AUTOSAR RS Safety
AUTOSAR RS Safety
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Table of Contents
1 Scope of Document 4
4 Requirements Specification 7
4.1 Top Level Safety Requirements and Safety Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Functional Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3 Technical Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.1 AUTOSAR AdaptivePlatform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.1.1 Functional Cluster: Platform Health Management
(PHM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.1.2 Functional Cluster: Execution Management (EM) . . 17
4.3.1.3 Functional Cluster: State Management (SM) . . . . 18
4.3.1.4 Operating System (OS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3.1.5 Functional Cluster: Persistency (PER) . . . . . . . . 20
4.3.1.6 Functional Cluster: Communication Management (CM) 21
4.3.1.7 Functional Cluster: Update and Configuration Man-
agement (UCM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5 Requirements Tracing 24
6 References 26
1 Scope of Document
This document specifies safety requirements on the AUTOSAR Platform, the
AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform in particular. This document elaborates the high level
safety requirements written in RS_Main. It makes use of the intended functionality
described in EXP_PlatformDesign document. The functional safety requirements are
derived from the safety goals and hazards mentioned in EXP_SafetyOverview. Tech-
nical safety requirements towards the AUTOSAR functional cluster and safety relevant
applications are derived from the functional safety requirements.
The AUTOSAR Classic Platform is not in scope.
No ASIL Ratings
4 Requirements Specification
This chapter contains top level safety requirements (safety goals) for AUTOSAR in
4.1. Functional safety requirements in 4.2 are derived from these safety goals. The
sub-chapter 4.3 contains technical safety requirements which are derived from the
functional safety requirements.
Type: draft
AUTOSAR shall ensure correct computation, execution and execution order of
Description:
multiple applications with mixed criticality.
To ensure freedom from interference with respect to timing [1] and data
Rationale: processing.
AppliesTo: AP
Supporting ISO26262 [1]
Material:
Type: draft
AUTOSAR shall ensure correct configuration during the entire life cycle of the
Description:
platform.
AUTOSAR needs to provide measures and mechanisms to keep the
Rationale: configuration consistent through out the whole life-cycle of the item.
AppliesTo: AP
Supporting ISO 26262 [1]
Material:
Type: draft
AUTOSAR shall ensure correct update and upgrade of multiple platform and
Description:
non-platform applications with mixed criticality.
AUTOSAR supports updatability during the life cycle and therefore the platform
Rationale:
is responsible to ensure that these updates are performed correctly and safe.
AppliesTo: AP
Supporting ISO 26262 [1]
Material:
Type: draft
Type: draft
AUTOSAR shall detect faults and failures while processing data,
Description:
communicating with other systems or system elements.
Mechanisms to detect faults and failures are required to achieve higher safety
ratings and increase product quality. A list of potential failures is described in
Rationale: EXP_SafetyOverview [5] and ISO 26262 [1]. Incorrect specification or
configuration is a potential source of failure.
AppliesTo: AP
Supporting ISO 26262 [1]
Material:
c(RS_Main_00010)
Type: draft
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe initialization of hardware
Description:
and software components
Safe initialization of the underlying hardware and the AUTOSAR Adaptive
Rationale: Platform functional cluster and services and the application software is required
to ensure intended functionality.
Use Case: AP-UC-02
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM, SM, UCM, PHM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00001, RS_SAF_00002)
[RS_SAF_10002]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe
verification mechanisms of platform functional-clusters, applications, services
and their respective configuration data. d
Type: draft
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe verification mechanisms of
Description: platform functional-clusters, applications, services and their respective
configuration data.
5
4
Due to the random hardware failures in the memory unit the data integrity is
required to be verified to ensure no loss of data has occurred over time during
Rationale:
operation, stand-by or powered off and has not been tampered with.
Note: Not with respect to cybersecurity.
Use Case: AP-UC-02, AP-UC-06
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM, UCM, PER
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00002, RS_SAF_00003)
[RS_SAF_10005]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe
shutdown and termination of application and services. d
Type: draft
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe shutdown and termination
Description:
of application and services.
