electronics

Article
Toward Building Smart Contract-Based Higher Education
Systems Using Zero-Knowledge Ethereum Virtual Machine
Dénes László Fekete 1 and Attila Kiss 1,2, *

1 Department of Information Systems, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, 1117 Budapest, Hungary
2 Department of Informatics, János Selye University, 945 01 Komárno, Slovakia
* Correspondence: [email protected]

Abstract: The issuing and verification of higher education certificates, including all higher education
documents, still functions in a costly and inappropriately bureaucratic manner. Blockchain technology
provides a more secure and consistent way to revolutionize the widely used generalized mechanisms
and system concepts. In this paper, the most necessary requirements are examined regarding a
blockchain-based higher education system, based on the most well-known research papers. Moreover,
the opportunities of working on an education system by maintaining a decentralized structure
organization are recommended as well. This paper recommends the most suitable blockchain
scaling solution for the architecture of an education system which uses the most state-of-the-art EVM
(Ethereum virtual machine) compatible approach to implement the higher education system with all
the predefined requirements. It is proven that the explained smart contract-based higher education
system, which uses zkEVM (zero-knowledge Ethereum virtual machine), consists of all necessary
functionalities and satisfies all predefined requirements. In fact, the recommended system, by using a
modular blockchain structure, implements all the functionality and capability of the examined related
works in one system, namely GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), which is compatible and
more secure.

Keywords: higher education system; verification; smart contract; security; decentralization;

Citation: Fekete, D.L.; Kiss, A. blockchain; zero-knowledge proof; Ethereum virtual machine
Toward Building Smart
Contract-Based Higher Education
Systems Using Zero-Knowledge
Ethereum Virtual Machine.
1. Introduction
Electronics 2023, 12, 664. https://
doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030664 Academic documents, degrees, and certifications provide undoubtable proof of a
student’s competence and accomplishments. The long-term tamper-proof ownership and
Academic Editors: Xiangjie Kong,
validation of these documents play a vital role in a student’s academic and professional
Priyadarsi Nanda and Ana Rosa
career. The responsibility of issuing, storing, and archiving these documents falls in
Cavalli
some manner onto HEIs (higher education institutions), which also usually determine,
Received: 9 January 2023 define, and modify the used framework and formats. The issuing and verification of these
Revised: 24 January 2023 documents are highly dependent on the given HEIs’ financial and geopolitical state [1]. The
Accepted: 26 January 2023 increasingly digitized world, having come about as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,
Published: 28 January 2023 requires total digital access to all documents and services accessible previously. However,
digitization does not by default imply stronger and more secure technological systems [2,3].
Overcoming these issues necessitates the use of the most accurate state-of-the-art technology
in a global system to achieve the expected requirements before and after graduation.
Copyright: © 2023 by the authors.
The goal of this research paper is to use a modular blockchain stack and zkEVM
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
(zero-knowledge Ethereum virtual machine) to create a permissionless verifiable education
This article is an open access article
system in which the trust assumption can be lower between the entities and stakeholders
distributed under the terms and
than in other education systems known so far. Furthermore, the hybrid approach can
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
reduce the attack vector and minimizes the possibility of malicious behavior.
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
From the point of view of verification, it is important to store as much data as possible
4.0/).
about students on-chain [4–6]. Thus, the history of the academic interactions of students

Electronics 2023, 12, 664. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030664 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/electronics

Electronics 2023, 12, 664 2 of 39

can be traced back and validated. The verifiability of the related previous events also
contributes to the verifiability of the current event. Therefore, it is essential to define
the possible interactions (functionalities). Moreover, due to the immutable characteris-
tic of the blockchain, there is a greater possibility to understand and support students’
interactions [7–9] before, during, and after their learning process [10]. In addition, the pro-
posed system provides users control of their data, and as such they can self-manage their
digital data in a self-sovereign manner.
The structure of this paper is shown in Figure 1. Firstly, the current state of certification,
of verification, and issuing is presented. In the next section, the current higher education
research papers related to blockchain technology are examined. During the examination,
the necessary requirements and essential functionalities for the recommended system are
determined based on the surveys. After that, the concepts related to blockchain technology
and the corresponding scaling solutions are briefly introduced, which are essential for
understanding the later discussed design concept. After these, the components of the
modular structure-based higher education system are introduced. A PoC (Proof of Concept)
application is introduced, which is based on the recommended system. Then, the details of
the recommended system are analyzed and discussed. Then, in the end, the future work
and the corresponding possibilities are explained.

Figure 1. The structure of the paper.

Electronics 2023, 12, 664 3 of 39

2. The Current State of Certification Issuing

Examining European trends based on the information available on Eurostat, on av-
erage 4.5 million people receive a higher-education diploma every year in Europe. Be-
tween 2002 and 2016, the number of people who obtained a degree aged between 30 and
34 years old consistently increased. At the end of the examined period, this number had
increased by 16% [11]. The labor market clearly demands and highly values [12] job-seekers
who have one or more degrees. It is a necessary requirement for applicants who wish to
work in their desired field. The processing time of these submitted applications is signifi-
cantly high, due to the time-consuming method of authentication and the communication
between assumed trusted third parties. In fact, this kind of process usually debits former
students with financial obligations. Despite today’s ‘instant world’, this process requires an
inordinate amount of time and trust in untrusted third parties.
The official certification and proof of professional qualifications immediately provide
better opportunities and further possibilities in the labour market; there is a proven parallel
and correlation between the two [12,13]. Migration statistics reveal that close to 30% of first-
and second-generation migrants possess a higher education degree. This trend implies the
necessity of interoperability, which is transferable over borders and between HEIs. This
necessity is highly important for them in the short (between HEIs) and long (certification
validation in other countries) term. The success of interoperability does not depend on only
one HEI, as the connection network is more complex and the number of corresponding
entities is enormous. Low-income countries have a giant drawback from a financial point
of view in maintaining and managing an up-to-date educational information system, as a
result of their unstable political regimes, for example.
The necessity for effortless interoperability between HEIs in different countries can also
be observed in Erasmus mobility in Europe as well. During this program, HEIs send their
own students or receive students from foreign HEIs for HEI part-time education, at most
one year. A mandatory requirement of this program is the accreditation of the received
credits from the foreign university at the university of origin [14]. Without any global
verification system, this process requires significant avoidable administration. However,
there is already a defined unified credit system and format [15] between European HEIs.
The used framework for supporting this process of accreditation is not widespread and it is
also not fully automated. There is no connection between this framework and the HEIs’
information system.

2.1. Verifications
The main limitation of the current certification verifications is the time-consuming,
high-cost, and inefficient process regarding problematic ownership guarantees. A lack of
transparency and availability, as well as the dependency on a trusted third party during
the verification process, are common [16].
The adoption of digitalization started a decade ago. Storage and verification hap-
pen simultaneously in the online space, but trust in this kind of system is still low and
ambiguous as a result of system errors, crashes, and hacking [17]. In general, an HEI
uses different types of customer relationship management software and stores important
information in more than one database. This type of traditional approach results in a
fully centralized system where only the system maintainer controls the whole system [18].
A more distributed approach is indispensable for strong consistency in student information,
smooth communication between entities, and simple certification verification.
In this corresponding paper [19], the researchers examined the verification habits
through well-defined corresponding interview questions. The results show that the usual
time period for verification is 12 days. Not only is the current system cost-inefficient,
but it proves to be time-consuming also, as a result of the long verification chain. Another
interesting result from this paper is that in the current digital world people still prefer
paper-based certifications and attempt to validate the certainty of this form. Only in one of
four cases arose the need for any further validation from the issuing HEI.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 4 of 39

Both HEIs and students require the ability to prove that the legally authorized en-
tity is in fact the issuer of a given certification [20]. Without it, verification cannot be
considered complete.
An incomplete approach to educational systems is one in which the system does not
include all available information about all students. The tracking of learning and actions
of each student is necessary, as this is evidence of their performance for the student, HIS,
and an external entity [21].

2.2. Certification Fraud

The fabrication of official certificates, most often a degree, happens in the labour
market during a job application. CV fraud has negative consequences for all participating
entities. It has negative impacts on the successful or the unsuccessful enrollment [22].
The previously mentioned statistic [19] points to how accessible and easy it is to commit
this type of crime. Due to the previously mentioned statistics, since certifications embody
values, applicants either lie about their skills and certifications or seek the black market.
In this way, the black market generates continuously increasing profits year to year [23].
The United States leads globally in the number of illegitimate institutions with more
than 300 currently in operation and also has more than 2 million fake degree certificates in
circulation according to Grolleau [24]. It is followed by the United Kingdom, in which about
270 fake institutions operate [25]. These cases are not standalone; in Australia, up to 35%
of candidates submitted falsified academic credentials in job applications [26]. Globally,
the ACFEs (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners) found that 41% of job applicants
submit fraudulent certificates annually [16]. A similar survey found that misleading or
fictitious educational credentials and experience were presented by most candidates [16].
The fight against and the preparation for certification fraud is a necessary, although sig-
nificant (GBP 40,000 a year) expense for larger companies, as it can address the inequality
between the competing candidates and the dishonest manner of the selection process [19,27].
Globally, the cost to organizations of certificate fraud can reach around USD 600 billion
every year [26].
It follows from the above findings that the problem of certification fraud has reached
serious and alarming proportions and needs to be addressed urgently. An enormous
number of research papers and statistics imply that the success of a reliable verification
system is unavoidable for certifications due to industrial pressure.

2.3. Certificate Issuing with Blockchain Technology

Considering the current situation, HEIs are using traditional centralized applications
and databases. Thus, the entities in the system raise concerns regarding the real level of
privacy and note the absence of control over their interactions and data, and as a result,
suffer the disadvantage of the centralized structure [28].
Achieving security, privacy, trust, and equality in the present century can be achieved
with blockchain technology. Higher education is an area where the application of blockchain
can provide users with a wide range of benefits, helping to promote mobility and avoiding
hierarchic bureaucracy, anxieties, and hardships [29].
Personal data are not under the control of any third-party organization. From a privacy
perspective, certificates are much more susceptible to data leaks in terms of personal
information [30]. The core requirements [30] for an education system, which can be fulfilled
with the use of blockchain technology, are strong links between entities, secure sharing,
improved visibility, and certification of authenticity. However, in addition to these, we must
pay attention to the resolution of the five limitations [16] mentioned by the authors that are
present in traditional verification systems. This is all to eliminate the dependence on third
parties, in order to have the verification process be more cost-effective and time-efficient
and to develop a system in which ownership means an actual owner, not a dependence on
the issuer.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 5 of 39

3. Related Works
3.1. Functional Categorization
The application of blockchain technology in higher education is a rather actively
researched area. Several surveys and reviews have been written in this field, but only some
of them have the exact categorization of research papers. These collected surveys [31–35]
categorize research papers on the higher education field into different categories according
to their functionalities.
It is necessary to examine these categories because some categories do not belong to
the traditional HEI system or there is an overlap between several categories. Specific func-
tionalities such as providing feedback services, job opportunities, cooperative learning (new
network of cooperation between students and professors in [35]), and secure content library
described in [31–33] are not further explained or considered, as a smart contract-based
system implies the implementation realities of each functionality. Thus, these functionali-
ties do not have fundamental requirements against the design of the system architecture.
Based on a well-designed open higher education system, the mentioned functions can
be implemented as external services, as they are not embedded in the higher education
system nor part of the basic processes of the higher education system. The accreditation of
educational institutions [35] are not corresponding to the HEI system because this is on a
higher level of abstraction.
The protection of intellectual property (copyrights) mentioned in [31,35] is not further
explained, since this functionality is not the task of a generalized education system which
is used by an HEI to fulfil and solve this problem. Global, worldwide systems are used for
solving this problem which is independent of the higher education system [36,37].
The remaining categories make up the functional requirements of an education system
that can verify all related information from the first interaction of a student to the last
interaction. These functionalities help to determine which interactions are required on-
chain to create a more trusted system. The categories from the mentioned surveys are
presented in Table 1. These categories can be transformed into five new functionalities:
• Certificates issuing and verification;
• Student assessments and exams;
• Data management;
• Credit transfer/interoperability;
• Admissions;
• Payments.

