Simulation Tabletop Exercise For Incident Response
Simulation Tabletop Exercise For Incident Response
TABLETOP
EXERCISE FOR
INCIDENT
RESPONSE
BY IZZMIER IZZUDDIN
@AdSecVN FB: AdSecVN @QuantriBaomat
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXERCISES ............................................................................................................. 3
TABLETOP EXERCISE 1: RANSOMWARE ATTACK SIMULATION ............................................. 3
ANSWERS TO TABLETOP EXERCISE 1 ................................................................................ 6
TABLETOP EXERCISE 2: DATA EXFILTRATION DETECTION...................................................10
ANSWERS TO TABLETOP EXERCISE 2 ...............................................................................12
TABLETOP EXERCISE 3: RANSOMWARE ATTACK ON CRITICAL SYSTEMS ............................16
ANSWERS TO TABLETOP EXERCISE 3 ...............................................................................18
Objective: To simulate a ransomware attack and evaluate the SOC team's ability to
respond across all roles (L1, L2, L3 and SOC Manager).
Scenario: During routine monitoring, the SOC observes unusual activity on the company’s
network. Several files appear to be encrypted and a ransom note is discovered demanding
payment in Bitcoin. The exercise begins with this discovery and proceeds through the
incident response lifecycle.
1. What initial actions should you take upon receiving the SIEM alert?
2. How do you validate if this activity is malicious?
3. When should you escalate this to L2?
1. What advanced forensic techniques can you apply to analyse the ransomware?
2. How would you identify the attack vector and prevent further compromise?
1. How do you prioritise the next steps while ensuring minimal operational disruption?
2. What communication strategies would you implement for internal and external
stakeholders?
Phase 2: Containment
• Email gateway logs reveal that the ransomware originated from a phishing email
sent to user_123, with a malicious attachment named "invoice_0321.exe."
1. How do you use threat intelligence to assess the risk of similar attacks?
2. What additional measures can be taken to harden endpoints?
1. Forensic Techniques:
o Collect the malware sample (invoice_0321.exe) from the endpoint.
o Use static analysis tools (IDA Pro) and dynamic sandbox tools (Cuckoo
Sandbox) to dissect the malware.
o Identify encryption algorithms used and potential decryption methods.
2. Prevent Further Compromise:
o Analyse phishing email headers to pinpoint origin and delivery mechanism.
o Develop Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for rapid detection across the
network.
Phase 2: Containment
1. Correlation:
o Match the email timestamp with endpoint logs to confirm execution of the
malicious file.
o Check DNS logs for domain resolution linked to the phishing email.
2. Recommendations:
o Implement stronger email filtering with sandboxing for attachments.
o Train employees to recognise phishing attempts.
1. Threat Intelligence:
o Use platforms like MISP or Recorded Future to research the attacker’s
tactics and tools.
o Confirm if the ransomware variant is linked to an active APT group.
2. Hardening Measures:
o Enforce application whitelisting and disable macros.
o Regularly update endpoint protections and vulnerability patches.
1. Present findings:
Objective: To evaluate and improve the SOC team's ability to detect, analyse and mitigate
a data exfiltration attempt through an unauthorised channel.
Inject 1:
• A SIEM alert indicates a large volume of outbound HTTPS traffic from a single
endpoint (192.168.2.45) to a suspicious domain (Dropbox subdomain).
• EDR logs show unusual processes initiated by an unauthorised PowerShell script
on the same endpoint.
Questions:
1. What are the immediate actions to validate the alert and triage the incident?
2. Which tools and techniques can L1 and L2 analysts use to confirm if data
exfiltration occurred?
Phase 2: Containment
Inject 2:
Questions:
1. How should the SOC team contain the suspected exfiltration activity?
2. What measures can be implemented to prevent further data leakage?
Questions:
Inject 4:
• The exfiltrated data includes patient records and internal financial projections,
violating GDPR and HIPAA.
• Senior leadership demands an estimate of operational and reputational damage.
