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Conceptualization of space and time

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 Conceptualization of space and time

Aleksander Szwedek

“We operate with nothing but things which do not

exist, with lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible
time, divisible space – how should explanation
even be possible when we first make everything
into an image, into our own image!”
Friedrich Nietzsche The Gay Science, aph.
112 (rev. ed., 1887).

1. The concepts of space and time

Space and time are fundamental in our lives. In their applications space and time always occur
together. Every event that happens in the world is determined by the space-coordinates x, y, z, and the
time-coordinate.
Space is not only basic in physics, but also almost omnipresent in cognitive linguistics where its
presence has ranged from specific applications in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) discussion to general
models like Langacker’s (1982, 1986) space grammar, or Fauconnier’s (1985) theory of mental
spaces. Space has not only been discussed as a physical, material phenomenon, but has also provided
the basis of reference for temporal and mental phenomena.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) distinguished spatialization (orientational) metaphors as one of three
major types, on a par with structural and ontological metaphors. They modified their 1980 views in the
2nd (2003) edition where they wrote that “All metaphors are structural (in that they map structures to
structures); all are ontological (in that they create target domain entities); and many are orientational
(in that they map orientational image-schemas).” (2003:264).
In his earliest version, Langacker (1982) called his model ‘space grammar’, and though he
abandoned that label in his later works, his proposals and representations are essentially spatial in
nature.
Though Fauconnier (1985) does not provide a clear-cut definition of what a mental space is, he
writes that mental spaces are partial assemblies, and that they have elements and relations which,
when organized as a package, can be called frames.
Space is described by Encyclopedia Britannica as a boundless, three-dimensional extent in which
objects and events occur and have relative position and direction.
The Oxford English Dictionary lists a number of senses of the word space, and rather surprisingly
gives the temporal sense of space first, and the “three-dimensional extent” only as second.
The first sense, “Denoting time or duration.” is illustrated by an example from Cursor Mundi
(1300 – 6980):
a 1300 Cursor M. 6980 1300 Cursor M. 6980 Þair faith lasted littel space.
The ‘material’ sense of space is described in OED as
“II. Denoting area or extension.
* Without article, in generalized sense.
5. a. Linear distance; interval between two or more points or objects.
Freq. with more or less suggestion of sense 6.
6. a. Superficial extent or area; also, extent in three dimensions.”

That description is illustrated with examples the first of which comes from 1390:
Gower Conf. III. 107 Astronomie .. makth a man have knowlechinge Of Sterres .. And what betwen
hem is of space.
It seems, however, that from the point of view of the degree of metaphoricity the OED order
should be reversed, as the temporal sense of space seems to be more metaphorical than, let’s call it the
material senses, as the material sense involves implicit reference to material objects existing in that
space.
Regardless of the order in OED, space has two major senses:
1) the material sense,
2) the temporal sense.
and a number of minor, but related senses, for example, personal space, space between letters, etc.
The two senses II.5. and II.6. in the OED description are related in that they both refer to
boundaries and containment. The difference is that distance is the extent between two reference
points, and area within more reference points than two.
To all intents and purposes, space has no material existence, and in the ‘material’ sense is defined
relative to objects – it is a relation between objects existing in it. As we read in Encyclopedia
Britannica, space is “a boundless, three-dimensional extent in which objects and events occur and
have relative position and direction.” and further on: “It appears that there is no quality contained in
our individual primitive sense-experiences that may be designated as spatial. Rather, what is spatial
appears to be a sort of order of the material objects of experience. The concept “material object”
must therefore be available if concepts concerning space are to be possible. It is the logically
primary concept.”
In other words, absurdly as it may sound, if there were no objects, there would be no space, no
extent and distance. Needless to add, the temporal space is not ‘material’ either and would not exist
without changing and moving objects.

The OED placement of the temporal sense of space as the first one indicates that time may be
conceptualized in terms of space. If that is the case, the concept of space is the source domain for the
domain of time as the following examples show.
1382 Wyclif Gen. xxx. 36 He .. putte a space of thre daies weye bitwix hem and his dowtir
husboond.
1300 Cursor M. 6980 Þair faith lasted littel space.
1782 Cowper Gilpin 242 The turnpike gates again Flew open in short space.
1812 Cary Dante, Parad. xxiii. 16 Short space ensued; I was not held .. Long in expectance.