Before termination of applications and services and/or shut-down of the
AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform or the whole ECU, the dependent applications
Rationale: have to be terminated properly in the right order to prevent conflicts or failures
or unexpected behavior. Ensure safe degradation, fault evacuation and fault
containment.
Use Case: [AP-UC-01], [AP-UC-06]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM, SM, PHM, UCM, OS
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00001, RS_SAF_00003)
[RS_SAF_10006]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe
transition of states in an application/service life cycle. d
Type: draft
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe transition of states in an
Description:
application/service life cycle.
AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform is responsible for managing and monitoring the
Rationale:
internal states of the application.
Use Case: [AP-UC-01], [AP-UC-06]
AppliesTo: AP
[RS_SAF_00001]
Dependencies:
EM, SM, PHM
5
4
Supporting –
Material:
c()
[RS_SAF_10008]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe
resource management for the AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform functional-clusters,
applications and services. d
Type: draft
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe resource management for
Description:
the AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform functional-clusters, applications and services.
The functional clusters, applications and services of the AUTOSAR Adaptive
Platform shall be ensured with adequate resources and availability to that
resource in the expected time with sufficient freedom from interference. No
Rationale: unexpected or unhandled exception shall prevent access or delay access to a
required and properly managed and authorized resource.
Resources are - among other - CPU, runtime, memory consumption, net
bandwidth, peripherals (like ADC, DAC, Timer) . . .
Use Case: [AP-UC-01]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM, OS
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
Description: The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide an interface for an application
or service to allow safe communication.
In a vehicle several ECUs with several software components are interrelating
with each other to fulfill a goal or functionality. AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform
Rationale: provides standardized interfaces and mechanisms to achieve safe
communication between these components. Safe communication with
elements outside of the vehicle is also in scope.
Use Case: [AP-UC-03], [AP-UC-04], [AP-UC-05]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: CM[E2E]
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00004)
Type: draft
Description: The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall prevent loss of a valid configuration.
AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform should provide mechanisms to switch back to the
Rationale: latest working configuration
Use Case: [AP-UC-02], [AP-UC-06]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: UCM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00002)
[RS_SAF_10028]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide de-
pendable scheduling of AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform functional-clusters, appli-
cations and services. d
Type: draft
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide dependable scheduling of
Description:
AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform functional-clusters, applications and services.
Dependable scheduling is required to ensure the proper time-allocation for all
Rationale:
the available functional-clusters, applications and services.
Use Case: [AP-UC-01]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM, OS
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00001, RS_SAF_00002)
[RS_SAF_10030]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe
program execution. d
Type: draft
Description: The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall provide safe program execution.
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall offer flow monitoring mechanisms to
Rationale: detect and ensure that the intended program flow of functional-clusters and
services as well as for user-applications and user-services is not violated.
Use Case: [AP-UC-01]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM, SM, OS, PHM
5
4
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00001)
[RS_SAF_10031]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall detect the pro-
gram execution time violation. d
Type: draft
Description: The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall detect the program execution time
violation.
All the timing constraints of the functional-clusters, applications and services
Rationale:
need to be supervised and monitored.
Use Case: [AP-UC-01], [AP-UC-06]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM, SM, OS, PHM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00001)
[RS_SAF_10037]{DRAFT} The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall prevent unin-
tended alteration of data. d
Type: draft
Description: The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall prevent unintended alteration of data.
Due to the random hardware failures in the memory unit the data integrity is
required to be verified to ensure no alteration to data has occurred over time
during operation, stand-by or powered off and has not been tampered with. To
Rationale:
achieve freedom from interference, the access to data needs to be managed
and protected.
Note: Not with respect to cybersecurity.
Use Case: [AP-UC-06]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PER, PHM
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
The AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform shall ensure that the safety relevant software
Description:
is updated/upgraded in a state that cannot cause a hazardous situation.
The update of safety critical application should be done when the car is
Rationale: stationary and at a safe location e.g. a parking garage.