Table 1. The different categorizations from surveys.

Author Title Categorizations

Alammary Blockchain-based appli- • Certificates management
(2019) cations in education: A • Competencies and learning outcomes management
systematic review [31] • Evaluating students’ professional ability
• Securing collaborative learning environment
• Protecting learning objects
• Fees and credits transfer
• Obtaining digital guardianship consent
• Competitions management
• Copyrights management
• Enhancing students’ interactions in e-learning
• Supporting lifelong learning
Loukil Blockchain adoption in • Certificate/degree verification and revocation
(2021) education: A systematic • User-centric educational record management
literature review [32] • Students’ professional ability evaluation
• Blockchain-based educational institute systems
• Online learning environment
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 6 of 39

Table 1. Cont.

Author Title Categorizations

Hameed A review of blockchain- • Content library
(2019) based educational • Storage of personal data
projects [33] • E-certificate
• Scoring system
• B2B approach
• Token system
• Cooperative learning
• Job opportunities
• Providing feedback services
Awaji Blockchain-based appli- • Certificate/degree verification
(2020) cations in higher educa- • Student assessments and exams
tion: A systematic map- • Credit transfer
ping study [34] • Data management
• Admissions
• Review papers
Fedorova Application of • Issue and storage of certificates and diplomas
(2020) blockchain technology • Identification solutions
in higher education [35] • Protection of intellectual property
• New network of cooperation between students and
their professors
• Formation of an academic passport (portfolio)
• Payment for studies with a cryptocurrency
• Accreditation of educational institutions
• Administration of the educational process

3.1.1. Certificates Issuing and Verification

The most discussed field in the application of blockchain technology in higher educa-
tion [38,39] is the issuing and verification of certificates. During the verification process
of a certification, a third party, one which is not the owner and not the issuer, wants to
validate the authenticity of the certificate whilst avoiding any privacy concerns the owner
may have, and any trust assumption regarding the issuer. In addition to the degree, all the
issuing and verification of official documents which correspond to a student are included
as a requirement. In general, the most common approach is to separate the verification and
all other functionalities into different systems. Thus, a hash of certification appears in the
decentralized network with an identifiable and unverifiable history by an external event.
In the better cases, they usually try to compress the hashes through different compression
mechanisms to approach a more cost-efficient solution but to also create a strong trust
assumption with a third party during a business-to-business process. An overview of the
examined papers is presented in Table 2.
Currently, the dissemination of non-standard standards continues, foregoing the use
of blockchain technology, for example, BADGR and Mozilla Open Badge within the EU
(European Union) [40]. The issues of ownership, verification, and interoperability that arise
with this approach could be solved with the use of a general protocol and cryptographic
signatures. At some universities, the issuing of blockchain-based digital certificates is
currently being tested in parallel with the traditional system, such as at the Malta College
of Arts, Science & Technology, where the Blockcerts-based [41] digital certificates system
is used [42], or The University of Nicosia and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
where the mentioned standard was first implemented and used [42,43].
Independently of HEIs, various research groups are also actively addressing this
topic in order to achieve a stronger and more secure decentralized system with a higher
transaction rate [44]. In this paper, the verification and sharing of issued certifications are
conducted using smart contracts in a blockchain network. Important personal data are
still stored in a centralized database, but verification can be achieved in a peer-to-peer
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 7 of 39

network. Furthermore, the cost of the transactions is high due to the necessary constant
communication with the smart contracts, as the Ethereum ecosystem is neither optimized
nor capable of these types of operations and interactions.
During verification, independent user validation is typically missing and only the
shared paper includes personal data. Privacy concerns are rather common [45,46] due
to the public characteristics of the blockchain, the usage of which, by default, cannot be
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) compatible. In the first place, few document
management systems deal exclusively with GDPR compliance. Due to the lack of personal
data and user validation, it is difficult to establish a clear correspondence between the
certificate and its owner.
The issuance of certification can be due to an event, the logic of which is coded in
a smart contract. This event can be initiated by an HEI or a student [47,48]. In this way,
a more automatic and transparent issuing system can be implemented, where a student is
responsible for their own certification process and state in a self-sovereign manner. This
process can be further improved from a security perspective by using only on-chain data,
since there is no invalid or untrusted data which is coming from outside the system [49].
Another approach is possible by using multi-signature contracts [4], in which an event is
approved by entities with the appropriate rights, thereby reducing fraud from a single
point of failure.

Table 2. Certificates issuing and verification summary table.

Author Title Findings

Rahardja Immutable Ubiquitous Digital Certificate Encryption by public key, permissioned network
(2021) Authentication Using Blockchain Proto- between HEIs
col [46]
Cheng Blockchain and smart contract for digital Randomly generated unique id, the Ethereum
(2018) certificate [47] Mainnet, files in a centralized database
Srivastava A Distributed Credit Transfer Ed- Centralized key distribution, permission network,
(2018) ucational Framework based on the longest chain problem, no smart contract capa-
blockchain [4] bility, no encryption
Han (2018) A novel blockchain-based education Files in a centralized database, permissioned net-
record-verification solution [44] work, smart contract-based policies
Kistaubayev Ethereum-Based information System for Files in a centralized database, smart contract
(2022) Digital Higher Education Registry and based on the Ethereum Mainnet
Verification of Student Achievement Doc-
uments [6]
Ayub Khan Educational Blockchain: A Secure Degree Permissioned Hyperledger Fabric network be-
(2021) Attestation and Verification Traceability tween HEIs, encryption for public storing
Architecture for Higher Education Com-
mission [39]
Vidal (2020) Blockchain application in higher educa- Hashes in a decentralized network, reliable times-
tion diploma management and results tamps for revocation
analysis [38]

3.1.2. Student Assessments and Exams

Well-designed student assessment and exam functionalities in the system provide a
secure communication platform for students and teachers. They facilitate the establishment
of a more transparent mode of examination [5,50,51], but reduce the possibilities regarding
forms of exams, as only questions with multiple-choice can be automated, as the correction
of an essay form of the exam requires the interaction of an external entity with the given
smart contract. This breaks the intention of automatization. In traditional HEI structures,
there is little chance of this form of examination being fully adapted [52], but the usage of
smart contracts to increase the performance of administrative tasks related to courses is
fully suitable. It can help student admissions to given courses and help teachers with the
administrative work related to courses [5,15,53,54]. In addition, a student can easily submit
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 8 of 39

a verifiable certification related to their courses with a chosen entity. A summary of the
examined papers is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Student assessments and exams summary table.

Author Title Findings

Morisio Blockchain6based storage of students ca- Permissioned Ethereum network, centralized key
(2018) reer [54] distribution, smart contract-based policies
Wu (2021) The application framework of blockchain Permissioned network, a new contract for each
technology in higher education based on new task or exam
the smart contract [53]
Turkanović EduCTX: A blockchain-based higher ed- Permissioned network between HEIs, centralized
(2018) ucation credit platform [15] key distribution, centralized third-party service,
tokenization
Lizcano Blockchain-based approach to create a Permissionless network, not a traditional ap-
(2020) model of trust in open and ubiquitous proach, a new structure for HEIs
higher education [52]
Shen (2018) Research on online quiz scheme based on Permissioned network, double-layer consortium
double-layer consortium blockchain [51] blockchain, single quiz
Ramos- Blockchain and smart contracts for edu- Permissioned network, generated correction key
Sosa (2020) cation [50]
Bhosale Revolutionizing Verification and Man- Permissioned network, dependency from the gov-
(2021) agement of Educational Certificates with ernment
Self-Sovereign Student Identities using
Blockchain [55]
Haïdar AM The future of university education: Ex- Permissioned network, almost all functional re-
(2021) amination, transcript, and certificate sys- quirements
tem using blockchain [5]

3.1.3. Data Management

Many different types of data management techniques appear in higher education
systems, as shown in Table 4. The architecture of data management can be in a centralized
or decentralized manner. From the point of view of the main blockchain, the data are stored
on-chain or off-chain. From a privacy point of view, they are either fully public or fully
private, or the given storage format of the data is GDPR-compatible. The most common
problem is the public on-chain storage of all data, which, in addition to having many
privacy concerns, is also an extremely expensive approach [56]. In a permissioned manner,
a centralized distributed system is implemented with blockchain characteristics [57,58].
The solutions mentioned in the papers [38,59,60] are less secure compared to a decentralized
approach due to this centralized characteristic. Forged certificates are easier due to a too
high trust assumption in centralized backend databases, which causes single-point-of-
failure concerns as well. Moreover, revocation and verification are also impossible if
malicious behavior is present in the system.

3.1.4. Credit Transfer/Interoperability

The need for simple interoperability between HEIs and the sharing of student data, such
as transcripts of records with credits, has been present for decades. The need is constantly
increasing due to the growing popularity and emergence of new exchange programs.
Data management mechanisms and the possibilities of effortless interoperability are
closely related, since well-designed data management carries within itself simple wide-
spread adaptation and interoperability as well. The adoption of completely unnecessary
blockchain functionalities and protocols can be found among currently available research
papers. An HEI credit in itself has an exact value by definition which is not transferable
and non-fungible. It symbolizes a student’s completion of a certain course. The work [4]
tries to bridge the problem of interoperability using a tokenized implementation of credit
transfers. In another research paper [15], a similarly tokenized approach was used for
HEI credits, but following the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System. Both
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 9 of 39

of the mentioned approaches are based on storing transcripts of records. Thus, there is
the opportunity to transfer credits, the corresponding information of courses, and all data
about a given course, between HEIs with verifiable proof and strong transparency.

Table 4. Data management summary table.

Author Title Findings

Santos A Decentralized Approach to Block- Based on Blockcert, revocation capability,
(2019) certs Credential Revocation [59] on the Ethereum Mainnet
Ataşen Blockchain-Based Digital Certifica- Smart contracts on the Ethereum Mainnet,
(2020) tion Platform: CertiDApp [56] files in a centralized database
Zhai TVS: a trusted verification scheme Storing and verification on a permissioned
(2022) for office documents based on HyperLedger Fabric network
blockchain [57]
Das (2022) A blockchain-based integrated doc- Version-controlling system on a permis-
ument management framework for sioned HyperLedger Fabric network, files
construction applications [58] in a centralized database

3.1.5. Admissions
The application process for an HEI can often be problematic and opaque. Applicants
often do not know what requirements they must meet and what official documents they
must submit to become successful applicants. This task is often the duty of the HEI’s
information system if there is no centralized national system in use. With the use of
blockchain technology in this field, there is the opportunity to monitor and follow the
real-time application status and have greater visibility over the application process [61].
In the research paper [62], instead of the Indian scholarship system, a smart contract-based
system is proposed, which eliminates the inconsistencies of the current system and provides
the possibility to follow and monitor processes. In addition to all this, a well-defined HEI
admission system can simply facilitate the registration of new students [63]. This usually
involves a student’s public key registration supervised by an authority or a group of
authorities. During both mentioned processes, it is important that the data management
privacy aspect satisfies the given requirements. An overview of the examined papers is
presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Admissions and payments summary table.

