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296 OCTOBER TERM, 1939.
Syllabus. 310 U. S.

v. Raymond, supra, "The defence when true in fact may

be sufficient in law, notwithstanding the validity of the
new patent"
The challenged judgment must be reversed with a
remand to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.

CANTWELL T AL.v. CONNECTICUT;

APPEAL FROM AND CERTIORARI TO = SUPREME COURT OF
ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.

No. 632. Argued March 29, 1940.--Decided May 20, 1940.

1. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth.

Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. P. 303.
2. The enactment by a State of any law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof is forbidden by'
th6 Fourteenth Amendment. P. 303.
3. Under the constitutional guaranty, freedom of conscience and of
religious belief is absolute; although freedom to act in the exercise
of religion is subject to regulation for the protection of society.
Such regulation, however, in attaining a permissible end; must
not unduly infringe the proteeted freedom. Pp. 303-304.
4. A state statute which forbids any person to solicit money or
valuables for any alleged religious cause, unless a certificate
theiefor shall first have been procured from a designated official,
who is required to determine whether such. cause is -A religious
-one and who may withhold his approval if he determines that
it is not, is a prdvious restraint upon the free exercise of religion
and a deprivation of liberty without due process of law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.. P. 304.
So held as it was applied to persons engaged in distributing
literature purporting to be religious, and soliciting contributions
to be used for the publication of such literature.
A State constitutionally may -by general and non-discriminatory
legislation regulate the time, place and manner of soliciting upon
its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other
respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the corn-
 CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT.
296 Argument for Respondent.

munity. The statute here, however, is not such a regulation. If

a certificate is issued, solicitation is permitted without other
restriction; but if a certificate is denied, solicitation is altogether
prohibited.
5. The fact that arbitrary or capricious action by the licensing officer
is subject to judicial review can not validate the statute. A
previous restraint by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious
under the Constitution as restraint by administrative action.
P. 306.
6. The common law offense of breach of the peace may be com-
mitted not only by acts of violence, but also by acts and words
likely to produce violence in others. P. 308.
7. Defendant, while on a public street endeavoring to interest
passersby in the purchase of .publications, or in making contribu-
tions, in the interest of what he believed to be true religion, in-
duced individuals to listen to the playing 6f a phonograph record
describing the publications. The record contained a verbal attack
upon the religious denomindtion of which the listeners were mem-
bers, provoking their indignation and a desire on their part to strike
the defendant, who thereupon picked up his books and phonograph
and went on his way. There was no showing that defendant's de-
portment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive; nor was it
claimed that he intended to insult or affront the listeners by.playing
the record; nor was it shown that the sound of the phonograph
disturbed persons living nearby, drew a crowd, or impeded traffic.
Held, that defendant's conviction of the common law offense of
breach of the peace was violative of constitutional guarantees of
religious liberty and freedom of speech. Pp. 307 et seq.
126 Conn. 1; 8 A. 2d 533, reversed.

APPEAL from, and certiorari (309 U. S. 626) to review, a

judgment which sustained the conviction of all the de-
fendaifts on one count of an information and the convic-
tion of one of the defendants on another count. The con-
victions were challenged as denying the constitutional.
rights of the defendants.
Mr. Hayden C. Covington, with whom Mr. Joseph F.
Rutherford was on the brief, for appellants and petitioner.
Messrs. FrancisA. Pallotti,Attorney General, and Mr.
Edwin S. Pickett, with whom Messrs. William L. Hadden,
 298 OCTOBER TERM, 1939..
Argument for Respondent. 310 U.S.

'Richard F. Corkey, Assistant Attorney General, and Luke

H. Stapleton were on the brief, for the State-of Connec-
ticut, appellee and-respondent.
The purpose of the statute is to protect the public
from fraud in the solicitation of money or other valuables
under the guise of religion. The only activity of any
alleged religious group which it is sought to regulate is
such solicitation.-
The statute does nbt impair in any way rights com-
monly regarded-;as embraced in freedom of speech.
The "liberty" of worship undoubtedly includes the right
to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles, and to
teach the doctrines which appellants advocate. Hamil-
ton v. Regents .of the University of California,293 U. S.
245, 262. But it is difficult to see how this statute can
,interfere with their freedom to Worship as they see fit.
It does not limit -or define their mode of worship or restrict
their teachings or doctrine..
The fact that appellants may believe as an article of
faith that the statute contravenes their religion furnishes
no constitutional basis for their violation of it. Com-
monwealth v-. Plaisted,148 Mass. 375; Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U. S. 145.
Undoubtedly appellants' activity in distributing litera-
ture is protected by freedom of the press. -But the activity
which violated the statute was their solicitation of funds.
The statute restricts in no way the distribution of- pam-
phlets and literature, nor the mere receiving of contribu-
"tions from those who might be iiclined to donate.
Whether solicitation was their primary purpose, or merely
incidental to the spread of the gospel in accordance with
their views, is not controlling.
Denial in the exercise of official discretion would not
"necessarily be final and conclusive on the person applying
for a permit. Norwalk v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 537,
542..
 CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT.
296 Argument for Respondent.

