A-LEVEL CAMBRIDGE HISTORY NOTES

ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR ONE, 1900-1914.

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INTRODUCTION

REF: ADVOCATE A. MARARA

World War One started on 28 July 1914 and ended on 11 November 1918. The war
engulfed major powers of the world which were classified into warring camps. These were
the Allied powers, based on the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia. The other camp
was the central powers based on the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.
The alliance system resulted in the invitation of many countries to the war. It is estimated by
historians that the war saw the participation of more than 70 million military personnel. The
causes of the war were mainly short and long term. Long term causes include the
imperialistic foreign policies of the great powers of Europe namely the German empire,
British empire, Russian empire, French empire, Ottoman empire, Austro-Hungarian empire
and Italian empire. The war was triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
of Austria on 28 June 1914. The assassination then acted as a catalyst that crystallised the
existing tensions and saw the alliances being harnessed. This ended up involving the rest of
the world into war, directly and indirectly.

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 LONG TERM CAUSES
1. ALLIANCE SYSTEM
REF: F. McDONOUGH, T. A MORRIS, D. MURPHY, J. JOLL

KEY QUESTION: WHY DID THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM DEVELOP?

SPECIFIED CONTENT
 Reasons for the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.
 Relations between members of the alliances.
 Consequences of the alliances for international stability.

No explanation of why the European powers acted as they did in July 1914 can avoid some
consideration of the nature and composition of the alliance system. Bernadotte Schmitt
argued that the issue at stake during the July crisis was a struggle to decide the balance of
power in Europe between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Thus, in Schmitt‟s
view, “ the alliances which had originally served the cause of peace, when put to the final
test, almost mechanically operated to convert a quarrel into a general war.”

Bismarck unified Germany through wars as an aspect of calculated diplomacy. From 1871-
1890, Bismarck became the arbiter of European politics through a series of alliances, deals,
treaties and relationships. The main objectives of his alliances was diplomatic isolation of
France to ensure that she would not seek vengeance for her loss of Alsace-Lorraine following
her defeat in 1871. The creation of peacetime alliances began with Bismarck‟s Three
Emperor‟s League or Dreikaiserbund [1873], the Dual Alliance[1879] and the Triple
Alliance[1882].

The Dreikaiserbund was between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Emperors present
were Kaiser Wilhelm 11 [William 11] of Germany, Tsar Alexander 11 of Russia and
Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary. The Emperors agreed to protect monarchism, assist each
other‟s independence.

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The results of the treaty were vast. Firstly, the Eastern question became pronounced due to
the revolt in the Balkans by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Eastern question thus worsened the
relationship between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Secondly, the episode resulted in a
German diplomatic defeat as Russia backed a British protest to Berlin. Lastly, the affair
brought home the dangers of a two front war to Bismarck.

The Dreikaiserbund was destroyed as a result of events in the Balkans. There was a series of
revolts against the Ottoman empire among the Sultan‟s Christian subjects between 1875-
1876. The Tsar, together with Germany and Austria-Hungary urged reforms on the Ottoman
empire. Britain refused to join in due to “ Splendid isolation.” Revolts broke out in Bulgaria
but they were ruthlessly suppressed by Turkey which outraged public opinion. The result was
the Russo-Turkish war of 1877.

Turkey was defeated by Russia in April 1877 leading to the signing of the Treaty of San
Stefano in 1878. The outcome of San Stefano was totally unacceptable to Britain. Britain had
always been opposed Russian ambitions in the Mediterranean as it threatened the Suez canal.
Britain sent warships in the region to protect her maritime interests in the Mediterranean.
Austria-Hungary was equally enraged as the Russians had broken their promise not to create
a big Bulgaria hence war became imminent.

The Congress of Berlin was convened by Bismarck as an honest broker [fair negotiator].
The treaty too left several problems. Firstly, the Balkan states were dissatisfied. Romania
resented the loss of Bessarabia. Serbia resented Austrian occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Bulgaria resented the reduction of her territory. Thus, the Balkan conflicts
brewed Balkan nationalism. Another outcome was that the Ottoman Empire was humiliated
and lastly Russia was angered since Britain and Austria had both gained territories from
Russian efforts.

The Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary became the very cornerstone of
Germany foreign policy. The treaty secured Germany southern frontiers in the event of an
attack from Russia. In the process, it also would thus frighten Russia into seeking a closer
relationship with Germany. The Kaiser was strongly opposed to this alliance as he saw it as
anti-Russian. Bismarck threatened to resign before he reluctantly signed. The
Dreikaiserbund which was renewed in 1881 meant at reducing tension in the Balkans
between the three countries. However, the outcome of this agreement was that war between
Russia and her two allies was not out of the question.

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Furthermore, Bismarck engineered an agreement that Britain, Italy and Austria-Hungary
would co-operate to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean. The Triple Alliance was
renewed in 1887 and a Secret Renewal Alliance was signed in the same year between
Germany and Russia. Thus, Bismarck had attempted to bring harmony among major powers
by playing off one power against each other by 1887.

By 1890, events were beginning to move against Bismarck as it was very difficult to keep on
good terms with Russia. The new Emperor William 11 was anti- Russian while French loans
were funding Russian industrialisation. Kaiser William 11 refused to accept the Reinsurance
treaty and Bismarck resigned as Chancellor and the nightmare of a two front war was now a
distinct possibility.

All these alliances were defensive and produced no rival set of alliances at the time. Germany
support for Austria-Hungary during the Bulgarian crisis, 1875 led to much friendlier Franco-
Russian relations which eventually resulted in the formation of a firm military alliance in
1894. [Dual Entente]. The creation of a Franco-Russian alliance had a clear aim of checking
German ambitions. According to McDonough, “ In direct consequence of this agreement,
French investment poured into Russia to support the development of its industry and
economy and close diplomatic and military links grew.”

The only major European power outside the two rival alliances by 1894 was Britain which
remained in “ Splendid isolation.” The first move by the British government away from the
precarious isolation was the signing of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, 1902. The treaty
encouraged Japan to go to war with Russia between 1904-05 where it gained an unexpected
victory.

A more significant agreement was the Entente Cordiale of 1894 between Britain and France.
This cleared up Anglo-French colonial agreement which gave no promise of military co-
operation in the event of a European war. However, this alliance was not viewed in this way
by the Kaiser who suspected that it was a secret military alliance aimed at encircling
Germany hence he wanted to test the closeness of the agreement. The result was the infamous
Tangier crisis of 1905.

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The Algeciras Conference duly took place between and April 1906. The British government
supported French claims in Morocco. The Russian government, under prompting from France
offered similar encouragement. As a result, the French gained a significant diplomatic victory
over Germany at Algeciras. All that the Kaiser‟s bullying had achieved was to heighten fears
in France, Britain and Russia about German imperial ambitions. This simply encouraged the
development of closer Franco-Russian alliance and set Britain foreign policy in a clear, anti-
German direction.

In 1907, Britain signed the Anglo-Russian Convention which settled Anglo-Russian

imperial differences in Afghanistan. The term Triple Entente started to be used to describe
the new diplomatic friendship between these three major European powers.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM ON

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

The alliances encouraged the development of detailed military plans. Germany developed the
Schlieffen plan in 1905 which was aimed at a quick decisive attack on France, followed by an
all out assault on Russia. Likewise, the Russian army chiefs also made detailed plans for a
rapid assault on Austria-Hungary and East Prussia in the event of a war, Plan 18. In the same
vein, French military chiefs planned a lightening offensive war against Germany on the
latter‟s western front. Thus, the idea of fighting a future war within a coalition was becoming
firmly planted in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy as well as France and Russia.

The crucial alliances were the German alliance with Austria-Hungary and the Franco-Russian
alliance. Germany was determined to support this alliance throughout the July crisis but was
following its own aims. France did offer support for Russia but did not play a crucial role in
the decision for war. Alliances were important, as James Joll has argued but no European
power really accepted that the alliance system was a complete deterrent of war. Each power
made the wrong calculations about likely behaviour of its alliance opponents.

