“Professor Colin Rogers has produced a timely and comprehensive intro-

duction to policing. Key areas of study from police history, accountability

through to international policing and views on future developments com-
bine to provide an excellent foundation for students of policing. Key points
are highlighted and reflective questions raised to support learners in de-
veloping their understanding while directing them to additional resources.
Highly recommended.”
Professor Stephen Tong, School Director of Research & Enterprise,
School of Law, Criminal Justice and Policing,
Canterbury Christ Church University, UK
Policing Structures

This book examines the structures that support the policing organisation
internally and externally, including its partners within the criminal justice
system. It has been written for students of policing, especially those under-
taking qualifications under the new Police Education Qualifications Frame-
work (PEQF), undergraduates who study the police as part of a criminology
or criminal justice degree or similar, and those with a general interest in the
police organisation in England and Wales. It includes chapters on:

• The historical context of police structure.

• Accountability, governance, and control in the police.
• Local, national, and international police structures.
• The partnership between the police and the criminal justice system.
• The future structure of policing.

Throughout the chapters are ‘important point boxes’ which emphasise the
key parts of each topic. At the end of each chapter are reflective questions,
useful websites, and a further reading list, all of which reinforce students’
knowledge and further their professional development. Written in a clear
and direct style, this book will appeal to students of policing, criminology,
criminal justice, cultural studies, and law. It is essential reading for students
taking a degree in Professional Policing.

Colin Rogers is Professor of Policing and Security at the International Cen-

tre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. As a former practi-
tioner of 30 years’ service he has been involved in policing matters at a local,
national, and international level.
Routledge Advances in Police Practice and Knowledge
Series editors: Dr Tom Cockcroft, Leeds Beckett University, UK , and
Dr Martin Wright, Canterbury Centre for Policing Research, UK

Routledge Advances in Police Practice and Knowledge is a new series of

books which brings together established academics and authors in the field
of police studies to provide themed textbooks that will support students en-
gaging with professional police studies within higher education. The focus
of the series is to provide academically rigorous accounts of research and
knowledge and to contextualise them in the practical and applied context
of policework. In doing so, the books that make up the series will provide
an invaluable resource to students studying policing through a variety of
academic and vocational routes.
The editors, Dr Tom Cockcroft and Dr Martin Wright, dedicate this
series to the memory of Professor PAJ (Tank) Waddington who believed
policing to be an honourable profession, and whose career’s work embodied
the values that inform the direction of the series.

Policing Structures
Colin Rogers
Policing Structures

Colin Rogers
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Colin Rogers
The right of Colin Rogers to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted
or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be
trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for
identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in- Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978 - 0 -367- 43367-3 (hbk)

ISBN: 978 - 0 -367- 43368 - 0 (pbk)
ISBN: 978 -1- 003- 00271- 0 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra
Contents

List of tables viii

Glossary of terms ix
Introduction xi
About this book xii

1 Policing structure—historical context 1

2 Policing structures—accountability, governance,

and control 17

3 Local police structures 43

4 National policing structures 76

5 International police structures 106

6 Partnership structures 126

7 Working within the structures 148

8 Police structures and the future? 176

Index 201
Tables

1.1 Implementation of Police 7

2.1 The Role of the Former Tri-Partite System 30
3.1 Police Forces in England and Wales 44
3.2 The Rank Structure 46
3.3 A Typical Organisation of a Medium- to Small-Sized
Police Force 46
3.4 Division of Labour within a Typical Territorial Division/BCU 47
3.5 Police Workforce in England and Wales by Role March 2019 48
3.6 Police Workforce in England and Wales by Rank March 2019 48
3.7 Important Powers Delegated to PCSOs 57
5.1 Interpol’s Crime Programmes 114
6.1 CPS Performance Indicators 140
7.1 Needs-Based and Asset-Based Approaches to Community
Development 165
8.1 Differences between Predictive Policing and
Community Policing 192
Glossary of terms

ABCD Asset-Based Community Development

AFO Authorised Firearms Office
AFRIPOL African Police Office
AI Artificial Intelligence
AMERIPOL The Police Community of the Americas
APCC Association of Police and Crime Commissioners
ASEANPOL Asian Police Office
BCU Basic Command Unity
BTP British Transport Police
CDRPs Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships
CEOP Child Exploitation and Online Protection Service
CEPOL European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training
CNC Civil Nuclear Constabulary
COBR Civil Contingencies Committee
COP College of Policing
CPOSA Chief Police Officers Staff Association
CPS Crown Prosecution Service
CSEW Crime Survey for England and Wales
CSPs Community Safety Partnerships
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions
EAW European Arrest Warrant
EBP Evidence-Based Policing
EUROPL European Police Agency
GLAA Gang Master and Labour Abuse Authority
HLA Higher Level Apprenticeships
HMCPI Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Inspectorate
HMICFRS Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and
Rescue Services
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
HO Home Office
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Agency
IOPC Independent Office for Police Conduct
x Glossary of terms

KPI Key Performance Indicator

LFR Live Facial recognition
MODP Ministry of Defence Police
MOPC Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime
MPS Metropolitan Police Service
NCA National Crime Agency
NDIP National Disclosure Improvement Plan
NPCC National Police Chiefs Council
NPOCC National Police Coordination Centre
ONS Office for National Statistics
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
PCC Police and Crime Commissioner
PCSO Police Community Support Officer
PEEL Police Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Legitimacy
PEQF Police Education Qualification Framework
PFEW Police Federation of England and Wales
POP Problem Oriented Police Work
PSA Police Superintendents Association
PSD Professional Standards Department
PSV Police Support Volunteers
PSU Police Support Units
SC Special Constable
SFO Serious Fraud Office
SPR Strategic Policing Requirement
SOC Serious Organised Crime
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPOL United Nations Police
Introduction

Policing does not exist in a vacuum. It is affected by many things, which

sometimes appear outside its remit or totally unconnected. It operates on
many levels—local, nationally, and internationally—and our understanding
of it is conditioned by a wide range of criteria, such as the media, anecdote,
or personal contact. This complex way in which we approach policing illus-
trates the variety of functions the police engage in, involving such things as
social, political, economic, and of course legal activities.
For many people, however, policing and the police involve a one-dimensional
activity—uniform, tackling crime and disorder being their one and only func-
tion. In addition, this organisation for many, appears to have been with us from
the dawn of time, and it is an everyday function for us in society.
However, this is far from the truth, although the police do tackle crime
and disorder, and officers do, in the main, wear uniforms. The Police Or-
ganisation is not yet 200 years old in its present function, although it has
changed significantly since the introduction of the “New Police” with the
Metropolitan Police Act 1829. It is therefore important for those new to the
study of the police to understand the historical aspect of the police as this
underpins the philosophy and organisational approaches utilised today.
About this book

This book has been written for students of policing, especially those under-
taking qualifications under the new Police Education Qualifications Frame-
work (PEQF), undergraduates who study the police as part of a criminology
or criminal justice degree or similar, and those with a general interest in the
police organisation in England and Wales.
Its focus is upon the structures that support the policing organisation in-
ternally and externally, including its partners within the criminal justice
system. Each chapter contains not just descriptive information but a cri-
tique of the topics themselves. The chapters also include important point
boxes, which draw the reader’s attention to important aspects of the topic,
and a section at the end of reflective questions based upon the contents of
the chapter. Where necessary, links to particular websites are included after
the reflective questions, along with a reference list supporting each chapter,
which will be more than useful for the reader to explore. A complete refer-
ence list is also provided at the end of each chapter. The police profession-
alisation programme, overseen by the College of Policing, seeks to inspire
police officers and others to become “reflective practitioners,” capable of
utilising an evidence-based approach for policing into the 21st century. It is
hoped that this publication will assist in this process.
Chapter 1

Policing structure—
historical context

Introduction
The famous historian David Lowenthal suggested that the past was a foreign
country and that they did things differently there (Lowenthal 2011). This re-
minds us that it is sometimes difficult for us to comprehend decisions made
many years ago, or to fully appreciate the complexities of society at the time.
From our current standpoint, it would appear that the organisation we refer
to as “The Police” has been embedded in our society and communities since
the dawn of time. We accept their presence as something necessary for us to
fulfil our lives and believe they are there to protect us, our rights and also to
protect the vulnerable. However, as Reiner (2010) points out, the formation of
the modern police as we know and interact with was a protracted and painful
struggle, faced with bitter resistance and open hostility. At the turn of the 18th
century, “the police idea was fiercely controversial” (Reiner 2010: 39).
The history of the introduction of the police in England and Wales is,
therefore, a contested issue. Reiner (2010) highlights this fact in his discus-
sion concerning the orthodox and revisionist approaches to police history.
The orthodox approach involves the “informative” version of policing intro-
duced as the March of Progress, and as a rational response to the pressures
in society brought about by urbanisation and the Industrial Revolution.
Opposition is seen as evaporating during the 1830s, and the police gained
“public approval” through their good work in communities (Ascoli 1979:
105). The revisionist perspective challenges the traditional view of police
history by situating its introduction within a “Marxist” framework, and as
an integral part of the capitalist system. This approach involves the “con-
trol” of workers with this system, and a fear of a working class as a threat to
the ruling elite. The “dangerous classes” (Silver 1967: 3) needed to be kept
under surveillance and closely controlled. Therefore, this perspective sees
the opposition to the police being strongest amongst the working class, ex-
pressed through small-scale conflicts, as well as anti-police riots against the
“plague of the blue locusts” (Storch 1975: 94).
2 Historical context

Palmer (1990) suggests that the “New Police” should be considered within
the wider context of increased government centralisation. Whatever the
reality surrounding the introduction of the “New Police” under the 1829
Metropolitan Police Act, we must not assume that there was no police pro-
vision whatsoever prior to this. Indeed, some of the services provided by the
“Old Police” were equal to, if not better than, the “New Police” in some areas.

Important point

The history of policing in England and Wales is a contested one

between orthodox and revisionist views.

The old police

For the purposes of this chapter, the “old police” under consideration will
be that provided during the 18th and early 19th century, immediately prior
to the Metropolitan Police Act 1829. The reason for this is primarily that the
“old police” provision has been considered by many police historians as be-
ing one of the main reasons for the introduction of the New Police. Emsley
(1996) suggests that during the 18th century, there were growing concerns
over crime and disorder in England and Wales. Traditionalist Historians
such as Melville Lee (1971) believed that at the dawn of the 19th century, the
country was immersed in one of its darker epochs of criminality. Before the
establishment of the New Police under the introduction of the Metropolitan
Police Act 1829, policing depended on magistrates, parish constables, and
night watchmen. These suffered from a bad reputation. Reith (1938) for ex-
ample refers to these as corrupt, and utterly useless in the way in which they
carried out their duties. Reith was not alone in his criticisms, and regularly
these individuals were lampooned in popular culture of the times. Despite
this, there were several developments that occurred, mostly in and around
London. For example, in the middle of the 18th century, Henry Fielding, the
Bow Street Magistrate, started to consider the causes of crime, linking it to
employment (Emsley 2001).
Legislation in the early 18th century allowed parishes to reorganise their
night watches, and increasingly metropolitan parishes utilised this to re-
cruit fit, relatively active men, and by the turn of the century some parishes
actually had watchmen patrolling beats in greater numbers than the “New
Police” when they were introduced (Pacey 1989). The quality, therefore, of
these men and their work is now a matter of debate. Traditionalist historians
have tended to dismiss constables and night watchmen as bumbling, inept,
corrupt, or illiterate fools (Melville Lee 1971). The office of constable had
 Historical context 3

become so onerous that it had become common to hire deputies (Critchley

1978). Many magistrates, it was believed, exploited their offices for fees, and
the members of the old policing arrangement who were effective, were rep-
resented as corrupt, using their offices for rewards and fees. Thief takers
became thief makers, and the most famous of all, Jonathan Wild, had a
team who “Stole on commission, and surrendered what they had taken to
Wild who then returned goods to their rightful owners” (Rock 1977: 215).
The “old system” therefore was said to be uncoordinated, uncertain, reliant
on private and amateur effort, and riddled with corrupt practices.
Despite this view, it has been challenged by revisionist historians, espe-
cially that the old police were driven by corruption and were inefficient. For
example, the idea that thief takers were corrupt being situated before 1829,
opposed by those who point to current day corruption amongst detectives
(see Hobbs 1998 for example). With regard to claims concerning the effi-
ciency of the old system, writers such as Brogden (1982) and Foster (1974)
suggest that what was represented as inefficiency or corruption may have
been the attitude that the old police would have had too much empathy
with their own communities. This would have made them unreliable for the
policing of morality, crime, and disorder as these issues became politicised.
The loyalty of working-class police in the old structure, could not be de-
pended upon by those controlling industry, it was thought. This was espe-
cially so in the case of controlling riots; thus it was important to introduce a
police system that would effectively control and regulate workers.

Important point

The view that the old police were unreliable is now challenged by some
who see the introduction of the new police as a political move.

The change from the Old Police to the New Police is often viewed as a
linear process, the one developing into the other overnight. However, there
were several important developments upon the journey that need to be ex-
amined before we consider the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829. The first of
these is the Bow Street Runners.

Bow Street Runners

Responsibility for the policing of London was highly localised and diffused,
with attempts to establish some form of centralised control being carried
out by concerned individuals, rather than Government (Palmer 1990). In
1729, a Justice of the Peace, Thomas de Veil, who had responsibility for the
4 Historical context

entire metropolis set up his office in Bow Street, Covent Garden. Shortly
after his death, Henry Fielding and later John Fielding, his brother, filled
the post of Magistrate at the Bow Street Office. The Fieldings were never in
favour of a single large police force, but they did introduce reform at Bow
Street. In 1750 Henry Fielding hired his first official police officers—four
plain clothes men, known as thief takers, and two “horsemen.” The Bow
Street thief takers were seen as an improvement on many of their contem-
poraries and a degree of professionalism did develop among them (Emsley
1996). By 1780, Bow Street had six detectives and a small loosely organised,
irregularly patrolling foot patrols, with a brief experiment into “horse pa-
trols” having lapsed some years previously (Palmer 1990).
Within the City of London, Thomas Gates, the city Marshall, organised
a small regular patrol, which in 1791, was given a uniform, and gradually
increased in number. In 1824, according to Emsley (1996), it consisted of
24 men divided equally into day and night patrols. Against a background of
new legislation, parishes in London improved their “watch” facilities, mainly
to protect property. From similar reasons, the Fieldings experimented with
patrols for the main roads so that, by the 1790s, an armed patrol of about
70 men, based at Bow Street, was watching the main roads into the centre
of London every evening until midnight. By 1828, this patrol had developed
in scope and size and consisted of a horse patrol of 54 men and 6 officers, a
dismounted patrol of 89 men and 12 officers, the night patrol of 82 men and
12 officers and the day foot patrol of 24 men and 3 officers. These functioned
under the control of Bow Street until 1836, when it passed into the control of
the Metropolitan Police (Cox 2008). Developments such as the Bow Street
Police office in the last years of the 18th and first quarter of the 19th centu-
ries took place against increasing debate about the state of policing. This
debate was influenced by some key contributions, such as Colquhoun’s “A
Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis,” first published in 1796.

Important point

For their size and resources, the Bow Street Runners were seen as rea-
sonably effective.

Patrick Colquhoun
Patrick Colquhoun was born in Scotland on 14th March 1745 and edu-
cated in a local grammar school. In May 1792, he applied for the office of
a stipendiary magistrate position in London and was accepted in 1797 at
Worship Street, later transferring to Queens Square where he remained un-
til retirement in 1818. During this time, he was also attached to the Thames
Police Office (Radzinowicz 1956). Colquhoun discharged his duties as a
 Historical context 5

Magistrate conscientiously, having little sympathy with those who wished

change through riots or disturbances. He was, however, greatly concerned
with the extent of crime in London, and continuously produced pamphlets
on the topic, as well as devoting time to the study of social and economic
problems. However, he is most remembered for his work entitled “A Treatise
on the Police of the Metropolis,” which was an important document and
contribution to the study of crime and the methods that should be utilised
for the maintenance of public order (Colquhoun 1969).
The reception of the work was remarkable, and it contributed signifi-
cantly to the debate around crime and policing at the time. It was the first
time that an attempt had been made to give a comprehensive survey of
the state of crime in the Metropolis, including the state of existing police
organisation, its administration, and the penal system. The treatise was
remarkable as it was based upon fact and observation, which provided
a basis for a detailed plan for more effective prevention and detection of
crime. He included figures and statistical information on almost every
aspect, which had not been achieved before. However, as Radzinowicz
observes, “the data has often to be accepted with reserve” (Radzinowicz
1956: 222). However, this work was the first to be written in the English
Language on the subject of police (Radzinowicz 1956). Consequently,
Colquhoun was, for a period of time, considered an expert on police and
crime, and was consulted by Government and other agencies. However,
despite this, when introducing the Police Bill in 1829, Robert Peel made
no reference to the valuable work conducted by Colquhoun and others,
in the years beforehand. Colquhoun is described by Melville Lee “as the
architect who designed our modern police” and Peel “as the builder who
constructed its framework” (Melville Lee 1971: 219). As can be seen there
were many influences that contributed to the introduction of the Metro-
politan Police Act 1829. One area that appears to suffer from a lack of
understanding in the development of policing in England and Wales, is the
role played by the introduction of Police in Dublin.

Important point

Patrick Colquhoun was one of the first to employ statistics in order to

establish the need for a police force.

The Dublin Police Act 1786

Whilst the attempts to establish meaningful and centrally controlled police
in England and Wales stumbled and was resisted, an experiment in Ireland
was about to embark. In Ireland at this time powerful government-directed
6 Historical context

police were not only politically more necessary, but there the traditions of
civil liberties and local vested interests were more fragile (Palmer 1990).
That said Dublin suffered from a high number of street violence and dis-
turbances caused by political frustration, coupled with a continuous frac-
tious relationship between the population and the British soldiers garrisoned
there. The Act called for the abolition of local policing throughout Dublin
and their replacement with a centrally controlled body of men within a sin-
gle jurisdiction. It proposed to abolish the watchmen-magistrate system and
reorganised the city into four distinct divisions, with the policing of the city
under the control of three Commissioners, two assistants, and one Chief.
These recruited as “officers of the peace” (Palmer 1990: 99): 1 High Consta-
ble, 4 Chief Constables, 40 petty constables, and some 400 watchmen. These
new Dublin policemen were to be young, Protestant and in good health,
being salaried and prevented from other employment. They would be uni-
formed and armed with a musket and bayonet. There was, of course, much
resistance to the introduction of the police force, partly political, but partly
based upon having a centralised body which would interfere with individu-
als as they went about their daily business. Despite this, on 28th March the
Act was passed in Parliament, and the passage of the Act meant that the
government committed itself to trying out the New Police idea in Ireland.
Deficiencies in equipment, problems with absenteeism and discipline led to
the introduction of “Inspectors of the Watch” in 1788. The duties of the police
force that patrolled the streets of Dublin for a decade (1786–1795) were diffi-
cult and varied. They included dealing with crime and immorality, suppress-
ing disturbances, licensing duties, and regulating traffic. Despite the volume
of work, and the problems discussed, it would appear that the city had seen a
decline in criminality. However, there were suggestions that this had moved
outside of the city police’s circle of control, into the neighbouring County of
Dublin, in a form of displacement. In addition, the control of public disorder
appeared to be less successful than had been hoped. Opposition to the Dublin
Police gained momentum both socially and politically, with the upshot that in
May 1795, the government introduced legislation that would return the police,
de-centralised, to the citizens of Dublin. However, the new arrangement pro-
vided for an awkward compromise between the pre 1786 Watch and the police
of 1786–1795. Despite the apparent failure of the Dublin Police experiment,
therein lay the seeds of a centralised police force that would one day influence
the introduction of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829.
These two major examples illustrate how the introduction by Robert Peel
of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829, was a result of a long-standing debate
concerning the change to policing arrangements. Clearly it did not happen
overnight and suffered a series of mishaps and even failures. However, for us
to understand the current structure of policing in England and Wales, par-
ticularly accountability, it is necessary for us to appreciate the difficulties
encountered in producing the “Modern Police” (Table 1.1).
 Historical context 7

Table 1.1 I mplementation of Police

Description Location Year

Bow Street Office London 1750

Magistrate and 4 officers
Bow Street Foot Patrol London 1773
70 men
7 police officers, 21 magistrates, London 1792
and 42 constables
1786 Police Act Dublin 1786 –1795
The Irish Police Experiment
Thames River Police London 1800
3 magistrates and 60 -man patrol
“Dismounted” Horse patrol London 1821
90 men

Source: Adapted from Palmer 1990.

The above table illustrates the establishment of police forces from around
1750–1821. However, it is not definitive, but is utilised merely to illustrate
that the topic of reform of the police was a continuous gradual and con-
tested matter.

Important point

The Dublin Police experiment formed the basis for the structure of the
Metropolitan Police in 1829.

The Metropolitan Police Act and beyond

The gradual changes in policing during the early 19th century and later 18th
century already discussed can generally be said to be the result of a new
concern for public order and an increased anxiety concerning urban growth
and the activities of the poor (Emsley 2001). However, there is still a need to
examine just how the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 came into being, and the
critical role it played in this process by Sir Robert Peel. Peel was appointed
Home Secretary in 1822, and he expressed his desire to rationalise the po-
lice system, along with other aspects of the criminal code. Notwithstanding
the fact that the Irish Police experiment had not solved the problems there,
their professionalism appeared to have made a difference. Consequently,
he formed a committee for policing in London, with himself as Chairman.
However, the approach did not work, with the committee forming the
8 Historical context

opinion that regular police would not co-exist with the freedoms and rights
of citizens (Hurd 2007).
However, by 1829, Peel became aware that the time, in a political sense
was on his side, and presented his plan of a unified and professional Metro-
politan Police under the direct control of the Home Secretary. Peel argued
that the then current arrangements were inadequate, and that the country
had outgrown its police arrangements and needed new protection. This,
he argued, was true not just for London, but for the country as a whole
(Radzinowicz 1968). His opponents still relied upon old arguments, such
as government may use the police against the people, such as the police in
France during the recent French Revolution. Peel’s argument, however, had
moved the police from being part of a more severe criminal code, to one of
prevention of crime in the first place, this improving the economics of the
country (Radzinowicz 1968: 160).
Despite this, the new police programme would not abolish at once all of
the current police establishments, but the new system was to be applied to
a few districts first, and then gradually extend to others as its advantages
became clearer.
The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 prescribed the following:

• A new Police Office should be established in Westminster;

• Two Justices to carry out the purposes of the Act (later officially
awarded the title of Commissioners);
• That there should be a single paid police force for the whole of Middle-
sex and other parishes;
• The New Force should supplant older arrangements and payment for
the old arrangement transferred to the New Metropolitan Police.

The object of the new force was laid down in very general terms, namely,
“Preservation of the Peace, The Prevention of Crimes, The Detection and
Committal of Offenders” (Radzinowicz 1968: 161). However, the ways of
achieving these remained to be discovered through trial and error.

Rowan and Mayne

The two new justices (or Commissioners) appointed to undertake this police
experiment were Charles Rowan, a distinguished military officer and former
Magistrate in Ireland, and Richard Mayne, who was a well-known barris-
ter (Reith 1956). These Commissioners undertook the necessary decision to
ensure that the new police were ready for duty in time. For example, the uni-
form, at first intended to be red and gold, was selected instead as blue, thus
making the police non-military both in character and appearance. Indeed
Reith (1956) is critical of Robert Peel when it comes to important decisions
concerning the practicalities of the New Police, stating “Peels carelessness
 Historical context 9

in evading decisions which were both necessary and important is inexpli-

cable” (Reith 1956: 143). Despite this, decisions were made by Rowan and
Mayne regarding the type of men required for the “New Police.” It was de-
cided that police recruits had to be healthy and strong, under the age of 35,
able to read and write, not less than 5 feet 7 inches tall, and able to produce
recommendations from individuals of good social standing. Much of this
has resonance for modern day recruitment. One area of weakness, and one
which caused Rowan and Mayne to come into conflict with Peel, was on
the question of the low rate of pay. Artisans and other comparable workers
were being paid 5 shillings a day (25 pence) whilst the New Police were being
offered 3 shillings a day (15 pence). The consequence of this was extreme dif-
ficulty in recruiting suitable individuals and retaining them. In 1833, out of
a total strength of 3,389 men, there were only 562 who had been recruits in
1829 (Reith 1956: 147). After the New Police took to the streets, opposition to
them became clear. However, for traditional historians, whilst acknowledg-
ing how vociferous and violent it was, depict it as rapidly evaporating once
the police had shown their worth and good will (Reiner 2010). Critchley
(1978) suggests that, following a parliamentary enquiry into one particular
incident where a police officer was fatally stabbed, “public opinion… veered
in favour of the police” (Critchley 1978: 55). This was for Ascoli (1979) a
turning point, in that the police had received the seal of public approval.
Revisionists, however, rather than suggest working-class opposition to the
New Police disappeared rapidly, suggest that there has been, and still exists,
a line of intermittent, overt hostility, traceable to current urban disorders
(Cohen 1979; White 2007).
The relationship between the police and regularly employed, respecta-
ble, and organised sections of the working class, whilst not characterised by
open conflict, was brittle and tentative, with many violent and bitter strug-
gles (Brogden 1982). Despite the recorded opposition to the New Police in
London, the new institution proved its worth to the extent that the concept
spread across the rest of England and Wales.

“Spreading the word”— creating provincial police

Traditionalist historians suggest that the New Police were such a success
that the model was introduced into the Boroughs by the Municipal Corpo-
ration Act of 1835, and into the Counties by the Rural Constabulary Acts
of 1839 and 1840. The Metropolitan Police were, however, only one model
of policing amongst several. Pre-dating the Metropolitan Police Act for ex-
ample, an Act of Parliament established a system of professional constables
in Cheshire designed to allow magistrates to supervise constables and to
work closely with police systems in being in nearby industrial areas (Emsley
2001). Additionally, Mayors and corporations had always had responsibility
for policing their city or town. There were already established police patrols
10 Historical context

that had been created under special legislation or general Acts. The Act of
1835 required that they all organise along the same lines. However, whilst
acknowledging this Act affected such as the provision as street lighting, and
helped establish local governance of such provision, Steedman (1984) sug-
gests the Act of 1835 did not affect the parish constable in the counties. This
was because the 1835 Act was a wide-ranging Act whose purpose was to
improve local governance by making it elective and thus accountable to a
broad range of respectable rate payers. Transforming the Borough Police, it
has been suggested, was not about a settled blueprint for police reform, but a
product of Government reformist politics (Palmer 1990). Legislation during
1839 and 1840 was introduced following a Report of the Royal Commission
on Constabulary (1836–1839) which had recommended a National Police.
However, the 1839 and 1840 Acts ignored this proposal, and left it to local
magistrates to run local policing arrangements (Emsley 2001). These Acts
empowered county magistrates to create a constabulary if they so desired.
Some did, but others did not, and during the 1840s there were continuing
experiments to develop and improve the old parish constable system. There-
fore, by the middle of the 19th century there were several different models
of policing functioning, ranging from the Metropolitan Police in London,
to the revised parish constables in some counties who were supervised by
professional superintendents. This was the situation until the County and
Borough Police Act 1856.

The County and Borough Police Act 1856

This Act made it obligatory for all counties and boroughs to set up
­uniformed, bureaucratic, hierarchical police forces rather than re-organise
the traditional parish system. Further, it established a national inspectorate
to report upon the efficiency of the forces once created.
The Act had as its guiding principle, to increase the efficiency of the po-
lice within the established framework of Local Government. It required
County Quarter Sessions, to take action for the whole of their counties, but
it made no direct attack on the boroughs to retain their separate forces,
but it facilitated unions with surrounding counties. It also introduced the
Treasury Grant, subject to efficiency and linked with Inspection, and was
calculated to reduce fears of the expense of having organised police forces,
and to introduce a relatively unobtrusive element of central accountability
(Radzinowicz 1968). County Constables were given the same powers and
duties within the borough as borough constables already had in counties
under the Act. Despite the opposition to the introduction of this Act, and of
previous Acts concerning policy arrangements, in 1861, it was reported that
in the counties and most of the larger boroughs the police were considered
to be efficient in numbers and discipline and equal to the duties required
(Radzinowicz 1968: 299).
 Historical context 11

Important point

The Municipal Corporation Act of 1835, and the Rural Constabulary

Acts of 1839 and 1840, along with the County and Borough Police Act
1856 saw the introduction of the “modern” police across England and
Wales.

By 1860, the modern police system in England and Wales was in place. In
London by this time, the London Police had doubled its original size to 7,000
men. Since 1851 the Borough and County Police had grown from 7,400 to
12,600 men (Palmer 1990). The method chosen, despite opposition, meant that
local authorities were strengthened, and police came to the boroughs as part
of local government reform and to counties as a body to support Justices of
the Peace (JPs). Whilst it is easy to point to the Metropolitan Police Act 1829
as the focal point for the history of Modern Policing, one must never forget the
journey that led up to this point, nor the journey in the decades immediately
thereafter. Considerable resistance to the introduction of a standing police force
in this country, based upon fears of interference with civil liberties, a belief in
exorbitant costs, a fear of misuse by Government against the people, and the
experiences of the police in the French Revolution, was negotiated via compro-
mise, understanding, and working to produce an acceptable policing model.
Only by understanding the historical journey of the Police as an organisation in
England and Wales, can we truly grasp and comprehend why the structures cur-
rently in place are so important to the continuing public support for the police.

Recent important historical developments

We have seen how the implementation of the “New Police” was not as
straightforward as some may think. However, once established police or-
ganisations quickly gained a foothold across England and Wales and be-
came part of everyday life. Indeed, Newburn (2008) suggests that there was
considerable resistance to the introduction of the “New Police” and that it
was not until the mid-20th century that anything like a broad degree of le-
gitimacy was achieved in this country. Successive Acts of Parliament passed
through the 19th century produced three types of police force, namely the
London Metropolitan Force, County forces, and Borough Police. Despite
this there was a degree of conformity within a localised system. This system,
according to Mawby (2008), inherited a broad mandate to provide a service
to the public that was wider than just a focus on crime control and public
order maintenance. In the first half of the 20th century, the First and Second
World Wars, coupled with intense periods of unrest, tended to divert the
police away from the local authorities (Emsley 2008).
12 Historical context

Police agencies across the country became standardised, as this was given
momentum indirectly by the police strike of 1918, which saw the intro-
duction of the Desborough Committee to inquire into pay and conditions
within the police service (Desborough 1919/1920). As part of the suggestions
concerning the police by the Desborough Committee, there was a move to
amalgamate smaller forces with larger ones, but this was not undertaken.
However, the period between the two world wars saw greater introduction
and use of female police officers, a greater understanding of the public use
of the road system, and more formalised auxiliary or special police amongst
others. Professional Policing was little more than a century old, and the 19th
and early 20th centuries had seen the gradual retirement of an establish-
ment which was amateurish and perhaps chaotic to one that was far more
professional (Royal Commission on the Police 1960).
Following the Second World War, policing was still largely organised upon
the beat system, which had been in being since the 19th century. Discipline was
still extremely rigid, and recruitment and retention suffered as a result. Con-
sequently, in 1967, the Home Office issued a circular that encouraged a new
system to be adopted by the police which reduced numbers of foot patrol and
placed officers in cars instead. This system, adopted from police in America,
was called Unit Beat Policing and was believed to improve police coverage,
including the use of police personal radios, and also improve the response to
citizen’s calls for assistance. However, this approach was not as successful as
hoped being undermined in part by police culture (Holdaway 1983) and also
transforming the police into a “fire brigade” service, devoid of community in-
teraction (Reiner 1992: 76). The main allegation was that the UBP introduced a
change in the style and image of the British Police, from “friendly local bobby”
to “crime buster,” supported by technology (Rogers 2004). In addition to these
changes, the police suffered from major corruption scandals, particularly with
the Metropolitan Police (Cox et al. 1977) and from the manner in which suspects
were detained and interviewed. Public confidence in the police fell dramatically
(Glennerster 2000) which led to the appointment of a Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, the work of which led to the introduction of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) (Home Office 1984).
This Act not only extended police powers but also introduced far reach-
ing procedural safeguards to prevent abuses of power, particularly in the
treatment of suspects. These safeguards have been updated since that time.
During this period, the police were highly visible in dealing with disorders
in urban areas, and also dealing with industrial disputes. The disorders in
Brixton in 1981 were covered by heavy handed policing methods, particularly
stop and search, and led to an inquiry chaired by Lord Scarman (1982). The
recommendations of this report were wide ranging and included recruitment
of ethnic minorities, consultation with communities, and independent review
of complaints against the police, amongst others. The report highlighted the
need for change and started the process for re-thinking of police activities.
A further influential incident and subsequent report that influenced recent
 Historical context 13

approaches to policing was the murder of Stephen Lawrence in London in

1993 (Macpherson 1999). This report concluded that the inquiry into the mur-
der contained fundamental errors, including a combination of professional
incompetence, institutional racism, and a failure of leadership by senior of-
ficers (1999: para. 46.1). Further, the report defined institutionally racist as
follows:

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and

professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic
origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour,
which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudices, igno-
rance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage mi-
nority ethnic people.
(Macpherson 1999: para. 6.34)

The 70 recommendations made by this report was described by Bowling and

Phillips (2002) as the most extensive programme of reforms in the history
of the relationship between the police and ethnic minority communities.
The impact of financial constraint, and the potential for plural policing in-
volving other forms of policing models (Rogers 2017) has also shaped the
recent history of Policing in England and Wales. Both of these ideas gave
momentum to two important inquiries in the 1990s, both of which have res-
onance today. These were known as the Sheehy and Posen inquiries. The
Sheehy inquiry produced 272 recommendations designed to reward good
performance and also to penalise bad performance. It included such ideas
as fixed term contracts, severance programmes, and performance-related
pay for senior officers.
The Posen Inquiry was very much focussed upon contracting out ser-
vices, and the most effective way of delivering core police services and to
see what areas could be relinquished by the police to other agencies or busi-
nesses. Whilst Newburn (2008) suggests this report was a “damp squib”
(2008: 107), both reports highlight the fact that government was driven to
ensure value for money from the police, whilst considering how the private
sector could become involved in the process of policing. A further historical
change in recent policing history worthy of note is the introduction of the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Home Office 1998). Based upon the ideas of
Crime Prevention discussed prior to this date, most police commentators
refer to the introduction of this approach by quoting the Morgan Report
(Standing Conference on Crime Prevention 1991). The main idea of this re-
port was the fact that it was not appropriate or desirable for the police to
“own” crime problems, including information about such problems. The
report highlighted the fact that Local Authorities have many powers all of
which impact upon criminality. The Morgan Report suggested that Local
Authorities assume statutory responsibility for community safety. However,
a form of the Morgan Report had to wait some years before it was published
14 Historical context

as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This introduced Crime and Disorder
Reduction Partnerships, which meant joint working between the police and
local authorities (Rogers 2012).
Whilst the main Act has been subsequently amended by the Police Reform
Act (2002) and a Review of the Act undertaken in 2006, the main idea still
remains in place, that of multi-agency, partnership approach to dealing with
crime and disorder within communities.

Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted some of the major milestones in the history
of policing in England and Wales. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to
include all of the incidents and political insertions into police history in
one chapter, but what has been discussed should highlight the fact that the
introduction of the Police was not an easy one. In fact, there were policing
arrangements before the “New Police” model in 1829, and the model intro-
duced by Peel was as a result of similar models elsewhere. The spread of
police organisations grew across the country in the 19th century, supported
by Acts of Parliament, but was not universally supported by all. Indeed, the
working class took some time to accept their presence, and this view is still
contested by some. However, the basic model of policing remained the same
until the middle third of the 20th century, when changes needed to be un-
dertaken, so that the police could reflect the society it polices. Indeed from
a period spanning the 1960s onwards there appears to be a focus by govern-
ment upon the activities of the police, fuelled in part by corruption allega-
tions, rising crime and the need for economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.
This approach continues today, and many of the latest ideas are discussed
in later chapters in this book. We have seen when considering historical per-
spectives that various reports and Acts of Parliament have focussed upon
the nature and relationship between the police, government, and local com-
munities. In particular, the question of how the police are effectively to be
held accountable is often discussed. This topic is critically examined in the
following chapter.

Reflective questions
1 Why was the introduction of the new police opposed?
2 What is meant by the traditionalist and orthodox views of police
history?
3 Why were older versions of policing considered unfit for purpose?
4 What are the most important changes in recent police history?
5 If the Metropolitan police act had not been successful, what kind of
police do you think we may have today?
 Historical context 15

Useful websites
The Police History Society: https://policehistorysociety.com/.
British Police History Group: http://british-police-history.uk/.
Origins of the Metropolitan Police: http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/history-from-
police-archives/Met6Kt/MetHistory/mhFormMetPol.html.

References
Ascoli, D. (1979) The Queens Peace, London, Hamish Hamilton.
Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2002) Racism, Crime and Justice, Longman, Harlow.
Brogden, M. (1982) The Police: Autonomy and Consent, London, Academic Press.
Cohen, S. (1979) The Punitive City. Contemporary Crises, 3(4), 217–222.
Colquhoun, P. (1969) A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis (report from 1806
edition), Montclair, NJ, Patterson Smith.
Cox, B., Shirley, J. and Short, M. (1977) The Fall of Scotland Yard, Harmondsworth,
Penguin Books.
Cox, D.J. (2008) Bow Street ‘Runners,’ in Newburn, T. and Neyroud, P. (eds.), Dic-
tionary of Policing, Cullumpton, Willan.
Critchley, T.A. (1978) A History of Police in England and Wales, London, Constable.
Desborough. (1919/1920) Reports of the Committee on the Police Service of E ngland,
Wales and Scotland, Part 1 (Cmd 253, London, HMSO), Part 2 (Cmd 574, London,
HMSO).
Emsley, C. (1996) The English Police: A Political and Social History, London,
Longman.
Emsley, C. (2001) The Origins and Development of the Police, in McLaughlin, E.
and Muncie, J. (eds.), Controlling Crime, (Open University), London, Sage.
Emsley, C. (2008) The Birth and Development of the Police, in Newburn, T. (ed.),
Handbook of Policing (2nd Edition), Cullompton, Willan.
Foster, J. (1974) Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capi-
talism in 3 English Towns, London, Routledge.
Glennerster, H. (2000) British Social Policing since 1945, Oxford, Blackwell.
Hobbs, D. (1998) Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, the Working Class, and
Detectives in the East End of London, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Holdaway, S. (1983) Inside the British Police, Oxford, Blackwell.
Home Office. (1984) The Police and Criminal evidence Act 1984, London, Home
Office.
Home Office. (1998) The Crime and Disorder Act, London, Home Office.
Hurd, D. (2007) Robert Peel – A Biography, London, Weidenfield and Nicolson.
Lowenthal, D. (2011) The Past is a Foreign Country, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Macpherson, Sir William. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Report (Cm 4262-I)
London, HMSO.
Mawby, R.C. (2008) The Police Organisation, in Newburn, T. (ed.), Handbook of
Policing (2nd Edition), Cullompton, Willan.
Melville Lee, W.L. (1971) A History of Police in England, Montclair, NJ, Patterson
Smith.
16 Historical context

Newburn, T. (2008) Introduction: Understanding Policing, in Newburn, T. (ed.),

Handbook of Policing (2nd Edition), Cullompton, Willan.
Pacey, R. (1989) An Imperfect, Inadequate and Wretched System? Policing London
before Peel. Criminal Justice History, 10, 950–980.
Palmer, S.H. (1990) Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780–1850, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Radzinowicz, L. (1956) A History of English Criminal Law and Its administration
from 1750, vol. 3, London, Stevens and Sons Ltd.
Radzinowicz, L. (1968) A History of English Criminal Law and Its administration
from 1750, vol. 4, “Grappling for Control,” London, Stevens and Sons.
Reiner, R. (1992) The Politics of the Police (2nd Edition), Brighton, Harvester.
Reiner, R. (2010) The Politics of the Police, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Reith, C. (1938) The Police Idea, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Reith, C. (1956) A New Study of Police History, Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd.
Rock, P. (1977) Law, Order and Power in Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth
Century England. International Annals of Criminology, 16, 233–265.
Rogers, C. (2004) From Dixon to Z Cars – The Introduction of Unit Beat Policing in
England and Wales. Police History Journal, 19, 10–14.
Rogers, C. (2012) Crime Reduction Partnerships (2nd Edition), Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Rogers, C. (2017) Plural Policing – Theory and Practice, Bristol, Policy Press.
Royal Commission on the Police. (1960) Interim Report (Cmnd 1222), London,
HMSO.
Scarman, Lord. (1982) The Scarman Report, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
Silver, A. (1967) The Demand for Order in Civil Society, in Bordua, D. (ed.), The
Police, New York, Wiley.
Standing Conference on Crime Prevention. (1991) Safer Communities: The Local
Delivery of Crime Prevention through the Partnership Approach (Morgan Report),
London, Home Office.
Steedman, C. (1984) Policing the Victorian Community, The Formation of English
Provincial Forces 1856–1880, London, Routledge.
Storch, R. (1975) “The Plague of the Blue Locusts,” Police Reform and Popular Re-
sistance in Northern England 1840–1857. International Review of Social History,
20, 61–90.
White, J. (2007) London in the 19th Century: A Human Awful Wonder of God,
London, Cape.
Chapter 2

Policing structures—
accountability, governance,
and control

Introduction
Egon Bittner, a famous commentator on police and policing, suggested
that the police, when compared to other government institutions, occu-
pied a special position, as it was simultaneously the best known and the
least understood (Bittner 1970). Nowhere is this statement truer than in the
area of police accountability in England and Wales. Most people would be
able to tell you what the police do in their day to day activity, but the area
of accountability would probably produce much less understanding and
knowledge. This chapter explores the idea of accountability, including such
issues as why it is needed, the current accountability structures and their
brief histories and a critical examination of the processes involved, includ-
ing organisational and individual accountability. It also needs to be situated
within the democratic political process.
Basically police accountability involves holding both individual police
officers, as well as law enforcement agencies, responsible for effectively de-
livering basic services of crime control and maintaining order, while treat-
ing individuals fairly and within the bounds of law. Police are expected to
uphold laws, regarding due process, search and seizure, arrests, discrimina-
tion, as well as other laws relating to equal employment, sexual harassment,
etc. Holding police accountable is important for maintaining the public’s
faith in the system. Research has shown that the public prefers independent
review of complaints against law enforcement, rather than relying on po-
lice departments to conduct internal investigations. Accountability is also
generally thought of as a system for controlling agencies and individuals. In
relation to policing a distinction is often drawn between individual forms of
accountability (controlling the constable) and organisational accountability
(oversight of the policies and processes of the constabulary). The term gov-
ernance is also often used when discussing police accountability. Govern-
ance is a term derived from political science and sociological literature that
focusses on the systems of regulation and ordering of contemporary society.
The term is generally used to refer to strategies of governing both within
and beyond the state.
18 Accountability, governance, and control

Therefore an important distinction can be made between organisational

and individual dimensions of accountability as follows:

1 Organisational accountability—direction and control of policing poli-

cies with overall priorities, resources and policing styles (Reiner 1985);
2 Individual accountability—utilising legal rules or complaints mecha-
nisms of individual policing employees as they go about their day to day
activities.

