MEONG BARCELONA

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

R.A. 9995
Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009

Prohibited Acts:
(a) To take photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any
similar activity or to capture an image of the private area of a person/s
• Sexual acts refers to intimate behavior or similar actions that are meant to be kept out of
public view
• Private area refers to the sexual organs, female breast, pubic area, buttocks or a person naked
• The taking of photo or video is without consent of the person/s involved and under
circumstances in which the person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy
(b) To copy or reproduce, or to cause to be copied or reproduced, such photo or video or recording of
sexual act or any similar activity with or without consideration;
(c) To sell or distribute, or cause to be sold or distributed, such photo or video or recording of sexual
act, whether it be the original copy or reproduction thereof; or
(d) (d) To publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, whether in print or broadcast
media, or show or exhibit the photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or any similar
activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device.
The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record or take
photo or video coverage of the same was given by such person/s. Any person who violates this provision shall
be liable for photo or video voyeurism as defined herein.

Elements:
• Subject matter of the photo or the video involve either private parts or sexual acts
• The individual in the photo or video must not have given consent for the media to be captured,
distributed, or broadcast.
• There is intent to cause harm or humiliation. The sharing of voyeuristic materials are with the purpose
of degrading or embarrassing the victim.

Penalties:
• The penalty of imprisonment of not less that three (3) years but not more than seven (7) years
• Fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
• Or both at the discretion of the court in violation of the prohibited acts

If the violator is a juridical person, its license or franchise shall be automatically be deemed revoked and the
persons liable shall be the officers thereof including the editor and reporter in the case of print media, and the
station manager, editor and broadcaster in the case of a broadcast media.

If the offender is a public officer or employee, or a professional, he/she shall be administratively liable.

If the offender is an alien, he/she shall be subject to deportation proceedings after serving his/her sentence and
payment of fines.

Exemption:
Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is
authorized by a written order of the court, to use the record or any copy thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of the crime of photo or video voyeurism.

Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and
upon showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that photo or video voyeurism has been

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 MEONG BARCELONA
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

committed or is about to be committed, and that the evidence to be obtained is essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution or prevention of such, crime.

Inadmissibility of Evidence:
Any record, photo or video, or copy thereof, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing
or investigation.

Notable cases:

1) People vs. Santos

The accused was convicted of secretly recording his partner and sharing the recording online. The court ruled
that the accused's actions were a gross violation of privacy.

2) Garcia vs. People

The accused was convicted of taking photos of a woman's private parts in a public restroom without her
consent. The court ruled that the accused violated the woman's reasonable expectation of privacy.

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R.A. 9775
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009

Child pornography refers to any representation, whether visual or audio, written, or combination thereof, by
electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic, or any other means of child engaged or involved in real or
simulated explicit sexual activities.

Purpose of the Law:

The Anti-child pornography law of 2009 bids to curb all forms of exploitation and abuse including, but not
limited to:
• The use of a child in pornographic performances and materials; and
• The inducement or coercion of a child to engage or be involved in pornography through whatever
means; and
• Comply with international treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory or a state party concerning
the rights of children

Definitions:
Child – age below 18; or over but unable to fully take care of himself from abuse due to physical or mental
disability or condition

Shall include:
• A person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child
• Computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a person who is represented
or who is made to appear to be a child

Child pornography – any representation whether visual, audio or written combination by electronic,
mechanical, digital of a child engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities

Sexual intercourse: actual or simulated –

1. Sexual intercourse or lascivious act including but not limited to, contact involving genital to
genital, anal to genital or oral to anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
2. Bestiality;

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 MEONG BARCELONA
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

3. Masturbation;
4. Sadistic or masochistic abuse
5. Lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, public area and/or anus; or
6. Use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts

Grooming – act of preparing a child or someone who the offender believes to be a child for a sexual activity or
sexual relationship

Luring – act of communicating, by means of a computer system, with a child for the purpose of facilitating the
commission of a sexual activity

Pandering – act of offering, advertising, promoting, representing or distributing through any material which
contains any form of Child Pornography

Prohibited Acts:
1. To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in Child Pornography
2. To produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of Child Pornography
3. To publish, offer, sell, distribute any form of Child Pornography
4. To possess any form of Child Pornography with the intent to sell, distribute, publish, or broadcast
5. To knowingly, willfully and intentionally provide a venue for the commission of prohibited acts
6. For film distributors, theaters and telecommunication companies, by themselves or in
cooperation with other entities, to distribute any form of Child Pornography
7. For a parent, legal guardian or person having custody or control of a child to knowingly permit the
child to engage, participate or assist in any form of Child Pornography
8. To engage in the luring or grooming of a child
9. To engage in pandering
10. To willfully access any form of Child Pornography
11. To conspire to commit any of the prohibited acts stated in this section
12. To possess any form of Child Pornography

Syndicated Child Pornography

• Committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of 3 or more persons

Elements:
-RA 9775 is Mala Prohibita: Good faith is not a defense

1. That there must be representation of a child

2. That the child is engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities
3. That the representation of the child may be visual, audio or written form or combination thereof
4. That the representation of the child is by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any
other means

First element: That there must be representation of a child

• Does not apply to adult pornography
• Trafficking children is qualified under RA 9208 (Trafficking in Persons Act)
• Child covers 18 above who cannot protect themselves from abuse due to physical or mental condition
• Must be established through a medical finding from a qualified physician
• Representation of an insane or blind adult engaged in explicit sexual activities is child pornography
• Also covers hentai
o The Act’s express findings indicate that Congress was concerned that limiting the child-
pornography prohibition to material that could be proven to feature actual children would

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SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

enable many child pornographers to evade conviction. The emergence of new technology and
the repeated transmission of pictures files over the internet could make it nearly impossible
to prove a particular image was produced using real children (United States v. Williams).

Second element: That the child is engaged or involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities
• “Simulated” sexual intercourse is not sexual intercourse that is merely suggested, but rather
sexual intercourse that is explicitly portrayed, even though (through camera tricks or otherwise) it
may not actually occurred (United States v. Williams)
• Explicit Sexual intercourse:
a. Sexual intercourse or lascivious act including but not limited to, contact involving genital to
genital, anal to genital or oral to anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
i. The material must depict or describe a patently offensive sexual conduct to be
considered as obscene.
b. Bestiality;
i. Sexual contact between a human being and an animal
c. Masturbation;
d. Sadistic or masochistic abuse
i. Sadism is a form of satisfaction, commonly sexual, derived from inflicting harm on
another
ii. Masochism is a form of perversion in which sexual pleasure is heightened when one
is beaten and maltreated at the hands of the other party
e. Lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, public area and/or anus; or
i. Nudity itself is not inherently indecent or obscene. Mere nudity in painting and
sculpture is not obscenity as nude figures may be considered as work of art.
f. Use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts
i. Using sexual gadgets in engaging sexual activities with a child

Third element: That the representation of the child may be visual, audio or written form or combination
thereof

Fourth element: That the representation of the child is by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means
• A person, who hires, employs or uses a child to engage in live sexual performance or showing in a
theatre should be held liable for trafficking in persons under RA 9208. It is submitted that child
pornography under RA No. 9775 is not committed for the following reasons:
o Under Senate Bill No. 2317, child pornography includes representation or live performance or
showing of a child engaged in explicit sexual activity; however, this phrase “live sexual
performance or showing of a child” was deleted
o Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis

Who may file:

1. Offended party
2. Parents or guardians
3. Ascendant or collateral relative within the 3rd degree of consanguinity
4. Officer, social worker
5. DSWD
6. Local social welfare development officer
7. Barangay chairman
8. Law enforcement officer
9. At least 3 concerned responsible citizen residing in the place where the violation occurred
10. Any person who has personal knowledge of the circumstances

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 MEONG BARCELONA
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

Responsibility of Mall Owners:

1. Notify PNP or the NBI within 7 days from obtaining facts and circumstances that Child
Pornography is being committed
2. Public display is conclusive presumption of knowledge of mall owner

Notable cases:

1) Christian Cadajas vs. People

Facts:
The case involves Christian Cadajas, a 24-year-old man who was charged with violating the Anti-Child
Pornography Act. He met a 14-year-old girl, AAA, in a canteen where he worked, and they started exchanging
messages on Facebook Messenger. They became sweethearts, despite AAA's mother's disapproval due to
AAA's young age. Cadajas asked AAA to send him nude photos of herself, which she eventually did. AAA's
mother discovered the photos and confronted Cadajas, leading to his arrest and charge.

Issue:
The main issues raised in the case are: (1) whether the evidence obtained from Cadajas' Facebook Messenger
account is admissible, considering that it was obtained by a private individual and not by the state; and (2)
whether Cadajas is guilty of violating the Anti-Child Pornography Act, specifically Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No.
10175, in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b), and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that: (1) the evidence obtained from Cadajas' Facebook Messenger account is
admissible, as it was obtained by a private individual (AAA) and not by the state; and (2) Cadajas is guilty of
violating the Anti-Child Pornography Act, specifically Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to Sections
4(a), 3(b), and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775.

The Court's argument and legal basis for its decision are as follows: The right to privacy is not applicable
between private individuals, and the admissibility of evidence is governed by the rules on relevance, materiality,
authentication of documents, and the exclusionary rules under the Rules on Evidence. The Court also held that
the crime of child pornography as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 10175 is committed when a person
induces a child to engage in sexual activities, including sending nude photos. In this case, the Court found that
Cadajas induced AAA to send him nude photos, which constitutes child pornography.

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R.A. 7610
Child Abuse Law

Elements:
1. Committed against children
a. Who are considered children?
i. Persons below 18 years of age OR
ii. Over 18 but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
2. There is abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination

Prohibited Acts
1. Child Abuse- maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any for the
following:
a. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

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b. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
c. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
d. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
2. Child prostitution and other Sexual Abuse
a. Elements:
i. Children, whether male or female
ii. For money OR profit OR any other consideration OR due to coercion OR influence
iii. Of any ADULT, SYNDICATE, or GROUP
iv. Indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
3. Attempt to Commit Child Prostitution
a. Attempt under Par. A, Sec 5
i. Any person, not relative of a child
ii. Found alone with the child
iii. In a room, cubicle of a house, inn, hotel, motel, etc.
iv. Under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child
is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
b. Attempt under Par. B, Sec 5
i. Any person
ii. Receiving services from a child
iii. In a sauna parlor or batch, massage clinic, health club, etc.
4. Child Trafficking
a. Elements:
i. Any person who shall engage in
ii. Trading and dealing with children including, but not limited to, the act of buying and
selling a child for money, and for any other consideration, or barter.
5. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking
a. When a child travels alone to a foreign country without a valid reason therefore and without
clearance from the DSWD or written permit or justification from the child’s parents or legal
guardian;
b. Person, agency, establishment, or child-caring institution recruits women or couples to be
children for the purpose of child trafficking; or
c. When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse midwife, local civil registrar or any
other person simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or
d. When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals,
clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-caring institutions who can be offered for
the purpose of child trafficking.
6. Obscene publications and indecent shows
a. A child is employed, used, persuaded, induced, or coerced
b. To perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in
obscene publications or pornographic materials
c. Such materials are distributed
7. Other acts if Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s
Development
a. Violation of Art. 59, PD 603
b. Keeping in his company a minor, 12 years or under or 10 years younger than the person liable,
in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house,
sauna or massage parlor, beach resort, etc.
c. Inducement, delivery, or offering of a minor for the above mentioned act
d. Use, coercion, forcing, or intimidating a street child or any other child to
i. Beg or use begging as a means of living;

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ii. Acts as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or

iii. iii. Conduct any illegal activities
8. Violation of working conditions for Minors as provided in this law and the Labor Code

Notable cases:

1) People vs. Tulagan

Facts:
The case of People vs. Tulagan involves Salvador Tulagan, who was charged with sexual assault and statutory
rape of a 9-year-old minor, AAA. The incidents allegedly occurred in September and October 2011. AAA's aunt,
BBB, testified that she noticed Tulagan looking at AAA outside their house, and later found AAA's genitalia
swollen after she had been with Tulagan. AAA testified that Tulagan inserted his finger into her vagina and later
had sexual intercourse with her. A medical examination revealed a healed laceration on AAA's hymen and a
dilated vaginal opening. Tulagan denied the allegations, claiming that he did not know AAA well and was
gathering dried banana leaves at the time of the incidents. The case involves two criminal cases, SCC-6210
and SCC-6211, filed against Tulagan for sexual assault and statutory rape of a 9-year-old girl, AAA.

Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming Tulagan's conviction for sexual assault and statutory rape despite
inconsistencies in AAA's testimony and the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Specifically, the issue is whether the Information sufficiently alleges the elements of violation of Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610, and whether the act of inserting a finger into a minor's vagina constitutes rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Tulagan for sexual assault and statutory rape, with modifications
to the penalties and damages awarded. The Court found that the prosecution had successfully discharged the
burden of proof, and that AAA's testimony was credible and consistent in relating the principal elements of the
crime. The Court ruled that the Information in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 sufficiently alleges the elements of
violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and that the act of inserting a finger into a minor's vagina constitutes
acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, punishable by reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua.

