Full Download (Ebook) Responsive Web Design by Example: Embrace responsive design with HTML5, CSS3, JavaScript, jQuery and Bootstrap 4 by Hussain, Frahaan ISBN 9781787287068, 1787287068 PDF DOCX
Full Download (Ebook) Responsive Web Design by Example: Embrace responsive design with HTML5, CSS3, JavaScript, jQuery and Bootstrap 4 by Hussain, Frahaan ISBN 9781787287068, 1787287068 PDF DOCX
com
DOWLOAD EBOOK
ebooknice.com
ebooknice.com
https://ebooknice.com/product/sat-ii-success-
math-1c-and-2c-2002-peterson-s-sat-ii-success-1722018
ebooknice.com
https://ebooknice.com/product/responsive-web-design-with-html5-and-
css3-5327010
ebooknice.com
(Ebook) Responsive Web Design with HTML5 and CSS3 Second
Edition by Ben Frain ISBN 9781784398934, 1784398934
https://ebooknice.com/product/responsive-web-design-with-html5-and-
css3-second-edition-52556862
ebooknice.com
ebooknice.com
ebooknice.com
ebooknice.com
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
Earl Grey. April In the course of these debates Earl Grey
21. complained that only 2000 cavalry had been sent to
Spain, though we had 27,000, and though that
description of force was peculiarly necessary in that
country; and he contrasted the conduct of the British
government with that of Buonaparte, “the
consummate general whose plans they had to
oppose. In rapidity of execution,” said his lordship, “he
is only equalled by his patience in preparing the
means. He has all the opposite qualities of Fabius and
Marcellus, whether you consider the country in which
he acts, the people with whom he has to contend, or
the means by which he is to subdue them. He rivals
Hannibal in the application of the means, and is
exempt from his only fault, that of not improving by
past experience. The means provided by Buonaparte
for the accomplishment of his purposes are so well
combined, and his objects so ably prosecuted, as
generally to give him a moral certainty of success;
and whatever may be thought of his total disregard of
the justice of those objects, it is impossible not to
admire the ability and wisdom with which he
combines the means of accomplishing them. In order
to maintain against such an antagonist the ultimate
contest which is to decide for ever the power and
independence of this country, the true policy of those
who govern it must be, to pay a strict attention to
economy, to be actuated by a determination to
concentrate our means, not to endanger them in any
enterprise or speculation in which the event is
doubtful; but pursuing the economical system of
husbanding our resources, by which alone we could
enable ourselves to continue a contest, the cessation
of which does not depend upon us, but upon the
injustice of our enemy.”
Earl of The Earl of Liverpool remarked, in reply, how
Liverpool. singular it was that every one who censured the plan
which ministers had followed with regard to Spain had
a plan of his own, and that none of those plans
should have a single principle of agreement with each
other. This at least, he said, showed the difficulty
which government must have felt in forming its
measures, though it afforded a facility in defending
them. As to the accusation of not sending a sufficient
force of cavalry, he stated that as much tonnage was
required for 5000 horse as for 40,000 foot; and
moreover that vessels of a different description were
necessary, of which a very limited number could at
any time be procured. Yet from 8000 to 9000 horse
had been sent, and there would have been not less
than 12,000, had not the General countermanded the
reinforcements which were ready. Weak as Earl Grey
might be pleased to deem the ministers, they had not
been so foolish as to expect that the first efforts of
the Spaniards would meet with uninterrupted success;
they were not yet guilty of calculating upon
impossibilities; they had not supposed that such a
cause as the cause of Spain, to be fought for with
such an enemy as the ruler of France, could be
determined in one campaign. Reverses they had met;
but those reverses were not owing to the indifference
or apathy of the Spaniards; they were imputable to
their want of discipline, and to an ill-judged contempt
for the French, a proof in itself of their zeal and
ardour. And what would have been the general
sentiment in that country and in this if our army had
retired without attempting any thing? If, when after
all her repeated disasters, the spirit of Spain was
unsubdued, and her capital bidding defiance to an
immense army at the very gates; if a British army, so
marshalled and equipped, and after a long march to
the aid of their ally, had in that hour of trial turned
their backs upon her danger, what would have been
thought of the sincerity of our co-operation? “I believe
in my conscience,” he continued, “that that movement
of Sir John Moore saved Spain. There are some,
perhaps, who may be startled at the assertion: it is
my fixed and decided opinion, and as such I will avow
it. After the destruction of Blake’s army, the defeat of
Castaños, and the dispersion of the army of
Extremadura, ... after the capitulation of Madrid,
which promised to emulate the glory of Zaragoza, and
would have done so, had not treachery interposed; if
at that crisis Buonaparte had pursued his conquests,
by pushing to the southern provinces, the Spanish
troops would never have had time to rally there. But
that time was given by Sir John Moore’s advance in
their favour. Never was there a more effectual
diversion. Sir John Moore himself said, that as a
diversion it had completely and effectually succeeded.
Nor was the moral effect of thus re-animating the
spirit of the nation to be overlooked. Let the final
issue of the contest be what it may, France has not
yet succeeded in subduing Spain. I admit that
Buonaparte has 200,000 men in that country; that his
troops are of the bravest, and his generals among the
most skilful in the world; and, above all, that he has
been himself at their head: and yet, with all this, he
has not got possession of more territory than he had
last year: he only holds such parts as in every war fell
to the lot of whichever brought the largest army into
the field. I am far from saying, regard being had to
the man and the circumstances of the case, that the
Spaniards must ultimately succeed; but, at the same
time, looking at the spirit they have evinced, and the
actions that have happened, particularly the defence
of Zaragoza, I cannot feel lukewarm in my hope that
their efforts will be crowned with ultimate success. In
that fatal contest with America we gained every
battle; we took every town we besieged, until the
capture of General Burgoyne; and yet the Americans
ultimately succeeded, by perseverance, in the contest.
In the present struggle, do not the extent and nature
of the country afford a hope of success? does not its
population forbid despair? We have not lost the
confidence of the Spanish people; we know that every
true Spanish heart beats high for this country; we
know that whatever may happen, they do not accuse
us. Submission may be the lot they are fated to
endure in the end; but they do not impute to us the
cause of their misfortunes: they are sensible that
neither the thirst after commerce, nor territory, nor
security, is to be imputed to us, in the assistance we
have afforded to them upon this important occasion.
Whatever may be the result, we have done our duty;
we have not despaired; we have persevered, and will
do so to the last, while there is any thing left to
contend for with a prospect of success.”
Mr. Canning. Mr. Canning also declared, that considering Sir John
May 9. Moore’s advance in a military point, in his poor
judgement he could not but think it a wise measure;
but in every view which ennobles military objects by
1809. exalting military character, he was sure it was so. With
May. all its consequences and disasters, he preferred it to a
retreat at that time. Of those disasters he would not
say a word: the battle of Coruña covered every thing;
but the retreat itself, and the precipitancy of it, he
could never cease to regret. This single expression
was the only hint even of censure as to the conduct of
the retreat which was heard in Parliament. In the
course of the debate an extraordinary confession was
made by Mr. Canning. “During the whole time,” he
said, “that these events were passing, government
May 9. had no means of arguing from the past: the occasion
was without precedent, and such as it was impossible
to lay their hand on any period of history to parallel,
either from its importance with regard to individuals,
to this happy country and to Europe, or the difficulty
that arose from there being so little knowledge to
guide their steps in the actual scene of their
operations. Why should government be ashamed to
say they wanted that knowledge of the interior of
Spain, which they found no one possessed? With
every other part of the continent we had had more
intercourse: of the situation of Spain we had every
thing to learn.” With what contemptuous satisfaction
must Buonaparte and the French politicians have
heard such a confession from the British secretary of
state for foreign affairs! With whatever feelings the
government might make this avowal, it was heard
with astonishment by the thoughtful part of the
people, and not without indignation. To them it was a
mournful thing thus to be told that their rulers laid in
no stock of knowledge, but lived, as it were, from
hand to mouth, upon what they happened to meet
with! Is there a country or a province in Europe, it
was asked; is there a European possession in any part
of the world, of which the French government does
not possess maps, plans, and the most ample
accounts of whatever may guide its politics, and
facilitate its invasion? Even respecting Spanish
America, such a confession would have been
disgraceful, because it would have betrayed an
inexcusable negligence in seeking for information; but
as regarding Spain itself, it became almost incredible.
Did there not exist faithful and copious accounts of
that kingdom, both by foreign and native writers? Had
we not still living, diplomatists who had resided for
years at the Spanish court; consuls and merchants
who had been domesticated, and almost naturalized
in Spain; and travellers who, either for their pleasure,
or on their commercial pursuits, had traversed every
province and every part of the Peninsula? Was not
12
information always to be found, if it were wisely and
perseveringly sought?
The truth was, that though we had means
adequate to any emergency, troops equal to any
service, and generals worthy to command them,
Government had the art of war to learn: it had been
forgotten in the cabinet since the days of Marlborough
and Godolphin. The minds of men expand with the
sphere in which they act, and that of our statesmen
had long been deplorably contracted. The nation,
contented with its maritime supremacy, hardly
considered itself as a military power; and had well
nigh acquiesced in what the French insultingly
proclaimed, and the enemies of the Government
sedulously repeated, that we had ceased to be so. We
had been sinking into a feeble, selfish policy, which
would have withered the root of our strength; its
avowed principle being to fix our attention exclusively
upon what were called British objects; in other words,
to pursue what was gainful, and be satisfied with
present safety, regardless of honour, and of the
certain ruin which that regardlessness must bring on.
The events in Spain had roused the country from a
lethargy which otherwise might have proved fatal;
and ministers, as undoubtedly the better part of their
1809. opponents would have done had they been then in
office, heartily participated the national feeling: but
when vigorous measures were required, they found
themselves without precedent and without system.
They had entered, however, into the contest
generously and magnanimously, with a spirit which, if
it were sustained, would rectify the errors of
inexperience, and work its way through all difficulties.
Earl Grey. Earl Grey took occasion in one of his speeches to
April 21. notice an opinion, that it was of no consequence by
which party the administration of affairs was directed.
“How can it,” he asked, “be seriously urged, that it is
the same thing whether the government be entrusted
to incapable persons, or able statesmen? I am really
astonished at the absurd extravagance of the doctrine
into which men of general good sense and good
intentions have been recently betrayed upon this
subject.” But no person had ever pretended that it
was the same thing whether the government were
administered by weak heads or by wise ones. What
had been maintained was, that the party out of place
was in no respect better than the party in, and in
many respects worse: that they did not possess the
slightest superiority in talents; that a comparison of
principles was wholly to their disadvantage; and that
the language respecting the present contest held,
even by those among them whose attachment to the
institutions of their country could not be doubted, was
such as left no hope for the honour of England if it
were committed to their hands. The existing ministry
acted upon braver and wiser principles, and, whatever
errors they committed in the management of the war,
to the latest ages it will be remembered for their
praise, that in the worst times they never despaired of
a good cause, nor shrunk from any responsibility that
the emergency required.
Expedition to An error, and one most grievous in its
the Scheldt. consequences, they committed at this time, by
dividing their force, and sending a great expedition
against the Isle of Walcheren, as a diversion in aid of
Austria, instead of bringing all their strength to bear
upon the Peninsula. It was a wise saying of Charles V.
that counsels are to be approved or condemned for
their causes, not for their consequences. When the
causes which led to this unhappy resolution are
considered, it will appear imputable in part to the
conduct of the Spanish government, still more to that
of the opposition in England. By refusing to put us in
possession of Cadiz as a point of retreat and safe
depôt, the Spaniards afforded their enemies in
England an argument in support of their favourite
position, that these allies had no confidence in us.
