Logic

Logic is the study of correct reasoning. It includes both formal and

informal logic. Formal logic is the study of deductively valid
inferences or logical truths. It examines how conclusions follow
from premises based on the structure of arguments alone,
independent of their topic and content. Informal logic is associated
with informal fallacies, critical thinking, and argumentation
theory. Informal logic examines arguments expressed in natural
language whereas formal logic uses formal language. When used
as a countable noun, the term "a logic" refers to a specific logical
formal system that articulates a proof system. Logic plays a Logic studies valid forms of
central role in many fields, such as philosophy, mathematics, inference like modus ponens.
computer science, and linguistics.

Logic studies arguments, which consist of a set of premises that leads to a conclusion. An example is the
argument from the premises "it's Sunday" and "if it's Sunday then I don't have to work" leading to the
conclusion "I don't have to work".[1] Premises and conclusions express propositions or claims that can be
true or false. An important feature of propositions is their internal structure. For example, complex
propositions are made up of simpler propositions linked by logical vocabulary like (and) or
(if...then). Simple propositions also have parts, like "Sunday" or "work" in the example. The truth of a
proposition usually depends on the meanings of all of its parts. However, this is not the case for logically
true propositions. They are true only because of their logical structure independent of the specific
meanings of the individual parts.

Arguments can be either correct or incorrect. An argument is correct if its premises support its
conclusion. Deductive arguments have the strongest form of support: if their premises are true then their
conclusion must also be true. This is not the case for ampliative arguments, which arrive at genuinely new
information not found in the premises. Many arguments in everyday discourse and the sciences are
ampliative arguments. They are divided into inductive and abductive arguments. Inductive arguments are
statistical generalizations, such as inferring that all ravens are black based on many individual
observations of black ravens.[2] Abductive arguments are inferences to the best explanation, for example,
when a doctor concludes that a patient has a certain disease which explains the symptoms they suffer.[3]
Arguments that fall short of the standards of correct reasoning often embody fallacies. Systems of logic
are theoretical frameworks for assessing the correctness of arguments.

Logic has been studied since antiquity. Early approaches include Aristotelian logic, Stoic logic, Nyaya,
and Mohism. Aristotelian logic focuses on reasoning in the form of syllogisms. It was considered the
main system of logic in the Western world until it was replaced by modern formal logic, which has its
roots in the work of late 19th-century mathematicians such as Gottlob Frege. Today, the most commonly
used system is classical logic. It consists of propositional logic and first-order logic. Propositional logic
only considers logical relations between full propositions. First-order logic also takes the internal parts of
propositions into account, like predicates and quantifiers. Extended logics accept the basic intuitions
behind classical logic and apply it to other fields, such as metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. Deviant
logics, on the other hand, reject certain classical intuitions and provide alternative explanations of the
basic laws of logic.

Definition
The word "logic" originates from the Greek word "logos", which has a variety of translations, such as
reason, discourse, or language.[4] Logic is traditionally defined as the study of the laws of thought or
correct reasoning,[5] and is usually understood in terms of inferences or arguments. Reasoning is the
activity of drawing inferences. Arguments are the outward expression of inferences.[6] An argument is a
set of premises together with a conclusion. Logic is interested in whether arguments are correct, i.e.
whether their premises support the conclusion.[7] These general characterizations apply to logic in the
widest sense, i.e., to both formal and informal logic since they are both concerned with assessing the
correctness of arguments.[8] Formal logic is the traditionally dominant field, and some logicians restrict
logic to formal logic.[9]

Formal logic
Formal logic is also known as symbolic logic and is widely used in mathematical logic. It uses a formal
approach to study reasoning: it replaces concrete expressions with abstract symbols to examine the
logical form of arguments independent of their concrete content. In this sense, it is topic-neutral since it is
only concerned with the abstract structure of arguments and not with their concrete content.[10]

Formal logic is interested in deductively valid arguments, for which the truth of their premises ensures
the truth of their conclusion. This means that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion to be false.[11] For valid arguments, the logical structure of the premises and the conclusion
follows a pattern called a rule of inference.[12] For example, modus ponens is a rule of inference
according to which all arguments of the form "(1) p, (2) if p then q, (3) therefore q" are valid, independent
of what the terms p and q stand for.[13] In this sense, formal logic can be defined as the science of valid
inferences. An alternative definition sees logic as the study of logical truths.[14] A proposition is logically
true if its truth depends only on the logical vocabulary used in it. This means that it is true in all possible
worlds and under all interpretations of its non-logical terms, like the claim "either it is raining, or it is
not".[15] These two definitions of formal logic are not identical, but they are closely related. For example,
if the inference from p to q is deductively valid then the claim "if p then q" is a logical truth.[16]

Formal logic uses formal languages to express

and analyze arguments.[17] They normally
have a very limited vocabulary and exact
syntactic rules. These rules specify how their
symbols can be combined to construct
Formal logic needs to translate natural language
sentences, so-called well-formed formulas.[18]
arguments into a formal language, like first-order logic, to
This simplicity and exactness of formal logic assess whether they are valid. In this example, the letter
make it capable of formulating precise rules "c" represents Carmen while the letters "M" and "T" stand
of inference. They determine whether a given for "Mexican" and "teacher". The symbol "∧" has the
argument is valid.[19] Because of the reliance meaning of "and".
on formal language, natural language arguments cannot be studied directly. Instead, they need to be
translated into formal language before their validity can be assessed.[20]

The term "logic" can also be used in a slightly different sense as a countable noun. In this sense, a logic is
a logical formal system. Distinct logics differ from each other concerning the rules of inference they
accept as valid and the formal languages used to express them.[21] Starting in the late 19th century, many
new formal systems have been proposed. There are disagreements about what makes a formal system a
logic.[22] For example, it has been suggested that only logically complete systems, like first-order logic,
qualify as logics. For such reasons, some theorists deny that higher-order logics are logics in the strict
sense.[23]