The Court held that the factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court also emphasized that a witness' testimony containing
inconsistencies or discrepancies does not necessarily diminish their credibility.

2) People vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The respondent, Gaspar Olayon, was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610, also known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act.
The alleged victim was a 14-year-old minor, AAA. The Informations filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City alleged that Olayon had sexual intercourse with AAA on two separate occasions, with lewd designs,
and committed lewd and lascivious acts upon her person. The RTC convicted Olayon of violation of Section 10
(a) of R.A. No. 7610. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and acquitted Olayon, ruling that
consensual sexual intercourse with a minor does not constitute child abuse under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting respondent Olayon of the two counts of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, despite

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 MEONG BARCELONA
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

the fact that the sexual acts committed by Olayon on the minor private complainant AAA are clearly within the
term "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development" declared punishable under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, acquitting respondent
Olayon of the two counts of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that
consensual sexual intercourse with a minor does not constitute child abuse under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610.
The Court explained that Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial to the child's development other
than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5. The Court further stated that for consensual
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor to fall within the purview of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610,
"persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion" of the child must be present.

3) People vs. Larin

Facts:
The case of People vs. Larin y Bondad involves Ernesto Larin, a lifeguard and swimming instructor at the
University of the Philippines, Los Baños (UPLB), who was charged with violating Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 7610 (RA 7610) for committing lascivious conduct against 14-year-old Carla Lenore Calumpang. The
incident occurred on April 17, 1996, at the Baker's Hall, UPLB campus, where Larin followed Carla to the ladies'
shower room, ordered her to remove her swimsuit, and then performed various lascivious acts on her, including
shaving her pubic hair, performing cunnilingus, and forcing her to hold and squeeze his penis. The next day,
Carla reported the incident to her mother, who accompanied her to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to file a complaint.

Issue:
The main issues raised in this case are: (1) Is the accused guilty of violating Section 5(b) of RA 7610 for
committing lascivious conduct against a child? (2) Is the testimony of the offended party credible? and (3) Is
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the award of moral damages proper?

Ruling:
The Court found the accused guilty of violating Section 5(b) of RA 7610 and upheld the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the award of moral damages of P100,000. The Court ruled that the prosecution had established
the elements of the offense, including the fact that the accused committed lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. The Court also found the testimony of Carla Lenore
Calumpang credible, noting that her testimony was detailed and consistent, and that she had no motive to
fabricate the story.

The Court explained that RA 7610 was enacted to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
and that the law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse of children. The Court
noted that the elements of the offense under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 include the fact that the accused commits
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, and that the child
is below 18 years of age. The Court also emphasized the importance of protecting children from sexual abuse
and the need to impose harsh penalties on those who commit such offenses.

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R.A. 10175
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012

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SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

Definition:

Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms are hereby defined as follows:

(a) Access refers to the instruction, communication with, storing data in, retrieving data from, or otherwise
making use of any resources of a computer system or communication network.

(b) Alteration refers to the modification or change, in form or substance, of an existing computer data or
program.

(c) Communication refers to the transmission of information through ICT media, including voice, video and
other forms of data.

(d) Computer refers to an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other data processing or
communications device, or grouping of such devices, capable of performing logical, arithmetic, routing, or
storage functions and which includes any storage facility or equipment or communications facility or
equipment directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device. It covers any type of computer
device including devices with data processing capabilities like mobile phones, smart phones, computer
networks and other devices connected to the internet.

(e) Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for
processing in a computer system including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a
function and includes electronic documents and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local
computer systems or online.

(f) Computer program refers to a set of instructions executed by the computer to achieve intended results.

(g) Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which,
pursuant to a program, performs automated processing of data. It covers any type of device with data
processing capabilities including, but not limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device consisting of
hardware and software may include input, output and storage components which may stand alone or be
connected in a network or other similar devices. It also includes computer data storage devices or media.

(h) Without right refers to either: (i) conduct undertaken without or in excess of authority; or (ii) conduct not
covered by established legal defenses, excuses, court orders, justifications, or relevant principles under the
law.

(i) Cyber refers to a computer or a computer network, the electronic medium in which online communication
takes place.

(j) Critical infrastructure refers to the computer systems, and/or networks, whether physical or virtual, and/or
the computer programs, computer data and/or traffic data so vital to this country that the incapacity or
destruction of or interference with such system and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national or economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.

(k) Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training,
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and
organization and user’s assets.

(l) Database refers to a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions which are
being prepared, processed or stored or have been prepared, processed or stored in a formalized manner and
which are intended for use in a computer system.

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SPECIAL PENAL LAWS FINALS REVIEWER-ATTY. WAYNE TUGADI

(m) Interception refers to listening to, recording, monitoring or surveillance of the content of communications,
including procuring of the content of data, either directly, through access and use of a computer system or
indirectly, through the use of electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the same time that the
communication is occurring.

(n) Service provider refers to:

(1) Any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by means of a
computer system; and

(2) Any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service or users
of such service.

(o) Subscriber’s information refers to any information contained in the form of computer data or any other
form that is held by a service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content data
and by which identity can be established:

(1) The type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of service;

(2) The subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access numbers, any assigned
network address, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service agreement or
arrangement; and

(3) Any other available information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available on
the basis of the service agreement or arrangement.

(p) Traffic data or non-content data refers to any computer data other than the content of the communication
including, but not limited to, the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type
of underlying service.

Offenses:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under
this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

(2) Illegal Interception. – The interception made by technical means without right of any non-public
transmission of computer data to, from, or within a computer system including electromagnetic
emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data.

(3) Data Interference. — The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.

(4) System Interference. — The intentional alteration or reckless hindering or interference with the
functioning of a computer or computer network by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting,
deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data or program, electronic document, or electronic
data message, without right or authority, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

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(5) Misuse of Devices.

(i) The use, production, sale, procurement, importation, distribution, or otherwise making
available, without right, of:

(aa) A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the
purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act; or

(bb) A computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any
part of a computer system is capable of being accessed with intent that it be used for
the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act.

(ii) The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs 5(i)(aa) or (bb) above with intent to use
said devices for the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this section.

(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead,
destroy reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration:

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case
of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

(b) Computer-related Offenses:

(1) Computer-related Forgery. —

(i) The input, alteration, or deletion of any computer data without right resulting in inauthentic
data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were
authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible; or

(ii) The act of knowingly using computer data which is the product of computer-related forgery
as defined herein, for the purpose of perpetuating a fraudulent or dishonest design.

(2) Computer-related Fraud. — The unauthorized input, alteration, or deletion of computer data or
program or interference in the functioning of a computer system, causing damage thereby with
fraudulent intent: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be
one (1) degree lower.

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical,
without right: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1)
degree lower.

(c) Content-related Offenses:

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(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of
any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor
or consideration.

(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No.
9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That
the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No.
9775.1âwphi1

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. — The transmission of commercial electronic

communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable
way for the recipient to reject. receipt of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include

misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to
read the message.

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised
in the future.

Section 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

RPC Based Offenses:

Section 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if
committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by
the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than
that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

Special Rules:

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Section 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability
for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

Section 9. Corporate Liability. — When any of the punishable acts herein defined are knowingly committed
on behalf of or for the benefit of a juridical person, by a natural person acting either individually or as part of an
organ of the juridical person, who has a leading position within, based on: (a) a power of representation of the
juridical person provided the act committed falls within the scope of such authority; (b) an authority to take
decisions on behalf of the juridical person: Provided, That the act committed falls within the scope of such
authority; or (c) an authority to exercise control within the juridical person, the juridical person shall be held
liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of Ten million
pesos (PhP10,000,000.00).

If the commission of any of the punishable acts herein defined was made possible due to the lack of
supervision or control by a natural person referred to and described in the preceding paragraph, for the benefit
of that juridical person by a natural person acting under its authority, the juridical person shall be held liable
for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of Five million pesos
(PhP5,000,000.00).

The liability imposed on the juridical person shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural
person who has committed the offense.

Notable cases:

1) Disini vs. Secretary of Justice

Facts:
The case revolves around the constitutionality of several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, also known
as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The law aims to regulate access to and use of cyberspace, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. Petitioners claim that certain provisions of the law
violate their constitutional rights, while the government asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put
order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. Specifically,
the case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law, which prohibits
the transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of a computer system that seeks to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services, unless falling under any of the enumerated exceptions.
The main objective of this provision is to curtail spamming and its deleterious effects, including vexation,
intrusions, larceny, deception, violence, and economic damage.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is whether Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act No. 10175 is unconstitutional for
being overbroad and violative of Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press. Specifically, the question is whether the provision unduly restricts the
freedom of speech and expression by prohibiting the transmission of commercial electronic communication
without prior affirmative consent from the recipient. Other issues raised include whether the provision violates
the right to privacy and due process, and whether it is too broad and vague, thereby violating the equal
protection clause.

Ruling:
The majority of the court held that Section 4(c)(3) is unconstitutional, declaring that it violates the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the dissenting opinion of
Justice Marvic Leonen held that the provision is constitutional and narrowly drawn to ensure that the
dissemination of commercial information online is done in a manner that is not injurious to others.

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The majority of the court held that Section 4(c)(3) is overbroad and violative of the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press. The court opined that the provision restricts the dissemination of commercial
information online without providing a clear and compelling reason for doing so.

2) People vs. Santos and Ressa

Facts:
Private complainant Wilfredo D. Keng, a businessman recognized in his professional circles as a diligent and
self-made entrepreneur, testified that upon reading a certain article, he was shocked to be identified as a
person with a shady past. He expressed anger and distress, stating that he had never committed any of the
crimes attributed to him in the article, nor had he been questioned or investigated by any law enforcement
agency for involvement in any crime. Keng further testified that the publication by Rappler severely impacted
his family, as his wife and two daughters were ridiculed and unfairly labeled as associated with drug lords and
smugglers. His family’s life was disrupted, and they could no longer enjoy their lives freely, now that he had
been publicly branded as an alleged criminal. Keng was advised to reach out to Rappler, requesting a retraction
of the article and a fair and balanced news report that would present his side of the story. He sought the help
of Atty. De Vera, who contacted Rappler’s editor-at-large, Marites Vitug, but Rappler refused to take down the
article or publish Keng’s side. As a result, Keng sought legal representation from Andres Padernal & Paras Law
Offices and filed a criminal complaint for cyberlibel with the National Bureau of Investigation against the
individuals responsible for the malicious article, including Reynaldo Santos, Jr., Maria Angelita Ressa, and
Benjamin Bitanga. On 14 May 2019, both Santos and Ressa were arraigned, with their counsel, Atty. Theodore
O. Te of the Free Legal Assistance Group, present. Both accused refused to enter a plea, prompting the Court
to enter separate not guilty pleas on their behalf.

Issue:
Whether or not both Accused Reynaldo Santos, Jr. and Maria Ressa are guilty for violating Section 4 (c)(4) the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Ruling:
The court held that the accused REYNALDO SANTOS, JR. and MARIA ANGELITA RESSA are GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 4 (C)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012 and are they are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as MINIMUM to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
MAXIMUM.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of cyberlibel.

FIRST ELEMENT: Discreditable act or condition concerning another – As to the first requisite, the Court finds
the subject article defamatory. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission
of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. A thorough reading of the subject article reveals that, clearly, there were several
crimes imputed upon the person of Keng. Such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, murder, smuggling of
fake cigarettes, illegal transaction of granting special investors residence visas to Chinese nationals for a fee.

In refuting all those imputations, the prosecution presented two (2) letters from PDEA dated 15 August 2016
and 20 May 2019 stating that Keng has no derogatory record on file at PDEA for violation of RA 9165 and that
Keng has no pending drug case in court and his name is not reflected in the PDEA National Drug Information
System, respectively.

SECOND ELEMENT: Publication of the charge – The element of publication is likewise established in this case.
In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the

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person against whom it has been written. In this case, both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that the
subject article was published in the website of Rappler, Inc. on 29 May 2012 and was updated on 19 February
2014.

THIRD ELEMENT: Identity of the person defamed – With respect to the third element, there is no doubt that the
article was referring to Wilfredo Keng as he was particularly named therein.

FOURTH ELEMENT: Existence of malice – The element of malice is, likewise, present in this case. The Court is
convinced that both accused are aware of the probable falsity of the subject article considering the fact that
Atty. De Vera pointed out to Francisco the inaccuracies in the subject article and the receipt by Vitug of the said
PDEA certification. Despite such awareness, however, both accused did not bother to publish the clarificatory
article and they just let the libelous article remain in their website. A news organization who claims to adhere
to accuracy, fairness and balance in terms of reporting, would have retracted, or at the very least, issued a
clarificatory article if there have been some indications of falsity to its previous article. Both accused, however,
did not. The Court finds that the subject article was republished with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. This clearly shows actual malice.