Author Title Findings

Mori (2019) Digital university admission ap- Permissioned Ethereum network, tok-
plication system with study doc- enization, on-chain storing
uments using smart contracts on
blockchain [63]
Bedi (2020) Smart contract-based central sector Permissioned Ethereum network, sup-
scheme of scholarship for college porting payments
and university students [62]
Curmi (2018) Blockchain-based certificate verifica- Smart contracts on the Ethereum Main-
tion platform [61] net, centralized service
Rooksby (2017) Trustless education? A blockchain Smart contracts on the Ethereum Main-
system for university grades [64] net, supporting payments, tokenization
Rashid (2019) TEduChain: A platform for crowd- Permissioned network, supporting pay-
sourcing tertiary education fund us- ments
ing blockchain technology [65]
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 10 of 39

3.1.6. Payments
Despite the fact that the use of blockchain technology is closely related to the fields of
accounting and finance [21,27,66], it is rarely present in the applications of the examined
research papers that focus on one problem. Payment transaction support is not the usual
functionality of a blockchain-based educational system. Despite this, there are continuous
and regular cash flows within the HEIs and with entities outside the HEIs. Currently, trans-
actions within the HEI are carried out with the help of a trusted third party and accounting
approval. This time-consuming process results in great dependence, inconsistency? and
impenetrability, as mentioned in the paper [62]. The most common approach regarding this
category is very futuristic, as self-issuing cryptocurrency [67] referred to as the “learn to
earn” mechanism is usually used and implemented in blockchain-based education systems.
With the help and motivation of tokens as money, the students are encouraged to achieve
better results, to work in groups, or to do more social work [64]. This inspiration capital can
come from external organizations [65,68], outside of the HEI. Even now, there are various
scholarship possibilities. There is no need to create a new scheme or mechanism. It is
more appropriate to concentrate on other aspects of this field, as a given HEI can simply
process payment transactions within the institution itself without an untrusted third party.
The payment support results in a more secure system with less trust assumption and less
human administrative work.

3.2. Challenges
The characteristics of Blockchain technology are also its main challenges, which must
be overcome in some way or another as they are fundamentally not suitable for application
in a higher education system. The mentioned surveys overview the main challenges of
blockchain technology adoption in an HEI.

3.2.1. Privacy
Due to their architectural approaches, education systems based on blockchain tech-
nology do not have complete anonymity. Ledger history, all transaction data, can be
traced back by everybody, as everything is public and there is no privacy protection imple-
mented. Moreover, the use of any kind of privacy protection always has corresponding
cost overheads. Some aspects, for example private smart contracts, have no straightfor-
ward implementation, due to their very complex and complicated requirements. From a
higher education system’s point of view, it is imperative that users should be capable of
maintaining their privacy regarding their transactions and their data [44].

3.2.2. Immutability
Due to the characteristics of blockchain technology, we cannot withdraw data from
the database, since the mutually dependent block structure immutably [38] does not make
this possible. For this reason, data protection in an on-chain manner is impossible due to
the limitations of the user’s operations and the lack of privacy protection.

3.2.3. Blockchain Usability

Regarding user adaptation, it is an inescapable challenge to make new technology easy
to use. The user must fulfill many complicated and complex prerequisites in order to be able
to interact with the blockchain-based network. Challenges that arise in blockchain usability
depend on the user, and since there is a lack of necessary individual competence, adaptation
cannot be achieved. Based on the interview questions in research papers [19,35], half of
the respondents are unfamiliar with blockchain technology. Moreover, in the research
paper [19], they specifically asked about the knowledge of the wallet which is a mandatory
attribute for the usage of a blockchain network. A total of 30% of the respondents can apply
and use a wallet. It is difficult to solve the problem of a lack of necessary knowledge from
the point of view of technology. The only way is to have a greater focus on application
interface design, to assist and provide a smoother user experience, and the possibility of
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 11 of 39

easier adoption [69]. The support and organizational enthusiasm of the HEI’s management
significantly help blockchain adaptation [70]. Since there is no new functionality, only
the extension of the existing ones, in this case, the adaption of the proposed system is
more simplified [71]. The success of the adaption depends on the users’ motivations and
attitudes toward the use of the new system and operations, but the majority of the academic
community is unaware of this technology [62].

3.2.4. Cost
Every transaction in a decentralized network has a cost, which is not present in a
traditional education system. Furthermore, the architecture is more complex and it has
higher hardware requirements than a traditional approach. Therefore, well-designed
and optimized data management is essential for a cost-efficient system when considering
resource costs and transaction costs [72].

3.2.5. Scalability
In a decentralized network, transaction congestion is a usual event as a result of its
permissionless manner, as has been previously mentioned. Therefore, the time of processing
a transaction and transaction latency increase. Transaction congestion cannot be solved
by a single entity, because the given network is not controlled by a single entity. Only
higher transaction cost can influence the result of transaction processing time. Regarding
the blockchain trilemma, scalability tends to decrease due to the exclusive support of
decentralization and security aspects. As a result, network application fields are reduced
due to scalability limitations and inadequate performance.
The mentioned research papers in the different categories are worrisome in many
places, such as security, scalability, and decentralization. It is difficult to adapt privacy-
sensitive data into a blockchain system so that the system can be well interoperable between
several entities, as well as having an appropriate transaction rate for the application.
However, with a suitable modular architecture and the determination and variety of the
stakeholders and entities, the system can include the mentioned functionalities and features.
Moreover, it can also fulfill the mentioned requirements and solve the mentioned challenges.

4. Blockchain Basics
Blockchain technology has an enormous number of definitions which spread across the
world wide web, as everybody attempts to take advantage of the current trends and have
it be applicable for their needs. The most accurate definition is that of distributed ledger
technology, which is replicated and shared among the members of a network. The unit of
the distributed system is the immutable block. Decentralization, as a mandatory attribute, is
ambiguous as a result of the various enterprise adaptations and interpretations, as so-called
blockchain-based systems often feature centralized distributed systems. Decentralization is
the basic pillar of technology in the classical sense, and even in later constructed systems
by organizations, decentralization is present at some level. Decentralization is the creation
of a permissionless, open, and trustless network where there is no central authority and
decision-making is community-based. The entities which take part in the maintenance of
the system resolve issues in a democratic way.
The first appearance of blockchain technology was in the Bitcoin White Paper pub-
lished under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [73], in which he described how
cryptography and a distributed ledger technology can be combined into an open digital
currency application. It solved double-spending [74] and permissionless distributed system
security and access problems [75], in which a set of non-trusting writers share a database
with no trusted middleman [76]. The use of a generalized protocol is essential for general
cooperation so that the participants in the system reach a consensus and have a unified
global view of the world state.
Interactions happen through the use of asymmetric cryptography, private and public
keys [77]. The owner of the transaction proves themself by signing the message of their
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 12 of 39

private key. Thus, the network can validate the truth of the transaction with the assistance
of the provided public key in the transaction. The usage of asymmetric key pairs allows
the user to ensure authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation into the network.
Nodes which have the transaction history of the entire system, thus containing all
the blocks of the given network, are referred to as full nodes of the given network. They
broadcast all the received messages through the network to avoid network state inconsis-
tencies. During block creation, the given collected and validated transactions are included
in the current block with the current timestamp, but it cannot be considered final until the
majority of the network has accepted it and until consensus is reached. This is a process
called mining or validation. The miner or validator node broadcasts the last created block
back to the network. The naming of the process and nodes depends on the consensus mech-
anism type. Validation-type consensus mechanisms generally speed up the finalization of
transactions, as conflicting chains can be penalized.

4.1. Smart Contracts

Initially, decentralized systems which were implemented were able to transfer the
assets of the given system between users, which provided developers with a minimal
opportunity for higher overheads and usage. Smart contracts allow the development and
implementation of formal applications based on a decentralized system for more real-world
problems and sectors as well, giving developers and users a completely free hand.
The basic concept can be found in Nick Szabo’s article [78], in which he combines
computer protocols with user interfaces to execute the terms of a contract. A smart contract
is a computer program which has self-verifying, self-executing, tamper-resistant properties.
It allows bytes code to be executed without any third parties on the blockchain [79].
Automatically executing smart contracts provide cost-effective, transparent, and secure
interactions [80].
Every smart contract has an actual valid state [81] which is approved by the nodes of
the network. The states of the smart contracts create the world state of the blockchain-based
network. The input of a smart contract is a transaction, the effect of which causes the
execution of the implemented logic in the contract to change the smart contract’s state.
A given smart contract’s execution can trigger different types of state changes and new
triggers in other contracts in the network.
The best-known smart contract-supported blockchain ecosystem is Ethereum [82],
based on the EVM (Ethereum virtual machine). With this virtual machine, users can define
smart contracts which are written in Turing-complete language and can run them in a
decentralized network. Solidity is the most common high-level programming language
which is translated into a stack-based bytecode language so that the EVM can interpret
it. Compiled bytecodes are stored on the blockchain, but various workflows are available
for auditing and trust [83], providing assurance of the implemented logic in the given
contract. Considering the structure of the Ethereum layers, smart contracts are located
under the application layer, in the contract layer, providing and ensuring decentralized
application functionality.
Regarding Ethereum and smart contracts, it is important to mention that a different
accounting method is used to keep track of user states, compared to Bitcoin. The main
difference is how the state of the system is recorded in the chain. In the case of Bitcoin,
the UTXO (unspent transaction output) accounting method is used. There are no accounts or
wallets. In essence, the transactions between addresses are stored in a directed acyclic graph.
In the case of Ethereum, the account-based model is used as an accounting method [82].
This implementation choice made smart contract support more effusive since smart contract
support is much more difficult with a UTXO accounting method. An account-based model
maintains a database of network states. They are referred to as accounts states. A user’s
private key or the corresponding smart contract can control the corresponding account.
However, the most important part is transaction initiation, as the origin of the whole
interaction process is only a user since a smart contract cannot initiate a process by itself.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 13 of 39

The mentioned double-spending problem is solved by the account-based model since

individual coins cannot be tracked. A replay attack occurs when the receiver sends the
same valid transaction to the Ethereum network repeatedly, ensuring the possibility of
effectively draining the origin sender’s account.
The Nonce account field traces the number of transactions sent from the given account
and prevents the possibility of such fraudulent transactions, thus preventing replay attacks.
Parallelization is more difficult to implement with an account-based account method,
but there are various modern solutions for this drawback [84].

4.2. Trilemma
Due to the decentralized characteristic of blockchain, the CAP (Consistency, Avail-
ability, Partition) theorem [85] used in the world of traditional distributed systems is not
suitable for the examination and categorization of blockchain systems. On the other hand,
in blockchain systems, The scalability trilemma (blockchain trilemma) proposed by Vitalik
Buterin (founder of Ethereum) can be used for similarities, dividends, and characteristic
measurement. Trilemma points out that three important properties of a blockchain system,
involving decentralization, security, and scalability, cannot perfectly co-exist, as shown
in Figure 2. Every project has to deal with this trade-off in order to bring the most favor-
able architectural decisions to reach the most optimal solutions [86]. As presented in the
paper [87], there is no appropriate consensus that can achieve all three simultaneously.
In relation to the consensus mechanism, these corner points can be more practically referred
to as fault tolerance, resource efficiency, and full transferability. It is important that these
corner points are not decisive, binary questions. Different trade-offs can and should be
applied in consideration of the given problem [88].

Figure 2. Blockchain trilemma with the permissioned and permissionless categorizations.

4.2.1. Decentralization
In a more decentralized system, there is no centralized entity that has absolute power
over the system and would independently make important decisions. A decentralized
network is controlled, governed, and directed by the community, the users. Decisions are
voted upon by users of the given network in a community-based manner.
Low trust and low cost can make a network more decentralized. Low trust involves
entities in the network being able to verify all rules separately, as well as independently
computing the latest state. Low cost means that the cost of joining the network and
the threshold criteria of the network are minimal. These attributes define the degree
of decentralization.

4.2.2. Security
Security examination is possible from two points of view, from that of internal and
of external attacks. During an internal attack, the attack is aimed at the consistency of a
network and the strength of its immutability. Typical threats against a blockchain network
are, for example, distributed denial of service attacks, Sybil attacks, collusion attacks,
and penny spend attacks.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 14 of 39

4.2.3. Scalability
Scalability defines the capacity and performance of a given network. This indicates
how many users the given network can serve and how wide it can grow. The two most
talked-about scalability metrics of blockchain scalability are transaction throughput and
transaction confirmation latency. According to the current networks, the appropriate num-
ber of transactions per second for real worldwide adoption has not been reached [89].
However, in the following sections, scaling approaches will be discussed, the use of
which can provide a completely acceptable and appropriate user experience. In addi-
tion, the blockchain trilemma is approached in the most appropriate way. This results in
decentralized scalability achieving higher performance without noticeably increasing the
network’s trust assumptions.

4.3. Permissioned and Permissionless

In relation to the blockchain trilemma, it is important to mention the permissioned
and permissionless categorizations, which differ from one another from the point of view
of decentralization, and thus also conceptually and in adaptation [90]. An entity can
freely join the permissionless network and has full rights, and can take part in network
decision-making without permission. In the case of permissioned networks, the system
is operated by centralized authorities, usually corporations, who maintain the whole
network and determine the decisions about the network. Therefore, all nodes have some
role and permission within the network, which allows them to take part in the network.
A permissioned approach is an increasingly widespread technology in the industry, where
privacy, as well as security and proprietary, are important, [91] due to the higher level
of centralization. From another point of view, a permissioned network is complemented
by an additional security layer, which is responsible for access control and determines
which entity has the right to execute a given operation. This adjunct layer is managed by a
centralized authority [92].
By reducing decentralization and requiring permission from the entities to become
involved in the system, the network immediately achieves security improvements [93,94].
In addition to improving security, better results can be achieved in terms of scalability and
performance [95,96].
It should be noted that the two approaches have different limitations and goals, along
with the fact that they can be used to solve different problems [97]. It is important to
mention the hybrid variant [98], which is a relatively new form. It combines the character-
istics of permissioned and permissionless forms in one network, using them for different
functionalities. In general, the centralized permissioned network uses the decentralized
permissioned network for communication or verification in the hybrid approach [99,100].

4.4. Monolithic and Modular

The most difficult component to satisfy of the trilemma is scalability. In order to
understand the scaling solutions discussed later and the structure of the proposed network
architecture, it is necessary to understand the difference between monolithic and modu-
lar architectures. The monolithic blockchain architecture approach can be divided into
three components:
• Data availability (and consensus);
• Execution;
• Settlement.
In the monolithic approach, all three components are handled and integrated into only
one network. Transaction sharing, ordering, and execution are operated in one network.
This implies strong limitations and makes only horizontal scaling possible [101], which
changes the functionality and protocol of the original network.
On the other hand, the approach of modular architecture makes it possible to create
a stack structure with several layers. Moreover, it can provide the monolithic structure’s
degree of security and guarantee decentralization. By definition in the modular approach,
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 15 of 39

at least one mentioned component is outsourced into an independent network. This kind
of architectural approach implies great flexibility in terms of components. A modular
blockchain is a network that takes on the task of only one given component. The division
of the components into different independent layers allows for a more optimal solution
from the point of view of security and scalability. Similar to the monolithic approach,
the network managing the given component is independent and sovereign. In addition, in
the network, which implements the functionality of a given component from the stack, due
to its modular characteristics, its functionalities are independently implemented and the
critical decision-making does not depend on underlying and overlying components.
The modular approach which divides the network into several components provides
solutions for monolithic constraints and improves the monolithic approaches without
drawbacks. Common constraints during the monolithic approach are:
• Inefficient transaction verification: all nodes which take part in the consensus mech-
anism must re-execute every transaction to verify the validation of the transactions,
independently from each other;
• Enormous resource requirements: in a given monolithic blockchain network, the thresh-
old criteria for joining the network is too high and too expensive, from the point of
resources. It affects the degree of decentralization as has been mentioned earlier;
• Scalability: the completion of all tasks of the components in a given blockchain
network limits transaction throughput and transaction confirmation latency. It can
only be improved to the detriment of security or decentralization.
The publication of ordered transactions after consensus is the task and responsibility
of data availability. This set of transactions defines the current status of the given chain.
Without data availability, it is not possible to define the chain state. The responsibility
of the data availability component is to ensure the validity of the data in a tamper-proof
manner. One such solution to the data availability problem is an implementation of proof of
availability [102], which is an approach of modular architecture. The blocks are compressed
into significantly smaller proofs. This technique reduces network communication costs and
data storage overhead.
Ordered transactions by consensus, which are accessible with the data availability
component, are executed in the execute component. The result of ordered transaction
processing is a new state. The new state is created from the last state by the state transition.
The new state will be used by the settlement component.
The settlement component supports the preservation of the new state from the state
transition after execution and helps ensure its validity. It ensures interoperability between
states. In terms of security, it is very sensitive, which is why a strongly decentralized and
secure monolithic chain is used for the implementation of this component.
The use of a monolithic blockchain is not optimal for real-world problems, in either a
permissionless or a permissioned manner [103]. It is not possible to achieve the appropriate
transaction throughput and transaction confirmation latency in a monolithic blockchain. It
is impossible to maintain a network that is responsible for the tasks of every component,
and also satisfies the three main points of the blockchain trilemma, which meet the privacy
requirements [104].

4.5. GDPR
GDPR [105] was enforced in May 2018 in all EU countries regarding how commercial
and public organizations process personal data. It was a major upgrade of data privacy
policies in the EU, as the last corresponding data privacy regulations were published in
1995. In the time that has passed since, many new technologies and platforms have been
developed in the world [106]. It was impossible to delay a major data privacy update any
longer. The reforms that GDPR enacted were concerned more with the use of technologies,
rather than the technologies themselves. Thus, in the case of blockchain, GDPR-compliant
blockchain technology is a misnomer, what exists is GDPR-compliant applications and
cases of given blockchain technologies [107].
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 16 of 39

GDPR defines six major data processing principles and three different roles. The EU
Blockchain Observatory and Forum’s report [108] sums up the connection between
blockchain and GDPR. In short, two principles emerge which are important from this
paper’s point of view, regarding the use of blockchain technology. The first requirement
is the identifiable controller which stores and controls the data. This role is enforced by
GDPR and it is impossible to define in a decentralized system. The second requirement
is the user’s right to modify or erase its data. As has been mentioned earlier, blockchain
stores the data in an immutable manner. It is also impossible to erase or modify on-chain
data. On the other hand, the report mentions solutions for solving on-chain data storage.
Personal data which have to complete these requirements can be stored off-chain and the
corresponding hash is stored on-chain. It is still unclear whether the hash is personal data
or not. However, as the requirements of GDPR are highly abstract, there is the possibility
for organizations to interpret them on their own. As the EU report [108] and some pub-
lished research papers [109,110] do not consider the hash as personal data, neither does this
paper. Besides these, the public characteristic of blockchain technology is also problematic,
as anyone can have limitless access to any on-chain personal data without any information
regarding the access.

5. Improvements
The real-world application of blockchain technology with privacy requirements does
not work without any scaling improvements. Blockchains in the traditional sense, such as
Bitcoin and Ethereum [111], which are based on a monolithic architecture, have various
scalability issues as a result of this. Fortunately, various scaling approaches are now being
researched and tested, which can increase the transaction speed and transaction throughput
of the network without sacrificing decentralization or security. Thus, with the help of the
increased network capacity, there is the possibility to serve the huge number of users in
a cost-efficient way through applications in the blockchain network [112,113]. There are
many different possibilities and solutions to scaling. The main focus in this section will be
on scaling methods related to the Ethereum blockchain ecosystem which will be presented.
There are significant trade-offs between security, decentralization, and scalability [114–116]
as has been mentioned in the blockchain trilemma problem. In addition, it is important to
mention that scalability is a problem not only in public permissionless blockchain technol-
ogy but also in the permissioned type as well, another heavily researched area [117,118].
There is no universally accepted scaling solution for all problems. The characteristics of the
given problem determine the most suitable scaling solution by the optimal fulfillment of
the requirements. Scaling solutions can be classified into two different categories:
• On-chain;
• Off-chain.
On-chain scaling solutions change the existing Ethereum protocol, basically implying
hard forks. On the other hand, off-chain solutions are implemented separately from the
Ethereum Mainnet. They do not require any changes in the existing Ethereum’s protocol.
Under Layer-1, the Ethereum Mainnet is to be understood. Additionally, Layer-2 refers to
the networks that rely on the Layer-1 network for security and consensus.
The most well-known on-chain solution is sharding, which horizontally divides the
database into smaller parts, thus ensuring greater transaction throughput [119]. The main
point of the sharding solution is the creation and maintenance of new chains separate from
one another. Sharding shares the network load between these new chains and it is not
necessary to process every transaction for every node [120]. On-chain solutions are not
discussed in detail in this paper, since the goal of the blockchain-based higher education
system is not the creation of a new Layer-1 blockchain network. Preferably, this will be
achieved using the functionalities of an existing network with an optimal scaling solution
which will exploit the decentralization and security of the existing Layer-1 blockchain
network by building a modular blockchain stack for higher education systems.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 17 of 39

As has been previously mentioned, off-chain scaling solutions do not require modifi-
cations in the existing Ethereum Mainnet. They are implemented independently of Layer-1.
Off-chain scaling solutions simply communicate with Layer-1. The communication and
interoperability with the Ethereum Mainnet usually happen through different bridge ap-
proaches. The main goal of these solutions is to somehow outsource the processing and
executing of transactions outside of the main chain, thereby reducing transaction costs and
improving transaction throughput. The later used scaling solution is based on the official
documentation of the Ethereum blockchain and the following research papers: [121–123].

5.1. Rollups
The goal of scaling solutions and thus rollups is to achieve better performance in
a cost-efficient manner, without compromising on security or decentralization. In short,
the goal of the rollups is to provide the same security and decentralization guarantees as
the Ethereum Mainnet. Due to the traditional monolithic structure used, the incorrect use
of the terms Layer-1 and Layer-2 is common in scaling. The most important condition of
the Layer-2 solution is that its security is derived from the Ethereum Mainnet. In a modular
context, these solutions include those which execute off-chain, but the settlement and data
availability are based on the Ethereum Mainnet. The main driving force is the collection of
several transactions into a batch, which will be shared in a single transaction on Layer-1,
reducing gas fees. Thus, the cost of a shared single transaction on Layer-1 is divided among
the transactions in the batch.
In addition, the states are stored on-chain, tracking state transitions from executed and
shared off-chain transactions. There are two different proof mechanisms for the tracking
and verifying of state transitions: fraud proof and validity proof. Fraud proof optimistically
assumes that the shared transactions and states are valid and only performs an on-chain
check if it is challenged. As long as the validity proof is generated off-chain by using a
significant amount of resources, the final proof of the transactions and state transitions
are tamper-proof.
These solutions mostly consist of an operator, validator, sequencer, and block proce-
dure roles. Different terms are used in given specific solutions as the functionalities of roles
are more specific. The requirements of these node roles are specialized, such as high compu-
tation capacity. For this reason, the structure of network maintenance is often centralized,
due to the nodes’ high need, but they are increasingly striving for decentralization [124]. In
the case of sidechains, plasma chains, state channels, and validiums, assets are transferred
across a bridge to be used on another chain. Therefore, these chains run in parallel with the
Ethereum Mainnet and occasionally interact with it. Consequently, these solutions do not
derive their security or data availability from the Ethereum Mainnet.
Rollups concentrate on the execution component in an off-chain manner, while the
Ethereum Mainnet is responsible for decentralization, security, and data availability. This
improves scalability since rollups completely eliminate on-chain with off-chain transaction
processing, which results in the Ethereum Mainnet having to process fewer transactions,
thus being less congested. In addition to the fact that rollup users have the possibility of
cheaper transactions, they benefit from and receive the same security and decentralization
guarantees as in the Ethereum Mainnet.

5.2. ZK Proof
Before presenting the two remaining scalability solutions, it is important to briefly
introduce a cryptographic technique which is called zero-knowledge proof, or in short ZK
proof. The proof mechanism of both of these is based on this technique. The main point of
the ZK proof method is that one entity, called a prover, can prove its statement is true to
another entity (called a verifier) without revealing any further information aside from the
shared true statement. The main challenge in the ZK proof is proving the knowledge of
certain information without revealing any extra information. This makes it possible to prove
secret information, without actually revealing the given secret information. The mentioned
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 18 of 39

two main roles during the method are prover and verifier, whose names are used later
for roles.
ZK proof has many different types of algorithms, for example, zk-SNARKs (zero-
knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge) [125] and zk-STARKs (zero-
knowledge scalable transparent argument of knowledge) [126]. They can be categorized
based on whether there is a challenge–response interaction or not. Therefore, the two types
are interactive and non-interactive [127].
During zk-SNARKs, CRS (Common Reference String) provides public parameters
which can be used for proving and verifying. Therefore, the given system security is
based on the CRS setup, as the corresponding information regarding the creation of public
parameters can be used for the generation of invalid validity proofs which are correct.
Some techniques heavily attempt to solve this problem by using a multi-party computation
ceremony. If there is an honest party in the ceremony, invalid validity proof generation is
not possible. The necessity of the trusted setup is a trade-off, with respect to the generated
proofs being verifiable rapidly and cheaply.
zk-STARKs are more transparent and scalable than zk-SNARKs. They can work
without a trusted setup as they use publicly verifiable randomness to set up parameters for
generating and verifying proofs. Moreover, the computation complexity is almost linearly
related to proving and verifying. Therefore, zk-STARKs are more optimal for large datasets.
On the other hand, the verification and the storage of the proof are costly operations in an
on-chain manner.
Outsourced verifiable computation as off-chain computation can be verifiable through
the use of ZK proof. With valid outputs, any third parties are capable of proving that
they executed their work correctly. ZK proof in connection with blockchain technology is
commonly used as a Layer-2 scaling solution, for private Layer-1 support, decentralized
storage, or blockchain compression [128,129].
For proving a computation, the given code has to be compiled to a ZK-friendly format.
However, some operations are not ZK-friendly (SHA and Keccak, due to the bitwise
operator). The proof generation time is connected with the number of expensive and
complex operations used. Moreover, it is important to mention that the proof generation
requires a huge amount of resources. This kind of hardware is usually specialized and
optimized for the generation of ZK proof.

5.3. zkRollups
zkRollups is very similar to optimistic rollups. Both of them move computation and
state storage off-chain. Thus, the number of transactions on Layer-1 is drastically reduced.
The main difference is the proof mechanism which is used by zkRollups. Instead of fraud
proof, validity proof is produced for proving the correctness of off-chain executions of
transactions and state transitions using ZK proof. zkRollups architecture is divided into
two components:
• On-chain contracts: one of them includes the blocks, deposited funds and states.
The other deals with the correction of ZK proof. It is the verifier in the sense of ZK
proof naming;
• Off-chain virtual machine: off-chain transaction execution and state storage are com-
plemented by this component.
The power of zkRollups is based on data availability, transaction finality, and censor-
ship resistance. All off-chain executed transaction data are shared on the Ethereum Mainnet
in the calldata; thus, any users can recreate the current state to prove the necessary proof to
withdraw their deposited funds. No supernode with malicious behavior can steal the users’
funds. Using validity proof, there is no necessity for a dispute period. The shared new
state, which is finalized on the smart contract, is immediately valid without any concerns.
In zkRollups, as in ZK proof, there are provers and verifiers. A prover is usually
called a sequencer as it collects and executes the transactions off-chain. A prover is usually
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 19 of 39

a centralized entity as proof generation has enormous resource requirements and using
validity proof it is not possible to take advantage of the centralized structure.
Validity proof is submitted by the prover, which creates the new state root which
already includes the state changes by the current transactions, the current block. The prover
must share the batch root for shared transactions and the new state root as well. If these
submitted data are correct, the verifier smart contract accepts the new state commitment.
Before the proof generation, the prover has to verify the same things as during Ethereum
Consensus, for example, whether a transaction has the correct sign or whether the cor-
responding nonce is correct. After a given number of transactions, the transactions are
aggregated into a batch which is compiled for the proving circuit to compile into a succinct
ZK proof. The proving circuit computes the validity proof for each transaction one after
the other. After the last computing, the last state root, corresponding to the last validity
proof, is the new state root which is shared with the verifier smart contract. After the proof
generation, the verifier smart contract can decide whether the state’s transition from the
pre-state root to the post-state root is valid by using the validity proof and batch root.
Users can enter the given zkRollup by depositing funds into the smart contract. These
deposit interactions are queued and are waiting for the sequencer, as a sequencer can
submit the deposit interaction in the corresponding zkRollup. After that, the user can use
its fund in zkRollup. During a withdrawal request, the user sends its assets to a specific
address. This implies the exit intention of the user. If the operator includes this transaction
in a batch, the user can submit the withdrawal request in the on-chain smart contract.
The smart contract verifies that the burning transaction has happened and executes the
asset transfer to the specific requested address.
Despite the fact that EVM compatibility in circuits is more difficult and resource-
intensive than the usual simple token transfer circuits, in the past two years great progress
has been achieved in the ability to implement EVM compatibility in zkRollups. The devel-
opment of this opportunity is still in the early phase and many competitors are attempting
to make the best EVM-compatible zkRollup. Therefore, there are two different types of
zkEVM approaches:
• Building ZK circuits for native EVM opcodes;
• Creating new languages for ZK proof computation.
The first one requires much time-intensive work to implement all EVM instruction sets
in an arithmetic circuit. However, this implies full compatibility and support for existing
projects and tools from the Ethereum ecosystem. The second one takes advantage of the
creation of a new programming language, which is more compatible with validity proofs.
The main drawback is breaking the compatibility with the Ethereum infrastructure and
resources. zkEVM will be discussed later in the architecture section.
zkRollups can guarantee immediate withdrawal from Layer-2 without any delays.
Thus, users have better liquidity opportunities. The usage of validity proofs creates the
opportunity for a secure system without using any incentivized models for security; thus,
liveness assumption is not a problem in this kind of system. Moreover, one trusted party
for tracking transactions to protect funds is not mandatory. On-chain transaction data
storing solves the data availability problem. Trustless cryptographic mechanisms ensure
the correctness of off-chain transactions. Besides these positives, the enormous resource
requirements reduce the degree of decentralization and ensure the possibility of centralized
operators influencing the system.

5.4. Validiums
As it has been mentioned earlier, this scaling solution is also based on a validity
proof mechanism as zkRollups, using ZK proof. The main difference is the storing of the
transaction data. Validiums do not store transaction data on the Ethereum Mainnet. Thus, it
implies the data availability problem, because the transaction data are stored independently
from the Ethereum Mainnet. Therefore, users’ funds can be frozen in the smart contract as
they cannot recreate the Merkle proofs for withdrawing their funds. On the other hand,
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 20 of 39

this implies faster withdrawals for users as they can withdraw their funds by only using
the correct corresponding Merkle proofs.
Validiums are based on off-chain transaction execution by using ZK proof. On the
Ethereum Mainnet, the verifier contract verifies the given validity proof as during zkRollups,
but in the validiums case, there is another proof for data availability for verifying the ex-
istence of off-chain transaction data. There is another contract, called the main contract,
which deals with the funds and state commitments.
Without using the Ethereum Mainnet for data availability, validiums still benefit the
Ethereum Mainnet from settlement and security points of view. Settlement guarantees for
validium users mean the accepted states cannot be reverted or edited if they are submitted
once on-chain. Besides that, the verification of validity proofs is implemented in the
immutable on-chain smart contract, which can reject the state transition if it is invalid.
Validiums work very similarly to zkRollups. They collect transactions into a batch
which will be sent to a proving circuit. Its output is the validity proof which ensures
that all the performed operations which were included in the batch are correct and valid.
Besides the validity proof, there is the state root which consists of the accounts’ state in a
Merkle Tree. With the calculated new state root and the corresponding validity proof, a state
update can be made if the verifier smart contract verifies the submitted data. The main
contract updates the current state root to the submitted one.
During a user deposit, the operator has to include the corresponding transaction into
a batch. Without this event, the user cannot transfer their funds in the given validium.
User exit is similar to that in zkRollups. The user has to submit their intention and the
operator will include this transaction into a batch. Then, the user can withdraw their
fund from the on-chain smart contract. There is another option for leaving the given
validium. It is an emergency exit against a centralized censorship situation. Like in other
rollups, by providing Merkle proof the user can withdraw its fund independently from
the operators.
The most cumbersome drawback of the validiums is data availability, as transaction
data are not published on the Ethereum Mainnet, on account of validiums storing all
transaction data off-chain. Without transaction data, the current state is not recreatable for
any users. Thus, users are not capable of withdrawing their funds on their own. There are
different solutions and approaches for the data availability problem. Most of them try to
complete the system with centralized entities that take responsibility for data availability.
This results in a trusted third party, referred to as a data availability manager, having to
share all transaction data by operators. Operators have to communicate with that party
because this party’s key is mandatory for interactions with validium’s smart contracts.
The EVM compatibility of validiums is the same as in zkRollups, but in this case,
there are no memory storage limitations. Validiums are not limited by Ethereum’s data
processing capacity, as validiums store little data on-chain. This results in validium being a
purely off-chain scaling solution. With the use of validity proofs, validiums can provide
higher security guarantees than other purely off-chain scaling solutions, such as plasma
chains or sidechains. Almost the same positives and negatives as in zkRollups are repeated
in the case of validiums. However, validiums can provide close to the highest throughput by
expanding the Ethereum ecosystem by moving the execution and storage of the transactions
to off-chain.

6. Design Concept
During the design stage, it was important that the requirements defined earlier were
fulfilled by the proposed higher education system. These requirements include system-level
ones, such as higher security, decentralization, scalability, and the blockchain trilemma,
as well as functional ones, which were discussed in the related works section.
The base of the system design is a single organization’s, HEI’s, own superintendent
and connections with other HEIs. Since an HEI is generally responsible for its own system
and the data and operations included in it [130], it would be problematic to build a system
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 21 of 39

based on the usual public characteristics of blockchain technology. This results in a sig-
nificant difference to the current systems, and the given HEI would be at a disadvantage
against other HEIs if all its secret internal data would be publicly accessible for anyone.
Furthermore, the completely public string of all data is not GDPR-compatible. Due to the
avoidance of publicity, the encrypted storage of data between several HEIs is problematic
from several points of view. Privacy always has an additional cost, which can possibly
affect scalability.
Moreover, the maintenance of a network from the HEIs’ point of view in which they
are forced to run and validate the operations of other HEIs and store their data implies an
enormous additional cost. As with the joining of each new HEI, the expenses of a given HEI
would double compared to the original painting cost. Considering a constantly growing
and expanding network, this would result in runaway and unaffordable costs. Furthermore,
the secrecy of smart contracts, which are used to create easier and simpler interoperability
referred to as private smart contracts, in a permissionless manner are not evident. It is
almost technically impossible to manage and verify the private smart contracts’ states with
fully private program codes, inputs, outputs, and computations as well. There is an entire
research field dedicated to solving this problem using homomorphic encryption [131,132].
The use of private smart contracts in a permissioned manner is simpler, and more
solutions are possible and available [91,133], but they involve additional operations and
communications. In addition, these approaches are designed and optimized for organiza-
tions and do not approach the problem from the perspective of the users.
From the mentioned problems, it follows that each HEI must maintain its own educa-
tion system independently of others, as usually happens now. With this, private data usage
can be implemented with the appropriate scalability, in addition to the fact that the system
is GDPR-compatible. However, the mentioned decentralized scalability is missing, since
one entity controls the entire system, if the mentioned monolithic architecture approach is
considered. Using the modular architecture approach, the education system maintaining
a given HEI will be integrated into this stack, thereby guaranteeing a greater degree of
decentralization of the system.
The given scaling solution plays an important role in ensuring that the data are not
publicly stored and that the maintenance of the system and the execution of transactions are
the tasks of only one single entity. This means that all data are stored off-chain. Moreover,
in order to guarantee the system’s security and correct operation with these requirements,
it is not possible to build the security on an incentive model. The proof mechanism of the
selected scaling solution cannot have the trust assumption of the existence of an honest
party, as this is too much to expect from simple users who do not want to take part in the
system maintenance. This is not a good direction, to make users responsible for the working
of a valid system. A cryptographic protocol is necessary for securing the network’s validity.
Therefore, the valid proof mechanism using ZK proof is the most optimal for fulfilling the
requirements. Furthermore, it solves the liveness assumption problem. With the current
state of research in zkEVM, there are many possibilities for using smart contracts with
validity proof.
On the other hand, one of the main points of using a scaling solution is to make an
education system which is capable of transferring money without any trusted third party.
For this reason, it is necessary to handle the funds in the most secure way during their
entire life cycle, and both during entry and exit. Furthermore, this functionality ensures
that users can take part in the costs of the system by paying their transaction fees or by
paying their service fees.
The selected scaling solution that fulfills the mentioned requirements is categorized
as validiums. In terms of the modular structure, in this design, the settlement layer is
a decentralized permissionless blockchain network, the Ethereum Mainnet, while the
execution and data availability components are implemented in a permissioned network
maintained by the HEI. Further on in this chapter, the individual components of the
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 22 of 39

modular stack will be explained in detail, as they together form a decentralized verifiable
higher education system.

6.1. Settlement Component

Among the three components, this is the most important from a security point of
view, since the finalization of the blocks takes place in this component. From the current
possibilities, from the point of view of security and decentralization, the most suitable
and appropriate alternative is Bitcoin or Ethereum. Since the other possible solutions are
optimized for scalability, security or decentralization are compromised. It is an unacceptable
trade-off from a settlement component point of view. Among other things, the stability of
decentralization [134,135] and smart contract support are important and significant during
the choosing of the underlying network. Therefore, it is for this reason that Ethereum is the
most suitable as the settlement component in this system. Furthermore, the wide token
distribution and developer community continue to improve the benefits of Ethereum in the
long term. In addition, it is important that the Solidity programming language for smart
contracts be the same as the programming language used in the execution component.
Only the settlement functionality of the Ethereum Mainnet is used in this architecture.
The settlement component can finalize the current block for the execution component.
With the use of validity proof, the blocks that are finalized cannot be reverted due to the
immutable manner of the blockchain and proof mechanism. The shared block can be
considered as final, ensuring that the given state transition cannot be rolled back. This is the
final settlement. The settlement component is incorruptible, always available, and resilient.
The settlement component provides periodical communication with the costly Ethereum
Mainnet, thereby reducing transaction costs. During the production of a block, corresponding
data which represent the current block effects are stored. In this case, it is the current state
root which includes all corresponding information of the users and smart contracts at a given
moment. It is submitted by the operator, who generates the corresponding validity proof. Its
further task is to validate that the required number of signatures are included in the message
and verify the correctness of validity proof. All in all, during an interaction, the submitted data
are the signatures of the committee members, the current state root, and the corresponding
validity proof. In the settlement component, the Ethereum Mainnet, this particular transaction,
which is a given interaction for producing a block, will be executed and included in a block.
This finalizes the current producing block and makes it easily verifiable.
The necessary bridge and other smart contracts serving the higher education system’s
correctness are deployed on the Ethereum Mainnet. In the case of the designed system,
the smart contracts that are deployed on the Ethereum Mainnet can be divided into two
categories based on their functionalities. One category is application smart contracts, which
include the verifier and state contracts, and are used by the execution component. Another
category is the committee smart contracts, which are supported by the data availability
component. It consists of only one smart contract. The state contract implements the
bridge functionality, which ensures interoperability between the two networks. The state
contract stores the current state root, which provides the possibility of the verification of
certifications or other defined features. The verification of the validity proofs provides
the correctness of each submitted state transition by the verifier smart contract. This is
achieved by using zk-SNARK circuits in this architecture. The verifier smart contract is
created from the corresponding circuits to verify the submitted validity proofs. It is possible
to use precompiled contracts to verify the validity proof which allows for the creation of
the necessary algebraic circuits.

6.2. Execution Component

The heart of the designed system is the execution component as it is the most character-
ful and influential part of the stack. It usually includes some kind of consensus mechanism,
but in this case, it is not necessary for off-chain transaction ordering and execution as only
one organization is responsible for these tasks. This is possible due to the organization’s
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 23 of 39

interest being the correctness of the system, and in fact, malicious behaviors are prevented
with the usage of validity proof mechanism. In this case, the execution component uti-
lizes the mentioned settlement layer to produce new blocks. It does this by submitting
the information and validity proof belonging to the current block with the mentioned
state contract.
This type of higher education system approach can only be achieved thanks to the
tremendous developments in this area in recent years by an enormous number of re-
searchers. It enables zkEVM circuit implementation and is used with blockchain tech-
nology. This is possible due to several reasons. Customized optimization and a more
flexible backend can be achieved by using polynomial commitment. Hardware acceleration
makes proofing more efficient. Another important factor is the use of lookup tables and
customized gadgets, which significantly reduce the overhead of the EVM circuit. A succinct
proof is therefore possible to prove that the states are updated correctly after applying
the transactions.
In order to understand the working of zkEVM, it is necessary to have a brief under-
standing of EVM. The EVM is a state machine that performs state transitions based on the
power of some input, from the previous state to the new, current one. All smart contracts
are stored in bytecode on the blockchain. These are compiled from their source codes.
During a smart contract interaction, these bytecodes are loaded first. EVM opcodes, which
are contained in bytecode, ensure the possibility of the interaction, and the execution of the
operation implemented in the given smart contract. In summary, reading the bytecodes
from the EVM’s storage, executing the given computation, and then writing the result back
to the EVM’s storage are the requirements for zkEVM. It follows from this that the proof of
zkEVM must prove that the bytecodes were correctly loaded, executed in the correct order,
and finally written out well.
As already mentioned, there are two approaches to implementing a zkEVM. In the pro-
posed system, a hybrid solution between the two is used, since there are more differences
from the point of view of data structures compared to in the Ethereum Mainnet. These
differences are in the block structure and state tree. These changes ensure the possibility of
easier and faster proof generation, in addition to the fact that the control of minor modifica-
tions is also almost fully compatible with existing applications and tools. The replacement
of the Keccak hash function required for the use of Merkle proofs with a different hash
function is necessary because Keccak is not ZK-compatible. However, on the other hand,
given the current trends, the development of Ethereum is heading in the direction to replace
the use of Merkle trees). With these changes, a faster prover time can be achieved than with
the fully compatible approach without minor modifications, but it still takes a long time to
generate proofs.
The Polygon zkEVM is used by the Polygon team in the designed system, implemented
opcodes for the ZK circuits, with which the mentioned full Ethereum compatibility is
achieved in almost all existing smart contracts, developer tools, and wallets. At the time of
writing, Polygon zkEVM is being open-sourced. Therefore, it will be able to be used freely
in this system. In addition, the use of recursive STARKs ensures higher performance in
proof generation compared to other solutions with a similar approach. Compared to other
projects, better results can be achieved in terms of proof generation time and scalability.
By default, zkEVM has many major components, but in this architecture, only the
necessary components are used for implementing the execution component of a higher
education system. zkNode and zkProver components are used beside a very similar bridge
implementation. The operator has to address all corresponding roles to the execution com-
ponent. Therefore, it is functional as a sequencer, synchronizer, and prover. It has to order
the transaction in batches for a later proof generation. Furthermore, it has to synchronize
the state between the deployed bridge on the Ethereum Mainnet and validium’s state. One
of the most important functionalities of the designed protocol is the possibility to request
the corresponding proof to the state root of the action or document.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 24 of 39

All corresponding rules of the implementation of EVM are implemented in the

zkProver component. This component generates the validity proofs for the batches of
transactions. It is the prover role of the operator. zkProver has quite a complex architecture
with two main state machines. In a nutshell, the zkEVM expresses state changes in a
polynomial form. Thus, all the valid transactions must satisfy the defined polynomial
constraints. The proof generation consists of two parts, which are STARK and SNARK
proof builders. Without the trusted setup requirement of the STARK proof builder it is
easier to prove the satisfaction of all the polynomial constraints. Later, the correctness of
recursive proofs generated by STARK is proved by using the SNARK proof builder. Thus,
on-chain cost is lesser when using SNARK proofs.
The deployed bridge in the settlement component during an interaction obtains the
current Merkle state root which includes all users’ balances and states of smart contracts.
It provides possibilities of emergency exit by submitting the corresponding Merkle proof.
The submitted Merkle root represents the state of the zkEVM in the chain and thus the
verification of a given information or event is possible on the settlement component.

6.3. Data Availability Component

Data availability is an important part of scaling solutions to guarantee security for
users. In some cases, such as rollups, this makes it possible to use the same security guaran-
tees as the Ethereum Mainnet. In the modular stack superstructure of the validium scaling
solution, data availability is implemented independently of the Ethereum Mainnet, in an
off-chain manner. Storing transaction data separately from the main chain ensures higher
transaction throughput and makes possibilities for higher gas consumption with complex
smart contracts. However, there is no data availability guarantee. Thus, the security is
reduced because the data provider can misbehave or go offline.
It is important to distinguish between data availability and data retrievability, as these
are completely different concepts. In the case of data retrievability, we want to obtain
older information about the blockchain’s history. These data consist of older blocks and
receipts related to the older events of the given blockchain, as long as the data availability
is relevant information related to the current shared block in the consensus mechanism.
Therefore, transaction data are used for recreating the actual state of a given blockchain.
As already mentioned in the settlement layer, a committee contract on the Ethereum
Mainnet addresses data availability. This contract is implemented by the DAC (Data
Availability Committee) [136] functionality, instead of trusting in only one single data
provider, but it is possible that this component is provided by only one entity. Thus, the
DAC has only one member.
DAC members are nodes which have unique addresses on the network. It is important
that more organizations take part in the committee, ensuring greater distribution, and thus
less trust assumption. It is important to minimize trust in only one organization. By default,
without DAC, there is the possibility of one point of failure because the transaction data
are handled by a single operator. However, with the help of more assumed trusted organi-
zations, the security of data availability is improved in an emergency situation. In addition
to all this, with the involvement of trusted organizations, users’ privacy can be maintained
and data can be managed in a private manner. It is possible to democratically remove a
member from the committee contract. The success of the voting depends on the defined
security level of the network. This is usually conducted over a longer period of time
because during this time the soundness of the system can be damaged.
The DAC members receive the message containing the distributed current state root
from the operator, which will be submitted on the Ethereum Mainnet. As well as this,
they receive the current transactions, so that they can validate whether the current state
root is correct. If the new state root is correct, the message is signed by their public keys.
During the operations, DAC members update their current states and store the relevant
data. The committee contract receives this message, which includes the actual state root,
validity proof, and signatures. The valid proof verification and state transition only take
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 25 of 39

place if the appropriate number of DAC members have signed the message. During an
emergency state, the state contract does not accept new state transitions, it is not possible
to execute new transactions. Only users can withdraw their funds. For this, an honest DAC
member is required as a minimum for providing Merkle proof for the last valid state.
The HEI can create a profitable opportunity for the involved trusted parties by using an
incentive model. The HEI creates its own DAC. DAC members must stake a predetermined
amount of assets that guarantee their honest behavior, which can be flushed due to the given
DAC member’s malicious behavior. It is important that these members can be organizations
that operate in DAC under legal contracts. Thus, there will be legal consequences for their
malicious behavior (for example, a data breach), besides their financial losses. In addition,
the DAC members have to receive a part of the transaction fees during the block creation.
Thus, a more secure process between users and DAC members is guaranteed.