The spatial representation of time is also seen in the use of spatial prepositions with expressions of
time, such as, for example, in or within five minutes, after an hour, to space out somebody’s visits more
and more, etc.
The claim that time is conceptualized in terms of space is also corroborated by Langacker’s (1990)
discussion of the verb ‘go’: “How does this future sense of ‘go’ derive from the original spatial sense?
One might suggest that it constitutes a metaphorical extension from the spatial to the temporal domain:
rather than moving through space in order to initiate the infinitival process, the subject moves through
time. It does seem evident that the notion of path receives a temporal interpretation.” (1990: 330).
All that means that the concept of space is the source domain for time. It seems reasonable then, to
focus first on the conceptualization of space, and see what consequences that analysis might have for
the conceptualization of time

2. Space in language expressions

Since, then, space is an abstract (non-material, in fact it is a ‘vacuum’) entity, it would be
interesting to examine through language expressions how it is conceptualized by human beings.
The aim of the following section is to answer the question whether indeed space itself is as
fundamental a concept as cognitive linguistics takes it to be. In order to see that, we will first analyze
briefly a few examples of expressions of space in its ‘material’ sense. Anticipating the result, if the
general cognitive direction from concrete to abstract is correct, it would seem natural that as an
abstract concept space would be referred to in terms of concrete, material being.
In its material, ‘extension’ sense space functions as the target domain, and that is illustrated by the
following conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions.

space is an object which one can make, have, give, possess, share; spaces may be spread about:

1606 Shakes. Ant. & Cl. ii. iii. 23 Therefore Make space enough betweene you.
1610 Shakes. Temp. i. ii. 492 Might I but through my prison once a day Behold this Mayd: .. space
enough Haue I in such a prison.
1706 Phillips (ed. Kersey) Vacuum Disseminatum, or Interspersum, i.e. small void Spaces spread
about between the Particles of Bodies.
The room should only hold ten people, but somehow a space is found for Michael.(BNC)
From inside the room it must have looked like he was just hopping off into empty space,… (BNC)
We had very large rooms, a wonderful space, and we were quite successful.(BNC)

The above examples illustrate the material sense of space in that they refer to space among material
objects. The concept of space as an object extends to less material relations such as personal, social,
etc. as in the following examples:

1950 Times 7 Feb. 5/5 In the last election, one company gave space to the Communist Party and the
Commonwealth Party, but the main newsreels adhered to the general agreement that space should
be given only to the main parties.
1980 G. B. Trudeau Tad Overweight, Seriously, I think I know where you’re coming from, and I’d like
 to share that space.
1981 Gossip (Holiday Special) 31/3 The reason why I can say that so boldly is because they give me
my space. They let me be me.
1818 Shelley Rosalind 952 And then I sunk in his embrace, Enclosing there a mighty space Of love.
1854 H. Reed Lect. Brit. Poets xv. (1857) 355 The vast spaces of our English poetry.
1977 C. McFadden Serial (1978) iii. 13/2 Leonard had a lot going for him otherwise, and Kate liked
the space he was in.
1850 H. Reed Lect. Eng. Lit. iv. (1855) 140 His human heart had large spaces to hold his fellow-
beings in.
Lots of bustle but just enough space to breathe.(BNC)
…neo-disco tracks and trackers of the Nineties elegantly negotiate a space between nostalgia
and machine futurism. (BNC)
…space for individualist explanation (BNC)
…I'm not left with much empty space in my life.';(BNC
…to create an enlarged European economic space.(BNC).

space is an animate object which can make noise, produce, breed, challenge and permit:

1565 Cooper Thesaurus, Raucus tractus, a long space of the sea makynge an hoarse noyse.
1667 Milton P.L. i. 650 Space may produce new Worlds.
1940 R. S. Lambert Ariel & All his Quality vii. 168 Selling ‘space’ .. breeds a very different
outlook from providing programmes.
1878 Browning La Saisiaz 6 No blue space in its outspread .. challenged my emerging head.
1866 Chambers's Encycl. VIII. 7/2 Various expressive adjectives, .. into the consideration of
which our space will not permit us to enter.

space is a container (which first of all is an object) into which other things can be put, or in which
other things are, it can be deep, and open or closed.