FIFTH ELEMENT: Committed through a computer system – Evidently, the libelous act was committed through
a computer system considering that during pre-trial, it was admitted as a fact, by both the prosecution and the
defense, that the subject article was published at Rappler’s website.

=======================================================================================

R.A. 3019
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

Modes of committing acts penalized under the law provided under Section 3

a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties
of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

Elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. That he:
i. Persuades, induced or influence another public officer to:
1. Perform an act that violates rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority;
2. Perform an offense in connection with his official duties; OR
ii. Allows himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such violation or
offense

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or
for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other
part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

Elements:
a. The offender is a public employee;

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b. That he made a request or asked a gift;

c. The request was made in connection with a transaction in the government; and
d. He has the right to intervene in the transaction based on his official capacity

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for
himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to
be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

Elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. That he secured or obtained a permit or license for another person;
c. That he directly/indirectly requested any pecuniary or material benefit in consideration with
the help given

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending
official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

a. During the pendency thereof or

b. Within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Elements:
a. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions or a
private person charged in conspiracy with the former ;
b. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and
c. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any
person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring
his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

Elements:
a. The public officer neglected or refused to act without valid reason after due demand has been
made on him;
b. Reasonable time has elapsed after due demand or request;
c. Such failure to act is for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in
favor of an interested party

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

Elements:
a. That the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;

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b. That such contract is grossly disadvantageous to the government

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

Elements:

a. The accused is a public officer

b. He has direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction;
and
c. That (a) he either intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest
OR (b) prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction
or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion
in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board,
committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of
manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they
belong.

Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest:
a. In any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group
b. Of which he is a member, and
c. Which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified
for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy
of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favour:

a. Of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or
b. Of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his
official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release
date.

Divulging valuable information of a confidential character,

a. Acquired by his office or by him
b. On account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
c. Releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by
consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of
the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene,

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directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That
this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to
whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office,
nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials
concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued
pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.

Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the
Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest
in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or
resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term.

The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress
of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his
incumbency.

It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest
prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after
such approval to retain such interest.

Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this
Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the
expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the
office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an
independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials
and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the
calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.

Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during
his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal
or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken
into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank
deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary.

Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.

Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act
or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries

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and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.

Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere
ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the
provisions of this Act.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or
occupation by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his
profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or
occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations
penalized in this Act.

Notable Cases:

1) Geduspan vs. People

Facts:
The case involves Marilyn C. Geduspan, a Department Manager A of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth), who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, along with Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, a private individual and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. The information alleged that Geduspan, as a public officer,
connived with Farahmand to release claims for payments of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with
Philhealth prior to January 1, 2000, amounting to P91,954.64, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite
clear provisions in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed on November 27, 1999. Geduspan filed a joint motion
to quash with Farahmand, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that
her position as Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, was classified under salary grade 26. The motion to
quash and motion for reconsideration were denied by the Sandiganbayan, prompting Geduspan to file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or
controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Specifically, does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over Geduspan,
a Department Manager A of Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled corporation, considering her
position and salary grade?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and ruled that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over Geduspan, a Department Manager A of Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled corporation. The
Court ordered Geduspan to pay the costs.

Ratio:
The Court held that the position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, such as
Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that it is the position that Geduspan
holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

2) Soriano Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., an Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, was accused of demanding a bribe from Thomas
N. Tan, a respondent in a qualified theft case, in exchange for dismissing the case. The incident occurred when

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Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which set up an entrapment operation
to catch Soriano in the act. The entrapment succeeded, and Soriano was caught receiving P2,000.00 from Tan.
As a result, an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Soriano with violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is whether the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted
by a Fiscal, such as Soriano, constitutes a "contract or transaction" within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. 3019, thereby bringing it within the scope of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words,
does the investigation conducted by Soriano fall under the definition of a "transaction" as provided in the law,
making him liable for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the investigation conducted by Soriano was not a contract or transaction within
the meaning of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019. Instead, the Court found Soriano guilty of bribery as
defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court's decision effectively acquitted
Soriano of the charge of violating Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, but found him liable for bribery under
the Revised Penal Code.

The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of the term "transaction" in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act
No. 3019. The Court held that the term "transaction" must be construed as analogous to the term "contract",
which involves some consideration. Since the investigation conducted by Soriano did not involve any
consideration, it cannot be considered a transaction within the meaning of the law. The Court also rejected the
argument that Soriano's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated, as the information filed against him clearly made out a case of bribery.

3) Jaravata vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Hilario Jaravata, the petitioner, was a public officer serving as the Assistant Principal of Leones Barangay High
School in Tubao, La Union. He was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complainants, namely Romeo Dacayanan, Domingo Lopez,
Marcela Bautista, and Francisco Dulay, alleged that Jaravata demanded payments from them in exchange for
facilitating the release of their salary differentials. The amounts received by Jaravata ranged from P50.00 to
P118.00. The Sandiganbayan found Jaravata guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to
imprisonment and perpetual special disqualification from public office.

Issue:
Did Jaravata, as a public officer, violate Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 by receiving payments from
classroom teachers in connection with the payment of their salary differentials, when he did not have the
official power to intervene in the payment process?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the judgment of the Sandiganbayan convicting Jaravata.
The Court held that Jaravata did not violate Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 because he did not have the
official power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials, and therefore, did not commit a corrupt
practice under the law.

The Supreme Court explained that Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 refers to a public officer whose official
intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction. In this case, there is no law that invests Jaravata, as
an assistant principal, with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the
complainants. Jaravata's role was merely that of a facilitator, and he did not exercise any official power in the

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payment process. The Court further held that Jaravata's actions did not constitute a corrupt practice under the
law, as he did not receive any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit in connection with a contract or
transaction between the government and any other party, wherein he had to intervene under the law.

4) Lucman vs. People

Facts:
The case involves Raquil-Ali M. Lucman, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Regional Executive Director (RED) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII, who was charged with violating Section
3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." The information filed
against Lucman alleged that he demanded and received a bribe of P2,500,000 from private complainants
Sergio Balolong, Aladin Saydala, and Hadji Abdulwahid D. Bualan in exchange for assisting them in their
application for government permits. The prosecution presented evidence that Lucman received P1,500,000
from the private complainants, which was corroborated by the testimony of Bualan and supporting documents.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Lucman for violating
Section 3(c) of RA 3019. Specifically, the issue is whether the prosecution was able to establish the elements
of the crime charged, and whether the Sandiganbayan's findings of guilt were supported by the evidence
presented.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, finding
Lucman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(c) of RA 3019. The Court modified Lucman's
sentence to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine
(9) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

The Court held that the elements of the crime charged were established, namely: (1) Lucman was a public
officer; (2) he had authority to grant applications for Free Patents; (3) he directly or indirectly requested or
received a gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit from private complainants; and (4) he requested
or received the gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help given or to be given.
The Court found no reason to overturn the Sandiganbayan's findings, as there was no showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. The Court
also took into consideration the provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the modified
sentence.

5) Fuentes v. People

Facts:
The case of Fuentes v. People stemmed from an Information charging Roberto P. Fuentes, the then Municipal
Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, with violation of Article 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act." The accusatory portion of the Information alleged that Fuentes, with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, refused to renew the business permit of Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela, the sole
proprietor of Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services, without any legal basis, causing undue
injury to Valenzuela. The prosecution presented evidence that Valenzuela had complied with all the
requirements for the renewal of her business permit, but Fuentes still refused to sign it, citing rumors that
Valenzuela was involved in smuggling and drug trading. Despite Valenzuela's efforts to secure clearances from
various law enforcement agencies, Fuentes still refused to issue the business permit, causing the suspension
of Triple A's operations from 2002 to 2006.

Issue:

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Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the petition is without merit and affirmed the Decision of the Sandiganbayan, finding
Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The Court held that Fuentes
committed a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and hence, must be held criminally liable therefor. The Court
also modified the award of damages in Valenzuela's favor, awarding temperate damages in the amount of
P300,000.00, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully paid.

The Court's decision was based on the finding that Fuentes acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith
in refusing to issue the business permit to Valenzuela, despite her compliance with all the requirements and
the clearances she secured from various law enforcement agencies. The Court held that Fuentes's actions
caused undue injury to Valenzuela, and that his refusal to issue the business permit was not only committed
with manifest partiality but also with bad faith.

6) Quibal v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The case of Quibal v. Sandiganbayan involves the conviction of two public officials, Elias C. Quibal and Antonio
U. Deniega, who were the mayor and treasurer, respectively, of the municipality of Palapag, Northern Samar.
The case revolves around the construction of a municipal market, where the construction contract was
awarded to Floters Construction Company, represented by Eduardo C. Guevarra, for a total amount of
P652,562.60. Despite the contractor's failure to complete the project on time, Quibal and Deniega released
payments totaling P650,000.00 to the contractor. The Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team
discovered several irregularities, including the fact that only 36.24% of the construction had been completed
despite the lapse of the contract period, and that the contractor had already been paid despite the non-
completion of the building. The audit team also found that the disbursement vouchers were not properly filled
up and the required supporting documents were not attached.

Issue:
The issues raised in this case are:

Did the respondent Sandiganbayan err in not upholding the constitutional right of petitioners to "due process"
by not allowing re-examination and re-audit of the project which has already been completed and utilized for
public use?

Did the respondent Sandiganbayan err in not resolving that the guilt of the petitioners has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt because (a) no undue injury has been caused to the government with the full
completion of the project, and (b) petitioners did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross
inexcusable negligence?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals of the crime charged. The Court imposed penalties of imprisonment ranging from six
years and one month to ten years and one day, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
indemnification of the Municipality of Palapag, Northern Samar in the amount of P348,345.35.

The Court held that the petitioners acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in releasing payments
to the contractor despite the contractor's failure to complete the project on time. The Court also found that the
petitioners' acts and omissions were grossly negligent, demonstrating an utter lack of care in enforcing the
contract and a reckless disregard of COA rules and regulations regarding disbursement of municipal funds. The

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Court rejected petitioners' contention that no undue injury was caused to the government, citing the
unnecessary delay of almost two years in completing the project and the failure to enforce the penalty clause
in the construction contract. The Court also rejected petitioners' claim of denial of due process, holding that a
re-audit would not exonerate them from liability. The Court's decision was based on the principle that public
officials must act with the highest degree of integrity and accountability, and that any deviation from this
standard would be considered a breach of their duties.

7) Dans v. People

Facts:
The case involves Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr., who were charged with violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) for entering into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous lease agreements
between the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI) in
1984. Marcos was the Chairman of LRTA and PGHFI, while Dans was the Vice-Chairman of LRTA and a Director
of PGHFI. The agreements involved the lease of two LRTA properties in Pasay City and Sta. Cruz, Manila, to
PGHFI, which were then subleased to private corporations at allegedly higher rates. Additionally, during the
trial, a witness, Mr. Cuervo, was called to testify on the fair market value of the property, but the testimony took
an unexpected turn when Presiding Justice Garchitorena began asking a series of leading and misleading
questions.

Issue:
The main issues raised in the case are: (1) Was the respondent court correct in denying the demurrer to
evidence of petitioner Dans in Criminal Case No. 17453? (2) Were the lease agreements manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government? (3) Did the respondent court commit error in convicting petitioners
Marcos and Dans of violating RA 3019? (4) Did the respondent court deny petitioners their right to due process
and a fair trial? Furthermore, did the court's active participation in the examination of witnesses, particularly
Presiding Justice Garchitorena's leading and misleading questions, violate the principles of due process and
impartiality?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petitions of Marcos and Dans, affirming the decision of the Sandiganbayan
convicting them of violating RA 3019. The Court ruled that the respondent court did not err in denying Dans'
demurrer to evidence, as the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to establish that the lease
agreements were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. The Court also ruled that the
respondent court did not commit error in convicting petitioners, as the evidence presented established their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the court held that the Presiding Justice's questions were improper
and violated the principles of due process and impartiality.

8) Caunan v. People

Facts:
The case involves consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by Joey P. Marquez and Ofelia C. Caunan,
who were found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges stemmed from the procurement of "walis ting-ting"
(broomsticks) by the local government of Parañaque City, where Marquez served as the City Mayor and Caunan
as the OIC General Services Office.

The prosecution alleged that Marquez, Caunan, and other local government officials conspired with Antonio
Razo, the owner of ZARO Trading, to engage in manifestly disadvantageous transactions involving the purchase
of broomsticks at prices significantly higher than the market rate. The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted
a special audit and found that the actual cost of the broomsticks was only P11.00 per piece, while the city
purchased them for P25.00 and P15.00 per piece in various transactions, resulting in substantial overpricing.