Unlike the ordinance in Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.

147, the statute does not seek to place any restriction upon
communication of any views or the advocacy of any cause,
nor to set up censorship in a police officer to determine
what literature may be distributed or ideas communi-
cated or who may distribute it.
The ordinance in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, forbade
the distribution by hand or otherwise of literature of any
kind without written permission.
The acts and conduct of petitioner are within the com-
mon law definition of breach of peace. It is not necessary
to show that other persons were actually provoked to the
point of violence. 1 Bishop Criminal Law, 9th Ed., § 539;
State v. Farrall,29 Conn. 72; State v. Warner, 34 Conn.
276, 279; Davis v. Burgess, 54 Mich. 514, 517; Delk v.
Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 45; L. R. A. 1916 B, 1117.
Nor is a specific intent to provoke a breach of peace essen-
tial; it is sufficient if the acts tend to produce it. State v.
Shelby, 95 Minn. 65.
Acts or language which, under the circumstances, are
calculated or likely to provoke another to acts of immedi-
ate violence may constitute a breach of the peace. 49
L. R. A. (N. S.) 919; Holmes v. State, 135 Ark. 187, 189;
Faulkner v. State, 166 Ga. 645, 665.
The rule is. as.applicable where the objectionable lan-
guage is communicated by means of a phonograph op-
erated by the accused or -by banner or placard. West v.
Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 735.
The tendency of words or conduct depends largely upon
the circumstances and is a question of fact. State v.
Moser, 33 Ark. 140. The playing for audition by loyal
Catholics of a record violently attacking their religion
could well be found to constitute the offense charged.
While the right to propagate religious views is not to
be denied, one will not be permitted to commit a breach
of peace under the guise of preaching the gospel. Delk
v. Commonwealth, supra,47.
300 OCTOBER TERM, 1939.
Opinion of the Court. 310 U. S.

Acts and conduct in violation of social duties, sub-

versive of good order, and contrary to the law of the land
are not immune becaus6 they are claimed to have been
motivated by religious belief. Reynolds v. United States,
98 U. S. 145; Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375.
MR. JUSTICE R OBERTs delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell,
members of a group known as Jehovah's Witnesses, and
claiming to be ordained ministers, were arrested in New
Haven, Connecticut, and each was charged by information
in five counts, with statutory and common law offenses.
After trial in the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven
County each of them was convicted on the third count,
which charged a violation' of § 6294 of the General'Statutes
of Connecticut,1 and on the fifth count, which charged
commission of the common law offense of inciting a breach
of the peace. On appeal to the Supreme Court the con-
viction of all three on the third count was affirmed. The
_conviction of Jesse Cantwell, on the fifth count, was also
affirmed, but the conviction of Newton and Russell on
that count was reversed and a new trial ordered as to
them.'
By demurrers to the information, by requests for rulings
of law at the trial, and by their assignments of error in
the State Supreme Court, the appellants pressed the con-
tention that the statute under which the third count was
drawn was offensive to the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because, on its face and as con-
strued and applied, it denied them freedom of speech and
prohibited their free exercise of religion. In like manner
' General Statutes § 6294 as amended by § 860d of the 1937
supplement.
'126 Conn. 1; 8 Ax 2d 533.
 CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT.
296 Opinioh of the Court.