Informal logic
When understood in a wide sense, logic encompasses both formal and informal logic.[24] Informal logic
uses non-formal criteria and standards to analyze and assess the correctness of arguments. Its main focus
is on everyday discourse.[25] Its development was prompted by difficulties in applying the insights of
formal logic to natural language arguments.[26] In this regard, it considers problems that formal logic on
its own is unable to address.[27] Both provide criteria for assessing the correctness of arguments and
distinguishing them from fallacies.[28]

Many characterizations of informal logic have been suggested but there is no general agreement on its
precise definition.[29] The most literal approach sees the terms "formal" and "informal" as applying to the
language used to express arguments. On this view, informal logic studies arguments that are in informal
or natural language.[30] Formal logic can only examine them indirectly by translating them first into a
formal language while informal logic investigates them in their original form.[31] On this view, the
argument "Birds fly. Tweety is a bird. Therefore, Tweety flies." belongs to natural language and is
examined by informal logic. But the formal translation "(1) ; (2)
; (3) " is studied by formal logic. [32] The study of natural language
arguments comes with various difficulties. For example, natural language expressions are often
ambiguous, vague, and context-dependent.[33] Another approach defines informal logic in a wide sense as
the normative study of the standards, criteria, and procedures of argumentation. In this sense, it includes
questions about the role of rationality, critical thinking, and the psychology of argumentation.[34]

Another characterization identifies informal logic with the study of non-deductive arguments. In this way,
it contrasts with deductive reasoning examined by formal logic.[35] Non-deductive arguments make their
conclusion probable but do not ensure that it is true. An example is the inductive argument from the
empirical observation that "all ravens I have seen so far are black" to the conclusion "all ravens are
black".[36]

A further approach is to define informal logic as the study of informal fallacies.[37] Informal fallacies are
incorrect arguments in which errors are present in the content and the context of the argument.[38] A false
dilemma, for example, involves an error of content by excluding viable options. This is the case in the
fallacy "you are either with us or against us; you are not with us; therefore, you are against us".[39] Some
theorists state that formal logic studies the general form of arguments while informal logic studies
particular instances of arguments. Another approach is to hold that formal logic only considers the role of
logical constants for correct inferences while informal logic also takes the meaning of substantive
concepts into account. Further approaches focus on the discussion of logical topics with or without formal
devices and on the role of epistemology for the assessment of arguments.[40]

Basic concepts

Premises, conclusions, and truth

Premises and conclusions

Premises and conclusions are the basic parts of inferences or arguments and therefore play a central role
in logic. In the case of a valid inference or a correct argument, the conclusion follows from the premises,
or in other words, the premises support the conclusion.[41] For instance, the premises "Mars is red" and
"Mars is a planet" support the conclusion "Mars is a red planet". For most types of logic, it is accepted
that premises and conclusions have to be truth-bearers.[41][a] This means that they have a truth value: they
are either true or false. Contemporary philosophy generally sees them either as propositions or as
sentences.[43] Propositions are the denotations of sentences and are usually seen as abstract objects.[44]
For example, the English sentence "the tree is green" is different from the German sentence "der Baum ist
grün" but both express the same proposition.[45]

Propositional theories of premises and conclusions are often criticized because they rely on abstract
objects. For instance, philosophical naturalists usually reject the existence of abstract objects. Other
arguments concern the challenges involved in specifying the identity criteria of propositions.[43] These
objections are avoided by seeing premises and conclusions not as propositions but as sentences, i.e. as
concrete linguistic objects like the symbols displayed on a page of a book. But this approach comes with
new problems of its own: sentences are often context-dependent and ambiguous, meaning an argument's
validity would not only depend on its parts but also on its context and on how it is interpreted.[46] Another
approach is to understand premises and conclusions in psychological terms as thoughts or judgments.
This position is known as psychologism. It was discussed at length around the turn of the 20th century
but it is not widely accepted today.[47]

Internal structure
Premises and conclusions have an internal structure. As propositions or sentences, they can be either
simple or complex.[48] A complex proposition has other propositions as its constituents, which are linked
to each other through propositional connectives like "and" or "if...then". Simple propositions, on the other
hand, do not have propositional parts. But they can also be conceived as having an internal structure: they
are made up of subpropositional parts, like singular terms and predicates.[49][48] For example, the simple
proposition "Mars is red" can be formed by applying the predicate "red" to the singular term "Mars". In
contrast, the complex proposition "Mars is red and Venus is white" is made up of two simple propositions
connected by the propositional connective "and".[49]

Whether a proposition is true depends, at least in part, on its constituents. For complex propositions
formed using truth-functional propositional connectives, their truth only depends on the truth values of
their parts.[49][50] But this relation is more complicated in the case of simple propositions and their
subpropositional parts. These subpropositional parts have meanings of their own, like referring to objects
or classes of objects.[51] Whether the simple proposition they form is true depends on their relation to
reality, i.e. what the objects they refer to are like. This topic is studied by theories of reference.[52]

Logical truth
Some complex propositions are true independently of the substantive meanings of their parts.[53] In
classical logic, for example, the complex proposition "either Mars is red or Mars is not red" is true
independent of whether its parts, like the simple proposition "Mars is red", are true or false. In such cases,
the truth is called a logical truth: a proposition is logically true if its truth depends only on the logical
vocabulary used in it.[54] This means that it is true under all interpretations of its non-logical terms. In
some modal logics, this means that the proposition is true in all possible worlds.[55] Some theorists define
logic as the study of logical truths.[16]