However, these are not completely distinct in practice as they influence each
other. Neither are they fully effective in isolation from each other and from
the internal mechanism of monitoring and control. As Jones (2008), rightly
points out, accountability also has complex meanings such as responsive-
ness, efficiency, etc. and this complexity extends to the use of accountability
in the context of policing. The framework of police governance and account-
ability is part of a range of processes and institutions that shape democrat-
ically accountable policing. Its effectiveness depends upon its relationship
with a variety of other criteria, at both individual and organisational levels,
and within wider society. Of course there are other factors outside of polic-
ing that form a vital part of the broader aspect of accountability, such as the
media and the general openness and transparency of the political process
and institutions. The question remains however, as to why accountability is
such an important issue for policing.

Reasons for accountability

There is a unique relationship between policing and the institutions of
democracy. Police are provided with formidable powers to enable them
to preserve order and protect liberties and freedoms of citizens. However,
these powers provide opportunities for illegality and misuse. Therefore the
way in which a society regulates and controls the organisation and powers
of the police is a crucial indicator of the nature of the political and social
order within that country (Waddington 1999). To try and understand the
reasons why police should be accountable for their actions, we need to un-
derstand and define exactly what we mean by the word “police” in this con-
text. Most people would when asked to define police, focus on what they do,
that is catch burglars, arrest troublemakers, etc. In one sense this is partly
right and partly wrong. These definitions are what sociologists call “Norm
Derivative” (Klockars 1985). That is, they are based upon beliefs about what
police should do or are supposed to do, about the purposes or ends of polic-
ing, not any real definition. By focussing upon what the police do, however,
we completely miss the underlying definition of what the police are there for.
Karl Klockars’s work on defining the police is an interesting way of un-
derstanding the real use and definition of police in society. The focus for
 Accountability, governance, and control 19

Klockars is upon the one thing that police in any time have had to assist
them perform their duties. It revolves around the fact that the police can
use coercive force to make citizens obey them. This force of course has to
be legitimate or authorised by society at large. Therefore, Klockars defines
police as follows:

Police are institutions or individuals given the general right to use coer-
cive force by the state within the states domestic territory.
(Klockars 1985)

Other writers on police matters tend to agree with Klockars that the role
of the police involves the use of force to make people comply with their
requirements.

Policing is the exercise of the authority of the state over the civil popu-
lation. The authority is based on the monopoly of legitimate coercion.
How this is achieved reflects the relationship between the civil popula-
tion and the state.
(Waddington 1999)

When discussing the police mandate and what the police do, Bittner (1970)
is more expansive. For him the police respond and act according to the fol-
lowing: “something that ought not to be happening and about which someone
had better do something now!” This idea of course allows for the legitimate
use of force to resolve any kind of issues, not necessarily those connected
with the criminal law. For Bittner, criminal law enforcement is merely an in-
cidental and derivative part of police work. It is done because it falls into the
larger part of their duties, and it becomes a work function exactly the same
as anything else that requires force which may be legitimately used. Whilst
Bittner’s work is also open to a critical analysis, there is no doubt that much
police work is not directly connected to crime calls (see College of Policing
2015). Despite this, clearly a major function of the police is the legitimate use
of coercive force upon the state’s citizens. Therefore, the law in England and
Wales allows for police to use as much force as is reasonably necessary in
the right circumstances. The main Act of Parliament that provides for such
is the Criminal law act 1967, section 3 of which states:

1 A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in

the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest
of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large
(Home Office 1967: 3).

Clearly, police can use coercive force to compel citizens to comply. This force
ranges from a simple verbal request to, in some exceptional circumstances,
20 Accountability, governance, and control

the use of deadly force. Such powers are extreme and therefore in a demo-
cratic model of policing, accountability for decision-making by such a pow-
erful body, given such an extreme power, is paramount.
In addition, police have powers of stop and search, arrest, detention, as
well as powers of entry, so the decisions to make these happen should also be
open to scrutiny. In addition, there are several major reasons why policing
should be held accountable. These are that:

1 Policing inevitably is political, as it expresses the exercise of power by

authoritative intervention in public conflicts.
2 It also involves police managers and senior officers having to choose
(especially in times of austerity) between policing priorities and polic-
ing styles (for example the recent debate regarding resources to tackle
knife crime in England and Wales: Birmingham Post 2019). Democratic
policing requires choices should be made that reflect the wishes of the
citizens as well as the views of professional experts.
3 However, there are many “publics” and “communities” and reflecting
and responding to community wishes and demands can be problematic.
This response, for example may become persecution for some sections
of community, so a challenge here is not simply to comply with all com-
munities wants and desires but to provide a platform for discussion and
a reasonable and satisfying compromise.
4 The increasing use of local taxation, such as the precept, influences the
delivery of local policing. This is an important point as much crime and
disorder is locally situated and the effectiveness in dealing with this re-
lies and is related to the level of information and cooperation provided
by local citizens and agencies. This, in turn, relies upon the level of le-
gitimacy trust and cooperation of local communities.

Effective levels of accountability can play an important part in promoting

such legitimacy.

The impact of police culture

It is beyond the remit of this chapter to discuss at any great depth police
culture and its impact on workings of the police. However, there has to be
an acknowledgement that cultures impact upon the way the police, or any
other organisation for that matter, operate and therefore can affect the ac-
countability processes. Some time ago, Robert Reiner (1985) summarised
the “core characteristics” of police culture. These include descriptors such
as conservative, mission-oriented, isolated, masculine, pessimistic, and
suspicious—an “ideal-type” that has withstood the test of time. Within po-
lice studies more broadly, the “police culture” concept is dually invoked to
describe both an overarching occupational ethos (e.g. cop code of silence,
 Accountability, governance, and control 21

“us versus them” mentality and the thin blue line) and individual officer ty-
pologies (e.g. enforcers, optimists, and dirty-Harrys). At either level, cul-
ture is often depicted according to a series of police values or attitudes
acquired through on-the-job socialisation and is said to play a vital role in
predictably explaining officer behaviour (Campeau 2015). Much has been
written concerning the police occupational subculture and its impact upon
behaviour of individual officers (for example see Cockcroft 2012; Loftus
2012; Charman 2017). Yet as Westmarland (2008) points out, police culture
or cultures is sometimes difficult to define. There has been a move away
from discussing a single police culture to a discourse surrounding multi-
ple cultures within the police organisation. For example, canteen culture,
shift culture, headquarters culture, etc. are now commonly used to describe
various internal parts of the police organisation. Reiner (1985) argues that
police culture affects the way the police carry out their work, which is of-
ten done by a lone officer or sometimes a pair of trusted colleagues. This
culture it is argued, reflects and perpetuates the power differences within
the community the police work within. Consequently, the accountability of
policing may be influenced and interfered with by the culture of the police,
which some say is racist (McLaughlin 2007), sexist (Westmarland 2001), and
sometimes corrupt (Skogan 2008). For example, police officers are supposed
to record details of stop and searches carried out on individuals in England
and Wales, and to submit a form showing details of individuals and reasons
for the interaction. The recording of such details acts as an accountabil-
ity process for stop and search procedures. Figures released by the Home
Office in 2019 show that in 2017/2018, there were three stop and searches
for every 1,000 White people compared with 29 stop and searches for every
1,000 Black people, whilst Black people were nine and a half times as likely
to be stopped and searched as White people in 2017/2018; the previous year
they were just over eight times as likely, and in 2014/2015 they were just over
four times as likely (Home Office 2019). Whilst there may be many reasons
for these figures highlighting the high numbers of black people being subject
to stop and search, one cannot escape the fact that they may be such as a
result of racial stereotyping by the police culture.

Important point

The cultures found within the police organisation can influence the
way in which they carry out their duties and affect the accountabil-
ity processes. The occupational police culture is often represented as
being sexist, macho, racist and conservative in outlook, along with a
perceived sense of mission which is to enforce the law only.
22 Accountability, governance, and control

As we can see the relationship between accountability and the idea of

democratic policing is multifaceted and complex. Of course, different coun-
tries who consider themselves democratic have developed different methods
of police accountability that suits their style of democratic policing. Despite
this there are some commonalities which underpin the idea of democratic
policing which should inform our understanding of police accountability.

Understanding democratic policing

As Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) point out, the concept of democracy is
best understood through its Greek roots, with demos meaning “the citizen
body” and cracy meaning “the rule of.” Therefore, the great advantage of
public policing in democratic countries is that it is accountable to every
citizen through the mechanisms of representative government (Bayley and
Shearing 2005). However, Berkley (1969) suggests that the phrase “demo-
cratic policing” is, in fact, a contradiction in terms with the police being
both instructors and servants of society. In many senses this equates to the
idea that the police have an “impossible mandate” based upon their legal
monopoly of the use of force, whilst they see themselves as crime fighters
and crook catchers. Yet, the public wants more crime prevention and legal
accountability in dealing with criminals (Manning and Van Maanen 1978).
Clearly, defining the idea of democratic policing model can be difficult.
Whilst the antithesis of democratic policing is the police state, democracy
itself has many meanings and definitions. However, there are certain im-
portant underlying themes and elements to the idea of democracy, such as
“consensus” and “freedom and equality” which will now be discussed.

Consensus
All politically civilised societies owe their continuing existence to a con-
sensus concerning the foundations of society (Berkley 1969). Citizens agree
upon a common purpose, the procedures by which these purposes are to be
affected and the institutions which are intended to preserve them. Without
consensus, therefore, no democratic system would survive for very long. In
general, the work of the police commences when this consensus fails. There
tends to be an inverse relationship between consensus and police power
so that where there is less consensus the more police power will generally
occur. Aligned to the concept of consensus is the idea that society allows
policing by consent, which is a crucial concept for how we think about pub-
lic policing in most Western Societies. Countries such as USA and the UK
and Canada have historically been source countries for police expertise and
training for developing countries, based upon the premise that policing is
supported by consensus and consent of the public. When comparing po-
lice systems based on consent and consensus with alternative, state-centred
 Accountability, governance, and control 23

social ordered systems, consent-based policing generally appears in a fa-

vourable light. Whilst the consent of some groups to being policed has
sometimes been lacking or unsatisfactory (Goldsmith 2001), the rhetoric of
consent of people to being policed still appears to retain a certain value.
However, the idea of a model of policing based upon near full consent of the
governed is now open to question. Broad social changes, as well as changes
to police management mean that there needs to be a reappraisal of the idea
of consent-based policing. As Fukuyama (1999, 2005) suggests there has
been a rise in scepticism and distrust among citizens in western societies
towards institutions representing political authority and public service.

Freedom and equality

Another vital element of democracy is that of “Freedom,” which suggests
that individuals in society need freedom to participate in politically moti-
vated discussion and are able to hold those government officials to account.
Additionally, police do not meet the citizen on equal footings. Police are
equipped with additional legal powers, both formal and informal, but they
also carry weapons as the tools of their trade (Sklansky 2008). No matter
how efficient the police may be and no matter how careful they are to ob-
serve civil liberties of long standing, they will always have to fight their way
against an undercurrent of opposition and criticism from some of the very
elements which they are paid to serve and protect and to which in the last
analysis they are responsible. This is an enduring problem of a police force
in a democracy. This idea is reinforced by Manning (2008), who argues that
a dominant and violent police force is a threat to a democratic society. This
implies that violence or force can and may be applied as needed, but that the
degree of force should be moderated to the minimum required to gain con-
trol. This is a major cause of abiding problems of policing in a democracy.
In addition, there is the problem of situating the definition of democratic
policing in a temporal context (Sklansky 2008). Democratic policing meant
something different in the 1950s and 1960s than it does today, partly be-
cause policing was different then and partly because, more fundamentally,
our notions of democracy were different.
Therefore, as Liang (1992) reminds us, democratic police are not neutral,
non-political forces without their own motivations, interests, and ideologi-
cal readings of events. They can employ narrow, self-servicing tactics when
under threat but often compromise in the interest of maintaining public
trust and support. Punch (2009) perhaps puts it more forcibly when he says
that one of the most important decisions the state can make is to take the
life of one of its own citizens. By implication, the gravest judgement a police
officer may not only have to make, on behalf of the state, but also society, is
to kill someone. However, policing is no longer monopolised by the public
police, that is, the police entrusted by government with a monopoly of the
24 Accountability, governance, and control

use of state sanctioned force. Policing is now widely offered by institutions

other than the state, most importantly by private companies on a commer-
cial basis and by communities on a volunteer basis. What we have witnessed
increasingly over the past decade has been the rise of a pluralised form of
policing provision (Crawford et al. 2005; McLaughlin 2007; Rogers 2017).
However, what we have seen is that, despite occasional problems high-
lighted by media, the great advantage of public policing in democratic
countries is that it is accountable to every citizen through the mechanisms
of representative government. Underpinning this idea is one of the most
important documents regarding democratic accountable policing in Europe
is the 2008 publication by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
Europe (OSCE 2008). This publication reinforces the key principles of dem-
ocratic policing, in particular police accountability and transparency. Here,
democratic policing is considered to require the police to be and consider
themselves to be accountable to:

• The citizens;
• Their representatives;
• The State; and
• The law.

Therefore, public police activities, ranging from behaviour and attitude to

strategies for police operations, appointment procedures, and even budget
management, must be open to scrutiny by a variety of oversight institutions.
Furthermore, a central feature of democratic policing is the understanding
that the consent of the people is required. Prerequisites for the gaining pub-
lic support should be “providing transparency in police operations and mutual
understanding with the public the police serve and protect” (OSCE 2008: 13).
In summation, there are several important strands that appear through-
out the literature when considering public policing and the democratic po-
licing ideal. These are that the public police have a monopoly of the use of
legitimate force on behalf of the state underpinned by discretion in its use,
they are accountable to the law and the people, and they work in partner-
ship with communities, what Loader refers to as Policing by Government
(Loader 2000: 326). The historical and current process of how public polic-
ing in England and Wales is held to account, both at an individual level and
at the organisational level, is discussed below.

The individual perspective of accountability

The concept of the constable

The term constable is most familiar to people as the rank of constable in the
hierarchical structure of the police rank system. This is its common use and
until fairly recently, before the various direct entry schemes came into being,
 Accountability, governance, and control 25

all sworn police officers began their careers as constables. However, there is
a separate and more meaningful background attached to the term constable
which underpins the reasons why police officers are held individually ac-
countable for their actions. According to Melville Lee (1971), the word con-
stable was imported by the Normans, but its etymology is not quite certain.
It is in fact a “contested” concept. It was said to be derived from “conning”
or king and “stapel,” a stay or prop to signify the King’s right-hand man.
Latterly the derivation “comes-stabuli,” meaning the master of the horse,
has become generally accepted as correct and has been applied to high and
low officials. For example, the term petty constables occurs in 1252 in a doc-
ument which provides for the employment of those officers for enforcing the
watch and word in parish and townships. The titles of tything man, petty
constable, parish constable, and finally police constable are various names
applied to the same office from the time of Alfred the Great up to modern
times. What must be remembered is that the position was always considered
an ancient honourable one (Lustgarten 1986), and the local competence of
the official has always been insisted upon. Lord Coke wrote that the qualifi-
cations that a constable should possess are:

1 Honesty, to execute the office without malice and partiality;

2 Knowledge so that they are able to understand their duties;
3 Ability, to be diligent and not to neglect their duties.

By the early 17th century, the constable was responsible for such matters as
military organisation, tax collection, regulation of ale houses, weight and
measures, the control of vagrants in addition to the arrest and custody of sus-
pects. However, such was the uncertainty of the constable’s legal powers, they
were subject to harassment by litigation from citizens. Constables knew how-
ever, that it was difficult in practice for the justice of the peace to hold them
accountable. The emergence of a professional constable across the country,
and particularly the Bow Street Runners, and later the police officers under
the Middlesex Justices Act 1792, played a big part in expanding the work of
the constable, and increased the need for accountability. Much of the above
has been encapsulated into the oath a constable has to take upon being sworn
into the police. The following is the oath as proscribed by the Police Act 1996:

I………………of………………do solemnly and sincerely declare and af-

firm that I will well and truly serve the Queen in the office of constable,
with fairness, integrity, diligence and impartiality, upholding funda-
mental human rights and according equal respect to all people; and that
I will, to the best of my power, cause the peace to be kept and preserved
and prevent all offences against people and property; and that while I
continue to hold the said office I will, to the best of my skill and knowl-
edge, discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to law.
(Home Office 1996)
26 Accountability, governance, and control

Even allowing for the updating of this oath to reflect modern day values the
underlying ideas of Lord Coke remain. The position and title of constable is
therefore considered to be a special one which also gives great authority and
discretion. The Association of Chief Police Officers’ evidence to the Royal
Commission on Policing in 1960, for example, describes the constable thus:

The constable is not an agent of any other authority, central or local, or

indeed any superior officer. The constable is personally responsible for
all of his/her actions and the constable is a citizen mainly exercising the
powers and duties of a citizen, he also exercises other powers conferred
upon him by virtue of his office. In exercising these powers he does so
on his own initiative and is liable in law for any impropriety. His au-
thority is original, not delegated, and examined at his own discretion by
virtue of his office.
Baldwin and Kinsey (1982: 8)

The doctrine of personal responsibility of the constable is the most impor-

tant principle underlying the British policing system. Therefore, the nature
and standards of police action are seen to rely on the individual integrity
and moral standards of the individual constable who alone is answerable to
the courts. As Emsley (1996) points out, the major difference between the
constable and the armed forces personnel is that the constable is expected to
generally act on his/her own, and to utilise his or her discretion. Therefore,
the constable is expected to act with authority, courage, and leadership,
along with ethical use of discretionary powers.
As we can see, there is a tremendous responsibility placed upon individu-
als who are sworn as constables within the police. The constable has an un-
derlying independence as a constitutional officer of the Crown, acting in his/
her own discretion to perform his duty of keeping the peace and he/she is not
subject to control by any political authority (Winsor 2013). They also have
great powers and also the ability to use their discretion in an ethical manner.
However, with these powers and tradition, goes an individual accountabil-
ity, and every constable needs to understand they are personally responsible
for their actions to the law, as well as senior officers and the community
they serve. Individual police officers within the police service are subject
to accountability also through the discipline or professional standards unit
of their force. These units investigate more serious complaints against the
police organisation as well as individuals. If found guilty of a disciplinary
offence, then depending upon the severity of the offence and other circum-
stances, one of the following disciplinary actions may be taken against the
individual:

• Management advice
• A written warning
 Accountability, governance, and control 27

• A final written warning

• An extension to a final written warning
• Dismissal with notice
• Dismissal without notice
(Home Office 2012)

As part of the accountability process and to oversee the complaints proce-

dures against both organisations and individuals, the government created
an independent body, namely the Independent Office for Police Conduct
(IOPC).

Important point

The doctrine of personal responsibility of the constable is the most

important principle underlying the British policing system. Therefore,
the nature and standards of police action are seen to rely on the indi-
vidual integrity and moral standards of the individual constable, who
alone is answerable to the courts.

Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC)

The is the non-departmental public body in England and Wales which, since
8 January 2018, has been responsible for overseeing the system for handling
serious complaints made against police forces and individuals in England
and Wales. Most allegations of police misconduct are investigated by po-
lice forces’ own professional standards departments (with oversight by the
IOPC). However the IOPC does conduct independent investigations of se-
rious allegations of misconduct or criminal offences by police officers and
other law enforcement officers. The IOPC will normally conduct an inde-
pendent investigation should a person die following police contact.

History of IOPC
The formation of the IOPC is rooted in the Independent Police Complaints
Commission (IPCC), which was formed in 2003. This, in turn, replaced the
Police Complaints Authority (PCA). Funded by the Home Office, the IPCC
operated under statutory powers and duties defined in the Police Reform
Act 2002. It was independent of pressure groups, political parties and, in
principle, of government. The IPCC could elect to manage or supervise the
police investigation into a particular complaint and independently investi-
gate the most serious cases itself. While some of the IPCC’s investigators
28 Accountability, governance, and control

were former police officers, the commissioners themselves could not have
worked for the police by law. It had set standards for police forces to im-
prove the way the public’s complaints were handled. The IPCC also handled
appeals by the public about the way their complaint was dealt with by the
local force, or its outcomes. The IPCC was also given the task of increasing
public confidence in the complaint system. The functions of the Independ-
ent Office for Police Conduct were previously undertaken by the Independ-
ent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), which was established in 2004
and abolished upon the creation of the IOPC. The Independent Office for
Police Conduct originated from the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Home
Office 2017) and, unlike its IPCC predecessor, does not have a commission
structure but is headed by a Director General, supported by Deputies, Re-
gional Directors, and a Director for Wales. The Policing and Crime Act
2017 has also indicated the Independent Office for Police Conduct has new
powers which the previous IPCC did not have. These include:

• a power to initiate its own investigations without relying on a force to

record and refer;
• powers to determine appeals and recommend remedies;
• a shortened process for deciding whether a case should go to a discipli-
nary hearing.

The IOPC investigate the most serious and sensitive incidents and allega-
tions involving the police and are independent of the police organisation.
They also carry out investigations into serious complaints and conduct mat-
ters relating to staff at:

• National Crime Agency (NCA);

• Gang masters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA);
• Home Office;
• Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC);
• Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC);
• Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs).

Most complaints about the police are normally dealt with by the relevant
police force. Each force has a separate department that oversees complaints,
and these are called are called “professional standards departments” (PSDs).
By law, police forces must refer certain serious matters to the IOPC for
their investigation. These are:

• Certain complaints made to their force—such as those that include an

allegation of serious corruption or serious assault;
• Indications of misconduct by police officers and staff—for example an
indication that a criminal offence has been committed or that a serious
injury has been caused;
 Accountability, governance, and control 29

• Every time someone had direct or indirect contact with the police when,
or shortly before, they were seriously injured or died. However, forces
only need to refer cases where the contact may have caused or contrib-
uted to the death or injury.

Important point

The IOPC conducts independent investigations of serious allegations

of misconduct or criminal offences by police officers and other law en-
forcement officers. The IOPC will normally conduct an independent
investigation should a person die following police contact.

The organisational perspective of accountability

Until very recently, responsibility for the delivery of all policing services in
England and Wales was, in most cases, shared between three different bod-
ies. The power sharing responsibilities were divided amongst the Home Sec-
retary, Police Authority, and the Chief Constable (Wakefield and Fleming
2009). This arrangement was commonly referred to as the tri-partite system
established by the Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964). Under this system,
the Home Secretary was responsible for the overall efficiency and effec-
tiveness of policing in England and Wales and was accountable directly to
parliament. The Chief Constable was responsible for all operational polic-
ing decisions within the force, controlling with autonomy over any availa-
ble resource (Pope and Weiner 1981). The third and final party involved in
policing was the Police Authority who regulated and held Chief Consta-
bles to account. In addition to this important duty, the Police Authority set
the strategic direction and budget. The composition of police authorities
differed, however, in most instances there were 17 members (Barrett 2011).
Nine members were from local government and were nominated to the au-
thority. The remaining eight independent members who were included as
part of the authority came from the local community with a requirement
that at least one independent member was a magistrate. Table 2.1 sets out
in detail the wider role and primary responsibilities of each of the parties
previously involved in policing within England and Wales.
Under this system, one of the current anomalies was that the Home Of-
fice, along with other politicians, could apply significant pressure on Chief
Constables to direct resources in particular ways. However, the result of any
such action was solely the responsibility of the Chief Constable and there
seemed little accountability on behalf of individual politicians. Another
area of concern under this system was the legitimacy of the Police Author-
ity. Although it was true that members were appointed representatives, the
majority of those who formed the Police Authority had not been directly
30 Accountability, governance, and control

Table 2.1 T he Role of the Former Tri-Partite System

Police authority Chief constable Home Off ice

Maintain efficient Responsible for direction Promote efficiency

force and control
Agree budget, Prepares draft budget, Determines grant
responsible for financial management
expenditure
Appoints Chief Control, directs Approves appointment
Constable employees of Chief Constable
Sets local objectives, Adheres to local and Sets national
consults locally national objectives and objectives, sets
targets performance levels
Issues local policing Draft local policing plans Receives copy of local
plan policing plan
Control finances for Operational and resource Can determine levels
extra resources allocation control of performance

Source: The Author.

appointed by the public as representatives of the people on policing issues. In-

stead, the majority of members were elected to local government positions as
councillors and not as a direct consequence of knowledge of policing matters
(Wakefield and Fleming 2009). There was also a belief that police authorities
often failed to hold Chief Constables to account. In part, it was believed that
the lack of powers and autonomy held by the authority combined to reinforce
the position of the Chief Constable while leaving the authority little option
other than to submit to the operational decisions of the Chief Constable. It
would be highly unlikely, unusual, and irregular that the Police Authority
would not have released the policing budget or precept to chief officers. As
Lustgarten (1986) pointed out in his perceptive work on the governance of po-
lice, the tri-partite structure was a lopsided thing, which was cruelly exposed
in terms of the powerlessness of police authorities during the miner strikes
of the early 1980s. Overall, there seemed to be a “democratic deficit” sur-
rounding police authorities and as a result, there has been over recent years,
a growing concern over public dissuasion and disconnection with policing.
Reiner (2010) has stated that police authorities “play the piper but never name
the tune.” Consequently, new accountability measures have been being intro-
duced which dramatically altered the tri-partite system and introduced a new
structure and organisational accountability processes.

The Police Reform and Social

Responsibility Act 2011
This Act introduced wide ranging changes to the accountability pro-
cess of the police by allowing for the introduction of the police and crime
 Accountability, governance, and control 31

commissioners instead of police authorities outside of London, and for the

Mayor’s office for policing and crime within the metropolitan police. Other
areas have, since the introduction of this position, adopted mayors, who
have the responsibility for policing within their cities, e.g. Manchester. A
Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) is an elected official in England
and Wales charged with securing efficient and effective policing of a po-
lice area. Commissioners replaced the police authorities. The first incum-
bents were elected on 15 November 2012 to serve for three-and-a-half years,
but subsequent Commissioners are to be elected for four-year terms. The
most recent elections took place in May 2016. Separate arrangements exist
for London as the City of London is policed by the City of London Police
with the City of London Corporation functioning as the police authority.
Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Police District is policed by the Metropoli-
tan Police Service, with the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime holding
the police to account through a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime ap-
pointed on the Mayor’s behalf; since 2017 similar arrangements to this also
exist in the Greater Manchester Combined Authority. Policing in Scotland
and Northern Ireland is the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament and
Northern Ireland Assembly, respectively. In Scotland, the Scottish Police
Authority serves in a similar capacity for Police Scotland, while in Northern
Ireland, the Minister of Justice fulfils a similar role for the Police Service
of Northern Ireland. The core functions of police and crime commission-
ers are to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force
within their area, and to hold the Chief constable to account for the delivery
of the police and crime plan. Police and crime commissioners are charged
with holding the police fund (from which all policing of the area is financed)
and raising the local policing precept from council tax. Police and crime
commissioners are also responsible for the appointment, suspension, and
dismissal of the Chief Constable.

Police and crime plans

Shortly after their election to office, a police and crime commissioner has
to produce a police and crime plan. That plan must include his or her ob-
jectives for policing their particular area, what resources will be provided
to the Chief Constable and how performance will be measured. Both the
Police and Crime Commissioner and the Chief Constable must have regard
to the police and crime plan in the exercise of their duties, and the PCC is
required to produce an annual report for the public on progress in policing.

Police funding
As we can see, Police and Crime Commissioners hold the “police fund,”
from which all policing is financed. The bulk of funding for the police fund
32 Accountability, governance, and control

comes from the Home Office in the form of an annual grant (calculated on
a proportionate basis by the Home Office to take into account the differ-
ences between the 43 forces in England and Wales, which vary significantly
in terms of population, geographical size, crime levels, and trends), though
Commissioners will also set a precept on the Council Tax to raise additional
funds. If a Commissioner wishes to increase the precept by an amount
deemed to be excessive, the Localism Act 2011 requires a referendum. It is
the Commissioner’s responsibility to set the budget for the force area, which
includes allocating enough money from the overall policing budget to en-
sure that he or she can discharge his or her own functions effectively.

Police and crime panels

The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 established police
and crime panels within each force area in England and Wales (excluding
Greater London). These panels consist of at least one representative from
each local authority in that area, and at least two independent members
co-opted by the panel. Panels are responsible for scrutinising commis-
sioners’ decisions and ensuring this information is available to the pub-
lic. They must review the commissioner’s draft police and crime plan and
draft annual report before publication, and the commissioner must give
their comments due consideration. A police and crime panel may require
the attendance of the commissioner or a member of his or her staff at
any time, and may suspend a commissioner from office where he or she
is charged with a serious criminal offence. Police and crime panels are
able to veto a Commissioner’s proposed precept or proposed candidate
for Chief Constable by a two-thirds majority. A National Audit Office re-
port published in January 2014 found that there were “few checks and bal-
ances” on the 41 commissioners between elections. It said police and crime
panels, which were set up to scrutinise PCCs, “lack powers” to act on the
information they receive.

Oath of impar tiality

On 16 August 2012 the Home Office announced that every newly elected
police and crime commissioner would be required to swear an “oath of im-
partiality” before taking office. The oath reads:

I do solemnly and sincerely promise that I will serve all the people of
Police Force Area in the office of police and crime commissioner with-
out fear or favour. I will act with integrity and diligence in my role and,
to the best of my ability, will execute the duties of my office to ensure
that the police are able to cut crime and protect the public. I will give
a voice to the public, especially victims of crime and work with other
 Accountability, governance, and control 33

services to ensure the safety of the community and effective criminal

justice. I will take all steps within my power to ensure transparency of
my decisions, so that I may be properly held to account by the public.
I will not seek to influence or prevent any lawful and reasonable inves-
tigation or arrest, nor encourage any police action save that which is
lawful and justified within the bounds of this office.
(Home Office 2011: 3)

By the time the first police and crime commissioner had been elected, in
November 2012, the original Home Office text of the “Oath of Impartiality”
had been significantly modified to the following:

I …………….. do hereby declare that I accept the office of Police and

Crime Commissioner for ………………. In making this declaration, I
solemnly and sincerely promise that during my term in office:
I will serve all the people of …………in the office of Police and Crime
Commissioner. I will act with integrity and diligence in my role and, to
the best of my ability, will execute the duties of my office to ensure that
the police are able to cut crime and protect the public. I will give a voice
to the public, especially victims of crime, and work with other services
to ensure the safety of the community and effective criminal justice. I
will take all steps within my power to ensure transparency of my deci-
sions, so that I may be properly held to account by the public. I will not
interfere with the operational independence of police officers.
(Home Office 2012: 4)

Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) were elected for the second time
on the 5th of May 2016 in 40 force areas across England and Wales. Every
force area is represented by a PCC, except Greater Manchester and London,
where PCC responsibilities lie with the Mayor. The rhetoric behind their
appointments includes the following:

• The role of the PCCs is to be the voice of the people and hold the police
to account. They are responsible for the totality of policing.
• PCCs aim to cut crime and deliver an effective and efficient police ser-
vice within their force area.
• PCCs have been elected by the public to hold Chief Constables and the
force to account, effectively making the police answerable to the com-
munities they serve.
• PCCs ensure community needs are met as effectively as possible and are
improving local relationships through building confidence and restor-
ing trust. They work in partnership across a range of agencies at local
and national level to ensure there is a unified approach to preventing
and reducing crime.
34 Accountability, governance, and control

However, the introduction of IPCCs has not been without its critics, es-
pecially following two rounds of elections in 2012 and 2016. Mawby and
Smith (2017) for example point out that despite there being a significant
increase in voter turnout from 15% to 26% this is still rather a low number
of voters from such an important position, and this questions the rep-
resentativeness of the position itself. In addition, the role appears to be
becoming far more political, with the number of political party nominees
rising whilst those considered as “independent” falling. Party politics
could therefore become paramount, which could mean the system will be
scarcely more answerable to the community than its predecessor, the po-
lice authority. Therefore, the danger of the role becoming completely po-
liticised is a real one. Loader and Muir’s (2016) conclusions suggest that,
despite some controversies in some forces, the system appears to work
and point out that older police authorities also suffered from controver-
sies. Indeed, they conclude that there were no notable examples of PCCs
politicising policing or infringing upon the operational independence of
Chief Constables, and suggest their introduction has in fact improved
accountability of the police service. PCCs appear to be holding Chief
Constables to account much more than the older police authorities, and
with more localised policing policies and the removal of central Home
Office Performance Indicators have led the way to greater innovation,
such as the introduction by the PCC in Sussex of a youth commission.
However, they consider that it is far from a perfect model and point to a
trend whereby Deputy Chief Constables tend to become appointed Chief
Constables following recruitment processes in which they are the only or
preferred candidate, thereby inviting allegations of nepotism.
The future role of PCCs could include a wider remit when it comes to
public safety. Already some English PCCs, such as Staffordshire’s com-
missioner, have assumed the role and functions involved in overseeing
fire authorities, and there is no reason that they should not be consid-
ered for oversight of other roles (Staffordshire PCC 2020). Their ability
to integrate and design services for local delivery could meet social needs
that are very different to those that led their establishment many decades
ago. This, with an acceptance of more evidence-led policies, could lead
to a deepening public engagement and participation in decision-making
around policing in particular and public safety in general. However, to
achieve this there should also be a focus upon those issues that are con-
sidered hidden, namely Domestic Violence, Cybercrime, etc., rather than
upon becoming elected through the traditional cry of more “Bobbies
­ on
the Beat.” Besides the strategic and policy-driven accountability pro-
cesses involving the PCCs and the direct organisational accountability
through community consultation, there are a number of other agencies
who are tasked to ensure a transparent and fair governance process.
These are discussed in the following sections.
 Accountability, governance, and control 35

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and

Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS)
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services
(HMICFRS)—this organisation is responsible to the Home Office for police
forces in England and Wales. It also inspects, by invitation, various UK spe-
cial police forces and elements of the Service (Military) Police. Since 2004,
HMIC has also had responsibility for examining HM Revenue and Cus-
toms and the Serious Organized Crime Agency. Inspection services have
been provided on a non-statutory basis for the Police Service of Northern
Ireland. Since July 2017 it has also become responsible for inspecting Fire &
Rescue Services in England. National inspections still play a key role in cen-
tral state influence within policing. HMICFRS for example makes recom-
mendations to the Home Secretary who may intervene in local police policy.
An example of this, the so-called Vulnerability Agenda, was a core feature
of HMICFRS inspection and monitoring. As a result, the safeguarding of
vulnerable people is now a priority for commissioners. A similar instance
can be seen in the work on Domestic Abuse by the Inspectorate, which is
now embodied in police priorities across England and Wales. Perhaps one of
the most influential HMICFRS areas of influence, however, lies in the PEEL
examinations of all forces in England and Wales. PEEL is the programme
in which HMICFRS draws together evidence from its annual all-force in-
spections. The evidence is used to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and le-
gitimacy of the police. These assessments were introduced so that the public
will be able to judge the performance of their force and policing as a whole.
PEEL stands for the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy Pro-
gramme. The effectiveness of a force is assessed in relation to how it carries
out its responsibilities including cutting crime, protecting the vulnerable,
tackling anti-social behaviour, and dealing with emergencies and other calls
for service. Its efficiency is assessed in relation to how it provides value for
money, whilst its legitimacy is assessed in relation to whether or not the force
operates fairly, ethically, and within the law.
The evidence from inspections, together with the context within which
forces operate, allows HMICFRS to make an assessment of each of the
43 police forces in England and Wales. This, in turn, is used to rank po-
lice forces by performance, etc. Thus, we can see that the national role of
HMICFR, despite all the rhetoric of a more locally based accountably sys-
tem for democratic policing, has actually become more evident. As the role
of the Association of Chief Officers Association (ACPO), and latterly its re-
placement the NCCP (discussed below), appears to have become weakened,
so has the role of Chief Constables to challenge such centralised inspections
(Holdaway 2017). In turn, the Inspectorate’s budget has increased by 66%
between 2010 and 2015, whilst police force budgets shrank considerably, and
this demonstrates perhaps, its enhanced role as a vital lever of central influ-
ence, and its closeness to central government.
36 Accountability, governance, and control

National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)

The NPCC was established on 1 April 2015 as the replacement organisa-
tion of the Association of Chief Police Officers. In 2010, the then Conserv-
ative Government announced a series of police reforms including local
accountability through Police and Crime Commissioners, and the creation
of the National Crime Agency and the College of Policing. In 2013, the
PCCs commissioned General Sir Nick Parker to review the services that
ACPO provided and make recommendations about the requirements of a
national policing body following the fundamental changes in policing. In
2014, a group of chief officers and PCCs began working together to imple-
ment Parker’s recommendations and develop a national body. Chief Officers
voted in support of the group’s proposals in July 2014. Chief Constable Sara
Thornton was appointed to chair the NPCC on 2 December 2014. ACPO
was closed down on 31 March 2015. The NPCC is founded by a legal agree-
ment between Chief Constables, Independent Police and Crime Commis-
sioners, and non-Home Office police force equivalents under Section 22A of
the Police Act 1996. It is hosted by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
but is supposed to act independently. The NPCC brings together, and is
funded by, police forces in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland as well as
the armed services and some British overseas territories. It draws on the ef-
forts and expertise of chief officers: those ranked Assistant Chief Constable
and above, or Commander and above in MPS and City of London Police,
and senior police staff equivalents. Further, it coordinates police forces’ col-
lective operational responses to national threats, such as terrorism, organ-
ised crime, and national emergencies.

Chief Constables’ Council

The Chief Constables’ Council is the senior operational decision-making
body for the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Every police force is repre-
sented in the work of the NPCC through the Chief Constables’ Council. The
Chief Constables’ Council is therefore the primary decision-making forum
for the NPCC. Chief Constables (and equivalents) meet quarterly to discuss
operational policing issues and agree action. Working with the College of
Policing, the council takes decisions on national standards and common
approaches with the aim of protecting the public from the most serious and
strategic threats.

Coordination committees
In addition to their day jobs, chief officers support the NPCC’s work by pro-
viding national operational perspectives on particular crime and policing is-
sues. There are 11 broad coordination committees, each led by a chief officer.
 Accountability, governance, and control 37

Within each area, chief officers may also lead on specific issues—for example,
under the Crime Operations Coordination Committee there are individual
leads for domestic abuse, rape, drugs, and cyber-crime. The coordination
committees cover:

• Crime Operations;
• Criminal Justice;
• Equality, Diversity, and Human Rights;
• Finance;
• Information Management;
• International Coordination;
• Local Policing;
• Operations;
• Performance Management;
• Workforce;
• Counter Terrorism (chaired by Metropolitan Police Service Assistant
Commissioner and responsible for the National Counter Terrorism Po-
licing Network).

Coordination committees work closely with the College of Policing to assist

in the development of professional practice for police officers in different
areas of policing. Representatives from the Government and other stake-
holders in the criminal justice system and third sector are involved in the
committees’ work to include a range of perspectives.

