J Bus Ethics

DOI 10.1007/s10551-011-1130-4

Ethical Blindness
Guido Palazzo • Franciska Krings • Ulrich Hoffrage

Received: 1 June 2010 / Accepted: 22 November 2011

Abstract Many models of (un)ethical decision making improved our understanding of why, how, and under what
assume that people decide rationally and are in principle conditions individuals make ethical decisions—and when
able to evaluate their decisions from a moral point of view. they fail to do so. These models suggest that (un)ethical
However, people might behave unethically without being decisions are the result of an interplay between personal traits
aware of it. They are ethically blind. Adopting a sense- of the decision maker and characteristics of the situation
making approach, we argue that ethical blindness results (Trevino 1986). However, most research on ethical decision
from a complex interplay between individual sensemaking making still builds on the assumption that decisions are made
activities and context factors. by rational actors (see critically Sonenshein 2007). The
rationality assumption is displayed in several ways. Standing
Keywords Ethical decision-making
Ethical/unethical in the tradition of moral philosophy, business ethicists usually
behavior
Ethical fading
Moral disengagement
Bounded assume that there is a moral point of view from which the
awareness/ethicality
Rigid framing ethicality of a decision can be evaluated. They acknowledge
that the moral point of view can be interpreted differently,
depending on the specific background philosophy (e.g., the
Introduction Kantian duty approach versus the Utilitarian calculation). But
they share the assumption that there is an objective and
Business history is rich with examples of extreme forms of impartial yardstick that people can (and do) use to weigh
unethical behavior by and within companies. When these arguments and come to a decision (Hunt and Vitell 1986). For
cases are made public by traditional muckrakers like Upton example, Sharp-Paine (1997) suggested that managers use
Sinclair in the nineteenth century or today’s NGOs, by different philosophical lenses when making a decision—
internal whistle-blowers or official investigations, the reflecting on consequences (Utilitarian lens), principles
public is often shocked. It seems to be difficult to under- (Kantian lens) and objectives (economic lens)—to include as
stand how behaviors that seem to violate any moral com- many aspects as possible. In contrast, interactionist models
mon sense are possible. (Trevino 1986) question the assumption that managers sim-
During the last three decades, the business ethics literature ply take a Kantian or Utilitarian position, independently of
has developed sophisticated models that have considerably the context in which the decision is made. Indeed, context
factors can have an important impact on the decision-making
process. Nevertheless, even though person-situation models
G. Palazzo (&)
F. Krings
U. Hoffrage
have dropped the assumption that managers deliberate like
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne,
Internef, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland philosophers, they still conceive them as rational actors,
e-mail: [email protected] holding that ‘‘cognitive moral development is the critical
F. Krings element in the judgment phase’’ (Jones 1991, p. 371, see also
e-mail: [email protected] Sonenshein 2007).
U. Hoffrage Often, however, (un)ethical decision making is less
e-mail: [email protected] rational and deliberate but more intuitive and automatic

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

(Gigerenzer 2008; Haidt 2001; Reynolds 2006; Sonenshein is, evaluate the information from a normative viewpoint,
2007). As a consequence, the ethical dimension of a establish a moral intention and make an ethical decision.
decision is not necessarily visible to the decision maker. Butterfield et al. (2000) have demonstrated that the first
People may behave unethically without being aware of it— step, i.e., moral awareness, needs to be understood as a
they may even be convinced that they are doing the right social sensemaking process. Put differently, whether or not
thing. It is only later that they realize the unethical a person becomes aware of a decision’s ethical dimension
dimension of their decision. We call this state ethical depends on the sensemaking process unfolding within the
blindness: the decision maker’s temporary inability to see social group that the person is part of. We suggest that the
the ethical dimension of a decision at stake. sensemaking process leading to ethical blindness is based
How can ethical blindness be explained? Some recent on the interplay between a tendency toward rigid framing
accounts in the literature allude to this question. Tenb- and contextual pressures. Frames make us view the world
runsel and Messick (2004) argue that under specific cir- from one particular and thus necessarily limited perspec-
cumstances the ethical aspect of a decision fades away so tive. They have blind spots. The more rigidly people apply
that the decision maker gradually becomes unaware of it. specific frames when making decisions, the lower their
There are several triggers of ethical fading. One is the use ability to switch to another perspective. They are locked
of euphemistic language. Another one is pointed out by into one frame. We refer to this phenomenon as rigid
Chugh et al. (2005) who, in their work on bounded ethi- framing and describe it as the result of an interplay of
cality, analyze how the computational limits of the human individual sensemaking activities with proximal and distal
mind lead to the use of simple heuristics which might, in contextual factors. The proximal context of sensemaking
turn, give rise to unethical decisions beyond the decision includes situational as well as organizational factors, while
maker’s awareness. Bandura (1999, 2002) argues that the distal context describes the overarching institutional
unethical decisions are promoted by disengaging from the context in which individual and organizational actors are
decision’s moral dimension. He illustrates how moral dis- embedded. As outlined below, ethical blindness is the
engagement is driven by individual, situational and insti- result of a complex interplay between sensemaking activ-
tutional forces. We build on and extend the above- ities and context pressures that unfold over time. As such,
mentioned accounts of ethical decision making in two the phenomenon only occurs given a particular constella-
ways: Firstly, we propose a theoretical model that con- tion of framing tendencies and contextual influences.
ceptualizes the interplay of psychological and sociological Nevertheless, its consequences can be substantial.
forces on three analytical levels, namely the individual In the following, we first describe the phenomenon of
sensemaking, the decision-making situation and the ideo- ethical blindness and explain how it can result from rigid
logical context, carving out specific constellations that framing. Then we explain how framing interacts with
make ethical blindness more or less probable. The debate proximal and distal context pressures. We subsequently
in previous accounts has mainly focused on psychological highlight the temporal dynamics behind the phenomenon.
forces and aspects of the immediate context. The institu- Finally, we conclude with some reflections on the descrip-
tional context in which individuals and their organizations tive and normative dimensions of ethical blindness.
are embedded has, so far, been neglected or discussed
separately from the psychological analysis. Secondly,
many authors underline that unethical decision making can What is Ethical Blindness?
only be understood as the result of a process that unfolds
over time (den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein 2008; Fleming Recent discussions on ‘‘bounded awareness’’ (Chugh and
and Zyglidopoulos 2008; McDevitt et al. 2007). However, Bazerman 2007) and ‘‘bounded ethicality’’ (Chugh et al.
the notion of time and its mechanisms has not been 2005) highlight the fact that people can make decisions that
developed further yet. Our model discusses the role of time run counter to their own values and principles, without
in more detail, drawing on research on the temporal aspects being aware of it. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
of decision making. ethical dimensions might indeed escape decision maker’s
We position our model in the context of constructivism, attention. For instance, in reflecting upon his own role in
explaining ethical blindness as the result of a sensemaking the Ford Pinto case, Gioia (1992, p. 383) asked himself:
process. Ethical decision making unfolds in four steps, ‘‘Why didn’t I see the gravity of the problem and its ethical
starting with moral awareness (Rest 1986): Whether or not overtones?’’ In a similar vein, one of the guards taking part
people make ethical decisions depends on their ability to in the classic Stanford prison experiment reported after the
process and encode incoming information in moral cate- experiment: ‘‘While I was doing it, I didn’t feel any regret,
gories. If a person is not aware of the moral dimension of a I didn’t feel any guilt. It was only afterwards, when I began
decision at stake, she can not proceed to the next steps, that to reflect on what I had done, that this behavior began to

