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 LOGIC

THE BASICS

Logic: The Basics is an accessible introduction to several core areas

of logic. The first part of the book features a self-contained
introduction to the standard topics in classical logic, such as:
• mathematical preliminaries
• propositional logic
• quantified logic (first monadic, then polyadic)
• English and standard ‘symbolic translations’
• tableau procedures.
Alongside comprehensive coverage of the standard topics,
this thoroughly revised second edition also introduces several
philosophically important nonclassical logics, free logics, and
modal logics, and gives the reader an idea of how they can take
their knowledge further. With its wealth of exercises (solutions
available in the encyclopedic online supplement), Logic: The Basics
is a useful textbook for courses ranging from the introductory level
to the early graduate level, and also as a reference for students and
researchers in philosophical logic.
Jc Beall is Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA; and Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia.
Shay Allen Logan is a Postdoctoral Scholar in Logic at North
Carolina State University, USA.
The Basics
Available: Forthcoming:

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY CONSCIOUSNESS

NANCY STANLICK KEITH FRANKISH

ANIMAL ETHICS EASTERN PHILOSOPHY (SECOND

TONY MILLIGAN EDITION)
VICTORIA HARRISON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
KEVIN WARWICK ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
BEN DIXON AND MAHESH ANANTH
BIOETHICS
ALASTAIR CAMPBELL GLOBAL JUSTICE
CARL DEATH
EVOLUTION
SHERRIE LYONS PHENOMENOLOGY
DAN ZAHAVI
FOOD ETHICS
RONALD SANDLER PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
AMY KIND
FREE WILL
MEGHAN GRIFFITH

HUMAN GENETICS (SECOND EDITION)

RICKI LEWIS

METAPHYSICS
MICHAEL RAE

PHILOSOPHY (FIFTH EDITION)

NIGEL WARBURTON
 LOGIC
THE BASICS
Second Edition

Jc Beall and Shay Allen Logan

Second edition published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2017 Jc Beall and Shay Allen Logan
The right of Jc Beall and Shay Allen Logan to be identified as authors of this work
has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent
to infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2010
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Names: Beall, J. C., author.
Title: Logic : the basics / Jc Beall and Shay Allen Logan.
Description: New York : Routledge, 2017. |
Series: The basics | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016037843 | ISBN 9781138852266 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781138852273 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781315723655 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Logic.
Classification: LCC BC108 .B347 2017 | DDC 160–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016037843
ISBN: 978-1-138-85226-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-85227-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-72365-5 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo and Scala Sans

by Out of House Publishing

Visit the eResource: www.routledge.com/9781138852273

To Katrina Higgins & Kimberly Ann Klinger Logan – for
absolutely everything.
And to our parents – for everything else.
 CONTENTS

Preface xv
Acknowledgments xxi

PART I BACKGROUND IDEAS 1

1 Consequences 3
1.1 Relations of support 4
1.2 Logical consequence: the basic recipe 5
1.3 Valid arguments and truth 7
1.4 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 9
1.5 Exercises 10
1.6 Notes 11

2 Models, modeled, and modeling 12

2.1 Models 12
2.2 Models in science 13
viii CONTENTS

2.3 Logic as modeling 15

2.4 A note on notation, metalanguages, and so on 15
2.5 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 16
2.6 Exercises 16
2.7 Notes 17
3 Language, form, and logical theories 18
3.1 Language and formal languages 18
3.2 Languages: syntax and semantics 19
3.3 Atoms, connectives, and molecules 23
3.4 Connectives and form 27
3.5 Validity and form 29
3.6 Logical theories: rivalry 31
3.7 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 32
3.8 Exercises 33
3.9 Notes 34

4 Set-theoretic tools 36
4.1 Sets 36
4.2 Ordered sets: pairs and n-tuples 40
4.3 Relations 42
4.4 Functions 44
4.5 Sets as tools 46
4.6 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 46
4.7 Exercises 47
4.8 Notes 48

PART II THE BASIC CLASSICAL THEORY 51

5 Basic classical syntax and semantics 53
5.1 Cases: complete and consistent 54
5.2 Classical ‘truth conditions’ 55
 CONTENTS ix

5.3 Basic classical consequence 57

5.4 Motivation: precision 59
5.5 Formal picture 60
5.6 Defined connectives 66
5.7 Some notable valid forms 67
5.8 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 69
5.9 Exercises 70
5.10 Notes 71

6 Basic classical tableaux 74

6.1 What are tableaux? 74
6.2 Tableaux for the basic classical theory 77
6.3 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 83
6.4 Exercises 83
6.5 Notes 84

7 Basic classical translations 86

7.1 Atoms, punctuation, and connectives 86
7.2 Syntax, altogether 90
7.3 Semantics 92
7.4 Consequence 92
7.5 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 94
7.6 Exercises 94
7.7 Notes 96

PART III FIRST-ORDER CLASSICAL THEORY 97

8 Atomic innards: unary 99
8.1 Atomic innards: names and predicates 99
8.2 Truth and falsity conditions for atomics 101
x CONTENTS

8.3 Cases, domains, and interpretation

functions 102
8.4 Classicality 104
8.5 A formal picture 105
8.6 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 108
8.7 Exercises 108
8.8 Notes 109

9 Everything and something 111

9.1 Validity involving quantifiers 111
9.2 Quantifiers: an informal sketch 113
9.3 Truth and falsity conditions 114
9.4 A formal picture 115
9.5 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 119
9.6 Exercises 120
9.7 Notes 122

10 First-order language with any-arity innards 123

10.1 Truth and falsity conditions for atomics 124
10.2 Cases, domains, and interpretation functions 126
10.3 Classicality 126
10.4 A formal picture 127
10.5 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 130
10.6 Exercises 130
10.7 Notes 132

11 Identity 133
11.1 Logical expressions, forms, and sentential forms 135
11.2 Validity involving identity 135
11.3 Identity: informal sketch 137
11.4 Truth conditions: informal sketch 138
 CONTENTS xi