they made the point that they'could not be found guilty

on the fifth count, without violation of the Amendment.
We have jurisdiction on appeal from the judgments
on the third count, as there was drawn in question the
validity of a state statute under the Federal Constitution,
and the decision was in favor of validity. Since the con-
viction on the fifth count was not based upon a statute,
but presents a substantial question under the Federal
Constitution, we granted the writ of certiorari in respect
of it.
The facts adduced to sustain the convictions on the
third count follow. On the day of their arrest the appel-
lants were engaged in going singly from house to house
on Cassius Street in New Haven. They were individually
equipped with a bag containing books, and pamphlets on
religious subjects, a portable phonograph and a set of
records, each of which, when played, introduced, and was
a description of, one of the books. Each appellant asked
the person who responded to his call for permission to
play one of the records. If permission was granted he
asked the person to buy the book described and, upon
refusali he solicited such contribution towards the pub-
lication of the pamphlets as the listener was willing to
make. If a contribution was received a pamphlet was
delivered upon condition that it would be read.
Cassius Street is in a thickly populated neighborhood,
where about ninety per cent of the residents are Roman
Catholics. A phonograph record, describing a book en-
titled "Enemies," included an attack on the Catholic
religion. None of the persons interviewed were members
of Jehovah's Witnesses.
The statute under which the appellants were charged
provides:
"No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions
or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable
302 OCTOBER TERM, 1939.
Opinion of the Court. 310 U. S.

or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the

organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting
or within the county in which such person or organization
is located unless such, cause shall have been approved by
the secretary of the public welfare council. Upon appli-
cation of any person in behalf of such cause, the secretary
shall determine whether such cause is -a religious one or
is a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and con-
forms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity,
and, if he shall so find, shall approve the same and issue
to the authority in charge a certificate to that effect.
Such certificate may be revoked at any time. Any per-
son violating any provision of this section shall be fined
not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not
more than thirty days or both."
The appellants claimed that their activities were not
within the statute but consisted only of distribution of
books, pamphlets, and periodicals. The State Supreme
Court construed the finding of the trial court to be that
"in addition to the sale of the books and the distribution
of the pamphlets the defendants were also soliciting con-
tributions or donations of money for an alleged religious
'cause, and thereby came within the purview of the
statute." It overruled the contention that the Act, as
applied to the appellants, offends the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it abridges or
denies religious freedom and liberty of speech and press.
The court stated that it was the solicitation that brought
the appellants within the sweep of the Act and not their
other activities in the dissemination of literature. It
declared the legislation constitutional as an effort by the
State to protect the public against fraud and imposition.
in the solicitation of funds for what purported to be
religious, charitable, or philanthropic causes.
The facts which were held to support the conviction of
Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count were that he stopped
 CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT. 303
296 Opinion of the Court..

two men in the street, asked, and received, permission to

play a phonograph record, and played the record "Ene-
mies," which attacked the religion and church of the
two men, who were Catholics. Both were incensed by
he contents of the record and were tempted to strike
Cantwell unless he went away. On being told to be on
his way he left their presence. There was no evidence
that he was personally offensive or entered into any argu-
ment with those he interviewed.
The court held that the charge was not assault or breach
,of the peace or threats on Cantwell's part, but invoking
or inciting others to breach of the peace, and that the
facts supported the conviction of that offense.
First. We hold- that the statute, as construed and
applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty
without due process of law in contravention of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment. 3 The First Amend-
ment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to
enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legis-
lation on the subject of religion has a double aspect.'. On
the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere
to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On
the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces
two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the nature of thingg the

' Schneide; v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160.

304 OCTOBER TERM, 1939.
Opinion of the Court. .310 U. S.

second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regula-

tion for the protection of society. The freedom to act
must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforce-
ment of that protection. In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as 'not, in 'attaining a per-
missible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
No one would contest the prop6sition that a State may
not, by statute; wholly deny the right to preach or to
disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous and
*absolute restraint would violate the terms of the guaran-
tee.' It is equally clear that a State may by general and
non-discriminatory legislation regifiate the times, tthe
places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and
of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects
safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the com-
munity, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The appel-
lants are right in their insistence that the Act in ques-
tion is not such a regulation. If a certificate is pro-
cured, solicitation is permitted without restraint but, in
the absence of a certificate, solicitation is altogether
prohibited.
The appellants urge that to require them to obtain a
certificate as a condition" of soliciting support for their
views amounts to a prior restraint on the exercise of their'
religion within the meaning of the Constitution. The
State insists that the Act, as construed by the Supreme
Court-of Connecticut, imposes no previous restraint upon
the dissemination of religious views or teaching but merely
safeguards against the perpetration of frauds under the
cloak of religion. Conceding that this is so, the question
remains whether the method adopted by Connecticut to
"Reynolds v. United States, 98 I. S. 145; Davis v. BeasoA, 133
U. S. 333.
'.Compare Near v. -Minnesota,283 U. S. 697, 713.
 CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT.
296 Opinion of the Court.