The pre 1914 alliance system was therefore a fragile system but it did not make war
inevitable. It seems that the alliance system raised expectations about likely allies in future
and thus influenced military plans of each power. Therefore, each power seemed to base its
decision for war on an assessment of national interests which were linked to alliances.

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 2. MILITARISM
REF: F. McDONOUGH, T.A. MORRIS, D. MURPHY

SPECIFIED CONTENT

 Increased armaments.
 Reasons for and consequences of the naval race.
 War aims.

It has often been claimed that a mood of militarism pervaded Europe before 1914.
Militarism, armaments and war plans of the major powers have all been put forward as
key factors in the outbreak of war in 1914. Europe has been viewed as an „armed camp‟
from 1870 to 1914. M. Howard argues that each announcement of increased armaments‟
expenditure by a European power before 1914 was viewed as a threat by its perceived
rival and thus created an atmosphere of mutual fear and suspicion which played a major
part in creating the mood for war in 1914.

The rhetoric used by German leaders in pursuit of Welt politic was often daring and
confrontational. The German press, heavily influenced by the Kaiser‟s press office, whipped
up jingoism and fomented antagonism against other nations. Nationalist pressure groups,
including the Navy League, the Colonial society and the Pan German League supported
Welt politic. Admiral Von Tirpitz was fully aware that a naval race could act as a rallying
point for German public opinion in support of existing authoritarian government.

The Anglo-German naval race which reached its most excitable stage between 1908 and 1910
added to internal tension. The German desire for a navy on a world scale met a British desire
to maintain its naval supremacy. The speed at which new, state of the art Dreadnought class
battleships could be built in Britain and Germany produced panic and antagonism.

The Anglo-German naval race soured British attitudes towards Germany more than any other
factor. Sir George Grey claimed that the naval race was the major reason why Britain went to
war in 1914. From 1907 to 1914, British naval expenditure increased from 31,5 to 50 million
pounds per annum to meet the German challenge and to maintain supremacy. The Anglo-

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German naval race led to the British government to become even more disturbed and
frightened about the direction of policy.

Furthermore, military balance of power in Europe tilted sharply against Germany. By 1912,
the German army numbered 761 000 and the Austro-Hungarian army was 450 000 strong.
[McDonough] Against this stood the Russian army of 1,3 million, the French army of 600
000 and the B.E.F of 150 000. [McDonough] Thus, this forced the German military leaders to
be pessimistic about how sharply the balance of power was moving against them. The naval
situation was even more highly worrying for Germany. A great deal of Germany money had
been used to build Dreadnoughts but the British had maintained a clear naval supremacy.
With the support of Russia and France, Britain could clearly launch an effective blockade
against Germany.

In these gloomy circumstances, the Germany press talked of Germany being encircled by a
hostile coalition of envious powers hence leading military figures urged a preventative war to
break Germany free from its diplomatic isolation. The whole trend of European diplomacy
was leading in the direction two power blocs which were likely sooner or later to go to war
with one another.

Many historians believe that the considerations of the leading powers regarding the strategic
balance of power was of much greater influence on policy during the July crisis. According to
L.F.C Turner, the crisis cannot be understood without the knowledge of the balance of
military power, military planning and military strategy. A.J.P Taylor also argues that the
outbreak of World War One was caused almost entirely by rival plans for mobilization by the
European powers. The balance of power was turning sharply against Austria-Hungary hence
her chiefs of staff argued for a preventative war in order to weaken Serbia. In the same vein,
German General Staff also were pessimistic about the German strategic position and they
also pushed for a war sooner than later in view of the growing strength of the French and
British forces.