The opposition writers did not fail to urge this as an
additional proof that they were unworthy of our
assistance; and the impression which they laboured to
produce was strengthened by persons whose hearts
were with their country, but who thought by heaping
obloquy upon the Spaniards, and making their very
misfortunes matter of accusation against them, to
excuse the manner of Sir John Moore’s retreat. To the
effect which had been thus produced on public
opinion ministers in some degree deferred. They
deferred still more to the pitiful maxim that the British
government ought to direct its efforts towards the
attainment of what were called purely British objects:
now there were ships at Antwerp and at Flushing, and
it was deemed a British object to destroy the naval
resources of the enemy.
Men in England regarded the commencement of
the Austrian war with widely different feelings, each
party expecting a result in conformity to its own
system of opinions. Those journalists who taught as
the first political commandment that Buonaparte was
Almighty, and that Europe should have none other
Lord but him, as from the commencement of the
troubles in Spain they had represented the cause of
the Spaniards to be hopeless, so they predicted now
that that resistless conqueror was only called a while
from his career of conquest in the Peninsula to win
new victories upon the Danube, after which he would
return to the Guadalquivir and the Tagus, and bear
down every thing before him there. Others, who had
too sanguinely expected immediate success from the
Spaniards, with equal but less excusable credulity
rested their hopes now upon Austria, ... there, they
said, the battle was to be fought, and the fate of
Spain as well as of Germany depended upon the
issue. The wiser few looked for little from the
continental governments, though they knew that
much was possible from the people; but from the
beginning of this new contest, it appeared to them
important chiefly because it effected a diversion in
favour of the Spaniards; especially they hoped that
England would seize the opportunity, and by meeting
the enemy upon that ground with equal numbers,
secure a certain and decisive victory.
Troops sent to Great and unfortunate as the error was of dividing
Portugal. their efforts, the Government acted with a spirit and
vigour which have seldom been seen in the counsels
of a British cabinet. At a time when they expected
that not Spain alone, but Portugal also, would be
abandoned by our troops, they made preparations for
sending thither another army with all speed, under Sir
Arthur Wellesley, who consequently resigned his seat
in Parliament, and his office as Chief Secretary in
Ireland. Sir John Craddock, who had then the
command in Portugal, being a much older officer, was
Earl of appointed Governor of Gibraltar. The Earl of
Buckinghamshir Buckinghamshire complained of this, as being an ill
e. reward for those exertions in collecting the scattered
April 10. British force, and preparing it for resistance, to which
it was owing that the determination of embarking
from Lisbon was abandoned. This complaint drew
from the Earl of Liverpool a just tribute to Sir John
Craddock’s merits, and some remarks not less just
upon the impropriety of bringing such a subject
before Parliament, as at once trenching upon the
prerogative, and virtually destroying that responsibility
which ministers possessed.
Lord Buckinghamshire was of opinion that we had
acted unwisely in reinstating the Portugueze Regency;
that it became the duty of ministers to form a
May 1. provisional government in that country till the subject
could be submitted to the Prince of Brazil’s decision;
and that when Marquis Wellesley went out as
ambassador to Seville, he should take with him
powers for making those changes in Portugal which
could not be delayed without most serious injury to
the common cause of that kingdom and of Spain, and
to the security of Great Britain and Ireland. To this it
was replied, that what had been done was done
because it was presumed to be most in accord with
the sentiments of the government in Brazil, at the
same time that due regard was paid to the feelings
and even the prejudices of the people. Lord
Buckinghamshire strongly recommended that we
should avail ourselves of the strength of Portugal as a
military position, and of the excellent qualities of the
Portugueze, which, under good discipline, whenever
they had had it, made them among the best soldiers
in the world. Such measures for that great purpose
had at that time been taken as the Earl of
Buckinghamshire wished. That nobleman spoke more
wisely upon the affairs of the Peninsula than any
other member of the opposition, and without the
slightest taint of party spirit. There were some, of
whom it would be difficult to say whether their
speeches displayed less knowledge of facts, or less
regard of them.
CHAPTER XXII.
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY’S SECOND
CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL. PASSAGE OF
THE DOURO, AND EXPULSION OF THE
FRENCH. DELIVERANCE OF GALICIA.
Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
ebooknice.com