that end transgresses the liberty safeguarded by the

Constitution.
The general regulation, in the public interest, of solici-
tation, which does not involve any religious test and
does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of
funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even
though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such
regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous re-
straint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an
inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.
It will be noted, however, that the Act requires an ap-
plication to the secretary of the public welfare council
of the State; that he is empowered to determine whether
the cause is a religious one, and that the issue of a cer-
tificate depends upon his affirmative action. If he finds
that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it be-
comes a crime. He is not to issue a certificate as a mat-
ter of course. His decision to issue or refuse it in-olves
appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the for-
mation of an opinion. He is authorized to withhold his
approval if he determines that the cause is not a reli-
gious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means
of determining its right to survive is a denial of
liberty protected by the First Amendment and in-
cluded in the liberty which is within the protection of
the Fourteenth.
The State asserts that if the licensing officer acts ar-
bitrarily, capriciously, or corruptly, his action is subject
to judicial correction. Counsel refer to the rule prevail-
ing in Connecticut that the decision of a commission or
an administrative official will be reviewed upon a claim
that "it works material damage to individual or corpo-
rate rights, or invades or threatens such rights, or is so
unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention, or is
not consonant with justice, or that a legal duty has not
.306 OCTOBER TERM, 1939.
Opinion of the Court. 310 U.S.

been performed." ' It is suggested that the statute is,

to be read as requiring the officer to issue a certificate
unless the cause, in question is clearly riot a religious one;
and that if he violates his duty his action will be cor-
rected by a court.
To this suggestion there are several sufficient answers.
The line between a discretionary and a ministerial act is
not always- easy to mark and the statute has not been
construed by the state court to impose a mere ministerial
duty on the secretary of the welfare council. Upon his
decision as to the nature of the cause, the right to solicit
depends. Moreover, the availability of a judicial rem-
edy for abuses in the system of licensing still leaves that
system one of previous restraint which, in the field of free
speech and press, we have held inadmissible. A statute
authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the
guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after trial is as
obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like
restraint by administrative action.7
Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to
imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may,
with impunity, commit frauds upon the public. Certainly
penal laws are available to punish such conduct. Even
the exercise of _religion niay be at some slight inconven-
ience in order that the State may protect its citizens from
injury. Without doubt a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a- stranger in
the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit
funds for any-purpose, to 6stablish his identity and his
'authority to act for the cause which he purports to repre-
sent.'. The State is- likewise free to regulate the time
Woodmont Assn. v. Milford, 85 Conn. 517, 522; 84 A. 307, 310;
see also Connecticut Co. v. Norwalk, 89 Conn. 528, 531; 94 A. 992.
'Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697.
"'Compare Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan,.229 U. S. 288, 306-310;
New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmorman, 278 U. S.63, 72.
 CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT.
296 Opinion of the Court.

and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of

public safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to con-
dition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of re-
ligious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which
rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority
as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden bur-
den upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Consti-
tution.
Second. We hold that, in the circumstances disclosed,
the conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count must
be set aside. Decision as to the lawfulness of the con-
viation demands the weighing of two conflicting interests.
The fundamental law declares the interest of the United
States that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited
and that freedom to communicate information and opin-
ion be not abridged. The State of Connecticut has an
obvious interest in the preservation and protection of
peace and good order within her borders. We must de-
termine whether the alleged protection of the State's
interest, means to which end would, in the absence of
limitation by the Federal Constitution, lie wholly within
the State's discretion, has been pressed, in this instance,
to a point where it has come into fatal collision with the
overriding interest protected by the federal compact.
Conviction on the fifth count was not pursuant to a
statute evincing a legislative judgment that street dis-
cussion of religious affairs, because of its tendency to
provoke disorder, should be regulated, or a judgment
that the playing of a phonograph on the streets should
in the interest of comfort or privacy be limited or pre-
vented. Violation of an Act exhibiting such a legislative
judgment and narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed
evil, would pose a question differing from that we must
here answer.' Such a declaration of the State's policy
! Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 670-1; Thornhill v.
Alabama, ante, pp.'98-105.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1939.
Opinion of the Court. 310 U. S.