Questions:
Inject 5:
Questions:
Q1: What are the immediate actions to validate the alert and triage the incident?
Answer:
• Log Analysis: L1 SOC analysts should immediately review SIEM logs to verify the
alert's authenticity. Look for the volume and frequency of outbound traffic to the
Dropbox subdomain and match it against typical baseline activity.
• Endpoint Review: EDR logs from the affected endpoint (192.168.2.45) should be
scrutinised for abnormal processes or PowerShell activity, specifically identifying
any unauthorised file access or execution of unusual scripts.
• Confirm Suspicious Activity: L2 analysts should corroborate findings by cross-
referencing network traffic with known Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) from threat
intelligence feeds, focusing on payload size, frequency and destination IP
reputation.
• Isolation Recommendation: If the activity is confirmed as suspicious, the endpoint
should be isolated to prevent further data leakage. Notify the incident response
team immediately for escalation.
Q2: Which tools and techniques can L1 and L2 analysts use to confirm if data exfiltration
occurred?
Answer:
• SIEM and Network Traffic Analysis: Use tools like Splunk or QRadar to query
network logs for large outbound HTTPS traffic and connections to external domains.
Examine TLS handshake metadata and timestamps.
• File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Review file access patterns on the endpoint to
determine if sensitive files were accessed and modified.
• Hash Analysis: Compare suspicious file hashes (those
of Project_Finance_Report.xlsm) with known malicious signatures from threat
intelligence databases.
• DLP Solutions: Check Data Loss Prevention tools for any alerts triggered by
attempts to upload sensitive files to cloud storage.
• User Activity Correlation: Correlate user activity logs ([email protected]) with
endpoint behavior to identify discrepancies, such as login anomalies or
unauthorised application use.
Phase 2: Containment
• DLP Policy Enforcement: Enhance data loss prevention (DLP) policies to detect and
block sensitive data uploads to unauthorised cloud services.
• Advanced EDR Features: Enable endpoint detection capabilities to prevent
unauthorised script execution (PowerShell lockdown or script blocking).
• User Awareness: Communicate with employees about the incident and reinforce
the need to avoid suspicious emails and report unusual activity immediately.
• Email Header Analysis: Inspect email headers and metadata for the phishing email
containing Project_Finance_Report.xlsm. Identify the sender domain and assess its
legitimacy.
• Attachment Forensics: Analyse the malicious Excel file for embedded macros or
scripts. Extract and execute the macro in a sandbox environment to understand its
behavior.
• Endpoint Process Audit: Use endpoint security tools to trace the origin of the
malicious process, pinpointing when and how it was executed.
Q2: How can the SOC team determine the extent of lateral movement?
Answer:
Q1: How should the SOC assess the impact of the breach?
Answer:
• Data Sensitivity Analysis: Identify the type of data exfiltrated, such as patient
medical records and financial projections, to determine regulatory implications
under GDPR and HIPAA.
• Operational Impact: Evaluate the criticality of affected systems and assess
downtime or operational delays caused by the incident.
• Reputational Analysis: Work with PR and legal teams to gauge the potential
reputational impact among customers and partners.
Q2: What actions should be taken to comply with legal and regulatory obligations?
Answer:
Q1: What steps should the SOC take to eradicate persistence mechanisms?
Answer:
• Credential Reset: Reset all credentials associated with the compromised account
and endpoint, enforcing stronger passwords and MFA.
• Backdoor Removal: Conduct a thorough forensic scan to identify and remove
backdoors or malicious scripts.
• Enhanced DLP Policies: Implement stricter DLP controls to monitor and block
unauthorised data uploads.
• Regular Phishing Simulations: Conduct ongoing phishing awareness training and
simulations to reduce susceptibility to email-based attacks.
• Proactive Threat Intelligence: Integrate updated threat intelligence feeds into
security tools to detect similar attacks earlier.
• Network Segmentation: Improve segmentation to limit access and reduce the
impact of potential lateral movement.