Truth tables
Truth tables can be used to show how logical connectives work or how the truth values of complex
propositions depends on their parts. They have a column for each input variable. Each row corresponds to
one possible combination of the truth values these variables can take; for truth tables presented in the
English literature, the symbols "T" and "F" or "1" and "0" are commonly used as abbreviations for the
truth values "true" and "false".[56] The first columns present all the possible truth-value combinations for
the input variables. Entries in the other columns present the truth values of the corresponding expressions
as determined by the input values. For example, the expression " " uses the logical connective
(and). It could be used to express a sentence like "yesterday was Sunday and the weather was good". It is
only true if both of its input variables, ("yesterday was Sunday") and ("the weather was good"), are
true. In all other cases, the expression as a whole is false. Other important logical connectives are (not),
(or), (if...then), and (Sheffer stroke).[57] Given the conditional proposition , one can form
truth tables of its converse , its inverse ( ), and its contrapositive ( ). Truth tables
can also be defined for more complex expressions that use several propositional connectives.[58]

Truth table of various expressions

p q p∧q p∨q p→q ¬p → ¬q p q

T T T T T T F

T F F T F T T

F T F T T F T
F F F F T T T

Arguments and inferences

Logic is commonly defined in terms of arguments or inferences as the study of their correctness.[59] An
argument is a set of premises together with a conclusion.[60] An inference is the process of reasoning
from these premises to the conclusion.[43] But these terms are often used interchangeably in logic.
Arguments are correct or incorrect depending on whether their premises support their conclusion.
Premises and conclusions, on the other hand, are true or false depending on whether they are in accord
with reality. In formal logic, a sound argument is an argument that is both correct and has only true
premises.[61] Sometimes a distinction is made between simple and complex arguments. A complex
argument is made up of a chain of simple arguments. This means that the conclusion of one argument acts
as a premise of later arguments. For a complex argument to be successful, each link of the chain has to be
successful.[43]

Arguments and inferences are either

correct or incorrect. If they are correct
then their premises support their
conclusion. In the incorrect case, this
support is missing. It can take
different forms corresponding to the
different types of reasoning.[62] The
strongest form of support corresponds
to deductive reasoning. But even
arguments that are not deductively
valid may still be good arguments
because their premises offer non-
deductive support to their conclusions.
For such cases, the term ampliative or
inductive reasoning is used.[63] Argument terminology used in logic
Deductive arguments are associated
with formal logic in contrast to the
relation between ampliative arguments and informal logic.[64]

Deductive
A deductively valid argument is one whose premises guarantee the truth of its conclusion.[11] For
instance, the argument "(1) all frogs are amphibians; (2) no cats are amphibians; (3) therefore no cats are
frogs" is deductively valid. For deductive validity, it does not matter whether the premises or the
conclusion are actually true. So the argument "(1) all frogs are mammals; (2) no cats are mammals; (3)
therefore no cats are frogs" is also valid because the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises.[65]

According to an influential view by Alfred Tarski, deductive arguments have three essential features: (1)
they are formal, i.e. they depend only on the form of the premises and the conclusion; (2) they are a
priori, i.e. no sense experience is needed to determine whether they obtain; (3) they are modal, i.e. that
they hold by logical necessity for the given propositions, independent of any other circumstances.[66]

Because of the first feature, the focus on formality, deductive inference is usually identified with rules of
inference.[67] Rules of inference specify the form of the premises and the conclusion: how they have to be
structured for the inference to be valid. Arguments that do not follow any rule of inference are
deductively invalid.[68] The modus ponens is a prominent rule of inference. It has the form "p; if p, then
q; therefore q".[69] Knowing that it has just rained ( ) and that after rain the streets are wet ( ), one
can use modus ponens to deduce that the streets are wet ( ). [70]

The third feature can be expressed by stating that deductively valid inferences are truth-preserving: it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false.[71] Because of this feature, it is often
asserted that deductive inferences are uninformative since the conclusion cannot arrive at new
information not already present in the premises.[72] But this point is not always accepted since it would
mean, for example, that most of mathematics is uninformative. A different characterization distinguishes
between surface and depth information. The surface information of a sentence is the information it
presents explicitly. Depth information is the totality of the information contained in the sentence, both
explicitly and implicitly. According to this view, deductive inferences are uninformative on the depth
level. But they can be highly informative on the surface level by making implicit information explicit.
This happens, for example, in mathematical proofs.[73]

Ampliative
Ampliative arguments are arguments whose conclusions contain additional information not found in their
premises. In this regard, they are more interesting since they contain information on the depth level and
the thinker may learn something genuinely new. But this feature comes with a certain cost: the premises
support the conclusion in the sense that they make its truth more likely but they do not ensure its truth.[74]
This means that the conclusion of an ampliative argument may be false even though all its premises are
true. This characteristic is closely related to non-monotonicity and defeasibility: it may be necessary to
retract an earlier conclusion upon receiving new information or in light of new inferences drawn.[75]
Ampliative reasoning plays a central role in many arguments found in everyday discourse and the
sciences. Ampliative arguments are not automatically incorrect. Instead, they just follow different
standards of correctness. The support they provide for their conclusion usually comes in degrees. This
means that strong ampliative arguments make their conclusion very likely while weak ones are less
certain. As a consequence, the line between correct and incorrect arguments is blurry in some cases, such
as when the premises offer weak but non-negligible support. This contrasts with deductive arguments,
which are either valid or invalid with nothing in-between.[76]