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The COA issued Notices of Disallowance for the transactions, which totaled over P1.3 million in overpricing for
the years 1996 to 1998. The petitioners contested the disallowances but were ultimately indicted by the
Ombudsman, leading to the filing of five Informations against them in the Sandiganbayan.

During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence, including the testimony of the audit team leader, Fatima
Bermudez, and the audit report, which detailed the findings of overpricing and procedural irregularities in the
procurement process. The Sandiganbayan found the petitioners guilty, leading to their appeals.

The petitioners contended that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of overpricing beyond a reasonable
doubt, arguing that the evidence presented was primarily hearsay and thus inadmissible.
They asserted that the audit team's conclusions were based on inadequate evidence, particularly the lack of
signed price quotations from suppliers and the use of market prices from other cities as a basis for comparison.
Marquez specifically argued that he had been excluded from liability by the COA and that the acquittal of
several co-accused cast doubt on the findings against him.

The prosecution maintained that the evidence presented, including the audit report and witness testimonies,
sufficiently demonstrated the existence of overpricing and procedural violations in the procurement process.
They argued that the Sandiganbayan correctly found that the transactions were grossly disadvantageous to the
government, fulfilling the requirements of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding the petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

Whether the testimony of the audit team and the audit report constituted hearsay and were inadmissible as
evidence.

Whether Marquez should be excluded from liability based on previous rulings and the COA's exclusion of him
from liability for the disallowances.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the Sandiganbayan's decision, acquitting both Marquez and Caunan. The Court
held that the prosecution did not meet the burden of proof required for a criminal conviction, which is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found that the evidence of overpricing was not adequately established,
as the prosecution relied on comparisons with prices from other cities and did not present direct evidence of
the actual prices paid for the specific broomsticks purchased by Parañaque City.

The Court emphasized that while the lack of public bidding in the procurement process raised concerns, it did
not automatically equate to a manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. The Court reiterated that
the elements of conspiracy and culpability must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and the mere presence
of procedural irregularities does not suffice to establish criminal liability.

The Court also addressed the hearsay issue, stating that while some of the audit team's findings could be
admissible, the conclusions drawn were based on insufficient and incompetent evidence. The Court
underscored the importance of presenting direct evidence to support claims of overpricing and
disadvantageous transactions.

Significant Legal Principles Established:

The burden of proof in criminal cases lies with the prosecution, which must establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

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The absence of public bidding does not automatically imply that a transaction is grossly disadvantageous to
the government; there must be clear evidence of overpricing or other forms of disadvantage.
Conspiracy must be proven with strong evidence, and negligence or reliance on subordinates does not equate
to criminal intent.

9) Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994

Facts:
The case of Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan involves Governor Antonio M. Bolastig of Samar, who was ordered to be
suspended from office for 90 days by the Sandiganbayan due to charges of overpricing office supplies. The
Information filed against him alleged that he, along with two others, wilfully and unlawfully entered into a
purchase contract for office supplies at a grossly disadvantageous price to the government, causing undue
injury to the government in the amount of P49,500.00. Bolastig entered a plea of not guilty and opposed the
motion for his suspension, arguing that it would deprive the people of Samar of their elected official's services.

Issue:
The main issues raised in this case are: Did the Sandiganbayan commit a grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the preventive suspension of Governor Bolastig from office for 90 days? Is the preventive suspension
mandatory under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or does the court have discretion to determine whether
the suspension is necessary?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the resolution of the Sandiganbayan
ordering the preventive suspension of Governor Bolastig from office for 90 days.

The Supreme Court held that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan
to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of
the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed.
The court has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The law presumes that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both. The duration of preventive suspension is coeval
with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases, which is 90 days. The fact that the
trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution does
not remove the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution.
The preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the services of an official elected by them, but
the vice governor, who has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor.

10) Layus v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134272, December 8, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner Celia T. Layus, M.D., the elected Mayor of Claveria, Cagayan, was charged with estafa through
falsification of public documents in an Information filed on February 19, 1997, before the Sandiganbayan,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 23583. The charges arose from a complaint alleging estafa through
falsification of public documents and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Layus and
several co-respondents. Following a preliminary investigation, the Graft Investigation Officer recommended
filing an information against Layus for estafa, while dismissing the charges against the other respondents.

Layus claimed she received the Joint Resolution recommending the filing of the information on February 21,
1997, and subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 7, 1997, unaware that the Information had

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already been filed on February 17, 1997. A warrant for her arrest was issued on April 8, 1997, leading her to post
bail and file a motion to lift a travel ban imposed on her due to her scheduled trip abroad.

During a hearing on April 18, 1997, the Sandiganbayan required her to enter a plea before considering her
motion to lift the travel ban. Layus entered a plea of not guilty, asserting that it should not waive her right to file
a motion for reinvestigation and a motion to quash the information. She later filed a motion to quash the
Information and a motion for reinvestigation, both of which were denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On November 19, 1997, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend Layus pendente lite, which was initially held
in abeyance due to the election period. However, on June 26, 1998, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to
suspend her. Layus subsequently filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the denial of her motion for reinvestigation, and the 90-day suspension imposed on her.

Layus argued that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over her case because her salary of P11,441
classified her under Salary Grade (SG) 25, which is below the SG 27 threshold required for the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction. She contended that the provisions of the Local Government Code did not automatically classify
her position as SG 27 and that her classification should be based on actual compensation. Layus claimed that
the funds in question were confidential and governed by COA Circular No. 385, and that the Ombudsman failed
to obtain a necessary COA report. She also argued that the documents presented during the preliminary
investigation were unauthenticated and that there was a breach of agreement regarding the timeline for her
motion for reinvestigation.

The respondents maintained that the Sandiganbayan had original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving mayors of fifth-class municipalities, as established in previous jurisprudence. They argued that the
classification of Layus' salary was irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue, as the law provided for a catchall
provision that included municipal mayors under SG 27. The respondents contended that Layus was afforded
due process and that the Ombudsman had the authority to investigate without needing a prior COA report. They
asserted that the lack of authentication of documents was a matter for trial, not for quashing the information.

Issue:

• Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the criminal case against Layus, given her
classification as a mayor of a fifth-class municipality.
• Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying Layus' motion for reinvestigation.
• Whether the 90-day suspension pendente lite imposed on Layus was justified.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed Layus' petition for lack of merit. It affirmed the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over
the case, citing that the classification of municipal mayors under SG 27 was established by law, regardless of
the actual salary received. The Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by
the position held, not the salary received.

On the denial of the motion for reinvestigation, the Court found that Layus had ample opportunity to present
her case and that the Ombudsman’s actions were valid. The Court reiterated that the preliminary investigation's
purpose is to determine probable cause, and the validity of the evidence presented is best addressed during
trial.

Regarding the 90-day suspension, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan acted within its authority, as the law
mandates suspension of public officials charged with valid information under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Court noted that the suspension was not automatic but followed a valid pre-suspension
hearing, which Layus was given the opportunity to contest.

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Significant Legal Principles Established:

• The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases involving public officials is determined by the
position held rather than the actual salary received.
• The Ombudsman has plenary authority to investigate and prosecute cases without needing prior
approval from the Commission on Audit.
• The validity of evidence and the merits of a defense are to be determined during trial, not at the
preliminary investigation stage.
• Mandatory suspension of public officials charged with valid information under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act is a legal requirement to prevent potential malfeasance.

11) Vener D. Collao v. People

Facts:
Vener D. Collao, the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 780, Zone 85, District V of the City of Manila, was accused
of demanding and accepting a commission of P40,000.00 from Franco G.C. Espiritu, a businessman, in
connection with a contract for the delivery of supplies for the construction of a basketball court and school
and sports equipment for the Sangguniang Kabataan. The contract was worth P134,200.00. Collao was
indicted for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. During the trial, the prosecution presented Espiritu, Gina Cabilan (liaison officer for FRCGE), and
Amorsolo Enriquez (designated Accounts Officer of Manila) as witnesses. The defense, on the other hand,
presented Collao as its lone witness.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Collao of the crime of violation of Section 3(b) of RA
3019?

Ruling:
The petition is without merit. The Court affirmed the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated May 25, 2018, which
found Collao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

The Court held that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that Collao demanded and accepted
a commission of P40,000.00 from Espiritu in connection with the contract. The Court gave credence to the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, particularly Espiritu and Cabilan, who corroborated each
other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. The Court also held that the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses do not impair their credibility. The Court further
ruled that the elements of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 were present, namely: (1) Collao was a public
officer; (2) he requested and received a share or commission; (3) the share was for his own behalf; (4) the share
was in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; and (5) Collao had the right to intervene
in his official capacity under the law. The Court also rejected Collao's defense, finding it to be weak and
unconvincing.

12) Dominador Marzan v. People

Facts:
The case of Marzan v. People involves Dominador G. Marzan, a Senior Jail Officer, and Atty. Basilio Pascual
Rupisan, a Provincial Legal Officer, who were charged with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges stemmed from the release of two
detainees, Cyrus Dulay and Wendell Pascua, without a court order on May 21, 2001. The detainees were
arrested for frustrated homicide and were detained at the Solano District Jail. Atty. Rupisan issued a

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Recognizance, which was not a valid court order, and Marzan released the detainees based on this document.
The release was in violation of the BJMP Manual and the Rules of Court.

Issue:
The main issue raised by Marzan in his petition is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in convicting him
despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove all the elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 beyond reasonable
doubt. Specifically, Marzan argued that the prosecution failed to establish that he had persuaded, induced, or
influenced another public officer to perform an act that constitutes a violation of rules and regulations.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Marzan's petition and affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan, which found him
guilty of violating Section 3(a) of RA 3019. The Court modified his penalty from imprisonment of six years and
one month as minimum to ten years as maximum to six years and one month as minimum to seven years as
maximum, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

The Court held that the prosecution established all the elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, which includes:
(1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public
officer to perform an act or allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act; and (3)
that the act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of
the latter. The Court found that Marzan allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced by Atty.
Rupisan to release the detainees without a court order, which constitutes a violation of the BJMP Manual and
the Rules of Court.

13) Ramsy D. Panes v. People

Facts:
The case involves Ramsy D. Panes, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Permits and Licenses Division of the City
of Victorias, Negros Occidental, who was accused of violating Section 3 (j) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) for issuing a business permit to Gaudencio Corona, a betting station and sub-
collecting agent of Dalisay, despite the absence of necessary documents and permits. The permit was issued
despite the lack of documentary evidence to support the same. The Sandiganbayan found Panes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced him to imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office.

Issue:
Is Panes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (j) of Republic Act No. 3019 for issuing a business
permit to Corona despite the absence of necessary documents and permits?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan, finding Panes guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 3 (j) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Court denied Panes' Petition for Review on Certiorari and
upheld the sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, and perpetual disqualification from public office.

The Court held that as OIC of the Permits and Licenses Division, Panes had the duty to examine and evaluate
the documents of the applicant before recommending the approval of the business permit. He cannot feign
ignorance of the irregularities in Corona's application, and his recommendation for approval despite these
irregularities constitutes a violation of Section 3 (j) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Court also rejected Panes'
defense of good faith and lack of malice, as the law punishes the act of knowingly granting or issuing a license
or permit to an applicant who is not qualified or legally entitled to such license or permit. The subsequent
cancellation of the business permit was deemed immaterial, as the crime had already been consummated the
moment the permit was issued to Corona.

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14) Patria Gutierrez v. People

Facts:
The case involves Mayor Patria C. Gutierrez, who was convicted of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The conviction stemmed from her refusal to pay
the gratuity pay of the late Mayor Naomi Corral, which was approved by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) in the amount of P352,456.11. Despite the approval and the submission of all required
documents, Mayor Gutierrez refused to pay the gratuity pay, citing reports of irregularities in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer. The case was filed before the Sandiganbayan, which convicted Mayor Gutierrez and
sentenced her to imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether Mayor Gutierrez violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by refusing to pay
the gratuity pay of the late Mayor Corral, causing undue injury to her and her family. Specifically, the issues
raised are: Did Mayor Gutierrez violate Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by causing undue injury to Dr. Corral
through her refusal to pay the gratuity pay? Was the refusal to pay the gratuity pay committed with evident bad
faith? Did the non-payment of the gratuity pay cause undue injury to Dr. Corral and her family?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by Mayor Gutierrez, affirming the decision
and resolution of the Sandiganbayan. The Court found that the prosecution had successfully established
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Mayor Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The Court explained that to convict an accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the following
elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he or she must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his or her action caused undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
or her functions.