11.5 Formal picture 139

11.6 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 142
11.7 Exercises 142
11.8 Notes 144

12 Tableaux for first-order logic with identity 145

12.1 A few reminders 145
12.2 Tableaux for polyadic first-order logic 146
12.3 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 157
12.4 Exercises 157
12.5 Notes 158

13 First-order translations 160

13.1 Basic classical theory with innards 160
13.2 First-order classical theory 162
13.3 Polyadic innards 163
13.4 Examples in the polyadic language 164
13.5 Adding identity 166
13.6 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 168
13.7 Exercises 169
13.8 Notes 170

PART IV NONCLASSICAL THEORIES 171

14 Alternative logical theories 173
14.1 Apparent unsettledness 173
14.2 Apparent overdeterminacy 176
14.3 Options 177
14.4 Cases 178
14.5 Truth and falsity conditions 179
14.6 Logical consequence 183
xii CONTENTS

14.7 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 187

14.8 Exercises 188
14.9 Notes 189

15 Nonclassical sentential logics 190

15.1 Syntax 190
15.2 Semantics, broadly 191
15.3 Defined connectives 196
15.4 Some notable forms 196
15.5 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 198
15.6 Exercises 199
15.7 Note 200

16 Nonclassical first-order theories 201

16.1 An informal gloss 201
16.2 A formal picture 202
16.3 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 205
16.4 Exercises 206
16.5 Notes 207

17 Nonclassical tableaux 208

17.1 Closure conditions 208
17.2 Tableaux for nonclassical first-order logics 210
17.3 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 215
17.4 Exercises 215

18 Nonclassical translations 216

18.1 Syntax and semantics 216
18.2 Consequence 220
18.3 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 222
18.4 Exercises 222
18.5 Note 223
 CONTENTS xiii

19 Speaking freely 224

19.1 Speaking of nonexistent ‘things’ 224
19.2 Existential import 225
19.3 Freeing our terms, expanding our domains 226
19.4 Truth conditions: an informal sketch 227
19.5 Formal picture 228
19.6 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 231
19.7 Exercises 232
19.8 Notes 233

20 Possibilities 235
20.1 Possibility and necessity 236
20.2 Towards truth and falsity conditions 237
20.3 Cases and consequence 242
20.4 Formal picture 243
20.5 Remark on going beyond possibility 247
20.6 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 250
20.7 Exercises 251
20.8 Notes 252

21 Free and modal tableaux 254

21.1 Free tableaux 254
21.2 Modal tableaux 257
21.3 Summary, looking ahead, and further reading 261
21.4 Exercises 262

22 Glimpsing different logical roads 264

22.1 Other conditionals 265
22.2 Other negations 267
22.3 Other alethic modalities: actuality 270
22.4 Same connectives, different truth conditions 271
xiv CONTENTS

22.5 Another road to difference: consequence 273

22.6 Summary, looking behind and ahead, and
further reading 275
22.7 Exercises 277
22.8 Notes 277
References 279
Index 283
 PREFACE

A book should have either intelligibility or correctness;

to combine the two is impossible.
– Bertrand Russell 1901

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

We have left the preface to the (single-authored) first edition
in its original state (see page xvi). That preface provides useful
background to the current (jointly authored) second edition.
This edition of the book was driven by reader feedback. On
one hand, readers liked the friendly and philosophically driven
approach of the first edition, in addition to the discussion of
increasingly popular ‘deviant’ or ‘nonclassical’ logical theories.
Readers – and Routledge – wanted those features to remain. On
the other hand, readers wanted some sort of ‘deductive apparatus’
or ‘proof theory’ or ‘syntactic procedure’ to accompany the various
semantically specified consequence relations – but a user-friendly
sort. Experts disagree on what’s best in this context. We went with
familiar tableaux procedures. As a result this new edition presents
xvi PREFACE

adequate tableaux procedures for each (semantically specified)

canvassed consequence relation.
Another reader-driven desideratum of the second edition
concerns structure: readers wanted the standard (classical) account
of logical consequence up front – all the way through (polyadic)
first-order logic (without identity, which we treat as non-logical
or extra-logical, much like modal notions). So, instead of
starting broadly with a weak subclassical logic (as the first edition
did) the first significant chunk of the new edition presents the
standard classical logic. Subsequent chapters then look at various
philosophically driven logical theories according to which logical
validity is weaker than classical logic.
This second edition truly is a new edition, almost completely
rewritten. We hope that the new edition has all the virtues of the
first edition and none of its vices, and that its virtues go beyond the
first edition too.
The ‘unsolicited advice to readers’ on pages xvii–xviii is hereby
given again (though in our voice). The same is true of ‘miscellany’
on page xix.
There is an online supplement, which contains a lot of
important material. In particular:

• Most important: many additional exercises are provided online.

• Metatheory: proofs of the adequacy of the tableau systems are
given (for advanced students or interested instructors).

The online material is sited here: www.routledge.com/978113

8852273.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

This book presents a few basic ideas in logical studies, particularly
some ideas in philosophical logic – logic motivated largely by
philosophical issues. The book aims not only to introduce you to
various ideas and logical theories; it aims to give you a flavor for
logical theorizing – theorizing about logic in the face of apparently
logic-relevant phenomena. If the book is successful, you’ll not only
 PREFACE xvii

be in position to pursue logic at a deeper level; you’ll be motivated

to do so.
The book [viz., the first edition, unlike the second edition]
takes a wholly one-sided approach to logic: namely, the so-
called ‘semantic’ or ‘model-theoretic’ side. You should be warned:
there is much, much more to logic than is found – or even
hinted at – in this book. A particularly conspicuous omission
is so-called proof theory: no ‘deductive systems’ of any sort are
discussed in this book. This omission is unfortunate in various
ways but – given space limitations on this book – it allows a more
leisurely discussion of a wider array of ideas than would otherwise
be possible. A handful of widely available ‘further readings’ are
suggested throughout, and a few of them – namely, ones that
are repeatedly mentioned – provide adequate proof systems for the
canvassed logics (model-theoretically understood).