Scenario: At 10:30 AM, an alert is triggered in the SIEM indicating multiple endpoints (IP
range: 10.1.20.50-10.1.20.60) are exhibiting unusual file encryption activity. Employees
report seeing ransom notes on their screens stating, “Your files have been encrypted. Pay 5
BTC within 72 hours to retrieve them.” The ransomware has encrypted critical files on a
shared network drive used by the finance and HR departments.
• Affected Systems:
o Endpoints: 10.1.20.50-10.1.20.60.
o Network Drive: \company-finance-share01.
• Key Indicator: Suspicious file extension .locked replacing original extensions on
encrypted files.
• Ransom Note Path: C:\Users\<username>\Desktop\README_ENCRYPTED.txt.
1. What immediate steps should the SOC team take to validate the ransomware
attack and initiate triage?
2. What indicators in the SIEM logs or endpoint behavior can confirm ransomware
activity?
3. Which tools should be used by L1 and L2 analysts to identify the ransomware
strain?
Phase 2: Containment
4. How can the SOC team prevent the ransomware from spreading to unaffected
systems?
5. What containment measures should be taken at the endpoint, network and server
levels?
6. What steps should the SOC take to secure backups during containment?
7. How should the SOC determine the root cause of the ransomware infection?
8. What measures are necessary to safely decrypt files or restore from backups?
9. How should the SOC team ensure that all remnants of the ransomware are
removed?
10. What communication strategy should the SOC adopt for internal and external
stakeholders?
11. What are the legal and regulatory considerations for reporting this ransomware
attack?
12. How should the SOC team coordinate with law enforcement agencies?
13. What steps should be taken to improve defenses against future ransomware
attacks?
14. How can the SOC ensure continuous monitoring for similar attack vectors?
15. What lessons learned should be documented and shared across the organisation?
1. What immediate steps should the SOC team take to validate the ransomware
attack and initiate triage?
Answer:
o Verify the initial incident report: The first step is to confirm the accuracy of
the alert and identify the nature of the attack. The SOC should examine SIEM
alerts and correlate them with user-reported issues. L1 analysts should
cross-reference the IP addresses of affected systems and investigate the
specific file modifications.
o Isolate affected systems: Disconnect affected systems from the network
immediately to prevent the ransomware from spreading. This is a critical
action to limit further encryption of files.
o Escalate to L2: Once confirmation of ransomware is established, escalate
the issue to L2 analysts for further analysis and response.
2. What indicators in the SIEM logs or endpoint behavior can confirm ransomware
activity?
Answer:
o SIEM Logs:
§ Spike in failed login attempts: This may indicate an attempt by the
ransomware to escalate privileges using brute-force methods.
§ Suspicious file changes: Logs showing rapid modifications to files
across multiple endpoints, especially unusual file extensions
(.locked), indicate that encryption is happening.
§ Network Traffic Analysis: Outbound traffic to unusual or external IP
addresses (often associated with ransomware communications)
should be flagged.
o Endpoint Behavior:
§ Files changing from their original format to an encrypted file extension
(.locked).
§ Presence of ransom notes, such as README_ENCRYPTED.txt, on the
user desktop.
§ Slow system performance due to the encryption process consuming
significant resources.
3. Which tools should be used by L1 and L2 analysts to identify the ransomware
strain?
Answer:
Phase 2: Containment
4. How can the SOC team prevent the ransomware from spreading to unaffected
systems?
Answer:
Answer:
o Endpoint Level:
§ Isolate affected systems using EDR tools. Block any suspicious
processes or services.
§ Disable network shares on affected systems to prevent further file
encryption on the network.
o Network Level:
Answer:
o Verify Backup Integrity: Immediately verify that backups are intact and
unaffected by the ransomware. Check that backups have not been
encrypted by comparing file hashes and file extensions.
o Disconnect Backup Systems: Ensure that backup systems (both on-
premises and cloud-based) are disconnected from the network or isolated to
prevent ransomware from targeting them.
o Backup Authentication: Verify the integrity of backup authentication and
make sure backup credentials are secure.