15) Maybel Umpa v. People

Facts:
Maybel Umpa, a public officer, was accused of estafa and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
for fraudulently promising to facilitate the issuance of land documents and accepting payment, but failing to
deliver. The case stemmed from a complaint filed by Lory Malibiran, who consulted Umpa on how to obtain
approved plans, tax declarations, and a certificate of title for a 7.2-hectare property in Rodriguez, Rizal. Umpa
assured Malibiran that she could produce the documents and asked for a sketch plan and a research fee of
P20,000. Later, she demanded an additional P620,000 to facilitate the release of the documents, which
Malibiran paid. However, Umpa failed to deliver any documents, prompting Malibiran to file a complaint against
her before the Land Registration Authority (LRA). The case was later filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
which found probable cause to indict Umpa and her co-accused, Carlita Castillo, for estafa and violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue:
Did the courts a quo err in finding Umpa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing estafa and violating the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, despite the alleged inconsistencies in Malibiran's testimony?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Umpa's petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the decision of the
Sandiganbayan, which found her guilty of estafa and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The

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Court also modified the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan to include perpetual disqualification from
holding public office and ordered Umpa to return the amount of P640,000 with a legal interest rate of 6% per
annum.

Ratio:
The Court held that the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code were proven beyond
reasonable doubt, including Umpa's false pretenses or fraudulent representations, Malibiran's reliance on
such representations, and the actual damages suffered by Malibiran. The Court also found that Umpa's actions
constituted a violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as she acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence in the performance of her duties as a public
officer.

16) Cabarios v. People

Facts:
Eric A. Cabarios, serving as a Board Member in Zamboanga Sibugay, was implicated alongside Michelle B.
Navalta and James Ismael A. Revantad in legal proceedings involving significant allegations of corruption. The
accusations centered around the mismanagement of the Aid to the Poor Program, specifically the
disbursement of funds to purportedly fictitious or non-existent beneficiaries. Charged with five counts each of
violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) and malversation of public funds
through falsification of public documents, the case first unfolded in the Sandiganbayan. On August 30, 2016,
the court convicted Cabarios of all counts, a decision which remained unchanged even after his motion for
reconsideration on October 25, 2016. Following these events, Cabarios escalated the matter to the Supreme
Court, challenging the adequacy of the evidence against him and critiquing the lower court's reliance on
hearsay.

Issue:
Were the beneficiaries of the Aid to the Poor Program fictitious or non-existent, thereby justifying the
convictions for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court rendered a verdict that led to the acquittal of Eric A. Cabarios from all charges. The justices
determined that the prosecution had not satisfactorily proven that the beneficiaries were either fictitious or
non-existent. As a result, the decision of the Sandiganbayan was overturned, and Cabarios was ordered to be
released immediately unless detained for another valid legal reason. Additionally, the proceedings against his
co-accused, who remained at large, were terminated, and their respective arrest warrants were nullified.

The Supreme Court's acquittal of Cabarios was underpinned by several critical considerations. Firstly, the
Court criticized the initial search efforts by the Commission on Audit (COA), which were deemed insufficient
and untimely, conducted two years post-disbursements. This delay raised plausible concerns that
beneficiaries might have relocated or deceased, thereby complicating verification processes. The Court also
drew parallels to a similar case (Chiong-Javier), where another board member was acquitted under
comparable circumstances, suggesting a precedent that influenced their decision. Moreover, the defense
successfully presented substantial evidence, including testimonies from individuals who confirmed receiving
aid or being closely related to the beneficiaries, countering the prosecution's narrative. Lastly, the Supreme
Court stressed the foundational legal principle of the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—a threshold not met in this instance due to the questionable
verification of beneficiary existence and procedural flaws. This comprehensive assessment led to the reversal
of Cabarios’s conviction, emphasizing the necessity for concrete and timely evidence in substantiating charges
of this nature.

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17) People v. Richard R. Enojo

Facts:
The case of People vs. Enojo involves Richard R. Enojo, a high-ranking public official who was charged with
violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act". The
charge stemmed from an incident on February 7, 2013, when Enojo, as the Officer-In-Charge, Provincial Legal
Officer/Provincial Administrator of Negros Oriental, allegedly persuaded, induced, and influenced the
Philippine National Police (PNP)-Dauin Police Office/Station to summon Ralph Gavin Hughes, Merlinda A.
Regalado, and Atty. Ligaya Rubio Violeta to a conference with him regarding a land dispute. The conference was
held at the Dauin Police Station, and Enojo claimed that he had a personal interest in the land in question. The
Sandiganbayan found Enojo guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to imprisonment. Enojo
appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Issue:
The sole issue to be resolved in the case is whether Enojo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
3(a) of RA 3019. Specifically, the issue is whether the prosecution proved that Enojo persuaded, induced, or
influenced the PNP to commit an act in violation of rules and regulations.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals acquitted Enojo of the charges, reversing the decision of the Sandiganbayan, which found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(a) of RA 3019. The Court of Appeals held that the
prosecution failed to prove that Enojo persuaded, induced, or influenced the PNP to commit an act in violation
of rules and regulations.

The Court of Appeals explained that the elements of the crime of violating Section 3(a) of RA 3019 are: (1) the
offender is a public officer; (2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform
an act, or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act; and (3) the
act performed by the other public officer, or committed by the offender, constitutes a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority, or an offense in connection with the official duty of the
latter.

18) Rodrigo D. Villanueva v. People

Facts:
The case of Villanueva v. People involves Rodrigo Deriquito Villanueva, the president and general manager of
AM-Europharma Corporation, who was charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charge stemmed from the awarding of a contract to
Villanueva's companies, AM-Europharma Corporation and Mallix Drug Center, for the purchase of medicines
by the Municipality of Janiuay, Iloilo, despite the suspension of accreditation of AM-Europharma Corporation
by the Department of Health (DOH). The contract was awarded on January 15, 2001, and the medicines were
delivered on the same day. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation and found probable
cause to indict Villanueva and several municipal officers for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether Villanueva and the municipal officers conspired to award the
contract to Villanueva's companies, thereby giving him unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of their official functions. Specifically, the issue is whether a private individual can be held liable for
conspiracy with public officials in committing the crime of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Ruling:

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan, finding Villanueva and his co-accused guilty
of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Court held that the elements of the offense were present, namely: (a)
the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he/she must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his/her action
caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The Court explained that the third element of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 consists of two separate acts, either of
which qualifies as a violation. The first act is when the accused causes undue injury to any party, including the
government, which must be proven with a reasonable basis.

19) People v. Ronald N. Ricketts

Facts:
The case involves Ronald N. Ricketts, Cyrus Paul S. Valenzuela, Manuel J. Mangubat, Joseph D. Arnaldo, and
Glenn S. Perez, who were accused of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019. Ricketts was the
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Optical Media Board (OMB), while Perez was a computer operator
in the OMB. The other accused held various positions in the OMB. On May 27, 2010, a raid was conducted on a
compound in Quiapo, Manila, resulting in the confiscation of pirated optical discs and the arrest of three
Chinese nationals. The seized items were loaded onto an Isuzu Elf van with Plate Number RGW 474, which was
found to have the markings "Sky High Marketing" on its sides. The van and the items were brought to the OMB
compound, where they were turned over to the guard-on-duty and recorded in the logbook. Later that night,
Perez was caught re-loading 121 boxes of the seized items back onto the Elf van without written authorization.
The prosecution presented evidence showing that Ricketts and Perez conspired to release the seized items to
Sky High Marketing Corporation, resulting in damage and prejudice to the government.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that the prosecution had
proved the conspiracy between accused-appellants, as well as their guilt of the offense charged beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ricketts, acquitting him of the charges due to lack of evidence proving his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the Court upheld the conviction of Perez, finding him guilty
of violating Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. The Court held that Perez' act of re-loading the seized items without
written authorization constituted giving an unwarranted benefit to the owner of the seized items, Sky High
Marketing Corporation.

The Court's decision was based on the principle that to prove conspiracy, the prosecution must show that all
participants performed overt acts with a common purpose or design to commit the felony. In this case, the
prosecution failed to establish Ricketts' participation in the conspiracy with proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court emphasized that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is insufficient to
constitute one as part of a conspiracy.

20) People v. Arnaldo Partisala

Facts:
The case involves Arnaldo Partisala, the Vice Mayor of Maasin, Iloilo, who was charged with Falsification of
Public Document and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The charges stemmed from the alleged falsification of the Minutes of the Regular
Session of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Maasin, Iloilo on June 21, 1996, which authorized Mayor Rene
Mondejar to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with International Builders Corporation (IBC) for

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the rechanneling of the Tigum River. The MOA granted IBC the authority to extract surplus sand and gravel
supply without the necessary permit from the Provincial Government of Iloilo.

Issue:
The issues raised in the case are: (1) whether or not the act of the SB Members, including Partisala, in
authorizing Mayor Mondejar to enter into the MOA with IBC gave unwarranted benefit and/or advantage to
Helen Edith Lee Tan in violation of RA 3019; and (2) whether or not Partisala, with his co-accused public
officers, conspired with each other in falsifying the Minutes of the Regular Session of the SB of Maasin, Iloilo.

Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan found Partisala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Document and
Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction.

The Court held that Partisala, as a public officer, took advantage of his official position to falsify the Minutes of
the SB on June 21, 1996, making it appear that the SB deliberated on the issuance of Resolution No. 30-A and
Resolution No. 30-B, which gave Mondejar the authority to enter into a contract with IBC. The Court found that
the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove that Partisala and his co-accused public officers
conspired to falsify the Minutes. The Court also found that Partisala's defense, which claimed that the
prosecution failed to present the true or real copy of the Minutes, was unmeritorious. The Court held that it is
not necessary to present the alleged true copy of the Minutes in order to prove falsification.

21) People v. Gemma Adana

Facts:
The case of People vs. Adana involves five public officials from the Municipality of Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay,
namely Gemma Florante Adana, Roland Cuenca Grijalvo, Felix Abelano Timsan, Emmanuel Fortuno Enteria,
and Jonathan Kee Cartagena, who were accused of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The accused were charged with violating the procurement law in the purchase
of heavy equipment worth P8,800,000.00 from CVCK Trading. The prosecution alleged that the accused
committed various irregularities in the bidding process, including the non-publication of the Invitation to Apply
for Eligibility and to Bid (IAEB) in the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS)
website, the lack of approved budget for the contract, and the modification of the specifications of the heavy
equipment after the Notice of Award was issued.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is whether the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Specifically, the issue is whether the prosecution was able to prove that the accused
committed the crime of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, particularly in the exercise of their
official functions, with malicious and fraudulent intent tantamount to bad faith or manifest partiality, and
causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the accused, finding them not guilty of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
The Court held that while there were procedural lapses committed by the accused in the exercise of their
official functions, there was no sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they acted with
malicious and fraudulent intent tantamount to bad faith or manifest partiality. The Court also found that there
was no sufficient evidence to prove that the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference.

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22) Quirino M. Libunao v. People

Facts:
The case involves Quirino M. Libunao, the former Regional Director of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG)-Caraga Region, who was convicted of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) for his involvement in illegal purchases made using the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) without conducting public bidding. The purchases were made from various
suppliers, including San Marino Laboratories Corporation and Revelstone Sales International, and resulted in
an overpricing of the items amounting to P2,863,689.36 or equivalent to 13.6% to 506% of the prevailing market
prices. Specifically, Libunao was accused of approving the transactions without public bidding, which resulted
in unwarranted benefits to the private suppliers.

Issue:
Did the Sandiganbayan err in convicting Libunao of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 despite the fact that
the Informations charged him with an offense under Section 3(g) of the same law? In other words, did Libunao
violate Section 3(e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefits to San Marino and Revelstone through gross
inexcusable negligence in approving the subject transactions despite the absence of public bidding?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition is devoid of merit and affirmed the Sandiganbayan's decision
convicting Libunao of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Court sentenced Libunao to suffer
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six years and one month, as minimum, to ten years, as maximum,
with perpetual disqualification from public office.

The Court held that the Informations sufficiently charged Libunao with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
which prohibits public officers from causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court found that the
elements of the crime were sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, including Libunao's act of approving
the transactions without public bidding, which resulted in unwarranted benefits to the private suppliers.

23) People of the Philippines v. Carlos Asuncion

Facts:
The case involves Mayor Carlos R. Asuncion and four other accused-appellants, namely Mamelfa R. Amongol,
Genoveva R. Ragasa, Rosita R. Ragunjan, and Virginia R. Rafanan, who were charged with violating the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) and malversation of public funds. The case stems from the grant of
financial assistance to four chapters of the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan, an organization of women rural workers,
in the amount of P100,000 each in 2012. The accused-appellants were alleged to have conspired to grant the
financial assistance without proper authority and in violation of the law. The financial assistance was granted
through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, and the
Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters. However, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the grant of financial
assistance, prompting the Office of the Ombudsman to file charges against the accused-appellants.

Issue:
Did the Sandiganbayan err in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating RA
3019 and malversation of public funds? Specifically, the issues raised are: (1) whether the prosecution proved
that the accused-appellants conspired to grant the financial assistance without proper authority; (2) whether
the accused-appellants acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in granting the financial assistance;
and (3) whether the prosecution proved that the accused-appellants were guilty of malversation of public
funds.