UNSOLICITED ADVICE TO READERS

This book is intended to be read in order, with each chapter pre-
supposing its predecessors. If you’ve already had some elementary
logic training, some of the early chapters can be skipped; however,
the book is intended chiefly for those who have had very little, if
any, logic training.
While mastering them often requires patience and careful
thinking, logical ideas are often fairly intuitive. Usually, when
an idea initially seems hard or too abstract, a bit more thinking
will eventually do the trick. Our advice is that in times of initial
difficulty you give the matter a bit more thought. Moreover,
don’t just work to master the given matters. Try hard to think
about different logical options from those explicitly canvassed in the
book. For example (though this won’t make much sense before
you read a few chapters), if a theory claims that the ‘right logic’
works this way, try to think about an alternative theory according
to which the ‘right logic’ works that way. The benefit of such
alternative thinking is twofold: you’ll get the chance to do some
logical theorizing on your own, and perhaps even come up with a
new logical theory; and, more importantly, the exploration will
xviii PREFACE

probably be quite enjoyable, no matter how hard you have to

think.

UNSOLICITED ADVICE TO TEACHERS

This book has been used successfully in three different classroom
settings.
• First course in logic. The text has been used as a fairly gentle
introduction to logical studies for all manner of majors (science
and humanities/arts), supplemented with handouts giving
adequate ‘proof systems’ (e.g., tableau or natural deduction).
Many students often go on to do a regular classical first-order
logic course, and then proceed to do further studies, either as a
major or minor, in philosophy or philosophical logic.
• Supplement to philosophy of logic. The text has been used as
a required supplemental text in introductory and advanced
philosophy of logic courses. In such courses, the focus is the
philosophy of logic(s), with this book providing some of the logical
ideas that feed the philosophy.
• Early (post-) graduate course. The text has been used as a sort
of transition text for students entering analytic programs in
philosophy. In this capacity, the text is used as a source of basic
logical ideas, with a slant on philosophically motivated logical
ideas, and is usually used as a predecessor to much more in-
depth study of philosophical logic (i.e., formal logics motivated
by philosophy).
Despite such success, the book can undoubtedly be improved,
and teachers are hereby encouraged to send suggestions for
improvement. (Note that an online supplement is available at
www.routledge.com/9781138852273.)

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE [FIRST EDITION OF THIS]

BOOK
I [viz., Beall, author of first edition] was invited to write a book
on logic for the Routledge Basics series, which I think is a good
 PREFACE xix

and useful series, and I was happy to contribute. The trouble –

as logicians and logic teachers will know – is that the universe
cannot possibly fit another introductory logic textbook; it is already
overly stuffed, indeed bursting to rid itself of elementary logic texts.
As a result, this book was not to be – and, given the state of the
universe, could not be – another introductory logic textbook. And
so it isn’t. On the other hand, the book was not to be another
‘logic for dummies’ or picture-book presentation of logical ideas.
(Actually, the latter would have been good, but, alas, I didn’t – and
still don’t – know how to do it.) Instead, the book was to give at
least a bit of ‘real logical content’ for those wanting to introduce
themselves to aspects of logical theorizing; and the book was to do
so with the goal of breadth over depth; but, again, there was to be
‘real content’, and so breadth had to suffer a little bit while depth
had to be deep enough – but not too deep.
What you have before you is my first attempt to do what was
to be done. Though it was not my aim when I set about writing
the chapters, I found it difficult not to conform to earlier ideas
expressed in some of my previous work. This is particularly the
case with Logical Pluralism 2005, which I wrote with my friend and
longstanding logical colleague Greg Restall. That book – namely,
Logical Pluralism – is suggested as further reading for those who wish
to pursue the philosophy of logic, and in particular the philosophy of
logical rivalry, in more depth. While philosophical issues motivate
this book’s contents, the philosophy of logic is barely discussed.
The tension between breadth, depth, and short-but-intelligible
is a challenging constraint. My hope, in the end, is as above: that
this book not only prepares you for deeper, more detailed logical
study, but that it motivates you to do so.

MISCELLANY
‘Further reading’ sections, found at the end of each chapter,
attempt not to be historical remarks, but rather only pointers to
either very broad survey-like material, wherein fuller bibliographic
references are found, or more advanced work that is nonetheless
fairly accessible and full of adequate bibliographical pointers.
xx PREFACE

We refer to whole chapters using ‘Chapter n’, where n is the

given chapter number. We refer to proper parts of chapters (viz.,
sections or subsections) using ‘§n.m’, which may be read ‘section m
of Chapter n’.
Throughout this book, unless otherwise noted, the word ‘or’
is used in its so-called inclusive usage, which amounts to either
. . . or . . . or both. Reminders are sometimes given about this, but it’s
useful to take note now (so as to avoid confusion with the so-called
exclusive usage, which involves the not-both reading).
Also, mostly for space-saving reasons (or avoiding an otherwise
bad line break), the abbreviation ‘st’ for such that is sometimes
used, though mostly in late chapters. (It is also usually flagged
and explained again when used.) Similarly, the standard ‘iff ’
abbreviation for if and only if is frequently used, and is explained in
Chapter 1.
« Parenthetical remark. We should note one other bit of style. In a few
places, so-called parenthetical remarks are displayed in the way that
this parenthetical remark is displayed. This convention is used in a
few places where either notes would otherwise be too long or there
are already too many notes in the given area. End parenthetical. »
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Always be thankful. And mean it.