Use Case: [AP-UC-02]
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: UCM, SM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_00003)
Type: draft
Platform Health Management shall inherit at least the highest safety integrity
Description:
level from any Process that is running on the platform.
Platform Health Management is responsible for ensuring part of the safe
execution of safety relevant processes/applications, it should at least be
Rationale:
developed with the highest ASIL as the process/application that is being
executed.
An ASIL C, B and QM Application is running on the adaptive Platform. PHM
Use Case: shall supervise the ASIL C and B application, therefore PHM shall be
implemented with an ASIL C
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PHM
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
Platform Health Management shall ensure that the State Management is
Description:
functioning, and triggers a watchdog reset in case it fails.
Since State Management is a fundamental functional cluster of the Adaptive
Rationale: AUTOSAR, if it fails then Platform Health Management (which controls the
watchdog) shall trigger a reset which is the only reasonable option
SM is managing a safety critical application. Supervision of SM fails and is
Use Case: detected by PHM. PHM shall trigger a watchdog reset.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PHM, SM
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
Platform Health Management shall ensure that the Execution Management is
Description:
functioning, and triggers a watchdog reset in case it fails.
Since Execution Management is a fundamental functional cluster of the
Rationale: Adaptive AUTOSAR, if it fails then Platform Health Management (which
controls the watchdog) shall trigger a reset which is the only reasonable option
EM is managing safety critical applications and supervision of EM fails and is
Use Case: detected by PHM. PHM shall trigger a watchdog reset.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PHM, EM
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
Platform Health Management shall monitor the execution frequency of safety
Description:
relevant applications and services.
Alive Supervision is one of the mechanisms of Platform Health Management by
Rationale:
which it monitors safety relevant processes/applications.
A safety critical application with alive supervision get stuck at some point in
Use Case: time during execution. PHM detects that the supervised application is not alive.
5
4
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PHM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10031)
[RS_SAF_21105]{DRAFT} Platform Health Management shall monitor the control
flow of safety relevant applications and services. d
Type: draft
Platform Health Management shall monitor the control flow of safety relevant
Description:
applications and services.
Logical Supervision is one of the mechanisms of Platform Health Management
Rationale:
by which it monitors safety relevant processes/applications.
A safety critical application is developed to follow a specific control flow and is
Use Case: suddenly not behaving as intended. PHM detects the control flow violation.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PHM
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
Platform Health Management shall monitor that the duration between the
Description: checkpoints of safety relevant applications and services are within the minimum
and maximum configured time limits.
Deadline Supervision is one of the mechanisms of Platform Health
Rationale: Management by which it monitors safety relevant processes/applications.
A safety critical application is developed to reach specific checkpoints in a
Use Case: defined time window and is suddenly not behaving as intended. PHM detects
the violation.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PHM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10031)
Type: draft
Platform Health Management shall notify State Management in case an
Description: AUTOSAR Adaptive Platform functional cluster, application or service other
than Execution Management and State Management fails.
Since the recovery actions are coordinated in SM, the failures shall be reported
Rationale:
to SM except if SM or EM themselves fail.
PHM supervises a safety critical application. This application fails. PHM
Use Case:
detects the issue and reports to SM.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PHM, SM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10005, RS_SAF_10006)
Type: draft
Execution Management shall inherit at least the highest safety integrity level
Description:
from any process that is running on the platform.
EM manages process instantiation and termination of all the processes and
Rationale: therefore needs to be developed and executed according to the same safety
standards as the highest rated safety application managed by EM in the system
An ASIL C, B and QM Application is running on the adaptive Platform. EM shall
Use Case: execute the ASIL C, B and the QM application, therefore EM shall be
implemented with an ASIL C.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10001)
[RS_SAF_21202]{DRAFT} Execution Management shall support fully determinis-
tic execution (time determinism and data determinism) so that higher ASIL levels
can be achieved even when using parallel processing. d
Type: draft
Execution Management shall support fully deterministic execution (time
Description: determinism and data determinism) so that higher ASIL levels can be achieved
even when using parallel processing.