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Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Sandiganbayan and acquitted the accused-appellants of the
charges against them. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court held that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants.
The Court noted that the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan and its chapters had been accredited by the Municipality
of Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, and that the accused-appellants had acted in good faith in granting the financial
assistance. The Court also found that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused-appellants had
conspired to commit the alleged offenses.

24) People of the Philippines v. Ma. Consuelo Toroba Palma Gil-Roflo

Facts:
The case involves accused-appellants Ma. Consuelo Toroba Palma Gil-Roflo, Jerico O. Ebita, Norman Jay
Jacinto P. Doral, Derrick P. Andrade, Sergio U. Andrade, and Chona Andrade Tolentino, who were charged with
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 (4)
of the Revised Penal Code. The accused-appellants were job order employees of the Provincial Government of
Davao Oriental, and they allegedly falsified their Daily Time Records (DTRs), Acceptance Reports (ARs), and
contracts of services. The prosecution claimed that the accused-appellants did not actually render services,
but still received salaries from the government. The case stemmed from an investigation conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman, which found that the accused-appellants were not performing their duties as job
order employees, but were instead working as house helpers of Roflo and her family in their houses in Davao
City.

Issue:
Did the accused-appellants commit Falsification of Public Documents and violate Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, acquitting the
accused-appellants of the crimes charged. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the accused-
appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the element of malicious intent on the part of the
accused-appellants. The accused-appellants were job order employees who were not required to work during
regular office hours, and they were permitted to work outside the agency's prescribed office hours. The Court
also found that the accused-appellants were acting in good faith and in the honest belief that they were
permitted to work outside the agency's prescribed office hours. The Court rejected the prosecution's claim that
the accused-appellants falsified their DTRs, ARs, and contracts of services, holding that the accused-
appellants were not required to strictly comply with the rules governing government employees, as they were
not entitled to the same benefits as regular government employees.

=======================================================================================

R.A. No. 7080 as amended by R.A. 7659

An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder

Definition:

Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term -

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a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or contract.

b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates otherwise.

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the

public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other
form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

See Section 2 As amended by Section 12 of RA No.7659

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five
million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life
imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who
participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall
be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

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Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under this Act in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and other
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.

Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
However, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from
their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Notable Cases:

1) Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The case involves former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, who was charged with plunder under Republic Act
No. 7080 (RA 7080), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The Office of the Ombudsman filed eight separate
informations against Estrada before the Sandiganbayan, alleging that he had amassed, accumulated, or
acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts while in office. The
informations accused Estrada of receiving “jueteng money” from gambling operators, misappropriating public
funds, and directing government agencies to purchase shares of stock for his personal gain. Estrada filed a
motion to quash the information, arguing that the Plunder Law was unconstitutional for being vague and
violating his right to due process. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, and Estrada subsequently filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The main issues raised in the case are:

Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad, thereby denying the accused
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and violating his fundamental
right to due process?
Does Section 4 of the Plunder Law circumvent the prosecution’s obligation to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal
acts showing an unlawful scheme or conspiracy?
Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that:

The Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad.
Section 4 of the Plunder Law does not circumvent the prosecution's obligation to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder.

The Court's decision is based on the principle that a statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. The Court held
that the Plunder Law is clear and free from ambiguity, and that the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. The Court also emphasized that the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is inapplicable to penal statutes,
and that the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are not applicable in this case.

2) Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People

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Facts:
The case involves former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas, who were charged with
plunder in connection with the alleged misuse of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) funds. The
respondents were accused of misappropriating and converting public funds amounting to P338 million from
the PCSO's Charity Fund and Intelligence Fund for their personal gain. The funds were allegedly used for various
purposes, including the "roll-out" of the small town lottery program, but were not properly accounted for. The
respondents were charged with plunder under Republic Act No. 7080. The case was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, which eventually led to the filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The main issues raised in the case are: (1) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioners' demurrer to evidence? (2) Did the prosecution prove the elements of plunder beyond
reasonable doubt? (3) Did the Court's decision violate the State's right to due process? Specifically, did the
respondents commit plunder by misappropriating and converting public funds from the PCSO's Charity Fund
and Intelligence Fund for their personal gain? Did the respondents amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten
wealth through a scheme or conspiracy, and did they misappropriate and convert public funds for their
personal gain?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the State's motion for reconsideration and affirmed its earlier decision acquitting
the petitioners of plunder charges. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the respondents committed plunder. The Court also ruled that the prosecution's evidence was
insufficient to prove the elements of plunder, including the existence of a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.

The Court's decision was based on the following grounds: Firstly, the prosecution failed to prove the existence
of a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth. The Court held that the
prosecution's evidence only showed that the respondents had access to the PCSO funds, but did not establish
that they had a common design or scheme to misappropriate the funds. Secondly, the respondents' actions
did not constitute a "raid on the public treasury" as required by the law on plunder. The Court held that the
respondents' actions were not tantamount to a "raid" on the public treasury, as they were still within the scope
of their official duties.

3) Revilla Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The case involves multiple petitions for certiorari filed by Ramon "Bong" B. Revilla, Jr., Richard A. Cambe, and
Janet Lim Napoles against the Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines. The petitions stem from a
resolution dated December 1, 2014, wherein the Sandiganbayan denied their applications for bail in Criminal
Case No. SB-14-CRM-0240, which charged them with the crime of Plunder under Republic Act No. 7080. The
Information was filed by the Office of the Ombudsman on June 5, 2014, alleging that from 2006 to 2010, Revilla,
a senator, and Cambe, his chief of staff, conspired with Napoles to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least Php 224,512,500.00 through kickbacks from projects funded by Revilla's Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). The prosecution presented evidence, including testimonies from whistleblowers and documents
indicating that the funds were misappropriated through fictitious non-government organizations (NGOs)
controlled by Napoles. Revilla and Cambe were arrested on June 19, 2014, and both filed separate applications
for bail, which were denied after hearings where the prosecution presented nine witnesses. The Sandiganbayan
found strong evidence of guilt, leading to the denial of bail. Revilla later withdrew his petition for certiorari, while
the Ombudsman sought to transfer the detention of Revilla and Cambe to a Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) facility, which the Sandiganbayan denied. Additionally, the prosecution filed a motion for a
writ of preliminary attachment against Revilla's properties, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan.

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Issue:
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the bail applications of Revilla, Cambe,
and Napoles?
Was the Sandiganbayan correct in denying the prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of Revilla and
Cambe to a BJMP facility?
Did the Sandiganbayan err in granting the writ of preliminary attachment against Revilla's properties?

Ruling:
The Court dismissed the petitions for lack of merit, affirming the Sandiganbayan's denial of bail for Cambe and
Napoles based on strong evidence of guilt.
The Court upheld the Sandiganbayan's decision to deny the prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of
Revilla and Cambe, finding no grave abuse of discretion.
The Court affirmed the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against Revilla's properties, ruling that
the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in denying bail to Cambe and
Napoles, as the evidence presented during the bail hearings was deemed strong enough to support the charge
of plunder. The Court emphasized that the right to bail is not absolute, especially in cases involving capital
offenses like plunder, where the evidence of guilt is strong. The Sandiganbayan's findings were based on a
thorough evaluation of the evidence, including testimonies from whistleblowers and documentary evidence
that established a clear connection between the accused and the alleged crime.

Regarding the motion to transfer detention, the Court found that the Sandiganbayan acted within its
jurisdiction, as the law allows for detention in facilities other than those supervised by the BJMP, provided that
the conditions of confinement are adequate. The prosecution's claims of special treatment were not
substantiated by compelling evidence.

In terms of the writ of preliminary attachment, the Court noted that the Sandiganbayan had the authority to
issue such a writ as a provisional remedy in cases involving public officers accused of plunder. The issuance
was justified based on the prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth and the risk of the accused concealing or
disposing of their properties. The Court reiterated that the attachment serves to protect the government's
interests while the criminal proceedings are ongoing, and it does not violate the accused's rights to due
process.

=======================================================================================

R.A. No. 8049

Anti-Hazing Act of 2018

Elements:

1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization;

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.

Definition:

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Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National
Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army
Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and
enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved ny the Secretary of National Defense and the
National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this
Act.

Section 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or organization shall be
allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization seven (7) days before the
conduct of such initiation. The written notice shall indicate the period of the initiation activities which shall not
exceed three (3) days, shall include the names of those to be subjected to such activities, and shall further
contain an undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites.

Section 3. The head of the school or organization or their representatives must assign at least two (2)
representatives of the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present during the initiation. It is the
duty of such representative to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit,
neophyte or applicant.

Penalties:

Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies
as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated
in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. The person or persons who participated in the
hazing shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or mutilation results there from.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile, impotent or blind.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4
months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to
smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member
shall have become incapacitated for the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14 years and 8 months) if
in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or shall have lost any other part of his body,
or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or
work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety (90) days.

5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years) if in consequence of
the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which
he was habitually engaged for a period of more than thirty (30) days.

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6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he
was habitually engaged for a period of ten (10) days or more, or that the injury sustained shall require medical
assistance for the same period.

7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if in consequence of the
hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he
was habitually engaged from one (1) to nine (9) days, or that the injury sustained shall require medical
assistance for the same period.

8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one day to 6 years) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which do not prevent him from engaging in
his habitual activity or work nor require medical attendance.

The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training organization, may
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under this provision
even before their conviction. The maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in any of the following
instances:

(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or deceit on the person of the
recruit who refuses to join;

(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning that hazing will be
committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;

(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from reporting the unlawful
act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or to the police authorities, through force,
violence, threat or intimidation;

(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or

(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the hazing.

The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring. If
the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization, the
parents shall be held liable as principals when they have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but
failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring.

The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge
thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for
the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.

The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned
the hazing although not present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed shall be liable as
principals. A fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present when the acts constituting the hazing were
committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from occurring shall be liable as principal.

The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as principal unless
he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.

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Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no
intention to commit so grave a wrong.

This section shall apply to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation
engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner provided herein.

Notable Cases:

1) Dungo vs. People

Facts:
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed an Information against Dandy
L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. for the death of Marlon Villanueva, a neophyte of the Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity. The incident occurred during a planned initiation rite on January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City. The Information alleged that the accused, in conspiracy with approximately twenty other
fraternity members, assaulted Villanueva, resulting in his death.

The prosecution presented twenty witnesses, including medical professionals and bystanders, who testified
about the events leading to Villanueva's death. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, the attending physician, noted that
Villanueva was brought to the hospital lifeless, with significant injuries indicative of hazing. An autopsy
performed by Dr. Roy Camarillo revealed multiple contusions and the cause of death as subdural hemorrhage
due to blunt force trauma, consistent with hazing injuries.

Witnesses, including Susan Ignacio, who owned a nearby store, testified to seeing Dungo and Sibal at the resort
on the night of the incident. They described a group of fraternity members arriving at the resort and later
observed individuals purchasing items from Ignacio's store. Other witnesses, including a tricycle driver and
hospital security guards, corroborated the timeline and identified Dungo and Sibal as the individuals who
brought Villanueva to the hospital.

In their defense, Dungo and Sibal presented alibi witnesses who claimed they were elsewhere during the
initiation rites. However, the trial court found their defenses unconvincing, noting that their testimonies were
self-serving and lacked credibility.

Issue:
• Whether the prosecution established the guilt of Dungo and Sibal beyond a reasonable doubt for
violating the Anti-Hazing Law (R.A. No. 8049).
• Whether the amended Information sufficiently informed the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them.
• Whether the presence of the accused during the hazing constituted prima facie evidence of
participation in the crime.

Arguments:

Petitioners' Arguments:
Dungo and Sibal contended that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, arguing
that the evidence presented was circumstantial and insufficient.
They claimed that the amended Information charged them with actual participation in the assault, while the
conviction was based on their mere presence during the hazing, which they argued was a different offense.
They also challenged the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, asserting that it violated their right to
be presumed innocent.

Prosecution's Arguments:

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The prosecution maintained that the evidence, including witness testimonies and medical findings,
established a clear link between the accused and the hazing incident that led to Villanueva's death.
They argued that the amended Information adequately charged the accused with the crime of hazing, as it
encompassed their roles in inducing the victim to attend the initiation rites.
The prosecution asserted that the presence of the accused during the hazing constituted prima facie evidence
of their participation, as provided by the Anti-Hazing Law.

Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Dungo and Sibal guilty of violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The RTC ruled that the prosecution had established the presence of the
accused at the scene of the crime and their involvement in the hazing activities. The court emphasized that the
evidence presented, including medical testimonies and eyewitness accounts, demonstrated that Villanueva
died as a result of hazing injuries.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, stating that the circumstantial evidence presented was
sufficient to establish the guilt of the petitioners. The CA noted that the defense of denial and alibi was weak
and could not overcome the positive identification made by prosecution witnesses.