– Dee Dee Long

Before turning to full acknowledgments we wish to note that the

logician Hitoshi Omori, our friend and early-stages collaborator,
joined this project early on when the second edition was being
conceived. Hitoshi provided valuable input and content on some
of the chapters of an early draft, and we had every expectation that
the three of us would be (fully joint) coauthors. Unfortunately,
communication unexpectedly – and, at this time of writing, as yet
inexplicably – shut down. We were unable to reach Hitoshi during
the major 7-month period of writing. At this stage, the second
edition is indeed the result of completely joint work by us (viz.,
Beall and Logan); however, we want to fully and warmly recognize
the valuable work and collaborative interactions that we had with
Hitoshi Omori. The second edition is better for his early input.
We are grateful to many people for discussions and lessons that
are reflected in this book. Some of those people are as follows
(we would say ‘all’ were it not for inadvertent omissions): William
Bausman, Kata Bimbo, Jeff Blocker, Ross Brady, Phillip Bricker,
xxii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Otávio Bueno, Colin Caret, Colin Cheyne, Matt Clemens, Mark

Colyvan, Roy Cook, Aaron Cotnoir, Max Cresswell, Charlie
Donahue, Hartry Field, Jay Garfield, Chris Gauker, Ed Gettier,
Rod Girle, Michael Glanzberg, Geoff Goddu, Patrick Greenough,
Patrick Grim, Gary Hardegree, Jim Henle, Ole Hjortland, Michael
Hughes, Dominic Hyde, Carrie Jenkins, Justin Kuster, the late
David Lewis, Michael Lynch, Ed Mares, the late Maximum Leader
(viz., Bob Meyer), Colin McCullough-Benner, Chris Mortensen,
Daniel Nolan, Hitoshi Omori, Doug Owings, Graham Priest,
Agustín Rayo, Stephen Read, Greg Restall, David Ripley, Marcus
Rossberg, Gill Russell, Josh Schechter, Jerry Seligman, Lionel
Shapiro, Stewart Shapiro, John Slaney, Nick (J. J.) Smith, Reed
Solomon, David Steuber, Koji Tanaka, Richard Trammell, Bas van
Fraassen, Achillé Varzi, Vũ, Zach Weber, Sam Wheeler, Robbie
Williams, Jeremy Wyatt, Nicole Wyatt, Crispin Wright, and Paul
Zumbo.
We are especially grateful to some people who gave helpful
feedback on early drafts of the first edition: Aaron Cotnoir, Chris
Gauker, Greg Restall, David Steuber, Jeremy Wyatt, Paul Zumbo,
and five additional anonymous readers for Routledge. Michael
Hughes provided useful comments on both an early and a late draft,
and we’re grateful for his help. Also, Dave Ripley gave particularly
good and useful comments on a late draft of the first edition; we
are very grateful for Dave’s insights, and equally grateful for his
enthusiasm with respect to this project. For a variety of reasons
(most schedule-related), some rather good suggestions from these
readers have been left out. We hope, nevertheless, that the book
remains useful and interesting.
Colin McCullough-Benner deserves very special thanks for
providing substantial feedback on the penultimate draft of this
second edition. Colin’s technical and philosophical eyes were an
invaluable boon to us.
In addition, five anonymous Routledge reviewers gave very
helpful feedback on an early draft of this (second) edition.
Marcus Rossberg provided not only useful discussion of logical
and philosophical issues; he also provided some help in thinking
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxiii

about and working out some LATEX issues in conforming to some

Routledge style demands.
With respect to LATEX we again join many authors in being
greatly indebted to the genius and generosity of the LATEX pioneers
and subsequent LATEX community. Thank you, all of you.
Finally, this book is dedicated to Katrina Higgins and Kimberly
Ann Klinger Logan, and also to Charles and Beverly Beall. All
of them, jointly and in their own individual ways, are responsible
for our seeking alternative logical lands. And that has made all the
difference.
Jc Beall
Storrs and Hobart, 2016
Shay Allen Logan
Minneapolis and Raleigh, 2016
 I

BACKGROUND IDEAS
 1

CONSEQUENCES

Everybody, sooner or later,

sits down to a banquet of consequences.
– Robert Louis Stevenson

‘Watch what you say,’ a parent often advises, ‘because what you say
has consequences.’ In saying as much, parents are right, and doubly
so. There are two senses in which what one says has consequences.
One sense, not terribly relevant for present purposes (not terribly
relevant for logic), is captured in the familiar dictum that actions
have consequences. To say something is to do something, and
doing something is an action. Actions, in turn, are events, and
events, as experience tells, have consequences, namely, their causal
effects. (Example: a consequence – a causal effect – of your
drinking petrol is your being ill, at least other things being equal.)
So, in the causal effects sense of ‘consequences’, the parents’ dictum
is perfectly right, but that sense of ‘consequence’ has little to do
with logic.
For present purposes, there is a more relevant sense in which
what one says has consequences. What one says, at least in the
declarative mode,1 has logical consequences, namely, whatever logically
follows from what one said, or whatever is logically implied by what
4 CONSEQUENCES

one said. Suppose, for example, that you’re given the following
information.

1. Agnes is a cat.
2. All cats are smart.

A consequence of (1) and (2), taken together, is that Agnes is smart.

In other words, that Agnes is smart logically follows from (1) and (2);
it is implied by (1) and (2), taken together.

1.1 RELATIONS OF SUPPORT

Logical consequence is a relation on sentences of a language, where
‘sentence’, unless otherwise indicated, is short for ‘meaningful,
declarative sentence’.2
Logical consequence is one among many relations over the
sentences of a language. Some of those relations might be called
relations of support. For example, let A1 , . . . , An and B be arbitrary
sentences of some given language – say, English. Here is one such
way that sentences in a given language can support other sentences
in the same language:

R1. If all of A1 , . . . , An are true, then B is probably true.

Consider, for example, the following sentences.

S1. Max took a nap on Day 1.

S2. Max took a nap on Day 2.
S3. Max took a nap on Day 3.
..
.
Sn. Max took a nap on Day n (viz., today).
Sm. Max will take a nap on Day n + 1 (viz., tomorrow).

On the surface, sentences (S1)–(Sn) support sentence (Sm) in the

sense of (R1): taken together, (S1)–(Sn) make (Sm) more likely.
Similarly, (3) supports (4) in the same way.
 LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE: THE BASIC RECIPE 5

3. The sun came up every day in the past.

4. The sun will come up tomorrow.
If (3) is true, then (4) is probably true too.
The relation of support given in (R1) is important for empirical
science and, in general, for rationally navigating about our world.
Clarifying the (R1) notion of ‘support’ is the job of probability
theory (and, relatedly, decision theory), an area beyond the range
of this book.