The terminology used to categorize ampliative arguments is inconsistent. Some authors, like James
Hawthorne, use the term "induction" to cover all forms of non-deductive arguments.[77] But in a more
narrow sense, induction is only one type of ampliative argument alongside abductive arguments.[78]
Some philosophers, like Leo Groarke, also allow conductive arguments[b] as another type.[79] In this
narrow sense, induction is often defined as a form of statistical generalization.[80] In this case, the
premises of an inductive argument are many individual observations that all show a certain pattern. The
conclusion then is a general law that this pattern always obtains.[81] In this sense, one may infer that "all
elephants are gray" based on one's past observations of the color of elephants.[78] A closely related form
of inductive inference has as its conclusion not a general law but one more specific instance, as when it is
inferred that an elephant one has not seen yet is also gray.[81] Some theorists, like Igor Douven, stipulate
that inductive inferences rest only on statistical considerations. This way, they can be distinguished from
abductive inference.[78]

Abductive inference may or may not take statistical observations into consideration. In either case, the
premises offer support for the conclusion because the conclusion is the best explanation of why the
premises are true.[82] In this sense, abduction is also called the inference to the best explanation.[83] For
example, given the premise that there is a plate with breadcrumbs in the kitchen in the early morning, one
may infer the conclusion that one's house-mate had a midnight snack and was too tired to clean the table.
This conclusion is justified because it is the best explanation of the current state of the kitchen.[78] For
abduction, it is not sufficient that the conclusion explains the premises. For example, the conclusion that a
burglar broke into the house last night, got hungry on the job, and had a midnight snack, would also
explain the state of the kitchen. But this conclusion is not justified because it is not the best or most likely
explanation.[82][83]

Fallacies
Not all arguments live up to the standards of correct reasoning. When they do not, they are usually
referred to as fallacies. Their central aspect is not that their conclusion is false but that there is some flaw
with the reasoning leading to this conclusion.[84] So the argument "it is sunny today; therefore spiders
have eight legs" is fallacious even though the conclusion is true. Some theorists, like John Stuart Mill,
give a more restrictive definition of fallacies by additionally requiring that they appear to be correct.[85]
This way, genuine fallacies can be distinguished from mere mistakes of reasoning due to carelessness.
This explains why people tend to commit fallacies: because they have an alluring element that seduces
people into committing and accepting them.[86] However, this reference to appearances is controversial
because it belongs to the field of psychology, not logic, and because appearances may be different for
different people.[87]

Fallacies are usually divided into formal and

informal fallacies.[38] For formal fallacies, the
source of the error is found in the form of the
argument. For example, denying the antecedent
is one type of formal fallacy, as in "if Othello is a
bachelor, then he is male; Othello is not a
bachelor; therefore Othello is not male".[88] But
most fallacies fall into the category of informal
fallacies, of which a great variety is discussed in
the academic literature. The source of their error
is usually found in the content or the context of Young America's dilemma: Shall I be wise and great, or
the argument.[89] Informal fallacies are rich and powerful? (poster from 1901) This is an
sometimes categorized as fallacies of ambiguity, example of a false dilemma: an informal fallacy using a
fallacies of presumption, or fallacies of disjunctive premise that excludes viable alternatives.
relevance. For fallacies of ambiguity, the
ambiguity and vagueness of natural language are
responsible for their flaw, as in "feathers are light; what is light cannot be dark; therefore feathers cannot
be dark".[90] Fallacies of presumption have a wrong or unjustified premise but may be valid otherwise.[91]
In the case of fallacies of relevance, the premises do not support the conclusion because they are not
relevant to it.[92]

Definitory and strategic rules

The main focus of most logicians is to study the criteria according to which an argument is correct or
incorrect. A fallacy is committed if these criteria are violated. In the case of formal logic, they are known
as rules of inference.[93] They are definitory rules, which determine whether an inference is correct or
which inferences are allowed. Definitory rules contrast with strategic rules. Strategic rules specify which
inferential moves are necessary to reach a given conclusion based on a set of premises. This distinction
does not just apply to logic but also to games. In chess, for example, the definitory rules dictate that
bishops may only move diagonally. The strategic rules, on the other hand, describe how the allowed
moves may be used to win a game, for instance, by controlling the center and by defending one's king.[94]
It has been argued that logicians should give more emphasis to strategic rules since they are highly
relevant for effective reasoning.[93]

Formal systems
A formal system of logic consists of a formal language together with a set of axioms and a proof system
used to draw inferences from these axioms.[95] In logic, axioms are statements that are accepted without
proof. They are used to justify other statements.[96] Some theorists also include a semantics that specifies
how the expressions of the formal language relate to real objects.[97] Starting in the late 19th century,
many new formal systems have been proposed.[98]

A formal language consists of an alphabet and syntactic rules. The alphabet is the set of basic symbols
used in expressions. The syntactic rules determine how these symbols may be arranged to result in well-
formed formulas.[99] For instance, the syntactic rules of propositional logic determine that " " is a
well-formed formula but " " is not since the logical conjunction requires terms on both sides. [100]

A proof system is a collection of rules to construct formal proofs. It is a tool to arrive at conclusions from
a set of axioms. Rules in a proof system are defined in terms of the syntactic form of formulas
independent of their specific content. For instance, the classical rule of conjunction introduction states
that follows from the premises and . Such rules can be applied sequentially, giving a
mechanical procedure for generating conclusions from premises. There are different types of proof
systems including natural deduction and sequent calculi.[101]

A semantics is a system for mapping expressions of a formal language to their denotations. In many
systems of logic, denotations are truth values. For instance, the semantics for classical propositional logic
assigns the formula the denotation "true" whenever and are true. From the semantic point of
view, a premise entails a conclusion if the conclusion is true whenever the premise is true.[102]

A system of logic is sound when its proof system cannot derive a conclusion from a set of premises
unless it is semantically entailed by them. In other words, its proof system cannot lead to false
conclusions, as defined by the semantics. A system is complete when its proof system can derive every
conclusion that is semantically entailed by its premises. In other words, its proof system can lead to any
true conclusion, as defined by the semantics. Thus, soundness and completeness together describe a
system whose notions of validity and entailment line up perfectly.[103]