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, concluding that the amended Information
properly charged the offense and that the presence of the accused during the hazing was sufficient to establish
their participation. The Court reiterated that the Anti-Hazing Law allows for the presumption of participation
based on presence, unless the accused can prove they took steps to prevent the hazing.

Significant Legal Principles Established:

• The case reaffirmed the principle that mere presence at the scene of a hazing incident can constitute
prima facie evidence of participation in the crime under R.A. No. 8049.
• The ruling clarified that the Anti-Hazing Law is a malum prohibitum offense, meaning that intent is not
a necessary element for conviction; the act itself is sufficient for liability.
• The decision highlighted the importance of circumstantial evidence in proving guilt in cases where
direct evidence may be lacking, particularly in secretive crimes like hazing.

2) People vs. Bayabos and People vs. Aris

Facts:
The case revolves around the tragic death of Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr., a probationary midshipman at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), who died during the mandatory Indoctrination and Orientation
Period from May 2 to June 1, 2001. Following his death on May 3, 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted an investigation, which led to the filing of criminal charges against several first-class
midshipmen for hazing. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales found probable cause to charge these
midshipmen as principals in the crime of hazing.

Additionally, the investigation revealed that certain school authorities, including Rear Admiral Virginio R. Aris
and several lieutenant officers, were also implicated as accomplices to the hazing under Republic Act No.
8049, known as the Anti-Hazing Law. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with these findings, leading to the
filing of a criminal case against the school authorities in the Sandiganbayan.

However, before the school authorities were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against
them, citing the dismissal of the case against the principal accused and the lack of essential averments in the
Information as required by the Anti-Hazing Law. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman to file a petition
before the Supreme Court, challenging the Sandiganbayan's decision.

Issue:

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Can the prosecution of the school authorities for the crime of accomplice to hazing proceed despite the
dismissal of the case against the principal accused?
Does the Information filed against the school authorities contain all the material averments necessary for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law?

Arguments:

Petitioner (Office of the Ombudsman): The Special Prosecutor argued that the Sandiganbayan erred in
dismissing the case against the school authorities solely based on the dismissal of the case against the
principal accused. The prosecution contended that the liability of accomplices is distinct and can proceed
independently as long as the commission of the crime is established. The Special Prosecutor also asserted
that the Information contained sufficient material facts to support the charge of accomplice to hazing.

Respondents (School Authorities): The school authorities contended that the Information did not contain all
essential elements of the offense, particularly that the alleged hazing was not a prerequisite for admission to
the PMMA. They argued that the PMMA was not a fraternity or organization as defined by the Anti-Hazing Law
and that there was no allegation of their prior knowledge or consent to the hazing activities. They further
claimed that the dismissal of the case against the principal accused necessitated the dismissal of the case
against them as accomplices.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case against the school authorities
solely based on the dismissal of the case against the principal accused. The Court emphasized that the
prosecution of accomplices is not automatically dismissed when the principal's case is dismissed or
acquitted, provided that the commission of the crime can be established.

However, the Court affirmed the quashal of the Information against the school authorities, finding that it lacked
essential averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Specifically, the Information failed to allege that the acts
of hazing were employed as a prerequisite for admission into the PMMA, which is a crucial element of the crime
of hazing. The Court noted that the Information merely characterized the acts as hazing without detailing how
they constituted a prerequisite for admission, rendering it insufficient.

The Court also clarified that the PMMA is indeed considered an organization under the Anti-Hazing Law, and
the failure to assert that the acts were not part of an approved training procedure was not a valid ground for
quashing the Information, as this is an affirmative defense for the accused.

Significant Legal Principles Established:

• The liability of accomplices is distinct from that of principals, and the prosecution of accomplices can
proceed independently of the principal's case.
• An Information must contain all essential elements of the crime charged, including specific averments
that establish the nature of the offense.
• The definition of "organization" under the Anti-Hazing Law includes educational institutions like the
PMMA.

3) Bartolome and Bandalan vs. People

Facts:
Carlos Paulo Bartolome y Ilagan and Joel Bandalan y Abordo were charged with violating the Anti-Hazing Law
(Republic Act No. 8049) following the death of John Daniel Samparada, a neophyte of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity. The incident occurred on October 22, 2009, in Dasmariñas, Cavite, during initiation rites that
allegedly involved physical suffering. The prosecution's case was built on circumstantial evidence, including

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testimonies from police officers who investigated the incident after Samparada was brought to Estrella
Hospital with severe injuries.

The police were alerted by the hospital staff that Samparada was a victim of hazing, as evidenced by bruises
on his body. Bartolome and Bandalan were identified as two of the three individuals who brought Samparada
to the hospital. During the investigation, police officers recovered a document from Bartolome that had
markings related to the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. The petitioners claimed that they were not involved in any
hazing and that Samparada had fallen and hit his head while they were at a friend's house.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the petitioners guilty based on circumstantial evidence, sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay damages to Samparada's heirs. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTC's decision, leading to the petitioners seeking relief from the Supreme Court.

Issue:
• Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt
of the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of hazing.
• Whether the presumption of guilt under the Anti-Hazing Law violated the constitutional presumption
of innocence of the accused.

Arguments:

Prosecution's Arguments:
• The prosecution argued that the circumstantial evidence, including the testimonies of police officers
and the document recovered from Bartolome, established a clear link between the petitioners and the
hazing incident that resulted in Samparada's death.
• They contended that the injuries sustained by Samparada were consistent with hazing practices and
that the petitioners' presence during the incident implied their participation.

Defense's Arguments:
• The petitioners contended that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of hazing,
particularly that there was an initiation rite and that Samparada was a recruit or neophyte of the
fraternity.
• They argued that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that the presumption of guilt under the Anti-Hazing Law infringed upon their
constitutional right to be presumed innocent.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the decisions of the RTC and CA, and acquitting the
petitioners. The Court emphasized that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which was
not met in this case. The Court found that:

Insufficient Evidence: The circumstantial evidence presented did not establish the elements of hazing as
defined under the law. The prosecution failed to prove that an initiation rite occurred and that Samparada was
a recruit or neophyte subjected to hazing.

Lack of Direct Evidence: The Court noted that no direct evidence linked the petitioners to the infliction of
injuries on Samparada. The circumstantial evidence, while suggestive, did not exclude the possibility that
others could have caused the injuries.

Presumption of Innocence: The Court reiterated the constitutional presumption of innocence, stating that any
reasonable doubt must lead to acquittal. The presumption of guilt under the Anti-Hazing Law could not override
this fundamental right.

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Significant Legal Principles Established:

• The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases remains paramount, and
circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion of guilt.
• The presumption of innocence is a constitutional right that must be upheld, and any law that creates
a presumption of guilt must be carefully scrutinized to ensure it does not violate this principle.
• The Court highlighted the importance of establishing all elements of a crime, particularly in cases
involving hazing, where the culture of secrecy often complicates the prosecution's ability to present
direct evidence.

=======================================================================================

R.A. No. 10883

Anti-Carnapping Act

Definition of Terms:

Carnapping - the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

Motor Vehicle - any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be
classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.

Defacing or tampering with serial number - the altering, changing, erasing, replacing or scratching of the
original factory inscribed serial number on the motor vehicle engine, engine block or chassis of any motor
vehicle.

Dismantling - refers to the tearing apart, piece-by-piece or part-by-part, of a motor vehicle.

Overhauling - refers to the cleaning or repairing of the whole engine of a motor vehicle by separating the motor
engine and its parts from the body of the motor vehicle.

Repainting- refers to changing the color of a motor vehicle by means of painting. There is painting whenever
the new color of a motor vehicle is different from its color registered in the Land Transportation Office.

Remodeling- refers to the introduction of some changes in the shape or form of the body of the motor vehicle.

Second Hand Spare Parts - refer to the parts taken from a carnapped vehicle used in assembling another
vehicle.

Total Wreck - refers to the state or status of a motor vehicle after a vehicular accident or other incident, so that
it is rendered inoperational and beyond economic repair due to the extent of damage in its body, chassis and
engine.

Unlawful transfer or use of vehicle plates - refers to the use or transfer of a vehicle plate issued by the LTO to
a certain vehicle to another vehicle. It is presumed illegally transferred when the motor vehicle plate does not
correspond with that as appearing in the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle to which it was issued.

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Sec. 3. Carnapping; Penalties. – Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things.

Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, regardless of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than twenty (20) years and one (1) day but not more than thirty (30)
years, when the carnapping is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) years and one (1) day but not more than forty (40) years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and the penalty of life imprisonment shall be imposed when the owner, driver, or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the commission of the carnapping.

Any person charged with carnapping or when the crime of carnapping is committed by criminal groups, gangs
or syndicates or by means of violence or intimidation of any person or persons or forced upon things; or when
the owner, driver, passenger or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
carnapping shall be denied bail when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Sec. 4. Concealment of Carnapping. – Any person who conceals carnapping shall be punished with
imprisonment of six (6) years up to twelve (12) years and a fine equal to theamount of the acquisition cost of
the motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or any other part involved in the violation: Provided, That if the person
violating any provision of this Act is a juridical person, the penalty herein provided shall be imposed on its
president, secretary, and/or members of the board of directors or any of its officers and employees who may
have directly participated in the violation.

Any public official or employee who directly commits the unlawful acts defined in this Act or is guilty of gross
negligence of duty or connives with or permits the commission of any of the said unlawful acts shall, in addition
to the penalty prescribed in the preceding paragraph, be dismissed from the service, and his/her benefits
forfeited and shall be permanently disqualified from holding public office.

Sec. 5. Original Registration of Motor Vehicles. – Any person seeking the original registration of a motor
vehicle, whether that motor vehicle is newly assembled or rebuilt or acquired from a registered owner, shall,
within one (1) week after the completion of the assembly or rebuilding job or the acquisition thereof from the
registered owner, apply to the Philippine National Police (PNP) for the clearance of the motor vehicle for
registration with the LTO. The PNP shall, upon receipt of the application, verify if the motor vehicle or its
numbered parts are in the list of carnapped motor vehicles or stolen motor vehicle parts. If the motor vehicle
or any of its numbered parts is not in the list, the PNP shall forthwith issue a certificate of clearance. Upon
presentation of the certificate of clearance from the PNP and after verification of the registration of the motor
vehicle engine, engine block and chassis in the permanent registry of motor vehicle engine, engine block and
chassis, the LTO shall register the motor vehicle in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations within
twenty (20) working days.

Sec. 6. Registration of Motor Vehicle, Motor Vehicle Engine, Engine Block and Chassis. – Within one (1)
year upon approval of this Act, every owner or possessor of unregistered motor vehicle or parts thereof in knock
down condition shall register before the LTO the motor vehicle engine, engine block and chassis in the name of
the possessor or in the name of the real owner who shall be readily available to answer any claim over the
registered motor vehicle engine, engine block and chassis. Thereafter, all motor vehicle engines, engine blocks
and chassis not registered with the LTO shall be considered as a carnapped vehicle, an untaxed importation or
coming from illegal source and shall be confiscated in favor of the government.

Sec. 7. Permanent Registry of Motor Vehicle, Motor Vehicle Engines, Engine Blocks and Chassis. – The LTO
shall keep a permanent registry of motor vehicle, motor vehicle engines, engine blocks and chassis of all motor
vehicles, specifying therein their type, make, serial numbers and stating therein the names and addresses of

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their present and previous owners. Copies of the registry and of all entries made there on shall be furnished
the PNP and all LTO regional, provincial and city branch offices; Provided, That all LTO regional, provincial and
city offices are likewise obliged to furnish copies of all registrations of motor vehicles to the main office and to
the PNP: Provided, further, That the original copy of the certificate of registration shall be given to the registered
owner, the second copy shall be retained with the LTO and the third copy shall be submitted to the PNP.
Moreover, it shall be unlawful for any person or employee who willfully encodes in the registry of motor vehicles
a non-existing vehicle or without history, new identity of already existing vehicle or double/ multiple registration
(“KAMBAL”) of vehicle.

Sec. 8. Registration of Sale, Transfer, Conveyance of a Motor Vehicle, Substitution or Replacement of a

Motor Vehicle Engine, Engine Block or Chassis. – Every sale, transfer, conveyance of a motor vehicle,
substitution or replacement of a motor vehicle engine, engine block or chassis of a motor vehicle shall be
registered with the LTO within twenty (20) working days upon purchase/acquisition of a motor vehicle and
substitution or replacement of a motor vehicle engine, engine block or chassis. A motor vehicle, motor vehicle
engine, engine block or chassis not registered with the LTO shall be presumed as a carnapped vehicle, an
untaxed imported vehicle, or a vehicle proceeding from illegal sources unless proven otherwise and shall be
confiscated in favor of the government.