1451 J. Capgrave Life St. Aug. 3 Asia .. conteyneth as mech in space as do þe othir too parties.
1671 Milton P.R. ii. 339 Our Saviour .. beheld In ample space under the broadest shade A Table richly
spred.
1697 Dryden Virg. Georg. iv. 218 But streighten'd in my Space, I must forsake This Task.
1816 Shelley Daemon i. 251 Each [orb] with undeviating aim .. through the depths of space Pursued
its wondrous way.
1873 Helps Anim. & Mast. i. (1875) 6 The pamphlet has vanished into space.
1854 Tomlinson Arago's Astron. 95 Suppose the body A is projected .. into free space.
1885 C. Leudesdorf Cremona's Proj. Geom. 33 In the above the geometric forms are supposed to lie in
space.
1827 Faraday Chem. Manip. vi. (1842) 179 Even the space left open round the neck may be closed
when desirable.

space has object–like properties. It can be small and large, and there may be more or less of it:

1815 J. Smith Panorama Sci. & Art II. 42 The more it is heated, the more space it takes up.
1774 Goldsm. Nat. Hist. (1776) II. 298 With a studied brevity, his system comprehends the greatest
variety, in the smallest space.
1565 Cooper Thesaurus s.v. Spatium, Great and large spaces in wide roomes.
 Synonyms of space, such as place, room, and even Prepositional Phrases denoting place display
similar collocation potential.

place
OED explains ‘place’ as “Space; extension (in two or three directions).”. That sense is illustrated
with the following examples of various metaphorical domains.
1628 Hobbes Thucyd. (1822) 85 When they were come in the city had not place for them all. [place as
an object one can have].
She had a special place in his heart.
600 J. Pory tr. Leo's Africa vi. 278 It is an extreme hot and drie place, bringing foorth no corne at all,
but great plenty of dates. [hot and dry are properties of material objects, not of places].
a 1631 Donne Nativitie 10 Seest thou, my Soule, ..how he Which fils all place, yet none holds him,
doth lye? [place is a container].
1655 Stanley Hist. Philos. i. (1701) 7/2 That the World is contained in place. This agrees with the
definition of place by space. [place is a container].
?_1366 Chaucer Rom. Rose 657 In many places were nightingales, Alpes, finches, and wodewales.
[place is a container].
1613 Purchas Pilgrimage vi. xiii. 534 Not staying aboue three or foure dayes in a place, as long as the
grasse will serue their Camels. [place is a container].
1897 Westm. Gaz. 13 Mar. 5/1 The Act expressly declared such betting in any place, [place is a
container].

room
Room is defined in OED as “Space; dimensional extent.” and illustrated by the following examples:
1757 Gray Bard 51 Give ample room, and verge enough The characters of hell to trace. [room as an
object that one can give]
1833 H. Martineau Loom & Lugger ii. i. 18 We must teach him .. that there is room in the wide world
for all. [room as an object that exists in the world].
1840 Penny Cycl. XVII. 345/1 The plants .. would then have room to grow out. [room as an object that
one can have].
1830 Wordsw. Let. to Dyce, In the edition of 1827 it was diligently revised, and the sense in several
instances got into less room. [room is a container].

prepositional phrases
Rather unexpectedly, prepositional phrases denoting space have received a similar, cognitive
interpretation consistent with the analysis of examples presented above. In his 1993 paper, Langacker
discusses the phrase “under the bed (is all dusty)” in the following words:
“The search domain is defined as the region to which a locative expression confines its
trajector [...]. Observe that a phrase like ‘under the bed (is all dusty)’ is construed as naming
a spatial region - a type of ‘thing’ [emphasis A.S.] - rather than a relationship (a
relationship per se can hardly be dusty). Our ability to conceptually reify and refer to the
search domain argues strongly for the psychological validity of this notion.” (Langacker
1993:16).
Langacker’s words leave no doubt that spatial region (space) is conceptualized as „a type of
thing”. Describing that example in terms of reification, Langacker narrowed his interpretation to
inanimate things. My earlier examples show that space can also be conceptualized in terms of
animate beings, and that is why I prefer to use a more general space is an object conceptual
metaphor, where object is understood as containing inanimate and animate entities. The theory
behind that claim is explained in section 5 below.