123
Ethical Blindness

dawn on me’’ (Zimbardo 2007, p. 158). Also in the most Ethical blindness is in line with recent models that
extreme forms of harm doing, mass murder for instance, underline the automatic, intuitive or unconscious compo-
the phenomenon of blindness can be observed. Browning nents of ethical decision making (e.g., Sonenshein 2007).
(2001, p. 72) cites a German policeman participating in the Those models challenge the idea that an ethical decision is
genocide in Poland and Russia in the early 1940s: the result of a deliberative and rational decision-making
‘‘Truthfully I must say that at the time we didn’t reflect process where people weigh alternative options against
about it at all. Only years later did any of us become truly their own values, general principles, and the potential
conscious of what had happened then. Only later did it first consequences for important others or the world in general
occur to me that [it] had not been right.’’ (Jones 1991; Kohlberg 1969; Rest 1986), pragmatically
Formally, ethical blindness can be defined as the tem- applying appropriate combinations of Kantian principles
porary inability of a decision maker to see the ethical and Utilitarian calculations (Hare 1981; Sharp-Paine 1997).
dimension of a decision at stake. The phenomenon can be According to the rational actor view, even a person who
understood along three aspects. First, it builds on the opts for an unethical decision knows (at least in principle)
assumption that people deviate from their own values and the difference between right and wrong in a given situation.
principles. These values and principles are part of their She just weighs positive and negative incentives against
identity and they have tried to live up to them in the past. personal interests and sees more advantages in the uneth-
Ethical blindness refers to the fact that ‘‘good people behave ical decision (Ashkanasy et al. 2006; Becker 1968). Recent
in pathological ways that are alien to their nature’’ (Zim- models questioning these assumptions refer to intuition
bardo 2007, p. 195; see also Bandura 2002). It results from (Haidt 2001), sensemaking (Sonenshein 2007), neurocog-
people’s inability to access ethical values or prototypes nitive processes (Reynolds 2006) or heuristics (Gigerenzer
(Reynolds 2006) that, in principle, are available to them. 2008, 2009) instead. Frames, schemas, prototypes, and
Second, ethical blindness is context-bound and thus a tem- their related concepts are indispensable building blocks of
porary state. It describes a psychological state of people our cognitive system, guiding our perceptions and under-
with normal (or even high) levels of integrity and the ability standing of the world. However, as we argue further below,
for moral reasoning. But for some reasons (often related to frames bear some inherent risks because they tend to have
the situation, as we outline further below), they are not able blind spots and they can be applied in a more or less rigid
to use these capacities when making the decision. However, manner. As a consequence, the ethical dimension of a
when the situation changes, they are likely to return to decision may be difficult to identify for the actor. More-
practicing their original values and principles. This charac- over, specific ways in which frames or schemata are used
teristic is well illustrated by the fact that the perpetrators may be reinforced by aspects of the context which, in turn,
might be surprised or even shocked by their own behavior may further increase the risk of ethical blindness. The
once the context has changed (Gioia 1992; Chugh and model proposed in this article shows how specific inter-
Bazerman 2007). This sentiment indicates that under dif- actions between the tendency toward rigid framing and
ferent circumstances, those people may have been able and situational or institutional pressures are especially likely to
willing to make a more ethical decision. Third, ethical give rise to ethical blindness. In what follows, we first
blindness is unconscious. People who are ethically blind are introduce the concept of rigid framing and then outline the
not aware of the fact that they deviate from their values and/ model in more detail.
or that they cannot and do not access those values when
making a decision. This aspect has also been observed by
Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) who examine it as a Rigid Framing and Ethical Blindness
state of ‘‘unintended unethicality’’. As we argue further
below, ethical blindness results from the co-evolution and Research in (neo)institutional theory (DiMaggio and
mutual transformation of sensemaking and contextual for- Powell 1983) and sensemaking (Weick 1995) show that
ces. At the beginning of the transformation process, people individuals construct and enact the reality in which they
often sense that something is wrong. They feel tensions operate. These constructionist approaches have been lar-
between the implications of their decision and their own gely neglected in the business ethics literature (Sonenshein
personal values. However, under certain conditions (i.e., a 2007) but are, in our view, particularly useful to explain
specific constellation of context pressures), as time goes by, ethical blindness (Werhane et al. 2011).
sensemaking becomes more and more narrow and rigid, According to the constructionist view (Berger and
tensions become less and less intense, and ethical concerns Luckmann 1966; Weick 1995), individuals act upon frames
start to fade away (Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004). This that they develop while interacting with their environment
process continues, in small steps, until the person loses sight (Ring and Rands 1989). Frames are ‘‘mental structures that
of the ethical dimension. She becomes ethically blind. simplify and guide our understanding of a complex reality’’

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

(Russo and Schoemaker 2004, p. 21) or, similarly, cogni- can also be constructed as a ‘‘web of moral relationships’’
tive frameworks ‘‘that people use to impose structure upon (Werhane 1999, p. 6). Or the same phenomenon may be
information, situations, and expectations to facilitate perceived by managers as ‘‘the end of an old and inefficient
understanding’’ (Gioia 1992, p. 385). Frames make us view industry’’, whereas local stakeholders would see ‘‘families
the world from one particular and thus necessarily limited uprooted and lives destroyed’’ (Oestreich 2002, p. 215).
perspective. They filter what we see and how we see it. Similarly, Wheeler et al. (2002) argued that Shell’s prob-
These filters function as vocabularies ‘‘in which words that lems in dealing with the critique and pressure of the Ogoni
are more abstract (frames) include and point to other less people in Nigeria over environmental pollution can partly
abstract words (cues)’’ (Weick 1995, p. 110). In the process be explained by a clash between the company’s scientific,
of sensemaking, people pull from several vocabularies that technical rationale and the Ogoni’s more spiritual, cultural
are mainly shaped by the dominating ideology of their understanding of the environment.
society, by the organizations they work for, and by their Typically, frames are exclusive, in the sense that we use
professional education (Weick 1995). As a result, frames only one frame at a time. As optical illusions such as
promote particular problem definitions, causal relations Rubin’s vase demonstrate, we can have one interpretation
between phenomena, normative evaluations and recom- (e.g., two bright faces looking at each other in front of a
mendations for action (Entman 1993). dark background, with the edges being seen as part of the
Frames develop through socialization processes where faces) or another interpretation (e.g., a dark vase in front of
stimuli and social phenomena are filtered repeatedly in a a bright background, with the edges being seen as part of
specific way. In using these frames, often in an automatic the vase), but we cannot adapt both views simultaneously
fashion, people make sense ‘‘by seeing a world on which (Driver and Baylis 1996). Being locked in one frame
they already imposed what they believe’’ (Weick 1995, (Schoemaker and Russo 2001) and not being able to switch
p. 15). Frames guide how information is processed, con- to a different frame is what we refer to as rigid framing.
trolling what information is attended to and, just as Rigid framing seriously impairs a person’s ability to see a
important, what is obscured. Frames are indispensable. more complete or richer picture of the world. As a result,
Without these mental structures, we would not be able to people might create a particulate rationality (Welzer 2005)
perceive and understand a complex situation. However, in which they behave on the basis of a narrow and self-
frames have blind spots, because they impose ‘‘mental referentially closed concept of reality. Through collective
boundaries on options’’ (Schoemaker and Russo 2001, interpretations, people in an organization may develop ‘‘a
p. 137). Blind spots in attention and perception have been moral microcosmos that likely could not survive outside
widely demonstrated in cognitive psychology (Neisser the organization’’ (Brief et al. 2000a, p. 484; see also
1979; Chabris and Simons 2010). People sometimes fail to Ashforth and Anand 2003). Nevertheless, they believe that
perceive relevant things going on in front of their eyes—a they ‘‘have the complete picture’’ (Schoemaker and Russo
phenomenon that Mack and Rock (1998) have called ‘‘in- 2001, p. 140) and ignore any information that cannot be
attentional blindness’’. Social psychology is also rich with captured by the initially used frame (Lakoff 2004). As a
examples that demonstrate how mental preconceptions consequence, a decision that may look irrational, unethical,
such as stereotypes bias our perceptions, often uncon- and pathological from outside the microcosmos may be
sciously (Fiske 1998). Research in personality psychology considered rational, ethical, and normal from the inside.
further demonstrates how individual differences in, for Thus, unethical practice may appear as normal routine
example, morality influence cognition (Narvaez et al. when perceived through the lens of the sensemaker (Brief
2006). In management research, the phenomenon has been et al. 2000a, b; Punch 1996).
covered as well (e.g., Dearborn and Simon 1958; Zajac and Rigid framing makes it difficult to transcend a specific
Bazerman 1991). For instance, Zahra and Couples (1993) view on the world and adopt another, different frame. As a
have demonstrated the impact of blind spots in competitive consequence, it prevents people from compensating for the
analysis. Recently, Ng et al. (2009) discussed blind spots in frame’s blind spots and from developing a deeper under-
the way corporations perceive their value chain. standing of the situation. People risk losing the ‘‘functional
By masking some elements and highlighting others, utility’’ of their representation of the world (Walsh 1995,
frames make people blind to some aspects of a problem. p. 303). Conversely, using a repertoire of frames (i.e.,
Those blind spots can only be detected when looking at the applying multiple frames, Schoemaker and Russo 2001),
problem from a different perspective, that is, by using a allows one to (consciously or unconsciously) alternate
different frame. Another consequence of blind spots is that, between them when analyzing a problem. As a result, more
depending on the frames people use, they may hold meanings can be extracted from a situation (Weick 1995).
opposing views of the very same situation. For instance, A problem can be viewed from multiple perspectives, using
what is perceived as a ‘‘web of economic relationships’’ different frames (e.g., from an economic, a legal, an