According to ISO 26262-6 Table 3 one principle of software architectural design
Rationale: is restricted use of interrupts to achieve determinism, which is highly
recommended to achieve ASIL D.
Two instances of the same application of the same ASIL can be executed for
Use Case: decomposition to reach the higher ASIL level (with some additional measure)
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: EM
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
State Management shall inherit at least the highest safety integrity level from
Description:
any Process that is managed by it.
SM manages state changes and recovery actions of all the processes and
Rationale: therefore needs to be developed and executed according to the same safety
standards as the highest rated safety application managed by SM in the system
An ASIL C, B and QM Application is running on the adaptive Platform. SM shall
Use Case: manage the ASIL C, B and the QM application, therefore SM shall be
implemented with an ASIL C.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: SM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10001)
[RS_SAF_21302]{DRAFT} State Management shall coordinate recovery actions.
d
Type: draft
Description: State Management shall coordinate recovery actions.
State Management is a central functional cluster to which Platform Health
Management reports supervision failures and State Management decides
Rationale: which recovery action (e.g. functional group state change, notification to a safe
application or even ECU reset) should be triggered.
PHM supervises a safety critical application. This application fails. PHM
Use Case:
detects the issue and reports to SM. SM coordinates the error recovery actions.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: SM, PHM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10005, RS_SAF_10006)
Type: draft
The OS shall support a mechanism that prevents starvation of applications or
Description: processes on the basis of CPU usage (under the respect of available
resources).
To achieve freedom from interference it is necessary to prevent processes from
Rationale: being adversely affected by other processes that are consuming of excessive
resources.
A QM application and a ASIL B application are executed on the same core. OS
Use Case:
ensures the defined amount of execution time for safety relevant application.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: OS
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
The OS shall support resource reservation for memory in the interval
Description:
[min,max]. If max is not specified it shall be considered as unlimited.
To achieve freedom from interference it is necessary to prevent processes from
adversely affecting other processes, through consumption of excessive
resources. To this end the OS mechanisms to configure minimum guarantees
Rationale:
on available memory are necessary. Optionally a maximum can be configured -
if not specified the process can consume all memory that is not otherwise
reserved.
A QM application and a ASIL application are executed on the same machine.
Use Case: OS is ensuring all applications are only getting the defined amount of memory
allocated.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: OS
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10008)
[RS_SAF_21403]{DRAFT} Operating System shall ensure that only allowed
memory accesses are made. d
Type: draft
Description: Operating System shall ensure that only allowed memory accesses are made.
To achieve freedom from interference it is necessary to prevent processes from
adversely affected other processes. Access to private memory which is
Rationale:
reserved for a process shall be protected against un-allowed accesses from
other processes.
A QM application and a ASIL application are executed on the same machine.
Use Case: OS prevents the QM application from changing the memory assigned to the
safety critical application.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: OS
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10008)
Type: draft
Persistency shall add integrity information to the persistent data if such a
Description:
mechanism does not already exist in the operating system
To be able to detect data corruption (violating data integrity), integrity
information such as CRC is needed to be added when storing data. If there
Rationale: exists an existing underlying mechanism which provides such a functionality
with the required integrity, e.g. within the OS, then this takes away AUTOSARs
responsibility.
A safety critical application requests to store data to a persistent storage.
Use Case: Persistency adds data integrity information and stores the data.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PER
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10037)
[RS_SAF_21502]{DRAFT} Persistency shall check the integrity of persistent data
when reading it if this is not already done by the operating system. d
Type: draft
Persistency shall check the integrity of persistent data when reading it if this is
Description:
not already done by the operating system.
Without an integrity check during read, a corrupted piece of data being read
can be wrongly treated as correct. If there exists an existing underlying
Rationale:
mechanism which provides such a functionality with the required integrity, e.g.
within the OS, then this takes away AUTOSARs responsibility.
A safety critical application requests data from a persistent storage.
Use Case: Persistency reads requested data and checks the integrity information.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: PER
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10037)
Type: draft
Communication Management shall provide mechanisms for detection of errors
Description: during the exchange of information among software components, by
considering all faults listed in the ISO standard (ISO 26262:6-2018 D.2.4).