7. How should the SOC determine the root cause of the ransomware infection?
Answer:
o Email Gateway and SIEM Correlation: Investigate the email gateway logs to
identify any malicious emails with attachments or links that might have
triggered the attack. SIEM logs can help trace the attack's entry point.
o Endpoint Forensics: Examine the endpoint that first received the
ransomware. Look for evidence of phishing emails, malicious attachments
or suspicious executable files.
o User Activity Analysis: Review the affected user’s activity and logs to see if
they interacted with any suspicious links or attachments that could have
delivered the ransomware.
8. What measures are necessary to safely decrypt files or restore from backups?
Answer:
Answer:
10. What communication strategy should the SOC adopt for internal and external
stakeholders?
Answer:
Answer:
• Data Protection Laws: Check if any sensitive personal or financial data was
affected, as this may trigger reporting requirements under laws like GDPR, HIPAA or
CCPA.
• Notification Obligations: Depending on the jurisdiction, the organisation may be
required to notify regulatory bodies about the breach (data protection authorities).
• Forensic Investigation and Chain of Custody: Ensure that all evidence is properly
documented for any potential legal action, including preserving the chain of
custody for digital evidence.
12. How should the SOC team coordinate with law enforcement agencies?
Answer:
• Incident Reporting: Contact local or international law enforcement, such as the FBI
or national CERT, to report the ransomware attack, especially if it involves critical
infrastructure or large-scale data loss.
• Provide Evidence: Provide relevant data, including ransom notes, affected systems
and IoCs, to assist law enforcement in tracking down the ransomware operators.
• Follow Legal Advice: Coordinate with legal teams to ensure compliance with laws
related to ransomware attacks, particularly when interacting with law enforcement.
13. What steps should be taken to improve defenses against future ransomware
attacks?
Answer:
Answer:
15. What lessons learned should be documented and shared across the organisation?
Answer:
• Incident Documentation: Document all actions taken during the incident, including
detection, containment and recovery steps.
• Root Cause Analysis: Share the root cause of the attack (phishing, unpatched
vulnerability) and recommend measures to prevent future incidents.
• Post-Incident Review: Conduct a debriefing session with all teams involved in the
response. Review the incident handling process and identify areas for
improvement.
• Policy and Procedure Update: Based on the lessons learned, update incident
response plans and security policies, particularly regarding ransomware.
Objective: To evaluate the SOC team’s ability to detect, investigate and mitigate an insider
threat incident while balancing operational and reputational concerns.
Scenario: Your organisation, a healthcare provider, has discovered that sensitive patient
records have been accessed and exported without authorisation. The data breach has
triggered alarms indicating potential insider involvement.
Inject 1:
• A SOC analyst receives an alert from the DLP (Data Loss Prevention) system
indicating the export of sensitive files to an external USB device by an employee in
the IT department.
• Endpoint logs show anomalous access to files unrelated to the employee's role.
Discussion Points:
1. What immediate actions should the SOC take to validate this alert?
Expected Response:
o Review DLP logs to confirm the file exfiltration attempt.
o Cross-reference with employee activity logs (badge access, login times).
o Alert the Incident Response (IR) team for further investigation.
2. How should the SOC ensure that this is an insider threat and not an external
compromise?
Expected Response:
o Examine endpoint logs for unauthorised access by the employee.
o Investigate any potential misuse of credentials by third parties.
Inject 2:
• The IT security team finds that the employee used admin-level access to bypass
restrictions.
• The employee’s recent activity shows a pattern of downloading and encrypting large
files.
Discussion Points:
Inject 3:
• Forensic analysis reveals the employee used a backdoor they installed months ago
to access systems unnoticed.
• The backdoor was hidden in a benign-looking software update pushed to the
company’s servers.
Discussion Points:
1. How should the SOC team investigate and remediate the backdoor?
Expected Response:
o Perform a full system scan for IoCs related to the backdoor.
o Remove the malicious code and replace the compromised update package.