Germany invaded Belgium in 1914 as a result of the Schlieffen plan but this should be

viewed in the context of wider German policy. Germany faced a world war with the prospect

of being involved on two fronts: against Russia in the east and France with probably Britain

in the west. Germany‟s only firm ally was Austria whose military effectiveness was of

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dubious value. Hence Germany believed that it was important to defeat France first. Russia

had a large army but would be slower to mobilise. The uncertainty about British policy

probably encouraged Germany to strike first. France‟s defences were such that a direct attack

was dangerous. Belgium‟s limited defences reflected its reliance on the international

recognition of its neutrality. Britain alleged that Germany was influenced by the possibility of

gaining access to the North Sea for its fleet. This is possible but only as a lesser motive.

3. IMPERIALISM
Ref: F. McDonough and D.G. Williamson

The upsurge of imperialism from 1880 to 1914 in Africa and Asia resulted in the partition
and scramble of the two regions. The major European powers saw this as „ New Imperialism‟
of wealth, growth, power and survival. The most unfortunate consequences of the „ New
Imperialism‟ were the creation of an atmosphere of heightened patriotism, known as
jingoism. Moreover there was the glorification of armed force and the denial of national self
determination to small powers. The principle of the grabbing territory from the small powers
created tension. However, imperial rivalries in Africa and Asia did not lead directly to the
outbreak of a major war between the European powers but they did encourage the growth of
nationalism, imperialism and militarism in each European country.

The struggle for empire was at its most intense in the following regions:

 the Upper Nile [Fashoda crisis]

 South Africa [Anglo-Boer wars]
 China

The French, bitterly resentful of Britain‟s dominant position in Egypt which it had acquired
in 1882, intended to seize a wide strip of territory right across central Africa from the Indian
ocean to the Atlantic. Both Britain and France raced to control the territories of the Upper
Nile. In 1889, a French force under General Marchand hoisted the French flag but was
confronted by the British army under General Kitchener which had recently defeated the
Mahdists of Sudan at Omdurman. A clash was tantamount to war between Britain and France
hence the two governments sought a diplomatic solution.

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France had little option since it was diplomatically isolated at the time and it conceded totally
to British demands in Sudan. Fashoda has been called by the historian J.V. Keiger, “ the
worst crisis in Franco-British relations since Waterloo.” Paradoxically, it also led to an
improvement in Anglo-French affairs, as influential voices in Paris began to argue that
France should cut its losses, write off Egypt and gain British backing for the annexation of
Morocco.

In South Africa, Britain faced threats from the Germans whom they feared would try to
extend their power eastwards from German South West Africa to the borders of the Transvaal
and this would effectively block any northward British expansion. The economic significance
of the Transvaal had been transformed by the discovery of gold there in 1886 and by 1894 its
economy was dominated by Germans. According to Williamson, “ German bankers
controlled the Transvaal National Bank and some 20 per cent of the foreign investment in the
state came from Germany.”

Moreover, the independence of the Boers was, however, threatened by the large number of
British protectors and adventurers who poured in. When Cecil Rhodes illegally launched a
badly planned and unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Boer government, the so called
Jameson Raid in 1895, the Germans could hardly remain indifferent to it. The Kaiser sent a
telegram to Paul Kruger congratulating him on preserving the independence of his country
against attack. This caused resentment in Britain as it was perceived to be Germany meddling
in the private affairs of the British empire. Windows belonging to German owned shops were
smashed and for the first time popular anti German feeling became widespread and intense.

As in Africa, Great power rivalry in China was determined by a mixture of political,

economic and strategic factors. Britain had long dominated Chinese trade up to 1890 due to
its superior sea power. However, the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway by Russia
changed the situation. Russia‟s main aim in China was to annex Manchuria and gain an ice
free port in Korea. Britain now faced the prospect of a challenge to its commercial position
from a major military land power. Russia could usually rely on the backing of France and
Germany in China while Britain‟s potential ally was Japan which saw Russia‟s expansion
into Korea as a threat to its own security. To protect their interests, Japan and Britain
negotiated a defensive alliance in 1902. (Anglo-Japanese treaty).

