made up of 8 zero value bytes. The left most 3 octets (bytes)
of the ciphertext is taken as the result. The value is displayed as 6 hexadecimal characters.

Example:
Key: 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF FE DC BA 98 76 54 32 10
Plaintext: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Ciphertext: 08 D7 B4 FB 62 9D 08 85
KVC: 08 D7 B4
Smartcard Key Transfer
Smartcard Transfer

 Smartcards are used to store keys for transfer between Luna EFT
devices
 A KTP must be created prior to smartcard transfer
 This is a DES/AES Transfer Protect Key
 Used to derive keys who protect data
Smartcard Transfer
The KTP

 KTP restrictions change depending on PCI status

Mode TDES KTP AES KTP


Non PCI • Encrypted key – TDES/DES • Encrypted key – AES/TDES
• KTP key length – 16/24 bytes • KTP key length – 128, 192
and 256 bytes
PCI • Encrypted key – TDES • Encrypted key – AES/TDES
• KTP key length – 24 bytes • KTP key length – 256 bytes
Smartcard Transfer

 Have the smartcard reader attached the EFT


 5 SafeNet smartcards are included in in the box
 Only official smartcards are supported
 Multiple sets of smartcards are supported

[local_host] support backup smartcard -cardsetid [ID]


Smartcard Transfer
Protection

 Cards and data have multi-layer protection


 User PIN
 The user PIN is determined during the transfer process and is bound to a card set
ID
 Transfer Protection Key
 The KTP is used to derive keys for encryption
 Partition owners must use the same KTP on other EFT’s to decrypt the card set
 Card set ID
 Each card set is given a name
 A partition owner trying to decrypt keys must know this name in advance
Smartcard Transfer
Restore

 The amount of smartcards for a single backup depend on the amount of


data
 Cards are automatically erased during a new backup process
 Cards are no erased after a successful restore process

[local_host] support restore smartcard -cardsetid [ID]


Network Key Transfer
Network Key Transfer
 Key distribution management could be challenging
 Replication of keys to remote sites
 Requires a common infrastructure (network)
 Schemes are used to simplify the process
Network Key Transfer
Schemes

 Keys are partitioned into groups


 Groups can overlap
 assist the operator in managing keys belonging to more than one
application
 Schemes provide the ability to control key transfer at the individual
key level
 The HSM keeps track of what keys have been already exported
Network Key Transfer
Schemes

Group A Group B Group C


Network Key Transfer
Models - Centralized

 Keys are entered manually at the central site


 Keys are centrally distributed to all other location via the network

Site

Site Site

Central
Site Site
Site

Site
Site

Site
Network Key Transfer
Models – Peer to Peer

 Each HSM can be the source/target


 Works just like a smartcard key transfer
 HSM’s in peer-to-peer mode are considered a ‘cluster’
 Easy way to distribute keys to new HSM’s
 Can be used as a backup system to export keys to a host file and then
import back on demand

Source/Target Source/Target
Network Key Transfer
Process Workflow

Key Keys are


Packages Packages
Custodians encoded into
are imported are exported
enter new packages by
to a host to target
keys into an
machine HSM’s
Luna EFT Administrator
Upgrade and Migration
Upgrading the Luna EFT
Hardware

 There is no upgrade path from Luna EFT 1.x to 2.x


 New generation hardware, firmware and software
 Keys can still be migrated from Luna EFT 1.x to 2.x
 By using Smartcard key transfer
 By using Network key transfer
Upgrading the Luna EFT
Software

 Upgrading the EFT software is a one-way operation


 No downgrade is available
 The software upgrade process is composed of a few steps
 SCP the package file to the EFT
 Verify the package to make sure it’s not curropted
 Update the software version using the appropriate package
The UI
Accessing the web UI
 Luna EFT 2.0 has a brand new web UI
 Not all browsers are supported
 Firefox is supported

 Landing page is https://<Luna EFT IP address>/eftweb


Accessing the web UI
 Login as the Administrator or the Partition Owner
 Provide tokens as needed
 Provide the appropriate password
Accessing the web UI
 SafeNet Authentication Client (SAC) must be installed
Accessing the web UI
Administrator

 The Administrator can view


 EFT’s health status
 SNMP settings
 Network configuration
 He can also change
 Network configuration*
 SNMP configuration
 Timeout values
 Printer settings
 Log level

* You can only add L3 routes and set web/SNMP services, not actual network configuration
Accessing the web UI
Partition Owner – Function Control

 Specific functions can be turned on/off


 Depending on actual need, policies and restrictions
 Functions are divided to groups
 Best policy is to disable what you don’t need
Accessing the web UI
Partition Owner – Key Settings

 Cast key restrictions such as


 Allow DES KM
 Disable DES
 Disable RAS (<1024)

 Specify restrictions on host-store keys


Accessing the web UI
Partition Owner – PIN Security

 Set applicable PIN block formats


 ISO
 IBM 3624
 Docutel
 Set PIN block format conversion restrictions
 Set PIN verification settings
 PVV
 IBM 3624 offset
Accessing the web UI
Partition Owner – OBM & Envelope Setup

 Configure the Online Banking Module


 Set password restrictions

 Configure printing for


 OBM
 PIN
 Keys
Accessing the web UI
Partition Owner – Network Configuration

 Host connections
 Access to the Luna EFT is based on access control lists
 You have to specify in advance which IP addresses are allowed to communicate
 The Luna EFT can handle up to 128 simultaneous connections
 These 128 connections can be allocated as you see fit between allows hosts

 Services
 Set on which NIC are host connections allowed
 Default port is 1000
 Set on which NIC 3rd party emulation is allowed
 Default port is 1001

 SSL
 Set whether you want to secure host connections with SSL
Accessing the web UI
Partition Owner – Certificate Management

 Create certificates for applications


 Self-Signed certificates can be created
 CA signed certificates are also supported
 CA certificates must be registered in order to valid

 Import existing certificates


 Export created certificates
 Manage certificates (register/delete)
Accessing the web UI
Partition Owner – 3rd Party Emulation

 Set configuration for 3rd party emulation


 ZMK characteristics
 Acceptable PIN block formats
 Control which LMK’s you want to use
 General security configuration
Thank you!

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