The Association of Police and Crime

Commissioners (APCC)
The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) is a company
limited by guarantee. The APCC services are overseen and directed by the
Chairman and board of Directors. The APCC offers the following services
to members:

• Provides information on national policing policy issues and legislation;

• Consults PCCs to enable them to develop policy positions and to influ-
ence change;
• Facilitates the leadership of PCCs on national governance structures
such as the College of Policing, National Crime Agency, Police Reform
and Transformation Board, and other police professional bodies;
• Provides a range of opportunities for members to come together to de-
bate and discuss national policing and criminal justice policy and en-
gage with senior stakeholders;
• Assists PCCs to share practice and identify ways to achieve efficiencies
through collaboration.
38 Accountability, governance, and control

It is by coming together that PCCs will be best able to influence change. A

national body helps PCCs make the most of their ability to influence at a
national level and deliver on their manifesto promises. PCCs have an impor-
tant contribution to make to how national policing services are governed,
such as the National Crime Agency and the Police Professional Body. The
APCC supports PCCs in providing this leadership at a national level. By
sharing best practice and identifying opportunities to work together, or pay-
ing for services jointly, the APCC helps PCCs be more efficient and effective.
If PCCs identify barriers to delivering their local plans, the APCC takes
co-ordinated action that can help remove barriers at a national level. All
40 PCCs are members of the APCC, alongside the City of London Police
Authority, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime for the Greater London
Authority, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, and the Jersey
Police Authority. Additionally, the membership includes non-geographic
police authorities: the British Transport Police Authority and the Ministry
of Defence Police Committee. The APCC is supported by a small, focussed
team of policing policy professionals with a wide range of experience of
representing the interests of local police governance bodies at a national
level. In November 2016 the Association of Police and Crime Commission-
ers adopted a new portfolio approach in which Police and Crime Commis-
sioners have been given the responsibility to lead on policy development in
the 20 newly configured portfolio areas.
Despite the suggestion that the introduction of commissioners enhances
local accountability, Jones and Lister (2019) question whether or not the
introduction of such represents a genuine democratic reform of police gov-
ernance and accountability. Despite the claims for local accountability, they
argue that the vertical axis of central to local control over policing institu-
tions stresses the centralisation and an ever tightening grip over policing
policy to the detriment of local democratic accountability. They believe
that over the period from 1964, which saw the introduction of the Police Act
(Home Office 1964) to 2012, local policing became more heavily merged from
the centre with its focus and activity driven by targets and directives set by
the Home Office. In particular at that time, the Home Office controlled the
greater part of police funding and most provincial forces funding came from
the national government. Thus a complex web of accountability and control
exists in which central influences were dominant but implemented via a “rule
at a distance” approach. Despite this apparent drive for localism under this
Act, there is still the persistence of central government influence. This can
be seen in such documents as The Strategic Policing Requirement (Home
Office 2015). Here forces have to respond to national threats, as defined by
the centre, or face the consequences, such as resourcing implications. These
implications rest with the “core executive” departments such as the Home
Office or the Treasury who can use a “carrot and stick” approach of reform
and change. For example, the introduction of competitive funding schemes in
support of national objectives such as the Police Innovation fund (2013–2018)
 Accountability, governance, and control 39

and the Police Transformation fund (2016–2018). Both of these schemes

however were funded by “top slicing” the overall budgets earmarked for the
Police and Crime Commissioners. We can see that in this section there are
important and diverse agencies involved in the organisational accountability
process of the police service in England and Wales. The following section
examines the individual within the police organisation and his/her responsi-
bility for accountability, etc. It considers the unique idea and history of the
office of constable, individual responsibility, and importantly the function of
the Independent Office Police Misconduct (IOPC).

Conclusion
Maurice Punch (2009) writing on the western style of democratic policing
stated he supported such for three main reasons: namely, accountability, ac-
countability, and accountability. It is accountability which allows us to apply
our policing methods in England and Wales, and it has its roots in our his-
tory and traditions as well as having a great importance for modern society.
Policing evolving from our communities’ means there is a link to those com-
munities and the law of the land. Indeed, apart from the official structures dis-
cussed within this chapter, each officer is held accountable to the community
they serve, through the structures in being. Individual police officers of what-
ever rank, have this inbuilt in their roles as constables, which has a long and
distinguished history, with clearly high expectations in terms of behaviour
and ethical decision-making. Understanding the different types of accounta-
bility processes for the police organisation and the police individual, helps us
understand the positioning of the police within our democratic society.

Reflective questions
1 What do we mean when we discuss police accountability?
2 Why is this aspect of policing important?
3 What are the two major types of accountability discussed in this
chapter?
4 What roles does the IOPC play in the accountability of the police?
5 What are the main functions of a police and Crime Commissioner?

Useful websites
Home Office website regarding individuals rights: https://www.gov.uk/
browse/justice/rights.
Association of Independent Police and Crime Commissioners: http://www.
apccs.police.uk/.
College of Policing: https://www.college.police.uk/Pages/Home.aspx.
Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC): https://www.policeconduct.gov.
uk/.
40 Accountability, governance, and control

National Police Chief’s Council: https://www.npcc.police.uk/.

Organisation for security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE): https://www.
osce.org/.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue services
(HMICFRS): https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/.

References
Baldwin, R. and Kinsey, R. (1982) Police Powers and Politics, London, Quartet Books.
Barrett, H. (2011) Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th Edition), Abingdon,
Routledge.
Bayley, D.H. and Shearing, C.D. (2005) The Future of Policing, in Newburn, T. (ed.),
Policing: Key Readings, Cullompton, Willan.
Berkley, G.E. (1969) The Democratic Policeman, Boston, MA, Beacon Press.
Birmingham Mail. (2019) Chancellor Philip Hammond Tells Police to Find
Money for Knife Crime by Making Cuts Elsewhere. Available at https://www.
birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/chancellor-philip-hammond-tells-
police-15938407 (accessed 29/3/2019).
Bittner, E. (1970) Aspects of Police Work, Boston, MA, Northeastern University
Press.
Campeau, H. (2015) ‘Police Culture’ at Work: Making Sense of Police Oversight.
The British Journal of Criminology 55(4), 669–687.
Charman, S. (2017) Police Socialisation, Identity and Culture: Becoming Blue,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Cockcroft, T. (2012) Police Culture: Themes and Concepts, London, Routledge.
Crawford, A., Lister, S., Blackburn, S., and Burnett, J. (2005) Plural Policing – The
Mixed Economy of Visible Patrols in England and Wales, Bristol, Policy Press.
Dunleavy, P. and O’Leary, B. (1987) Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal
Democracy, London, Macmillan.
Emsley, C. (1996) The English Police: A Political and Social History, London,
Longman.
Fukuyama, F. (1999) The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of
Social Order, New York, The Free Press.
Fukuyama, F. (2005) State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-
First Century, London, Profile Books Ltd.
Goldsmith, A. (2001) The Pursuit of Police Integrity: Leadership and Governance
Dimensions. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 13, 185.
Holdaway, S. (2017) The Re-Professionalization of the Police in England and Wales.
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 17(5), 588–604.
Home Office. (1964) The Police Act 1964, London, The Stationery Office.
Home Office. (1967) The Criminal Law Act, London, The Stationery Office.
Home Office. (1996) The Police Act, London, The Stationery Office.
Home Office. (2011) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, London,
The Stationery Office.
Home Office. (2012) Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and
Attendance Management Procedures, Home Office Circular 23/2012, London, The
Home Office.
Home Office. (2017) The Policing and Crime Act, London, The Stationery Office.
 Accountability, governance, and control 41

Home Office. (2019) Stop and Search. Available at https://www.ethnicity-facts-

figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/policing/stop-and-search/latest
(accessed 21/8/2019).
Jones, T. (2008) The Accountability of Policing, in Newburn, T. (ed.), Handbook of
Policing, Cullompton, Willan.
Jones, T. and Lister, S. (2019) Localism and Police Governance in England &
Wales: Exploring Continuity and Change. Available at http://eprints.whiterose.
ac.uk/143795/8/Localism%20and%20police%20governance%20in%20Eng-
land%20FINALv3.pdf.
Klockars, C. (1985) Idea of Police, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage.
Lee, W.L.M. (1971) A History of Police in England, London, Methuen and Co.
Liang, H.H. (1992) The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from
Metternich to the Second World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Loader, I. (2000) Plural Policing and Democratic Governance, Social and Legal
Studies, 9, 323.
Loader, I. and Muir, R. (2016) Embracing Police and Crime Commissioners: Les-
sons from the Past, Directions for the Future. The Police Foundation. Available
at http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/uploads/catalogerfiles/embracing-pccs-
lessons-from-the-past-directions-for-the-future/embracing_pccs.pdf (accessed
17/4/2019).
Loftus, B. (2012) Police Culture in a Changing World, Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Lustgarten, L. (1986) The Governance of Police, London, Sweet and Maxwell.
Manning, P.K. (2008) The Technology of Policing: Crime Mapping, Information
Technology and the Rationality of Crime Control, New York, New York Univer-
sity Press.
Manning, P.K. and Van Maanen, M. (1978) Policing – A View from the Streets, Santa
Monica, CA, Goodyear Publishing.
Mawby, R.I. and Smith, K. (2017) Civilian Oversight of the Police in England and
Wales: The Election of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 and 2016. The
International Journal of Police Science and Management, 19(1), 23–30.
McLaughlin, E. (2007) The New Policing, London, Sage.
National Audit Office. (2014) Police Accountability: Landscape Review. Available
at https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Police-accountability-
Landscape-review.pdf.
OSCE. (2008) Guidebook on Democratic Policing, Vienna, Austria.
Pope, D. and Weiner, N. (1981) Policing, London, Croom Helm Limited.
Punch, M. (2009) Police Corruption: Deviance, Accountability and Reforming Polic-
ing, Cullompton, Willan.
Reiner, R. (1985) The Politics of the Police (1st Edition), London, Oxford University
Press.
Reiner, R. (2010) The Politics of the Police (4th Edition), London, Oxford University
Press.
Rogers, C. (2017) Plural Policing: Theory and Practice, Bristol, Policy Press.
Sklansky, D.A. (2008) Democracy and the Police, Stanford, CA, Stanford University
Press.
Skogan, W.G. (2008) Why Reforms Fail. Policing and Society, 18(1), 23–34.
Staffordshire PCC. (2020) Fire and Rescue Overview. Available at https://stafford-
shire-pfcc.gov.uk/about/fire-rescue/overview/ (accessed 6/4/2020).
42 Accountability, governance, and control

Waddington, P.A.J. (1999) Policing Citizens, London, UCL.

Wakefield, A. and Fleming, S. (2009) The SAGE Dictionary of Policing, London,
SAGE.
Westmarland, L. (2001) Blowing the Whistle of Police Violence. Gender, Ethnogra-
phy and Ethics. British Journal of Criminology, 41, 523–535.
Westmarland, L. (2008) Police Cultures, in Newburn, T. (ed.), Handbook of Policing
(2nd Edition), Cullompton, Willan.
Winsor, T.P. (2013) Operational Independence and the New Accountability of
Policing, the John Harris Memorial Lecture 2013, delivered 11/7/13. Available at
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/hmcic-tom-winsor-john-
harris-memorial-lecture.pdf (accessed 1/4/18).
Chapter 3

Local police structures

Introduction
Local policing has been the bedrock of policing provision in England and
Wales since the introduction of the modern Police with the Metropolitan
Police Act 1929 (Home Office 1829). Indeed, the concept of local crime pre-
vention and justice goes back much further, to Anglo Saxon and Norman
times (see Critchley 1967 for example). However, general awareness of the
current structure of local policing appears to be limited. In a survey con-
ducted by IPSOS/MORI (2010), it was found that participants had an under-
lying sense that the Home Office had a role to play, but there was very little
engagement and knowledge of police at force level. This chapter will exam-
ine local policing structures, how in general police forces are organised, the
rank structures in the organisation, what police are trying to achieve, and
current changes to the way police are being recruited at different levels. It
will also examine the use of alternatives to sworn officers, and the way in
which the public interact with the police. It will further critically examine
the current structures to understand whether they are fit for purpose in times
of austerity and the wider political, environmental, and global challenges.

The Criminal Justice Sector and the

Police Service
The Police Service in the UK is part of the Criminal Justice Sector that in-
cludes many agencies including the courts, the Criminal Prosecution Service
(CPS), the Probation Service, and Social services. Crimes are dealt with at
two levels, with less serious offences being tried at a magistrates’ court and
more serious or complex offences being tried at a Crown Court. The Police
Service is the largest and most expensive part of the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, yet the sector as a whole only runs properly if the different components
work together. Co-operation between the agencies in the Criminal Justice
Sector operates at a strategic level (as when the CPS and the Police Service
work together to reduce the time it takes for a case to reach court) and at
local level (for example, when police constables work with probation officers
who are monitoring sex offenders who have been released from jail). All
44 Local police structures

the parts of the Sector (including the Police Service) do different jobs, but
police officers also have very different powers from most other professionals
involved in Criminal Justice. These powers give police officers the right to
use physical force where it is necessary, but these rights also confer excep-
tional responsibilities upon officers. The right to use “legal force” explains
the origin of the term “police force.”
Police Officers are not the only ones working within the Police Service.
Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs—with lesser powers than police
officers but whose powers still exceed those of ordinary citizens), Crime An-
alysts, Scenes of Crime Officers, and the full range of professionals required
to run large organisations (including finance experts and IT managers) all
work together. Special Constables, who are part-time police constables
(with the same powers as regular officers), form a very important part of
the “strength” of the operational Police Service. Overall, the percentage of
“Police Staff” (those who are not police officers) within the Police Service is
increasing because many functions can often be more effectively delivered
by non-police officers. Such changes are part of the “professionalisation
agenda” of central government and included in the aim of such policies is to
make the Police Service more expert, more professionally based and better
value for money. There are currently 43 territorial police forces in England
and Wales. These are shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Police Forces in England and Wales

1 Avon and Somerset Constabulary

2 Bedfordshire Police
3 Cambridgeshire Constabulary
4 Cheshire Constabulary
5 City of London Police
6 Cleveland Police
7 Cumbria Constabulary
8 Derbyshire Constabulary
9 Devon and Cornwall Police
10 Dorset Police
11 Durham Constabulary
12 Dyfed-Powys Police
13 Essex Police
14 Gloucestershire Constabulary
15 Greater Manchester Police
16 Gwent Police
17 Hampshire Constabulary
18 Hertfordshire Constabulary
19 Humberside Police
20 Kent Police
21 Lancashire Constabulary
22 Leicestershire Constabulary
 Local police structures 45

23 Lincolnshire Police
24 Merseyside Police
25 Metropolitan Police Services
26 Norfolk Constabulary
27 North Wales Police
28 North Yorkshire Police
29 Northamptonshire Police
30 Northumbria Police
31 Nottinghamshire Police
32 South Wales Police
33 South Yorkshire Police
34 Staffordshire Police
35 Suffolk Constabulary
36 Surrey Police
37 Sussex Police
38 Thames Valley Police
39 Warwickshire Police
40 West Mercia Police
41 West Midlands Police
42 West Yorkshire Police
43 Wiltshire Police

In addition to these there are the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Ministry
of Defence Police, the States of Jersey Police, the Police Service of Northern
Ireland, and the Scottish Police Service. One of the reasons why there are so
many forces lies in the local aspect of policing which was considered vitally
important during the 19th century when the introduction of police forces
were beginning to spread across the country. Most police forces followed
the geographical boundaries of the local authorities, hence the large number
of forces which over the years have been reduced by various amalgama-
tions. The majority of police forces also use the same rank structure, with
the Metropolitan police being the exception with the introduction of some
different ranks at senior level.

Ranks and roles

Police officers have the formal rank structure shown in Table 3.2. The prefix
“detective” is used to denote specialist duties but it is not a rank in itself.
In London, officers of Assistant Chief Constable rank are known as Com-
manders. The most senior rank in the Metropolitan and City of London
Police forces is that of Commissioner. These ranks are organised by respon-
sibility, and Table 3.3 illustrates this.
The Assistant Chief Officer in charge of budgeting and resources is the
chief administrative officer of the force. The post-holder is not a police of-
ficer and will have responsibilities for large departments (HR, accounts,
46 Local police structures

Table 3.2 The Rank Structure

Chief
Constable
or
Assistant
Commissioner
Deputy Chief
Constable or
Deputy Assistant
Commissioner

Assistant Chief Constable or

Commander

Chief Superintendents

Superintendents

Chief Inspectors

Inspectors

Sergeants

Constables

Table 3.3 A Typical Organisation of a Medium- to Small-Sized Police Force

Chief Constable
(Strategic Management, Leadership and Diversity)

Deputy Chief Constable Assistant Chief Constable Assistant Chief Officer

(Performance Management, Territorial Policing and Operations (Finance and Resources)
Professional standards,
legal services)

Divisions (BCUs) Specialist Divisions.

Central Division Crime Services Division

Western Division Communications Division

Northern Division Operational Support Division

 Local police structures 47

Table 3.4 Division of Labour within a Typical Territorial Division/BCU

Central Division Crime Services Division

Chief Supt (Divisional Commander) Det. Chief Supt. ( Divisional commander)

Supt. (Operations) D/Supt. (Level 2 Crime reduction)

Supt. (Partnerships) D/Supt. (S.I.O)
C/Insp. (Operations) D/Insp. (Special branch, Airport, Port)
Det. C/Insp (Crime/CID) D/Supt. (Intelligence)
Human resources Manager
Business/Finance Manager Scientific Support Manager
Human Resources Manager
Business Manager

Districts

Each led by an Inspector and Support team e.g. Fraud investigation, Child protection,
containing community beat managers, scenes of crime investigations, fingerprints and DNA
PCSOs, response/tactical officers analysis and crime intelligence and mapping.

estates, and finance). Assisting the Chief Constable are the Deputy and As-
sistant chief constables. In addition to holding a specific portfolio, the Dep-
uty Chief Constable deputises for the Chief Constable as required. Below
the senior management team are divisions, each headed by a police officer
of the rank of Chief Superintendent. The number of territorial divisions
(Basic Command Units, BCUs) depends upon the size and population of
the areas within the force. Each BCU may have 5–10 police stations, some
operating 24 hours a day. The Specialist Divisions have different functions.
For example, an Operational Support Division includes search teams, tac-
tical operations and firearm teams, road policing, dogs, and helicopters.
The Communications Division is responsible for the control rooms and call
centres. Table 3.4 illustrates the division of labour within a typical territo-
rial division and of the Crime Services Division. Of course these may vary
according to the size and makeup of the force and are sometimes referred to
by different names such as Basic Command Unit, Regional area, etc.
The larger the force, the greater the number of senior officers and territo-
rial divisions and the wider the range of specialist divisions.

The current workforce

At the time of writing the total number of police staff stands at 202,023 indi-
viduals. Of this number some 123,171 were sworn or attested police officers,
this figure being an increase from 122,405 officers reported in March 2018.
Of these officers, it is estimated that 103,347 police officers were employed
in front-line policing roles. As of March 2019, the workforce comprised the
following illustrated in Table 3.5.
48 Local police structures

Table 3.5 Police Workforce in England and Wales

by Role March 2019

Total police officers 123,171

Special constabulary 11,690
Police support volunteers 7,918
Police staff, etc. 69,305
Police community support officers 9,547

Source: Home Office (2019).

Table 3.6 Police Workforce in England and Wales

by Rank March 2019

Chief officers 212

Chief superintendents 312
Superintendents 896
Chief inspectors 1,666
Inspectors 5,555
Sergeants 18,460
Constables 96,070

Source: Home Office (2019).

In terms of numbers per rank of police officers, the numbers in each role
can be seen in Table 3.6.
As can clearly be seen the largest numbers of police officers are designated
at the Constable rank. Despite these numbers, however, the total number of
police officers has decreased since 31st March 2009 where it stood at a total
of 143,769.
For the police organisation, there are wide ranging thoughts about how
they should perform their duties within communities. Very often, the con-
cepts of the principles of policing are referred to.

The principles of policing

Since the introduction of Modern Policing normally associated with the
Metropolitan Police Act 1829, several important philosophical points or prin-
ciples have come to underpin and help define the function and purpose of
Policing. The nine “Peelian Principles” are much quoted in many discussions
surrounding the work of modern-day police forces, and are worth listing here:

1 The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and
disorder.
2 The ability of the Police to perform their duties is dependent upon pub-
lic approval of police actions.
 Local police structures 49

3 Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary

observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of
the public.
4 The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes
proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.
5 Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion
but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.
6 Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of
the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice,
and warning is found to be insufficient.
7 Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that
gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and
the public are the police; the police being only members of the public
who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent
on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8 Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions
and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.
9 The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the
visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.
(Source: The Police Federation 2019: 4)

Peels principles
Williams (2003) suggests that Peels Principles have had a profound effect
upon modern day policing in the USA. Utilising a comparative historical
overview of both policing models, he concludes that, despite a lack of ac-
ceptance of Peels original nine principles by the police in America, many
police agencies now utilise the Peelian ideas in their community policing
statements. In a similar vein, Robertson (2012) identifies that what makes
Canada’s police service distinct from other parts of public service is their
adherence to the basic Peelian principles, which brings them closer to the
community.
Generally the principles emphasise crime prevention over law enforce-
ment and recognise that social controls are more effective than external force
in keeping the peace. The principles also recognise the reliance of the police
on public co-operation, which requires public confidence in their activities.
The principles themselves find expression in the idea of Community Polic-
ing, whereby police work with and through community, in the framework
of impartiality and without direct political interference. It is these ideas,
according to Reiner (2000) that allowed the introduction of a public police
service to be introduced in the face of stiff opposition. Despite the obvious
utility and reference to Peels Principles, the exact origin of these principles
remains contested. In attempting to research their history, a study by Lentz
and Chaires (2007) suggests that Peels Principles are largely the invention
of 20th-century textbook authors. However, as the authors confirm, even
50 Local police structures

if Peels Principles were invented, it does not necessarily make them fiction.
Much of history is constructed and later reconstructed as new information
is discovered. For example, the nine principles of policing are quoted from
Melville Lee (1901) and replicated in texts such as Carter and Radelet (1999).
However other texts such as those written by Peak (1993, 2003), Mayhall
(1985), and Palmiotto (1997) cite 12 principles. The fact that there appears
to be no definitive number, and that different police scholars quote differ-
ent numbers of principles throws some disquiet upon their origin. Lentz
and Chaires (2007), upon examining those books commonly referenced as
sources of the principles, found that only Reith (1952: 154) in fact identifies
nine principles of police but they are presented as a summary of the way in
which the police had evolved up to that point. When discussing their origin
in policing history, Reith suggested his principles were “merely a collected
and numbered tabulation compiled from Chapter references and definitions
found in public records, etc.” However, Reith does not provide any specific
citations or Chapter references for his list.
In addition to the discussion above, Brogden and Nijhar (2005) when dis-
cussing Community Policing, suggest that the Principles have contributed
to a nostalgic and unreal view of the past. This, however, assists in the ap-
plication of the Community Policing approach, which is then presented as
a return to a “golden age” (Reiner 1992) of Policing, when police and public
worked together in harmony. These “Peelian Principles” continue to be uti-
lised by writers and others in the police narrative (Emsley 2014). However, as
Reiner et al. (2019) point out the nine principles are arguably an invention of
20th-century historians, such as Reith (1956), who, it is suggested, expanded
the brief instructions for the first Metropolitan Police recruits (Lentz and
Chaires 2007). However, these ideals have remained influential, and have
been used to underpin such reports as Lord Scarman’s Report on the
Brixton Riots (Scarman 1981), which focussed on the aims of the police as
the prevention of crime, protection of life and property, and preservation of
public peace. Further, these ideas are echoed in the “community policing”
concepts, which have been exported across the world (Kleinig 1996).

Police officers and attestation

Police Officers hold a unique office of constable (discussed in more depth
elsewhere in this book). They are “sworn officers” of the law and take an
oath to the monarch to uphold the law fairly and without fear or favour.
This is undertaken on appointment, and the oath is made to the monarch to
ensure the separation of power and political independence of the Office of
Constable. The oath or attestation is currently as follows:

I……………of……………do solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm

that I will well and truly serve the Queen in the office of constable, with
 Local police structures 51

fairness, integrity, diligence and impartiality, upholding fundamental

human rights and according equal respect to all people; and that I will,
to the best of my power, cause the peace to be kept and preserved and
prevent all offences against people and property; and that while I con-
tinue to hold the said office I will, to the best of my skill and knowledge,
discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to law.
(Home Office 1996: 3)

Police Officers terms and conditions are contained in Police Regulations

(Home Office 1996), and there are restrictions such as not engaging in any
activity which is likely to interfere with the impartial discharge of duty;
not wilfully refusing or neglecting their duty, and also abstaining from an
­“active role” in any party politics.
Section 91 of the Police Act makes it illegal to undertake any form of in-
dustrial action. Police officers are not employees in the normal sense of the
word but “Officers of the Crown.”
Regular police officers are not the only ones who have to swear an oath to
the Queen. This applies also to the volunteers known as “Special Constables.”

The special constabulary

Brief historical context

Special Constables were first recognised by statute in 1662, but the idea
can be traced to the “posse comitatus” of Medieval times (Palmer 1990),
which involved the use of all citizens to help capture suspected criminals.
Specials were recruited mainly from the propertied classes, and the initi-
ative for mobilisation of specials was usually a local emergency. However,
on some occasions the Home Office directed the police to enlist special
constables in an organised manner. For example, in April 1810, when a
radical MP was committed to the Tower of London, in order to control
the crowd, Magistrates enrolled seven constables and some 140 Special
Constables (Palmer 1990: 148).
Throughout the early 19th century, government in the UK would rely
on the support generated by the process of calling upon special consta-
bles, which is one reason, perhaps, why in England modern police forces
were slow to emerge. However, the 1831 Special Constables Act provided
for the appointment of Special Constables in times of “tumult, riot or
felony” (Gill and Mawby 1990: 18). Therefore, for a period of time the use
of Special Constables as a reserve force to support the regular force was
dependent on emergencies and the situation faced. This ad hoc approach
was maintained until just after the Second World War, when the special
constabulary began to become more involved in day-to-day policing activ-
ities (Bullock 2014).
52 Local police structures

The Police Act 1964 (Home Office 1964) is generally considered to be the
Act that established the modern Special Constabulary. Each force has its own
Special Constabulary comprised of volunteers, who commit at least four
hours per week to working with and supporting regular police officers. They
wear similar uniforms and have the same powers as regular officers. “Spe-
cials,” as they are now commonly called, are also subject to the same rules
of conduct and disciplinary procedures as sworn officers. In the past, “Spe-
cials” have been subject to some abuse, being labelled as ­“hobby-bobbies,”
for example (Berry et al. 1998); problems surrounding integration and com-
munication between “Specials” and the regular police have also occurred.
However, they are representative of their community and have played a vital
part in the Neighbourhood Policing approach. They also comprise an im-
portant component of that form of plural policing. However, the idea of
special police is much older than the Police Act of 1964, and this historical
context is worthy of examination in order to understand the reasons behind
the importance of the volunteer police officer’s role.

The special constabulary today

Generally speaking, a “Special’s” main role is to conduct local, intelligence-
based patrols and to take part in crime prevention initiatives, often targeted
at specific problem areas. In many forces, “Specials” are also involved in
policing major incidents, and in providing operational support to regular
officers. Depending upon their individual force, “Specials” generally engage
in the following activities:

• Conducting foot patrols;

• Assisting at the scene of accidents, fights, or fires;
• Enforcing road safety initiatives;
• Conducting house-to-house enquiries;
• Providing security at major events;
• Presenting evidence in court;
• Tackling anti-social behaviour;
• Tackling alcohol-related incidents;
• Spending time at local schools educating young people about crime re-
duction and community safety.

The number of “Specials” has varied over time, with Bullock (2014) suggest-
ing it peaked at over 67,000 in the 1950s. However, Gill and Mawby (1990)
suggest that this had fallen to about 15,000 by 1980. Suggested reasons for
this reduction in numbers could include the removal of those less active
members. During the last decade, the number of “Specials” gradually de-
clined until, by the mid-2000s, they stood at around 11,000. The current
number of “Specials” in England and Wales is 10,640 (Home Office 2019).
 Local police structures 53

Police Community Support Officers

Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are believed to have played a
major part in increasing engagement and interaction with local communi-
ties. It is for this reason that they should be discussed at some length. PCSOs
were first introduced in 2002, but initially both the public and the police
service appeared sceptical. Although their primary role was to contribute to
public reassurance through visibility and accessibility as part of the neigh-
bourhood policing team approach and the reassurance programme, there
was confusion at first as to what this entailed. A national evaluation of the
role in 2004 identified a range of non-standard tasks being undertaken by
PCSOs, which included distributing crime prevention advice, collecting ev-
idence for Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), minor house-to-house
enquiries and witness support (Cooper et al. 2006). Concerns arose that the
PCSO role, with limited powers compared to a police officer, would become
simply a cheap way to fulfil some officer functions (Caless 2007). PCSOs are
now recognised as a useful addition to the policing family (O’Neill 2015).
Given the depth of local knowledge which PCSOs can acquire from their
beat areas, they can help to address problems in a neighbourhood, gather
intelligence for police colleagues and ultimately play a key role in improving
police legitimacy with the public (Foster and Jones 2010). PCSOs are seen as
skilled at negotiation and discussion (O’Neill 2014) and are more ethnically
diverse than police officers or staff; 9.1% black and minority ethnic staff
work as PCSOs compared with 5.5% of officers and 6.9% of other police
staff, respectively (Cooper et al. 2006). Evidence shows that neighbourhood
policing, particularly through the use of PCSOs, has had a significant im-
pact on the way the police engage with diverse communities (O’Neill 2015).
The national evaluation of PCSOs undertaken by the Home Office in 2006
demonstrated that they were particularly valued for their work in tackling
local problems involving young people and engaging with and reassuring
the public (Cooper et al. 2006). However, PCSOs are police staff and are not
warranted officers, so they can more easily be made redundant. Indeed, in
the last few years their numbers have fallen (Home Office 2015), although
most police forces are attempting to maintain the same proportion of PCSOs
in their operational workforce. Recent research suggests that a decrease in
the number of PCSOs results in the impairment of neighbourhood policing,
while increasing their number comparably enhances it (Greig-Midlane 2014).
Having said this, there is also evidence to suggest that their role is changing.
The 2014 HMIC report found PCSOs were taking on more roles and re-
sponsibilities, some of which removed them from community engagement,
such as scene guarding, road closures, detaining suspects or young people,
giving fixed penalty notices (FPN), and responding to low-level emergencies
(HMIC 2014). Some forces have found new sources of funding for PCSOs,
such as through local authorities. Telford and Wrekin, for example, were
54 Local police structures

subsidising the cost of PCSOs whilst allowing the local council to have some
influence over daily tasking (The Police Foundation 2014). Some forces have
suggested that it is helpful to divide activities into those that could be done
by unsworn staff and those which specifically require a police response. So,
for example, offering advice to burglary victims could be given by a range
of people (aided by the police) whereas dealing with a major public disorder
incident can only be done by a warranted officer (The Police Foundation
2014). There are a range of activities that can be undertaken by people other
than sworn police officers. In order to fully understand and critically evalu-
ate their role thus far, however, it is useful to consider the background to the
introduction of Community Support Officers.

Historical context
The thematic report “Open All Hours” compiled by Her Majesty’s In-
spectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) explored a disparity between success
in crime reduction and the apparent lack of an equivalent impact on the
public’s confidence in the police and perceptions of crime, and identified
a “reassurance gap” (HMIC 2001). When asked what would improve their
feelings of safety, satisfaction, and confidence in the police, surveys consist-
ently highlighted the public’s desire for greater levels of foot patrol. How-
ever, the role of the police officer has changed in recent years, resulting in
less time being spent on the beat. An examination of how officers’ time was
spent (PA Consulting Group 2001) confirmed that most time outside the
station was spent responding to incidents and making enquiries, and that
most officer patrol was carried out in cars. In addition, many activities keep
police officers off the beat; making an arrest, for example, could keep an
officer in the station for three and a half hours. There appeared to be a
gap between the public desire for visible patrol and the ability of the police
service to provide that function. Consequently, the issue of how to reassure
the public was high on the agenda at this time. PCSOs were introduced as
a way of increasing the visible presence of the police organisation through
patrol on foot. In relation to improving perceived police effectiveness and
increasing feelings and perceptions of safety, the mechanisms of increasing
police visibility and familiarity and the increased levels of foot patrol were
found to be most effective (Dalgleish and Myhill 2004).
The Government at this time had made a commitment to deliver neigh-
bourhood policing to all communities. The aim was to “make communities
feel safe and secure by reducing crime and anti-social behaviour in their
area” (Home Office 2005), through the work of visible and accessible neigh-
bourhood policing teams that were responsive to local priorities. The suc-
cessful implementation of neighbourhood policing involved engaging the
public and using local intelligence to target deployment of the teams. PC-
SOs were to have a key part to play in the local mixed teams that included
officers, special constables, wardens, and others which constituted a new
 Local police structures 55

form of plural policing. The introduction of PCSOs in the Police Reform

Act 2002 represented a fundamental change in policing. The Act extended
the role of police staff (personnel employed by a police organisation who
do not have the sworn status of a constable) to assist sworn police officers
and carry out many front-line roles, giving authority to the chief officer of a
police force to designate any person who is employed by the police authority
as a Community Support Officer and confer on that person any of a list of
powers given in the Act. This list has subsequently been expanded through
the later legislation. CSOs were particularly intended to provide a visible,
uniformed patrolling presence and tackle anti-social behaviour. In order to
assist with the introduction of CSOs, Home Office funds were made availa-
ble from 2002 onwards and implementation of the CSO initiative was rapid.
The total number of PCSOs currently employed in England and Wales
can be seen in the previous table.
The current situation regarding the number of PCSOs is that there has
been a reduction in the numbers from 10,139 in 2018 to 9,547 in 2019, a per-
centage reduction of nearly 6%. This is a continuation of the trend in PCSO
numbers since 2010 (Home Office 2019). However, PCSOs have a relatively
high number of workers who classify themselves as BME workers (10%)
which is higher than it is for police officers and police staff. In addition
PCSOs have quite a high proportion of female staff (46%) which again is
much higher than the police officers (30%) (Home Office 2019).

Legislative powers
The statutory term for PCSO is Community Support Officer, but to em-
phasise that they are under the control and direction of the police service
and to distinguish them from other agencies’ staff involved in community
safety, they were soon invariably called Police Community Support Officers
(PCSOs) by police forces. As unsworn officers, PCSOs needed to have their
powers enshrined by the Police Reform Act 2002 to enable them to carry
out their role effectively. These are highlighted in the following section, and
are considered under the section of the Act entitled Exercise of police powers
etc. by civilians.
As proposed in Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform, the Act
provides for specified police support staff and civilians to be given particu-
lar powers in various defined circumstances in order to perform certain de-
fined functions. The purpose of this was three-fold:

• First, it was intended to free up police officer time for their core func-
tions by making more effective use of support staff, including detention
officers, escort officers, and investigating officers acting as Scenes of
Crime Officers (SOCOs).
• Second, as part of the drive to tackle crime more effectively, it was
the Government’s intention to enable forces to employ specialist
56 Local police structures

investigating officers to provide expertise in combating specialist crime,

in such areas as finance and Information Technology. The Act enabled
such investigators to be granted the powers necessary to enable them to
do their job effectively.
• Third, the Act was designed to provide additional capacity to com-
bat low-level disorder, and thereby help reduce the public’s fear of
crime. The Act enabled chief officers to appoint suitable support staff
(“Community Support Officers”) to roles providing a visible presence in
the community, with powers sufficient to deal with minor issues. Such
staff would be under the formal direction and control of the chief of-
ficer. The Government also wanted to harness the commitment of those
already involved in crime reduction activities, such as traffic wardens,
neighbourhood and street wardens, and security staff, as part of an
extended police family. The Act made provision for community safety
accreditation schemes and a railway safety accreditation scheme and,
in certain circumstances, the granting of limited powers to accredited
members of those schemes. In addition there were several sections of the
Act that laid down specific powers attributed to the role of the PCSO.
The most important of these powers are illustrated in Table 3.7.

Clearly the powers listed above indicate the street-level work envisaged for
the Community Support Officer, thus releasing sworn officers for other du-
ties. Community Support Officers were to interact with a number of other
agencies in performing those wider “policing” duties. Despite claims for
their success, they were not universally accepted as being a valuable addi-
tion to the policing family by all.

Critical reaction to PCSOs

Since their inception, PCSOs have been the target of unremitting criticism,
including the accusation that they have replaced “real” police officers and
the suggestion that they are not suitably well-trained to patrol neighbour-
hoods and do not have sufficient powers to carry out their role properly
(Caless 2007). The Police Federation appears to have determined the way in
which criticism of the introduction of PCSOs developed. Clearly there was
a fear that PCSOs were introduced to undermine the role of the constable.
This fear was apparent in the words of the then National Chair of the Police
Federation, who informed the then Home Secretary in 2006 that PCSOs
were an example of cheaper policing not better policing, despite government
assurances that they would be supporting police officers and not replacing
them (Berry 2006). Perhaps these comments are understandable; the Feder-
ation was clearly arguing in defence of its members, and there did appear
to be widespread unease that PCSOs represented a shift towards policing
“on the cheap,” with the increase in PCSO numbers potentially threatening
Table 3.7 I mportant Powers Delegated to PCSOs

Section of the Police Specif ic powers and duties

Reform Act 2002

Section 192 Lists powers and duties dealing with misconduct in public places, including the issue of FPN for
anti-social behaviour, litter, etc., and gives powers to request name and address from person(s)
committing an offence that causes injury, alarm, distress, or damage to another.
Section 195 Enables suitably designated persons to exercise powers to issue FPNs for a range of offences
including being drunk in a public highway, throwing fireworks, wasting police time, etc. amongst
many other anti-social behaviour and disorder offences.
Section 196 Sets out the power to require the name and address of a person believed to have committed an
offence as designated. If the person fails to provide the name and address, or it is believed to be
false, etc. the PCSO can require that person to remain with him for up to 30 minutes pending the
arrival of a constable. Alternatively, that person can freely accompany the PCSO to a police station
rather than wait. Section 198 of the Act specifies the circumstances in which a PCSO may use
reasonable force in the exercise of his powers to detain.
Sections 199 and These sections outline powers for the confiscation of alcohol and the prevention of the consumption
200 of alcohol in designated places.
Sections 204, 205, These sections relate to powers involving the use of vehicles, including the removal of abandoned
and 206 vehicles, the power to stop and direct traffic and to carry out authorised road checks.
Section 207 This section enables the extension of strictly limited powers of a constable under the Terrorism
Act 2000. The purpose of extending such powers to designated Community Support Officers is
to enable them to provide valuable support to constables in times of terrorist threat, and to give
chief officers the discretion to deploy constables for duties that require their full expertise and
powers in such times. If specified in a Community Support Officer’s designation, paragraph 14 of
this section confers on him the powers of a constable under section 36 of the Terrorism Act 2000
to enforce a cordoned area, where the cordoned area has been established under the Terrorism
Act.
Local police structures

Source: The author.

57
58 Local police structures

the recruitment of more police officers. However, the wider changes affect-
ing the police and policing in this country may have very little directly to
do with the role of the PCSO. It may be that other changes, such as the
rise of private policing in which many of the functions will increase of the
traditional police, are being contracted out to private companies, security
firms, or to people who perform patrol functions. The point the Federation
appears to have missed is that policing was undergoing a profound change
in England and Wales, and PCSOs were merely one amongst many of those
changes. Jones and Van Sluis (2009) highlights the fact that the Act of Par-
liament that launched PCSOs, The Police Reform Act 2002, also provided
for the introduction of a national neighbourhood and street warden pro-
gramme, which funded the growth of warden schemes throughout England
and Wales. In general warden schemes conducted local patrols, delivered
public reassurance, and undertook crime prevention activities. PCSOs also
provide assistance at the scenes of incidents; tackle anti-social behaviour;
and engage in wider community activities, such as school visits. In terms of
legal powers and enforcement, they operate with more limited legal capaci-
ties than regular officers, but they do have the power to detain members of
the public in certain circumstances and also to issue FPNs.
When discussing the broad topic of civilianisation within the police in
England and Wales, Neyroud (2010) suggests that the idea of PCSOs came
from the Dutch “Stadswacht” scheme of the early 1990s and was introduced
to support the national reassurance policing programme. Civilianisation is
the process by which fully attested, sworn police officers are replaced with
civilian staff who have few or limited police powers, and who provide ei-
ther administrative or specialist support to police. English and Welsh police
forces were initially invited to bid for additional funds for the piloting of PC-
SOs. Following the initial evaluation of the pilot (see Cooper et al. 2006) the
government committed itself to providing 24,000 PCSOs across the country.
This target was subsequently reduced, and by the spring of 2007, some 16,000
PCSOs were recruited and in place. The recruitment of PCSOs was rejected
by the Police Federation, who viewed them as “plastic” police. However,
the national evaluation (Cooper et al. 2006) found generally strong support
from communities, as had the earlier experiences from Holland. The public,
it appeared, liked the fact that PCSOs were not normally removed from the
community, as were police officers. Despite this, critics pointed to the fact
that there was some confusion amongst the public concerning the powers
and role of PCSOs, and the failure to create an effective career structure for
them has been problematic.
Johnston (1992) highlights the role the introduction of PCSOs has had
upon the diversity of the police service as a whole, believing that it will also
have an impact upon the diversity of sworn officers as many of them tend
to be recruited as PCSOs. Indeed, in his work, some 47% of PCSOs viewed
their job as a stepping stone to the regular police, based upon a survey of
 Local police structures 59

2025 PCSO recruits’ applications. This survey also considered the integra-
tion of PCSOs within wider policing team activities and concluded that this
was slightly problematic; however, in areas where there was good supervi-
sion and planning, it appeared to have occurred much more smoothly.