1.2 LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE: THE BASIC RECIPE

Logical consequence, the chief topic of logic, is a stricter relation of
support than that in (R1). Notice, for example, that while (4) may
be very likely true if (3) is true, it is still possible, in some sense, for
(3) to be true without (4) being true. After all, the sun might well
explode later today.
While (R1) might indicate a strong relation of support between
some sentences and another, it doesn’t capture the tightest relation
of support. Logical consequence, on many standard views, is often
thought to be the tightest relation of support over sentences of a
language. In order for some sentence B to be a logical consequence
of sentences A1 , . . . , An , the truth of the latter needs to ‘guarantee’
the truth of the former, in some suitably strong sense of ‘guarantee’.
Throughout this book, we will rely on the following (so-called
semantic) account of logical consequence, where A1 , . . . , An and B
are arbitrary sentences of some given language (or fragment of a
language).

Definition 1 (Logical Consequence) B is a logical consequence of

A1 , . . . , An if and only if there is no case in which A1 , . . . , An are all true
but B is not true.

Notice that the given ‘definition’ has two parts corresponding to

the ‘if and only if ’ construction, namely,
• If B is a logical consequence of A1 , . . . , An , then there is no case
in which A1 , . . . , An are all true but B is not true.
6 CONSEQUENCES

• If there is no case in which A1 , . . . , An are all true but B is not

true, then B is a logical consequence of A1 , . . . , An .

Also notable is that the given ‘definition’ is really just a recipe.

In order to get a proper definition, one needs to specify two key
ingredients:

• what ‘cases’ are;

• what it is to be true in a case.

Once these ingredients are specified, one gets an account of logical

consequence. For example, let A1 , . . . , An and B be declarative
sentences of English. If we have a sufficiently precise notion of
possibility and, in turn, think of ‘cases’ as such possibilities, we can
treat ‘true in a case’ as ‘possibly true’ and get the following account
of logical consequence – call it ‘necessary consequence’.

• B is a (necessary) consequence of A1 , . . . , An if and only if there is

no possibility in which A1 , . . . , An are all true but B is not true.
(In other words, B is a consequence of A1 , . . . , An if and only
if it is impossible for each given Ai to be true without B being
true.)

Presumably, this account has it that, as above, ‘Agnes is smart’ is a

consequence of (1) and (2). After all, presumably, it’s not possible
for (1) and (2) to be true without ‘Agnes is smart’ also being true.
On the other hand, (4) is not a necessary consequence of (3), since,
presumably, it is possible for (3) to be true without (4) being true.
Of course, taking ‘cases’ to be ‘possibilities’ requires some spec-
ification of what is possible, or at least some class of ‘relevant
possibilities’. The answer is not always straightforward. Is it
possible to travel faster than the speed of light? Well, it’s not
physically possible (i.e., the physical laws prohibit it), but one might
acknowledge a broader sense of ‘possibility’ in which such travel
is possible – for example, coherent or imaginable or the like. If
one restricts one’s ‘cases’ to only physical possibilities, one gets
a different account of logical consequence from an account that
admits of possibilities that go beyond the physical laws.
 VALID ARGUMENTS AND TRUTH 7

In subsequent chapters, we will be exploring different logical

theories of our language (or fragments of our language). A logical
theory of our language (or a fragment thereof) is a theory that
specifies a relation that models (in a sense to be made more precise)
the logical consequence relation over that language (or fragment).
Some fragments of our language seem to call for some types of
‘cases’, while other fragments call for other (or additional) types.
Subsequent chapters will clarify this point.

1.3 VALID ARGUMENTS AND TRUTH

In general, theses require arguments. Consider the thesis that
there are feline gods. Is the thesis true? An argument is required.
Why think that there are feline gods? We need to examine
the argument – the reasons that purport to ‘support’ the given
thesis.
Arguments, for our purposes, comprise premises and a con-
clusion. The latter item is the thesis in question; the former purport
to ‘support’ the conclusion. Arguments may be evaluated according
to any relation of support (over sentences). An argument might
be ‘good’ relative to some relation of support, but not good by
another. For example, the argument from (3) to (4) is a good
argument when assessed along the lines of (R1); however, it is not
good when assessed in terms of (say) necessary consequence, since,
as noted above, (4) is not a necessary consequence of (3).
In some areas of rational inquiry, empirical observation is often
sufficient to figure out the truth. Suppose that you want to know
whether there’s a cat on the table. One reliable method is handy:
look at the table and see whether there’s a cat on it! Of course, ‘real
empirical science’ is much more complicated than checking out
cats, but empirical observation – empirical testing – is nonetheless
a critical ingredient.
What about other pursuits for which there is little, if any,
opportunity for settling matters by observation? Consider, for
example, pure mathematics or philosophy. In such areas, theses
cannot be empirically tested, at least in general. How, then, do we
figure out the truth in such areas? Argument is the only recourse.
8 CONSEQUENCES

When argument is the only recourse, as in mathematics or (at

least much of) philosophy, it makes sense to invoke the strictest
relation of support – namely, logical consequence. Traditionally, an
argument is said to be valid – strictly speaking, logically valid – if its
conclusion is a logical consequence of its premises. We will follow
suit.
Of course, a valid argument needn’t be a proof of anything.
After all, the ‘definition’ (or, for now, ‘recipe’) of logical consequence
doesn’t require that any of the premises be true. Rather, the given
account requires only the absence of any ‘counterexample’, where
these are defined as follows.

Definition 2 (Counterexample) A counterexample to an argument

is a case in which the premises are true but the conclusion is not true.