2. How can the SOC identify if the insider had external accomplices?
Expected Response:
o Review communications logs for external IPs or suspicious domains.
o Cross-check financial records for unexplained transactions.
Inject 4:
• The HR department reports that several affected patients have already contacted
the media, causing reputational damage.
• A local regulator has issued a notice requesting details of the breach.
Discussion Points:
1. What steps should be taken to manage the regulatory and public response?
Expected Response:
o Coordinate with legal and PR teams to draft a public statement.
Inject 5:
• The insider threat has been neutralised, but operational disruptions persist due to
increased scrutiny on data access processes.
Discussion Points:
Objective: To assess the SOC team’s ability to detect, analyse and mitigate a multi-stage
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) targeting a critical infrastructure organisation.
Scenario: Your organisation, a major energy provider, has experienced unusual network
activity over the past month. Threat intelligence indicates that an APT group is actively
targeting critical infrastructure in the region. SOC must investigate and respond to mitigate
the threat.
Inject 1:
Discussion Points:
1. What are the immediate steps to validate and respond to these login attempts?
Expected Response:
o Analyse logs from Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems to
confirm brute force attempts.
o Block the suspicious IPs at the firewall and initiate user account lockdowns.
2. What other indicators of compromise (IoCs) should the SOC search for?
Expected Response:
o Look for unusual logins, access attempts outside business hours or new
admin accounts created.
o Check for unusual data exfiltration patterns and correlated endpoint activity.
Inject 2:
Discussion Points:
1. What steps should the SOC take to contain the exploited server?
Expected Response:
o Isolate the compromised server from the network immediately.
Inject 3:
• Internal logs show the attacker has successfully moved laterally to SCADA systems
controlling critical infrastructure.
• Anomalies are observed in the configuration of energy grid load balancers.
Discussion Points:
Inject 4:
• SOC detects a large volume of data being exfiltrated to a known malicious domain.
• Attackers threaten to disrupt energy supply if ransom demands are not met.
Discussion Points:
Inject 5:
• The APT group’s access has been eradicated, but system outages persist and
customers demand accountability.
Discussion Points:
Objective: Evaluate the SOC team’s ability to detect, investigate and respond to a
compromise originating from a trusted third-party vendor.
Inject 1:
• Threat intelligence reports indicate that IzzmierTech’s update server has been
compromised, distributing malware-laden updates to all clients.
• SOC detects outbound traffic from multiple endpoints to suspicious domains
linked to malware C2 servers.
Discussion Points:
1. What are the SOC's immediate priorities upon receiving this information?
Expected Response:
o Validate whether your organisation has applied the compromised update.
o Identify affected systems and isolate them from the network.
2. What sources of information should SOC analyse to confirm the extent of the
compromise?
Expected Response:
o Examine endpoint logs, DNS logs and proxy logs for indicators of
compromise (IoCs).
o Review system update logs to identify machines that received the update.
Inject 2:
• SOC finds that the malware installs a backdoor, allowing attackers to execute
commands remotely.
• Internal systems show signs of data reconnaissance, including scans for sensitive
file shares.
Discussion Points:
Inject 3:
• The attackers use the malware to exfiltrate sensitive financial data to an external
server.
• Some compromised accounts belong to high-privilege users, raising concerns
about further access.
Discussion Points:
1. What strategies should SOC adopt to detect and prevent further data
exfiltration?
Expected Response:
o Monitor outbound traffic for unusual patterns, especially large data
transfers.
o Deploy DLP solutions to enforce restrictions on sensitive data access.
2. How should the SOC secure high-privilege accounts to mitigate potential risks?
Expected Response:
o Force password resets for all privileged accounts.
o Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all critical accounts
immediately.
Inject 4:
• IzzmierTech confirms their software update server has been fully compromised and
urges all clients to uninstall the affected update.
• Regulatory authorities contact the organisation, requesting an incident report and
assurance of future security measures.
Inject 5:
• All affected systems have been restored, but the incident highlights gaps in vendor
risk management and patch testing.
Discussion Points: