The convergence of classical

cryptography towards quantum

cryptography
 Protocole BB84

The BB84 protocol is the first quantum key distribution protocol developed by Bennett
and Brassard in 1984.

The BB84 protocol is a non-deterministic protocol using the polarization of photonic

Qbits.
• Aliceencodes her bit sequence by randomly selecting
the rectilinear base or the diagonal base without
revealing her choices to anyone. The photons are
then sent to Bob via the quantum channel.
• Bob receives the photons and records the results by
randomly choosing one of the two bases.
• Alice exchanges her basic choices with Bob via a
public channel, but not the binary value associated
with each photon.
• Bob compares his choices of bases with those of Alice and identifies
the subset of bits corresponding to cases where they both chose
the same base.
Bob then communicates to Alice via the public channel the
corresponding positions in the sequence, the other bits are then
eliminated.
• Bob then transmits to Alice via the public channel a subset of his
results. Alice compares this sequence of bits with her own
sequence and then performs error analysis.
• If the error rate is less than the required value, Alice then deduces
that there was no act of espionage during the procedure, and that
therefore the communication via the quantum channel was secure.
Alice and Bob then have the option of keeping the remaining bits
that form their private key. If the BER is greater than this critical
value, we then abandon the procedure and start the protocol again
at step 1.
Les protocoles à variables discrètes
Single photon protocols
Example du codage par le protocole BB84

Binary sequence 1 0 1 0 0 1 1

base of Alice B+ BX BX B+ BX B+ BX

Alice measurment ↑ → ↑
Bob analyzer B+ BX B+ BX BX B+ B+

Bobmeasurment ↑ → ↑ →
Keys raw 1 0 - - 0 1 -
The BB84 protocol with the presence of a spy
Bits d’Alice 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Base d’Alice
+ X X + X + + + X +
Polarisation
d’Alice
V D A V D H V H A H
Base de
Bob
+ + X X X + X + X +
Polarisation
de Bob
V H A D D H A H A D
Key
1 0 1 - 0 - 1 0 1 0
Bits of Alice 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Alice’s Base + X X + X + + + X +
d’Alice
Alice’s V D A V D H V H A H
Polarization
of Alice
Eve base’s X X + + X + X + X +
Eve’s A D H V A H D H D H
Polarisation
Bits 1 0 1 - 0 - 1 0 1 0
captured
New Base + X X + X + + + X +
of Alice
New D H A A D A H D A A
polarization of
Alice
Bits sent by 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Eve
Base’s Bob + + X X X + X + X +
Polarization V H A D D H A H A D
of Bob
Key
- 0 - - 0 - - - 1 -
Protocole B92
• In 1992, Charles Bennett proposed the B92
protocol in his paper “Quantum cryptography
using any two non-orthogonal states”.
• B92 protocol is a modified version of the BB84
protocol with the key difference between the two
being that while BB84 protocol uses four different
polarization states of photon,
• the B92 protocol uses two bases: the first is the
rectilinear basis, conventionally H, V-polarization
state and the other is the diagonal
basis, conventionally +-45°polarization state).
• The B92 protocol can be summarized in the
following steps
 • Alice sends a string of photons in either H-polarisation
state or +45°-polarisation state, chosen randomly. H-
state will correspond to the bit ‘0’ whereas +45°-state
will correspond to the bit ‘1’.

Alice

1, 90°
0, 135°
Bob randomly chooses between
rectilinear V 90° and a-diagonal
135° basis, to measure the
polarisation of the received
photon. Bob
• When receiving the Qubits, Bob measures
them in random bases proceed to the
comparison :
• If the choice is different, no measurement
will be carried out and the Qubit will be
ignored
• But if the choice coincides and the data
from Alice and Bob are correlated,the Qubit
will be preserved
• For the verification, Bob and Alice publicly share
a part of the generated random bit string
• If the bit error rate crosses a tolerable limit, the
protocol is aborted.
• If not, they now have been able to generate a
secure key between them.
 1, 90°
0, 135°

Bob
Alice
 Alice sends a 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
photon :
Aice bases

Bob selects the bse

Bob understand the 1 0 - 0 - 1 1 1

value
Final keys : 1 0 - 0 - 1 - 1

Qubit : Emission : Reception :

0 Horizontal (0°) Anti-diagonal (135°)
1 Diagonal (45°) Vertical (90°)
 Alice sends a 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
photon :
Aice bases

Bob selects the bse

Bob understand the 1 0 - 0 - 1 1 1

value

Final keys : 1 0 - 0 - 1 - 1

Qubit : Emission : Reception :

0 Horizontal (0°) Anti-diagonal (135°)
1 Diagonal (45°) Vertical (90°)
 Six-State Protocol (SSP).
• In 1999 Pasquinucci and Gisin proposed in
their article "Incoherent and coherente a
vesdropping in the six-state protocol of
quantum cryptography", a protocol which is
considered an improvement of the four-state
BB84 protocol, with two additional
polarization states represented on a circular
basis (|⟳>,|⟲>), their expressions are given
the two additional states correspond to
the ±Z axis, so the six states are along
the three axes along ±x, ±y and ±z
 the probability of selecting the correct base is
reduced to 1⁄3 instead of 1⁄2, which is a
significant advantage, meaning they eliminate
2⁄3 of the transmiCed Qbits before extracting
the secret key
As disadvantages:
the time to adopt the key is long
more experimental devices
Alice :0 , 1 , BOB 0

Alice :0 , BOB O , 1
Bit d’Alice 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0

Base
d’Alice
Polarisation V D D G A H V H H V G G H G Dr
d’Alice
Base de
Bob
Polarisation H H A G V D H H V G Dr Dr V Dr G
de Bob
La clé 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
secrète

Alice :0 , 1 , BOB 0

Alice :0 , BOB O , 1
 ATTAQUES
• Photon Number Splitting Attack (PNS)
• Faked-state attack
 SARG04
• It retained the same principle and experimental
implementation as the BB84 protocol, when encoding
photons on the four non-orthogonal states (|±x> and
|±y> defining the linear and diagonal basis
respectively) and communications bias the quantum
channel.
• However, it presents a difference at the reconciliation
stage on the classic channel.
• Where Alice does not reveal these states and bases,
but she sends a pair of non-orthogonal states, on
which she has encoded one of these Qbits.
 SARG04
On receipt, if Bob uses a correct base to make these
measurements, he will measure an identical state.
But otherwise it won't measure the same state and won't
be able to determine the transmitted bit.
The Qbit chain obtained after the sieving phase is 4 times
shorter than that obtained by the BB84 protocol, this is
the disadvantage of this type of protocol .
However, the SARG04 protocol allows the detection of
errors linked to the quantum channel, the influence of
the detector as well as the modifications made by Eve.
 steps
• (same as BB84) Alice randomly sends 1
polarization out of 4
• (same as BB84) Bob randomly selects an H/V or
diagonal base
• In BB84, Bob and Alice discuss when they had the
same base (H/V 0°/90° or diagonal 45°/135°),
transmission and reception. This time, Alice will
give a pair of non-orthogonal answers, one of
which will be correct. For example 0°/135°.
 GV95
• From an experimental point of view, this
configuration is carried out with a Mach
Zehnder interferometer with two storage
channels of equal delays, allowing the
representation of bits 0 and 1 respectively
 GV95
• The two wave packets arrive simultaneously at
the second beam splitter, so that when the
particle is emitted in the |ψ0> state emerges
at the detector D0, and if it is in the |ψ1>
state, it will be detected by the detector D1,
which represent states 0 and 1 respectively. In
addition,
• Bob records the photon reception time tr
• Then, it first sends the wave packet |a> to
Bob, upon arrival it will send the packet |b>
with a fixed delay τ (chosen so that it is
greater than the travel time θ).
• In parallel, Alice records the packet sending
time te which is random for later use.
MZ
• In order to detect the presence of a possible
spy, Alice performs two tests:
• Alice and Bob compare the receive time tr
with the send time te for each state, to ensure
that Eve cannot delay a packet to measure
another packet.
.

• Alice and Bob verify that .

But that doesn't stop Eve from replacing a wave
packet with a false wave packet.
• Alice and Bob look for changes in the data by
comparing a portion of the transmitted bits to
the same portion of the received bits.
• If after checking, Alice and Bob notice that the
timing is not respected or the anti-correlated bits
are detected, then they discover Eve's intrusion.
 Protocole KMB09
• It is based on the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle and on the condition of using two
unbiased bases by Alice and Bob, one of the
bases encodes bit 0 and the other encodes bit
1.
• If this condition is not verified then the bit will
not be transmitted
 Protocole KMB09
• This protocol derives its security from the fact
that the detection of the Eve intruder is
carried out by calculating the index
transmission error rate (ITER) and the
quantum error rate introduced by Eve.
Knowing that ITER increases when the photon
states are very large, introducing more noise
into the transmission line
 Protocole KMB09
The procedure of this protocol follows the
following steps:
• Alice generates a random sequence, and
assigns each bit individually and randomly to
an index i=1,2,…,N. Then it sends the single
photons to Bob in one of two states.
• Bob randomly measures the Qbits according
to the two measurement bases.
• On the public channel, Alice informs Bob of
the submitted indexes (i).
• In turn, Bob matches these measurements
with Alice's values. It keeps those that are
correlated and informs Alice of those that are
interrupted.
• Finally, Alice and Bob determine if a spy is
introducing errors, by comparing the error
rate to the threshold limit, if it is low enough,
then they will assume that no spy has been
introduced.
 protocole S9
• It is based on a combination of one public key and the
other private.
• The security of this protocol arises from the fact that
Alice and Bob each use secret keys in the exchange of
Qbits which are transmitted on the quantum channel
during all phases of communications.
• Knowing that the Qbit is in any state counter to the
BB84 protocol, the Qbit is in one of four states.
• The S09 protocol takes place in three phases as follows
 protocole S9
• Preparation phase (Alice): Alice takes a bit i and
transforms it into an element of a secret base BK
generating the Qubit |ψ K,i>, then sends it to Bob
through the quantum channel. Message key
• preparation phase: Bob applies the secret
operation Ui on the Qubit |ψK,i>, then he sends
the resulting qubit back to Alice.
• Measurement and derivation phase: Alice
measures the qubit in the base BK and obtains bit
j.
 Entanglement protocols