7. Proof of Concept Application

The purpose of the PoC application is to prove the functionality of the defined concept
in reality. Smart contracts are written in Solidity programming language. The corre-
sponding unit tests are in python and run by the Brownie testing framework. During the
functional testing, Remix IDE and MetaMask were used. The PoC project is available in
this repository.
Since the requirement of the network system is extremely high (zkProver: 1TB RAM
with 128-core CPU), the PoC was deployed on the “Polygon zkEVM Testnet”, not locally.
In this regard, it is important to note that the PoC does not include the data availability
component in the aforementioned form. The polygon zkEVM node was used for connection
to the network. The deployed smart contracts are available on the permissionless test
network at the following addresses (viewer):
• Teacher: 0x173D71646e388774960cA33b94106a00b81760Ea;
• Student: 0x33cCeb2279767D585EA2Bb0C1B2b875bDCEFf9e2;
• Degree: 0x1A54F40445ee8B1F11cAf0D46C4EE5fC2c63FB2a;
• University: 0x3dC33b50574deedCBedb6D1654E657A8BCD2edCf;
• CourseCatalog: 0xAd1b862ad9C0F53023fe2590e74Ea5053EF27Dc3.
Furthermore, the addresses of the wallets used during interaction on the permission-
less testnet during the test session:
• University wallet: 0x42174c41FAed24ff21b6b704b208919a2844D10F;
• Teacher wallet: 0xbE26D3F09339656dEbEC30F85774258Ed401b63a;
• Student wallet: 0x553C8E64992c5726657E4D0143D8Fb1b8f179da6.
The centre of the application is the university smart contract, as shown in Figure 3.
The university smart contract is the owner of the other contracts. Thus, the system op-
erates on the basis of predetermined and publicly available policies, in which there can
be no invalid state transition. The implementation of some smart contracts is based on
tokenization (EIP-721), because it makes the testing easier to use and already existing tools
can be used, for example, the MetaMask wallet. During the public testing, a wallet with a
student role was able to issue a degree to itself, after fulfilling the specified requirements.
This ownership can be verifiable from the current state root on the permissionless network,
without any third party. Furthermore, the smart contract on the permissionless network
only accepts valid state transitions between state roots.
The main experience is that it was found that by using the sequencer and the prover
between the entity and the permissionless network, a hierarchical trustful chain is created
on the permissionless network. Therefore, during the verification of a degree, it is sure that
the relevant events preceding the issuance of the degree (such as the admission of a student
or a teacher’s course details) are also correct and valid. A state machine is created on the
permission network which manages the HEI’s cycle. Its end state is the creation of a degree,
as shown in Figure 4.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 26 of 39

Figure 3. The class diagram of the PoC application.

Figure 4. The states of the PoC application.

8. Analysis
8.1. Data Management
The most important structural change to the other blockchain-based higher education
system is that the operator in the middle of the system maintains a single HEI, as Figure 5
shows. With the help of the validity proof mechanism, the system can still work in secure
mode, despite the fact that it is operated by only one HEI. The permissionless distribution
of data raises privacy concerns, and managing it with encryption involves enormous
overhead in terms of computation and cost. In the permissioned manner, this approach
cannot guarantee tamper-proof operation, since this type of structure is optimized for more
organizations. In this case, the implementation of an HEI system in such an environment
does not fit. Furthermore, the GDPR requires the determination of the involved parties
and the traction of personal data. Therefore, by exploiting smart contract compatibility,
the implementation of a private IPFS with defined trusted parties in a permissioned manner
is the most secure, as in DAC. This approach is similar to the one in the paper [137],
with some changes that users have the opportunity to erase or modify their off-chain stored
data from the database. Therefore, the execution component is supplemented with a data
management component to implement the necessary functionalities.

Figure 5. The connections in the system.

Electronics 2023, 12, 664 27 of 39

8.2. Credit Transfer/Interoperability

With the usage of smart contract compatibility, the two smart contract-based higher
education systems using zkEVM have the opportunity for credit transfer via a predefined
protocol. This can be achieved by using bridges. One HEI is part of the other HEI’s system.
Thus, they can supervise the credit transfers from their systems to the other ones. For this,
it is necessary that the given HEI uses this recommended higher education system. The two
HEIs can retroactively verify the events belonging to the given student, and if they have
the correct access then the personal data can be verified as well. This results in faster and
easier interoperability. Some parts of the current manual mechanism can be somewhat
automated with predefined conditions. Without using the same system, the verification
process is less time and work-consuming with the usage of the recommended system
verification capabilities. Due to the higher interoperability, it is necessary to use some
standard format for the documents (W3C-VC, W3C-VC-EDU). This helps to expand the
technical dimension [138].

8.3. Admissions
In the application process, the applicant student will sign the application message
with their public key which indicates their desire to take part in the application. With this,
the application procedure starts. Then, the necessary personal data will be uploaded via the
well-defined user interface to communicate with the operator. No privacy concerns arise
with this mentioned data management method. The applicant can already verify the status
of the application at this stage, because the interaction of the responsible person is also
displayed on the applicant student’s interface. The public key represents the given user in
the system. Upon successful application, the given public key will receive further access to
the system. Therefore, the given later student can be followed for the entire duration of
their study, from their application to their graduation.

8.4. Student Assessments and Exams

Due to smart contract compatibility, it is possible to completely automate the entire
process of the courses’ lifecycle, from course registration to the corresponding final exam.
The process of course registration can be implemented into smart contracts. Predetermined
requirements, such as necessary prerequisite courses or a minimum grade average, can
automatically decide who satisfies the requirements to register for a given course. Thus,
the allocation of course places is transparent and ensures equal opportunities for all ap-
plicants. In the case of this proposed system, a given transaction, for example, a course
registration, has minimal costs. In addition to the automated exam, it is also possible to
submit the exam papers in a private and verifiable manner. This is important so that the
implementation of the overture mechanism can be easily achieved within the system.

8.5. Certificates Issuing and Verification

The on-chain and off-chain tracking of the duration of a course makes it possible
to obtain fully automatic certificate issuing. The students can obtain their degree if they
have passed the necessary requirements. In this way, the type of misuse attacks can be
minimized. The degree obtained by the student is a token in the system, for which the HEI
creates a visual representation. The verification of given information, tokens, and visual
certifications is always available through the settlement component by using the requested
proof for the state root.
It is important to mention that this provides data retrieval and verification, but due to
the centralized manner of data storing, there is a possibility that the retrieval function will
be frozen due to malicious behaviour. Therefore, it is advisable to implement functionality
for users to store the most important certifications and related information with the corre-
sponding proof in decentralized storage. Thus, the given certification and information can
always be verified in any circumstances.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 28 of 39

8.6. Payments
Using a fully functional scaling solution such as the Ethereum Mainnet, it is possible
to adapt any asset without any modifications. Thus, any agreement included in a smart
contract can also use payment functionality. Therefore, it is possible that the system can
deal with tuition fees, dividend fees, scholarships, or any other types of payments without
any untrusted third parties. It is possible to adapt any token to the system, including
stablecoins. In this way, the application of volatile cryptocurrencies to paid users can
be avoided. With this, the higher education system has less trust assumption and less
human administrative work in relation to this payment. It is important to note that when
examining the current international regulatory trends [139], there is no single state in
the developed countries that have recognized it as a legal tender, only a few as taxable
assets. Furthermore, due to the novelty of the technology, there is a lot of uncertainty in
taxation-related matters across countries [140].

8.7. Analysis of the Challenges

With the permissioned collection of transactions and data, no personal data are made
public on the main chain. With this approach, the users have complete control over under
what circumstances and how they want to store their data while maintaining the possibility
of verification. The provision of completely decentralized data, on the other hand, lacks
in this approach. However, it is important to note that with the current regulations, this
would not be a suitable way to store personal data by an organization.
With outsourced data management and the off-chain approach, only the necessary
data have immutability characteristics. The current state root and validity proof are the
only part of the system which is fully immutability independent from the HEI. Additional
data can be erased or modified from the system. With this approach, the system meets the
requirements of the GDPR.
In smart contract-based business process execution, the verification of smart contracts
is indispensable and mandatory for achieving trust and security. Program-level and
contract-level verifications can bring confidence and reliability to the design and testing of
the system [141].
There are lots of different types of smart contract vulnerabilities which can be detected
by using tools, but these tools are not perfect. They are still under development [142]. They
can help to minimize the risk of faults and bugs. The development and testing of these
new contracts are in the very early stage, but a similar approach of the underlying system
as in the case of Arbitrium minimizes false assumptions. In the case of zkEVM, there is a
new attack vector, because the validation of circuit correctness is pretty difficult. The entire
system’s correctness is based on the assumption of circuit correctness.
With this approach, the measure of blockchain usability is not reducing or increasing.
It offers similar features as the Ethereum Mainnet. It is necessary to use a specific wallet,
which differs from the implementation of higher education systems up to now. However,
most of the user interface can be implemented similarly to a traditional higher education
system user interface. Therefore, users do not need to be experts in blockchain technology
to be able to use the system. A well-structured and implemented user interface can include
all mentioned requirements and functionalities.
As it has been mentioned before, a higher education system which is built on a
decentralized structure always has a cost overhead that is unlike the traditional one. In this
designed system, there is an additional cost in terms of hardware resources and user
transactions, as each interaction of the operator with the settlement component involves
transaction fees.
In terms of hardware resources, the huge amount of hardware resources required
for the generation of the validity proof is expensive and outstanding compared to tra-
ditional systems. The performance of a large number of expensive math operations for
generating ZK proof can be improved by using specialized hardware such as FPGAs (Field
Programmable Gate Arrays) and ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits). However,
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 29 of 39