123
Ethical Blindness

administrative, a technical, and an ethical perspective). Sensemaking in Context: The Interplay Between
Even though it is not possible to adopt different frames at Framing and Contextual Factors
the same time, it is possible to employ them in a sequential
fashion. Ideally, the insights gained from this sequential In line with the person–situation interactionist model of
process are later structured and integrated (e.g., by ethical decision making (Trevino 1986), we assume that
assigning priorities) into a well-balanced and well-elabo- framing interacts with context factors. Sensemaking
rated decision: ‘‘The greater the variety of beliefs in a depends on the surrounding context, specifically on context
repertoire, the more fully should any situation be seen, the factors that can amplify or attenuate a specific way in
more solutions that should be identified, and the more which a frame is used. Most research following the inter-
likely it should be that someone knows a great deal about actionist tradition only considers aspects of the organiza-
what is happening’’ (Weick 1995, p. 87). tion and the immediate situation. We distinguish between a
In sum, we suggest that rigid framing is related to proximal and a distal context and discuss them further
(dangerously) narrow and limited sensemaking. Ethical below in separate sections. Proximal context comprises the
blindness may thus result from framing a decision making organization as well as the immediate decision making
situation in a too rigid manner. For example, key (implicit) situation. Distal context refers to the overarching institu-
assumptions of rigid economic, legal and scientific framing tional constellation in which the organization and indi-
are that profit maximization is inherently moral, that laws vidual actors are embedded. The impact of institutions on
are the only moral limit to profits and that scientific ethical or unethical decision making has received little
expertise should prevail over the concerns of affected attention (Misangyi et al. 2008) but is likely to have an
laypersons, respectively. People who use those frames do important influence on the construction and use of frames
not necessarily make unethical decisions. However, using and thus on ethical blindness. In what follows, we outline
these frames rigidly increases the probability that people the basic mechanisms of the sensemaking model to account
don’t see the ethical dimension of their decision (Tenb- for ethical blindness, together with empirical evidence and
runsel and Messick 2004). In line with this argument, business examples illustrating the proposed interaction
Punch (1996) explained some managers’ unethical deci- between context pressures and rigid framing.
sions by the fact that they are dominated by an economic As Weick (2005) pointed out, people do not engage in
frame upon which they automatically draw, blinding them sensemaking starting from scratch, but by building on
for other perspectives. The same may be true for using previous experiences that have shaped their way of per-
ethical frames too rigidly. For example, it has been dem- ceiving the world. Our model (see Fig. 1) begins with an
onstrated that Christian fundamentalists react with strong individual sensemaking process that tends to be dominated
outrage to those who, in their view, violate sacred values by a specific frame; that is, a person’s perception is char-
(Tetlock et al. 2000). acterized by a certain degree of rigidity in framing. As a

Individual sensemaking: interacting with Proximal context:

in concert with in opposition to

Distal context: Distal context:

in concert with in opposition to in concert with in opposition to

Risk of rigid framing: high moderate moderate low

Risk of ethical blindness: high moderate moderate low

Fig. 1 Sensemaking model of ethical blindness

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

consequence, she tends to see only certain aspects of the assume that flexible framing bears a lower risk for ethical
situation and neglects others. She does not look at the blindness from the outset and that in this case, the risk of
situation from different angles (i.e., apply different ethical blindness would be higher only under extreme
frames), running the risk of staying locked into one frame. external pressures.
Sensemaking is always embedded in context. As a Second, our approach builds on the assumption that a
consequence, during the sensemaking process, the person is decision maker is not necessarily aware of the ethical
confronted with a series of external pressures that are part dimension of a decision. We do not question the notion of
of her context and relevant for her decision. Those pres- intentional unethicality as unethical decisions might indeed
sures are part of proximal (organizational and situational result from the calculation of profits over risks by self-
pressures) or distal context (institutional pressures). interested but nonetheless rational people (Becker 1968).
Importantly, context pressures do not necessarily increase However, our argument is that under a certain constellation
the probability of ethical blindness. Some pressures are in of proximal and distal context pressures that unfold over
concert with a frame and thus reinforce initial framing time (see below), even intentional or conscious thinking
tendencies. Other pressures may be in opposition to the processes might morph into unconscious processes, bearing
applied frame, questioning its validity, thus weakening the risk of ethical blindness. A decision maker might loose
initial framing tendencies and increasing the probability of sight of his or her initial transactional considerations and
flexible framing. Hence, the risk of ethical blindness is might start to believe in his or her own rationalizations
high, moderate, or low, depending on the nature of the (Ashforth and Anand 2003). Doubtful business practices
interplay (in concert or in opposition; see Fig. 1) between can be normalized and habitualized through routine (Mis-
context forces and framing. The model further shows that angyi et al. 2008). We argue that there are numerous cases
the probability of rigid sensemaking and ethical blindness of unethical behavior that do not easily fit the rationality
varies, depending on the contextual constellation in which mold and are better explained by a sensemaking process
the sensemaking takes place. A high risk situation could, that leads to ethical blindness.
for instance, be imagined as follows (see the far left path of Third, because we describe ethical blindness as the
the model in Fig. 1): People with classical business school result of a sensemaking process based on interactions
training might work in an organization that encourages between framing and context factors, a note on the role of
them to mainly focus on profits when making decisions individual differences seems warranted, for instance, with
(e.g., by turning managers into deal makers). Additionally, respect to personality. Personality traits are a set of rela-
situational forces such as group pressure within a depart- tively stable dimensions of behavioral tendencies, provid-
ment make it difficult for them to develop alternative ing a draft of an individual’s typical pattern of behavior,
sensemaking options. If the organization is additionally thoughts and feelings (McAdams 2009). As such, the role
embedded in an institutional context that is dominated by of personality for ethical decision making is two-fold: First,
free market ideology with a strong focus on deregulation, it has a direct impact on ethical decision making, inde-
the probability of rigid framing is high. It is interesting to pendently of context. For example, personality traits rela-
see that exactly these conditions were met at Enron before ted to an increased experience of negative emotions (e.g.,
the whole system that was built up there collapsed (Sims neuroticism, negative affectivity, trait anger) are related to
and Brinkmann 2003), lending support to our model’s engaging more frequently in counterproductive work
claim that a rigid framing can lead to ethical blindness, behaviors such as stealing or aggression (Berry et al. 2007;
which in turn increases the risk of unethical behavior. Fox et al. 2001). However, these direct effects are typically
Before describing the mechanisms and empirical not large and there is considerable variance. The second
evidence in more detail, three notes on the model are role of personality seems more promising and more perti-
warranted. First, the model starts out with a specific nent for our sensemaking model: personality influences the
sensemaking process, namely one that is already charac- way people construe situations and thus how they react to
terized by the dominance of a single frame. Rigid framing them. For example, the social-cognitive model of the moral
may be the result of a socialization process and/or a con- personality suggests that individual differences in morality
sequence of an overwhelming situational constellation (i.e., are due to differences in chronic availability and accessi-
the situation strongly suggests the rigid use of one partic- bility of moral constructs in social information-processing
ular frame in most people; Reynolds et al. 2010). We return (Lapsley and Narvaez 2004; Narvaez et al. 2006). Put
to these points when we describe the evolution of the differently, people high in morality are more likely to have
outlined processes over time. At this point, we acknowl- moral schematas, scripts, or protoypes readily available
edge that sensemaking is not always characterized by rigid and presumably even chronically activated. Hence, indi-
framing but that a person may apply different frames in a vidual differences in morality colour perceptions and
flexible, sequential fashion, as described earlier. We interpretations of a given situation go along with different

123
Ethical Blindness

probabilities and intensities with which moral frames are Another example of the impact of organizational context is
used. Further, personality may moderate how people react the tendency of some corporations (especially of those that
to a given situation, rendering certain behaviors more operate in high-tech markets) to create a culture of objectivity
likely than others. For example, people high in trait anger that strongly encourages the use of scientific rationalism as
react more strongly (i.e., with more negative emotions) to the dominant frame. Decisions have to rely on ‘‘’hard’,
negative events at work than people low in trait anger. As a quantitative data and analysis’’ (Feldman 2004, p. 698). As
consequence, they are more likely to engage in workplace Feldman (2004) argued regarding the NASA space shuttle
aggression when feeling unfairly treated (Fox et al. 2001). disasters, the narrow scientific frame reduced the range of
Taken together, we acknowledge that stable individual legitimate arguments and undermined the sensitivity to the
differences may have both direct and indirect effects but moral values and concerns that could have been relevant for
put more emphasis on indirect effects when describing our the decision. Here, ethical blindness can be amplified by
model below. organizational routines (Brief et al. 2000a, b; Gioia 1992;
Vaughan 1996; March 1981; Perrow 1986) which tend to
Interactions Between Framing and Proximal Context overemphasize technical rationality thereby providing actors
with a specialized and precise language (Steffy and Grimes
The attention of decision-makers is always situated, that is, 1986). The low variety provided by that language makes it
placed in the context of organizational routines (Ocasio easier to navigate in routinized situations but turns into a risk
1997; March 1988; Argyris and Schön 1978). Routines tend when the environmental conditions change significantly
to reinforce existing world perceptions, whether they are still (Miles and Snow 1994; Perrow 1986) and when it would be
appropriate or not. As a result, knowledge routines that were better to ‘‘drop your tools’’ (Weick 1996).
core capabilities can turn into ‘‘core rigidities’’ (Leonard- Aspects of the immediate situation may further reinforce
Barton 1992). Overall, as Miller (1993, p. 117) has argued, rigid framing and thus increase the risk of ethical blind-
organizations, especially if they are successful, tend toward ness. Some situations are so powerful that they elicit a
an ‘‘architecture of simplicity’’ which manifests in more specific behavior in many people, independently of inten-
narrow and ‘‘increasingly homogeneous managerial ‘lenses’ tions, level of moral development, values or reasoning.
or world views’’. Thus, the organizational context has an Research on the influence of authority is a good illustration
important impact on the use of frames. Individuals, teams of the pervasive impact of a strong situation (Ashforth and
and communities that cooperate within organizations Anand 2003; Brief et al. 1995; Brief 2000a). Many people
determine to a certain degree individual framing activities are willing to engage in unethical behavior if they are
(Foldy et al. 2008; Smircich and Stubbart 1985). For asked to do so by legitimate authority figures (Milgram
example, organizations that promote aggressive competition 1974; Blass 1991; Burger 2009; Werhane et al. 2011). For
are likely to support rigid and narrow world perceptions instance, managers are willing to discriminate against
among their members, by reinforcing the dominant use of a Blacks or foreigners in hiring processes when asked to do
frame that divides the world into ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’. Com- so by their superiors (Brief et al. 1995; Petersen and Dietz
petition between groups or teams over scarce resources such 2000). This behavior could in particular be observed when
as wealth or recognition has been repeatedly shown to give managers were high in prejudice (Petersen and Dietz
rise to unethical behavior that includes hostility and dero- 2005), lending further support to the assumption that con-
gating members of other groups (Esses et al. 2005; Sherif text pressure may indeed reinforce initial rigid framing
et al. 1961). if they are in concert with the frame (see Fig. 1; upper
Similar processes can be observed in the corporate world. half, left path), in this case, with the prejudices (of some
For example, in his analysis of the Pinto case, Gioia (1992) managers). Only strong organizational pressures (e.g.,
pointed out that there was a strong ‘‘us versus them’’ culture establishing strong organizational sanctions when employ-
in the corporation, where Ford insiders perceived them- ees breach the organization’s codes of conduct) can break
selves as acting in a hostile political and media environment. this influence of organizational authorities (Petersen and
Clinard and Yeager (1980) showed that in the 1970s, Krings 2009), indicating that context pressures that run
transgressions in some industries were closely linked to the counter to initial framing may indeed reduce the risk of
feeling of being over-regulated by people from outside who ethical blindness (see Fig. 1; upper half, right path). Con-
have no clue of their industry. Jackall (1988, p. 147) talks versely, certain people resist extreme authority pressures to
about managers’ feelings of ‘‘beleaguerment’’ as if they behave unethically (e.g., in Milgram’s experiments; Packer
were ‘‘under siege’’. Strong distinctions between ‘‘us’’ and 2008), demonstrating that they may have applied a strong
‘‘them’’ are typical for cohesive teams and important ele- ethical frame that ran counter to the forces operating within
ments of groupthink, that is, a mode of thinking that leads to the environment, ultimately reducing the risk of ethical
biased group decision making (Janis 1972). blindness.

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

Peer or majority pressure is another situational factor isomorphic pressures on individual and organizational
influencing framing, especially in organizational contexts actors to follow established practices and interpretations
with strong cultural conformity. Toffler (2003) described in (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Institutionalized norms and
her analysis of the collapse of Arthur Andersen how the practices reduce uncertainty and threat because they embed
company tried to transform business school graduates into the interaction between individuals and organizations in a
highly interchangeable ‘‘Androids’’ by imposing on them shared context of stable mutual expectations.
the ‘‘Arthur Andersen way’’, a set of strong social norms. In a pluralistic societal context, there are various com-
The seminal work of Ash (1955) showed that the mere peting institutional logics (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006;
existence of an opinion that is shared by a majority of the Friedland and Alford 1991), offering a multiplicity of
members within a group has a strong impact on individual interpretation schemes from which individuals and orga-
judgments. In situations with a strong majority norm, nizations can draw (Denis et al. 2007; Kraatz and Block
individuals adapt their opinions and behaviors to those of 2008). However, sets of beliefs can also unfold a hege-
the majority. Interestingly, it is not necessary that the monic domination within society (Gramsci 1971), thereby
majority exerts pressure to attain compliance. Conforming turning a specific interpretation of the world into an
to socially shared group norms satisfies some of the most objective unquestioned discourse (Foucault 1980). Reality
basic human drives, namely the desire to belong and the is then represented in schematic, efficient, but ‘‘reductive
need to maintain a positive self-concept (Baumeister and categories’’ (Said 1994, p. 239). Depending on the applied
Leary 1995). The need to satisfy those desires through institutional logics, actors might dispose of a more or less
conformity may be stronger in some organizational cul- pluralistic and a more or less narrow interpretation of
tures than in others. If this mechanism is encouraged by the reality (Lakoff 2004; Tetlock 2000).
organizational culture (as at Arthur Andersen), it may As a result of strong institutional logics, frame rigidity
reinforce initial framing (at Arthur Andersen, the dominant of individual actors might be reinforced and ethical
economic frame coming from business school education), blindness becomes more probable (see Fig. 1; far left path
ultimately making people blind to the fact that conforming of the model). Punch (1996) has argued that a strong anti-
with the majority may sometimes lead to unethical government and anti-regulation ideology can provide the
decisions. rationalization for significant rule-breaking. As others have
Finally, time pressure is another powerful situational argued, the persistence of corruption can be interpreted as a
factor that affects individual framing (Sonenshein 2007). It result of institutional logics that reinforce certain behav-
constrains cognitive resources and effort, leads people to ioral standards as taken for granted and normal (Misangyi
use more simple decision strategies (Rieskamp and Hof- et al. 2008). Or, the atrocities at Abu Ghraib can be partly
frage 2008) and has a stronger influence on behavior than explained by powerful institutional norms, manifesting in
personality does when it comes, for instance, to helping governmental and military practice to condone or explicitly
others who are in distress (Darley and Batson 1973). Given support certain torture practices in the Iraq war (Zimbardo
that managerial decisions are often time sensitive, man- 2007). In a similar vein, interpretations of the Ford Pinto
agers normally favor speed over accuracy when making scandal have been criticized as being dominated too much
sense of the world (Weick 1995), which, in turn, might by the organizational perspective, neglecting the fact that
foster the use of more rigid frames. the behavior of Ford was appropriately reflecting the
demands of the institutional standards and norms in which
Interactions Between Framing and Distal Context the automotive industry was embedded: ‘‘Established
safety priorities, supplemented by long-standing industry
Apart from aspects of the specific organizational context norms and a change-resistant legal culture, helped define
and the immediate situation, sensemaking activities are possible fuel tank ruptures as socially legitimate acceptable
influenced by the societal institutions that build the over- norms’’ (Lee and Ermann 1999, p. 32).
arching distal context of social praxis (Callon 2007). If Powerful constellations of institutional entities such as
strong institutional norms are in line with the frame applied the free market and related institutional practices such as
in a decision, they will tend to increase the rigidity of the specific industry standards can provide the ideological
actor’s sensemaking efforts (see Fig. 1, lower half). Insti- support for a rigid economic framing of a decision. Trice
tutions can be defined as ‘‘a reciprocal typification of and Beyer (1993; see also Weick 1995) have described
habitualized action’’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 54) or ideology as structured simplifications. Such simplifications
as ‘‘shared definitions or meanings’’ (Tolbert and Zucker are conveyed in business school education, thereby influ-
1996, p. 180). They provide the resources that actors use encing how management students frame decisions. For
when constructing their frames of world perception. Strong instance, it has been shown that business school education
institutions create strong belief systems. They impose increases students’ focus on self-interests (Marwell and

123
Ethical Blindness

Ames 1981). In the light of the recent wave of business and Zyglidopoulos 2008; McDevitt et al. 2007). For
scandals, there has been a critical discussion on the link example, Jones’ model explicitly refers to ‘‘single-event
between mental models students learn at business schools moral decision making and eliminates elements that may
and their decisions later on as managers in organizations shape moral decision making over time’’ (Jones 1991,
(Ferraro et al. 2005; Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Khurana p. 380). While this and similar interactionist models are
2007; Mintzberg 2004). Note that we do not argue that doubtlessly able to account for many instances of unethical
ethical blindness is exclusively linked to rigid economic decisions, recent empirical studies and theorizing explicitly
framing. Instead, we posit that using any frame, including conceptualize unethical decisions as the result of a process
ethical frames in a rigid manner, increases the risk of that unfolds over time (e.g., Bandura 1999; Brief et al.
ethical blindness, given a specific context (just consider 2000a, b; Chugh et al. 2005; Tenbrunsel and Messick
how many people have been killed for religious reasons). 2004). The fact that many decisions become routinized
Many of our arguments and examples refer to economic illustrates that time must play a key role in the under-
framing simply because we focus on decision making in standing of ethical blindness.
corporations. While there seems to be a consensus on the relevance of
Since there is a strong tendency to defend, protect and time for understanding (un)ethical decision making, the
enact the (learnt) norms and practices of one’s society, temporal dynamics have not yet been analyzed or con-
actors living in a free market system, especially those who ceptualized in detail. In what follows, we discuss the
strive for a career in business, tend to perceive common impact of time along the two building blocks of our model,
business practices and market-driven procedures and out- framing and context.
comes as fair, legitimate and morally just (Jost et al. 2003).
‘‘As a result of the increasing dominance of fair market Framing and Time
ideology, other ways of reasoning, other logical schemas,
and other values are unlikely to be seriously considered, Brief et al. (2000a, b) described how newcomers in a
even if they would be preferable on moral grounds’’ (Jost deviant organizational culture might first reluctantly accept
et al. 2003, p. 80). The situational cues of a business setting the wrongdoing but then gradually, over time, might
might thus tend to reinforce the economic frame of the free internalize and even embrace the values and beliefs linked
market ideology and suppress alternative frames (Frederick to the wrongdoing. Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) intro-
and Hoffman 1995; Jackall 1988). A key assumption of duced the term of ethical fading to describe a process in
free market ideology is the strict separation of market which filters of world perception become more and more
activities from other social forms of interaction (Gonin narrow. Over time, the probability that people see ethical
et al. 2012). The market coordinates free and self-interested colors in their decision decreases and thus the risk of eth-
individuals and automatically transforms their egoistic ical blindness increases. Such a process of slow and
interactions into a common good. It is thus not necessary, incremental change (Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004;
and even counterproductive, to apply criteria other than Vaughan 1996) can be understood as a sequence of small
economic ones when making decisions in corporations transgressions—as a former Enron executive stated: ‘‘You
(Friedman 1970; Jensen 2002). As a result, managers tend did it once, it smelled bad,… you did it again, it didn’t
to amoralize even genuine ethical topics such as the sus- smell as bad’’ (McLean and Elkind 2003, p. 128). How can
tainability practices of their corporation (Crane 2000), this process be explained? What drives the temporal
feeling the obligation to reframe their private ethical con- dynamic toward ethical blindness? To find answers to this
cerns into a public economic language (Ashforth and question, we draw on four concepts that have been mainly
Anand 2003; Sonenshein 2006). discussed in psychological research: temporal construal
theory, the concept of just-noticeable-differences, hindsight
bias, and the phenomenon of escalation of commitment.
The Impact of Time on Ethical Blindness
Temporal Construal Theory
We have described ethical blindness as the result of the
interaction between framing and (proximal and distal) Trope and Liberman (2000, 2003) demonstrated that peo-
context. Previous accounts of unethical decision making ple construe situations differently depending on how tem-
that we built on provided various building blocks for our porally close they are to the situation. It is easier to make
model. Many of these accounts also emphasized that time demanding but abstract ethical commitments for one’s
plays a crucial role in unethical decision making. Various future behavior than specific commitments for one’s cur-
scholars have criticized models of ethical decision as being rent behavior. Believing that we can change our behavior
too static (den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein 2008; Fleming later might actually keep us from changing it now.

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

Focusing on the temporal relation between decisions and individuals, under pressure, to take small steps along a
their consequences, the philosopher Hans Jonas argued that continuum that ends with evildoing. Each step is so small
a large temporal distance between the two has a negative as to be essentially continuous with previous ones; after
impact on the morality of the decision. People have diffi- each step, the individual is positioned to take the next one’’
culties seeing or imagining consequences that are tempo- (Darley 1992, pp. 208, 210, cited in Brief et al. 2000a, b).
rally distant. If they try imagining these consequences, they
are so abstract and speculative that people cannot emo- Hindsight Bias
tionally connect to them. Arendt (1963) described this as a
lack of moral imagination. Hence, in this case, knowledge The fact that the process of incremental change remains
about the consequences does not lead to behavioral chan- unnoticed is strengthened by a phenomenon well-known in
ges (Jonas 1985). If the temporal lag between a decision memory research, namely the hindsight bias (Hoffrage and
and its consequences is large, ethical blindness becomes Pohl 2003; Blank et al. 2007). If people hear about the
more likely. outcome of a story, they tend to think they knew it all
along. Moreover, their memories on what they themselves
Just-Noticeable-Differences predicted prior to receiving outcome information are also
systematically shifted toward the outcome information.
The difference between two subsequent decisions over When attempting to reconstruct events, people engage in
time might give some insight into the temporal dynamics ‘‘‘rejudging’ the outcome’’ (Hawkins and Hastie 1990,
underlying ethical blindness. Because change occurs at a p. 321). Such reconstruction attempts, however, are sys-
slow pace and often on a small scale, one small step after tematically distorted by outcome knowledge (Pohl et al.
the other, each often below a just-noticeable difference, it 2003; Hoffrage et al. 2000). Similarly, autobiographical
may remain unnoticed (Hoffrage 2011). The concept of a memories of past events are often adjusted to more recent
just-noticeable-difference (Gescheider 1985) refers to the information, eliminating inconsistencies, so that, ulti-
smallest difference between two stimuli that a person is mately, events form a coherent story (Mazzoni and Van-
able to notice. If one holds a 30 g weight in one hand and a nucci 2007). To the extent that memories of past beliefs
40 g weight in the other, it is quite easy to tell which one is and behaviors are systematically distorted toward current
heavier. In contrast, comparing 30 g and 31 g is a much beliefs and behaviors, changes over time remain unnoticed.
harder task for most people. While a 10 g difference is
clearly above the noticeability threshold, 1 g is below. The Escalation of Commitment
Weber–Fechner law (Gescheider 1985) describes that the
just-noticeable difference is not absolute but depends on a The progression in small steps is propelled by a phenom-
reference system, and, in fact, a 10 g difference can no enon described as the escalation of commitment (Arkes and
longer be noticed when comparing a weight of 930 g to one Blumer 1985; Staw 1976). People tend to continue a course
of 940 g. In a process of behavioral change that evolves of action once it is taken, even if their former decisions turn
over time, the point of reference for a decision is not an out to be poor or even blatantly wrong. The reason for this
imaginary point of nowhere, a moral starting point where a tendency lays in the fact that once people have invested
person was still acting with integrity. The reference point time, money, or other resources in a decision, it creates
for today’s decision is yesterday’s decision and if today’s sunk costs. From a rational point of view, these costs
transgression just goes a bit further than yesterday’s deci- should be ignored when reconsidering a decision. How-
sion, the ethical difference remains acceptable and the ever, in reality, they make it more difficult for people to
overall progression toward a more unethical course of move away from a chosen path.
action goes unnoticed. People might view small steps of Two aspects emerge from the approaches described
harmdoing as not nice but acceptable because those steps above as particularly relevant for understanding the role of
seem to deviate only very little from what they perceive as time for unethical decision making: the temporal relation
the right thing to do (Welzer 2008). Thus, unethical deci- between subsequent decisions and the temporal relation
sions may even evolve against the conscious intention of between decisions and consequences. For the former, it is
the decision maker (Chugh and Bazerman 2007). Contin- temporal proximity, for the latter, it is the temporal dis-
uing in small steps and comparing the next level of tance that bears the risk of leading into ethical blindness.
harmdoing only to the previous one and not to an (imagi-
nary) objective moral point of view, makes it easier to Context and Time
continue. Ultimately, this dynamic may lead into an esca-
lation process. Small transgressions spiral into more severe Within our sensemaking model, the evolution of ethical
ones. ‘‘The essence of the process involves causing blindness is driven by the interaction between framing and

123
Ethical Blindness

context. Our previous discussion of context factors like each generation of fishermen considered the fish stock that
authority pressure or institutional norms might lead to the was present when they started fishing as the natural stock.
misunderstanding that proximal and distal context factors As a consequence, the three generations of fishermen had
are descriptions of an objectively given environment that is different perceptions of how the environment had changed:
clearly separable from the individual. However, the While for younger fishers, changes in fish stock were small,
sensemaking approach posits that environments are enac- older fishers perceived them as dramatic. Importantly, the
ted and co-created through individual and shared inter- young fishermen failed to realize previous changes and
pretation (Smircich and Stubbart 1985). As we have were relatively relaxed about the small changes they
argued, frames come from previous experiences made observed. Almost nobody (with the exception of a few very
within a social context and they have the potential to old fishermen) could adopt a perspective that spanned more
change the very same context. Thus, repeatedly using a than a single generation. Yet it is precisely this generation-
specific frame may not only perpetuate the frame (Ashforth spanning, overarching perspective that would allow one to
and Anand 2003) but also change the context, for example, recognize dramatic changes. Due to the shift in baselines
the organizational culture (Vaughan 2005). Subsequently, from one generation to the next, individuals could not see
individuals act within the new, transformed context, the them. The intriguing term ‘‘shifting baselines’’ was intro-
one that they co-created (for example, in a culture where duced by Pauly (1995): People perceive changes in the
unethical behavior is increasingly tolerated) (Ashforth and environment only relative to their own experience; as a
Anand 2003). The consequences of yesterday’s actions consequence, they consider the state of environment they
become the preconditions of tomorrow’s actions (Welzer live in as the ‘‘natural’’ state. Hence, what is dramatic at
2005). Put differently, today’s decisions reinforce or even one moment in history becomes normal in a following
create tomorrow’s situational and institutional pressures moment in history. For example, Enron might be a phe-
(March and Simon 1958; Ocasio 1997). The escalating nomenon that was only possible in the anything-goes
commitment of individual decision makers might manifest context of the new economy hype in the early 2000s. The
in organizational path dependence. This phenomenon mutual transformation of decision makers and their distal
describes a process in which organizational decisions and proximal context establishes a new normality that, in
become more and more routinized and rigid until the its most extreme form, may even allow genocide to appear
organization is locked into a situation, where only a con- as normal (Welzer 2005; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond
siderably reduced range of decision making options is 2008).
perceived as possible (von Sydow et al. 2009). Given such
a dynamic, sensemaking processes of individuals as well as
their context will co-change over time. As frames become Reducing the Risk of Ethical Blindness Through Moral
more rigid, the risk of ethical blindness increases. This Imagination
development takes place step-by-step, gradually over time,
in a process of mutual confirmation that transforms both If rigid framing is the problem behind ethical blindness,
individual actors and their context. If context and indi- flexible framing may be part of the solutions. Flexible
viduals co-evolve, the relation between the two remains framing reduces the risk of ethical blindness, because it
stable and, as a consequence, the individual cannot see the challenges mindless routines and promotes moral imagi-
change that took place (Chugh and Bazerman 2007; Welzer nation, that is ‘‘an ability to imaginatively discern various
2005). possibilities for acting within a given situation and to
To the extent that unethical decision making can be envision the potential help and harm that are likely to result
understood as the result of a process that unfolds over time, from a given action’’ (Johnson 1993, p. 202). Moral
it might be worth to also consider the role of specific his- imagination requires that people are ‘‘frame-vigilant’’
toric moments in the past which manifest in specific (Zimbardo 2007, p. 454) and understand that they cannot
institutional constellations (in our model, distal context). see certain aspects because of the frame(s) they use.
These constellations define normality for a particular Moreover, it requires that people understand how proximal
society and provide the context for individuals and their and distal context factors narrow their own sensemaking
organizations (in our model, proximal context). When the activities. Also, people should be encouraged to engage in
maritime biologists Saenz Arroyo et al. (2005) set out to ‘‘script-breaking’’ behavior (Gioia 1992, p. 388). For
examine how fish populations at the Gulf of California instance, managers’ rigid framing of situations in terms of
change over time due to commercial fishing, they needed— organizational loyalty may be challenged and progressively
as a reference point—the natural population, that is, the replaced by a broader view of having duties toward various
population that existed before it was influenced by human stakeholders (Brief et al. 2000a, b). It is crucial that
activity. When interviewing fishermen, they found that organizations provide the appropriate support in terms of

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

processes and norms. Brief et al. (2000a, b) have criticized cognitive-psychological and constructivist literature. It
the fact that management scholars have focused on how to defines ethical blindness as a psychological state where
ensure compliance rather than on how to promote dissent. people are temporarily blind to ethical dimensions in a
One way to introduce fruitful disagreement would be decision making situation. As such, it increases the risk of
to disperse or multiply authority (Brief et al. 2000a, b; unethical behavior. Ethical blindness is the result of a
Kelman and Hamilton 1989). As a consequence, organi- sensemaking process that unfolds over time during which
zational practices, policies, and decisions are exposed to framing and context pressures mutually reinforce and
independent decision making parties and thus, multiple ultimately transform each other. Thus, when ethically
perspectives, weakening strong routines. blind, even people with high levels of integrity may deviate
Leadership qualities play an equally important role. from their own values.
Leaders who openly invite dissent are more likely to It is important to note that by highlighting the impact of
challenge rigid framing and foster sensemaking activities context forces and arguing that people are sometimes
characterized by flexible framing (Foldy et al. 2008). Russo unable to draw on their personal values and unable to see
and Schoemaker (2004, p. 164) point at the dissent-pro- ethical dimensions in a situation, we do not want to
moting leadership style of Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. at the ‘‘excuse’’ unethical behavior. At the heart of the sense-
General Motor’s board of directors whom they cite as making process is the assumption that people actively
follows: ‘‘Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete construct (and co-evolve with) the environment. Thus,
agreement on the decision here. … Then I propose we sensemaking is not an automated response but an active
postpone further discussion of this matter until our next construction process. Hence, people are responsible for
meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement their decisions and for the environment they shape. How-
and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision ever, it could be argued that the concept of moral respon-
is all about’’. sibility needs to be defined in a broader way: Those who
We argued that the risk of ethical blindness is amplified contribute to building a context that strengthens rigid
by institutional forces of the distal context. Those forces are framing are morally responsible for unethical decisions
mostly not under the control of the individual or the orga- as well.
nization. Nevertheless, what corporations can do is to What is ethical? This question is not crucial for under-
weaken the influence of specific overarching worldviews by standing ethical blindness. By adopting the insider per-
systematically creating multiple communication channels spective of the decision maker, the question of whether her
with their environment. Thus, flexible framing might be behavior is ethical or not from an objective and universal
promoted by organizational boundary spanning that pro- point of view is irrelevant. The important thing is that the
vides decision makers with a richer picture of their societal decision maker deviates from her own values. Nevertheless,
context (Fennell and Alexander 1987). Boundary spanning in our view, the question of what is ethical is still important.
lays at the crossroads of proximal (organization) and distal Individual values do not develop in a social vacuum but are
(society, other organizations) context factors. It provides formed and nourished through socialization processes that
corporations with what Post and Altman (1992, p. 13) have embed and situate individual actors in a context of normative
called ‘‘windows of the corporation through which man- traditions. As such, individual values are not only a personal
agement can perceive, monitor, and understand external but also a social category. The literature on ethical decision
change, and simultaneously, a window in through which making treats this category mainly in a descriptive way.
society can influence corporate policy and practice’’. Suc- Accordingly, unethical behavior is defined as behavior ‘‘that
cessful boundary spanning reduces the probability that is either illegal or morally inacceptable to the larger com-
organizations develop their own microcosmos of particulate munity’’ (Jones 1991, p. 367).
rationality. If this microcosmos already exists, boundary This position has been criticized as being too relativistic
spanning might help to induce a strong external shock often because it avoids a precise normative stance on right and
needed to overcome the dynamics of rigid framing and wrong (Reynolds 2006; Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe
ethical blindness (Ashforth and Anand 2003, p. 38). 2008). In fact, as our discussion of the mutual transfor-
mation of individuals and context suggests, values and
normative standards of an entire community might shift,
Ethical Blindness as a Normative and Descriptive developing into a self-referentially closed microcosmos,
Concept and creating a new ‘‘normality’’. This new normality itself
might be morally dubious. Indeed, the analysis of past and
The conceptual model developed in this article offers a present genocides (Welzer 2005; Hagan and Rymond-
novel view on interactions between person and context Richmond 2008) demonstrates that dominant norms of a
factors to explain the risk of unethical behavior, integrating community can become questionable from a moral point of

123
Ethical Blindness

view because they violate hypernorms (Donaldson and Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk costs.
Dunfee 1994) or deviate from ‘‘cosmopolitan’’ or ‘‘higher Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35,
124–140.
order interests’’ (Teegen et al. 2004, p. 471). Ash, S. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American,
Thus, decisions can be unethical because organizational 193, 31–35.
decision makers act against their own moral standards and Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. (2003). The normalization of corruption
those of their community (e.g., the organization) with the in organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 25,
1–52.
community standards themselves being in line with higher Ashkanasy, N. M., Windsor, C. A., & Trevino, L. (2006). Bad apples
order principles such as those outlined in the principles of in bad barrels revisited: Cognitive moral development, just world
the UN Global Compact. Furthermore, a decision can be beliefs, rewards, and ethical decision-making. Business Ethics
unethical despite the fact that it is in line with the com- Quarterly, 16, 449–473.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of
munity standards because these standards themselves might inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3,
violate universal moral principles that the decision maker 193–209.
normally shares and supports. Importantly, the insider Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of
perspective of the organizational decision maker remains moral agency. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 101–119.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire
the point of reference but the yardstick for normative for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human emotion.
evaluation can either be polis or cosmos, thereby allowing Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497–529.
for descriptive and normative research on ethical decision Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach.
making in corporations. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217.
Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality.
We deliberately abstained from taking a normative New York: Anchor Books.
position of what is right and wrong. However, this article Berry, C. M., Ones, D. S., & Sackett, P. R. (2007). Interpersonal
takes a normative standpoint with respect to the phenom- deviance, organizational deviance, and their common correlates:
enon of ethical blindness itself and its driving factors. A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology,
92(2), 410–424.
Overall, we posit that flexible framing is better than rigid Blank, H., Musch, J., & Pohl, R. (2007). Hindsight bias: On being
framing. Specifically, we argue that flexible framing wise after the event. Social Cognition, 25, 1–9.
reduces the risk of ethical blindness and, ultimately, that of Blass, T. (1991). Understanding behavior in the Milgram obedience
unethical behavior. Flexible framing, however, should not experiment: The role of personality, situations, and their
interactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
be confused with ethical relativity or opportunism. It refers 60(3), 398–413.
to the contention that good decisions depend on moral Boltanski, L., & Thévenot, L. (2006). On justification: Economies of
imagination (Arendt 1963; Werhane 1999; Werhane et al. worth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2011), that is, on a person’s ability to see and consider a Brief, A. P., Buttram, R. T., & Dukerich, J. M. (2000a). Collective
corruption in the corporate world: Toward a process model. In
multitude of aspects when making decisions. Seeing and M. E. Turner (Ed.), Groups at work: Advances in theory and
taking more aspects of an issue into consideration helps to research (pp. 471–499). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
compensate for a frame’s blind spots and increases the Brief, A. P., Buttram, R. T., Elliot, J. D., Reizenstein, R. M., &
probability of considering ethics, together with other McCline, R. L. (1995). Releasing the beast: A study of
compliance with orders to use race as a selection criterion.
aspects, in corporate decision making. To the extent that Journal of Social Issues, 51, 177–193.
flexible framing is superior to rigid framing on the indi- Brief, A. P., Dietz, J., Cohen, R. R., Pugh, S. D., & Vaslow, J. B.
vidual level, it makes sense to promote conditions in (2000b). Just doing business: Modern racism and obedience to
societies and organizations that foster a climate of toler- authority as explanations for employment discrimination. Orga-
nizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 72–97.
ance and pluralism instead of fundamentalism and dog- Browning, C. R. (2001). Ordinary men. Reserve police battalion 101
matism (Habermas 1996; Popper 1995; Rorty 1991; Walzer and the final solution in Poland. London: Penguin.
1997). Flexible framing is unlikely to develop if rigid Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram. Would people still obey
definitions of what is right and wrong dominate, and if today? American Psychologist, 64, 1–11.
Butterfield, K. D., Treviño, L. K., & Weaver, G. R. (2000). Moral
alternative opinions are suppressed and critical voices awareness in business: Influences of issue-related and social
silenced. The most effective cure for ethical blindness is an context factors. Human Relations, 53(7), 981–1018.
atmosphere of open, democratic, and critical deliberation. Callon, M. (2007). What does it mean to say that economics is
performative? In D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa, & L. Siu (Eds.), Do
economists make markets? On the performativity of economics
(pp. 311–357). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
References Chabris, C., & Simons, D. (2010). The invisible gorilla: And other
ways our intuitions deceive us. New York: Crown Publishing
Arendt, H. (1963). Eichman in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of Group.
evil. New York: The Vinking Press. Chugh, D., Banaji, M. R., & Bazerman, M. H. (2005). Bounded
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1978). Organisational learning: A ethicality as a psychological barrier to recognizing conflicts of
theory of action perspective. Reading: Addison-Wesley interest. In D. A. Moore, D. M. Cain, G. Loewenstein, & M.
Publishing. Bazerman (Eds.), Conflicts of interest: Challenges and solutions

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

in business, law, medicine, and public policy (pp. 74–95). New Frederick, R. E., & Hoffman, W. M. (1995). Environmental risk
York: Cambridge University Press. problems and the language of ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly,
Chugh, D., & Bazerman, M. (2007). Bounded awareness: What you 5(4), 699–711.
fail to see can hurt you. Mind & Society, 6, 1–18. Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in:
Clinard, M. B., & Yeager, P. C. (1980). Corporate crime. New York: Symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions. In W.
Free Press. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new institutionalism
Crane, A. (2000). Corporate greening as amoralization. Organization in organizational analysis (pp. 232–263). Chicago: University of
Studies, 21, 673–696. Chicago Press.
Darley, J. M. (1992). Social organization for the production of evil. Friedman, M., (1970, Sept 13). The social responsibility of business is
Psychological Inquiry, 3, 199–218. to increase its profit. New York Times Magazine. (Reprinted in
Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Donaldson, T., & Werhane, P. H. (Eds.). (1970). Ethical issues
study of situational and dispositional variables in helping in business (pp. 217–223). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27(1), Gescheider, G. A. (1985). Psychophysics: Method, theory and
100–108. application (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Dearborn, D. C., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Selective perception: A note Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the
on the departmental identification of executives. Sociometry, 21, transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Review, 21,
360–396. 13–47.
den Nieuwenboer, N. A., & Kaptein, M. (2008). Spiraling down into Gigerenzer, G. (2008). Moral intuition = Fast and frugal heuristics?
corruption: A dynamic analysis of the social identity processes In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology: Vol. 2. The
that cause corruption in organizations to grow. Journal of cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity (pp. 1–26).
Business Ethics, 83, 133–146. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Denis, J.-L., Langley, A., & Rouleau, L. (2007). Strategizing in Gigerenzer, G. (2009). Moral satisficing: Rethinking morality as
pluralistic contexts: Rethinking theoretical frames. Human bounded rationality. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 528–554.
Relations, 60, 179–215. Gioia, D. A. (1992). Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: of missed opportunities. Journal of Business Ethics, 11,
Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organiza- 379–389.
tional fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160. Gonin, M., Palazzo, G., & Hoffrage, U. (2012). Neither bad apple nor
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. (1994). Toward a unified conception bad barrel: How the societal context impacts unethical behavior in
of business ethics: Integrative social contracts theory. Academy organizations. Business Ethics: A European Review (forthcoming).
of Management Review, 19, 252–284. Gramsci, A. (1971). The prison notebooks: Selections. New York:
Driver, J., & Baylis, G. C. (1996). Edge-assignment and figure-ground International Publishers.
segmentation in short-term visual matching. Cognitive Psychol- Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT
ogy, 31, 248–306. Press.
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured Hagan, J., & Rymond-Richmond, W. (2008). The collective dynamics
paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43, 51–58. of racial dehumanization and genocidal victimization in Darfur.
Esses, V. M., Jackson, L. M., Dovidio, J. F., & Hodson, G. (2005). American Sociological Review, 73, 875–902.
Instrumental relations among groups: Group competition, con- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social
flict, and prejudice. In J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick, & L. A. Rudman intuitionist approach to moral judgement. Psychological Review,
(Eds.), On the nature of prejudice. Fifty years after Allport 108, 814–834.
(pp. 227–243). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Hare, R. M. (1981). Moral thinking: Its levels, methods, and point.
Feldman, S. P. (2004). The culture of objectivity: Quantification, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
uncertainty, and the evaluation of risk at NASA. Human Hawkins, S. A., & Hastie, R. (1990). Hindsight: Biased judgment of
Relations, 57, 691–718. the past events after the outcomes are known. Psychological
Fennell, M., & Alexander, J. A. (1987). Organizational boundary Bulletin, 107, 311–327.
spanning in institutionalized environments. Academy of Man- Hoffrage, U. (2011). How people can behave irresponsibly and
agement Journal, 30, 456–476. unethically without noticing it. In G. Palazzo & M. Wentland
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. (2005). Economic language and (Eds.), Practising responsible management in the 21st century.
assumptions: How theories can become self-fulfilling. Academy Paris: Pearson Education.
of Management Review, 30(1), 8–24. Hoffrage, U., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (2000). Hindsight bias: A
Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. by-product of knowledge updating? Journal of Experimental
T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 566–581.
social psychology: Vol. 2 (4th ed., pp. 357–411). New York: Hoffrage, U., & Pohl, R. (2003). Research on Hindsight bias: A rich
McGraw Hill. past, a productive present, and a challenging future. Memory, 11,
Fleming, P., & Zyglidopoulos, S. C. (2008). The escalation of 329–335.
deception in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 81, Hunt, S. D., & Vitell, S. J. (1986). A general theory of marketing
837–850. ethics. Journal of Macromarketing, 6, 5–17.
Foldy, E. G., Goldman, L., & Ospina, S. (2008). Sensegiving and the Jackall, R. (1988). Moral mazes. The world of corporate managers.
role of cognitive shifts in the work of leadership. Leadership Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quarterly, 19, 514–529. Janis, I. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Foucault, M. 1980. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other Jensen, M. C. (2002). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and
writings, 1972–1977 (C. Gordon, Ed., Trans.). New York: the corporate objective function. Business Ethics Quarterly, 12,
Pantheon. 235–256.
Fox, S., Spector, P. E., & Miles, D. (2001). Counterproductive work Johnson, M. (1993). Moral imagination. Chicago: University of
behavior (CWB) in response to job stressors and organizational Chicago Press.
justice: Some mediator and moderator tests for autonomy and Jonas, H. (1985). The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics
emotions. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 59, 291–309. for the technological age. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

123
Ethical Blindness

Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in and institutional entrepreneurs. Academy of Management
organizations: An issue-contingent model. Academy of Manage- Review, 33, 750–770.
ment Review, 16, 366–395. Narvaez, D., Lapsley, D. K., Hagele, S., & Lasky, B. (2006). Moral
Jost, J. T., Blount, S., Pfeffer, J., & Hunyady, G. (2003). Fair market chronicity and social information processing: Tests of a social
ideology: Its cognitive-motivational underpinnings. Research in cognitive approach to the moral personality. Journal of Research
Organizational Behavior, 25, 53–91. in Personality, 40, 966–985.
Kelman, H. C., & Hamilton, V. L. (1989). Crimes of obedience. New Neisser, U. (1979). The control of information pickup in selective
Haven: Yale University Press. looking. In A. D. Pick (Ed.), Perception and its development: A
Khurana, R. (2007). From higher aims to hired hands. Princeton: tribute to Eleanor J Gibson (pp. 201–219). Hillsdale, NJ:
Princeton University Press. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-develop- Ng, D., Westgren, R., & Sonka, S. (2009). Competitive blind spots
mental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), in an institutional field. Strategic Management Journal, 30,
Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347–480). 349–369.
Chicago: Rand McNally. Ocasio, W. (1997). Towards an attention-based view of the firm.
Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. (2008). Organizational implications of Strategic Management Journal, 18, 187–206.
institutional pluralism. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby, Oestreich, J. E. (2002). What can business do to appease anti-
& K. Sahlin-Andersson (Eds.), Handbook of organizational globalization protestors? Business and Society Review, 107,
institutionalism (pp. 243–275). Sage: London. 207–220.
Lakoff, G. (2004). Don’t think of an elephant!. Vermont: Chelsea Packer, D. J. (2008). Identifying systematic disobedience in Mil-
Green Publishing. gram’s obedience experiments: A meta-analytic review. Psy-
Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). A social-cognitive approach to the chological Science, 3, 301–304.
moral personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral Pauly, D. (1995). Anecdotes and the shifting baseline syndrome of
development, self and identity (pp. 189–212). Mahwah, NJ: fisheries. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 10, 430.
Erlbaum. Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organizations: A critical essay. New
Lee, M., & Ermann, M. D. (1999). Pinto ‘‘madness’’ as a flawed York: Random House.
landmark narrative: An organisational and network analysis. Petersen, L.-E., & Dietz, J. (2000). Social discrimination in a
Social Problems, 46, 30–47. personnel selection context: The effects of an authority’s
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core capabilities and core rigidities: A instruction to discriminate and followers’ authoritarianism.
paradox in managing new product development. Strategic Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 206–220.
Management Journal, 13, 111–125. Petersen, L.-E., & Dietz, J. (2005). Prejudice and enforcement of
Ley Toffler, B., & Reingold, J. (2003). Final accounting. Ambition, workforce homogeneity as explanations for employment dis-
greed, and the fall of Arthur Andersen. New York: Broadway crimination. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35, 144–159.
Books. Petersen, L.-E., & Krings, F. (2009). Are ethical codes of conduct
Mack, A., & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional blindness. Cambridge, toothless tigers for dealing with employment discrimination?
MA: MIT Press. Journal of Business Ethics, 85, 501–514.
March, J. G. (1981). Footnotes to organizational change. Adminstra- Pohl, R. F., Eisenhauer, M., & Hardt, O. (2003). SARA—a cognitive
tive Science Quarterly, 26, 563–577. process model to simulate anchoring effect and hindsight bias.
March, J. G. (1988). Organizational learning. Annual Review of Memory, 11, 337–356.
Sociology, 14, 319–340. Popper, K. (1995/1945). The open society and its enemies (2
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: volumes). London: Routledge.
Wiley. Post, J. E., & Altman, B. W. (1992). Models of corporate greening:
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1981). Economists free ride, does How corporate social policy and organisational learning inform
anyone else? Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV. leading-edge environmental management. Research in Corpo-
Journal of Public Economics, 15, 295–310. rate Social Performance and Policy, 13, 3–29.
Mazzoni, G., & Vannucci, M. (2007). Hindsight bias, the misinfor- Punch, M. (1996). Dirty business. Exploring corporate misconduct.
mation effect, and false autobiographical memories. Social London: Sage.
Cognition, 25, 203–220. Rest, J. R. (1986). Moral development: Advances in research and
McAdams, D. P. (2009). The person: An introduction to the science of theory. New York: Praeger.
personality psychology (5th ed.). New York: Wiley. Reynolds, S. J. (2006). A neurocognitive model of the ethical
McDevitt, R., Giapponi, C., & Tromley, C. (2007). A model of ethical decision-making process: Implications for study and practice.
decision making: The integration of process and content. Journal Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 737–748.
of Business Ethics, 73, 219–229. Reynolds, S. J., Leavitt, K., & Decelles, K. A. (2010). Automatic
McLean, B., & Elkind, P. (2003). The smartest guys in the room: The ethics: The effects of implicit assumptions and contextual cues
amazing rise and scandalous fall of Enron. Penguin books: New on moral behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology;, 95(4),
York. 752–760.
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. (1994). Fit, failure and the hall of fame. Rieskamp, J., & Hoffrage, U. (2008). Inferences under time pressure:
New York: The Free Press. How opportunity costs affect strategy selection. Acta Psycho-
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. logica, 127, 258–276.
New York: Harper & Row. Ring, P. S., & Rands, G. P. (1989). Sensemaking, understanding,
Miller, D. (1993). The architecture of simplicity. Academy of and committing: Emergent interpersonal transaction processes in
Management Review, 18, 116–138. the evolution of 3M’s microgravity research program. In H. Van
Mintzberg, H. (2004). Managers not MBAs. A hard look at the soft den Ven, H. L. Angle, & M. S. Poole (Eds.), Research on
practice of managing and management development. London: the management of innovation: The Minnesota studies (pp. 337–
Prentice-Hall. 366). New York: Ballinger.
Misangyi, V. F., Weaver, G. R., & Elms, H. (2008). Ending Rorty, R. (1991). The priority of democracy to philosophy. In R.
corruption: The interplay among institutional logics, resources, Rorty (Ed.), Objectivity, relativism, and truth: Philosophical

123
 G. Palazzo et al.

papers (Vol. I, pp. 175–196). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Trevino, L. K. (1986). Ethical decision making in organizations: A
University Press. person-situation interactionist model. Academy of Management
Russo, J. E., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (2004). Winning decisions: Review, 11, 601–617.
Getting it right the first time. New York: Doubleday. Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. (1993). The cultures of work
Saenz-Arroyo, A., Roberts, C. M., Torre, J., Carino-Olvera, M., & organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Enriuez-Andrade, R. R. (2005). Rapidly shifting environmental Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2000). Temporal construal and time-
baselines among fishers of the Gulf of California. Proceedings of dependent changes in preference. Journal of Personality and
the Royal Society B, 272, 1957–1962. Social Psychology, 79, 876–889.
Said, E. W. (1994/1978). Orientalism (25th anniversary edition). New Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological
York: Vintage Books. Review, 110, 403–421.
Schoemaker, P. J. H., & Russo, J. E. (2001). Managing frames to Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger launch decision: Risky technol-
make better decisions. In S. Hoch & H. Kunreuther (Eds.), ogy, culture and deviance at NASA. Chicago: University of
Wharton on making decisions (pp. 131–155). Ort: Wiley. Chicago Press.
Sharp-Paine, L. (1997). Cases in leadership, ethics, and organiza- Vaughan, D. (2005). System effects: On slippery slopes, repeating
tional integrity. A strategic perspective. Chicago: Irwin. negative patterns, and learning from mistake? In W. H. Starbuck
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. & M. Farjoun (Eds.), Organization at the limit. Lessons from the
(1961). Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The Robbers Cave Columbia disaster (pp. 41–59). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Experiment. Norman: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange. Von Sydow, J., Schreyögg, G., & Koch, J. (2009). Organizational
Sims, R. R., & Brinkmann, J. (2003). Enron ethics (or: culture matters path dependence: Opening the black box. Academy of Manage-
more than codes). Journal of Business Ethics, 45, 243–256. ment Review, 34, 689–709.
Smircich, L., & Stubbart, C. (1985). Strategic management in an Walsh, J. P. (1995). Managerial and organizational cognition: Notes
enacted world. Academy of Management Review, 10, 724–736. from a trip down memory lane. Organization Science, 6, 280–321.
Sonenshein, S. (2006). Crafting social issues at work. Academy of Walzer, M. (1997). On toleration. Yale: Yale University Press.
Management Journal, 49, 1158–1172. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks:
Sonenshein, S. (2007). The role of construction, intuition, and Sage.
justification in responding to ethical issues at work: The Weick, K. (1996). Drop your tools: An allegory for organizational
sensemaking-intuition model. Academy of Management Review, studies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 301–313.
32, 1022–1040. Weick, K. (2005). Making sense of blurred images: Mindful organizing
Staw, B. M. (1976). Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of in mission STS-107. In W. H. Starbuck & M. Farjoun (Eds.),
escalating commitment to a chosen course of action. Organiza- Organization at the limit. Lessons from the Columbia disaster
tional Behavior and Human Performance, 16, 27–44. (pp. 159–177). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Steffy, B. D., & Grimes, A. J. (1986). A critical theory of organization Welzer, H. (2005). Täter. Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen
science. Academy of Management Review, 11, 322–336. Massenmörder werden. Frankfurt: S. Fischer.
Teegen, H., Doh, J. P., & Vachani, S. (2004). The importance of Welzer, H. (2008). Klimakriege. Frankfurt: S. Fischer.
nongovernmental organization (NGOs)in global governance and Werhane, P. H. (1999). Moral imagination and management decision
value creation: An international business research agenda. making. New York: Oxford University Press.
Journal of International Business Studies, 35(6), 463–483. Werhane, P. H., Hartman, L. P., Moberg, D., Englehardt, E.,
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (2004). Ethical fading: The role Pritchard, M. & Parmar, B. (2011). Social constructivism,
of self-deception in unethical behavior. Social Justice Research, mental models, and problems of obedience. Journal of Business
17, 223–236. Ethics, 100(1), 103–118.
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Smith-Crowe, K. (2008). Ethical decision Wheeler, D., Fabig, H., & Boele, R. (2002). Paradoxes and dilemmas
making: Where we’ve been and where we’re going. Academy of for stakeholder responsive firms in the extractive sector: lessons
Management Annals, 2, 545–607. from the case of Shell and the Ogoni. Journal of Business Ethics,
Tetlock, P. E. (2000). Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: 39, 297–318.
Do both disease and cure depend on the politics of the beholder? Zahra, S. A., & Couples, S. S. (1993). Blind spots in competitive
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 293–326. analysis. Academy of Management Executive, 7, 7–28.
Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., & Green, M. C. (2000). Zajac, E. J., & Bazerman, M. H. (1991). Blind spots in industry and
The psychology of the unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden competitor analysis: Implications of interfirm (mis)perception
base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. Journal of Personality for strategic decisions. Academy of Management Review, 16,
and Social Psychology, 78, 853–870. 37–56.
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1996). The institutionalization of Zimbardo, P. (2007). The Lucifer effect. Understanding how good
institutional theory. In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. R. Nord (Eds.), people turn evil. New York: Random House.
Handbook of organization studies (pp. 175–190). London: Sage
Publications.

123