Evaluation of the role

In response to the apparent confusion around patterns of different powers,
the government introduced a framework of standard powers by way of Stat-
uary Instrument (SI 2007/3202) which came into force in December 2007.
These powers relate largely to the use of FPN for anti-social behaviour.
However, there still remains a considerable list of additional (discretionary)
powers from which the chief constables can select.
The main success of PCSOs has been the support they have provided for
facilitating the institutionalisation of neighbourhood policing teams across
the country, in addition to the role they have played in helping to diversify
the police.
Findings from the National Evaluation of the Introduction of PCSOs can
be summarised as follows:

• PCSOs were seen as being more accessible than police officers. Mem-
bers of the public were more likely to report things to PCSOs which
they would not bother a police officer with. The public was more likely
to pass information to PCSOs.
• The public valued the role of PCSOs and there was strong evidence from
case studies such as Manchester, Northumbria, and Sussex to suggest
that, where PCSOs were known in their communities, there was a per-
ception that they had made a real impact in their areas, especially in
dealing with youth disorders.
• The diversity of PCSOs, particularly in terms of ethnicity and age, had
been a marked feature of the implementation.
• The survey found that there was no evidence that PCSOs were having
a measurable impact on the level of recorded crime or incidents of
anti-social behaviour in areas where they were deployed.
• However, the evaluation noted that this was early research into the im-
pact of PCSOs, and stated as a result that it may be a little premature in
some of its findings.

PCSOs in the future

Clearly, PCSOs represented an attempt to maintain patrol function within
the remit and control of the public police. Since the inception of their role,
PCSOs have been the target of criticism (Caless 2007). This has ranged from
being viewed as a cheap replacement for “real” police officers, to not being
60 Local police structures

trained sufficiently for their role and possessing insufficient powers to com-
pel compliance. They were awarded the title “Numties” or “Blockheads” by
the Police Federation during 2004, which is ironically reminiscent of the hos-
tility displayed towards the new police as “blue bottles,” “peelers,” or “blue
locusts” following their introduction in the mid-19th century (Storch 1986).
“Mission creep” has been highlighted as a perceived threat to the constable’s
role, but there are a large number of roles and other tasks now being done
by unsworn officers including custody work, Cime Scene Investigation (CSI),
fingerprinting, and media relations, all of which have previously been under-
taken by police officers. A key challenge for the future, therefore, is the extent
to which PCSOs may become drawn into carrying out new tasks to fill service
gaps, and/or become enforcement officers that engage with local communities
in problem-solving and crime prevention. There are signs that the “mission
creep” and incremental growth in powers are becoming more evident, with
the possibility of adverse implications for the reassurance role.
The College of Policing conducted an analysis of demand on policing
in 2015 (College of Policing 2015). This analysis confirms that much of
the work of the police revolves around public protection issues, and it is
predicted that this will increase. Consequently, the College of Policing at-
tempted to upskill Community Support Officers for an increased role in
crime prevention, working in partnership with other policing providers.
What is important is that this approach appears to be a “step-up” in terms
of how Community Support Officers are regarded by the police organisa-
tion as a whole. Indeed, as the police organisation continues to change,
and with PCSOs now fully embedded and accepted, they may be expected
to take more of a leading role in providing service to the public. In order
to do so however, PCSOs will need to be flexible and adaptive to their new
role (College of Policing 2019).

Police support volunteers

Volunteers in context
Baroness Neuberger produced a report in 2009 that suggested that there
simply would not be a reliable criminal justice system in the UK without the
dedication of volunteers and that more emphasis should be put on their role
(Baroness Neuberger 2009). This report recognised that volunteers, includ-
ing Special Constables already discussed, play a large and important role in
the criminal justice system. The report went on to suggest that there is enor-
mous potential for people to assist in all aspects of the CJS, and particularly
working for the police. Police Support Volunteers are part of the police or-
ganisation and are highly valued not only for the direct support they pro-
vide but also for links with the community. The Institute for Public Safety,
Crime and Justice at the University of Northampton are heavily engaged
 Local police structures 61

in examining the current role of police specials and other volunteers in

the police and also to assist in future workforce planning (Britton et al.
2016).
In the UK, volunteers are a key feature of social capital, with volunteers
increasingly becoming involved in running libraries (Casselden et al. 2015)
and other local provisions of service, including sport (Morgan 2013). Ac-
cording to Stott (2011) and Smith (2011), volunteers are typically degree
educated, middle aged, and of high social class. In Australia, for example,
in 2006, the main reason why people volunteered, according to Volunteer
Australia (2015), was to help others and the community (57%), personal
satisfaction (44%), to do something worthwhile (36%), social contact (22%),
and to use their skills and experience (16%). As Crawford (2014) rightly
points out policing can no longer be seen as something that just the police
do. Therefore, the mixed economy of policing is important, and requires
an acceptance that citizen involvement in policing is extremely important.
Early versions of community involvement were seen in Neighbourhood
Watch Schemes. These were never really formal or had strong links with
the police. However, during the 1990s opportunities for volunteers opened
up whereby volunteers took up more formal volunteering roles such as
staffing police station front desks (Millie 2012). It was at this time that
the name PSV first came to prominence to describe non-warranted, non-
uniformed work by volunteers for the police. A major difference PSVs and
Special Constables is that PSVs are not warranted, meaning they are not
attested as constables or have the powers of a constable. Nor do PSVs gen-
erally wear a uniform.
The opportunities for PSVs include many diverse roles such as general
administration and office support, working on reception desks, contacting
victims of crime to reassure and check on them, helping to run police pro-
motional events, and even engaging in training programmes as “role” actors
(Bullock 2014).

Citizens in Policing
Citizens in Policing is the term used to describe the thousands of people
across the UK who give up their time to support the police (CIP 2020). The
lead for the programme is based within the National Police Chiefs Council,
who coordinates efforts to increase volunteers in policing. Their strategic
aim is to make sure volunteers:

• Give the best they can and get the best experience back;
• Their skills need to be effectively utilised;
• Their time maximised;
• Their contributions to society recognised and their commitment
encouraged.
62 Local police structures

They also examine the possibility of role “rewards” in terms of development,

training, and progression, so volunteering is appealing, and volunteers are
integrated and retained within the policing family.

Criticism of PSVs
Despite the obvious advantages of utilising Police Service Volunteers, there
are some concerns regarding their use. Whilst seen as a cost- effective use
of resources, they are not without some costs, such as training, equipment,
expenses, insurance, and management costs. Additionally, there have
been some concerns expressed about the possibility of removing full-time
paid employment positions and replacing them with volunteers (Unison
2014). The lack of a centralised strategy for recruitment of PSVs means
an ad hoc type of approach to their accountability and management by
different forces. Neuberger (2009) highlights the fact that the integration
of volunteers depends largely on the enthusiasm of key individuals within
agencies, and, in the main, arrangements for recruitment, training, and
supervision are highly localised. In terms of management of PSVs, this ap-
pears different from regular and special constables, and much less formal,
with an apparent emphasis on making PSVs feel welcome, valued, and
thanked for their time (Bullock 2014). Despite these and other misgivings
there appears to be a government drive to increase the number of police
volunteers to assist the regular police. In a document considering Policing
in 2030, Britton and Knight (2016) put forward points for an agenda to not
only sustain the future of Police Volunteers, at a local and national level,
but suggest there needs to be a leadership “shake up” to make it happen.
Clearly, policing is undergoing many changes in its organisational struc-
ture, and also in its use of staff, both warranted and non-warranted vol-
unteers. However, it is also reforming itself in other ways, such as utilising
different methods of recruiting the right person for particular roles.

Newer types of recruitment

Changes in police education and recruitment

The College of Policing, in a recent report on future demand for services from
the police (College of Policing 2015) illustrates very clearly the way in which
calls for police action are changing, and will continue to change, in the near
future. Traditional acquisitive crime is falling, whilst information-based
crimes, such as internet fraud and crimes focussing upon the vulnerable, are
on the increase. New offences require different expertise and skill sets and
necessitate greater levels of cross-organisational working and leadership.
Reduction in numbers of police staff is linked to several factors, including the
 Local police structures 63

increase in specialist departments, the decline of general patrol, and a move

to professionalise police officers through a degree programme. The College
of Policing (2015) highlights the fact that the number of police officers in
England and Wales has been falling over the last five years. In March 2014,
there were just fewer than 128,000 full-time equivalent officers, the result of
an 11% reduction (the loss of around 16,000 officers) since 2010. In 2014 there
was one police officer for every 445 members of the public, an increase of 50
people per officer since 2010. As police officers and staff numbers decline,
there is concern about whether forces are able to maintain levels of service
delivery. This report indicates that the proportion of adults who reported
seeing a police officer on foot patrol in their local area at least once a week
fell from 38% in 2011/2012 to 34% in 2012/2013. Clearly, the police service of
the future will be leaner, and have more specialist officers and departments
with possibly little visible general patrol functions. Consequently, we may
need a new type of police officer, one with more pronounced leadership and
professional abilities than hitherto required.

Degree entry
For an occupation to be considered professional, there are four require-
ments that need to be met. These are:

• A specialist knowledge base;

• A distinct ethical dimension;
• Continuous professional development;
• Standards of education and accreditation.

Whilst the police service in England and Wales, under the guidance of the
College of Policing, is in the process of developing the first three aspects of
professionalism listed, the fourth element of education and accreditation
needs further improvement. Consequently, at the annual conference of Ex-
cellence in Policing (2015), the problems surrounding inconsistencies in po-
lice training and education were discussed. Producing better, professional
leaders is considered to be one way in which the police service may adjust
to and perform well in the new pluralised world of policing. Dame Shirley
Pearce (2015) suggests that there are three types of variable that are cur-
rently undermining the police service and need to be addressed. These are:

• The way in which police officers are selected, as forces have individu-
alised selection processes and entry requirements. This ranges from no
specific qualifications being required to the expected completion of a
foundation degree. This means there are large differences in knowledge
and experience amongst constables.
64 Local police structures

• A lack of consistent approach to further training or accreditation of

officers once they are selected. Skills learned in one force are not neces-
sarily recognised by another force, with consequent retraining needed
for police officers.
• That new and specialist skills to deal with changing patterns of crime
need to be developed, with greater clarity on the skills needed for new
and specialist staff in important positions. National training standards
that are consistent are important for the future of the police.

Speaking at the same conference, Peach (2015) outlined a new framework

which plans to work with universities and the higher education sector to
allow officers to undertake self-funded undergraduate degree programmes
or police force-funded merger programmes. The aim is to end the discrep-
ancies that exist as result of some forces recruiting graduates and working
with universities on training, while others struggle to recruit officers with
three diplomas or other equivalents to “A” levels, and find the development
of further training for these officers a challenge. Pointing to the fact that
approximately 42% of the population is educated to degree level, and with
European police forces moving towards a graduate workforce, Peach sug-
gested it was time for degree-level training to take a more prominent place
in policing in England and Wales. In response to these recommendations,
the College of Policing has suggested two graduate-level routes into polic-
ing; the attainment of a full degree combined with the later development of
skills by working in conjunction with both the force and the university, or
a conversion programme for people who have completed another degree,
similar to a Postgraduate Certificate. For Superintendents, there are a num-
ber of questions being considered, including whether any Master’s degree
is suitable for policing or whether it should be in a relevant subject from
an agreed list, or an entirely bespoke programme. In addition to increased
educational qualifications, the police in England and Wales would retain its
enhanced entry provisions, such as the recently introduced Fast Track and
Direct Entry programmes, in its drive to become more professional.

Fast Track and Direct Entry programmes

The Fast Track and Direct Entry programmes have been designed to open
up entry to the service to talented individuals from diverse backgrounds,
which will bring new perspectives to support the continuous development
of policing. As well as attracting, identifying, and developing the most tal-
ented constables, it looks to recruit special constables and police staff from
within the police service. The fast track entry scheme offers a development
programme and promotion mechanism, to enable the most talented to ad-
vance more rapidly to the rank of Inspector (within two years for serving
 Local police structures 65

constables and three years for police staff, special constables, and external
graduates). This will enable the service to develop a cadre of officers with
the skills, experience, and capacity to reach the senior ranks of the service—
at least that of Superintendent—to impact on and positively influence the
management and culture of policing. The Direct Entry at Superintendent
programme supports the National Policing Vision in helping to bring exist-
ing exceptional leaders into the police service to have an immediate impact
on culture, efficiency, and effectiveness. This will be achieved by opening
up entry to the service to proven leaders who will join policing directly at
the rank of Superintendent, rather than having to work their way up from
the rank of constable. Programme members will be trained over 18 months
and given coaching and mentoring, to equip them with the skills required to
perform as a Superintendent who inspires confidence in officers, staff, and
the public. This will create a cohort that has the potential to further develop
and acquire the skills and experience to progress to the chief officer ranks.

Direct entry schemes

In March 2012, Sir Tom Winsor published an Independent Review of Po-
lice Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions. This wide-ranging ap-
praisal of the police service made a number of recommendations. One of
the most controversial was that a direct entry pathway into policing, at the
superintendent rank, which was established in 2014.
The Direct Entry Inspector and Superintendent training and develop-
ment programmes are a fundamental and crucial change designed to bring
new perspectives, skills, and experience into the police service to deliver a
service which is professional, efficient, and capable of dealing with the grow-
ing pressures of today and beyond. The Direct Entry programme supports
the National Policing Vision 2025 (APCC 2015) in helping to bring existing
exceptional leaders into the police service to make an immediate impact
on culture, efficiency, and effectiveness. This will be achieved by opening
up entry to the service to proven leaders who will join policing directly at
the rank of Superintendent and Inspector rather than having to work their
way up from the rank of constable. Programme members are trained over
18–24 months depending on the programme choice and given coaching and
mentoring, which will equip them with the skills required whilst inspiring
confidence in officers, staff, and the public. In addition the programme will,
it is believed, equip successful individuals with the skills, knowledge, and
experience to respond to policing challenges with confidence. This will be
achieved through a combination of training, coupled with in-force opera-
tional rotations and professional development. On successful completion of
the Direct Entry Superintendent programme, Superintendents are awarded
a post-graduate qualification.
66 Local police structures

Detective constable recruitment

Traditionally, having experience of uniform policing was the only way to
become a detective constable. In 2017 this was changed. Detective consta-
bles and police constables have the same rank. However, they have differ-
ent operational roles, but there are also similarities too, albeit detectives
don’t wear a uniform. Detective constables ultimately deal with serious and
complex investigations. Trainee detective constables start a two-year pro-
bationary period with 20 weeks of training—and undergo basic training
such as Officer Safety Training, managing conflict, and understanding key
powers and procedures, all of which are critical for all officers regardless
of specialism. Applicants are required to complete and pass the National
Investigators Exam, advanced Detective Training Course, and continue to
work towards becoming a substantive detective constable. All of this is to
be achieved within two years, after which the applicant is successfully con-
firmed in the rank of detective constable.
Having discussed at length the structure, roles, and different aspects of
the police organisation, the question that needs consideration is this: Is the
current system, basically founded in 1829, and through subsequent Acts
of Parliament, fit for our complex and diverse society, or does it need up-
grading to face and deal with the challenges that lie ahead? In other words,
should the police system in England and Wales be reformed?

The case for reform?

Much of the crime and disorder the police deal with has a significant local
character. It requires the police response to be concentrated in one place—
usually where a crime scene, victim, offender, witnesses, and evidence can
all be found. However, there is a substantial and increasing amount of crime
that transcends local, regional, and national borders. Online fraud, online
child sexual abuse, other forms of cybercrime, human trafficking, regional
and national drug dealing—often along “county lines”—are all examples of
crimes which, inconveniently for policing, are not neatly arranged in local
areas. The reality is that police force boundaries have a diminishing signifi-
cance in the face of these crimes.

The 43-force model

For many years, there has been controversy about the 43-force structure
of policing in England and Wales. In our highly connected world, the need
has never been greater for the police service to function, with the NCA,
as a single law enforcement system. But the police service does not do this
well. This is usually because it is inhibited by the competing pressures of
the needs for operational efficiency on the one hand and respect for local
governance and accountability arrangements on the other. They may also
 Local police structures 67

be held back by a lack of a coherent mechanism for regional and national

decision-making. In too many respects, the lines on the map act as barriers
to the exchange of intelligence, to co-operation, and to true efficiency and
effectiveness. Each of the 43 police forces in England and Wales has a locally
elected PCC. PCCs are likely to be judged by the public primarily on their
success in tackling “local” crime and disorder. In asserting the operational
independence of the police, Peel’s fifth principle states that, ultimately, the
police should “seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public
opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to
law, in complete independence of policy.” In the context of policing policy
in the 21st century, there is a tension between the duty of the chief constable
to maintain order and enforce the criminal law, and to have regard to local
priorities established by PCCs. With the greater demands for regional and
national co-operation and co-ordination, that tension becomes more acute.
It is important that the relationships between local, regional, and national
demands and priorities are understood, respected, and accommodated to
ensure public safety. The present and future nature of crime and disorder
means that policing will need greater co-ordination at regional and national
levels to make sure local factors do not inhibit improvement in policing.
This is not to say that the aspects of policing which are inherently local in
character should be eroded. However, a rebalancing of effort, attention, and
resources across local, regional, and national functions is required. It would
appear that there are problems which appear to exist that make this difficult
to achieve.
For example:

• IT is fragmented and inconsistent, without a comprehensive set of na-

tional data standards, not fully joined up across all forces and without
a clear plan to make it so.
• Certain functions which are suited to being carried out on a regional
or national basis, such as payroll, procurement, and fleet management,
often are not.
• Certain specialist capabilities are replicated unnecessarily between po-
lice forces, regional organised crime units, and the NCA.
• Some money-saving collaboration agreements, such as the alliance be-
tween the Warwickshire and West Mercia forces, have failed.
• Other collaboration agreements, such as the one that established the
National Police Air Service, continue, but with well-documented short-
comings and deep dissatisfaction voiced by many chief constables and
PCCs.

In the light of these and other observations, the increasingly urgent need for
police reform appears clear. It may be the time has come for the police ser-
vice to realise the pressing need for single-system operation in many, if not
68 Local police structures

all, activities which are not purely local. In addition to these points, there
appears a mismatch between police funding and public expectations. There
has been a real-terms reduction in police funding of 19% since 2010/2011. Po-
lice funding for the 2018/2019 financial year amounted to £12.3 billion. This
provided for a workforce of approximately 190,000 (122,000 police officers
and 68,000 police staff) in other words, approximately one police officer for
every 480 people. However, the money also has to pay for buildings, vehi-
cles, and other things the police need to do their jobs. Increasingly, some
also needs to go towards investment in new capabilities to tackle the chang-
ing face of crime: for example, technology to analyse the dark web, or to
overcome the use of encrypted communications by organised crime groups.
Police spending in England and Wales represented only around 2% of pub-
lic expenditure. Yet policing is among the most essential public services of
all as without it, society would find it difficult to function. Without public
safety and security, the other institutions of society would be in jeopardy.
Peel’s second and third principles remind us that, to be successful, the
police must be able to secure and maintain public respect and the willing
co-operation of the public to observe the law. To achieve that, the police
service as a whole must have enough funding to meet the legitimate expec-
tations of the public it serves, including for the longer term. Each police
force must also receive enough of a share of the funding, in a way that rec-
ognises the particular characteristics and policing challenges of the force
area. However, the police service is not currently funded this way and not all
forces receive their fair shares. The money is divided between each of the 43
forces in England and Wales, according to a funding formula designed and
established by the Home Office. However, there are known limitations in the
funding formula, which create disproportionate funding settlements in cer-
tain forces. Most police force funding comes from central government. But
around 30% comes from local council tax through the policing precept—
and this percentage varies from force to force. This is because of striking
differences in the council tax base between police force areas. Some areas
are affluent, with a high proportion of privately owned, high-value housing.
Others are not, so they rely more heavily on central government funding.
In previous years, revisions to the funding formula deliberately allocated
more central government grant to those areas. At the same time, those areas
tended not to support precept increases. The dual effect of these things is
to compound the more recent cuts in central government funding. These
poorer areas are among those which have experienced the greatest cuts in
their police budgets. Generally, it is a simple equation: police in poorer ar-
eas are more stretched; people in those areas are therefore perhaps less safe.
Previous efforts by the Home Office to fix the limitations in the fund-
ing formula were postponed four years ago. However, even if the funding
formula were to be revised, and multi-year settlements became the norm,
 Local police structures 69

neither would solve a bigger problem faced by the police: the widening gap
between the needs of the public and the police’s capacity and capability to
meet them. To some degree, the gap is created by cuts in other public ser-
vices, which have shifted demands onto the police and other parts of the
criminal justice system. For example, recent research by the All-Party Par-
liamentary Group on Knife Crime suggests a growing link between cuts to
youth services and the country’s knife crime epidemic. There is a particu-
lar tension between the clamour for “old-style” policing and the reality of
modern crime, most of which takes place outside the public’s view. Adults
in England and Wales are more likely to fall victim to fraud than any other
crime type, and just because a crime isn’t visible does not mean it is not se-
rious or does not require police attention.
Public expectations of the police tend to focus on reassurance, visibility,
and protection. Some voices insist that the public place very great weight on
local issues such as speeding in villages or illegal parking on market days. But
the reality is that, in many communities, people are more concerned about
violent crime, drugs, and gangs. Citizens who are concerned about low-level,
yet highly visible, crimes and irritations can be vocal. The police recorded
nearly 600,000 domestic abuse-related crimes last year, an increase of 23%
year on year. In recent years, there has been a very significant increase in
referrals of online child abuse images from industry to the National Crime
Agency (NCA). According to the NCA, there are 2.88 million accounts glob-
ally on the most harmful child sexual abuse and exploitation dark-web sites.
The NCA believes at least 5% of these (144,000) emanate from the UK.
For the police, these matters cannot be ignored. Nor can other serious
threats to public safety and national security, such as organised crime and
terrorism. As recently as 2017, there were five terrorist attacks on British
soil. Since then, the UK has faced the persistent, serious threat of more. For
police leaders, there is a balance to strike between providing a visible service
and one that also deals effectively with the less visible forms of crime and
disorder. Striking this balance creates the potential for the public to wonder
where the police officers are, and to lose faith in them.
In order to understand, at least partially, what changes are likely to occur
to our police forces in the near future, one needs to consult a major policy
changing plan, called the Policing Vision 2025.

The Policing Vision 2025

This document published jointly by the Association of Police and Crime
Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs Council (2015) sets out the
plan for policing up to the year 2025. It sets out to transform policing in
the light of increased threats such as austerity measures, increased use of
technology, and other demands from an increasingly diverse and complex
70 Local police structures

society. Specific areas which are discussed within this important document
are shown below:

• Local policing;
• Specialist capabilities;
• Workforce;
• Digital policing;
• Joined up business delivery.

Each of these sections will be briefly discussed below.

Local policing
The report suggests that the model of policing utilised in England and Wales
with its link to citizens, through local policing, in company with the provi-
sion of specialist services such as the National crime Agency at a national
and international level, is looked upon by others as the model to aspire to.
Knowing the community, when to provide services such as mental health
needs, requires working with a range of partners seamlessly. However, this
requires an excellent evidence-based understanding of demand, which, un-
fortunately, most police forces do not possess (HMIC et al. 2015); there-
fore, alignment with other local public services is seen as important to
improve outcomes for citizens and protect the vulnerable. In some senses
this approach is not new. The partnership approach at the local level was
introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Home Office 1998) which
introduced crime and disorder partnerships based on local consultation and
delivery of joint crime prevention services (Rogers 2012).

Specialist capabilities
This strategic chapter suggests that the threat from terrorism, cybercrime,
and organised crime will continue to grow. Consequently, policing will need
to concentrate even more on protecting society as a whole. This will, of
course, mean that law enforcement capabilities, including equipping and
training people, need to be developed. In order to assist with this aim, there
may need to be an increase in specialist capabilities, with a uniform and
standardised approach across police forces in the country. The sharing of
expertise across police forces maybe one way of achieving an effective re-
sponse, although there may be a temptation to draw resources from rural
areas to more urban locations.

Workforce
Like any organisation the police service is reliant upon its employees to
carry out its function efficiently and effectively. Therefore, the workforce
 Local police structures 71

needs to be one which is professional, and equipped with skills to enable it

to face up to future challenges. The current police professional programme,
with its new methods of entry and qualifications for police officers (C.O.P.
2019), is indicative of this move. In addition, the police culture, often dis-
cussed in literature (see Reiner 2019), will need to be aligned so that it values
difference and diversity, and that “nostalgia” is not the answer to future
challenges.

Digital policing
The recent and rapid development of technology means it plays a significant
and central part in everything we do. The internet, for example, has changed
the way in which the public engage with the police, whilst also influencing
their expectations of the service. Online crime has increased dramatically,
with the introduction of new types of crime, whilst traditional forms of
criminality have been enhanced by technology. Criminals appear to be able
to exploit technology far more quickly than law enforcement agencies, who,
of course, have to abide by laws regarding the use as well as working within
tight budgets. In order to tackle these issues, police will need to explore new
technology to reach out to individuals who are increasingly living their lives
online. Traditional methods of contact will need to be balanced, for there
are still some sections of the community that are not digitally enabled.

Enabling business delivery

This aspect of policing will require police forces to interact and work closer
with other agencies, both from the public sector and the private sector.
Greater joint working between local authorities, emergency services, and lo-
cal police forces will be required, as will developing common data standards
and working with common business support functions, so that economies of
scale will be achieved.

Conclusion
Local policing structures in England and Wales have basically remained
the same for a number of years. Despite occasional changes to geographical
boundaries and the occasional amalgamation of forces, the “local” concept
supporting policing has remained the same. However, major events, such
as austerity, have forced the police to reflect upon the way it delivers many
of its services, and also to consider its internal structures. Recruitment and
education of police officers will change considerably as the police service in
England and Wales moves into a more professional model under the guid-
ance of the College of Policing. As this settles into place, police agencies will
need to consider greater use of different types of people to assist in deliver-
ing services. Special Constables, PCSOs, and other forms of volunteers could
72 Local police structures

be increased as the workforce not only strives to become professional under

difficult economic and social changes, but also to maintain a level of service.

Reflective questions
1 What role does the police play within the criminal justice system?
2 Why are there 43 separate forces in England and Wales?
3 What impact could the reduction of police officer have for the
community?
4 Why are Peels Principles a contested concept?
5 What value can be placed on the use of volunteers by the police
organisation?
6 How can the role of PCSOs be enhanced to support policing in general?
7 What is meant by the professionalisation programme in policing?
8 What are the advantages and disadvantages that may be associated
with direct entry schemes?
9 Why is there a case for possible reform of the current police delivery
structure in England and Wales?

Useful websites
College of Policing website regarding PCSOs: https://recruit.college.police.
uk/pcso/Pages/default.aspx.
Special Constables website: https://recruit.college.police.uk/Special/Pages/
default.aspx.
Police Support Volunteers: https://www.police.uk/volunteering/.
Citizens in Policing website: https://www.citizensinpolicing.net/.
Police direct entry schemes: https://recruit.college.police.uk/Officer/leader
ship-programmes/Direct-Entry-Programme/Pages/Direct-Entry-Programme.
aspx.
The nine principles of Sir Robert Peel’s police, all of which resonate strongly
today: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent.
The Home Office website contains a wealth of information on policing, in-
cluding documents on research, policy, and legislation (including the Police
Reform Act 2002): http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/.
The Metropolitan Police Service website contains details of its structure and
management and illustrates the range and complexity of functions in a very
large police force: http://www.met.police.uk/about/webinfo.htm.
Policing Vision 2025 document available at: https://www.npcc.police.uk/
documents/Policing%20Vision.pdf.
The Institute for Public Safety, Crime and Justice at the University of
Northampton available at: https://pure.northampton.ac.uk/en/organisations/
httpswwwnorthamptonacukresearchresearch-institutesinstitute-for-p.
 Local police structures 73

References
Baroness Neuberger. (2009). Report on Volunteers in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem. Available at http://www.oneeastmidlands.org.uk/sites/default/files/library/
volunteers%20in%20cjs.pdf.
Berry, G., Izat, J., Mawby, R., Walley, L. and Wright, A. (1998) Practical Police
Management, London, Police Review Publishing Co.
Berry, J. (2006) Officer Numbers Could Be Slashed. Available at www.policemag.
co.uk/Archive/2006/0606/0606.pdf.
Britton, I. and Knight, L. (2016) 2030 Vision: Specials and Police Support Volunteers –
At the Heart of Policing Reform, University of Northampton Institute for Public
Safety, Crime and Justice.
Brogden, M. and Nijhar, P. (2005) Community Policing: National and International
Models and Approaches, Cullompton, Willan.
Bullock, K. (2014) Citizens, Community and Crime Control, London, Palgrave
Macmillan.
Britton, I. and Knight, L. (2016) 2030 Vision: Specials and Police Support Volunteers –
At the Heart of Policing Reform, University of Northampton Institute for Public
Safety, Crime and Justice.
Caless, B. (2007) “Numties in Yellow Jackets”: The Nature of Hostility towards the
Police Community Support Officer in Neighbourhood Policing Team. Policing,
1(2), 187–195.
Carter, D. and Radelet, L.A. (1999) The Police and the Community (6th Edition),
Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall.
Casselden, B., Pickard, A.J. and McLeod, J. (2015) The Challenges Facing Public
Libraries in the Big Society: The Role of Volunteers and the Issues that Surround
Their Use in England. Journal of Librarianship and Information Science, 47(3),
187–203.
CIP. (2020) Citizens in Policing. Available at https://www.citizensinpolicing.net/ (ac-
cessed 7/4/2020).
College of Policing. (2015) Estimating Demand on the Police Service. Available at
https://www.college.police.uk/News/College-news/Documents/Demand%20
Report%2023_1_15_noBleed.pdf.
College of Policing. (2019) National Policing. Police Community Support Officer:
Operational Handbook, July 2019. Available at http://recruit.college.police.uk/
pcso/pages/default.aspx.
Cooper, C., Anscombe, J., Avenall, J., McLean, F. and Morris, J. (2006) A National
Evaluation of Community Support Officers.
Crawford, A. (2014) The Police, Policing and the Future of the “Extended Polic-
ing Family,” in Brown, J.M. (ed.), The Future of Policing, Abingdon, Routledge,
173–190.
Critchley, T.A. (1967) A History of Police in England and Wales, 900–1966, London,
Constable.
Dalgleish, D. and Myhill, A. (2004) Reassuring the Public: A Review of International
Policing Interventions, London, Home Office.
Emsley, C. (2014) Peel’s Principles, Police Principles, in Brown, J. (ed.), The Future
of Policing, London, Routledge.
74 Local police structures

Foster, J. and Jones, C. (2010) “Nice To Do” and Essential: Improving Neighbour-
hood Policing in an English Police Force, Policing. A Journal of Policy and Prac-
tice, 4(4), 395–402.
Gill, M. and Mawby, R. (1990) A Special Constable: A study of the Police Reserve,
Aldershot, Avebury.
Greig-Midlane, J. (2014) Changing the Beat? The Impact of Austerity on the Neigh-
bourhood Policing Work Force, Cardiff, Cardiff University Press.
HMIC. (2001) Open All Hours: A Thematic Inspection Report on the Role of Police
Visibility and Accessibility in Public Reassurance, London, HMIC.
HMIC. (2014) Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge. Available at https://www.
justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-
meeting-the-challenge.pdf.
Home Office Affairs Committee. (2015) Report on PCCs. Available at https://publi-
cations.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmhaff/844/844.pdf.
Home Office. (1829) The Metropolitan Police Act, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (1964) The Police Act 1964, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (1996) The Police Act 1996, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (1998) The Crime and Disorder Act, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (2005) Building Communities, Beating Crime: A Better Police Service
for the 21st Century, London, The Stationery Office.
Home Office. (2015) Police Work Force Numbers, 31st March 2015. Available at
www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-
march-2015-data-tables.
Home Office. (2019) Police Work force numbers, 31st March 2019. Available at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/831726/police-workforce-mar19-hosb1119.pdf.
IPSOS Mori Crime Survey. (2010) Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116598/horr33-
report.pdf.
Jones, T. and Van Sluis, A. (2009) National Standards, Local Delivery: Police
Reform in England and Wales, in Van Sluis, A. and Frevel, B. (eds.), The Con-
tested Police, Elizabethtown, PA, Southern Public Administration Education
Foundation.
Johnston, L., (1992) The Rebirth of Private Policing, London, Routledge.
Kleinig, J., (1996) The Ethics of Policing, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Lentz, S.A. and Chaires, R.H. (2007) The Invention of Peels Principles: A Study of
Policing “Textbook” History. Journal of Criminal Justice, 35, 69–79.
Lord Scarman. (1981) The Brixton Disorders, HMSO, London.
Mayhall, P.D. (1985) Police-Community Relations and the Administration of Justice
(3rd Edition), New York, John Wiley and Sons.
Melville Lee, W.L. (1901) A History of Police in England, London, Methuen and Co.
Millie, A. (2012) Police Stations, Architecture and Public Reassurance. British Jour-
nal of Criminology, 52(6), 1092–1112.
Morgan, H. (2013) Sport Volunteering, Active Citizenship and Social Capital En-
hancement: What Role in the Big Society? International Journal of Sport Policy
and Politics, 5(3), 381–395.
Neyroud, P. (2010) Review of the Police Leadership and Training. Available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/118222/report.pdf.
 Local police structures 75

O’Neill, M. (2014) Playing Nicely with Others, in Brown, J.M. (ed.), The Future of
Policing, Abingdon, Routledge.
O’Neill, M. (2015) Police Community Support Officers in England: A Dramaturgi-
cal Analysis, Policing and Society. An International Journal of Research and Pol-
icy. Available at www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10439463.2015.1020805.
PA Consulting. (2001) Diary of a Police Officer, Home Office Research Report 149,
London, Home Office.
Palmer, S.H. (1990) Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780–1850, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
Palmiotto, M. (1997) Policing: Concepts, Strategies and Current Issues in American
Police Forces, Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press.
Peach, S. (2015) Police Education Qualification Framework. Available at http://
www.excellenceinpolicing.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Plenary_Peach_S.
pdf.
Pearce, D.S. (2015) Police Professionalism. Available at http://www.excellenceinpo-
licing.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Plenary_Pearce_Day-1_consistency.pdf.
Peak, K.J. (1993) Policing America: Methods, Issues, Challenges, Upper Saddle
River, NJ, Pearson Education Inc.
Peak, K.J. (2003) Policing America: Methods, Issues, Challenges (4th Edition), Up-
per Saddle River, NJ, Pearson Education Inc.
Police Federation. (2019) The Office of Constable. Available at https://www.polfed.
org/media/14239/the-office-of-constable-with-links-2018.pdf.
Police Foundation. (2014) Does Neighbourhood Policing Have a Future? Oxford,
Oxford Policing Policy, Forum, 16.
Reiner, R. (1992) The Politics of the Police, Brighton, Harvester.
Reiner, R. (2000) The Politics of the Police (3rd Edition), Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Reiner, R. (2019) The Politics of the Police, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Reith, C. (1956) The Blind Eye of History: A Study of the Origins of the Present Police
Era, London, Faber and Faber Ltd.
Robertson, N. (2012) Policing: Fundamental Principles in a Canadian Context.
Canadian Public Administration, 55(3), 343–363.
Rogers, C. (2012) Crime Reduction Partnerships, Oxford, Blackwells.
Smith, M.J. (2011) The Intellectual Roots of Big Society, in Stott, M. (ed.), The Big
Society Challenge, Thetford, Keystone Development and Trust Publications, 27–35.
Storch, R.D. (1986) The Plague of the Blue Locusts. International Review of Social
History. Available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-
review-of-social-history/article/plague-of-the-blue-locusts/AC3CFC19831A827F9
819E676FD19D331.
Stott, M. (2011) Introduction: Big Society in Context, in Stott, M. (ed.), The Big
Society Challenge, Thetford, Keystone Development and Trust Publications.
Unison. (2014) ‘Home Guard’ of the Police Volunteers to Fill in for Police Cuts,
London, Unison.
Volunteering Australia. (2015) Key Facts and Statistics about Volunteering in
Australia. Available at https://www.volunteeringaustralia.org/wp-content/uploads/
VA-Key-statistics-about-Australian-volunteering-16-April-20151.pdf (accessed
13/8/2019).
Williams, K.L. (2003) Peels Principles and Their Acceptance by American Police:
Ending 175 years of Reinvention. The Police Journal, 76, 97–120.
Chapter 4

National policing structures

Introduction
Chapter 3 considered the main aspects of policing at a local level in England
and Wales. As we can see from this chapter and Chapter 1, local geography
and accountability played a large part in the structure of current local po-
licing. However, crime is not constrained by such geographies and much
crime is carried out cross border or at a national level. For example, the
current concerns around “county lines” drug distribution requires not only
close cooperation between forces across the country but also some form of
national agency to co-ordinate and plan responses to this and other forms
of serious organised crime at a national level. In addition, there needs to be
other forms of agencies that make sure that policing delivery and activities
across the country are delivered in a uniform manner. This includes such as
police recruitment and training. In addition some forms of policing needs
to operate at a national level because of the special nature of their role. This
chapter examines these agencies and considers their functionality and link-
age to local policing.

The National Crime Agency

The National Crime Agency leads the UK’s attempt to cut serious and or-
ganised crime, protecting the public by disrupting and bringing to justice
those serious and organised criminals who pose the highest risk to the UK.
NCA officers work at building the best possible intelligence picture of all
serious and organised crime threats, whilst pursuing the most serious and
dangerous offenders. In addition they develop and deliver specialist capabil-
ities on behalf of law enforcement and other partners. The National Crime
Agency (NCA) is the UK’s lead agency against:

• Organised crime;
• Human, weapon, and drug trafficking, and cybercrime; and
• Economic crime.
 National policing structures 77

It works across regional and international borders but can be tasked to in-
vestigate any crime. The NCA has a strategic role in which it looks at the
bigger picture across the UK, analysing how criminals are operating and
how they can be disrupted. To do this it works closely with Regional Organ-
ised Crime Units (ROCUs), the Serious Fraud Office, as well as individual
police forces. It is also the UK point of contact for foreign agencies such as
Interpol, Europol, and other international law enforcement agencies. On a
day-to-day basis the NCA assists police forces and other law enforcement
agencies and vice versa under voluntary assistance arrangements. However,
in extreme emergencies, the NCA Director-General has the power to direct
a chief officer of a police force to give directed assistance with NCA tasks
where necessary (but only with consent of the relevant Secretary of State),
making that person one of the most senior law enforcement leaders in the
country. The NCA itself can also be directed by the Secretary of State to
give directed assistance to a police force or other law enforcement agency
such as in the case of Operation Stovewood, where the NCA investigated the
issues of child abuse in Rotherham (NCA 2020).

Important point

The National Crime Agency (NCA) is the UK’s lead agency against:
• Organised crime;
• Human, weapon, and drug trafficking, and cybercrime; and
• Economic crime.