Systems of logic
Systems of logic are theoretical frameworks for assessing the correctness of reasoning and arguments.
For over two thousand years, Aristotelian logic was treated as the canon of logic in the Western
world,[104] but modern developments in this field have led to a vast proliferation of logical systems.[105]
One prominent categorization divides modern formal logical systems into classical logic, extended logics,
and deviant logics.[106]

Aristotelian
Aristotelian logic encompasses a great variety of topics. They include metaphysical theses about
ontological categories and problems of scientific explanation. But in a more narrow sense, it is identical
to term logic or syllogistics. A syllogism is a form of argument involving three propositions: two
premises and a conclusion. Each proposition has three essential parts: a subject, a predicate, and a copula
connecting the subject to the predicate.[107] For example, the proposition "Socrates is wise" is made up of
the subject "Socrates", the predicate "wise", and the copula "is".[108] The subject and the predicate are the
terms of the proposition. Aristotelian logic does not contain complex propositions made up of simple
propositions. It differs in this aspect from propositional logic, in which any two propositions can be
linked using a logical connective like "and" to form a new complex proposition.[109]

In Aristotelian logic, the subject can be universal,

particular, indefinite, or singular. For example, the
term "all humans" is a universal subject in the
proposition "all humans are mortal". A similar
proposition could be formed by replacing it with the
particular term "some humans", the indefinite term
"a human", or the singular term "Socrates".[110]

Aristotelian logic only includes predicates for

simple properties of entities. But it lacks predicates
corresponding to relations between entities.[111] The
predicate can be linked to the subject in two ways:
either by affirming it or by denying it.[112] For
example, the proposition "Socrates is not a cat"
involves the denial of the predicate "cat" to the
subject "Socrates". Using combinations of subjects
and predicates, a great variety of propositions and
syllogisms can be formed. Syllogisms are
characterized by the fact that the premises are linked
to each other and to the conclusion by sharing one
The square of opposition is often used to visualize
predicate in each case.[113] Thus, these three
the relations between the four basic categorical
propositions contain three predicates, referred to as propositions in Aristotelian logic. It shows, for
major term, minor term, and middle term.[114] The example, that the propositions "All S are P" and
central aspect of Aristotelian logic involves "Some S are not P" are contradictory, meaning that
classifying all possible syllogisms into valid and one of them has to be true while the other is false.
invalid arguments according to how the propositions
are formed.[112][115] For example, the syllogism "all
men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal" is valid. The syllogism "all cats are
mortal; Socrates is mortal; therefore Socrates is a cat", on the other hand, is invalid.[116]

Classical
Classical logic is distinct from traditional or Aristotelian logic. It encompasses propositional logic and
first-order logic. It is "classical" in the sense that it is based on basic logical intuitions shared by most
logicians.[117] These intuitions include the law of excluded middle, the double negation elimination, the
principle of explosion, and the bivalence of truth.[118] It was originally developed to analyze
mathematical arguments and was only later applied to other fields as well. Because of this focus on
mathematics, it does not include logical vocabulary relevant to many other topics of philosophical
importance. Examples of concepts it overlooks are the contrast between necessity and possibility and the
problem of ethical obligation and permission. Similarly, it does not address the relations between past,
present, and future.[119] Such issues are addressed by extended logics. They build on the basic intuitions
of classical logic and expand it by introducing new logical vocabulary. This way, the exact logical
approach is applied to fields like ethics or epistemology that lie beyond the scope of mathematics.[120]

Propositional logic
Propositional logic comprises formal systems in which formulae are built from atomic propositions using
logical connectives. For instance, propositional logic represents the conjunction of two atomic
propositions and as the complex formula . Unlike predicate logic where terms and predicates
are the smallest units, propositional logic takes full propositions with truth values as its most basic
component.[121] Thus, propositional logics can only represent logical relationships that arise from the
way complex propositions are built from simpler ones. But it cannot represent inferences that result from
the inner structure of a proposition.[122]

First-order logic
First-order logic includes the same propositional connectives as
propositional logic but differs from it because it articulates the
internal structure of propositions. This happens through devices
such as singular terms, which refer to particular objects,
Gottlob Frege's Begriffschrift
predicates, which refer to properties and relations, and quantifiers, introduced the notion of quantifier in
which treat notions like "some" and "all".[123] For example, to a graphical notation, which here
express the proposition "this raven is black", one may use the represents the judgment that
predicate for the property "black" and the singular term is true.
referring to the raven to form the expression . To express that
some objects are black, the existential quantifier is combined
with the variable to form the proposition . First-order logic contains various rules of inference
that determine how expressions articulated this way can form valid arguments, for example, that one may
infer from .[124]

Extended
Extended logics are logical systems that accept the basic principles of classical logic. They introduce
additional symbols and principles to apply it to fields like metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology.[125]

Modal logic
Modal logic is an extension of classical logic. In its original form, sometimes called "alethic modal
logic", it introduces two new symbols: expresses that something is possible while expresses that
something is necessary. [126] For example, if the formula stands for the sentence "Socrates is a
banker" then the formula articulates the sentence "It is possible that Socrates is a banker".[127] To
include these symbols in the logical formalism, modal logic introduces new rules of inference that govern
what role they play in inferences. One rule of inference states that, if something is necessary, then it is
also possible. This means that follows from . Another principle states that if a proposition is
necessary then its negation is impossible and vice versa. This means that is equivalent to .[128]