3. Time in language expressions

There is a widespread belief among cognitive linguists that time is described in terms of space (see
also the temporal sense of space in OED). For example Lyons (1977:718) writes that “The
spatialization of time is so obvious and so pervasive a phenomenon in the grammatical and lexical
structure of so many of the world’s languages that it has been frequently noted, even by scholars who
would not think themselves as subscribing to the hypothesis of localism.”
Discussing the development of the future sense of ‘go’ Langacker (1990) asks: “How does this
future sense of ‘go’ derive from the original spatial sense?” and he answers that “One might suggest
that it constitutes a metaphorical extension from the spatial to the temporal domain: rather than moving
through space in order to initiate the infinitival process, the subject moves through time. It does seem
evident that the notion of path receives a temporal interpretation.” (1990:330).
Langacker’s spatial notation of temporal phenomena in his ‘space grammar’ adds to his suggestion
that the temporal sense is derived from the spatial sense, and is therefore interpreted through spatial
representation.
Lakoff (1993) expresses similar views even more forcefully in terms of biological determination:
“In our visual systems, we have detectors for motion and detectors for objects/locations. We do not
have detectors for time (whatever this could mean). Thus, it makes good biological sense that time
should be understood in terms of things and motion.” (1993:218).
The time as space metaphor across languages was recently discussed by Günter Radden
(2004:99-120) who concludes his presentation with the following words: “Our understanding of “time”
is essentially metaphoric. The most important metaphorical source domain is that of “space”, and the
conceptual metaphor time as space is conceptually well-motivated.” (2005:117).
Those widespread and noteworthy views seem to be corroborated by examples from OED quoted
in point 2. of the present paper (some of which are repeated here for convenience), as well as other
examples with spatial (locative) expressions.
1382 Wyclif Gen. xxx. 36 He .. putte a space of thre daies weye bitwix hem and his dowtir
husboond.
1300 Cursor M. 6980 air faith lasted littel space.
1782 Cowper Gilpin 242 The turnpike gates again Flew open in short space.
Other examples with spatial (locative) phrases:
How far is it to your birthday?
Christmas is just around the bend.
However, on closer examination we are led to the conclusion that what is spatial about those
expressions pertains not to space itself, but to objects (which are spatial structures themselves) in space
(objects are far away or round the bend), and thus should be interpreted in terms of time is an object
metaphor. Such an interpretation was first proposed in Lakoff and Johnson (1980:Ch. 9). They explain
examples like The time will come when…, The time for action has arrived, Time flies, etc. in terms of
time is a moving object metaphor, with all the consequences like assigning time a front-back
orientation. They also propose that time is stationary and we move through it, illustrated by such
examples as As we go through the years…, We are approaching the end of the year, etc. The latter
examples clearly indicate that time is conceptualized as a container through which we pass, and every
container is first an object. The container interpretation of time gets support from other examples with
prepositions of containment: In the future, in the year 2002, I will be back within 5 minutes, inside (of)
an hour, etc.
The time as object metaphor is also obvious in Lakoff’s (1993) words quoted above when, albeit
somewhat inconsistently, Lakoff admits that “time should be understood in terms of things and
motion.” (emphasis A.S.) the latter of which I understand as “things in motion”. If we accept
Langacker’s (1986) distinction between conceptually independent things, and conceptually dependent
relations, we will necessarily arrive at a conclusion, that motion as a relation is dependent on things,
and thus objects (things) are left as the ultimate source domain of space as well as of time.
I wish to add here that many analyses of time as space are incorrect and lead to wrong conclusions.
According to Radden (2005), Lakoff (1993) is among those who describe the metaphor based on the
‘time as motion’ model as time passing is motion of an object.
It has to be emphasized that Lakoff does not say that ‘time is motion’. It is passing that is motion,
in other words ‘passing time is an object in motion’. Secondly, Lakoff explicitly writes that “time
should be understood in terms of things and motion.” (emphasis A.S.), in my opinion, to be interpreted
as “‘motion’ of those things”.
I think that Radden’s ‘time as motion’ model is ill-conceived. In section 7. of his article ‘”Time” as
“motion”’, Radden writes that “When asked to explain the notion of “time” people will invariably
make use of expressions of motion: time passes, flows, goes by, etc. Moreover, people commonly view
time as moving from the past via the present to the future. But it is not only time that moves,
…” (Radden 2005: 114). Radden’s explanation is inconsistent in that time cannot be a moving object
and the motion itself at the same time. Radden’s examples, time passes, flows, goes by, show very
clearly that time is not motion. Time is an object which undergoes various modes of motion. In most
cases it is conceptualized as an animate object which goes by, comes. arrives, flies, creeps, strolls, runs,
rushes, time is a healer and avenger, time can be killed, etc.

The analysis of the material sense of space presented above indisputably shows that the ultimate
source domain for space is material object.
For time, if we accept the “time is space” metaphor, we could postulate that if time is space and
space is an object, then time is an object. However, we need not take that complex, roundabout route. It
is much easier to postulate that the underlying metaphor for time is simply time is an object as above
examples evidently demonstrate.