The National Crime Agency was established in 2013 as a non-ministerial

government department, replacing the Serious Organised Crime Agency
and absorbing the formerly separate Child Exploitation and Online Protec-
tion Centre (CEOP) as one of its commands. It also assumed a number of
responsibilities of other law enforcement agencies. The NCA has also taken
on a range of functions from the National Policing Improvement Agency,
which has been scrapped as part of the government’s changes to policing.
These include a specialist database relating to injuries and unusual weap-
ons, expert research on potential serial killers, and the National Missing
Persons Bureau. The agencies combining the NCA had a combined budget
of £812 million, yet the new agency only had £464 million in its first year—a
decrease of 43%. Some of the responsibilities of the former UK Border
Agency (now Immigration Enforcement and Border Force) relating to bor-
der policing also became part of the NCA. Like its predecessor SOCA, the
NCA has been dubbed the “British FBI” by the media.
78 National policing structures

The NCA faces several challenges over the next few years. The first of
these is the scale of growing problems. At the end of 2014, for example,
UK law enforcement estimated there were 5,800 organised crime groups—
comprising some 40,600 individuals. This is an increase of 300 organised
crime groups and 3,500 people on the year before. The National Crime
Agency (NCA) estimates that there are as many as 50,000 people in the UK
involved in the downloading and viewing of indecent images online. The
Director General of the NCA has suggested that the British public cannot
expect every person viewing indecent images to enter the criminal justice
system—not least because of the sheer scale of the problem. The NCA re-
ceived 12,505 referrals from the National Centre for Missing and Exploited
Children (based in Washington DC, for some reason) in its first 12 months,
compared to 9,855 in 2012, an increase of almost 27%. Tackling modern
slavery is another area that the Home Secretary has identified as requiring
more effort. The Home Office’s Chief Scientific Adviser estimates that there
may have been as many as 13,000 potential victims of modern slavery in the
UK in 2013. This figure was increased in August 2017 to “tens of thousands
of victims.” Most will rely on the services of organised criminal groups at
some point in their journey to the UK.
The second challenge, of funding and resources, links with the first
challenge. Although the NCA budget is half a billion pounds, in propor-
tion to the scale of the problem this is quite small. The combined budget
of previous agencies and units that make up the NCA was almost a billion
pounds, so the agency has had an almost 50% cut before its creation. The
NCA has only 5,000 staff, around 1,250 of which are investigators, which
is small when faced with the problems of modern policing and security.
For the Rotherham investigation the NCA has had to bring in agency staff
who are ex-police to assist with the scale of the investigation. Third, there
is the challenge of the “failure” of its predecessor agencies, SOCA, and the
National Crime squad, and the fact that its success needs to be judged over
years and not months due to the nature of the threat. SOCA was criticised
for poor management and that some staff had poor investigation skills due
to not working in law enforcement before. It is suggested that around 300
police detectives left SOCA due to this. With the NCA having the same staff
this could be an issue. The NCA has already been criticised for not seiz-
ing enough assets (even though they seized more than SOCA in their last
year of operation) as well as using a search warrant that was judged to be
illegal after staff at the agency were allegedly deliberately trying to stretch
the boundaries imposed upon such investigation agencies by the statutory
scheme under which they operate. The judge, Mr Justice Hickinbottom,
stated, the case was conducted perhaps with incompetence rather than bad
faith (The Independent 2015).
 National policing structures 79

The NCA is organised into eight operational branches, overseen by seven

directors, who are, in turn, overseen by a Director-General, assisted by a
Deputy Director General. The commands are as follows:

• Border Policing Command;

• CEOP Command;
• Economic Crime Command;
• Organised Crime Command;
• Intelligence;
• Operations;
• Specialist Capabilities;
• Proceeds of Crime Centre.

The Assets Recovery Agency became part of the Serious Organised Crime
Agency from April 2008. This then became the Proceeds of Crime Centre
in the NCA. The power to launch civil recovery proceedings has also been
extended to the three main prosecutors in England and Wales: The Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS), the Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office
(RCPO), and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). It will also be extended to the
Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland and the Crown Office and
Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland. As well as the NCA operating at the
national framework there are several other police forces that function at
that level.

National police forces

There are some police agencies that, because of the special nature of their
role, operate at a national level. This of course may alter their powers and
their accountability processes. The first of these is the British Transport
police.

British Transport Police (BTP)

The British Transport Police is largely funded by the train operating compa-
nies, Network Rail, and the London Underground—part of Transport for
London. Around 95% of BTP’s funding comes from the train operating com-
panies. Other operators with whom the BTP has a service agreement also
contribute appropriately. This funding arrangement does not give the com-
panies power to set objectives for the BTP, but there are industry representa-
tives serving as members of the police authority. The police authority decides
objectives, whilst the industry membership represents five out of 13 members.
There is also substantial counter-terrorism funding from the Home Office.
80 National policing structures

Important point

British Transport Police primarily operate on the national railways

network and have the powers of a constable within certain confines
related to that network.

The first railway employees described as police can be traced back to 30

June 1826. A regulation of the Stockton and Darlington Railway refers to
the police establishment of one Superintendent, four officers, and numerous
gate-keepers. This is the first mention of Railway Police anywhere and was
three years before the Metropolitan Police Act was passed. They were not,
however, described as “constables” and the description may refer to men
controlling the trains not enforcing the law. Specific reference to “consta-
bles” rather than mere “policemen” is made by the BTP website article “A
History of Policing the Railway,” which states, “The London, Birmingham
and Liverpool Railway Companion of 1838 reports ‘Each Constable, be-
sides being in the employ of the company, is sworn as a County Constable.’”
Further reference is made by the BTP to “an Act of 1838…which according
to J.R. Whitbread in The Railway Policeman was the first legislation to pro-
vide for any form of policing of the railway whilst under construction, i.e. to
protect the public from the navvies more or less” (BTP 2020).
The modern British Transport Police was formed by the British Transport
Commission Act 1949, which combined the already-existing police forces
inherited from the pre-nationalisation railways by British Railways, those
forces having been previously formed by powers available under common
law to parishes, landowners, and other bodies to appoint constables to pa-
trol land and/or property under their control. This is distinct from the es-
tablishment of a police force by statute, as applicable to the Metropolitan
Police in 1829; BTP did not have jurisdiction on a statutory basis until the
enactment of the Transport Police (Jurisdiction) Act 1994, which was sub-
sequently amended by the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003. Under
s.31 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, British Transport Police
officers have all the power and privileges of a constable when:

• On track (any land or other property comprising the permanent way of any
railway, taken together with the ballast, sleepers, and rails laid thereon,
whether or not the land or other property is also used for other purposes,
any level crossings, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, culverts, retaining walls, or
other structures used or to be used for the support of, or otherwise in con-
nection with, track; and any walls, fences, or other structures bounding the
railway or bounding any adjacent or adjoining property);
 National policing structures 81

• On network (a railway line, or installations associated with a railway

line);
• In a station (any land or other property which consists of premises used
as, or for the purposes of, or otherwise in connection with, a railway
passenger station or railway passenger terminal (including any ap-
proaches, forecourt, cycle store, or car park), whether or not the land
or other property is, or the premises are, also used for other purposes);
• In a light maintenance depot;
• On other land used for purposes of or in relation to a railway, the trans-
port police;
• On other land in which a person who provides railway services has a
freehold or leasehold interest; and
• Throughout Great Britain for a purpose connected to a railway or to
anything occurring on or in relation to a railway.

“Railway” means a system of transport employing parallel rails which pro-

vide support and guidance for vehicles carried on flanged wheels and form
a track which either is of a gauge of at least 350 millimetres or crosses a
carriageway (whether or not on the same level).
A BTP constable may enter

• The track;
• A network;
• A station;
• A substation;
• A light maintenance depot; and
• A railway vehicle.

Without a warrant, using reasonable force if necessary, and whether or not

an offence has been committed. It is an offence to assault or impersonate a
BTP constable. They need however to move between railway sites and often
have a presence in city centres. Consequently, BTP officers can be called
upon to intervene in incidents outside their natural jurisdiction. ACPO es-
timate that some 8,000 such incidents occur every year. As a result of the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, BTP officers can act as police
constables outside their normal jurisdiction in the following circumstances:
If requested by a constable of:

• A territorial police force;

• The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP); or
• The Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC)

to assist him/her in the execution of their duties in relation to a particular

incident, investigation or operation, a BTP constable also has the powers of
82 National policing structures

the requesting officer for the purposes of that incident, investigation, or op-
eration. If a constable from a territorial police force makes the request, then
the powers of the BTP constable extend only to the requesting constable’s
police area. If a constable from the MDP or CNC makes the request, then
the powers of the BTP officer are the same as those of the requesting con-
stable. If requested by the Chief Constable of one of the forces mentioned
above, a BTP constable takes on all the powers and privileges of members of
the requesting force. This power is used for planned operations, such as the
2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles.

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) is a special armed police force re-
sponsible for providing law enforcement and security at any relevant nuclear
site and for security of nuclear materials in transit within the United King-
dom. The CNC was established on 1 April 2005, replacing the former Atomic
Energy Authority Constabulary established in 1955. The CNC does not
guard the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons; this role is the responsibility
of the British Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence Police. The core
role of the CNC is to provide armed policing and security for civil nuclear
establishments and materials throughout the United Kingdom and to main-
tain a state of readiness against any possible attack on a licensed nuclear
site. The Constabulary was established in Chapter 3, sections 51–71 of the
Energy Act 2004. The Act set up the Civil Nuclear Police Authority and the
position of Chief Constable; defines the powers of members of the constab-
ulary; mandates that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire &
Rescue (HMICFRS) must inspect the force; and amends several other acts.
It falls under the remit of the newly formed Department for Business, En-
ergy and Industrial Strategy instead of the Home Office.

Important point

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary are an armed police force usually

guarding nuclear facilities. They have the powers of regular consta-
bles under certain circumstances.

The CNC’s Annual Reports regularly state that the crime dealt with by
officers at civil nuclear sites remains low in volume, whilst the management
and investigation of crime does not form any part of the Constabulary’s mis-
sion statement. Whilst the CNC are a police force, this acknowledgement
would suggest the role of a CNC Police Officer is that of providing armed
 National policing structures 83

security, rather than primarily being concerned with law enforcement. This
view is also supported by the number of arrests made by the force annually
compared with a territorial police force of a similar number of police of-
ficers. In 2016, for example, CNC officers made 24 arrests. This compares
to Dorset Police, a force with a similar number of officers who made 7,460
arrests annually in the latest annual figures. During the year 2010–2011, the
CNC made 12 arrests, although two of those people were de-arrested at the
scene (one when it was realised that the person was not wanted on warrant
after all and another where it was decided that police action was not appro-
priate in relation to an alleged assault). Unlike the majority of the British
police territorial forces, all frontline CNC officers are routinely armed while
carrying out duties. CNC officers also operate the armament on board the
ships of the Limited Company, a subsidiary of International Nuclear Ser-
vices, which specialise in transporting spent nuclear fuel and reprocessed
uranium on behalf of its ultimate parent, the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority. Such ships have an on-board escort of armed police.
The CNC is also authorised to carry out covert intelligence operations
against anti-nuclear protesters. In July 2009 Judge Christopher Rose said
the CNC’s approach to covert activity is conspicuously professional. He
found that the system for storing the intelligence gained from informers was
working well and that “senior officers regard covert surveillance as a long-
term job.”
CNC police officers have the same powers as regular police officers, but
with jurisdiction limited to those set out in the Energy Act 2004, which are:

• Any place when escorting nuclear materials in transit;

• Any place when pursuing or detaining subjects who have unlawfully
removed or interfered with materials guarded by the CNC, or have been
reasonably suspected of being guilty of doing so;
• Civil nuclear sites;
• Land around such sites up to 5 km from the boundary;
• Shipyards when safeguarding such nuclear material.

Funding comes from the companies which run ten nuclear plants in the UK.
Around a third is paid by the private consortium managing Sellafield, which
is largely owned by American and French firms. Nearly a fifth of the funding
is provided by British Energy, the privatised company owned by Electricite
de France (EDF). A criticism of the CNC has been the manner in which they
have controlled their budget. The nuclear industry itself acknowledges it is
in regular contact with the CNC and the security services regarding deploy-
ment and security at nuclear sites in the UK. One of the biggest concerns,
given the importance of their role and function, has been that of account-
ability. Most police forces in England and Wales follow the normal basis
of police governance and accountability as outlined in a previous chapter
84 National policing structures

in this book. It is here that one of the major differences between rural and
urban forces and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary resides. Whilst the CNC
is subject to statutory regulation and scrutiny by HMICFRS, the Office for
Civil Nuclear Security, the Health and Safety executive and other regulators
pertinent to nuclear sites, there are significant differences. The Energy Act
2004, for example, makes provision for the involvement of the Secretary of
State through the regulator in the nuclear industry for the dedicated de-
ployment of constables. The main function of the regulator revolves around
the role of the armed element of constabulary deployment. The nuclear
operators appear to regard the regulator as the final arbiter in matters of
armed police numbers deployed at their sites. For example, if the regulator
decides that a large number of officers are required at a particular site then
the operator must provide and pay for this facility. However, if the regulator
decides that no armed presence is required at a site then the operator must
accept this. This brings into question the relationship between the Regula-
tor of the industry and the Chief Constable of the CNC as to operational
independence as the regulator equates to the Secretary of State. It could
be argued that that this person holds both the power to control resources
whilst also occupying a political position, something the founding fathers of
the modern police were against. Thus it is questionable, given the increased
importance of protecting the public from threats such as terrorism, that the
responsibility and accountability for operational policing in the context of
the Civil Nuclear Constabulary should be vested in an individual who may
have focus on the political interests whilst also carrying out the functions
associated with operational independence of the chief constable. Despite
this, in many senses the CNC operates as a police organisation, despite clear
differences within their framework for accountability and governance. At
first sight, the accountability process appears to be slightly eccentric and
similarly constructed to other armed police organisations in the UK, such
as for example, the Ministry of Defence Police (Rogers 2007).

Important point

The Civil nuclear constabulary has received some criticism for its
complicated accountability and governance process.

Ministry of Defence Police

The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) is a civilian police force which is part
of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence. The MDP are not military po-
lice and should not be confused with the Royal Military Police or any other
 National policing structures 85

Service Police organisation. Although superficially similar to other UK po-

lice forces, the MDP is significantly different in role, function, and account-
ability. The MDP’s primary responsibilities are to provide armed security
and to counter terrorism, as well as uniformed policing and limited investi-
gative services to Ministry of Defence property, personnel, and installations
throughout the United Kingdom. The different role is clearly borne out by
the number of arrests made by MDP officers against forces with similar
numbers of police officers (Sussex Police and Avon and Somerset Constabu-
lary). In 2016, MDP officers made 61 arrests. In comparison, in the year end-
ing March 2017, Sussex Police made 17,506 arrests whilst Avon & Somerset
Constabulary recorded 26,694 arrests for notifiable crimes. MDP officers
are attested as constables under the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.
All MDP officers are trained as Authorized Firearms Officers (AFOs) and
90% of those on duty are armed at any given time. The force was originally
formed in 1971 by the merger of three separate service constabularies: the
Air Force Department Constabulary, the Army Department Constabulary,
and the Admiralty Constabulary. The force, which consists of two divisions,
is headquartered at MDP Wethersfield, Essex. These earlier constabularies
were formed as a result of the Special Constables Act 1923, although their
histories can be traced back much further as watchmen. Their powers came
from different legislative sources. In 1984, the House of Commons Defence
Select Committee recognised the difficulties under which the Ministry of
Defence Police were operating; the committee’s recommendations led to the
passing of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.
The MDF has a number of specialised departments and provides officers
for international policing secondments, including those overseas and the
training of resident police forces in these areas. These overseas missions
are carried out under the mandates of the United Nations, NATO, or the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Most recent overseas deployments have
been to Afghanistan to train Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in polic-
ing skills.

Important point

The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) is a civilian police force which

is part of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence. The MDP are
not military police and should not be confused with the Royal Mili-
tary Police or any other Service Police organisation.

The force underwent a significant restructuring as part of the coalition

government’s post 2010 austerity measures, and the Strategic Defence and
Security Review. Its budget was cut from £360 million to £180 million and it
86 National policing structures

was to lose 20% of its workforce and up to 50% of its stations by 2016. The
new, smaller force concentrates on high-end tasks, such as nuclear weapons
security and mobile armed policing of the defence estate.
According to the MDP, as of 2019 the force had a workforce of around
2,900 police officers and 260 police staff based at numerous defence and
infrastructure locations across the United Kingdom. In terms of officer
numbers, it is the second largest of the three special police forces and 12th
largest of the police forces of the United Kingdom overall. As of 2017, the
force also had the highest number of officers trained as AFOs of any police
force, including the Metropolitan Police. As only 90% of MDP officers per-
form this role at any one time however the Met will, in practice, have more
operational AFOs. The MDP’s primary responsibility is protecting sites of
national importance throughout the United Kingdom, mostly through pro-
vision of Authorized Firearms Officers at high security sites. As such, it
deals with both military personnel and civilians. Although some critics in
the press and pressure groups consider the MDP to be a Paramilitary force,
this is a claim that is denied by the MDP and the UK government.
The Ministry of Defence’s requirement of the MDP is expressed in six
core capabilities. These are:

• Armed nuclear security;

• Territorial policing and security;
• Intelligence gathering and analysis to support the efficient and effective
deployment of MDP resources;
• The prevention, investigation, and detection of fraud and corruption,
and the theft of or criminal damage to key defence equipment and assets;
• To provide specialist civil policing support to defence and other inter-
national policing commitments, in support of UK government policy;
• To maintain specialist policing capabilities that can be deployed at
short notice as part of the response to unforeseen requirements at de-
fence establishments in the UK.

Unlike the other special police forces in the United Kingdom, the MDP does
not have a police authority to oversee the functions of the force. However,
the Ministry of Defence Police Committee, established by the Ministry of
Defence Police Act 1987, advises the Secretary of State for Defence on mat-
ters concerning the MDP. The Committee (or its members) also has various
functions in determining police misconduct and appeals cases. According
to the Terms of Reference of the MOD Police Committee, the Committee is
responsible for:

• Providing scrutiny and guidance to ensure that police powers and au-
thority are impartially and lawfully exercised by the Chief Constable;
• Confirming that the MDP is meeting the standards required of a police
force;
 National policing structures 87

• Confirming that the MDP’s exercise of its authority is responsible, pro-

portionate and impartial;
• Confirming that MOD’s use of the MDP is appropriate in relation to the
exercising of policing powers and authority;
• Providing scrutiny and guidance on matters of efficiency and effective-
ness and on any other matter in relation to the use of policing powers
which fall within the responsibility of the MDP;
• Considering the MDP’s targets, financial performance, and risk man-
agement arrangements;
• Providing advice once a year to the top-line budget holder covering fi-
nancial performance and risk management for inclusion in the Annual
Assurance Report;
• Assisting in the appointment of Chief Officers to the MDP;
• Considering all complaints made against MDP Chief Officers (this re-
sponsibility may be delegated to a sub-panel of the Committee);
• Undertaking all responsibilities required of the MDP Conduct and Ap-
peal Regulations;
• Submitting an annual report to the Defence Secretary on the MDP’s
discharge of policing powers, and providing advice to ministers and the
department, on matters concerning value for money and efficiencies;
• Publishing the operating costs and expenses of the Committee each
year.

Apart from the policing agencies discussed in this chapter so far, there also
exist other national structures that enable the police function to be carried
out effectively in England and Wales.

Other important national structures

Having examined the commonly known police agencies that exist at the
national level of policing, the following section examines the lesser-known
structural arrangements that expand local and national policing whilst pro-
viding important welfare, educational, and other support for police officers
and staff.

National Arrangements for Mutual Aid

Mutual aid is the provision of policing assistance from one force to an-
other. It is a formal arrangement, and mutual aid is usually provided in
response to or in anticipation of a major incident or event. Mutual aid,
however, ranges from small-scale, inter-force support by reacting to a sig-
nificant or serious incident or in some cases supporting a force or gov-
ernment department in a large pre-planned event. It provides an overall
resilience to the provision of effective policing of the incident and force
area in question (Home office 2012).
88 National policing structures

Section 24 of the Police Act 1996 sets out the legal framework for policing
in England and Wales. In respect of the collaboration provisions in the Act,
the process of collaboration also includes the British Transport Police and
the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.

Important point

Mutual aid is the provision of policing assistance from one force to

another. It is a formal arrangement and mutual aid is usually provided
in response to or in anticipation of a major incident or event.

In an historical context, police forces had developed their own mutual aid
protocols, which involved neighbouring forces providing mutual support,
usually in response to public order events, which were beyond the capacity
of one police force. The miner strike of the early 1980s saw the first large-
scale and long-term deployment of officers in response to public order de-
mands, but the need for coordinated efforts became apparent during the
1970s. At the Saltley coke works in 1972, in a confrontation between miners
and the police from Birmingham, a new tactic, that of flying pickets, was
used by the strikers. Consequently the police had to admit defeat and the
coke works were closed. This led to the formation of the police National
Reporting centre to improve the effectiveness of mutual aid arrangements.
It also led to the change in function and title of civil defence columns into
Police Support Units (PSUs) (Waddington 1991). Therefore, police forces
no longer just supported neighbouring forces. They were part of a national
mobilisation plan managed at a strategic level to ensure sustainability of
policing over a prolonged period. Mutual aid has changed since the early
1980s and the need for policing major industrial disputes. There are how-
ever, still major threats attached to events such as, NATO conferences, and
other international gatherings. These require a large amount of resources
and officers, not just uniformed staff but those specialist officers engaged
in counter terrorist work or those with specific IT skills. The role of the Na-
tional Police Chiefs Council plays a specific role, as it now coordinates the
provision of mutual aid between forces through the National police Coordi-
nation Centre (NPoCC). The remit of the NPoCC is as follows:

• Co-ordinate and broker mutual aid in both steady state and a crisis;
• Co-ordinate a continuous testing and exercising regime to ensure effec-
tive mobilisation of national assets in a crisis;
• Co-ordinate, collate and act as a national repository for capacity and
capability in relation to the Strategic and National Policing Require-
ments on specialist UK policing assets;
 National policing structures 89

• Develop reporting mechanisms with the Home Office and Central Gov-
ernment crisis management;
• Support the chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) in
COBR during times of national crisis and for large scale events.

(NPCC 2020)

As can be seen, the NPoCC is closely aligned to the government through the
Home Office, Central government, and COBR. COBR or COBRA is short-
hand for the Civil Contingencies Committee that is convened to handle mat-
ters of national emergency or major disruption. Its purpose is to coordinate
different departments and agencies in response to such emergencies, which
clearly involves policing activities.
Mutual aid can be categorised under three main types. These types are
outlined below:

• Emergency/Spontaneous deployment—which could mean for example

an unforeseen demand such as an initial outbreak of disorder or investi-
gation, where another force is called upon to assist. A definition of time
for such spontaneous support is up to 15 days duration;
• Planned Deployment/event—for example, G8 and London Olympics
2012. Here the event requires a capacity beyond a single force or cannot
alone police the event and provide appropriate resilience in the rest of
its force area.
• Specialist Staff deployments—for example hostage/kidnap nego-
tiators where a host force does not have sufficient staff to fulfil local
requirements.

(NPCC 2019)

These definitions are important as there is a cost recovery for the deploy-
ment of mutual aid from one force to another. As can be seen, whenever
there is a need for mutual aid, arrangements are in place for the temporary
removal of staff to another force to assist. However, there are more per-
manent arrangements for ongoing perceived national threats through the
Strategic Policing Requirement.

The Strategic Policing Requirement

The Strategic Policing Requirement is one of the obligations imposed by
the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. It is intended to help
Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), their police forces, and partner
agencies to plan for, respond to, and recover from threats that extend be-
yond their immediate communities. Some situations (terrorism, civil emer-
gencies, threats to public safety, etc.) require a national response, and the
90 National policing structures

Strategic Policing Requirement document sets out what resources police

forces need in order to respond effectively in these circumstances. It helps
PCCs and Chief Constables to plan to counter them effectively. The focus of
the Requirement is to ensure forces work in collaboration to tackle shared
threats, concentrating on what the police need to achieve, rather than how
they should achieve it. PCCs and Chief Constables have responsibility for
implementing the Requirement and must work together to determine the
most effective and cost-efficient way to maintain the level of resources
needed to meet both their force’s contribution to the national response and
their own operational needs. Also, PCCs are empowered to hold their Chief
Constable to account for the delivery of these functions. Although the Stra-
tegic Policing Requirement is not legislation which has been passed by Par-
liament, there is an obligation on policing bodies to have regard to it. This
means that PCCs and Chief Constables should follow its guidance unless
they are satisfied that there are particular circumstances which give them
good reasons not to; they should be prepared to justify any decision to de-
part from it. In order to counter the threats, the Strategic Policing Require-
ment identifies that the police and police and crime commissioners should
adopt a 5Cs approach. These are:

• Capacity and contribution—consider the realities of the threat and

agree their contribution to meeting that threat having taken into ac-
count their capacity to contribute.
• Capability—a need to consider the skills and training required to en-
sure the forces contribution to the national requirement is effective.
• Consistency—a need for certain key specialist policing capabilities to
be delivered in a consistent way across all forces or in some cases with
other partners such as “blue-light” emergency or national services.
• Connectivity—a requirement for policing capabilities to be effectively
joined up, both across force boundaries and through national ones, as
well as being able to connect with key partners when responding to civil
emergencies.
• Consistency—for certain key specialist policing capabilities when deliv-
ered cross force/national or in conjunction with key partners. For exam-
ple, riot-trained officers from a particular force should be able to work
with officers from other forces who have had the same or similar training.

Whilst on the face of it, the SPR seems a logical approach to dealing with
perceived long-term and vital national threats, it has suffered some criti-
cism, not least the fact that it tends to undermine the role of the Police and
Crime commissioner, who was introduced to increase local accountability
and control of policing (Lister and Rowe 2014). Despite this, the arrange-
ments for mutual aid and the SPR highlight the changing nature of crime
and criminality from being a historical issue to having an increased national
and international dimension.
 National policing structures 91

Important point

The Strategic Policing Requirement is one of the obligations imposed

by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. It is intended
to help Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), their police forces,
and partner agencies to plan for, respond to, and recover from threats
that extend beyond their immediate communities.

The Police Federation of England and Wales

The Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW) is the statutory staff as-
sociation for police Constables, Sergeants, Inspectors, and Chief Inspectors in
the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales. Under UK labour law,
the police are prohibited from joining ordinary trade unions to defend pay and
working conditions, by the Police Act 1996, because of the view that a police
strike would pose an exceptional public safety risk. The PFEW was originally
established by the Police Act 1919 as an alternative system, which would serve
to represent staff, and where disputes could be resolved through arbitration so
long as the government (as employer) continued to bargain in good faith. There
were approximately 124,000 members in 2014. Members can elect not to pay
subscriptions and thereby not receive the legal representation and other benefits
that paying members receive, but they still continue officially to be members
of the Federation. In reality only a very few officers have ever decided not to
pay their full subscription dues. Superintendents and Chief Superintendents are
represented by a separate staff association, the Police Superintendents’ Associ-
ation of England and Wales (PSA), while the most senior officers are members
of the Chief Police Officers Staff Association (CPOSA). Each of the 43 police
forces in England and Wales has its own federation branch board and council.
The 43 forces are grouped into eight regions. Due to its size, the Metropolitan
Police federation branch board is structured differently.
The Police Federation of England and Wales was set up by the Police
Act 1919 after two British police strikes in 1918 and 1919. The government
of the day were frightened by the prospect of the police going on strike and
created the Police Federation of England and Wales but withdrew the right
of officers in the UK to strike.

Important point

The Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW) is the statu-

tory staff association for police Constables, Sergeants, Inspectors,
and Chief Inspectors in the 43 territorial police forces in England and
Wales. By law police offices are not allowed to strike.
92 National policing structures

Police officers hold office and are not employees. Each officer is an inde-
pendent legal official and not an “agent of the police force, police author-
ity or government” (Police Federation 2020). This allows the police their
unique status and notionally provides the citizens of the UK a protection
from any government that might wish unlawfully to use the police as an
instrument against them. Many observers mistakenly equate the Police Fed-
eration with a trade union. This is technically an incorrect assumption as it
was set up specifically by the government of the day not to be a trade union;
however, in reality the Federation does function in a similar manner. It ne-
gotiates with the Official Side on all matters concerning its membership’s
pay, allowances, hours of duty, annual leave, pensions, and other conditions
of service. However, unlike a union, the Federation is controlled entirely by
serving police officers, has no political affiliations, and has no powers to call
a strike. That is not to say that the Federation remains aloof from applying
political pressure, as the successful 1976 ballot regarding the right to strike
and the 2012/2013 “Plebgate” affair. The Plebgate affair is of particular in-
terest as the Federation had several weaknesses exposed. Plebgate was a
British political scandal which started in September 2012. The trigger was
an altercation between Conservative MP Andrew Mitchell, who resigned
from his position as the Government Chief Whip because of the incident,
and the police. Plebgate gained notoriety initially for the conduct claimed of
Mitchell and again two months later when, subsequent to Mitchell’s resig-
nation, CCTV and other evidence was revealed which appeared to call into
question some of the evidence against him.
Leaked police logs, later apparently backed up by eyewitness evidence,
suggested that Mitchell had sworn at police officers on duty at Downing
Street and called them “plebs” (a pejorative word signifying someone of low
social class) when they refused to open the main gate for him as he attempted
to leave with his bicycle, telling him to walk through the adjacent pedestrian
gate instead. Mitchell apologised but denied using the words claimed and
in particular calling police officers “plebs.” However, finding his position
untenable amid the media storm surrounding the incident, he resigned from
office a month later. The story returned to the headlines a few months later,
when CCTV footage was released to the media which threw into doubt the
police version of events and when it was revealed that an email purporting
to be from a member of the public, which had backed up the accounts given
in the official police log, was actually sent by a serving police officer who
had not been present at the scene. The Metropolitan Police investigated the
incident as Operation Alice.
The affair was revisited again in October 2013, after a report from the
then Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) concluded three
officers representing the Police Federation had given a false account of a
meeting they had with Mitchell at his constituency office in October 2012,
and that the findings of a subsequent investigation had been changed just
 National policing structures 93

in time to recommend no disciplinary action be taken against them. After

both Home Secretary Theresa May and Prime Minister David Cameron
criticised the conduct of the officers involved, the officers issued a statement
in which they apologised for misleading the public. At the Old Bailey, PC
Keith Wallis subsequently admitted falsely claiming to have witnessed the
incident and was sentenced to 12 months in prison. Once the criminal tri-
als were out of the way, Mitchell sued for libel. The judge ruled that on the
balance of probabilities Mitchell had said the words alleged or something so
close to them as to amount to the same including the politically toxic word
pleb (BBC 2014a). However, as a result of this event, which included allega-
tions that federation members lied to parliament, the then Home Secretary
Theresa May referred to this, along with others, in a speech on 21 May 2014
which demanded the police address issues of honesty and integrity and that
the Federation reform (BBC 2014b). This call for reform supported ongoing
reviews of the Police Federation. At the end of December 2012, the PFEW
announced it would be independently reviewed. The review was conducted
by Sir David Normington (Normington 2014) and the Police Federation ac-
cepted its recommendations in May 2014 and is currently working through
making these organisational changes. Briefly, the conclusion of the report
proposed changes from the top to the bottom of the federation in terms of
culture, behaviours, structures, and organisation. It also suggested that the
federation had a history of resistance to change and would need exceptional
leadership and commitment to introduce the changes recommended. Over-
all the report considered the federation needed to engage in:

• Building trust through a new openness and accountability to the mem-

bership and the public, including how resources were being used, and
an effective two way communication process with its members.
• Professionalism by improving competence and capability of the federa-
tion’s representatives. This includes higher professional standards and
conduct in the way representatives behave towards each other, to politi-
cians, and to the general public.
• Unity through putting aside all the historic divisions between ranks
and branches and between branches and head office. This would be
achieved by establishing a National Council with representatives to act
and speak with a single creditable voice.
• Value for money by showing it is willing to find ways of cutting costs and
reducing members subscriptions.

As such, an Interim National Board (INB) was set up (formerly the Joint
Central Committee) which had responsibility for national pay negotiations
on behalf of its members. This has now been superseded by the National
Board. It also performs many other functions, such as training, administer-
ing legal representation, and liaising with government and other national
94 National policing structures

bodies on policy and legislative matters. The current structure of the Police
Federation of England and Wales operates at three levels: namely Branch,
National, and Region level.

Branch level
Each police force in England and Wales has a Police Federation Branch.
Branches are made up of local workplace representatives for that force, the
Branch Council, who are elected by members from that force, and workplace
representatives undertake their work alongside their duties as a full-time
police officer. A Branch Board is elected from the Branch Council, which
includes Branch Secretary, Chair, and Treasurer. Branch Boards meet regu-
larly through the year to consider issues that affect their electorate.
Branch Boards act as the negotiation and consultative body when dealing
with their force’s Chief Constable, senior officers, and the Police and Crime
Commissioners, providing a link between police officers and senior man-
agement. They deal with the day-to-day problems Federated officers face,
and work to improve the status of the police service and its members.

National level
The Branch Chair and Secretary from each force, as well as other individ-
uals from protected characteristics groups, make up the National Council
which meets regularly through the year to discuss national issues. From the
National Council, a National Board is elected by National Council mem-
bers. The National Board along with the National Council are the key
decision-making bodies for the organisation.

Regions
Each of the 43 Joint Branch Boards is also part of one of eight regions:

• Region 1: North West (comprising Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater

Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside)
• Region 2: North East (comprising Cleveland, Durham, Humberside,
Northumbria, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire)
• Region 3: Midlands (comprising Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West
Mercia, West Midlands)
• Region 4: Eastern (comprising Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Leices-
tershire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire,
Suffolk)
• Region 5: South East (comprising Bedfordshire, Essex, Hampshire,
Hertfordshire, Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley)
 National policing structures 95

• Region 6: South West (comprising Avon & Somerset, Devon & Cornwall,
Dorset, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire)
• Region 7: Wales (comprising Dyfed Powys, Gwent, North Wales, South
Wales)
• Region 8: London (comprising City of London, Metropolitan)
(POLFED 2020)

The PFEW’s HQ is at Leatherhead, Surrey, in a complex which also incor-

porates the federation’s national training centre and a hotel facility for fed-
eration members. The above does not of course cover national forces such
as The MOD police. The Ministry of Defence Police has its own federation
separate from Home Office police federations. The Defence Police Feder-
ation (DPF) was created in 1971 and has legal status by provision of the
Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. The DPF functions in a similar fashion
to a trade union and membership is voluntary. Like all UK police forces the
MDP does not have the right to take strike action. However, the DPF has
in recent years concentrated its efforts on what it sees as unfair conditions
levelled on MDP Officers in comparison to other Home Office (HO) and
Special Police forces. These include:

• Pay—MDP Officers are only paid 95% of the salary other officers re-
ceive. This includes Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) Officers, who
now have full pay parity with HO Forces.
• Pension—MDP Officers are currently enrolled as part of the Civil Ser-
vice Alpha Pension scheme on joining, not the standard police pension
scheme.
• Retirement Age—MDP Officers are currently expected to work until
age 65. This includes qualifying yearly as an AFO and completing the
bleep test to 7.6. The DPF is currently co-operating with a study by the
University of Loughborough to determine how realistic these fitness ex-
pectations are of officers as they age.

Whilst the Police Federation of England and Wales represents ranks up to

and including Chief Inspectors, those ranks above this—which are not rep-
resented by the National Police Chiefs Council (discussed elsewhere in this
book)—are represented by the Superintendents Association.

The Superintendents’ Association

The Police Superintendents’ Association is the sole representative body for
police officers in the ranks of superintendent and chief superintendent in
England and Wales. Its members are the senior operational leaders in po-
licing in the 43 Home Office forces, British Transport Police, and the Civil
96 National policing structures

Nuclear Constabulary. The Association’s headquarters are in Pangbourne,

Berkshire. The 1919 Police Act, which created the Police Federation of
England and Wales to represent officers below the rank of superintendent,
made no formal provision for the rank of superintendents. In 1920 the Home
Office called a conference of superintendents, one from each force, or two
from those with more than 12 superintendents, to decide how they should
be represented on the Police Council. The delegates decided to elect one
county and one city or borough superintendent to the Police Council, and a
committee of eight was formed to communicate with the Home Secretary.
This was the beginning of the present Superintendents’ Association.
The Police Council met for the first time on 6 July 1920 and formulated
Police Regulations to provide national conditions of service, discipline,
and allowances for officers. The following year, the Home Secretary ap-
proved the establishment of four permanent District conferences for su-
perintendents, with each force sending one representative, or two from
larger forces. They were permitted to convene twice every year, at public
expense. In 1952, a committee chaired by Lord Oaksey published a re-
port that contained recommendations on police pay and conditions of
service. This led to the formation of the Police Superintendents’ Associ-
ation of England and Wales and also included the Metropolitan Police
Service in London and the City of London Police, both of which had
been outside the previous arrangements. The association is the sole rep-
resentative body for superintendents and chief superintendents and has
represented its members through a series of reforms including most nota-
bly the Willink Commission (1960), the Edmund-Davies Inquiry (1977),
the Sheehy Inquiry (1992), the Winsor Review (2010), and the Hutton
pension reforms (2010).
As the association grew in strength and influence over the years, the
Home Office agreed to fund a Chief Superintendent to be seconded from
a force as the full-time Secretary of the association. Additional fund-
ing was granted in 1983, 1995, and 2004, respectively, for the posts of
National President, National Deputy Secretary, and vice president. In
2014 the post of Deputy National Secretary was removed and replaced
by an employed police staff member as Assistant Secretary. In 2018, the
association shortened its name to become the Police Superintendents’ As-
sociation (dropping “of England and Wales”) to more accurately reflect
the UK-wide scope of its membership. Serving police officers who are
Superintendents or Chief Superintendents in one of the 43 Home Office
England and Wales police forces, the British Transport Police, and the
Civil Nuclear Constabulary can join the association. Since 2014, this has
included the new Direct Entry Superintendents recruited directly into
the rank from outside the police service. The association currently has
around 1,285 members, and eligible officers are not automatically en-
rolled but must opt-in to join, paying an annual subscription.
 National policing structures 97

Important point

The Police Superintendents’ Association is the sole representative

body for police officers in the ranks of superintendent and chief su-
perintendent in England and Wales. Its members are the senior oper-
ational leaders in policing.

There are currently 46 Branches of the association, one for each of the
46 eligible forces. The Branches are grouped together into five Districts,
A, B, C, D, and E. These represent largely geographic areas but are con-
figured to ensure a mixture of large metropolitan forces and smaller
forces within each District. Branch officials, elected by their peers, are
the voting members who attend District meetings. The number of del-
egates who attend from each Branch is in proportion to the number of
members within the Branch. District meetings are held three times a
year, hosted by different Branches, in turn, on a rota basis. National
Officers attend each District meeting. The president chairs the associa-
tion’s National Executive Committee (NEC), which is its policy-making
forum. The NEC includes the vice president and two representatives
from each District. There are also representatives for women members;
black and minority ethnic (BME) members; and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) members. These “reserved places” are elected
and are there to ensure that the NEC represents and champions the di-
verse interests of Superintendents and the wider service. The Association
also has a representative from Wales to represent Welsh police interests.
The NEC meets five times per year, and the association holds an annual
general meeting (AGM), usually in spring. It also holds a national con-
ference every September.

The College of Policing

Historical context of the College of Policing

When considering the College of Policing (COP), it is necessary to outline
the historical developments that have given rise to the establishment as we
know it today. Following the Second World War the British Home Office
fronted by senior civil servant Sir Frank Newsam set about to establish a
National Police Training College. This was hailed “a landmark in the history
of the police force of England and Wales” by the then Home Secretary James
Chuter Ede (Harris 1949: 217). As explained by Harris (1949), the Bramshill
Police Training College was established in 1948 by the Home Office for the
98 National policing structures

purpose of providing training to officers serving at, or seeking promotion

to, the rank of Inspector or above. With the rationale that:

In order to raise the standards and efficiency of the Police Service

college training should widen the interests, improve the professional
knowledge, and stimulate the energies of men in the middle or higher
ranks of the Service.
(Harris 1949: 219)

Described as an “outstanding example of cooperation between the central

Government, the local authorities, and the Police themselves” (Harris 1949:
218), the establishment of the Police Training College set the precedence for
a national body that aimed to provide training and to improve standards of
policing in the United Kingdom. Albeit targeted towards the upper echelons
of policing, this establishment laid the foundations for the future of police
training and development, and its successive replacements. The National Po-
lice College was later named the “Police Staff College” in 1979 and continued
its work through until 2001. Under the New Labour administration, Part 4 of
the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 saw the Police Staff College replaced
by the Central Police Training and Development Authority (CPTDA), com-
monly known as Centrex. Essentially, Centrex was responsible for overseeing
police recruitment processes, training and promotions, whilst it also sought
to “to provide advice and consultancy services, generally with respect to best
police practice” (Great Britain: Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001). Centrex
was made up predominantly of seconded police officers and civil servants on
the premise that “good police practitioners would automatically be good train-
ers”; whilst this would appear to be a logical presumption, Reiner (2000) ex-
plains this model is indicative of the insular nature of the police force and its
resistance to external agencies (such as higher education and academics) in
the provision of education and in advisory roles (Rogers 2011: 5).
Further reform under the 2006 Police and Justice Act saw the dissolu-
tion of Centrex and the establishment of the National Police Improvement
Agency (NPIA), formed by the amalgamation of Centrex along with other
relevant agencies including the Police Information Technology Organisa-
tion, the National Centre for Policing Excellence, and a number of Home
Office staff roles (Great Britain: Home Affairs Committee 2011). As ex-
plained by Rogers (2011: 5), the idea of the NPIA was to “work in partnership
with forces and other policing agencies to improve the way they work across all
areas of policing.” This effectively saw the mainstreaming of the idea of col-
laboration in police work, training, and policy development, acknowledging
that policing was not solely the job of the police.
The Home Affairs Committee stated that:

The NPIA has done much to bring about welcome changes to policing.
In particular, it has acted as a catalyst for identifying areas for efficiency
 National policing structures 99

gains within forces, encouraging greater collaboration and identifying

where economies of scale can be realised through national procurement
frameworks. It has succeeded in the first stage of rationalising a number
of different agencies responsible for supporting police forces. But now
is the right time to phase out the NPIA, reviewing its role and how this
translates into a streamlined national landscape.
(Great Britain: Home Affairs Committee 2011: 2)

Establishment of the College of Policing

The creation of the College of Policing was first announced by the Home
Secretary in December 2011 and became effective in February 2013 (Col-
lege of Policing 2015). The COP inherited much of its responsibility from its
predecessors (the National Police Improvement agency and Centrex) as well
as the Association of Chief Police Officer (ACPO). However, the College of
Policing differs in the fact that it is:

The first professional body of policing, [it is] a different entity from the
NPIA, with a different mission and objectives. Its governance is dif-
ferent and inclusive, and its priorities are evidence-based and commis-
sioned with partners within and outside policing.
(College of Policing 2013: 1)

The College of Policing Came into existence as a registered limited com-

pany; notwithstanding this, it has been stated by the College of Policing that
“although the Home Secretary is its only shareholder, the Home Secretary has
been clear that she does not believe the Government should be responsible for
the day-to-day running of the College” (College of Policing 2013: 4). It has
further been added that “as soon as Parliamentary time allows, the College
of Policing will be established as a statutory body, independent of government”
(College of Policing 2015). Notwithstanding this, the notion of independ-
ence is disputed as this chapter will discuss.
The overall strategic aim of the COP is “to ensure all officers and staff
have the right knowledge and skills to do their job,” ultimately aiming to
create an efficient and professional police service within the UK (College
of Policing 2013: 1).
Highlighting its main strategic aims to:

• set standards of professional practice

• accredit training providers and set learning and development outcomes
• identify, develop and promote good practice based on evidence
• support police forces and other organisations to work together to protect
the public and prevent crime
• identify, develop and promote ethics, values and standards of integrity.
(College of Policing 2013: 1)
100 National policing structures

One way in which the College of Policing set out to achieve such aims is
through collaboration with academics and the Higher Education (HE) sys-
tem. This section predominantly focusses on the collaboration aspect of the
College of Policing work (particularly between the police and the academic
sector) for the purpose of developing evidence-based policy and practice
within operational policing.

Important point

The overall strategic aim of the COP is “to ensure all officers and staff
have the right knowledge and skills to do their job,” ultimately aiming
to create an efficient and professional police service within the UK.

At present, the College of Policing has increased the emphasis on action

research, bringing together both police and academic researchers to work in
collaboration, with the intention of generating evidence-based policies that
can be mutually understood and translated into well-reasoned practices
whilst allowing ongoing evaluation and development of the “What Works”
evidence base (College of Policing 2013). However, its aim is not:

just the creation and availability of rigorous evidence on what works

best to reduce crime, but also an understanding of how this evidence
is adopted throughout an organisation and the extent to which it is ac-
cepted and valued within the professional culture.
(Ritter and Lancaster 2013 cited in Hunter et al. 2015: 3)

As explained by Sharples (2013), Cherney and Head (2011) (cited in Hunter

et al. 2015: 3):

The most effective mechanisms for bridging the inherent gaps between
research knowledge and practice are frequently debated. Recommenda-
tions focus on the accessibility and format of information, the need to
involve practitioners as evidence producers so research is more firmly
embedded in and relevant to frontline experience; increasing skills
and capacity through training and development programmes and the
‘championing’ of research-based practice within the organisation.

As claimed by the COP, there is a positive correlation between police knowl-

edge of research and willingness to incorporate evidence-based practice into
police work (Miller 2013). Therefore, through the use of academic collabo-
ration the COP aims to “increase receptivity and engagement of the Service
 National policing structures 101

to research & scientific practice; to encourage excellence in development and

application of research into practice; to support continuous professional de-
velopment of practitioners [and] strengthen the evidence base for policing”
(Miller 2013: 4). Nonetheless, this model is not without its criticisms. The
College of Policing aims to assist and facilitate the building of partnerships
between police forces and academic institutions, namely universities. Prior
to the creation of the College of Policing, Laws and Rein (1997) identified
three distinct stakeholders in the process of evidence-based policy develop-
ment and application:

Front line officers who deliver the service; policy makers and upper
managers who define agency goals; and the perspective of researchers
who attempt to develop knowledge that is both useful and generalizable.
(Laws and Rein 1997: 53)

The idea of police and academic collaboration isn’t an entirely new con-
cept, with research consortiums such as the University Police Science
Institute (UPSI) and the Applied Criminology Centre having forged suc-
cessful police and academic partnerships predating the College of Policing
(University of Huddersfield 2015; UPSI 2015). The creation of the College
of Policing discernibly introduces a new stakeholder in the process of fa-
cilitating police and academic partnerships. The College of Policing has
been extremely influential in the changes as to how officers will be edu-
cated now and in the future, particularly through the Police Education
Qualification Framework (PEQF).

The Police Education Qualification Framework (PEQF)

During 2016, the College of Policing undertook a consultation exercise with
three options for consideration, namely:

1 The establishment of a qualifications framework for policing, working

in partnership with the Higher Education sector to set minimum educa-
tion levels.
2 The creation of opportunities for current officers and staff to gain ac-
credited and recognised qualifications.
3 The development of initial entry routes which involved self-funded
undergraduate programmes, police-funded graduate conversion pro-
grammes for graduates in other academic disciplines and higher level
apprenticeships (HLA).
(College of Policing 2016: 5)

Following the consultation, the College announced a number of changes

as to how the police are recruited, how qualifications are recognised, and
102 National policing structures

the educational requirements for promotion (College of Policing 2017). As a

result there are three new ways to prepare new recruits for the role of consta-
ble, including an apprenticeship which trains you to degree level.

• Apprenticeship. Join as a constable, and follow an apprenticeship in

professional policing practice—you earn while you learn. This route
normally takes three years with both on and off the job learning. On
successfully finishing the programme, you complete your probation and
achieve a degree.
• Degree-holder entry. If you have a degree in any subject, you can join
and follow a work-based programme, supported by off the job learn-
ing. This route normally takes two years, and the learning you have
undergone is recognised in a graduate diploma in professional policing
practice when you complete probation.
• Pre-join degree. If you want to study first, you can do a three-year de-
gree in professional policing at your own expense, and then apply to a
force and follow a shorter on the job training programme. Being a spe-
cial constable can be included in this route.

The justification put forward for the introduction of such a programme

lies mainly in a changing society. Police officers have to make difficult
decisions which impact upon the public daily, facing complex problems,
dangerous situations, and the changing nature of crime. Additionally
they are required to engage in such as digital investigation, and also to
deal with vulnerable people. Traditional training programmes were not
designed with these demands and challenges in mind. Constables, for
example, will need to operate at a level where personal responsibility for
decisions in difficult environments will be required. In addition, as Tong
(2017) rightly points out, the police will have to contend with rapidly
changing technology, including the use of drones, driverless cars, big
data, and the introduction of AI (artificial intelligence). Technological
skills are not usually utilised in police training facilities, and as police
work becomes more technical and specialised, different challenges will
appear in terms of community safety and engagement, as well as greater
opportunities for criminal activities.

Important point

The Police Education Qualification Framework introduced three new

ways to enter the police: namely through an apprenticeship approach,
as a degree holder, or through a pre-join degree programme.
 National policing structures 103

Conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, there are several important national polic-
ing structures that interact with the local structures of policing in England
and Wales. The National Crime Agency is an important player in the co-
ordination and strategic response to serious organised crime and those
criminal activities that cross force boundaries. In addition, there are several
“national” type forces that, whilst generally having the powers of consta-
bles attached to their officers, operate in a special environment. Further
organisations operate at a national level, such as the Police Federation, the
Superintendents Association, and the College of Policing. This illustrates
that, although the delivery of policing is locally based, the national focus is
extremely important in terms of welfare, education, and training of police
officers. An important aspect, however, is that neither local nor national po-
lice agencies operate in isolation, and they are connected in order to provide
a corporate approach to policing in England and Wales. This connection, of
course, works with regard to the international structures of policing as well.

Reflective questions
1 Why is it important to have national policing structures?
2 Should national police forces such as the Civil Nuclear Constabulary
exist? Please explain your answer.
3 What are the problems associated with a national police structure?
4 If mutual aid is used so often, should there be a national uniformed
police?
5 Why are police officers not allowed by law to strike?
6 Should policing be a degree entry profession? Please explain your answer.

Useful websites
National Crime Agency: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/.
British Transport Police: https://www.btp.police.uk/.
Civil Nuclear Constabulary: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
civil-nuclear-constabulary.
Ministry of Defence Police: http://www.mod.police.uk/.
Police Federation of England and Wales: https://www.polfed.org/.
The College of Policing: https://www.college.police.uk/Pages/Home.aspx.

References
BBC. (2014a) Andrew Mitchell ‘Probably Called Police Plebs,’ Judge Rules. Available
at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30235009 (accessed 17/2/2020).
BBC. (2014b) Theresa May Urges Police Federation Reform. Available at https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27504422 (accessed 17/2/2020).
104 National policing structures

BTP (British Transport Police). (2020) History. Available at http://www.btp.police.

uk/about_us/our_history.aspx (accessed 17/2/2020).
College of Policing. (2013) Frequently Asked Questions. Available at http://www.
college.police.uk/About/Documents/FAQs_College.doc (accessed 26/1/2020).
College of Policing. (2015) About Us. Available at http://www.college.police.uk/
About/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 26/1/2020).
College of Policing. (2016) Policing Educational Qualifications Framework Consulta-
tion, Ryton, College of Policing.
College of Policing. (2017) An Education Qualifications Framework for Policing,
Ryton, College of Policing.
Great Britain: Criminal Justice and Police Act. (2001). Elizabeth II Chapter 16,
London, The Stationery Office.
Harris, R.E. (1949) New Police College Opened in Britain. Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 40(2), 217–222.
Home Affairs Committee. (2011) New Landscape of Policing: Report, London, Par-
liament House of Commons.
Home Office. (2012) Statutory Guidance for Police Collaboration, London, Home
Office.
Hunter, G., May, T., Wigzell, A. and McSweeney T. (2015) An Evaluation of the
‘What Works Centre for Crime Reduction’ Year 1: Baseline. Available at http://
www.whatworks.college.police.uk/About/Documents/WWCEvaluation_Year_1.
pdf (accessed 12/11/2015).
The Independent. (2015) NCA Slammed as ‘Ignorant’ and ‘Ill-Informed’ by High
Court Judge after Agency Used Unlawful Search Warrants. Available at https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/nca-slammed-as-ignorant-and-ill-
informed-by-high-court-judge-after-agency-used-unlawful-search-10247710.
html (accessed 7/4/2020).
Laws, D. and Rein, M. (1997) Knowledge for Policy and Practice, in Tucker, D.,
Garvin, C. and Sarri, R. (eds.), Integrating Knowledge and Practice, Westport,
CT, Praeger.
Lister, S. and Rowe, W. (2014). Electing Police and Crime Commissioners in England
and Wales: Prospecting for the Democratisation of Policing. Policing and Society,
An International Journal of Research and Policy, 25(4), 358–377.
Miller, N. (2013). Evidence Matters. Available at http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/
files/events/2015/Miller-Evidence-Matters.pdf (accessed 2/2/16).
NCA. (2020) The Rotherham Child Abuse Enquiry. Available at https://national
crimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/operation-stovewood-rotherham-
child-sexual-abuse-investigation?highlight=WyJyb3RoZXJoYW0iXQ==.
Normington, Sir Ian. (2014). Independent Report into the Police Federation. Availa-
ble at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/1163/1163.
pdf.
NPCC. (2019) National Policing Guidelines on Charging for Police Services: Mutual
Aid Cost Recovery, London, NPCC.
NPCC. (2020) National Police Coordination Centre. Available at https://www.npcc.
police.uk/NPoCC/home.aspx (accessed 19/2/2020).
POLFED. (2020) The Structure of the Federation. Available at https://www.polfed.
org/about-us/structure/structure-of-the-federation/ (accessed 19/2/2020).
 National policing structures 105

Police Federation. (2020) Each Officer Is an Independent Legal Official and Not
An “Agent Of The Police Force, Police Authority or Government.” Available at
https://www.polfed.org/.
Reiner, R. (2000) The Politics of the Police, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Rogers, C. (2007) The Civil Nuclear Constabulary: Accountability and Policing
Post 9/11. The Police Journal, 80(3), 237–245.
Rogers, C. (2011) Introduction, in Rogers, C., Lewis, R., John, T. and Read, T. (eds.),
Police Work: Principles and Practice, Oxon, Routledge.
Tong, S. (2017) Professionalising Policing: Seeking Viable and Sustainable Ap-
proaches to Police Education and Learning. No 3 (2017): European Police Science
and Research Bulletin – Special Conference Edition Nr.3.
University of Huddersfield. (2015) Applied Criminology Centre. Available at http://
www.hud.ac.uk/research/researchcentres/acc/ (accessed 20/12/15).
UPSI. (2015) About Us. Available at http://upsi.org.uk/about-us/ (accessed 20/12/15).
Waddington, P.A.J. (1991) The Strong Arm of the Law, Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Chapter 5

International police
structures

Introduction
Until relatively recently policing operated in a local dimension. Crime and
disorder tended to be found within a limited geographical area and most po-
lice officers rarely had contact with officers from other forces. Local knowl-
edge fuelled much police practice. However, this approach has changed and
has affected the fundamental practices of local policing (Casey et al. 2018).
Consequently, there has to be some form of arrangement or agency at the
international level that can connect local and national police agencies in
an effort to tackle growing cross border and global criminality. This chap-
ter will explore those international agencies that currently work with police
organisations in the United Kingdom and consider their history and their
function, as well as a critical discussion concerning their effectiveness.
It would appear that the main driver in the development of the major-
ity of international police co-operation has been the need for exchange of
information and intelligence about common threats. However, the idea of
international cooperation amongst police agencies and other facets of the
criminal justice system has taken on heightened significance. Criminals
and criminal enterprises do not restrict their activities to existing geopo-
litical boundaries. This has only accelerated in recent decades with both
the softening of some regional borders and the acceleration of information
technologies into our lives. In addition, political responses to globalisation
have had a profound impact upon the structures of policing and its organ-
isational culture, priorities, and procedures (Bowling et al. 2019). It is now
easier than ever for criminals, terrorists, and other motivated offenders to
utilise technology in order to conduct their criminal activities at greater
distances. These distances provide both physical and legal protection for
offenders, whilst complicating governmental efforts to detect, disrupt, and
investigate transnational crimes and illicit activities. International police
cooperation is also witnessed in the trend to introduce blended police and
military responses to stabilise and (at times) democratise nations in crisis.
Though the need for international cooperation is apparent, bringing about
 International police structures 107

successful cooperative schemes is a difficult process. Nations differ in the

structure and procedures associated with their criminal justice systems and
they have differing standards and rules for how their justice systems work.
Nations also have different cultural values regarding human rights, civil lib-
erties, and the role of government in the lives of the citizenry, and the nature
of police operations and interactions with the public. Nations have varied
political systems for creating and enforcing laws, as well as having varying
levels of professionalisms within their policing systems and differing eco-
nomic capacities to fund public safety and national security operations. At
the most fundamental level, nations at times differ in what behaviours con-
stitute a violation of criminal law. All of these factors complicate developing
effective international cooperation amongst nations, even when there is a
predisposition to unite. The challenges are further enhanced by the intro-
duction of nationalism, historical regional conflicts, and the varying per-
sonalities and egos of those charged with representing the policing interests
of their respective nations.

Important point

Challenges to good international policing arrangements include:

• Different criminal justice systems in different countries;
• Different political systems for creating laws;
• Different cultural views, especially concerning human rights;
• Different governance and accountability structures.

Despite these many obstacles, there are examples of effective efforts by

nations and police forces to cooperate in the furtherance of law enforce-
ment and national security objectives. There appears to be two types of glo-
balised style policing agencies: namely Global Hubs, such as Interpol, and
Regional Policing Agencies, such as Europol.

Regional policing agencies

EUROPOL
Europol is the European Union’s law enforcement agency. At the time of
writing, Police agencies in the UK are members of Europol. Following
Brexit, of course, it may be that police agencies in the UK will not be full
members of Europol but will still have protocols and arrangements in place
concerning information exchange, etc. Headquartered in The Hague, the
Netherlands, Europol supports the EU Member States in their fight against
108 International police structures

terrorism, cybercrime, and other serious and organised forms of crime.

They also work with many non-EU partner states and international or-
ganisations. Large-scale criminal and terrorist networks pose a significant
threat to the internal security of the EU and to the safety and livelihood of
its people. The biggest security threats appear to come from:

• Terrorism;
• International drug trafficking and money laundering;
• Organised fraud;
• The counterfeiting of euros;
• Trafficking in human beings.

The networks behind the crimes in each of these areas are quick to seize
new opportunities, and they are resilient in the face of traditional law en-
forcement measures. Europol therefore offers a unique range of services and
provide:

• Support centre for law enforcement operations;

• Hub for information on criminal activities;
• Centre for law enforcement expertise.

Important point

Following Brexit, it may be that police agencies in the UK will not be

full members of Europol but will hopefully still have protocols and
arrangements in place concerning information exchange, etc.

Europol has more than 1,000 staff members, 220 liaison officers, approxi-
mately 100 crime analysts, and support over 40,000 international investiga-
tions each year. However, their core function is that of analysis.

CEPOL
The European Union has enlarged from 15 to (currently) 28 Member States,
the idea of an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice had been introduced
in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), and by the Lisbon Treaty coming into
effect (2009), the Stockholm Programme (2010) called, among other things,
for fostering a genuine European judicial and law enforcement culture,
where training on Union-related issues would be systematically accessible
for judicial staff as well as law enforcement officials (European Council
2010, Article 1.2.6 “Training”).
 International police structures 109

CEPOL is an agency of the European Union dedicated to developing,

implementing, and coordinating training for law enforcement officials. It
brings together a network of training institutes for law enforcement officials
in EU Member States and supports them in providing frontline training on
security priorities, law enforcement cooperation, and information exchange.
CEPOL also works with EU bodies, international organisations, and other
countries to ensure that the most serious security threats are tackled with
a collective response. On l July 2016, the date of its new legal mandate,
CEPOL’s official name changed from “European Police College” to “The
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training.” The European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training was established by the Regu-
lation (EU) 2015/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
November 2015. These documents are key working documents of CEPOL.
CEPOL’s stated mission is to contribute to a safer Europe by facilitat-
ing cooperation and knowledge sharing among law enforcement officials of
the EU Member States and to some extent, from other countries, on issues
stemming from EU priorities in the field of security; in particular, from the
EU Policy Cycle on serious and organised crime (CEPOL 2017). National
law enforcement training institutions—through framework partnership
agreements—implement activities from CEPOL’s Work Programme. In ad-
dition to providing training at a national level, national law enforcement
training institutions are a vital part of the CEPOL network and work with
CEPOL to:

• Implement the annual Work Programme;

• Contribute to the EU learning network and harmonised curricula
through the provision of national expertise and identification of good
practice;
• Design the learning environment to agreed common standards;
• Support CEPOL’s e-Net.

Between 2014 and 2017, CEPOL went through a series of major milestones
that profoundly changed the agency and shaped its future—from the reloca-
tion to Hungary to the implementation of its new mandate. CEPOL was able
to successfully maintain business continuity whilst increasing the participa-
tion, quality, and diversity of its activities. In 2014, staff had four months to
relocate the agency from the United Kingdom to Hungary whilst keeping it
fully operational. In 2017, in line with a thorough analysis of training needs
and the agency’s mandate, CEPOL offered thematic training portfolios in
eight priority categories. The training offer comprised residential activ-
ities, online learning (i.e. webinars, online modules, online courses, etc.),
exchange programmes, as well as research and science initiatives. The use of
differentiated training tools ensures complementarity and the opportunity
to respond in the best possible way to the needs of the Member States. More
110 International police structures

than 89% of the CEPOL training and learning activities aimed at closing
performance gaps for law enforcement officials tasked with tackling critical
security threats stemming from the European Agenda on Security, such as:

• Serious and organised crime, including cybercrime and migration ---

30% of activities;
• Counter-terrorism – --26% of activities;
• Horizontal aspects, such as law enforcement cooperation tools, profes-
sional networks and information exchange, etc. ---33% of activities.
(CEPOL 2020)

In terms of engagement and quality of provision, the majority of police or-

ganisations and their staff who receive CEPOL training appear to find them
quite good. For example, a survey of users of CEPOL, carried out by Rowe
and Beke (2018), concluded that the e-learning provision was very good, with
CEPOL having a strong profile across law enforcement and that the content
of their programmes meeting customer needs. Despite the fact that there
were some issues, such as language barriers, contact points in some coun-
tries were experiencing difficulties. Regardless of that, this report concluded
that these were problems associated with the re-emergence of CEPOL and
as such were seen as growing pains as the new organisation settled into the
international world of policing. A further criticism of CEPOL, however, is
that it is another pan-European agency designed to harmonise police educa-
tion and training and another structure designed to “centralise” and trans-
fer policy making away from individual states (Jaschke et al. 2007).

AFRIPOL
AFRIPOL (African Police Office) is an African criminal police agency that
facilitates the exchange of information between national police forces on
international crime, terrorism, narcotics, or arms trafficking in Africa. The
idea of creating Afripol was decided at the 22nd Interpol African Regional
Conference in 2013 which saw the unanimous support of the 41 leaders of
African police present at the conference. In October 2018, the AU Commis-
sioner for Peace and Security announced that more than 40 African coun-
tries are now working together via Afripol. Part of the process involves the
work of liaison offices in 40 countries.
In October 2018, AFRIPOL announced a cooperation agreement which
commenced in January 2019 with Interpol to “focus its efforts on the fight
against terrorism, transnational crimes and electronic crimes.”

AMERIPOL
The Police Community of the Americas or Ameripol is an agency coopera-
tion between police organisations created in 2007. Its mission is to promote
 International police structures 111

and enhance police cooperation in terms of technical-scientific facts, train-

ing, exchange of information, and progress in terms of legal assistance to
guide strategic and operational work against threats to public and citizen
safety. In 2015, AMERIPOL constituted as an agency of Police coopera-
tion for the joint deployment of strategies to deal with organised crime and
transnational crime in the Americas, supported in this work from every po-
lice force in the area, focussing on the security of citizens in all constituent
countries.

ASEANOPOL
The Association of South Eastern Nations Police (ASEANOPOL) is a simi-
lar international policing agency which also seeks to enhance Police profes-
sionalism, forge stronger regional cooperation in policing, and to promote
lasting friendship amongst police officers of member countries. Its main
objectives are to:

• Ensure the effective implementation of all resolutions adopted at the

ASEANAPOL Conferences;
• Serve as a coordination and communication mechanism to allow mem-
bers to establish and to maintain all channels of interaction amongst
members;
• Foster mutual assistance and cooperation amongst members; and
• Endeavour to increase regional cooperation efforts against transnational
crime.

In terms of functionality, this agency facilitates and coordinates cross-

border cooperation on intelligence and information sharing and exchange
with other countries, conducts and coordinates joint operations and activi-
ties involving criminal investigations, the building and maintenance of the
ASEANAPOL database, training, capacity building, the development of
scientific investigative tools, and technical support.
Whilst Regional Police Agencies were formed specifically to focus on
their own particular countries within a region, and generally operate sim-
ilarly in terms of their aims and objectives, they regularly work together in
an effort to combat cross border crime as the following example illustrates.

Case study—regional cooperation

Law enforcement authorities from more than 60 countries, coordi-
nated and supported by Europol joined forces to target organised
crime groups and their infrastructures across the EU in a series of
actions in hundreds of locations, with the cooperation of many other
regional agencies.
112 International police structures

Operation Dragon has been the fourth cooperative international

law enforcement operation under the EU Policy Cycle targeting seri-
ous and organised crime in the EU and globally, and involved actions
in hundreds of locations between 5 June and 20 October 2017.
EU Member States and their international partners came together
to disrupt the activities of criminal groups involved in the following
crime areas: payment card fraud, facilitation of illegal immigration,
cybercrime, synthetic drugs/cocaine/heroin trafficking, firearms traf-
ficking, euro counterfeiting, organised property crime, excise fraud
and trafficking in human beings.
As part of Operation Dragon, law enforcement authorities assigned
thousands of police, border and coast guard as well as customs of-
ficers to actions that focussed on key hotspots in the EU, with the aim
of having a lasting and significant impact on serious and organised
crime, disrupting criminal groups and their activities for months or
even years to come.

Important point

Regional police hubs not only focus upon their own region but col-
laborate with and work together with other regional hubs to tackle
serious organised crime.

Global policing hubs

Whilst regional policing hubs can work together in order to tackle serious
organised crime there are global policing agencies that claim to be world
policing organisations. The most well-known of these is Interpol, as well as
the United Nations Police (UNPOL).

Interpol
The international police organisation Interpol brings together police from
different nations in a joint network for cooperation in matters of inter-
national crime. Dating back to 1923, Interpol has steadily expanded its
membership and extended its mandate in the area of international police
objectives and now works at a global level. The terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11th, 2002 and the resulting increased awareness of the problem of in-
ternational crime and the urgency of its response brought about substantial
 International police structures 113

changes in Interpol’s structure and activities, and expanded its field of op-
eration. The full name of INTERPOL is the International Criminal Police
Organisation and they are an inter-governmental organisation. There are
currently 194 member countries, and INTERPOL’s main reason for exist-
ence is to assist police in all of these countries to work together to make the
world a safe and secure place.

Important point

The full name of INTERPOL is the International Criminal Police Or-

ganisation and they are an inter-governmental organisation. There are
currently 194 member countries.

In order to achieve this, INTERPOL facilitates and shares access to data

on crimes and criminals, whilst also offering a range of technical and op-
erational support. INTERPOL also connects all of these countries via a
communications system called I-24/7. Countries use this secure network to
contact each other, and INTERPOL itself. It also allows them to access
INTERPOL databases and services in real-time, from both central and re-
mote locations.
INTERPOL also coordinate networks of police and experts in different
crime areas, who come together through working groups and conferences to
share experiences and ideas, whilst also providing a range of expertise and
services to member countries. There are currently 17 police databases with
information on crimes and criminals (from names and fingerprints to sto-
len passports), accessible in real-time to member countries. They also offer
investigative support, such as forensics, analysis, and assistance in locat-
ing fugitives around the world. Training is an important part of Interpol’s
function so that officials know how to work efficiently and effectively with
their services. This expertise supports national efforts in combating crimes
across three global areas which are considered the most pressing today: ter-
rorism, cybercrime, and organised crime.
Officials working in each specialised crime area run a variety of differ-
ent activities alongside member countries. These activities include inves-
tigative support, field operations, training, and networking. In addition,
Interpol conducts extensive “environmental scanning” activities in order
to predict future crime problems through research and development in
international crime and trends. Since INTERPOL is a global organisa-
tion, it can provide a platform for cooperation enabling police to work
directly with their counterparts, even between countries which do not
have diplomatic relations. They also claim to provide a voice for police
114 International police structures

Table 5.1 Interpol’s Crime Programmes

Counter-terrorism Organised and emerging Cybercrime

crime

Assisting member Targeting and disrupting Making cyberspace

countries to prevent international criminal safe for all by
and disrupt terrorist networks; identifying, supporting
activities through analysing, and member countries
the identification of responding to criminal to prevent and
individuals, networks, threats investigate
and affiliates cyber-attacks

Source: The Author.

on the world stage, engaging with governments at the highest level to en-
courage this cooperation and use of their services. Interpol claims to be
a politically neutral organisation and operates within the limits of exist-
ing laws within the different country members. Interpol’s main activities
can be summarised in Table 5.1.
As we can see, not all of the work carried out by Interpol revolves around
bringing criminals to justice as the following work example illustrates.

Interpol work example

Following the 2004 Asian Tsunami, Interpol began an international

policing operation involving 700 officers and staff from 30 countries,
all supervised by Interpol. During a twoyear period, police identified
over 300 victims, assisted with body recovery and repatriation, and
investigated victims last known movements.
Source: the Author

Clearly, Interpol plays a number of significant roles in various as-

pects of criminal investigations, missing person files, human trafficking,
smuggling of drugs and contraband and often related crimes that ex-
tend across international boundaries. Interpol has assisted in the drive
to situate international collaboration and cooperation to solve crimes
and investigate criminal activities to a new modern level. The increased
use of technology in investigation surveillance and intelligence gathering
has provided successful prosecutions of offenders and resolved countless
outstanding cases (Sweet 2010). However, the organisation itself has not
been above criticism.
 International police structures 115

Criticisms
Despite the claims for success by Interpol and its constituent members it
has not been above criticism. It is alleged that sometimes co-operation
has been seen as largely illusory (Fijnaut 2016). For example, for the most
part only European police services have the more advanced means of com-
munication with Interpol at their disposal and some 70% of all Interpol
activities take place in and between Western Europe and North America
(Fijnaut 2016). Despite close cooperation through the members of Interpol,
an increase in inter-state relations and situations of conflict between states
can lead to an interruption or suspension of police cooperation (Safjanski
2015). Authoritarian regimes have also begun turning to Interpol for help
in pursuing their political opponents abroad. For example, it is alleged that
Russia transmitted through Interpol to criminal databases worldwide the
name of an individual who worked for a Moscow-based anti-corruption or-
ganisation and whom it was alleged had torn down a flyer from a fence val-
ued at around 2 dollars. He was circulated as wanted for theft of street art.
The individual fled to Lithuania and two years later went to Cyprus where
he was arrested and held for three weeks in gaol before being released by
the Cypriot Minister of Justice (Lemon 2019). Interpol is probably the most
well-known of the regional type police agencies. However, there are similar
types of police agencies that have been formed to assist in similar activities
across the world.

The United Nations Police (UNPOL)

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) is an integral part of the United Na-
tions peace operations. Currently, about 12,500 UN Police officers from
over 90 countries are deployed in 12 UN peacekeeping and 6 UN DPA-
led Special Political Missions. The mission of the UN Police is to enhance
international peace and security by supporting Member States in conflict,
post-conflict, and other crisis situations to realize effective, efficient, repre-
sentative, responsive, and accountable police services that serve and pro-
tect the population. Since the 1960s, the United Nations Member States,
including the UK, have contributed police officers to United Nations Peace-
keeping operations. The policing tasks of these operations were originally
limited to monitoring, observing, and reporting, but by the early 1990s, ad-
vising, mentoring, and training of personnel were adopted into the activities
of the peace operations. UN Police, mandated by the United Nations Secu-
rity Council build and support, or, where mandated, act as a substitute or
partial substitute for, host-state police capacity to prevent and detect crime,
protect life and property, and maintain public order and safety in adherence
to the rule of law and international human rights law. Through Formed
Police Units (FPUs), Individual Police Officers, specialised teams, and
116 International police structures

civilian experts, UN police pursue community-oriented and intelligence-

led policing approaches to contribute to the protection of civilians and
human rights; address, among others, sexual and gender-based violence,
conflict-related sexual violence, and serious and organised crime; and con-
duct investigations, special operations, and electoral security.
The duties and roles of the UN Police (UNPOL) component in a Peace-
keeping Operation or in a Special Political Mission may vary, depending on
each mission’s reality. The host-State policing institutions are, often, pri-
marily responsible for the link between the government and security issues.
Therefore, UNPOL play an important role on building the capacity of the
host government policing institutions and other law enforcement agencies,
especially in conflict and post-conflict situations, including technical assis-
tance, co-location, training and mentoring programs, where mandated.
Essentially, there are three different categories that work in United Na-
tions Police Component:

1 As an Individual Police Officer (IPO): an IPO is temporary seconded,

individually, to work within United Nations and share his/her knowl-
edge with the host-State policing institutions. United Nations efforts
are to bring highly specialised officers to mission areas. Some of the
requirements to work as an Individual Police Officer, for instance, are
to be at least 25 years old, maximum 62, with a minimum police-related
working experience of 5 years.
2 As part of a Formed Police Unit (FPU) component: FPU roles includes
crowd control and protection of UN assets. The whole component is
assessed as a unit before being deployed to a peacekeeping operation.
3 As a professional and higher categories staff: this kind of appointment may
allow you to initiate a career in United Nations, and often a master’s degree
or higher education is required. The salaries are higher and this includes
special functions in a mission like Chiefs and Senior Police Advisers.

Important point

The mission of the UN Police is to enhance international peace and se-

curity by supporting Member States in conflict, post-conflict, and other
crisis situations to realise effective, efficient, representative, responsive,
and accountable police services that serve and protect the population.

Also, UNPOL may be responsible for:

• Policy and guidance development: creating policy and guidance and de-
fining the parameters of international police peacekeeping.
 International police structures 117

• Strategic planning: strengthening the Police Division’s resources and

ability to conduct strategic planning.
• Selection and recruitment processes: improving efforts to recruit, se-
lect, deploy, and rotate highly qualified staff in missions. Increasing the
number of female officers in the UN Police service.
• Operational support to missions through the Standing Police Capacity:
increasing the effectiveness of the operational support provided by the
Standing Police Capacity.
• Response to Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV): strengthening
its response to sexual and gender-based violence and creating guidance
to assist its police officers.

In United Nations System, a Formed Police Unit (FPU) is a team of 140

police officers, which is deployed as a group, who undertake crowd control,
protect UN staff and material, and escort UN personnel when they must
visit insecure regions of a mission area. As peacekeepers, UNPOL person-
nel are increasingly involved in the three Rs—namely reform, restructuring,
and rebuilding. Whilst UNPOL are deployed as peacekeepers, there is also
a growing demand for UNPOL to become peacebuilders. Efforts to repli-
cate liberal democratic policing models in such places as Kosovo, Bosnia, and
later deployments to Timor-Leste in particular saw efforts to introduce and
reinforce democratic policing (Greener 2009). Whilst the Kosovo and Bosnia
work appeared to be successful, early missions in east-Timor failed to strongly
pursue democratic policing models with the result being the creation of a po-
lice force that was criticised for having a lack of democratic oversight and
control (Hood 2006). UNPOL and its approach used in international policing
can be very different for deployed officers from their normal policing jobs in
their home countries. Cultural, political, social, and economic environments
within which the police may have to work requires personnel who can be seen
to easily deal with such differences. UN policy has changed in line with the
UN peacekeeping operations which has seen key administration functions in
failing states being taken over. This involves greater and deeper peacebuild-
ing efforts with UNPOL becoming involved more in building democratic po-
licing agencies in countries not used to having such an approach.

United Nations Office on Drugs

and Crime (UNODC)
UNODC is an international agency in the fight against illicit drugs and in-
ternational crime. Established in 1997 through a merger between the United
Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime
Prevention, UNODC operates in all regions of the world through an ex-
tensive network of field offices. UNODC relies on voluntary contributions,
mainly from Governments, for 90% of its budget.
118 International police structures

This agency assists Member States in their actions against illicit drugs,
crime, and terrorism. In the Millennium Declaration, Member States also
resolved to intensify efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions,
to redouble the efforts to implement the commitment to counter the world
drug problem and to take concerted action against international terrorism.
Therefore the three pillars of the UNODC work programme are:

• Field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of

Member States to counteract illicit drugs, crime, and terrorism
• Research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understand-
ing of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence base for policy
and operational decisions
• Work to assist States in the ratification and implementation of the rele-
vant international treaties, the development of domestic legislation on
drugs, crime, and terrorism, and the provision of secretariat and sub-
stantive services to the treaty-based and governing bodies

UNODC assists membership and governments by concentrating their ef-

forts in the following areas:

Organised crime and trafficking. UNODC helps Governments react to the

instability and insecurity caused by crimes such as smuggling of illicit drugs,
weapons, natural resources, counterfeit goods, and human beings between
countries and continents. It also considers emerging forms of crime, such as
cybercrime, trafficking in cultural artefacts, and environmental crime.
Corruption. Corruption is a major impediment to economic and social de-
velopment, UNODC partners with the public and private sectors, as well as
civil society, to tackle the impact that corrupt individuals have on govern-
ment, national borders, and trading channels.
Crime prevention and criminal justice reform. UNODC promotes the use of
training manuals and the adoption of codes of conduct and standards and
norms that aim to guarantee that the accused, the guilty, and the victims
can all rely on a criminal justice system that is fair and grounded on human
rights values. A strong rule of law also instils confidence among citizens in
the effectiveness of the courts and the humanness of the prisons.
Drug abuse prevention and health. By utilising educational ad campaigns
and by basing its approach on scientific findings, UNODC tries to convince
young people not to use illicit drugs; drug-dependent people to seek treat-
ment; and Governments to see drug use as a health problem, not a crime.
Terrorism prevention. On this issue, UNODC is moving towards an approach
that involves developing long-term, customised assistance to agencies in-
volved in investigating and adjudicating cases linked to terrorism.

As can be seen, the United Nations plays a major part in global polic-
ing activities. The original idea of peacekeeping has become increasingly
 International police structures 119

changed into peacebuilding, and the UN has become increasingly involved

in tackling drug abuse, terrorism prevention, and crime prevention in
general.

Important aspects of International Policing

The European Arrest Warrant

The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is an arrest warrant valid through-
out all member states of the European Union (EU). Once issued, it re-
quires another member state to arrest and transfer a criminal suspect or
sentenced person to the issuing state so that the person can be put on
trial or complete a detention period. The Extradition Act 2003 (EA2003)
provided the domestic legal basis for the UK’s obligations on extradition.
The EA2003 introduced the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and sur-
render procedures between member states contained in what is called the
“Council Framework decision 2002/584/JHA” (Framework Decision). The
EA2003 also governs extradition to countries outside of the EU where
extradition treaties exist. An EAW can only be issued for the purposes of
conducting a criminal prosecution (not merely an investigation), or en-
forcing a custodial sentence. It can only be issued for offences carrying a
minimum penalty of one year or more in prison. Where the sentence has
already been passed, an EAW can only be issued if the prison term to be
enforced is at least four months long. The introduction of the EAW sys-
tem was intended to increase the speed and ease of extradition through-
out EU countries by removing the political and administrative phases of
decision-making which had characterised the previous system of extradi-
tion in Europe, and converting the process into a system run entirely by the
judiciary. Since it was first implemented in 2004 the use of the EAW has
risen. Member state country evaluation reports suggest that the number
of EAWs issued has increased from approximately 3,000 in 2004 to 15,200
in 2009, but dropped back to 10,400 in 2013. A European Arrest Warrant
may only be issued by the competent judicial authority in an EU member
state or a state with a special agreement with the EU. The issuing judicial
authority must complete a form stating identity and nationality of the per-
son sought, the nature and legal classification of the offence, the circum-
stances surrounding the alleged committal of the offence including when
and where it was committed and the degree of participation of the person
sought, and scale of penalties for the offence.
Many member states have designated public prosecutors as their judicial
authorities for the purposes of the framework decision. Such designations
have been questioned before the British and Irish courts on the basis that
in order for an authority to be judicial it should be a court or judge. In both
120 International police structures

countries, the designated issuing authority is a judge. However the courts

of each have rejected these arguments. In Assange v Swedish Prosecution
Authority the High Court of England and Wales found that:

[…] it cannot be said that the term judicial applies only to a judge who
adjudicates. The differing European traditions recognise that others,
including prosecutors, can be included within that term for various pur-
poses. It is therefore entirely consistent with the principles of mutual
recognition and mutual confidence to recognise as valid an EAW issued
by a prosecuting authority designated under Article 6. To do otherwise
would be to construe the word ‘judicial’ out of context and look at it
simply through the eyes of a common law judge, who would not con-
sider a prosecutor as having a judicial position or acting as a judicial
authority. The position in some other Member States is different […]
(Supreme Court UK 2011)

On appeal, the UK’s Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High Court
and found that, when comparing different language versions, the framework
decision demonstrated an intention to regard public prosecutors as judicial
authorities and that the conduct of the member states since its enactment
confirmed this interpretation. Since its implementation in 2004, the EAW
system has been occasionally criticised for inappropriate or disproportion-
ate use. Following a report by an internal working party, the Presidency of
the Council of the European Union suggested in 2007 that it would be ap-
propriate to have a discussion at EU level on the principle of proportionality
which is outset in article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity and how to take this principle into consideration by judicial authorities
when issuing a European arrest warrant.