would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as in-

fringing constitutional limitations. Here, however, the
judgment is based on a common law concept of the most
general and undefined nature. The court below has held
that the petitioner's conduct constituted the commission
of an offense under the' state law,' and we accept its
decision as binding upon us to that extent.
The offense known as breach of the peace embraces
a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public
order. and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts
but acts and words likely to produce violence in others.
No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the
principle of freedom 'of speech sanctions incitement to
riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to
exhort others to physical attack.upon those belonging to
another sect. When clear and present danger of riot,
disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets,
or other, immediate threat. to public safety,, peace, or
order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or
punish is obvious. Equally obvious is it that a State
may not unduly suppress free communication of views,
religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable
conditions. Here we have a situation analogous to a con-
viction under a statute sweeping in a great variety of
conduct under a general and indefinite characterization,
and. leaving to the executive and judicial branches too
wide a discretion in its application.
Having these considerations in mind, we note that
Jesse Cantwell, on April 26, 1938, was upon a public
street, where he had a right to be, and where he had a
right peacefully to impart his views to others. There is
no showing that his deportment was noisy, truculent,
overbearing or offensive. He requested of two pedes-
trians permission to play to them a phonograph record.
The permission was granted. It is not claimed that he
 CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT.
296 Opinion- of the Court.

intended to insult or affront the hearers by- playing the

record. It is plain that he wished only to interest theni
in his propaganda. The sound of the phonograph is not
shown to have disturbed residents of the street, to have,
drawn a crowd, or to have impeded traffic. Thus far he
had invaded no right or interest of the public or of the
men accosted,
The record played by Cantwell embodies a general
attack on all organized religious systems as instruments of
Satan and injurious toman; it then single out the Roman
Catholic Church for strictures couched in terms Which nat-
urally would'offend not only persons of that persuasion,
but all others who respect the honestly held religious faith
of their fellows. The hearers were in fact highly offended.
One of them said he felt like hitting Cantwell and the
other that he was tempted to throw Cantwell off the street.
The one who testified he felt like hitting Cantwell. said,
in answer to the question "Did you do anything else or
have any other reaction?" "No, sir, because he said he
would take the victrola and he went." The other witness,
testified that he told Cantwell he had better get off the
street before something happened to him and that was the
end of the matter as Cantwell picked up his'books and
walked up the street.
Cantwell's conduct, in the view of the court below, con-
sidered apart from the effect of his communication upon
his hearers, did not amount to a breach of the peace. One
may, however, be guilty of the offense if he commit, acts or
make statements likely to provoke violence and disturb-
ance of good order, even though no such eventuality be
intended. Decisions to this effect are many, but exami-
nation discloses that, in practically all, the provocative
language which was held to amount to a breach of the
peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks
directed to the person of the hearer. Resort to epithets or
310 OCTOBER TERM,' 1939.
Opinion of the Court. 310 U. S.

personal, abuse is not in any proper sense communication

of informati6n or opinion safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument.
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of
bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discour-
tesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we find only an
effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to
contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell. how-
ever nisguided others may think him,'conceived to be true
religion.
In the realm of-religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of
one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To
persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as
we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification
of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this
nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite
of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in-the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and
right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is. that
under their shield many types of life, character, opinion
and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.' No-
where is this shield more necessary than in our own coun-
try for a people composed of many races and of many
creeds. There are limits to' the exercise of these liberties.
The danger in these times from the coercive activities of
those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit
would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order
to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their
liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These
*and other transgressions of those limits the States appro-
priately may punish.
 BORCHARD v. CALIFORNIA BANK.
296 Statement of the Case.

Although the contents of the record. not unnaturally

aroused animosity, we think that, in the absence of a
statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific con-
duct as constituting a clear and present danger to a
substantial interest of the State, the petitioner's communi-
cation, considered in the light of the constitutional guar-
antees, raised no such clear and present menace to public
- peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of
the common law offense in question."0
The judgment affirming the convictions on the third
and fifth counts is reversed and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.

BORCHARD ET AL. v. CALIFORNIA BANK ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 752. Argued April 30, 1940.-Decided May 20, 1940.

In a proceeding under § 75 (s) of the Bankruptcy Act, the debtors

petitioned the conciliation commissioner for an appraisal and the
setting aside of the property to them (no action having been taken
upon a previous petition); appraisers were appointed and made
report to the commissioner of the value of the property, but no
stay order fixing terms on which the debtors would remain in pos-
session had been entered. Held, the action of the District Court,
at that stage, in granting leave to a creditor to sell the property
under deeds of trust was contrary to the provisions of § 75 (s).
P. 316.
107 F. 2d 96, reversed.
CERTIORARI, 309 U. S. 648, to review the affirmance of
an order of the District Court, in a proceeding under
" Compare Schenck V. Un'fted States, 249 U. S. 47, 52; Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 256; Thornhill v. Alabama, ante, p. 88.