Other forms of modal logic introduce similar symbols but associate different meanings with them to
apply modal logic to other fields. For example, deontic logic concerns the field of ethics and introduces
symbols to express the ideas of obligation and permission, i.e. to describe whether an agent has to
perform a certain action or is allowed to perform it.[129] The modal operators in temporal modal logic
articulate temporal relations. They can be used to express, for example, that something happened at one
time or that something is happening all the time.[129] In epistemology, epistemic modal logic is used to
represent the ideas of knowing something in contrast to merely believing it to be the case.[130]

Higher order logic

Higher-order logics extend classical logic not by using modal operators but by introducing new forms of
quantification.[131] Quantifiers correspond to terms like "all" or "some". In classical first-order logic,
quantifiers are only applied to individuals. The formula " " (some apples are
sweet) is an example of the existential quantifier " " applied to the individual variable " ". In higher-
order logics, quantification is also allowed over predicates. This increases its expressive power. For
example, to express the idea that Mary and John share some qualities, one could use the formula
" ". In this case, the existential quantifier is applied to the predicate variable
" ". [132] The added expressive power is especially useful for mathematics since it allows for more
succinct formulations of mathematical theories.[43] But it has drawbacks in regard to its meta-logical
properties and ontological implications, which is why first-order logic is still more commonly used.[133]

Deviant
Deviant logics are logical systems that reject some of the basic intuitions of classical logic. Because of
this, they are usually seen not as its supplements but as its rivals. Deviant logical systems differ from each
other either because they reject different classical intuitions or because they propose different alternatives
to the same issue.[134]

Intuitionistic logic is a restricted version of classical logic.[135] It uses the same symbols but excludes
some rules of inference. For example, according to the law of double negation elimination, if a sentence
is not not true, then it is true. This means that follows from . This is a valid rule of inference in
classical logic but it is invalid in intuitionistic logic. Another classical principle not part of intuitionistic
logic is the law of excluded middle. It states that for every sentence, either it or its negation is true. This
means that every proposition of the form is true.[135] These deviations from classical logic are
based on the idea that truth is established by verification using a proof. Intuitionistic logic is especially
prominent in the field of constructive mathematics, which emphasizes the need to find or construct a
specific example to prove its existence.[136]

Multi-valued logics depart from classicality by rejecting the principle of bivalence, which requires all
propositions to be either true or false. For instance, Jan Łukasiewicz and Stephen Cole Kleene both
proposed ternary logics which have a third truth value representing that a statement's truth value is
indeterminate.[137] These logics have been applied in the field of linguistics. Fuzzy logics are multivalued
logics that have an infinite number of "degrees of truth", represented by a real number between 0 and
1.[138]
Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that can deal with contradictions. They are formulated to avoid
the principle of explosion: for them, it is not the case that anything follows from a contradiction.[139]
They are often motivated by dialetheism, the view that contradictions are real or that reality itself is
contradictory. Graham Priest is an influential contemporary proponent of this position and similar views
have been ascribed to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.[140]

Informal
Informal logic is usually carried out in a less systematic way. It often focuses on more specific issues, like
investigating a particular type of fallacy or studying a certain aspect of argumentation. Nonetheless, some
frameworks of informal logic have also been presented that try to provide a systematic characterization of
the correctness of arguments.[141]

The pragmatic or dialogical approach to informal logic sees arguments as speech acts and not merely as
a set of premises together with a conclusion.[142] As speech acts, they occur in a certain context, like a
dialogue, which affects the standards of right and wrong arguments.[143] A prominent version by Douglas
N. Walton understands a dialogue as a game between two players. The initial position of each player is
characterized by the propositions to which they are committed and the conclusion they intend to prove.
Dialogues are games of persuasion: each player has the goal of convincing the opponent of their own
conclusion.[144] This is achieved by making arguments: arguments are the moves of the game.[145] They
affect to which propositions the players are committed. A winning move is a successful argument that
takes the opponent's commitments as premises and shows how one's own conclusion follows from them.
This is usually not possible straight away. For this reason, it is normally necessary to formulate a
sequence of arguments as intermediary steps, each of which brings the opponent a little closer to one's
intended conclusion. Besides these positive arguments leading one closer to victory, there are also
negative arguments preventing the opponent's victory by denying their conclusion.[144] Whether an
argument is correct depends on whether it promotes the progress of the dialogue. Fallacies, on the other
hand, are violations of the standards of proper argumentative rules.[146] These standards also depend on
the type of dialogue. For example, the standards governing the scientific discourse differ from the
standards in business negotiations.[147]

The epistemic approach to informal logic, on the other hand, focuses on the epistemic role of
arguments.[148] It is based on the idea that arguments aim to increase our knowledge. They achieve this
by linking justified beliefs to beliefs that are not yet justified.[149] Correct arguments succeed at
expanding knowledge while fallacies are epistemic failures: they do not justify the belief in their
conclusion.[150] For example, the fallacy of begging the question is a fallacy because it fails to provide
independent justification for its conclusion, even though it is deductively valid.[151] In this sense, logical
normativity consists in epistemic success or rationality.[149] The Bayesian approach is one example of an
epistemic approach.[152] Central to Bayesianism is not just whether the agent believes something but the
degree to which they believe it, the so-called credence. Degrees of belief are seen as subjective
probabilities in the believed proposition, i.e. how certain the agent is that the proposition is true.[153] On
this view, reasoning can be interpreted as a process of changing one's credences, often in reaction to new
incoming information.[154] Correct reasoning and the arguments it is based on follow the laws of
probability, for example, the principle of conditionalization. Bad or irrational reasoning, on the other
hand, violates these laws.[155]

Areas of research
Logic is studied in various fields. In many cases, this is done by applying its formal method to specific
topics outside its scope, like to ethics or computer science.[156] In other cases, logic itself is made the
subject of research in another discipline. This can happen in diverse ways. For instance, it can involve
investigating the philosophical assumptions linked to the basic concepts used by logicians. Other ways
include interpreting and analyzing logic through mathematical structures as well as studying and
comparing abstract properties of formal logical systems.[157]