many HEIs cannot afford such a high level of investment. However, distributed hardware
resources between several HEIs can solve this problem. Compared to a traditional system,
there is almost the same usage of storage capacity, if the operator does not deploy its own
Ethereum full node for communicating with the settlement layer.
In terms of transaction cost, compared to the traditional system, this is a new concept
within the higher education system. It depends on how much the given HEI wants to spend
on the system’s costs. The bridge deployed in the settlement component has different on-
chain computation costs. Gas refers to the fee required to successfully execute a transaction
or a contract on the Ethereum Mainnet.
Due to the use of DAC, the validation of signatures is necessary to ensure data
availability, as without the appropriate number of signatures, the state transition in the
state contract is not allowed. The verification of one signature costs 3000 gas. A DAC
committee is usually made up of 7–10 members. Since there is a fixed number of members
in the DAC of the designed system, the cost can be calculated using the predefined number
of members for successful attestation. During the calculation the committee is made up of
seven members, so the cost of verifying a DA attestation is roughly 21,000 gas. However,
with the use of DAC, no transaction data are posted on-chain which provides cheaper cost
and better privacy.
Another source of transaction cost is the state transition which is tracked by the state
root and verified by the validity proof. Using zk-STARK proofs, the cost of the verification
of the validity proof is around 350,000 gas in the Ethereum Mainnet. Moreover, the cost
of updating the last state root with the new one is 20,000 gas, because the Merkle root is
stored as a 32-byte word.
In summary, one interaction costs around 400,000 gas for the operator, the maintainer
HEI. Calculating the average gas price, at the time of writing, the cost is around USD 25.00.
An HEI must pay this amount of money for interacting with the settlement component,
which makes the designed system more decentralized and verifiable. However, it is
possible for the given HEI to force the users to pay their transaction fees, thus reducing its
system’s maintenance costs. In this case, the arising transaction fees require completely
new interaction methods in the operation of the HEI, which cannot be easily achieved.
Furthermore, users must have at least minimal knowledge of the blockchain technology
domain in order to take part in the system. However, with the use of blockchain technology,
social innovations can be achieved that create new social relations, involving new ways of
communicating. Adaptation is more important than automation or accessibility because
the system will be in the trust ecosystem [143].
Using a validium type scaling solution, the transaction throughput of the system does
not depend on the underlying decentralized settlement component. The used protocol has
no internal limitations in terms of off-chain transaction execution. The performance of the
system depends on the HEI hardware resources. zkEVM can handle up to 2000 transactions
per second according to the statement of the Polygon team. However, in terms of the
proposed system, even more can be achieved by off-chain execution of transactions and
off-chain storage of transaction data. In this case, only hardware constraints limit the
scalability of the system.
As already mentioned, time-consuming proof generation reduces transaction through-
put and increases transaction latency. Considering the current situation, the Polygon
zkEVM prover is capable of validating 500K gas units on a single CPU server (64 cores) in
about 5 min, which can be significantly reduced further with the use of special hardware
resources. However, immediate request–response interactions cannot be possible due to
the long time period of proof generation.
Last but not least, it is important to mention SSI (self-sovereign identity) in connection
with the proposed education system. It is a set of technologies which give back control
to individuals over their digital identity. One of the main building blocks is the verifiable
credential. In Section 2.1 of this book [144], the conditions of the verifiable credential are
examined in relation to SSI. In brief, a credential must be verifiable in some way. The verifier
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 30 of 39

must be able to determine who issued the credential and that the credential is not tampered,
expired, or revoked. The proposed system fulfills these requirements. The entities are
able to complete the verification process without third-party involvement. For interaction
without the involvement of a third party, users need to store their own data in some form.
Secure data storage (in Section 9.8.5 of this book [144]) is the most suitable for this. However,
due to the early adaptation of blockchain technology and the support of the users, these
documents are parallel stored in a centralized manner with the use of the DAC. This system
property is configurable and can be left out later.
Different cultural differences must be taken into account when SSI technology is
mentioned. In Eastern culture, there is a stronger emphasis on communal governance
than on individual control (14.1 section in this book [144]). Furthermore, clear governance
laws and rules are necessary for the blockchain-based educational system, so that the
verification of the information is acceptable, for example, who can be the issuer, and who
can host nodes [138]. However, the current state is characterized by a lack of government
support and industry standards, and high regulatory uncertainty [145]. Examining the
current trends, it is rare that the credentials stored only on the blockchain are legally
recognized [139].

9. Discussion
All in all, after a detailed discussion of all functionalities and challenges corresponding
to an HEI’s system it is following that the recommended system includes all defined
functionalities and satisfies all mentioned challenges. Compared with other systems which
are defined in related works, it implies that the recommended system is the only system
with these capabilities. This is based on a different architectural structure which implies a
different trust model compared to others. There is no other system from the mentioned
ones with a similar trust model or architecture.
All mentioned related works are compared with the recommended system in
Tables 6 and 7. The comparison implies that there are few complex systems which im-
plement almost all functionalities. Essentially, the systems concentrate on the realization
of a few functionalities. The systems which are defined in the [4,5] papers have similar
functional properties as the proposed system. However, it is important to note that these
systems operate in a permissioned network. This does not allow for verification of anything
in a trustlessness manner.

Table 6. Comparison with the mentioned systems.

[46] [47] [4] [44] [39] [38] [54] [55] This Paper
Certificates issuing
X X X X X X X X
and verification
Data management ON OF ON OF OF OF ON ON OF
Credit transfer X X X
Admissions X X X
Student assessments
X X X X
and exams
Payments X
Privacy EN CS PN CS EN CS PN PN PN
Settlement layer PN PL PN PN PN PL PN PN PL
PN: Permissioned Network, PL: Permissionless Network, EN: Encrypted, CS: Centralized Storage, OC: On-chain,
OF: Off-chain.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 31 of 39

Table 7. Comparison with the mentioned systems.

[15] [52] [50] [5] [56] [63] [62] [6] This Paper
Certificates issuing
X X X X
and verification
Data management ON ON ON OF OF ON ON OF OF
Credit transfer X X X X
Admissions X X X X X X X X
Student assessments
X X X X X X
and exams
Payments X X
Privacy PN PL PN PN CS PN PN PL PN
Settlement layer PN PL PN PN PL PN PN PL PL
PN: Permissioned Network, PL: Permissionless Network, EN: Encrypted, CS: Centralized Storage, OC: On-chain,
OF: Off-chain.

Vitalik Buterin defined different trust models in this article corresponding to the
blockchain networks. Based on the article, the mentioned systems can be divided into
different categories, as Figure 6 shows. Since the mentioned systems are operated by a
centralized entity, these systems belong to the centralized category, 1 of 1. In this category,
the behavior of a certain actor determines the correct behavior of the system. The proposed
system also falls into this category, but with the usage of zkEVM, the possibility of invalid
state transitions, and transactions, is reduced to the minimum. The centralized entity,
the operator, can only censor transactions. Furthermore, due to the mentioned modular
architecture, data retrieval is still verifiable if there is only one honest entity in the system,
1 of N (small N). This is the case when DAC can be more powerful than a single provider.
Furthermore, the verification is independent of the HEI system, because it is based on the
permissionless network, while in the other mentioned systems with the same trust assump-
tion, it is not possible to decide whether the result of a request is correct. Thus, the trust
model of the proposed system in the worst case is the same as the mentioned systems.

Figure 6. The different trust models.

The modular architecture ensures that the client’s dependence on the centralized
entity is minimized. The client functions are divided into three categories: verification
(system or data verification), request (state transition request), and data retrieval (file or
information retrieval). The architectural structure of the mentioned systems is categorized
in a permissioned or permissionless category. In the case of permissioned category, the client
is fully exposed to the permissioned network, a central entity, as Figure 7 shows. The client
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 32 of 39

has no information about whether the system is working properly or whether the returned
data is correct. The client can only interact with the system with the help of a third party.
In the case of a permissionless manner, a permissionless distributed ledger is used as
the system, as Figure 7 shows. With this type of system, privacy concerns arise, as it is
completely public and immutable. Furthermore, the cost of the system increases, since the
given system is integrated into a decentralized system that is also used by other entities.
In the case of the proposed system, the client can verify the returned results by relying on a
permissionless network, as shown in Figure 8. Furthermore, during data retrieval, the client
can prove data authenticity without the centralized entity. The assumption remains at the
same level as in the other categories.

Figure 7. The connections in permissioned and permissionless systems.

Figure 8. The connections in the recommended system.

Due to the cost of the settlement component transactions, it is advisable to set a

predetermined transaction number and fee. However, considering this cost, the designed
system always offers a cheaper alternative than the ones presented in the related works
section. It is a subservient idea to divide the given events into well-defined time periods
in order to reduce the number of necessary interactions with the settlement component.
In addition, due to the long time of proof generation, it is necessary to supplement the
system with a permissioned storage component, in which the users can receive and retrieve
their requested Merkle proof for the corresponding state root, since it is not possible
to determine the proof when the interaction happens. It is necessary to wait until the
transactions are ordered and sorted into a batch by the operator. The usage of multi-
signature interactions and all data that can be stored off-chain in the private IPFS can help
to reduce the mentioned long time of proof generation, as the more complex operations
imply a longer time in the proof generation.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 33 of 39

10. Conclusions
The designed system satisfies the general higher education requirements and solves
the mentioned challenges. The hybrid approach provides a possibility to improve the
decentralization and security measures of a higher education system which by default is
strongly dependent on the centralized structure. All events and certifications can be verified
through the decentralized settlement component in a cost-effective and less bureaucratic
and time-consuming way than in centralized traditional systems.
However, it is important to examine the designed system from the point of view of
the current acceptance of this technology as a trustful verification method. Blockchain
technology is still in its early stages and its adaptation is not widespread. Furthermore, it is
necessary to validate the GDPR compatibility of the designed system in order to make sure
the system complies with all regulations.
The used DAC is based on the assumption that there is a trusted organization in the
committee. In this case, when a given HEI maintains its own education system, it is better
to make the system wider with more involved organizations. This reduces the possibility of
attacks and setbacks. Organizations participating in the committee can be held responsible
for abuses committed by them. On the other hand, the most serious consequence of abuse
is the freezing of the deposited funds of users in the bridge. The freezing is a temporary
problematic period rather than the final state of the system. The system can be restored
after the emergency state and the users can withdraw their funds.
Using Polygon zkEVM, one of the most up-to-date and fastest open-source projects,
it is possible to implement a fully verifiable higher education system in a decentralized
manner. By using zk-STARK proofs of the system, the on-chain transaction cost is reduced
to a minimum. However, it is important to note that all zkEVM developments are currently
"works in progress" and the release of fully functional systems is planned for the second
half of this year; however, the basic functionalities are already available.
After the zkEVM fully EVM-compatible release, a deeper examination and evaluation
of gas consumption is necessary for the future. It is indispensable to have a wide-range
examination of the cost consequences of decentralization. In addition, the examination
of hardware consumption is also important, so that it will be possible to define the entry
threshold to maintain the system and the cost of a semester more easily.
The recommended system building in a modular stack uses validity proof for provid-
ing the consistent working of a tamper-proof centralized system. It provides possibilities
for the HEI to maintain the system in a more secure and decentralized manner on its own.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, D.L.F. and A.K.; methodology, D.L.F. and A.K.; software,
D.L.F.; validation, D.L.F. and A.K.; investigation, D.L.F. and A.K.; writing—original draft prepa-
ration, D.L.F. and A.K.; writing—review and editing, D.L.F. and A.K.; supervision, A.K.; project
administration, A.K. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was supported by grants of “Application Domain Specific Highly Reliable IT
Solutions” project that has been implemented with the support provided from the National Research,
Development and Innovation Fund of Hungary, financed under the Thematic Excellence Programme
TKP2020-NKA-06 (National Challenges Subprogramme) funding scheme.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Electronics 2023, 12, 664 34 of 39

Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:

ACFE Association of Certified Fraud Examiners

ASIC Application-specific integrated circuit
CAP Consistency, Availability, Partition
CRS Common Reference String
DAC Data Availability Committee
EU European Union
EVM Ethereum virtual machine
FPGA Field programmable gate array
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
HEI Higher education institution
PoC Proof of concept
SSI Self-sovereign identity
UTXO Unspent transaction output
zkEVM Zero-knowledge Ethereum virtual machine
zk-SNARK Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge
zk-STARK Zero-knowledge scalable transparent argument of knowledge

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