Bell inequality

Quantum mechanics:
 E91
In 1991, Ekert proposed a new quantum key
distribution protocol in his article entitled
“Quantum cryptography based on bell’s
theorem”, he named it the E91 protocol.
 E91
• This protocol is based on the EPR paradox (was
presented by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosenen
1935), which makes it possible to prove the certainty of
entangled pairs and Bell's inequalities theorem in the
detection of a possible Eve spy. The EPR protocol relies
on two important entanglement properties,
• the first is that the entangled states are perfectly
correlated;
• and the second is that any spying attempts will destroy
this correlation and will be detected by Alice or Bob.
 E91
• As the idea of the protocol is the protection of
entangled pairs to remotely generate
correlated measurements in Alice and Bob.
• So an entangled photon source is
implemented using two approaches
 E91
The first approach: is a standard approach, which
consists of putting a source of entangled photon
pairs in the middle of the transmission channel
between Alice and Bob, called the EPR source.
The two entangled photons are coded on one of the
four chosen states randomly by the EPR source
and sending in two opposite directions; one
towards Alice, the other towards Bob as shown in
figure.
Then, Alice and Bob would each choose a random basis
on which to measure the state of the received photon.
Comparing their results, Alice and Bob only retain their
measurements if their measurement base choices
coincide with the source base choice
 E91
• The second approach: is the simplest, whose
entangled photon source is included in Alice's
side. In this case, Alice generates a pair of
entangled photons, one of which she keeps
and sends the other to Bob (figure).
After reception, Alice and Bob measure their
respective photons in B+ or B×, choosing a basis
randomly and independently. By publicly comparing
the bases of measurement, If the bases are the same,
they keep the result otherwise they reject it.
 Steps E91
• The source centre chooses the EPR
pair(Entangled Bell State)
|φ+⟩⟩=(1/√2)(|00⟩+|11⟩),
⟩ ⟩ sends the first
particle |φ+⟩₁ to Alice and second particle
|φ+⟩₂
⟩ to Bob.
 E91
• Alice makes a measurement with a direction
randomly chosen between {0, π/8
, π/4}, whereas Bob makes a measurement
with a direction randomly chosen between
{−π/8 , 0, π/8}.
• They record the measurement result and
broadcast the measurement basis which they
used, through the classical channel.
 E91
• Thus, Alice and Bob now know each other's
choice. They divide the measurement result
into two groups:
• one is the decoy qubits G₁ where they choose
different measurement basis
• and another is the raw key qubits G₂ where
they choose the same measurement basis.
 E91
• The group G₁ is used to detect whether there is
an eavesdropping. To detect eavesdropping, they
can compute the test statistic S using the
correlation coefficients between Alice’s bases and
Bob’s, similar.
• If there is an error in the value of S, which means
that there is also a eavesdropper, Alice and Bob
will conclude that the quantum channel is not
safe and they will interrupt this communication
and start a new one.
 E91
• If the quantum channel is safe, G₂ can be used
as the raw keys because Alice and Bob can
receive the same measurements. Both Alice
and Bob agree on that the measurement |0⟩
represents the classical bit 0, while the
measurement |1⟩⟩ represents the classical bit
1, and thus get their key string.
E91 protocol uses CHSH inequality
(Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
inequality)
 BBM92
• BBM92 is the fusion of E91 and BB84 but not
quite, or even a BB84 using entanglement. This
protocol does not need a Bell test.
• We therefore start on the basis of BB84:
2 measurement bases, for example H/V and
diagonal, same Alice and Bob randomly choose
one of the two bases to measure the entangled
photon When the chosen bases are revealed, if
they match, they keep the bits. Otherwise they
throw it away. A sample result is revealed to
check if they were wiretapped by Eve
• As the photons are entangled, they are necessarily the
same (or anti-coincidence, depending on the
implementation details). And if Eve ever intercepted the
photon, then she lost the entanglement at the time of the
measurement, and therefore cannot recreate exactly the
same photon - the non-cloning theorem requires - Eve will
have to play at random personally (she does not do not
know the basis of measurement, as a reminder). Alice and
Bob will then see differences in the sample of so-called
good photons, which reveals the presence of Eve. So, no
need to do a Bell test like in BB84. That said, doing a Bell
test will never hurt: it will obviously increase safety.
 implementation of the BBM92
protocol with temporal photons
 Cow
• A binary sequence is coded by Alice, using pulses
produced by an attenuated laser source with an
average photon number μ=0,1.
• They are separated by fixed and well-defined
time intervals; then forwarded them to Bob.
Knowing that the probability of generating bit 1
or 0 without a decoy state is 1/2. But if the decoy
bit must be generated then it will be with an
equiprobable probability of (1-f)/2 for bit 0 or 1.
• On reception, Bob measures the received bit
using two detectors, the first is used to
measure the time of arrival at the detector
DB, and the second is the monitoring detector
DM.
• When the DB detector database is enabled
and the detection time is monitored by the
DM detector, Bob will announce the Qbit after
the measurement.
• Alice examines the bit sequence, the decoy
sequence at the interferometer output, and
the detection time. If a possible spy is
detected, then it will break the coherence
between two successive pulses.
• Alice tells Bob which bit should be removed
from her raw key because it corresponds to
the decoy sequence.
• Finally the secret key is generated from the
raw key with the classic error correction
process and confidentiality amplification.
• The advantage of the COW protocol is that it
is immune to PNS attacks, but in return it is
sensitive to other attacks.