Philosophy of logic and philosophical logic

Philosophy of logic is the philosophical discipline studying the scope and nature of logic.[59] It examines
many presuppositions implicit in logic, like how to define its basic concepts or the metaphysical
assumptions associated with them.[158] It is also concerned with how to classify logical systems and
considers the ontological commitments they incur.[159] Philosophical logic is one of the areas within the
philosophy of logic. It studies the application of logical methods to philosophical problems in fields like
metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology.[160] This application usually happens in the form of extended or
deviant logical systems.[161]

Metalogic
Metalogic is the field of inquiry studying the properties of formal logical systems. For example, when a
new formal system is developed, metalogicians may study it to determine which formulas can be proven
in it. They may also study whether an algorithm could be developed to find a proof for each formula and
whether every provable formula in it is a tautology. Finally, they may compare it to other logical systems
to understand its distinctive features. A key issue in metalogic concerns the relation between syntax and
semantics. The syntactic rules of a formal system determine how to deduce conclusions from premises,
i.e. how to formulate proofs. The semantics of a formal system governs which sentences are true and
which ones are false. This determines the validity of arguments since, for valid arguments, it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. The relation between syntax and
semantics concerns issues like whether every valid argument is provable and whether every provable
argument is valid. Metalogicians also study whether logical systems are complete, sound, and consistent.
They are interested in whether the systems are decidable and what expressive power they have.
Metalogicians usually rely heavily on abstract mathematical reasoning when examining and formulating
metalogical proofs. This way, they aim to arrive at precise and general conclusions on these topics.[162]

Mathematical logic
The term "mathematical logic" is sometimes used as a synonym of "formal logic". But in a more
restricted sense, it refers to the study of logic within mathematics. Major subareas include model theory,
proof theory, set theory, and computability theory.[164] Research in mathematical logic commonly
addresses the mathematical properties of formal systems of logic. However, it can also include attempts
 to use logic to analyze mathematical reasoning or to establish
logic-based foundations of mathematics.[165] The latter was a
major concern in early 20th-century mathematical logic, which
pursued the program of logicism pioneered by philosopher-
logicians such as Gottlob Frege, Alfred North Whitehead, and
Bertrand Russell. Mathematical theories were supposed to be
logical tautologies, and their program was to show this by means
of a reduction of mathematics to logic. Many attempts to realize
this program failed, from the crippling of Frege's project in his
Grundgesetze by Russell's paradox, to the defeat of Hilbert's
program by Gödel's incompleteness theorems.[166]

Set theory originated in the study of the infinite by Georg Cantor,

and it has been the source of many of the most challenging and
Bertrand Russell made various important issues in mathematical logic. They include Cantor's
contributions to mathematical theorem, the status of the Axiom of Choice, the question of the
logic.[163]
independence of the continuum hypothesis, and the modern debate
on large cardinal axioms.[167]

Computability theory is the branch of mathematical logic that studies effective procedures to solve
calculation problems. One of its main goals is to understand whether it is possible to solve a given
problem using an algorithm. For instance, given a certain claim about the positive integers, it examines
whether an algorithm can be found to determine if this claim is true. Computability theory uses various
theoretical tools and models, such as Turing machines, to explore this type of issue.[168]

Computational logic
Computational logic is the branch of logic and computer science that studies how to implement
mathematical reasoning and logical formalisms using computers. This includes, for example, automatic
theorem provers, which employ rules of inference to construct a proof step by step from a set of premises
to the intended conclusion without human intervention.[169] Logic programming languages are designed
specifically to express facts using logical formulas and to draw inferences from these facts. For example,
Prolog is a logic programming language based on predicate logic.[170] Computer scientists also apply
concepts from logic to problems in computing. The works of Claude Shannon were influential in this
regard. He showed how Boolean logic can be used to understand and implement computer circuits.[171]
This can be achieved using electronic logic gates, i.e. electronic circuits with one or more inputs and
usually one output. The truth values of propositions are represented by voltage levels. In this way, logic
functions can be simulated by applying the corresponding voltages to the inputs of the circuit and
determining the value of the function by measuring the voltage of the output.[172]

Formal semantics of natural language

Formal semantics is a subfield of logic, linguistics, and the philosophy of language. The discipline of
semantics studies the meaning of language. Formal semantics uses formal tools from the fields of
symbolic logic and mathematics to give precise theories of the meaning of natural language expressions.
It understands meaning usually in relation to truth conditions, i.e. it examines in which situations a
sentence would be true or false. One of its central methodological assumptions is the principle of
compositionality. It states that the meaning of a complex
expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and how
they are combined. For example, the meaning of the verb phrase
"walk and sing" depends on the meanings of the individual
expressions "walk" and "sing". Many theories in formal semantics
rely on model theory. This means that they employ set theory to
construct a model and then interpret the meanings of expression in
relation to the elements in this model. For example, the term
"walk" may be interpreted as the set of all individuals in the model
that share the property of walking. Early influential theorists in
this field were Richard Montague and Barbara Partee, who
focused their analysis on the English language.[173]

Epistemology of logic
The epistemology of logic studies how one knows that an
argument is valid or that a proposition is logically true.[174] This Conjunction (AND) is one of the
basic operations of Boolean logic. It
includes questions like how to justify that modus ponens is a valid
can be electronically implemented in
rule of inference or that contradictions are false.[175] The several ways, for example, by using
traditionally dominant view is that this form of logical two transistors.
understanding belongs to knowledge a priori.[176] In this regard, it
is often argued that the mind has a special faculty to examine
relations between pure ideas and that this faculty is also responsible for apprehending logical truths.[177]
A similar approach understands the rules of logic in terms of linguistic conventions. On this view, the
laws of logic are trivial since they are true by definition: they just express the meanings of the logical
vocabulary.[178]