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Japan recognised Britain‟s interests in China, while Britain accepted that Japan was „in a
peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially‟ interested in Korea. Both
countries pledged full support to each other in the event of an attack from any hostile power.

Although as earlier suggested that it is probably correct to say that the First World War was
not directly caused by the „New Imperialism‟ but its influence on future events such as
Tangier, 1905 and Agadir, 1911 was not insignificant. The craving of the great powers to
expand at the expense of weaker states in Africa notably in Egypt, 1882, Fashoda, 1889 and
Morocco, 1905 all created tension. The hunger by weaker states in the Balkan peninsula for
self-determination created an atmosphere in which mutual antagonism was the order of the
day.

The Agadir crisis, 1905 brought European politics to a pitch of tension from which it was not
released before a general war. Its implications spread eastwards down the Mediterranean. A
direct result of the extension of French influence in Morocco was Italy‟s attempt in 1911 to
improve its own standing in North Africa. To this end, it launched an unprovoked attack upon
the Turkish possession of Tripoli. The stretching of Turkish resources provided an irresistible
temptation to the Balkan states to free themselves forever from the influence of Turkey. The
German Foreign Ministry acted clumsily and foolishly in the Agadir crisis of 1911. The
dispatch of the gunboat „Panther‟ to the Moroccan port of Agadir, seemingly to protect
German interests there immediately resurrected British fears of a hostile naval presence in the
Mediterranean and a threat to Gibraltar.

The Agadir crisis worsened relations between Britain and Germany for no good reason and
weakened the support in both countries for reductions in naval building programmes. French
reaction to the compromise settlement destroyed the administration of Joseph Caillaux whose
initial aim had been to achieve a measure of conciliation with Germany. The succession of
the more aggressively patriotic Raymond Poincare can be seen as the beginning of the
national awakening that led to France into war by 1914. Moreover, the crisis led to a degree
of formal military cooperation between Britain and France. This took the form of a naval
agreement in 1912 which clearly indicated Britain‟s awareness of the German threat to its
interests. As a result, the Agadir crisis dealt a blow to the prestige of the German government
similar to that suffered by Russians in the Balkans.

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The second Moroccan crisis had very serious consequences for the peace of Europe. It
heightened tension between Germany and Britain and France, which fuelled the arms race
and made Germany increasingly desperate for a diplomatic victory. The German government
pushed by the army, public opinion and a highly effective pressure group called the
Wehrverein increased the size of the army by about 29 000 men in 1912 and then a year
later a further increase of 117 000 men and 119 officers and non -commissioned officers was
approved. In Britain, the Navy League and the National Service League subjected their own
government to similar pressures.

In general, British fears of imperial decline, German ambitions for an empire and Austro-
Hungarian anxiety regarding the loss of power were all linked to the general survival of the
fittest mood which the imperialist age had profoundly influenced. The imperialist idea of
struggle and rivalry emphasized the need for bold new policies and dynamic solutions to
problems in international relations hence their interests clashed notably in the Balkans to
pave way for the outbreak of World War One.

4. NATIONALISM
The role of national self- determination in the origins of the war has been another important
area of debate. Martel has argued that the First World War grew out of a clash between „Slav
nationalism‟ and the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian empire. Thus, the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the final straw in this struggle for the mastery in the Balkans.
It offered Austria-Hungary an ideal opportunity to rouse public opinion in support of a war
which aimed to weaken the drive for self- determination in the Balkans.

Another school of thought object that the struggle to supplant the Ottoman empire in the
Balkans was a very important factor in the outbreak of war. They instead argue that the key
players in this struggle were southern European nationalist groups, Russia, which hoped to
profit from the decline of the Ottoman empire, and Austria-Hungary, which feared Slav
nationalism and Russian ambitions. In July 1914, the military leaders of Austria-Hungary
were so determined to deal with Serbia that they lost their heads, persisted with a disastrous
ultimatum and ignored all pleas for mediation. According to McDonough, “ The level of fear
and emotion that Slav nationalism caused in Austria-Hungary should not be underestimated.”