Sec. 9. Duty of Collector of Customs to Report. – Within seven (7) days after the arrival of an imported vehicle,
motor vehicle engine, engine block, chassis or body, the Collector of Customs of a principal port of entry where
the imported vehicle or parts enumerated above are unloaded shall report the shipment to the LTO, specifying
the make, type and serial numbers, if any, of the motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, engine block, chassis or
body, and stating the names and addresses of the owner or consignee thereof. If the motor vehicle, motor
vehicle engine, engine block, chassis or body does not bear any serial number, the Collector of Customs
concerned shall hold the motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, engine block, chassis or body until it is
numbered by the LTO: Provided, That a PNP clearance shall be required prior to engraving the engine or chassis
number.

Sec. 10. Duty of Importers, Distributors and Sellers of Motor Vehicles to Keep Record of Stocks. – Any
person engaged in the importation, distribution, and buying and selling of motor vehicles, motor vehicle
engines, engine blocks, chassis or body shall keep a permanent record of one’s stocks, stating therein their
type, make and serial numbers, and the names and addresses of the persons from whom they were acquired
and the names and addresses of the persons to whom they are sold, and shall render accurately a monthly
report of his/her transactions in motor vehicles to the LTO.

Sec.11. Duty of Manufacturers of Engine Blocks, Chassis or Body to Cause the Numbering of Engine
Blocks, Chassis or Body Manufactured. – Any person engaged in the manufacture of engine blocks, chassis
or body shall cause the numbering of every engine block, chassis or body manufactured in a convenient and
conspicuous part thereof which the LTO may direct for the purpose of uniformity and identification of the
factory and shall submit to the LTO a monthly report of the manufacture and sale of engine blocks, chassis or
body.

Sec. 12. Clearance and Permit Required for Assembly or Rebuilding of Motor Vehicles. – Any person who
shall undertake to assemble or rebuild or cause the assembly or rebuilding of a motor vehicle shall first secure
a certificate of clearance from the PNP: Provided, That no such permit shall be issued unless the applicant
shall present a statement under oath containing the type, make and serial numbers of the engine, chassis and
body, if any, and the complete list of the spare parts of the motor vehicle to be assembled or rebuilt together
with the names and addresses of the sources thereof.

In the case of motor vehicle engines to be mounted on motor boats, motor bancas, water crafts and other light
water vessels, the applicant shall secure a permit from the PNP, which office shall in turn furnish the LTO
pertinent data concerning the motor vehicle engines including their type, make and serial numbers.

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Sec. 13. Clearance Required for Shipment of Motor Vehicles, Motor Vehicle Engines, Engine Blocks,
Chassis or Body. – The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall submit a report to the PNP within seven (7) days
upon boarding all motor vehicles being boarded the “RORO”, ferry, boat, vessel or ship for interisland and
international shipment. The PPA shall not allow the loading of motor vehicles in all interisland and international
shipping vessels without a motor vehicle clearance from the PNP, except cargo trucks and other trucks carrying
goods. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)-accredited public utility vehicles (PUV)
and other motor vehicles carrying foodstuff and dry goods.

Sec. 14. Defacing or Tampering with Serial Numbers of Motor Vehicle Engines, Engine Blocks and Chassis.
– It shall be unlawful for any person to deface or otherwise tamper with the original or registered serial number
of motor vehicle engines, engine blocks and chassis.

Sec. 15. Identity Transfer. – It shall be unlawful for any person, office or entity to cause and/or allow the sale,
registration, and/or transfer into another name, the chassis number, engine number and plate number of a
motor vehicle declared as “total wreck” or beyond economic repair by concerned insurance company, and/or
law enforcement agencies, due to its involvement in a vehicular accident or for some other causes. The LTO
shall cancel the registration of total wreck vehicle as reported by the PNP and/or as declared by the Insurance
Commission.

Sec. 16. Transfer of Vehicle Plate. – It shall be unlawful for any person, office or entity to transfer or use a
vehicle plate from one vehicle to another without securing the proper authority from the LTO.

Sec. 17. Sale of Second Hand Spare Parts. – It shall be unlawful for any person, office or entity to buy and/or
sell any second hand spare parts taken from a carnapped vehicle.

Sec. 18. Foreign Nationals. – Foreign nationals convicted under the provisions of this Act shall be deported
immediately after service of sentence without further proceedings by the Bureau of Immigration.

Sec. 19. Reward. – Any person who voluntarily gives information leading to the recovery of carnapped vehicles
and for the apprehension of the persons charged with carnapping shall be given monetary reward as the PNP
may determine. The PNP shall include in their annual budget the amount necessary to carry out the purposes
of this section. Any information given by informers shall be treated as confidential matter.

Sec. 20. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The PNP together with the Department of Transportation
and Communications, LTO, Philippine Coast Guard, Maritime Industry Authority, Bureau of Customs and
relevant motorists and automotive sectors shall, within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act, after
unanimous approval, promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations to effectively carry out the
provisions of this Act, including the setting up of a coordinated online access and the effective clearance
system mentioned in Section 12 of this Act to expedite motor vehicle data and details verification.

Notable Cases:

1) Izon vs. People

Facts:
Petitioners Amado Izon and Jimmy Milla, along with a co-accused Pedro Divino, were charged with robbery with
violence against a person in the Circuit Criminal Court of Olongapo City. The information alleged that on
September 8, 1977, the accused conspired to commit robbery against Reynaldo Togorio, using violence and
intimidation. Specifically, Milla and Divino were armed with a bladed weapon, which they used to stab Togorio,
while Izon assisted in mauling him. The accused stole a motorized tricycle valued at P11,000.00, which was
later recovered.

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Upon arraignment, the petitioners pleaded guilty and were sentenced under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6539), which defines a motor vehicle and prescribes penalties for its theft. The petitioners
contended that the court erred in applying the Anti-Carnapping Act, arguing that the information did not specify
that the motorized tricycle was being used on public highways, thus failing to meet the definition of a motor
vehicle under the Act. They claimed this omission violated their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them.

Issue:

Whether a motorized tricycle qualifies as a "motor vehicle" under the definition provided in the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972.
Whether the petitioners were adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, in
accordance with their constitutional rights.

Arguments:

Petitioners' Argument: The petitioners argued that the motorized tricycle was not a "motor vehicle" as defined
by the Anti-Carnapping Act because it was not licensed to operate on public highways. They contended that
the information did not inform them that they were being charged under the Anti-Carnapping Act, which
constituted a violation of their right to be informed of the charges against them.

Respondent's Argument (Solicitor General): The Solicitor General countered that the term "public highways"
should not be narrowly interpreted. The argument posited that any street used by the public qualifies as a
public highway, and thus, the motorized tricycle, regardless of its licensing status, falls under the definition of
a motor vehicle. The Solicitor General maintained that the information provided sufficient notice to the
petitioners regarding the nature of the charges, as it clearly described the act of taking a motorized tricycle.

Ruling:
The court upheld the decision of the lower court, affirming that the motorized tricycle in question is indeed a
"motor vehicle" as defined by the Anti-Carnapping Act. The court reasoned that the definition of "public
highways" encompasses any road or street open for public use, and there is no requirement for a vehicle to be
licensed to be classified as a motor vehicle under the Act. The court emphasized that the severity of the offense
is determined by the nature of the vehicle itself rather than its licensing status.

Furthermore, the court found that the petitioners were adequately informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. The information clearly indicated that they were charged with a crime that involved
the taking of a motorized tricycle, which constituted carnapping under the law. The court concluded that the
petitioners could not claim they were misled by the information, as it was sufficient to inform them of the
charges based on the facts alleged.

Significant Legal Principles Established:

• The definition of "motor vehicle" under the Anti-Carnapping Act includes any motorized vehicle
used on public streets, regardless of licensing status.
• The requirement for an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation does
not necessitate the technical naming of the crime, but rather the factual basis of the charge must
be clear.
• The interpretation of statutory terms should not create arbitrary distinctions that could lead to
absurd results, emphasizing the principle that where the law does not distinguish, no distinction
should be made.

2) People vs. Lagat

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Facts:
The case of People vs. Lagat y Gawan involves Renato Lagat and James Palalay, who were accused of
carnapping a tricycle owned by Jose Biag. On April 12, 2005, Biag and his tricycle were reported missing. Later
that day, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle at a palay buying station in Alicia, Isabela,
with cavans of palay allegedly stolen from the area. When the Alicia PNP approached them, Lagat and Palalay
jumped and ran. Upon inspection of the tricycle, Biag's wallet and registration papers were found, and traces
of blood were discovered on the tricycle. Biag's body was later found with hack wounds. Lagat and Palalay were
arrested and charged with qualified carnapping.

Issue:
The main issues raised in this case are: Are the accused guilty of qualified carnapping beyond reasonable
doubt? Is the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused? What is the proper penalty and damages to be awarded to the heirs of the victim?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the conviction of Lagat and
Palalay for qualified carnapping. The Court found that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence. The accused are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Biag the following damages:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and
P876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity, with interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of the judgment.

The Court held that the elements of carnapping, as defined under Republic Act No. 6539, were present in the
case: (1) there was an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the vehicle belonged to a person other than the offender;
(3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (4) the offender intended to gain from the taking of the
vehicle.

3) People vs. Asamuddin

Facts:
The case of Julkipli Asamuddin y Salapudin involves a messenger of E. Gloria Money Changer who was accused
of carnapping and qualified theft. On July 11, 2007, Emelina Gloria y Umali, the proprietor of E. Gloria Money
Changer, entrusted Asamuddin with a motorcycle and a large amount of cash to be delivered to a money
changer in Mabini, Manila. However, Asamuddin failed to deliver the money and disappeared with the
motorcycle. Emelina reported the incident to the police, and Asamuddin was eventually arrested in Zamboanga
City on February 25, 2009. The trial court found Asamuddin guilty of carnapping and qualified theft, and
sentenced him to indeterminate imprisonment of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months.

Issue:
The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the conviction of Asamuddin
for Qualified Theft and Carnapping. Specifically, the issue is whether the prosecution had established the guilt
of Asamuddin beyond reasonable doubt, and whether the penalty imposed by the trial court was correct.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and found the appeal without merit. The Court affirmed the
conviction of Asamuddin for carnapping and qualified theft, and upheld the sentence imposed by the trial
court. The Court held that the prosecution had established the elements of carnapping and qualified theft
beyond reasonable doubt, and that the penalty imposed was correct.

The Court's decision was based on the finding that the prosecution had established the guilt of Asamuddin
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that Asamuddin's failure to return the motorcycle to Emelina after

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his working hours constituted "unlawful taking" under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. The Court also found
that Asamuddin had breached the trust reposed in him by Emelina, and that his actions constituted qualified
theft. The Court rejected Asamuddin's defense of denial, finding it to be negative and self-serving and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence of non-culpability. The Court also found that Asamuddin's
admission that he was at E. Gloria Money Changer shop in the morning of July 11, 2007 served to bolster the
testimony of Emelina.

4) Casanas vs. People

Facts:
In the legal matter of "Casanas y Cabantac v. People," the Supreme Court of the Philippines reviewed a petition
concerning Joshua Casanas y Cabantac, alias Joshua Geronimo y Lopez. Casanas was previously convicted
for the carnapping of a Racal motorcycle, registered under plate number 7539IJ, owned by Christopher
Calderon. This event transpired on August 14, 2012, in Marilao, Bulacan. Calderon had permitted Casanas to
use his motorcycle to ferry a passenger, but Casanas failed to return the vehicle as agreed, leading to his
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 269, on May 15, 2013. The Court of
Appeals (CA) later affirmed this conviction on July 28, 2015, noting Casanas's action of detaching the sidecar
as further evidence of intent to permanently deprive Calderon of the motorcycle. Casanas's defenses,
including claims of borrowing the motorcycle and being detained by police, were not accepted due to lack of
credible evidence.

Issue:
Did the RTC-Valenzuela have jurisdiction over the carnapping case involving Casanas, given that the alleged
crime occurred in Marilao, Bulacan?
Was the conviction of Casanas for carnapping by the RTC-Valenzuela correct?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC-Valenzuela did not have jurisdiction over the case since the crime of
carnapping occurred outside its territorial limits, specifically in Marilao, Bulacan. Consequently, the decisions
of both the RTC-Valenzuela and the CA were declared null and void due to the lack of jurisdiction. The case was
dismissed, although the dismissal allowed for the possibility of re-filing the case in the proper jurisdiction,
which would be in Marilao, Bulacan.

The Supreme Court's decision was anchored on the principle that jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined
by the place where the crime or its essential ingredients occurred. In this case, all evidences, including the
testimony of the owner Christopher Calderon and the police statement, clearly placed the crime in Marilao,
Bulacan. The court emphasized that judicial authority is strictly confined within the geographical boundaries
prescribed by law, and any exercise of authority outside these boundaries is invalid. The court also highlighted
the importance of adhering to jurisdictional rules to ensure that the administration of justice is conducted
within the correct legal framework and territory, thereby upholding the rule of law and ensuring fairness in
judicial proceedings.

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