We can say that B is a logical consequence of A1 , . . . , An if and

only if there is no counterexample to the argument from (premises)
A1 , . . . , An to (conclusion) B. In turn, an argument is valid just if
there is no counterexample to it.
Accordingly, an argument may be valid – that is, its conclusion
be a logical consequence of its premises – even though none of
its premises are true. In mathematics and philosophy, validity is a
necessary condition on suitable arguments; it is not sufficient. What
is sufficient, for such pursuits, is a so-called sound argument.

Definition 3 (Sound Argument) A sound argument is valid and

all its premises are true.

Suppose that, among the ‘cases’ in our definition of validity (or

logical consequence), there is an ‘actual case’ @ such that A is
true-in-@ just if A is true (i.e., actually true). On such an account,
every sound argument has a true conclusion. After all, a sound
argument, by definition, has all true premises. By supposition, a
sentence is true just if true-in-@, and so all premises of a sound
argument are true-in-@. But a sound argument, by definition, is
also valid, and so, by definition, if its premises are true in a case,
then so too is its conclusion. Since, as noted, the premises of any
sound argument are true-in-@, so too is its conclusion.
 SUMMARY, LOOKING AHEAD, AND FURTHER READING 9

Logic, in the end, serves the pursuit of truth; however, it does

not principally concern itself with truth. Instead, logic, as above,
has its chief concern with consequence – logical consequence.
Logic aims to precisely specify valid arguments. Once the valid
arguments are in order, rational inquiry may proceed to discern the
sound arguments. For our purposes in this book, we will focus
on different accounts of logical consequence, and some of the
phenomena that motivate the various accounts.

1.4 SUMMARY, LOOKING AHEAD, AND FURTHER

READING
Summary. Logical consequence is the chief concern of logic. An
argument is valid just if its conclusion is a logical consequence of
its premises. Logical consequence, in this book, will be understood
as absence of counterexample, where a counterexample is a ‘case’ in
which all the premises are true but the conclusion not true. One
of the chief concerns of logic, broadly construed, is to figure out
which ‘cases’ are involved in specifying the consequence relation
on a given language (or fragment thereof). In subsequent chapters,
we will look at different accounts of logical consequence – different
logical theories of our language (or fragments thereof) – and some
of the phenomena that have motivated them.

Looking ahead. In the next chapter we will examine the general

method we will use for examining logical consequence. Since
languages are complex, and the relation of logical consequence is
at least as complicated as the language it is defined on, we will need
some method of cutting through all this complexity. Taking a hint
from the sciences, our general technique will be to build models
of languages and use these to help us better understand the logical
consequence relation in natural language.

Further reading. For related, accessible discussion of logic, see Read

(1995); Haack (1978); Haack (1996). (And see the bibliographies
therein for a host of other sources!) For a more advanced discussion
of the ‘recipe’ of logical consequence, see Beall and Restall (2005).
10 CONSEQUENCES

1.5 EXERCISES
Note: For additional exercises and for worked-out exercises,
please see the online supplement at www.routledge.com/97811
38852273.

1. What is an argument?
2. What is a valid argument?
3. What is a sound argument?
4. What is the general ‘recipe’ for defining logical consequence
(or validity)? What are the two key ingredients that one must
specify in defining a consequence relation?
5. Using the ‘necessary consequence’ account of validity, specify
which of the following arguments are valid or invalid. Justify
your answer.

(a) Argument 1.

i. If Agnes arrived at work on time, then her car worked

properly.
ii. If Agnes’s car worked properly, then the car’s ignition
was not broken.
iii. The car’s ignition was not broken.
iv. Therefore, Agnes arrived at work on time.

(b) Argument 2.

i. Either the sun will rise tomorrow or it will explode

tomorrow.
ii. The sun will not explode tomorrow.
iii. Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow.

(c) Argument 3.

i. If Max wins the lottery, then Max will be a millionaire.

ii. Max will not win the lottery.
iii. Therefore, Max will not be a millionaire.
 NOTES 11

(d) Argument 4.
i. If Beetle is an extraterrestrial, then Beetle is not from
earth.
ii. Beetle is an extraterrestrial.
iii. Therefore, Beetle is not from earth.

1.6 NOTES
1. For purposes of this book, a declarative sentence (or a sentence
used in the ‘declarative mode’) is one that is used (successfully
or otherwise) to declare or state something about the world.
This is hardly a precise definition, but it’ll do. (Example. Each
of ‘You are reading a book’, ‘Obama is the first black US
president’, and ‘1+1=5’ are declarative sentences, but sentences
such as ‘Shut that door!’ and ‘Do you like Vegemite?’ are not
declarative, since they fail to declare or state anything about the
world.)
2. Taking consequence to be a relation on sentences simplifies
matters a great deal, and sidesteps the issue of so-called ‘truth
bearers’, an ongoing issue in philosophy of logic. For present
purposes, simplicity is worth the sidestep.
 2

MODELS, MODELED, AND

MODELING

Models, in virtue of modeling, model.

– A model thinker

The goal of providing a logical theory for a language or a fragment

of a language is to provide a model of the relation of logical
consequence that holds in that language. To understand this process
better we examine the practice of using models more broadly. The
themes in this chapter run throughout the book.

2.1 MODELS
Consider the wide array of models you encounter in the course of
your ordinary life. If you listen to weather reports on a regular basis
you hear talk of weather models. If you pay attention to business news
you hear about economic models. Maybe you’re a hobbyist and you
build model airplanes. Perhaps you’ve done something courageous
or noble and been called a model citizen. It’s difficult to pin down
precisely what all these have in common.1
For our purposes, we adopt the following definition:

One thing x is a model of another thing y just when x is being put

forward as similar to y in some specified way and with a specified margin
 MODELS IN SCIENCE 13

of error, and when in addition x is in fact similar to y in that way and

within that margin of error.