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In Joachim Remak‟s view, the Habsburg-Serb quarrel was not a minor issue but a major one
which brought about war. The rest of the world was dragged into the „third Balkan war‟
Remak argues that Austria-Hungary and Serbia both knew that they were on a collision
course in 1914 and that they did not care if their battle for supremacy in the Balkans activated
all the major European alliances. According to this view, primary responsibility for beginning
the war is shared between Austria-Hungary which wanted to restore its prestige and Serbia
which stood in a good position to benefit from European rivalry in the region. The growth of
Serbia clearly threatened the future of the Habsburg empire. The delivery of the Austrian
ultimatum and the decision to attack Serbia were also crucial points on the road to war. Thus,
the view that Austria-Hungary was sorely responsible has also been strongly argued by many
historians.

John Leslie has cast doubt on the importance of the Austro-Serb quarrel. He makes three
crucial points:

 Austria-Hungary used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as an excuse to

settle accounts with Serbia and asked Germany to prevent Russian intervention.
 Germany saw the war with Serbia as secondary to the struggle with Russia.
 In the July crisis, the Kaiser virtually commanded Austria-Hungary to set aside its
anger against Serbia and to deploy the major portion of its troops against Russia.

Thus, Leslie believes that Austria-Hungary can be held responsible for planning a local
Austro-Serb conflict which linked to its fears about Balkan nationalism. Germany which was
not interested in this quarrel, quite deliberately used it as an opportunity to launch the
European war which Austria-Hungary had never desired.

Lastly, John Lowe perhaps puts the significance of the Austro-Serb quarrel into its proper
context by stating that, “ The crisis in the Balkans was the occasion, rather than the cause of
the First World War.”

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BALKAN CONFLICTS

SPECIFIED CONTENT

 Condition of the Balkans in the late 1800s.

 Balkan nationalism.

The key cause of Balkan instability was the existence of a wide range of nationalist groups
agitating for religious toleration and self- government. In 1876, a full scale Bulgarian
rebellion was under way, with the various nationalist groups receiving support from Serbia,
Montenegro and Russia. This crisis eventually escalated into a full scale war between Russia
and Turkey from 1877 to 1878 over the future of Bulgaria, culminating in defeat for the
Ottoman empire which was forced to sign the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. Under this
agreement, Bulgaria was given virtual independence, Serbia and Romania received territory
and Russia and Austria-Hungary agreed to supervise reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, British and Austro-Hungarian governments believed that Russia had been given
too much power in the Balkans. In the end, Bismarck decided to play „honest broker‟ in the
crisis and proposed an international Congress in Berlin. Under the Congress of Berlin in
1878, Russia would retain its territorial gains, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania would keep
their independence and Bosnia-Herzegovina would be placed under the exclusive
administration of Austria-Hungary.

The outcome of the Balkan conflicts in the late 1870s meant that Bulgaria was turned into an
autonomous principality of the Ottoman empire with a Christian government and a national
army. Major changes were proposed with the aim of preserving the Ottoman empire, south,
south-west of Bulgaria and east Rumelia to remain under Ottoman rule. This served to
encourage more civil unrest hence in 1885, nationalists in Eastern Rumelia revolted against
Ottoman rule and demanded the right to join the rest of Bulgaria. The Russian government
used the revolt as a pretext to gain further territory. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary
wanted Bulgaria to be completely independent of any Tsarist influence and they enlisted the
support of Bismarck. The result was the signing of the Dual Alliance in 1879.

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The Bulgarian crisis revealed the complexity of the Balkan problem which revolved around
nationalist demands for self- determination, the gradual decline of Ottoman rule an the
designs of Russia and Austria-Hungary. It showed how easily problems in the Balkans could
create a delicate international situation. The significance of the Bulgarian conflict was
threefold:

 It put an end to the League of the Three Emperors.