This requirement is created initially to fulfill the goal of AUTOSAR in supporting
the development of safety-related systems by offering safety measures and
mechanisms. As users may build project-specific applications, it is only
Rationale:
possible for AUTOSAR to provide the safe exchange of information. ISO 26262
is mentioned and to be followed, as it is the international standard for functional
safety of E/E systems for automotive.
Two ASIL rated applications on different control devices shall exchange
information through a component (HW or SW) with a lower rated ASIL.
Communication Management shall support safety mechanisms like a counter, a
Use Case:
checksum and a timestamp to allow the ASIL applications or the CM
implementations to detect and ensure that the information has been transmitted
correctly, in time and in-order.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: CM[E2E]
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10014, RS_SAF_10037)
[RS_SAF_21602]{DRAFT} Communication Management shall, based on individ-
ual safety concepts, allow integrators to select and configure the set of safety
mechanisms to detect communication faults. d
Type: draft
Communication Management shall, based on individual safety concepts, allow
Description: integrators to select and configure the set of safety mechanisms to detect
communication faults.
The AUTOSAR Platform is designed to be used in various applications. It is
possible that for specific applications, a particular type of fault will not occur.
Rationale:
Therefore, it is reasonable to have the configurability such that integrators may
freely select the set of mechanisms to be deployed.
A hi-level design change or new information requires a different communication
protection mechanism. An integrator can select the proper protection by
Use Case:
changing the Manifest. Communication Management uses the changed
descriptor after a system update.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: CM[E2E]
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10014, RS_SAF_10037)
Type: draft
Update and Configuration Management (UCM) shall orchestrate the recovery
Description: to a safe operating mode in case of failed update process of a safety relevant
software.
A failed update of a safety relevant software can cause a hazardous situation
Rationale: and to avoid such a situation, Update and Configuration Management shall
ensure that it stays in a safe operating mode.
A system update has been performed and the new configuration is not stable
Use Case: and crashes. The system shall transition to a safe operating mode because the
safety integrity is not ensured any more.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: UCM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10038)
[RS_SAF_21702]{DRAFT} In case of software update/install of a safety relevant
software, Update and Configuration Management shall verify the update/instal-
lation by checking the integrity of the updated or newly installed software. d
Type: draft
In case of software update/install of a safety relevant software, Update and
Description: Configuration Management shall verify the update/installation by checking the
integrity of the updated or newly installed software.
Update and Configuration Management shall ensure that the updated safety
Rationale:
relevant software is installed correctly.
A system update is going to be performed. The update package contains
Use Case: several modules. Update and Configuration Management shall check that the
information within the update package is extracted and stored properly.
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: UCM
Supporting –
Material:
Type: draft
If the verification of the update/installation of a safety relevant software fails,
Update and Configuration Management shall ensure that a transition from
Description:
non-hazardous state to a potentially hazardous state is not made unless the
safety feature is available
The safety feature whose update failed shall be either available as it was or a
retry should be made which eventually results in the updated safety feature.
Rationale: Unless this happens, the function group state which ensures that a hazardous
situation cannot occur, shall not be changed.
Use Case: –
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: UCM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10038)
[RS_SAF_21704]{DRAFT} Update and Configuration Management shall verify
the integrity of the new configuration and ensure that a well known configura-
tion can be used in case the verification fails. d
Type: draft
Update and Configuration Management shall verify the integrity of the new
Description: configuration and ensure that a well known configuration can be used in case
the verification fails.
During transmission of a new configuration errors may occur and the integrity
check may fail. To allow to continue operation Update and Configuration
Rationale: Management shall provide a mechanism to roll back or load another known and
consistent configuration which is considered safe.
Use Case: –
AppliesTo: AP
Dependencies: UCM
Supporting –
Material:
c(RS_SAF_10027)
5 Requirements Tracing
The following table references the requirements specified in [6] and links to the fulfill-
ment of these.
Feature Description Satisfied by
6 References