It is clear that both pieces of this definition are necessary. It won’t

do to say that x is a model of y whenever x is similar to y in some
way, for then everything would be a model of every other thing.
After all, any two things are similar in some way. On the other hand,
if we were to say only that x is a model of y whenever x is put
forward as similar to y in some way, then if we were to put forward
this page of this book as similar to, say, democracy in terms of its
size, then, since we had put it forward as such, it would have to be
the case that this page is in fact a model of democracy in terms of
its size. But this doesn’t even make sense! Democracy doesn’t (in
any obvious sense) have a size.
The definition of ‘model’ just given only captures one of the
ways we use this word. But ‘model’ is quite a versatile word, and
plays quite a few other roles also. For example, given that x is a
model of y and z is a model of w, we might say that x and z are
models, and that y and w are being modeled. Also, if we are working
with a particular model, x, of an object y, we might say we are
modeling y using x. Modeling, then, is something we sometimes do
when given two objects x and y: we treat one as a model of the
other.
Since words in the ‘model’ family work at many different levels
and play a variety of different grammatical roles, we will need to
be careful with the word and pay attention to how it’s occurring in
context. This is especially the case in logic where, for historical
reasons, the word ‘model’ has been given an entirely different,
technical meaning in addition to those pointed out above.

2.2 MODELS IN SCIENCE

As it turns out, it isn’t just in ordinary life that models are rife.
They form the backbone of contemporary scientific practice as
well. To take only a few examples, Watson and Crick built a tin-
and-cardboard model of the DNA molecule in order to demonstrate
its double-helix structure; population biologists use statistical models
14 MODELS, MODELED, AND MODELING

of population growth and fluctuation as a basis for their policy

recommendations; and virologists use online gaming communities
as models for the spread of diseases.
The general way in which models are used in the sciences can
be described as follows:

• One proposes something x as a model of some other thing y.

Recall this means x is put forward as similar to y in some respect,
and with some acceptable margin for error.
• Data are collected to see whether x is in fact similar to y to
within the acceptable margin for error. If so, x is accepted as a
model of y, if not x is rejected as a model of y.
• If the model is accepted, scientists use their knowledge about
features of x to make predictions about those features of y that
are thought to be similar to features of x.
• These predictions are tested by gathering more data. If the data
match the predictions, the model is confirmed, if not, the model
is invalidated, and a new or modified model is sought, starting
the process over.

In general, scientists use models when they are studying highly

complex systems that are too difficult to deal with in the raw.
Models, being objects the scientists can control, are easier to deal
with, understand, and manipulate, so allow science to progress
more rapidly.
There are a range of details that need to be specified when
proposing a model. First, we need to carefully specify both what
object x is being proposed as a model and what object y we will be
using x as a model of. We call the thing being modeled the target
system of the model, and we call the object x a model of the target
system. After specifying these, we still need to specify the exact way
in which x is being seen as similar to y. These assumptions – the
assumptions that x is similar to y in these particular ways – are called
modeling hypotheses.
To see these words in action, let’s look at a well-known example
of modeling from the sciences: Watson and Crick’s production of
an actual tin-and-cardboard double-helical structure as a model
 A NOTE ON NOTATION, METALANGUAGES, AND SO ON 15

of the DNA molecule. The target system of their model was the
DNA molecule. The tin-and-cardboard structure they build was
their model of the DNA molecule. And, finally, their modeling
hypothesis was that the shape of the two structures were generally
similar. Importantly, the tin-and-cardboard structure was different
in many ways from an actual DNA molecule. In particular, as
Ronald Giere has amusingly observed, Watson and Crick were not
proposing that their model was similar to an actual DNA molecule
in the sense that both were composed of tin and cardboard.2

2.3 LOGIC AS MODELING

Logic, as we discussed in the first chapter, is the study of the relation
of logical consequence. The logical consequence relation itself is
a very complex relation holding among objects in a very complex
structure – the natural language structure. Thus, in logic as in other
sciences, our general strategy for making progress is to put forward
certain structures that serve as models of the natural language rela-
tion of logical consequence, and to study these models in the hope
of making sense of what they are modeling. To do this, of course,
we must specify the target system of our models – the parts of natural
language whose logical consequence relation we are attempting to
model, as well as the modeling hypotheses – the particular aspects of
the natural language relation of logical consequence that we are
supposing are similar to the relations we highlight in our models.
In this book we present a family of different logical theories.
Each logical theory provides a model of some fragment of the
natural language logical consequence relation. These models – the
formal consequence relations themselves – reflect a particular view
(or theory) of which arguments in the target language are in fact
logically valid.

2.4 A NOTE ON NOTATION, METALANGUAGES,

AND SO ON
A logical theory is expressed in a language about the target model
language (which, in turn, is supposed to model the target natural
16 MODELS, MODELED, AND MODELING

language). A language you’re talking about is (in that context) a

so-called object language (it’s the object of your discussion); and
the language you use to talk about the object language is (in
that context) called a metalanguage. We won’t use this terminology
much. While precision about which language one is using (or
talking about) is important, we’ll be only as precise as needs be.
In general, context or special notation will make matters clear
throughout the book.

2.5 SUMMARY, LOOKING AHEAD, AND FURTHER

READING
Summary. Logical theories aim at modeling natural languages or
a fragment of natural languages. In this chapter, we explained
what we mean by ‘modeling’. We presented a definition, briefly
went through some examples from science, and then discussed our
understanding of logic as modeling.
Looking ahead. The next two chapters are devoted to stage-setting.
Chapter 3 discusses features of language that are relevant to logic.
Chapter 4 briefly – and, for the most part, informally – introduces
some useful set-theoretic notions. These two chapters will make
subsequent discussion easier.
Further reading. There is an ongoing debate in the philosophy of
science about how models work and what they do when they work.
A good entry-point into this debate is the paper Giere (2004) and
the references it contains. Be warned: the debate in this area is far
from straightforward, and nobody has found a ‘safe’ position yet.
For work specifically on the role of modeling in logic, it’s worth
looking at Cook (2002) and Cook (2010).