4. Objectification
All those examples clearly show that we conceptualize space, in all its senses, in terms of material
objects, the only entities accessible to our senses on which all cognition is founded. The theory in
which the ultimate source of metaphorization are physical objects has been called objectification and
has been developed by the present author in a number of papers (Szwedek 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a,
2004b, 2007, 2008). The term objectification is used in its common OED sense: “The action of
objectifying, or condition of being objectified; an instance of this, an external thing in which an idea,
principle, etc. is expressed concretely”.
That fundamental claim, that the ultimate source of metaphorization is the level of material objects,
the only entities accessible to our senses. is based on four arguments: the cultural model of the Great
Chain of Being (as a model of people’s conceptualization of the world), Kotarbiński’s (1929) reism,
neuroembryological evidence, and linguistic expressions reflecting conceptualization.

4.1.The Great Chain of Being, introduced to linguistics in Lakoff and Turner (1989), is adopted here
in its reduced form of four levels proposed by Krzeszowski (1997: 67).

properties material life instincts reason

levels substance
Humans + + + +
 Animals + + +
Plants + +
Inorganic Things +

If, as is generally claimed, that cultural model represents our experience of the world, it is necessary to
emphasize three points:
i) material substance is the only property shared by all levels;
ii) there is no place for non-physical phenomena, abstract entities and relations such as, for
example, states, activities, events, etc.;
iii) i) and ii) lead to an obvious and clear conclusion that our fundamental, ordinary, everyday
cognition is the cognition of physical objects.
We overlook the importance of those obvious facts because, as Lakoff and Turner (1989) wrote,
this model “is largely unconscious and so fundamental to our thinking that we barely notice it” (1989:
167) (see also the neuroembryological evidence discussed below).

4.2. In 1929 Tadeusz Kotarbiński, a Polish philosopher, introduced reism on the basis of his criticism of
Aristotelian categories. He suggested
…at least tentatively, adopting a stance in which all categories are reduced to the category of
things. […] … every “name” which is not a name of a thing, we take to be an illusory name. Let
us take states, first. However, it will be better in this case not to use the word “state”, but the
word “event”, equivalent to the word “state” in a more general sense which we have in mind
here. (1929:71). (tr. A.S.)

He then proceeded to illustrate his claim with the following example:

And here are other true sentences about “events”: “The eruption of Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii
and Herculaneum”, […], etc. etc. We answer that only externally are those sentences about
events. In fact, we have here only substitute phrases of such expressions as: […] “Vesuvius
erupted so that it destroyed Pompeii and Herculaneum”, and so on. All so-called names of
events disappeared […]. Confessing this we can in a few words express our view and say that no
object is an event, because only illusorily (never in reality) can we utter a true sentence about an
event. […] Since therefore, to say “N exists” – is only to say “A certain object is N”, therefore,
in other words, we can express our view in the sentence: “Events do not exist”. Thus evaporates
the whole category of objects which would be events (1929:70-71).

And he concluded:
In consequence of that reduction it turns out that there are no other objects except things, in
other words – every object is a thing, whatever is, is a thing. […] However, it needs to be
emphasised clearly here that by a thing we do not understand only an inanimate block. To the
contrary – there are things inanimate, as well as animate, soulless, as well as “endowed with
psychic life”, thus both things in the narrower sense of the word, as well as people.” So much
about the reduction of the category of objects to the category of things. The position of such a
reduction can be called r e i s m” (1929: 75).

Comparing the Great Chain of Being and Kotarbiński’s reism one cannot help noticing a striking
similarity in their final conclusion that the basis of all our understanding and experience is the world of
physical objects and that physical experience is the basis and point of reference for all other possible
kinds of experience and conceptualisation.
In that situation it is quite remarkable that in our everyday communication the level of objects is
absent. We never say: „Oh, it’s an object, and it is a pen”, „It’s an object and it’s a cow”, etc.
It simply means that we take that level for granted to the extent that we are unaware of its
existence. This is also observed in linguistic discussions of image schemata such as container, path,
link, balance, etc. which have been analysed quite frequently and in detail. The object schema is only
listed as one of many, but, with one exception (Krzeszowski 1991), no attempt has been made to
describe it in any detail.
Why we are not aware of that level, and why that level is absent from thought and language, was
simply and brilliantly elucidated by Wittgenstein (1953):
„The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes.)” (1953:30)

4.3. There is also strong neurological evidence supporting Wittgenstein’s lucid observation. It explains
the absence of the object–level in thought and language in terms of the depth of embedding of object-
schema in our cognition.
In the physical world, the most fundamental property of objects is density of matter – density
which is the basis for the identification of surface, size, weight, shape, etc. The only sense that allows
us to experience density, and consequently surface, weight, etc. is touch (for an extensive discussion of
the sense of touch see Hatwell, Streri and Gentaz 2003; see also Szwedek 2000 for knowing is touching
metaphor in a number of languages).
Touch is also unique among the senses in that it is the only whole-body sense, it is the only
physical-contact sense, and in that the touching-organs, hands and mouth have the biggest neuronal
representation in the brain (cf. sensory and motor homunculus models).
However, more importantly, it is the most fundamental and primeval of all senses. It develops as
early as the 8th week of pregnancy and thus simultaneously with the formation of the neural system
(also in the 8th week). It is a clear evidence that the sense of touch is programmed earliest and at the
deepest level of the neural system.
Evidence from the phylogenetic development of mankind, from physical objects to ideas, and
ontogenetic development of neural system of individuals clearly show the neural depth of embedding
of the physical object schema, its primeval character, and in consequence explain its absence from our
consciousness, from thought and language.
In their development, our ancestors first limited their communication to physical objects. With
evolution they developed mental and emotional worlds which with time became equally, if not more
important than the physical world. While developing abstract concepts in metaphysical worlds, they
naturally based on what had been known to them, i.e. the physical objects and their properties.
A parallel development is also seen in the development of writing – from very concrete –
pictographic to abstract – ideographic system.
Those abstract worlds are not accessible to our senses; we can only perceive physical symptoms
accompanying mental processes and emotional states.
Despite that inaccessibility, people are rarely short of words to talk about thoughts and emotions
without restraint.

4.4. And finally, there is linguistic evidence, as the example below clearly show, that supports my
claim about objectification. The concept of thought that I have chosen as an illustration has all the
conceptual complexities - it is not only definitely non-physical, inaccessible to our senses, but, what is
more, it is processual in nature. We first have to somehow break up the process of thinking, identify a
segment of it, form a concept of that segment as an object with all adequate properties and then assign
some language expressions which we will use to refer to the concept and its properties. Thus it is a
good example to adequately illustrate the issue of linguistic representation of the non-physical worlds,
as well as the relation between the physical and non-physical worlds.

– thought is an object:
We have thoughts, take thoughts, give thoughts, abandon thoughts, thoughts can be scattered,
gathered or collected, suspended, etc., exactly like any physical objects.
– thought is a container:
We can be deep or lost in thoughts. Thoughts can be deep, etc.
– thought is a moving object:
Thoughts can be passing, moving or fleeting.
– thoughts have properties like physical objects:
Thoughts can have weight, can be weighty or hard, dark, brilliant, clear and gloomy.
thoughts can be counted: We can have many thoughts, first thought, second thought and
last thought.
– thoughts are animate objects:
Thoughts can be dangerous, happy, sober; Thoughts are born, cross one’s mind, and
strike. Thoughts are born (the birth of thought).
– thoughts are a reading matter: We read thought.
– thoughts, like all physical objects, have spatial orientation: current of thoughts, train of
thoughts, next, last thought.
– thoughts, like objects, can be evaluated: They can be good or bad, evil, wicked and sinful.

5. Conclusions
Up to now all studies on metaphors have focused on the source domain of many concepts such as
time, thought, love, fear, etc. pointing at space as the ultimate source domain. But nobody so far has
attempted to investigate the concept of space as a target domain and ask a question what might be the
source domain of space. This is quite odd as space, which in itself is non-physical, should be the prime
candidate for such an analysis. The reason of that situation probably is that space has commonly been
confused with the totality of objects (also spatial, i.e. three-dimensional, in themselves). The present
paper argues that if all our cognition has a bodily basis, then it is not space that is accessible to our
senses and that constitutes the ultimate source domain. It is the physical objects (both animate and
inanimate) that are the only entities accessible to our senses and it is the physical object that is the
ultimate source domain of space, time and other concepts.
The position that the physical object is the ultimate source domain is called objectification, the first
step in all metaphorical processes. The term objectification is used in its common OED sense as “The
action of objectifying, or condition of being objectified; an instance of this, an external thing in which
an idea, principle, etc. is expressed concretely”.
One consequence is that if we accept objectification, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) typology into
structural, orientational and ontological metaphors will lose sense, as structure and orientation are
aspects of objects (ontology), and therefore structural and orientational metaphors derive naturally from
objectification. What, however, will remain a problem is the issue of which aspects of objects are
inherited along with objectification and which are not or even cannot.

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