Criticisms
EAWs have been issued for minor offences, such as possession of 0.45 grams
of cannabis; theft of two car tyres; driving a car under the influence of al-
cohol, where the limit was not significantly exceeded (0.81 mg/1); and the
theft of a piglet. In the UK, persons arrested under an EAW have been ex-
tradited for minor offences such as the stealing of ten chickens (Romania),
unintentionally receiving a stolen mobile phone (Poland), and theft of £20
worth of petrol (Czech Republic). At the other extreme, the EAW has failed
in some cases. The Irish Supreme Court refused to extradite an Irish citizen
to Hungary who was alleged to have killed two children through negligent
driving. While the Irish Court never questioned the facts of the case or the
fairness or outcome of the Hungarian trial, it decided that the person did
not technically “flee” from Hungary, only “failed to return,” having left the
country with the consent of the Hungarian authorities; therefore, the legal
 International police structures 121

requirements for extradition under an EAW had not been established. How-
ever, the requirement that the person has “fled” the requesting jurisdiction
has since been removed from Irish law, and a new warrant has been issued
by the Hungarian authorities. Mutual recognition in EU criminal law was
adopted as a second-best option as a result of member countries’ unwill-
ingness to harmonise their criminal legislation. Accordingly, the judicial
decisions of one member state need to be automatically acknowledged by
all member states. However different the member states’ substantive and
procedural rules may be, if a judgment is rendered in full compliance with
a member state’s laws, it has to be recognised by all other member states as
well. The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant is perhaps
the most prominent example of mutual recognition-based instruments in
the area of EU criminal law. Extradition between member states is simpli-
fied, and diverted from the traditional diplomatic level to a dialogue be-
tween the member states’ judiciaries. It abandons the requirement of double
criminality for a number of crime groups, and makes the surrender of a
member state’s own citizens mandatory in certain cases. Surrender can only
be denied on the basis of a limited number of pre-established grounds. As a
general rule, executing member states are obliged to depart from their tradi-
tional right and responsibility to assess the issuing countries’ legal systems,
including their fundamental rights protection mechanisms.
According to traditional standards developed by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), extradition was barred where there was a threat
of it resulting in a “flagrant breach of the European Convention on Human
Rights, without an effective remedy in the requesting State.” In contrast,
the Framework Decision on the EAW does not allow for such a meticulous
scrutiny and obliges member states to trust each other’s judiciaries and legal
systems. Surrender on the basis of human rights considerations may only
be halted if a member state seriously and persistently breaches the values
common to the EU and its member states, which are set out in Art. 2 TEU
(Treaty of European Union), and is sanctioned by the Council pursuant to
Art. 7 TEU.10. Alternatively, according to recent case law by the Court of
Justice for the European Union (CJEU), if the requested judicial authority
finds the general fundamental rights situation in an issuing country prob-
lematic, and establishes the potential risks of human rights violations in the
individual case, the surrender can also be postponed.
Mutual trust, i.e. the obligation on states to have confidence in each oth-
er’s legal systems, is a legal creation, a so-called presumption applicable vis-
à-vis member states as long as they are member states. Since the effect of a
surrender extends beyond the actual transfer of the suspect or the convict,
the underlying trust also has to cover future points in time, including when
a sentence in the transferred person’s case is likely to be passed, and if he or
she is found guilty, when a sanction is imposed and enforced. Mutual trust
therefore has to cover both the procedure to be conducted in the issuing
122 International police structures

state (i.e. it is to be presumed that member states have an impartial judici-

ary and all suspects will be granted a fair trial) and the possible criminal
sanctions, including prison conditions. Consequently, if a country ceases to
be an EU member state or is likely to be seceding from the EU by the time
a criminal decision is passed or a sanction is enforced, the presumption on
which the EAW is based can no longer apply at the time of surrender, and
the procedure of transfer should be halted.

The EAW and Brexit

Recent political changes means that the role of the EAW within British po-
licing has been thrown into doubt. At the time of writing, January 2020,
negotiations are ongoing with regard to its use following Brexit. However, it
may be that the UK will not be able to utilise the European Arrest Warrant
system after Brexit. This has triggered a number of fears concerning the
ability of criminals from Europe being able to live in the UK, and vice versa.
However, the current government has unveiled plans for an extradition
bill to ensure persons wanted by authorities in a trusted country for a se-
rious crime are arrested quickly. The measure will, it is reported, also give
the police powers to arrest someone wanted for a serious crime in a non-EU
country without having to apply to a court for a warrant first. However, the
government has admitted it will also be needed in dealings with EU coun-
tries in the event that the UK no longer had access to the European Arrest
Warrant after leaving the EU (The Independent 2019).

Important point

Following Brexit, the UK may not be members of the EAW process

and may have to negotiate worth other countries a similar function.

A separate and important international aspect of policing is that of police

liaison officers.

International Liaison Officers

Whilst much international co-operation depends on the Macro-level par-
ticipation by governments and their agencies and organisations, the smooth
running of local implementation of strategies is the responsibility of those
near to the work itself. If we accept that the goals of these co-operative
arrangements are to share intelligence on criminal activities, create new
training opportunities for field officers and staff, develop trust, and create
 International police structures 123

strong professional relationships (Casey et al. 2018), then good relationships

must exist at the functional level. One of the major structures in place that
helps this approach to function effectively is the role of the Liaison Officer.
This fairly recent innovation serves as points of first contact between police
forces in the host country and those of the country they represent, play-
ing the role of facilitators or mediators for the exchange of intelligence
and for personnel exchanges and the provision of training and equipment
(Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007). Liaison Officers often play a key role in
operations that involve multi-country/agency operations, liaising with local
police and law enforcement bodies. One of the problems associated with
Liaison Officers is that of cost. Because of this, Liaison Officers tend to be
posted to those countries with which there has already been a considera-
ble amount of co-operation. Consequently, a Liaison Officer in one country
may have responsibility for contacts with one or more other countries in a
particular region. The ability to network is often cited as a key factor to pos-
itive outcomes for police co-operation (Lemieux 2010) and involves officers
who are purely operational and work to enforce laws in conjunction with
foreign police institutions.

Important point

International liaison officers are important as they assist in the cooper-

ation between countries and can provide intelligence and information.

The deployment, therefore, of Liaison Officers facilitates co-operation

through the swift exchange of data and information. The Liaison Officer
is often described as the human interface for data connection between
their home and host Country (Block 2008). As Bowling et al. (2019) say,
they are often the glue that holds all of the international co-operation to-
gether, as they seek to solve problems in other countries that affect their
home countries.

Conclusion
As this chapter has clearly illustrated, International Policing is a vibrant,
functional, and important aspect of security for citizens across the world.
It has become more and more important as policing and security has, like
many other commodities, become globalised due to economic, political,
technical, and social changes. It is now clear that there is a distinct link
between the local, national, and international elements of crime, in its many
formats. Consequently, there has developed an appropriate response to
124 International police structures

this phenomenon, within a global or regional framework at the international

level. However, at whatever level an International agency exists, its primary
functions appear to include the exchange of information and intelligence, the
co-ordination of appropriate responses to particular crimes, the training and
education of its operators, and the important aspect of placing liaison officers
in difficult countries to help facilitate these objectives. Despite the apparent
advantages of such agencies, there still remain some fundamental questions
concerning accountability, governance, and the behaviours of some police of-
ficers on placement or attachment. Clearly, whilst the current situation does
not involve a truly global police force, in the future, should current trends con-
tinue, the possibility of such an organisation is not beyond belief. As a demon-
stration of how policing at the international level permeates downwards to
policing at a local level, one only has to consider the impact that Brexit may
have upon such issues as the European Exchange Warrant, designed to extra-
dite people convicted of criminal offences easily between members of the EU.
Should the UK not be allowed to maintain its membership of this policing
function, then an important alternative will have to be speedily put into place
in order for criminals to be brought to justice.

Reflective questions
1 In what ways do local, national, and international police agencies work
together?
2 What are the challenges associated with good policing arrangements at
the international level?
3 What are the main functions of the so-called international policing
hubs?
4 What are the major problems facing International policing agencies
such as UNPOL?
5 How important are Liaison Officers in international policing arrangements?

Useful websites
INTERPOL: https://www.interpol.int/en.
EUROPOL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/.
CEPOL: https://www.cepol.europa.eu/.
UN CIVPOL: https://police.un.org/en.
UNODC: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html?ref =menutop.
AMERIPOL: http://www.ameripol.org/portalAmeripol/appmanager/portal/
desk?_nfpb=false.
ASEANAPOL: http://www.aseanapol.org/.
 International police structures 125

References
Block, L. (2008) Combating Organised Crime in Europe: Practicalities of Police
Co-operation. Policing, 2(1), 74–81.
Bowling, B., Reiner, R. and Shyptycki, J. (2019) The Politics of the Police (5th
Edition), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Casey, J., Jenkins, M.J. and Dammer, H.R. (2018) Policing the World (2nd Edition),
Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press.
CEPOL. (2017) Annual Report. Available at https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/Annual%20Report%202017.pdf (accessed 27/8/2019).
CEPOL. (2020) What We Do. Available at https://www.cepol.europa.eu/who-we-are/
european-union-agency-law-enforcement-training/about-us (accessed 07/04/2020).
European Council. (2010). Article 1.2.6 “Training.” Available at https://register.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017024%202009%20INIT (accessed
27/8/2019).
Fijnaut, C.J.C.F. (2016) The Containment of Organised Crime and Terrorism,
Holland, Brill – Nijhoff.
Goldsmith, A. and Sheptycki, J. (2007) Crafting Transnational Policing: Police
Capacity-building and Global Policing Reform, Portland, OR, Hart Publishing.
Greener, B. (2009) The New International Policing, in the Possibility of Transna-
tional Policing. Policing and Society, 19(3), 300–317.
Hood, L. (2006) Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999–2004. International
Peacekeeping, 13(1), 66–77.
Independent. (2019) Brexit: UK could be thrown out of European Arrest Warrant
system, government admits. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/politics/brexit-european-arrest-warrant-boris-johnson-queens-speech-crim
e-a9253861.html (accessed 19/2/2020).
Jaschke, H.G., Bjorgo, T., Del Barrio Romero, F., Kwanton, C., Mawby, R. and
Pagon, M. (2007) Perspectives on Police Science in Europe, Bramshill, Hants.
Lemieux, F. (2010) The Nature and Structure of Police Co-operation, in Lemieux,
F. (ed.), International Police Co-operation: Emerging Issues, Theory and Practice,
Cullompton, Willan.
Lemon, E. (2019) Weaponizing Interpol. Journal of Democracy, 30(2), 15–29.
Rowe, M. and Beke, M. (2018) CEPOL Stakeholder Engagement Survey 2018. Availa-
ble at http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/38775/1/Rowe%20et%20al%20-%20CEPOL%20
Stakeholder%20Engagement%20Survey%202018.pdf (accessed 27/8/2019).
Safjanski, T. (2015) Prospects for the Development of the International Criminal
Police Organisation Interpol, Internal Security, July–December 2015, 267–277.
Sweet, D. (2010) Interpol DVI Best Practice Standards – An Overview. Forensic Sci-
ence International, 201(1–3), 18–21.
Supreme Court UK. (2011) Assange (Appellant) v The Swedish Prosecution Author-
ity (Respondent). Available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2011-
0264.html (accessed on 19/2/2020).
Chapter 6

Partnership structures

Introduction
We have seen how the police in England and Wales depend upon working
with and through communities in order to provide an efficient and effective
service that reduces crime and brings offenders to justice. In some senses
this is a good example of police and their “customers” working together in
partnership. However, for the police to be really effective in dealing with
their tasks they have to work closely with other major agencies. This chapter
therefore, critically examines those partnership structures that enable the
police to carry out their function effectively, namely The Crown Prosecu-
tion Service (CPS), The Forensic Science arrangements, and Crime Reduc-
tion Partnerships, known as Community Safety Partnerships.

Community Safety Partnerships

One of the most effective partnership structures involving the police must
surely be that of the Community Safety Partnerships. Formerly known as
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) initiated as part of
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Home Office 1998), they gave local gov-
ernment a major role in this area of work. This role was strengthened by sec-
tion 17 of this Act of Parliament which meant that agencies which included
local Government and Police to do all that it reasonably could to prevent
crime and disorder in relation to the performance of its other responsibil-
ities. Thus, Local Government was transformed into an organisation on
which the police could call upon. This increased dramatically the number
of crime prevention initiatives through a multiagency approach to solving
particular crime problems. Community crime prevention is based on the
early work of the University of Chicago which sought to tackle aspects of
social disorganisation which resulted in crime and delinquency. An early in-
itiative to achieve this was the Chicago Area Project, which commenced in
1932. The Chicago Area Project attempted to resolve local problems as there
was a strong belief that juvenile delinquency was due to the deterioration
 Partnership structures 127

of conditions in neighbourhoods. Hence the project arranged recreational

activities, improved the neighbourhood environment with the support of
community members, provided informal guidance to gang members, and
collaborated with the police and teachers when youths were having prob-
lems at school or with the law (Schlossman and Sedlak 1983).

Historical context
The publication of the Morgan Report (Home Office 1991) in the UK recom-
mended a move away from using the term “crime prevention” towards the
concept of “community safety.” Morgan considered “crime prevention” to
be too narrow and it allowed people to assume the police were solely respon-
sible for fighting crime; Morgan believed dealing with crime was a much
broader issue and involved partnerships from all sections of the community.
It had also been recognised in the 1990s that there had been a rise in re-
corded crime, but there were limited police resources to deal with the prob-
lems (Crawford 1998); hence, there was a need for a different approach. It
has been suggested that the term “community” within “community safety”
appeals to the individual perceptions of positive feelings and is associated
with “openness” and “integrative,” and hence is generally viewed as positive
and non-threatening (Cohen 1985).
The Morgan Report stressed the importance of the role that commu-
nities should play in crime prevention strategies in the UK and sought to
stimulate greater participation from all members of the general public in
the fight against crime (Home Office 1991). The recommendations made
within the report (Home Office 1991) were not pursued by the Conserva-
tive government during the 1990s; however, this changed when the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998 (Home Office 1999) was introduced and statutory
partnerships were incorporated, supporting the then British Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair’s concept of being “tough on crime, tough on the causes of
crime.” These partnerships are known as Crime and Disorder Reduction
Partnerships (CDRPs) in England and Community Safety Partnerships
(CSPs) in Wales. The CDRPs and CSPs required the police to enter into
“joint working and collective responsibility” arrangements with the com-
munity and other agencies to identify and respond to crime and disorder
issues (Newburn 2002). The partnerships were reinforced by section 17 of
the legislation which imposed a statutory duty on agencies (such as the local
authorities, police authorities, health authorities, and fire authorities) to “do
all that they reasonably can do to prevent crime and disorder in its area.”
A key aspect was to introduce the multi-agency approach or what became
known as the “partnership approach.” The role of these partnerships was to
develop and implement a strategy for reducing crime and disorder in each
district and unitary local authority in England and Wales. Applying the act
required a change in policing philosophy and adopting different policing
128 Partnership structures

styles, such as community policing and problem-orientated policing. The

British government’s White Paper Building Communities, Beating Crime ac-
knowledged the challenges and demonstrated their support to the new ap-
proach which included the provision of 24,000 Police Community Support
Officers (PCSOs) (Home Office 2004).

Important point

The role of Community Safety Partnerships is to develop and imple-

ment strategies for reducing crime and disorder in each district and
unitary local authority in England and Wales. This meant a change
in policing philosophy and adopting different policing styles, such as
community policing and problem-orientated policing.

In the early 2000s when the police service in England and Wales broad-
ened their remit wider than law enforcement and crime reduction, the
National Reassurance Policing Programme (2003) was introduced. The ob-
jectives of the programme were to improve the public’s sense of security,
reduce anti-social behaviour, improve confidence in policing, and increase
social capital and collective efficacy. This has subsequently led to the roll-
out of the Neighbourhood Policing Programme, which has the purposes of
tackling crime, the fear of crime, and bringing the police closer to commu-
nities through officers building lasting and trusted relationships with the
communities they serve. It was recognised that the communities are in the
best position to prioritise their needs and collaborate in identifying and de-
veloping solutions. The programme introduced Police Community Support
Officers to increase the visible presence on the street, and establish dedi-
cated neighbourhood policing teams across the country. It was also identi-
fied that the community should be empowered to hold the police and others
accountable for addressing acute and persistent problems related to crime
and anti-social behaviour.
Crawford and Lister’s (2004) findings suggest that locally dedicated vis-
ible patrol personnel that engage and work with local communities can
provide people with a stake in their own security, help foster “social cohe-
sion,” and assist in the regeneration of areas. Rogers (2004) cautions that
there is however a need to manage expectations of what local capacity can
achieve. Making reference to Police Community Support Officers, Rogers
(2004) states that whilst they offer a visible presence “on the streets,” they
may have limited effectiveness as representatives of authority in the longer
term due to their limited powers and duties. Bright (1991) has been critical
of the approach to empower communities in order to reduce crime. Whilst
 Partnership structures 129

he acknowledges communities have a vital role to play he does not believe

communities have the capacity, resources, or authority to resolve crime and
disorder. Bright (1991) is of the opinion that anti-crime and disorder com-
munity strategies are least common and least successful in areas where they
are most needed, such as poor, high crime neighbourhoods.
Another challenge relating to community crime prevention initiatives is
that they cannot be taken off the shelf and applied to all communities. Each
initiative requires an independent assessment to understand issues relating
to crime and disorder specific to the locality, which results in different crime
reduction agendas in different locations (Walklate 2002). Whilst it is ac-
knowledged one approach will not fit all and the initiatives require a unique
approach, additional time and resources, this approach does ensure that
the crime reduction strategies implemented in an area are appropriate and
therefore more likely to be effective. This approach is proving to be useful
for counter-terrorism activities; Innes (2006) suggests that community in-
telligence and democratic policing are key to countering terrorism in the
UK at the present time. Being a highly localised system the neighbourhood
policing programme allows locally defined problems to be addressed and
neighbourhood officers to be well placed to generate trust and collect in-
telligence. Neighbourhood officers are able to gain a better understanding
of the make-up of different communities, the different social networks to
which individuals and groups belong, and the intra-community tensions
that may exist. This position allows the police service to develop community
resilience and preparedness activities to counter the risk. When introducing
neighbourhood policing and attempting to improve the democratic style of
policing Lowe and Innes (2012) state three main principles that need to be
considered; the community’s problems should become the neighbourhood
policing priorities, informal social control should be incorporated within
the policing approach, and there should be local accountability of services
and transparency of decision-making.
It is acknowledged that the police cannot be everywhere and have limited
resources and capacity (Sklansky 2008). Whilst it is not possible for the po-
lice to always be present within society there is still a need for some form of
“policing” (Reiner 2010), and therefore “policing” has evolved from the state
having the monopoly of control over it (Stenning 2000). As Loader (2000)
notes, the pluralisation of policing has seen the shift away from the public
police towards other public-sector agencies, private sector contributors and
communities. As a consequence of this, many new stakeholders have been
introduced into the “extended” community safety/policing family (Craw-
ford and Lister 2004). The breadth of community safety and the additional
range of factors now involved has received some scepticism (Crawford and
Lister 2004). The term “community safety” has been criticised for being too
broad because it could encompass all forms of safety issues within the com-
munity (Joyce 2006). Edwards and Hughes (2005) highlight how the increase
130 Partnership structures

in stakeholders has created competing interests and practitioners of com-

munity safety are now having to manoeuvre around political relationships
at the local, regional, and national level.
Therefore crime and disorder reduction partnerships were the process by
which crime and disorder in the community was addressed through the use
of a joined-up approach. The Home Office provided guidelines concern-
ing structure, organisation, and operating practices; the operation of such
partnerships was subject to local interpretation and implementation. For
example, the existing differences for the implementation of youth offending
teams, and tackling drug abuse issues. The 2002 Police Reform Act (Home
Office 2002) amended the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and Police and Fire
authorities became Responsible Bodies, and the following year Primary
Care Trust in England, and Health Authorities in Wales, joined the group of
organisations defined as such. Most CDRPs are now known as Community
Safety Partnerships (CSPs), and have, like many other agencies in the last
decade, seen a large reduction in funding and resources, which has necessi-
tated restricting and refocussing of many initiatives.

Partnership problems
Over the course of the use of CDRPs and latterly CSPs, several areas have
been highlighted as problematic. These included:

• Crime Audits—whilst Crime Audits are clearly important, these tended

to focus upon “reported crime” (Audit Commission 1999). Addition-
ally, many partnerships lacked the skills required to evaluate local
crime trends, and many audits failed to analyse data in such a way as to
enable them to provide a guide for action. Some believe that the use of
crime statistics was too narrow and that the broader issues of safety and
hazards, which would have included crime and disorder, would have
been more useful (Byrne and Pease 2003).
• Inter-Agency Working—Problems may arise when a number of agen-
cies are required to work together. One is that of Leadership, which in
a multiagency setting might be difficult to achieve. This may lead to re-
sentment by other partner agencies, who could actually disengage with
the process. There are also potential problems with the different per-
spective of different agencies and different “power perspectives.” For
example Crawford (1999) found very real differences between Police and
Probation Officers’ understanding of the causes of crime and how to
provide the correct interventions.

A subsequent study of partnerships argued that success in reducing crime

depended upon generating a synergy among those in partnership, and a
commitment to tackle crime (National Audit Office 2004).
 Partnership structures 131

• Resources: Initially no additional funding was made available to CDRPs

as it was assumed that their activities could be financed from the budget
of the participating agencies. However, the Home Office established a
Partnership Development Fund to provide money and support for ac-
tivities. However, the issue of resources and funding has always been a
challenge for the partnerships, and since 2008 and 2010, the funding for
such activities has been reduced, thus making the problem more diffi-
cult to overcome.

Important point

The main challenges around partnership working lay in the areas of

producing accurate crime audits, the problems of different agendas by
different agencies, and the issue of lack of resources.

Impact upon policing

The introduction of CDRPs (and subsequently CSPs) under the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998 had a significant impact upon policing. Up to that point,
the police could claim to have had exclusivity in dealing with crime and dis-
order, but was compelled to enter into joint collaboration with other agencies,
and a collective responsibility was born. On a positive note, the police were
obliged to enter into a problem solving philosophy, but those possibly also
attributed to an impact upon police autonomy. Further, the delivery of crime
and disorder by a multiagency partnership approach, has, for some, seen a
fragmented approach which blurs police accountability (Newburn 2002).

Community safety partnerships today

The current situation

Community safety partnerships today are made up of representatives from
the “responsible authorities,” which are the:

• Police;
• Local authorities;
• Fire and rescue authorities;
• Probation service;
• Health.

The responsible authorities work together to protect their local communi-

ties from crime and to help people feel safer. They annually assess local
132 Partnership structures

crime priorities and consult partners and the local community about how
to deal with them. There are currently about 300 CSPs in England and 22 in
Wales. Community safety partnerships and police and crime commission-
ers (PCCs) work together by:

• CSPs sending their annual community safety plan and strategy to their
local PCC;
• One or more CSPs attending PCC meetings;
• CSPs submitting any merger requests to their PCC (but the PCC cannot
impose mergers);
• The PCC asking for reports from CSPs on specific issues.

In addition they aim to support communities develop solutions that help

tackle crime, fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, monitor police per-
formance, and help gain the co-operation of the public with the police in
preventing crime and enhancing local community safety. Each CSP has a
policing committee to deal with police monitoring and engagement with
local communities but they may also set up delivery groups to address par-
ticular community safety issues that arise in their areas. Whilst CSPs in-
volve in the main local authority agencies as well as private businesses and
volunteer groups, the police also work closely with partners within the crim-
inal justice system, such as the Director of Public Prosecutions and, most
importantly, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).

The Director of Public Prosecutions

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is the third most senior public
prosecutor in England and Wales (after the Attorney General and Solicitor
General). The DPP is the head of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS),
with personal responsibility for its 7,000 staff and approximately 800,000
prosecutions undertaken by it every year. The holder of the role is appointed
by the Attorney General on the recommendation of a panel that includes
the First Civil Service Commissioner. First created in 1879, the office was
merged with that of the Treasury Solicitor five years later, before again be-
coming independent in 1908. The Director’s department and role underwent
modernisation from 1944 to 1964 under Sir Theobald Mathew QC, and fur-
ther expansion with the introduction of the CPS in 1985, which came under
the control of the Director. The Director is superintended by the Attorney
General, who answers for the CPS in Parliament. The role itself is a high
profile one that is constantly under scrutiny and often subject to criticism.
For example in 2015, the then DPP Alison Saunders faced strong pressure
to resign following her decision not to prosecute a former Labour peer on
historical sexual offence charges (Guardian 2015).
 Partnership structures 133

Important point

The DPP is the head of the CPS and has responsibility for its
performances.

The Crown Prosecution Service

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is the principal public agency for con-
ducting criminal prosecutions in England and Wales, and it is headed by
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The Crime Prosecution Service
(CPS) was established by the Prosecution of Offenders Act, 1985 (Home Of-
fice 1985), and it became functional during 1986. It is responsible for pros-
ecuting persons charged by the police with a criminal offence in England
and Wales. Its major roles are to advise the police on prosecution, reviewing
cases submitted to it by the police, and prepare and present cases at court.
The work of the CPS is monitored by the CPS Inspectorate, the CPSI. The
role of the CPSI is to promote improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness,
and fairness of the prosecution service within the framework of a joined-up
criminal justice process (Joyce 2006). The Attorney General for England
and Wales superintends the CPS’s work and answers for it in Parliament,
although the Attorney General has no influence over the conduct of prose-
cutions, except when national security is an issue or for a small number of
offences that require the Attorney General’s permission to prosecute. The
prosecution of offenders was formerly carried out by the police, and the ra-
tionale for separating the investigation of crime from its prosecution was to
eliminate bias. It was suggested that the involvement of the police with the
prosecution gave them an unhealthy interest in the successful conclusion of
a case. The new system therefore employed solicitors/lawyers, who had no
prior knowledge of, or involvement with, a case to apply a dispassionate and
objective view of the case. Most of its casework is dealt with by the 13 CPS
Areas, which are responsible for conducting prosecutions in specific parts of
England and Wales; each area is led by a Chief Crown Prosecutor. The areas
(with their respective police forces) are:

• Cymru/Wales (Dyfed Powys, Gwent, North Wales, South Wales);

• East Midlands (Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire,
Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire);
• Eastern (Cambridgeshire, Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk);
• London (City of London, Metropolitan);
• Mersey Cheshire (Cheshire, Merseyside);
• North East (Cleveland, Durham, Northumbria);
134 Partnership structures

• North West (Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire);

• South East (Kent, Surrey, Sussex);
• South West (Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Gloucestershire);
• Thames and Chiltern (Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Thames Valley);
• Wessex (Dorset, Hampshire & Isle of Wight, Wiltshire);
• West Midlands (Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West
Midlands);
• Yorkshire and Humberside (West Yorkshire, North Yorkshire, South
Yorkshire, Humberside).

CPS Direct provides charging advice/authorisation by phone and electron-

ically to police forces at all hours. Most charging decisions by the CPS are
now made by CPS Direct, which then passes the prosecution to the appro-
priate CPS Area. The Casework Divisions deal with prosecutions requiring
specialist knowledge and experience:

• Specialist Fraud Division—Complex frauds and cases investigated by

HMRC and other agencies;
• International Justice and Organised Crime Division—Serious organ-
ised crime and cases investigated by the National Crime Agency, and
Extradition (formerly part of Special Crime);
• Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division—Appeals, counter-
terrorism, and special crime, which includes deaths in custody, public
corruption, and medical manslaughter;
• CPS Proceeds of Crime Unit—since 2014 this discrete casework divi-
sion has been responsible for pre-charge restraint and post-conviction
enforcement of orders made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(POCA 2002) and in the year 2016/2017 recovered over £80 million.

Important point

The CPS is responsible for prosecuting persons charged by the police

with a criminal offence in England and Wales. Its major roles are to
advise the police on prosecution, reviewing cases submitted to it by
the police, and prepare and present cases at court.

Pre-charge advice
One of the most important roles of the CPS lies in giving pre-charge advice
to the police. The CPS often provides confidential advice to investigators
on the viability of a prosecution in complex or unusual cases. This includes
clarifying the intent needed to commit an offence or addressing shortcom-
ings in the available evidence. Unlike in many other jurisdictions, the CPS
 Partnership structures 135

has no power to order investigations or direct investigators to take action.

Whether the CPS is asked for advice or a charging decision is entirely at the
discretion of investigators.

The code for prosecutors

Police forces have the authority to charge suspects with less serious of-
fences, such as common assault or criminal damage with a low value. The
CPS is responsible for taking all other charging decisions—including for
serious offences such as murder and rape—and the police cannot charge
suspects with these offences without authorisation from a crown pros-
ecutor (except in emergency situations where police can charge without
a prosecutor’s authority in certain circumstances). The Code for Crown
Prosecutors (CPS 2018) requires prosecutors to answer two questions in
the “Full Code Test”: Is there sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of
conviction? (In other words, is there sufficient evidence to provide a realis-
tic prospect of conviction against each suspect on each charge?) The code
means that an objective, impartial and reasonable jury or bench of mag-
istrates or judge hearing a case alone, properly directed and acting in ac-
cordance with the law, is more likely than not to convict the defendant of
the charge alleged. The second question asked is Is a prosecution required
in the public interest? These questions must be answered in this order; if
there is insufficient evidence, the public interest in prosecuting is irrele-
vant. According to the code, if there is insufficient evidence to prosecute,
no further action will be taken against the suspect or the prosecutor will
ask the police to carry out further inquiries to gather more evidence. When
there is sufficient evidence but a prosecution is not required in the public
interest, prosecutors can decide that no further action should be taken or
that a caution or reprimand is a suitable alternative to prosecution.
In limited circumstances, where the Full Code Test is not met the Thresh-
old Test may be applied to charge a suspect. The seriousness or circum-
stances of the case must justify the making of an immediate charging
decision, and there must be substantial grounds to object to bail. There must
be a rigorous examination of the five conditions of the Threshold Test, to
ensure that it is only applied when necessary and that cases are not charged
prematurely. All five conditions must be met before the Threshold Test can
be applied. Where any of the conditions are not met, there is no need to con-
sider any of the other conditions, as the Threshold Test cannot be applied
and the suspect cannot be charged. The five conditions that must be met
before a Threshold Test can be applied are as follows:

1 There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person to be charged

has committed the offence.
2 Further evidence can be obtained to provide a realistic prospect of
conviction.
136 Partnership structures

3 The seriousness or the circumstances of the case justifies the making of

an immediate charging decision.
4 There are continuing substantial grounds to object to bail in accord-
ance with the Bail Act 1976 and in all the circumstances of the case it is
proper to do so.
5 It is in the public interest to charge the suspect

A decision to charge under the Threshold Test must be kept under review.
The prosecutor should be proactive to secure from the police the identified
outstanding evidence or other material in accordance with an agreed time-
table. The evidence must be regularly assessed to ensure that the charge is
still appropriate and that continued objection to bail is justified. The Full
Code Test must be applied as soon as the anticipated further evidence or
material is received and, in any event, in Crown Court cases, usually before
the formal service of the prosecution case.

Conducting prosecutions
Whether a decision to charge is taken by police or prosecutors, the CPS
will conduct the case, which includes preparing the case for court hearings,
disclosing material to the defence, and presenting the case in court. The CPS
will be represented in court from the first hearing through to conviction/
sentencing, and in some cases appeal. All prosecutions must be kept un-
der continuous review and stopped if the Full Code Test (see above) is no
longer satisfied or was never satisfied (i.e. the decision to charge was wrong).
Mishandling of a case, such as failing to disclose evidence, can result in the
courts either acquitting a defendant or quashing the conviction on appeal.

Appeals
When an appeal against conviction or sentence is lodged by a defendant, the
CPS will decide whether or not to oppose the appeal after considering the
grounds of appeal. If it decides to oppose, it will present relevant evidence
and material to assist the appellate court.
Exceptionally, the CPS has invited defendants to appeal when it has con-
cluded that the safety of a conviction was questionable.

Extradition
The Extradition Act 2003 also tasks the CPS with representing foreign states
in extradition proceedings, normally heard at Westminster Magistrates’
Court. While it acts on the foreign prosecutor’s instructions, the CPS retains
a discretion on how the case should be prosecuted. The Extradition Unit at
CPS Headquarters deals with all cases in which the extradition of a person
 Partnership structures 137

within England and Wales is sought by another state and all cases in which
the CPS is seeking the extradition of an individual outside the European
Union. The CPS Areas prepare and manage their own extradition requests
under the European Arrest Warrant framework (see a discussion regarding
this topic elsewhere in this book).

Criticisms of the CPS

Despite the laudable sentiments behind the creation of the CPS, there have
been a number of criticisms and concerns regarding its future. It has suf-
fered from allegations of inconsistency in decision-making concerning
some cases, such as the decisions not to prosecute alleged offenders over
the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. The latest figures from the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS) indicate that despite a significant increase in the
number of rapes being reported each year, there has been a drop in the num-
ber of alleged perpetrators being prosecuted. This situation is prompting
victims’ groups to argue that rape is being effectively decriminalised, be-
cause so few cases are actually taken to court. This year, from 58,657 reports
of rape, only 1,758 accused perpetrators were even charged with an offence,
which raises the question of how the CPS agencies are viewing and dealing
with this problem (Baird 2019). The criticism is worse, because it would also
appear that prosecutors and police appear to be failing in their duties to
disclose crucial evidence leading to cases being pursued that should have
been dropped. Disclosure is the process in a criminal case by which some-
one charged with a crime is provided with copies of, or access to, material
from the investigation that is capable of undermining the prosecution case
against them and/or assisting their defence. Without this process taking
place a trial would not be fair. Investigators, prosecutors, defence teams,
and the courts all have important roles to play in ensuring the disclosure
process is done properly, and promptly. The stages of the current disclosure
process during an investigation and a prosecution include:

• When an allegation is made against someone, the investigator will begin

an investigation. From the outset the investigator has a duty to record,
retain, and review material collected over the course of the investiga-
tion. The investigator reveals this material to the prosecutor to allow for
effective disclosure to the defence.
• Disclosure obligations begin at the start of an investigation, and investi-
gators have a duty to conduct a thorough investigation, manage all ma-
terial appropriately and follow all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether
they point towards or away from any suspect.
• If the investigator believes there is strong evidence to suggest someone
committed a crime they will present the evidence to the prosecutor, who
decides if the person should be charged.
138 Partnership structures

• If a person is charged with an offence the investigator will review all

material gathered during the investigation. This could include CCTV
footage, statements from witnesses, mobile phone messages, social me-
dia conversations, or photographs.
• Some evidence will be used in the prosecution and will be part of the
case. Some material will be irrelevant and have no bearing on the case
at all.
• The remainder is referred to as the “unused material.” This material
is relevant to the case but is not being used as part of the prosecution
evidence presented to the Court. The investigators create a schedule of
the unused material to aid the disclosure process.
• The unused material is reviewed by the investigator and if any of it is
capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the defence it
will be brought to the attention of the prosecutor.

Prosecutors must provide the defence with a schedule of all of the non-
sensitive unused material and provide them with any material that un-
dermines the case for the prosecution or assists the case for the accused.
The accused must serve a defence statement on the prosecution in Crown
Court cases and may do so in magistrates’ court cases, which sets out
their defence to the allegations and can point the investigator to other
lines of inquiry. The investigator will review all their material again and
decide whether, in the light of the defence statement, additional material
is now relevant or meets the test for disclosure because it supports the
case for the accused. The investigator then produces a further report to
the prosecutor who makes the final decision on whether further material
should be disclosed. The accused has a right to challenge that decision
by making an application to the court. The investigator and prosecutor
have a continuing duty to keep disclosure under review throughout the
life of a case. Disclosure is such a problem that an ongoing action plan has
been implemented in order to improve this important facet of prosecution
work. In January 2018 the CPS, National Police Chiefs’ Council, and the
College of Policing released the Joint National Disclosure Improvement
Plan (NDIP), which sets out the actions that are to be taken to improve
how the criminal justice system deals with disclosure (CPS 2020). The plan
includes a range of measures that supports police and prosecutors with
their disclosure duties, also outlining a joint commitment to making clear,
effective, and sustainable changes, and providing the police with the tools
needed to manage all cases to high standards expected.
In summary, the review analysed the evidence and, while recognising
that important operational improvements which are currently being imple-
mented through the NDIP, diagnosed the cross-cutting problems with the
disclosure process as:
 Partnership structures 139

1 Reasonable lines of inquiry are not always being followed in line with
the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act Codes duty to do so.
2 This duty and disclosure obligations are not being considered with suf-
ficient attention from the outset of a criminal investigation.
3 Investigators not always identifying material as relevant for inclusion
on the disclosure schedules they create as an audit trail for the unused
material in the case, then prosecutors not always asking the right ques-
tions to uncover the error.
4 Investigators and prosecutors not always applying the disclosure test cor-
rectly, which means that material that should be disclosed is not disclosed.
5 Disclosing the right material too late.
6 The engagement of the defence and the judiciary with disclosure issues
where they have a role in the process.
7 Not having the necessary technological tools.
8 Not collecting or measuring disclosure performance data adequately.

The area of file preparation for prosecutions is clearly a worrying one for
police and CPS alike. Media reporting of cases that collapse due to poor
evidence preparation and evidence disclosure have the ability to undermine
the CJS and its partner constituents, damaging the public’s perception of
their legitimacy and support (The Independent 2018). Given some of the is-
sues discussed above, it is not unreasonable that the accountability process
of the CPS is important.

CPS and accountability

Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Inspectorate (HMCPSI) is the body that
is responsible for the inspection of, and improvements to, the Crown Pros-
ecution Service (CPS). This body has a statutory duty to inspect the work
of the CPS, and is an independent agency, not connected to the body being
inspected. As such, the HMCPSI produces an annual report on the work of
the CPS, based upon recognised key performance measures. These meas-
ures can be seen in Table 6.1.
Like many other public bodies, the CPS has been subject to significant
reductions in its budget, which the HMCPSI has pointed to when discussing
the delivery of services (HMCPSI 2019). In particular, Victim Liaison Units
(VLUs) appear to have been reduced in order that other parts of daily core
business could be supported. This has meant that the quality of service pro-
vided to victims, which included updates and letters to victims, suffered as
a consequence. In addition to the problems identified in VLUs, the issue of
disclosure remains problematic, as well as file preparation (HMCPSI 2019).
According to the CPS (CPS 2019), the service prosecuted 494,811 cases dur-
ing 2018–2019, with 83.7% of defendants convicted, and 76.7% guilty pleas,
140 Partnership structures

Table 6.1 CPS Performance Indicators

Measure 18/19- Q1 18/19- Q2 18/19-Q3

Magistrates’ Court— conviction rate 84.8% 84.0% 84.1%

Magistrates’ Court— percentage of GPs at 77.1% 76.6% 76.9%
1st hearing
Magistrates’ Court— average number of 1.65% 1.67% 1.66%
hearings per case (guilty pleas)
Magistrates’ Court— average number of 2.74% 2.76% 2.76%
hearings per case (contests)
Magistrates’ Court— prosecutions 27.6% 26.2% 24.8%
dropped at third or subsequent hearing
Crown Court— conviction rate 78.7% 79.7% 80.8%
Crown Court—guilty plea at first hearing 38.7% 40.2% 40.1%
Crown Court— average number of 3.61% 3.53% 3.63%
hearings per case (guilty pleas)
Crown Court— average number of 5.06% 5.01% 5.26%
hearings per case (contests)
Crown Court—timely compliance with 91.9% 92.3% 91.5%
judges’ order and court directions
Violence against women—rolling annual 59.2% 60.0% 61.4%
rape conviction rate
Violence against women— domestic abuse 76.5% 76.1% 76.3%
conviction rate
Hate crime — conviction rate 84.6% 84.2% 84.3%
Hate crime —sentence uplift 71.8% 74.0% 73.6%
Unsuccessful outcomes due to victim 28.3% 27.8% 26.0%
issues (all cases)

Adapted by the author from https://w w w.cps.gov.uk /key-measures.

whilst in terms of recovery of assets, the CPS claims to have recovered £97.7
million pounds. However public confidence in the CPS is still relatively low
with only 62% having confidence in their performance (Home Office 2019).
If the CPS is a vital partnership structure when it comes to bringing defend-
ants to justice, then the Forensic Science Structure that supports investiga-
tors is equally so.

The Forensic Science Structure

Forensic Science is the application of science in the resolution of legal dis-
putes. Science is important in this context because it has the potential to
provide reliable, pertinent, and often definitive information about a given
case. In addition, much of the information it provides cannot be obtained
by other means (Jackson and Jackson 2004). Therefore the role of forensic
scientists is to provide the justice system with impartial, scientifically rigor-
ous information. Such information can be crucial in establishing whether a
 Partnership structures 141

crime has been committed and, if so, by whom. Forensic evidence in police
work is becoming increasingly important, not only because of advances in
science but also because of changes in the legal system (Becker 2009).

Important point

Forensic Science is the application of science in the resolution of legal

disputes. Science is important in this context because it has the po-
tential to provide reliable, pertinent, and often definitive information
about a given case. In addition, much of the information it provides
cannot be obtained by other means.