2.6 EXERCISES
Note: For additional exercises and for worked exercises, please see
the online supplement at www.routledge.com/9781138852273.
1. Given the definition of ‘model’ we’ve adopted, consider the
following list of situations and say, for each of them, (a) what
 NOTES 17

the target system is, (b) what object is being proposed as a model
of the target system, (c), what the modeling hypotheses are,
(d) what an appropriate margin for error is within which the
model is in fact a model of the thing it is a model of, and (e)
what predictions the model might generate.
• According to the latest weather models, there is a 60 percent
chance of rain this weekend.
• Given the recent spike in its stock prices, economic models
suggest XYZ corp.’s stock will fall in the next two weeks.
• Last weekend I put the finishing touches on the model
airplane I was building with my son.
• Rosa Parks’s sitting at the front of the bus was a model act of
civil disobedience.
2. Why is modeling useful? Why might it be useful to model
natural languages?
3. Suppose x is similar to y. Why is this not enough to make x a
model of y?
4. In Chapter 1, we saw a ‘basic recipe’ for logical consequence.
Similarly, in this chapter we saw that there is a recipe for
scientific modeling as well. Explain in your own words the
components of this recipe.
5. Why might two models x and y both count as good models
for a phenomenon z even if, in some cases, x and y make
different predictions about z? Can you think of an example of
a phenomenon that is usefully modeled in more than one way?

2.7 NOTES
1. A great deal of work in philosophy of science attempts to do just
this. A good place to begin examining this literature is the work
of Bas van Fraassen (e.g., van Fraassen, 1980 or van Fraassen,
2008) and Ronald Giere (e.g., Giere, 2004).
2. See Giere, 2004.
 3

LANGUAGE, FORM, AND

LOGICAL THEORIES

Traditionally, (formal) logic is concerned with

the analysis of sentences . . . and of proof . . .
with attention to the form in abstraction from the matter.
– Alonzo Church 1956
The aim of this chapter is to cover three topics: features of language
that are relevant to logic, the aim of ‘formal languages’ with respect
to modern logic, and the idea of rivalry among logical theories.
Subsequent chapters, following the brief ‘set-theoretic toolbox’ in
Chapter 4, look at different logical theories and phenomena that
motivate them. This chapter, like its predecessors, remains abstract;
its aim is simply to lay out some big-picture ideas that will be useful
for subsequent discussion.

3.1 LANGUAGE AND FORMAL LANGUAGES

Today, the discipline of logic is largely formal logic. In part, formal
logic is so called because it often aims to specify valid argument
forms, and it sees logical consequence as being largely a matter of
such forms. We will get more specific about what this means in
the course of the chapter, but for now you can take it to mean that
formal logic is largely concerned with shapes of valid arguments,
 LANGUAGES: SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 19

rather than with the specific arguments themselves. (For analogy,

think of the different shapes a sturdy house might take. One might
be interested in particular houses themselves – for example, Agnes’s
house at Catnip Lane or the like – regardless of their shape; but one
might, along the aims of the formal logician, be interested more in
the shape than the particular houses.)
Formal logic is also so called for another reason: namely, that
contemporary logicians almost always construct ‘formal languages’
in their aim to specify logical consequence. Formal languages serve
as models of a given natural language (or fragment thereof); they
are intended to illuminate the behavior of logical connectives and,
ultimately, the target consequence relation.
Logic, in the first instance, is about what follows from what
in a given natural language (or some fragment thereof). Natural
languages are familiar languages like English, Spanish, French,
German, Polish, Mandarin, Italian, Strine, and so on.1 Natural
languages are powerful and useful tools; however, they are also rife
with features such as ambiguity and vagueness. Such features, while
perhaps partly contributing to the flexibility of natural languages,
make the relation of logical consequence in any actual natural
language a wildly complicated object of investigation. As we saw in
the previous chapter, a standard approach to studying extremely
complex systems is to specify a less-complicated model of the
system. To do this, we must specify both a different system and
a particular way in which the different system is taken to be similar
to the target system of the investigation. In large part logicians do
this by constructing artificial – or formal – languages.

3.2 LANGUAGES: SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

Languages have a syntax and semantics. Syntax provides the
uninterpreted sentences of language while semantics does the work
of providing meaning. This might sound like a rather abstract
distinction; so let’s make it concrete. In English, the word ‘cat’ is
composed of three letters – ‘c’, ‘a’ and ‘t’, in that order. It rhymes
with ‘mat’ and ‘bat’ and ‘drat’. It is possible to misspell the word
‘cat’, to mispronounce it, and so on. These are all syntactic features
20 LANGUAGE, FORM, AND LOGICAL THEORIES

of ‘cat’. Semantically, ‘cat’ picks out (among other things) a small,

furry, domesticated mammal. The word ‘cat’ is neither furry nor
domesticated. Cats cannot be misspelled or mispronounced. Cats
don’t rhyme with anything because rhyming is something words
do, not something cats do. The difference between syntax and
semantics is as stark as the difference between the word ‘cat’ and
actual cats.

3.2.1 SYNTAX

For our purposes a syntax provides

• syntactic ingredients – basic building blocks of the language;
• a set of (well-formed) sentences of the language.

The set of syntactic ingredients contains all of the items involved

in the given language’s sentences. Consider, for example, the follo-
wing sentence of English.
Agnes is sleeping.
There are various syntactic ingredients used in this sentence. To
begin, there are the individual letters ‘A’, ‘g’, ‘n’, and so on.
Such letters are ingredients for other ingredients, in particular,
the name ‘Agnes’ and the predicate ‘is sleeping’ (which is spelled
with an invisible letter called ‘space’, which falls between the two
occurrences of ‘s’ in ‘is sleeping’). Finally, there is a punctuation
mark, namely, ‘.’. These syntactic ingredients are put together in
the appropriate way to form the given sentence, namely, ‘Agnes is
sleeping’.
What if we took the above ingredients (e.g., the name ‘Agnes’
and predicate ‘is sleeping’) and put them together as follows?
is sleeping. Agnes
Is this a sentence of English? No. The given string of ingredients
is not among English’s set of sentences. Of course, it’s conceivable
that English could have evolved in such a way that ‘is sleeping.
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