 It severely weakened Germany‟s role as a so called „honest broker‟ in the Balkans.
 It killed the Reinsurance treaty, signed in 1887, which the Russians saw as a worthless
and unscrupulous agreement that was not renewed.

Thus, the diplomacy of Bismarck foundered on the rocks of the Balkans. Bismarck‟s fall in
1890 is still being viewed as a key turning point on the road to war. Bismarck‟s cautious
foreign policy was successful in the short term hence leaders who followed him favoured
confrontation rather than conciliation. Paradoxically, the fact that Bismarck‟s alliance
diplomacy had placed German figures in the aristocracy, army and navy to push for a bolder
and more expansionist foreign policy.

From 1912-1914, the major focus of European attention switched to the Balkans. This area
was a labyrinth of ethnic tensions, nationalist groups determined to break free of the ethnic
tensions, nationalist groups determined to break free of the Ottoman rule. In 1897, Russia and
Austria-Hungary had signed an agreement which „put the Balkans on ice.‟ Although
Romania, Greece and Montenegro were independent, Turkey had influence over Macedonia
and Albania. The Young Turk revolt in 1908 did not help matters as it saw the increased
demise of the Ottoman empire.

The 1908-9 Bosnian crisis served to stir up Russian fears about German aims in the Balkans.
The Tsar expressed outrage at the annexation but the Kaiser said that if Russia went to war
over the issue, Germany would stand by Austria-Hungary. The Times newspaper claimed that
the Kaiser had stood by Austria-Hungary in „shining armour‟ Thus, this dose of German
diplomatic bullying made the Russian government all the more resolved to increase its
defence expenditure, draw closer to its potential allies and not back down in the Balkans
again.

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Following the annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary in 1908, Serbia made a daring bid to
create a Balkan coalition. The outcome was the formation of the Balkan league, 1912. The
chief aim of this coalition was to force the Turks out of the Balkans. In October 1912, the
Balkan league drove the Turks out of most of the European territory of the Balkans. The
treaty of London, 1912 which ended the First Balkan War gave Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece
nearly all the European territory of the Ottoman empire except Albania, Serbia, Greece and
Bulgaria were left dissatisfied and the coalition fell apart.

The second Balkan war broke out in 1913 when Bulgaria attacked Serbia, prompting Greece,
Romania and Turkey to declare war on Bulgaria. Bulgaria was easily defeated leading to the
signing of the treaty of Bucharest, 1913. The Bulgarians were forced to give Serbia large
gains in Macedonia. However, Austro-Hungarian and German pressure denied the Serbs
access to the Adriatic port and this became a bone of contention. The Balkan wars ruined the
dream of a Pan Slav coalition but they ended with the Ottoman empire having been virtually
driven out of its European territory. Equally, Bulgaria was isolated and severely weakened
and the power Greece ad Serbia had greatly increased. Thus, the outcome of the Balkan wars
was really a body blow to the strategic position of Austria-Hungary.

IMMEDIATE CAUSE: SARAJEVO ASSASSINATION

On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of Austria-
Hungary, and his wife Sophie were assassinated in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia by
Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Serb terrorist group, the Blackhand. Sarajevo was a very
dangerous place for a member of the Habsburg family to visit as it was a citadel of Serb and
Bosnian nationalist groups. To worsen matters, the date chosen for the visit was of great
emotional significance for Serb nationalists as it marked the anniversary of a famous victory
by the Turks over the Serbs at the battle of Kosovo in the 14th century. The news of the death
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand produced fury in Austria. The Austrian government
immediately decided to pin the blame for the assassination on the on the Serbian government,
even though they had no proof of this. Count Leopold Berchtold, Austrian Foreign
Minister, advised Franz Joseph to use the assassination as a pretext to „settle accounts‟ with
Serbia.