Some theorists, like Hilary Putnam and Penelope Maddy, object to the view that logic is knowable a
priori. They hold instead that logical truths depend on the empirical world. This is usually combined with
the claim that the laws of logic express universal regularities found in the structural features of the world.
According to this view, they may be explored by studying general patterns of the fundamental sciences.
For example, it has been argued that certain insights of quantum mechanics refute the principle of
distributivity in classical logic, which states that the formula is equivalent to
. This claim can be used as an empirical argument for the thesis that quantum logic
is the correct logical system and should replace classical logic.[179]

History
Logic was developed independently in several cultures during antiquity. One major early contributor was
Aristotle, who developed term logic in his Organon and Prior Analytics.[183] He was responsible for the
introduction of the hypothetical syllogism[184] and temporal modal logic.[185] Further innovations include
inductive logic[186] as well as the discussion of new logical concepts such as terms, predicables,
syllogisms, and propositions. Aristotelian logic was highly regarded in classical and medieval times, both
in Europe and the Middle East. It remained in wide use in the West until the early 19th century.[187] It has
now been superseded by later work, though many of its key insights are still present in modern systems of
logic.[188]
 Top row: Aristotle, who established the canon of western philosophy;[108] and Avicenna, who replaced
Aristotelian logic in Islamic discourse.[180] Bottom row: William of Ockham, a major figure of medieval
scholarly thought;[181] and Gottlob Frege, one of the founders of modern symbolic logic.[182]

Ibn Sina (Avicenna) was the founder of Avicennian logic, which replaced Aristotelian logic as the
dominant system of logic in the Islamic world.[189] It influenced Western medieval writers such as
Albertus Magnus and William of Ockham.[190] Ibn Sina wrote on the hypothetical syllogism[191] and on
the propositional calculus.[192] He developed an original "temporally modalized" syllogistic theory,
involving temporal logic and modal logic.[193] He also made use of inductive logic, such as his methods
of agreement, difference, and concomitant variation, which are critical to the scientific method.[191] Fakhr
al-Din al-Razi was another influential Muslim logician. He criticized Aristotelian syllogistics and
formulated an early system of inductive logic, foreshadowing the system of inductive logic developed by
John Stuart Mill.[194]

During the Middle Ages, many translations and interpretations of Aristotelian logic were made. The
works of Boethius were particularly influential. Besides translating Aristotle's work into Latin, he also
produced textbooks on logic.[195] Later, the works of Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Ibn
Rushd (Averroes) were drawn on. This expanded the range of ancient works available to medieval
Christian scholars since more Greek work was available to Muslim scholars that had been preserved in
Latin commentaries. In 1323, William of Ockham's influential Summa Logicae was released. It is a
comprehensive treatise on logic that discusses many basic concepts of logic and provides a systematic
exposition of types of propositions and their truth conditions.[196]
In Chinese philosophy, the School of Names and Mohism were particularly influential. The School of
Names focused on the use of language and on paradoxes. For example, Gongsun Long proposed the
white horse paradox, which defends the thesis that a white horse is not a horse. The school of Mohism
also acknowledged the importance of language for logic and tried to relate the ideas in these fields to the
realm of ethics.[197]

In India, the study of logic was primarily pursued by the schools of Nyaya, Buddhism, and Jainism. It
was not treated as a separate academic discipline and discussions of its topics usually happened in the
context of epistemology and theories of dialogue or argumentation.[198] In Nyaya, inference is understood
as a source of knowledge (pramāṇa). It follows the perception of an object and tries to arrive at
conclusions, for example, about the cause of this object.[199] A similar emphasis on the relation to
epistemology is also found in Buddhist and Jainist schools of logic, where inference is used to expand the
knowledge gained through other sources.[200] Some of the later theories of Nyaya, belonging to the
Navya-Nyāya school, resemble modern forms of logic, such as Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense
and reference and his definition of number.[201]

The syllogistic logic developed by Aristotle predominated in the West until the mid-19th century, when
interest in the foundations of mathematics stimulated the development of modern symbolic logic.[202]
Many see Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift as the birthplace of modern logic. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's
idea of a universal formal language is often considered a forerunner. Other pioneers were George Boole,
who invented Boolean algebra as a mathematical system of logic, and Charles Peirce, who developed the
logic of relatives. Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, in turn, condensed many of these
insights in their work Principia Mathematica. Modern logic introduced novel concepts, such as functions,
quantifiers, and relational predicates. A hallmark of modern symbolic logic is its use of formal language
to precisely codify its insights. In this regard, it departs from earlier logicians, who relied mainly on
natural language.[203] Of particular influence was the development of first-order logic, which is usually
treated as the standard system of modern logic.[204] Its analytical generality allowed the formalization of
mathematics and drove the investigation of set theory. It also made Alfred Tarski's approach to model
theory possible and provided the foundation of modern mathematical logic.[205]

See also

Philosophy portal
 Glossary of logic – List of definitions of terms and concepts used in logic
Outline of logic – Overview of and topical guide to logic
Critical thinking – Analysis of facts to form a judgment
List of logic journals
List of logic symbols – List of symbols used to express logical relations
List of logicians
Logic puzzle – Puzzle deriving from the mathematics field of deduction
Logical reasoning – Process of drawing correct inferences
Logos – Concept in philosophy, religion, rhetoric, and psychology
Vector logic

References

Notes
a. However, there are some forms of logic, like imperative logic, where this may not be the
case.[42]
b. Conductive arguments present reasons in favor of a conclusion without claiming that the
reasons are strong enough to decisively support the conclusion.

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