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THE JULY CRISIS AND THE DECISION FOR WAR

On 4 July 1914, Franz Josef, Austrian Emperor, sent a letter to Kaiser Wilhelm, Germany
King, asking for German support to „eliminate Serbia as a power in the Balkans‟ The Kaiser
consulted with Theobald von Bethmann- Hollweg, the German Chancellor, to decide the
German position. They agreed that Austria should be given a free hand, the blank cheque, to
start war with Serbia. They hoped that the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would
remain localised but both knew that the crisis might bring Russian intervention and a
European war. The German government was prepared to risk this, in order to secure a victory
for Austria-Hungary over Serbia. The Kaiser advised the Austrian government that „
Germany would stand behind her.‟ The German reply was exactly what the Austrian
government had wanted hence it decided to issue an ultimatum to the Serbian government,
framed in a matter that would be likely to provoke war.

The Russian and French governments met from 20 July to 23 July 1914 to discuss their
positions in view of the escalating crisis. Raymond Poincare, the French President, gave his
full support to Russia in resisting any attempts by the Austria-Hungary to threaten the
independence of Serbia. This is widely viewed as a „second blank cheque„ which
encouraged the Russian government to risk war with both Germany and Austria-Hungary.

However, it must be underscored that the French government advised the Russian
government to do nothing during the July crisis that would be likely to provoke Germany.
Equally, the Russian government sought a negotiated settlement to the crisis. The Tsar
begged the Kaiser to restrain Austria-Hungary, without success, throughout the crisis. The
French decision to support Russia was designed to deter Austria-Hungary but the German
decision to support Austria-Hungary aimed to provoke. This is the fundamental difference
between the two so called „blank cheques‟ issued during the July crisis.

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On 30 July 1914, the Tsar announced that Russian mobilisation would take place on the
following day. The German timetable for war (Schlieffen plan) was now swung into rapid
action. The urgency Germany felt to implement the Schlieffen plan now dominated events.
The Schlieffen plan imagined a quick and overwhelming attack on the French army through
Belgium because the French frontier was heavily defended. It assumed that:

 France would be defeated in in six weeks.

 Russia would take at least six weeks to mobilise.
 Belgium would be too weak to resist a German invasion.
 Britain might protest but would not go to war over Belgium.

On 31 July 1914, the German government sent the Russian government an ultimatum which
said that unless Russia ceased all military preparations, Germany would have to declare war.
Thus, on 1 August The crisis escalated on 23 July 1914 when the Austrian government
finally delivered the ultimatum to Serbia. The ultimatum claimed that Serbia was involved in
the assassination of the Archduke and made ten demands designed to put down the terrorist
activities of Serb nationalists, including joint Habsburg-Serb action to suppress all
movements opposed to the Dual monarchy (Austria-Hungary) in Serbia. The Russian
government advised Serbia to take a conciliatory and co-operative line. The Serbian
government agreed to most of Austria‟s demands but insisted that any investigation of the
problem should adhere to international law. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister,
proposed a Conference in London to settle the matter but this was rejected by Austria-
Hungary and Germany. The first declaration of war in the crisis came on 28 July 1914, when
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The Russian government made it very clear that
Russia would go to war to save Serbia unless Austria-Hungary withdrew its troops from
Serbian territory. The Austro-Hungarian government refused. Thus, on 29 July 1914, Russia
announced that it had no alternative but to make plans for the mobilisation of its troops. The
Kaiser informed the Tsar that Russian mobilisation would lead to German mobilisation.
Bethman- Hollweg made a last minute plea for British neutrality in the event of a war but the
British government refused to give such an assurance. The main contribution of the British
government to the July crisis was to make a number of proposals to Serbia, Austria-Hungary,
Germany and Russia to settle the matter by negotiation, which were rejected by the German
and Austro-Hungarian governments.

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On 1 August, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. On 2 August 1914, the German
government sent an ultimatum to the Belgian government asking for permission to allow the
German army safe passage for the now inevitable attack on France. Sir Edward Grey
informed the German government that any breach of that neutrality would result in a British
declaration of war. On 3 August 1914, the German army invaded Belgium to start the First
World War which would last for four savage and bloody years.

CHAIRMAN MAO PUBLICATIONS: 2024

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