Historical context
The Forensic Science Service (FSS) was a government-owned company
in the United Kingdom which provided forensic science services to the
police forces and government agencies of England and Wales, as well as
other countries. The UK Government announced the closure of the FSS
in December 2010, citing monthly losses of up to £2 million as justification.
The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee—Seventh Re-
port (FSS) took evidence between 23 March 2011 and 27 April 2011 Science
and Technology Committee. The FSS finally closed on 31 March 2012, but
the archives—a collection of case files and retained casework samples, such
as microscope slides, fibre samples, and DNA samples—has been retained
to allow review of old cases. Forensic work is now contracted out to the pri-
vate sector or carried out in-house, by individual police forces. The FSS suf-
fered damage to its reputation following the failure to recover blood stains
from a shoe in the murder of Damilola Taylor.
Damilola Taylor, who was just ten years old when he died in a stairwell on
a housing estate in Peckham, South London, was fatally stabbed with a bro-
ken bottle. The two brothers who were finally convicted of manslaughter in
2007 were prime suspects within days of the brutal stabbing, but blood from
the ten-year-old was missed when a trainer and jumper belonging to them
were examined in 2000. The court that eventually convicted the brothers at
a later date had heard there had been “serious quality failures” in the exam-
inations carried out by the government’s Forensic Science Service (Sentamu
et al. 2002). Further damage occurred when the FSS failed to use the most
up-to-date techniques for extracting DNA samples in cases between 2000
and 2005. This led the then Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to
advise all police forces in England and Wales to review cases where sam-
ples had failed to give a DNA profile and a critical report from government
(House of Commons 2005).
142 Partnership structures

Current forensic arrangements

Forensic science services are now provided through a mixture of commercial
providers and some in-house provision by the 43 police forces in England
and Wales. There is currently a variety of forensic delivery models. For ex-
ample, scale of demand varies between forces, the availability of in-house
services varies, and Chief Constables have discretion regarding expenditure
control. Most of the models use a mixture of internal and commercial fo-
rensic science provisions, with a range of different contracting approaches,
as follows:

• West and South Coast Consortium: comprises 19 forces, with a cen-

tralised commercial team who oversee procurement and contracting ar-
rangements. Procurement is by lot, and the team pursue a multi-supplier
approach to provide a spread of work among suppliers.
• East Midlands region: is a collaboration of five forces. They are con-
tracted with a single supplier in a strategic partnering arrangement,
which includes co-location of some services. The intended effect of this
approach is a focus on outcomes rather than transactions.
• Yorkshire and North East region: is a collaboration of seven forces who
have also contracted with a single supplier, with co-location. The region
also has an in-house digital forensics function.
• The Metropolitan Police: has its own laboratory and team of casework
scientists to set forensic strategy, undertake examinations both in the
laboratory and at crime scenes and provide interpretation of results.
They have a partnering arrangement with a single supplier to outsource
some testing and a managed service contract for digital forensics to in-
house teams.
• West Midlands Region: have commissioned traditional forensic ser-
vices as a region since 2008. A mix of in-house services exists including
DNA recovery capabilities in all forces for preservation of DNA, and
biology scene investigation and reporting capability in West Midlands.
Digital forensics is undertaken by in-house digital forensic units, with
an ability to utilise other forces’ contracts.
• Eastern Region: comprises seven forces and the contract is product-
based but with some flexibility to negotiate service delivery levels where
necessary. Procurement is by “lot” with multiple suppliers for most lots
to allow flexibility and resilience. The vast majority of digital services
are provided through in-house digital forensic units, with commercial
providers used for peaks in demand.
• City of London Police: operates under a partially private-funded
budgetary model and uses two frameworks to outsource forensic ser-
vice provision. The forensic framework for services, such as DNA and
toxicology, focusses on quality, communication with scientists, and
 Partnership structures 143

the option to make examinations bespoke. The digital framework is

lot based and uses a number of providers to support the in-house dig-
ital function.

The National Crime Agency has its own contractual arrangements for fo-
rensic science services with a number of commercial providers, as well as
in-house specialist digital capabilities.

Important point

Forensic science services are now provided through a mixture of com-

mercial providers and some in-house provision by the 43 police forces
in England and Wales.

In 2016, the government set out its Forensic Science Strategy for a national
approach to forensic science delivery in the Criminal Justice System. The
resulting Transforming Forensics Programme (TFP) was a police-led pro-
gramme which is seeking to deliver suitable forensic capabilities in support of
the Policy Vision 2025 (discussed elsewhere in the book). However, the current
arrangements are not without risk. In January 2018, Key Forensic Services
Ltd entered into administration, which illustrates some of the risks associ-
ated with the free market. In addition there has been criticism and allegations
of poor practices in some areas of forensic examinations, such as allegations
of manipulation of results at Randox Testing Services. Here, it appears that
some 40 motorists convicted of drug-driving offences were cleared following
evidence of manipulation in the testing process. This led to around 10,500 test
results being reviewed (BBC 2018). Such incidents have prompted reviews into
the current system such as the recently published, jointly authored review en-
titled “Forensic Review” (Home Office, APCC, and NPCC 2018). This review
highlighted the need for strengthening the current arrangements for provision
of forensic services by strengthening the regulatory, governance, and capac-
ity areas. In particular, a major area of concern was a lack of progress with
regard to legislation to give the Forensic Science Regulator statutory powers
of enforcement. This has led to allegations of a lack of quality standards,
with a destabilisation of the market by the use of unaccredited laboratories.
A subsequent review by the Forensic Science Regulator, known colloquially
as The Tulley Report (Tulley 2019) however, found that the extent of com-
pliance with the Regulation Codes of Practice and Conduct had increased
significantly from the previous 12 months, with a rise from 19 organisations
holding accreditation, to 37 having the accreditation status (Tulley 2019: 24).
144 Partnership structures

This increase in compliance with the Code, and hence the increase in accred-
itation, is seen as a major step. However, there are still a significant number
of such organisations with no accreditation at all, and the regulators have
asked the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) to identify with the police
in England and Wales, where gaps in compliance exist so that they may be
addressed. Clearly, areas of concern remain in the perceived quality of some
Forensic Service provision in England and Wales.

Conclusion
Policing in England and Wales relies upon partnership structures to as-
sist it in its policing activities. The democratic policing model, as we have
seen, demands that the police work with and through communities in or-
der to provide safety and security for the public. The police cannot achieve
this alone, and the official formation of bodies such as Community Safety
Partnerships extends this relationship and allows for a greater number of
agencies within that structure to become involved, particularly when it
comes to preventing crime and disorder. Once a prosecution has begun
however, different structures come into play to work in partnership with
the police within the Criminal Justice System. Whilst not without its crit-
ics, and despite some high profile miscarriages of justice along with poor
conviction rates in some offences, the CPS and the police generally work
well together. This is despite the identified failings in such areas as disclo-
sure of evidence and highlights perhaps the problems of differing agencies
working together. The situation with regard to forensic science appears to
also be one of a structure in transit as it moves from being a government-
controlled organisation towards a market forces-driven set-up involving
many different private firms as well as in-house provision in some forces.
The problem with this approach could be one of inconsistency in the provi-
sion of evidence to support prosecutions from possibly unlicensed agents.
The interaction by the Police with the CPS and the Forensic Science pro-
vision, whilst vital to their work, also contains the problem that the high
profile mistakes highlighted could undermine the very support and legiti-
macy that is fundamental to the continuing support of the public.

Reflective questions
1 Why is partnership work so important for the police?
2 What was the historical context for the introduction of Community
safety partnerships?
3 What problems could exist in CSP and police arrangements?
4 Why is it preferential to have the CPS prosecuting cases rather than the
police?
5 What can be done to improve disclosure of evidence with the CPS?
 Partnership structures 145

6 What is the role of forensic science in prosecuting criminals?

7 Why is the current arrangement for provision of forensic science ser-
vices being criticised?

Useful websites
Association of Police and Crime Commissioners: https://www.apccs.police.uk/.
Local Government Association: https://www.local.gov.uk/.
The Crown Prosecution Service: https://www.cps.gov.uk/.
Forensic Science Regulator: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
forensic-science-regulator.
The National Police Chief Council: https://www.npcc.police.uk/.

References
Audit Commission. (1999) Safety in Numbers: Promoting Community Safety,
Abingdon, Audit Commission Publications.
Baird, V. (2019) Thousands of Rape Victims Are Being Denied Justice. The CPS
and Police Must Do Better. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/com-
mentisfree/2019/sep/19/help-rape-victims-cps-police-change-attitudes (accessed
20/2/2020).
BBC. (2018) Overturned Drug-Driving Offences. Available at https://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-england-manchester-46406710 (accessed 5/12/19).
Becker, R.F. (2009) Criminal Investigation (3rd Edition), London, Jones and Bartlett.
Bright, J. (1991) Crime Prevention: The British Experience, in Stenson, K. and
Cowell, D. (eds.), The Politics of Crime Control, London, Sage.
Byrne, S. and Pease, K. (2003) Crime Reduction and Community Safety, in New-
burn, T. (ed.), Handbook of Policing, Cullompton, Willan.
Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of Social Control, Cambridge, Polity Press.
CPS. (2018) Code for Prosecutors. Available at https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/
code-crown-prosecutors (accessed 20/2/2020).
CPS. (2019) Crown Prosecution Service Annual Report and Accounts 2018–2019.
Available at www.gov.uk/offiicial-documents (accessed 5/12/19).
CPS. (2020) National Disclosure Improvement Plan. Available at https://www.cps.
gov.uk/publication/joint-national-disclosure-improvement-plan-june-update (ac-
cessed on 20/2/2020).
Crawford, A. (1998) Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and
Practices, Harlow, Longman.
Crawford, A. (1999) The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community Part-
nerships, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Crawford, A. and Lister, S. (2004) The Extended Police Family: Visible Patrols in
Residential Areas, York, Rowntree Foundation.
Edwards, G. and Hughes, G. (2005) Comparing the Governance of Safety in Europe:
A Geo Historical Approach. Theoretical Criminology, 9(3), 345–363.
HMCPSI. (2019) Annual Report 2018–2019. Available at www.gov.uk/official-
documents (accessed 5/12/19).
146 Partnership structures

Home Office. (1991) Safer Communities: The Local Delivery of Crime Prevention
through the Partnership Approach (The Morgan Report), London, Home Office.
Home Office. (1995) Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (1998) The Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (2002) The Police Reform Act, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (2004) Building Communities, Beating Crime: A Better Police Service
for the 21st Century, London, Home Office.
Home Office. (2019) Crime Survey for England and Wales, London, Home Office.
Home Office, APCC and NPCC (2018) Forensics Review – Review of the Provision
of Forensic Science to the CIS in England and Wales. Available at www.gov.uk/
government/publications (accessed 5/12/19).
House of Commons. (2005) Science and Technology Seventh Report, Session 2004–
2005. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cm-
sctech/96/9602.htm (accessed on 20/2/2020).
Independent, The. (2018) Untold damage’ Caused by Failure to Properly Disclose
Evidence in Court Cases, Review Finds. Available at https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/crime/rape-cases-evidence-collapse-liam-allan-disclosure-
review-damage-police-prosecutors-a8635896.html (accessed 20/2/2020).
Innes, M. (2006) Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community In-
telligence and Democratic Policing. Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Sciences, 605(1), 222–241.
Jackson, A.R.W. and Jackson, J.M. (2004) Forensic Science, Harlow, Pearson.
Joyce, P. (2006) Criminal Justice: An Introduction, London, Routledge.
Loader, I. (2000) Plural Policing and Democratic Governance. Social and Legal
Studies, 9, 323.
Lowe, T. and Innes, M. (2012) ‘Can We Speak in Confidence?’, Community Intelli-
gence and Neighbourhood Policing. Policing and Society, 22(3), 1–22.
National Audit Office. (2004) Reducing Crime: The Home Office Working with Crime
and Disorder Reduction Partnership, London, National Audit Office.
Newburn, T. (2002) Community Safety and Policing: Some Implications of the
Crime and Disorder Act, in Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (eds.),
Crime Prevention and Community Safety, London, Sage.
Reiner, R. (2010) The Politics of the Police (4th Edition), Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Rogers, C. (2004) Separated by a Common Goal: Some Problems of Interagency
Working. Community Safety, 3(2), 5–11.
Schlossman, S. and Sedlak, M. (1983) The Chicago Area Project Revisited, Crime
and Delinquency, 29(3), 398–462.
Sentamu, Rt Revd. J., Blakey, D. and Nove, P. (2002) The Damilola Taylor Murder
Investigation Review: The Report of the Oversight Panel. Presented to Sir John
Stevens QPMDL Commissioner of the Metropolis, December.
Sklansky, D.A. (2008) Democracy and the Police, Stanford, CA, Stanford University
Press.
Stenning, P.C. (2000) Powers and accountability of private police. European Journal
on Criminal Policy and Research, 8, 325–52.
The Guardian. (2015) The child abuse allegations against Lord Janner should have
been prosecuted a decade ago. It’s Too Late Now. Available at https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/29/the-guardian-view-on-alison-
saunders-dont-sack-her-back-her (accessed 20/2/2020).
 Partnership structures 147

Tulley, G. (2019) Forensic Science Regulators Annual Report 2017–2019. Availa-

ble at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldsctech/333/33302.
htm (accessed on 20/2/2020).
Walklate, S. (2002) Issues in Local Community Safety: It’s All a Question of Trust,
in Crawford, A. (ed.), Crime and Insecurity, London, Routledge.
Chapter 7

Working within the

structures

Introduction
This chapter explores those issues, that whilst not structures in their own
right, affect the structures of policing. Of course, many things can influence
the way a country is policed. After all, policing does not exist in a vacuum, but
is affected by such issues as new ideas about how policing should be delivered,
the introduction of new technology, itself, changes in political power, social
and demographic changes, international events, and environmental changes
to name but a few. This chapter will consider some of the more pertinent is-
sues that have had and still are having a major impact upon current policing
structures in England and Wales. Although not definitive it should start the
reader on a process of wider considerations about how local policing can be
affected by issues that appear to be not important at first glance.

Policing by numbers 1— Performance Management

A Home Office definition of Performance Management in policing suggests
it is:

The practice of: reviewing current performance and the factors that
might affect future performance; and taking decisions in response to
that information; so that appropriate actions are taken in order to make
future performance better than it might otherwise be.
(Home Office/ACPO 2008: 4)

The introduction of Performance Management approaches within the police

lay in the 1980s when the then Conservative Government under the leader-
ship of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher undertook an overhaul of public
service provision. This overhaul included a “value for money” approach, of
which performance management was a major component. In 1983, the Home
Office issued circular 114 of 1983 entitled “Manpower, Effectiveness and Ef-
ficiency in the Police Service.” This circular forced senior police officers to
consider the value they were giving for the cost in terms of money of policing.
 Working within the structures 149

Important point

In 1983, the Home Office issued circular 114 of 1983 entitled “Man-
power, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service.” This circu-
lar forced senior police officers to consider the value they were giving
for the cost in terms of money of policing.

This was a pivotal moment in recent police history as for the first
time, chief officers had to consider the justification for their expenditure,
whilst also devising indicators for their performance (Edwards 1999).
Consequently each police service started producing plans, strategies,
and measurements of certain functions, and also to consider just what
the police were doing with their time. This push into performance man-
agement produced a focus upon defining just what the police role actu-
ally is. In 1994, a report of a committee chaired by Lord Cassels entitled
“The Role and Responsibilities of Police” was published (Cassels 1994).
This report relegated the prevention of crime, seen as the founding prin-
ciple of the creation of the modern police (see Chapter 1) to second place
behind upholding the law. However, the report did warn against the use
of arrest figures as a measure of efficiency, whilst also pointing out the
difficulty in measuring public confidence. Interestingly, the report also
acknowledged that some aspects of policing were beyond quantification,
such as keeping the Queens peace or crime prevention.
A separate report published in 1995, also set out to determine what police
should be doing. This report entitled “Review of Police Core and Ancillary
Tasks” (Home Office 1995) found there was little scope for the police service
to withdraw completely from large areas of, the then current police work.
However, the report suggested that “Ancillary” tasks could safely be passed
on to other agencies, but there were few. Despite this, the report opened up
the debate concerning the use of other agencies to conduct activities previ-
ously considered the domain of the police.

Important point

Performance management is the practice of reviewing current per-

formance and the factors that might affect future performance; and
taking decisions in response to that information; so that appropriate
actions are taken in order to make future performance better than it
might otherwise be.
150 Working within the structures

In addition to the above, Golding and Savage (2008) suggested there was
a push by Government to create a “crisis of performance” based on their
belief that the police were failing to deliver on the crime front. This provided
momentum for the Government to implement their ideas around perfor-
mance management. In support of this were two regulatory agencies which
were introduced during the 1980s: the then HMIC and the Audit Commis-
sion. These agencies had been introduced to support the concept of “New
Public Management” (see Ranson and Stewart 1994). Both agencies had
campaigned for greater use of measuring police performance utilising the
introduction of Performance Indicators (PIs). In 1995, the Audit Commis-
sion published its first set of national results, presenting these results in a
tabular format, showing each individual forces performance in the follow-
ing areas:

• Speed of response to 999 calls

• Total amount of crime
• Rate of detection
• Number of officers available for operational duty
• Cost of policing per head of population
(Audit Commission 1995)

However, this report suffered criticism for being too focussed upon num-
bers, and the more “quantifiable” aspects of policing. This led to a more
sophisticated approach by agencies to measuring police performance. Thus,
the idea of performance management became embedded in the Leadership
of British Policing, both with the police organisation and outside of it. This
culminated in the cultural shift into what is known as New Public Manage-
ment (NPM) (Ranson and Stewart 1994). According to Pollitt (2002) the
main features of NPM are:

• Being close to customers

• Being performance driven
• Focused on continuous performance
• Lean flat structures – decentralized decision making
• Tight cost controls
• Performance related Human Resource systems
(Pollitt 2002: 276)

During the first decade of the 2000s, the drive for economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness through the New Public Management approach continued.
National league tables and performance indicators were enhanced, and
HMIC played a key role in this through the introduction of the Police Per-
formance Assessment Framework (PPAF), through which HMIC formu-
lated annual judgements on force level performance in terms of families of
 Working within the structures 151

forces with a similar profile in a range of broad performance-related topics.

These types of measurements are still with us today, and can be seen in the
current HMICFRS (Her Majesty Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire
Rescue Services) programme entitled P.E.E.L. (Police Effectiveness, Effi-
ciency, and Legitimacy) programme discussed in more depth in Chapter 2
in this book.
Despite purporting to service the needs of the community through effi-
cient allocation and monitoring of resources, performance measurements
can fail to acknowledge the needs of and the impact of such actions, upon
the community. They also attract criticisms in that they could be seen as
de-skilling police officers, who are encouraged to prioritise their work in
terms of those activities that can be easily quantified. By failing to reflect the
service element of policing, it is suggested that some officers might consider
some roles, including community engagement, or victims of crime care, as
being of less importance (Cockcroft and Beattie 2009). Despite the intro-
duction of Police and Crime Commissioners (see Chapter 2), some believe
the Home Office maintains powerful levers of influence over policing, none
more so than a dominant performance management model of policing.

Policing by numbers 2— crime statistics

The idea of measuring crime in an organised manner first came about in
France in the 1830s, where two people, Quetelet and Guerry, served as part
of a scientific idea of discovering laws and regularities in the world like those
identified in the natural world (Beirne 1993). However, this approach was
compatible with the introduction of centralised bureaucracies that were ex-
panding across Europe at that time. In England and Wales, the first national
crime statistics was compiled in 1857 and the format in which they were
published remained more or less the same until 2002 (Maguire 2012). The
production of annual criminal statistics such as these has a number of pur-
poses and uses, which can change over time. In particular their introduction
provided:

• A way for central administrators to see what was happening in different

parts of the country;
• A way of assisting in allocation of resources;
• A way of monitoring police and court activities.

In a different way, they were also regarded as providing a barometer about

the moral health of the nation, whilst also being used to measure the success
or not of Government policies relating to crime. The publication of these
statistics provided politicians with information for political debate, but un-
til fairly recently, this debate was low key and short lived. Even during the
election complains of 1997, 2001, and 2005, law and order issues were not
152 Working within the structures

prominent (Downes and Morgan 2012). However, Crime and Disorder was
prominent in all political parties’ manifestos for the 2010 election, with all
parties highlighting and utilising crime statistics in their campaigns. The
trend for political use of crime statistics continues, with the result that po-
lice practices, structures, and approaches are eventually affected by politi-
cians and others. Crime statistics in the United Kingdom refers to the data
collected in the United Kingdom and that collected by the individual areas,
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, which operate separate
judicial systems. It covers data related to crime in the United Kingdom. As
with crime statistics elsewhere, they are broadly divided into victim studies
and police statistics. More recently, third-party reporting is used to quan-
tify specific under-reported issues, for example, hate crime.

Important point

Crime statistics in the United Kingdom refers to the data collected

in the United Kingdom, and that collected by the individual areas,
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, which operate
separate judicial systems.

The crime survey

The Crime Survey for England and Wales is an attempt to measure both
the amount of crime, and the impact of crime on England and Wales. The
original survey (carried out in 1982, to cover the 1981 year) covered all
three judicial areas of the UK, and was therefore referred to as the British
Crime Survey, but now it only covers England and Wales. In Scotland and
Northern Ireland, similar surveys, namely the Scottish Crime and Victimi-
sation Survey and Northern Ireland Crime Survey have similar purposes.
These surveys collect information about the victims of crime, the circum-
stances surrounding the crime, and the behaviour of the perpetrators. They
are used to plan, and measure the results of, crime reduction or percep-
tion measures. In addition, they collect data about the perception of issues
such as antisocial behaviour and the criminal justice system. Other crime
surveys include the Commercial Victimisation Survey, which covers small
and medium-sized businesses, and the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey,
with a particular focus on young people.

Police recorded statistics

The accuracy of police statistics is open to debate. Crimes are under-
reported, as victims may be reluctant to report them due to considering
 Working within the structures 153

it too trivial, embarrassing, aversion to dealing with the police, or fear of

repercussions by the perpetrators. The police also sometimes fail to record
correctly all crimes reported to them. Further, the police may not accept
a person’s claim that they are a victim of crime and it has been suggested
that the police sometimes deliberately do not record a crime to save time
or manipulate performance figures. In 2002, the Home Office introduced a
National Crime Recording Standard in England and Wales, due to a lack
of uniformity in how police forces recorded notifiable offences. One issue
identified was no-criming, the practice of writing off reported notifiable of-
fences from police force statistics. The National Crime Recording Standard
was applied inconsistently across crimes and regions, frequently incorrectly,
for instance, it varied significantly by area: in the year to March 2011, 2%
of reported rapes in Gloucestershire were recorded as “no crime,” while
30% of reported rapes in Kent were so classified, making accurate compar-
ison difficult. This was sometimes due to pressure from performance and
other factors. During the period November 2012–October 2013, an average
of 19% of crimes reported to the police were not recorded, with one quarter
of sexual crimes and one-third of violent crimes not being recorded, with
rape being particularly bad at 37% “no-criming.” Reporting also appears
to be inconsistent across local forces with HMICFRS (2020) illustrating the
inconsistency in this area. In a few forces, crime-recording was considered
very good, which illustrates that it can be done well and the statistics can be
trusted. In some other forces, however, it was found to be unacceptably bad
and the failure to properly record crime was seen as inexcusably poor and
indefensible. Twenty per cent of reviewed decisions to cancel a report were
found to be incorrect, and in about a quarter of cases there was no record of
victims being informed that their report had been cancelled.

Important point

Police recorded statistics are generally considered unreliable for a

number of reasons, including non-recording of reported offences,
poor IT systems, and manipulation of figures.

Senior members of the policing establishment admit to long-term, wide-

spread manipulation of crime figures, such as John Stevens, former head of
the Metropolitan Police Service who is quoted as saying:

Ever since I’ve been in police service there has been a fiddling of fig-
ures. I remember being a detective constable where we used to write off
crimes.
(The Telegraph 2014)
154 Working within the structures

In April 2013, the framework for reporting of official police statistics was
amended to address some of these issues. The Home Office delegated the re-
sponsibility for auditing a police forces compliance with the National Crime
Recording Standard to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspectorate of Constabulary,
later renamed Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue
Service. The first statistics using the new framework were published in July
2014. After the 2014 changes, five yearly rolling compliance audits by Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue Service found that
police force still do not uniformly comply with The National Crime Record-
ing Standards. In 2014, the Office of National Statistics stated that the un-
reliability of notifiable offence statistics meant they did not meet the quality
standards required of national statistics (ONS 2014). Currently the Office for
National Statistics produces figures on crime levels and trends for England
and Wales based primarily on the two sets of statistics, namely The Crime
Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) and police recorded crime data (ONS
2020). Policing by numbers is a quantitative managerialism approach to man-
aging the police structure in England and Wales. However, it is the quality of
policing that also matters and that quality can be enhanced by utilising the
community policing approach.

Community policing approaches

Community Policing is difficult to define. However, Tilley (2008) refers to
Community Policing as being decentralised, involving strong two way com-
munication between citizens and the police. Priorities are defined by the
community, and the community plays an important part in determining and
implementing locally relevant and acceptable solutions to its problems (Tilley
2008: 40). In the USA, the community policing movement has been much
stronger than in Britain. In fact, it became so influential that Greene (2000)
referred to it as becoming the national mantra for the American Police.

Important point

Community policing is difficult to define but generally includes strong

two way communication between citizens and the police. Priorities
are defined by the community, and the community plays an important
part in determining and implementing locally relevant and acceptable
solutions to its problems.

Whilst Community Policing is difficult to define, there are guiding pa-

rameters which are principles developed over several years in the USA
(Trojanowicz 1983b, 1986).
 Working within the structures 155

The principles are worth highlighting here:

• Community policing is a philosophy and a strategy. It allows police and

community to work together. The philosophy rests on the belief that law
abiding people in the community deserve input into the police process,
in exchange for their participation and support.
• It requires implementation by all personnel. This means that everyone
in the police, including sworn and unsworn officers, must engage in the
philosophy and seek ways to translate this into practice.
• It requires a different type of officer. This refers to the introduction of
the Community Policing Officer, who acts as the direct link between the
police and the community. CPOs must be allowed to maintain direct,
daily face-to-face contact with the people they serve.
• The CPO should work with volunteers. The CPO’s role should be to work
with people within communities to explore solutions to local concerns.
• It introduces a different relationship between officers and citizens. This
relationship, based on trust, sees police acting as a catalyst, getting peo-
ple to accept their share of responsibility for improving quality of life
within their communities.
• It introduces proactive police work. Community policing broadens the
police role by being proactive in making communities safer, rather than
focussing on the traditional reactive role.
• It aims to protect the most vulnerable in society. This includes those
who are most vulnerable, namely juveniles, the elderly, minorities, the
poor, disabled, and the homeless. This is achieved by working closer
with other agencies and communities themselves.
• It seeks to balance human skills with technological innovations. Com-
munity policing rests on the belief that nothing is better than humans
talking to each other, working together to solve problems.
• It must be integrated and implemented force-wide. This involves every-
one in the force, with the CPOs as specialists, bridging the gap between
the people and the police.
• It emphasises de-centralisation. Community policing emphasises the
fact that there should be de-centralised staff to work with the commu-
nity. It supports the idea that communities should see the police as a
resource they can use to help solve the problems within the community,
rather than impose order.

What is common to these principles is accountability to both the police

agency and community, decentralisation of authority and structure, shared
decision-making with the community, and more empowerment of police
officers (Michaelson et al. 1988). Having attempted to provide some under-
standing of just what community policing actually is, there may be some
benefit in situating its development in a wider political framework.
156 Working within the structures

Community policing in context

Neo-liberal ideas of governance during the late 1980s and 1990s have
gained further prominence, in addition to the attractive, nostalgic idea
that local police officers are best responsive to local communities (Reiner
2010). Further it has been assisted by a growing trend towards the devo-
lution by the state of policing functions that were previously the respon-
sibility of state-sponsored policing providers, to individuals, groups, and
communities. Neo-liberalism can be defined as having the following three
distinct elements. The first of these is a concentrated focus on the individ-
ual, who is viewed as the most qualified to articulate her or his needs and
desires, whereby society should be organised towards reducing barriers
that impede this goal. Second, unregulated markets are considered the
most effective and efficient means for promoting self-sufficiency, whereby
individuals pursue their wants and needs through the mechanism of
price. The third is the belief that the state should be non-interventionist
by emphasising the maintenance of competitive markets and guaran-
teeing individual rights fashioned primarily around a property regime
(Plehwe and Walpen 2006). This approach has also been referred to as
the responsibilisation policy (Garland 2001), whereby citizens and organ-
isations are encouraged to start their own anti-crime measures, and an
entire preventative community infrastructure has grown up in addition
to the police and the Criminal Justice System. Much has been written
about exactly what constitutes community policing (see Palmiotto 2013;
Rogers 2012; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1998, for example). However,
one useful understanding of community policing is provided by Friedman
(1992), which builds upon Trojanowicz’s earlier work. In essence, commu-
nity policing receives its mandate for existence from community support
and from police professionalism. Its broad function is the provision of
services in a decentralised environment that features intimate, informal,
and formal relationships with the public. One of the greatest strengths of
community policing, however, is that it assists in supporting the legiti-
macy for the police. This is considered vital for community and police to
work together to deal with crime and other types of disorder. Underpin-
ning the community policing approach is the strong idea of community
involvement. This is commonly referred to as community engagement.

Community engagement
Community engagement represents another central (though contested)
concept within contemporary and mainstream policing discourses. Myhill
(2006) defined community engagement as:

The process of enabling the participation of citizens and communities

in policing at their chosen level, ranging from providing information
 Working within the structures 157

and reassurance, to empowering them to identify and implement solu-

tions to local problems and influence strategic priorities and decisions.
(Myhill 2006: IV)

Though it clearly suggests appeal for both police and community, the pro-
cess of community engagement is rarely straightforward in practice. Indeed,
Matrix (2007, cited in Lloyd and Foster 2009) note that community engage-
ment represents a complex process for police services in so-called demo-
cratic societies. Here, in a typology of “engagers and non-engagers,” they
distinguish between those more and less “active” and socially networked
citizens who enjoy different relationships with the police, where offending/
non-offending and “community anchor” status are key mediating features.

Important point

Community engagement is the process of enabling the participation

of citizens and communities in policing at their chosen level, ranging
from providing information and reassurance, to empowering them to
identify and implement solutions to local problems and influence stra-
tegic priorities and decisions.

Myhill (2006) also highlights the challenges involved (from the police per-
spective) of engaging more deeply and widely with the community with the
aim of enhanced partnership working. These centre on:

• Sustaining commitment;
• Power-sharing issues;
• Resolving tensions and conflicts within police performance measure-
ment systems;
• Organisational training and culture-change;
• Mainstreaming community engagement;
• Development of community trust, confidence, and capacities; and
• Safeguarding the role of the community beat officer.

Community engagement of course helps to sustain a most important facet

of policing in a democratic society, that of police legitimacy.

Police legitimacy
In any democratic policing model the acceptance of police legitimacy
is paramount for the police and community to work together (Tyler and
Huo 2002). Police legitimacy has been described as the right to rule and the
158 Working within the structures

recognition by the ruled of that right. Therefore, despite the fact that police
organisations are given the right to rule by the state or Government, legiti-
macy only exists when it is perceived by the public. Research suggests that
legitimacy traditionally captures the degree to which citizens have trust
and confidence in authorities and, importantly, are willing to obey the di-
rectives of authorities such as the police (Hough et al. 2010). Additionally,
whether the police and the public are morally aligned, by sharing similar
values for example, has been seen to be an additional and important el-
ement of police legitimacy. Further research also suggests that there are
two key elements that support legitimacy (Tyler 2003). The first is the way
people perceive police performance. This refers to how well the police do
their job, as police will not achieve the legitimacy they need if they lack
the ability to be successful in carrying out their core functions of tackling
crime and disorder. The second is what has been termed “procedural jus-
tice,” which broadly refers to the quality of police treatment and the quality
of police decision-making. There are several key elements of procedural
justice, including dignity and respect, trustworthy motives, neutrality, and
voice. When police treat people with respect, demonstrate trustworthiness,
are neutral in their decision-making, and provide people with an oppor-
tunity to participate in the process and air concerns before decisions are
made, people are more likely to believe police are being procedurally just.
It is the widespread use of procedural justice that is one of the most ef-
fective ways to promote police legitimacy. Procedural justice is important
therefore for fundamental reasons, but there are other factors which justify
its importance. The first is that people tend to comply with the law when
the police are not around if procedural justice is used; thus, compliance
with the law is not purely explained solely by the threat of punishment or
the use of coercive power. Additionally, utilising this approach will make
the police more effective in their work of controlling crime and disorder
as they will be able to ensure valuable assistance from the general public,
including those considered as the most vulnerable in society. Communities
can help the police become more efficient in their day-to-day activities of
crime control and prevention work, and this of course increases confidence
in the police, and supports and even increases the idea of police legitimacy.
The danger of course is that in times of austerity and budgetary reductions,
this aspect of police/community interaction suffers.

Important point

Police legitimacy has been described as the right to rule and the recog-
nition by the ruled of that right.
 Working within the structures 159

Important point

Procedural justice requires the police to treat people according to the

rules, to treat them with dignity and respect, to listen to what they
have to say and explain the reasons for their decisions.

Community policing allies itself to these ideas with the intention that
through this approach to policing, communities can start to take ownership
of identifying and solving their own crime and disorder problems. There is a
link here to previous Government’s ideas surrounding the concept of the Big
Society, and the use of volunteers. In essence, the “big society” referred to
a tripartite partnership between the citizen, community, and local Govern-
ment (Eaton 2010). This vision required families, networks, and neighbour-
hoods in a post-modern society to formalise a working partnership that was
effective and sustainable in its approach to solving problems, building social
cohesion and setting priorities for Britain (BBC 2010). In doing so, the Gov-
ernment along with involvement of communities was set on building a “big
society” that would be bigger, stronger, and accountable to all. How this
equated to the practicalities of living in the UK is worthy of examination.
The Prime Minister referred to the ideology of “big society” as liberalism,
empowerment, freedom, and responsibility where the top-down approach
to Government was abandoned and replaced by local innovation and civic
action. Interestingly, critics of the Government, including the general secre-
tary of Unison, referred to the “big society” as the “big cop-out,” only con-
cerned with cutting investment and saving money (ITN 2010). This laissez
faire approach to Government would have had implications for new public
management and centralised performance indicators as it was thought that
society and communities would assess performance. However, Government
insisted that for the “big society” to work, it would require significant in-
volvement, encouragement, and support from communities. Fundamen-
tally, there are five key strands to understanding the “big society” identified
by the Cabinet Office (2010).

Empowering communities
The Government aimed to reform the planning and procedural systems to
give local people the ability to determine how their communities would de-
velop and be shaped in the future. Specifically, the “big society” required
local people to have a greater say in the “construction” of their surround-
ings. Accompanying these new powers, local people would also have ways
of saving local facilities and services that were threatened by closure if they
160 Working within the structures

were deemed to be fundamental to the fabric of society. Communities would

have the right to take over state-run services and facilities. Bringing about
this change, the Government intended to recruit and train “community or-
ganisers” to support the creation of neighbourhood ground all over the UK.

Action-orientated communities
Community involvement, philanthropy, and a spirit of volunteerism were an
integral component of the “big society.” The introduction of a “big society”
day and a focus on civic service aimed to increase and stimulate involvement
from members of the communities from all socio-economic backgrounds. A
“National Citizen Service” was to be established to encourage young people
to develop the skills needed in a modern society aimed to break-down nega-
tive perceptions and stimulate cohesion.

Decentralised power
A drive for decentralisation and “rolling back the frontiers of the state” were
all perhaps a synonymous style of governance set by the conservative party
in previous administrations. Reducing the size and influence of the state
by stimulating local initiatives was perceived as key drivers in the move to
establish a “big society.” Greater autonomy, both financially and procedur-
ally, was likely to be seen as Government moved away from micro-manage-
ment or “nano level” management and moved to a more macro management
approach. This cultural change in governance would see local authorities
and local officials having greater discretion and influence of the direction of
local policy. Decisions on housing and planning were also likely to return
to local councils in an effort to make the procedure of allocation and urban
design more accountable to local people.

Greater social enterprises

As pluralisation was to be encouraged, it was envisaged that there would
be an expansion in social enterprises. Those sectors, companies, industries,
and organisations that had previously been operating under a monopoly or
oligopoly were likely to see an increase in competition as state-run functions
would be shared with other social enterprises. Public-sector workers were to
be encouraged to set up employee-owned co-operatives encouraging inno-
vation and quality of service for the end user whilst being a more economi-
cally viable option for the state. Funding the “big society” would come from
dormant bank accounts which were believed would provide the necessary
finding for stimulating neighbourhood groups, charities, and social enter-
prise. As previously indicated, it was however unlikely that the “big society”
ideology drive would be funded by an unlimited supply of capital and finan-
cial constraints would play a large part in their introduction and use.
 Working within the structures 161

Information ability
Finally, confidence in official data and statistics had been eroded in recent
years with possibly unfounded, incorrect statistics being published resulting
in several official apologies being made in parliament by senior ministers.
Underpinning the “big society,” the Government aimed to create a new cul-
ture where the public had a “right to data” that would be published regularly
in an attempt to improve accountability. From a policing point of view, the
concept expects individuals and community groups to increasingly assume
responsibility for dealing with crime and disorder within their communities.

Self-policing in communities
As austerity has affected the resources available for the police organisation,
a rationalisation process has had to be invoked. More investment in tech-
nology has been accompanied by other initiatives, including greater use of
unsworn staff to undertake more and more work historically undertaken by
police officers. A separate aspect of this type of approach is the encourage-
ment of communities and individuals to undertake more policing activities.
One approach to maintaining police/community interaction, it is argued,
is the introduction and cultivation of the concept of “expert citizens.” This
approach calls for the police to adopt a new way of working in order to
maximise available resources and to continue to cope with the financial and
other pressures likely to impinge upon them. A key element of this is the
concept of the “expert citizen.” Popularised by the Danish political theorist
Henrik Bang (2005), the expert citizen suggests an individual (in and from
the community) who is equipped with relevant knowledge, understandings,
and skills that enable him/her to actively participate in efforts to improve
community life. Bang actually distinguishes between the expert citizen and
the “everyday maker” in his work. Both categories of political identity de-
scribe the activities of informed and empowered individuals within political
life though some differences are suggested in terms of their affiliations, lev-
els of participation, and self-interest.
For Fraser et al. (2014) the expert citizen:

Would be one who not only reduces demand on the police service
through taking steps to keep their person and property safe, but also
through all of their interactions with the police service.
(Fraser et al. 2014: 18)

Thus the expert citizen, in a policing context, would be someone who knows
about not only locks, bolts, and other situational crime prevention tech-
niques but also the requirements of police systems (such as 999 and 101 tele-
phone systems in the UK). They would also volunteer information, act as
witnesses, and proactively engage with the police. The expert citizen would
162 Working within the structures

no doubt be encouraged and supported to develop a range of “community

skills” (analogous to First Aid in the workplace). Participation would, it is
assumed, follow different routes and levels of intensity, from ad hoc engage-
ments on specific problems to more routine participation as part of a police
or community volunteer scheme.

Important point

The expert citizen has been described as one who reduces demand on
police services by taking steps to keep their property and person safe
and also through their positive interactions with the police.

Challenges for the exper t citizen

While suggesting distinct possibilities for improved police-public relations
and improvements in policing and community life, the expert citizen con-
cept also raises issues which are worthy of attention. These include:

• The concept may be seen as imprecise and vacuous: for example, what
does it mean? How does the citizen become expert? How is the idea of
“expert” defined? Who decides on expert status?
• Following Bang (2005), how would issues of self-interest and/or ideology
be addressed in the selection of and engagement with expert citizens?
• How would police organisations (and communities) ensure that there is
citizen expert representation from among a diverse range of community
groups?
• Is the intention to create a society of expert citizens or is the plan more
limited and focussed on specific and targeted individuals?
• Is there a suggested or required level of participation required for the
citizen expert?
• There may be police resistance to the idea (police culture is notoriously
resistant to change and has a propensity towards suspicion of “non-
police” input).
• There may be public resistance where individuals and groups reject calls
to become expert citizens either because they do not want to accept re-
sponsibility, or through fear of reprisals and so on.

Exper t citizen as a community bridge

The approach acknowledges that a major feature of improving policing and
equipping it to better cope in the future, is to encourage the police to develop
better understandings of demand. This goes beyond merely monitoring
 Working within the structures 163

calls for assistance coming into the police organisation and extends to im-
proved identification of local community needs and expectations. It also
encompasses an improved internal understanding—that is, of the police
organisations own cultural dispositions as well as its skills base—as well
as an enhanced understanding of the priorities and capabilities of partner
agencies. The expert citizen clearly has a major role to play here, becoming
an asset able and prepared to speak on behalf of local people in ways that
account for local experiences as well as with an understanding of police or-
ganisational requirements. Of course the concept of the “citizen” is already
familiar within policing discourses: the “active citizen” and “citizen-focused
policing” are two relatively well-established terms (for example, see Lloyd
and Foster 2009). The notion of the expert citizen implies something differ-
ent and arguably more sophisticated: while the expert citizen is likely to be
an active and participating citizen, the emphasis and requirement will be on
such involvement in an informed, knowledgeable, reflective, reflexive, and
purposeful way.

A new neighbourhood policing?

There is much that will be familiar to the observer or practitioner of policing
in terms of the major challenges (and solutions) identified. The emphasis on
the value of multi-agency partnership working, prevention, prioritising fre-
quent (or repeat) victims, technology (especially social media), harnessing
and mobilising community support as well the centrality of police cultural
influences has been well explored elsewhere in the literature and research.
However, neighbourhood policing, in its present form, is singled out for
criticism. It would appear that for some, today’s neighbourhood policing
is superficial and partial in its implementation (Fraser et al. 2014). Despite
this, they acknowledge its potential, viewing it as a key and continued hope
for the future of policing. Arguing the case for a “new neighbourhood po-
licing” approach, Fraser et al. advocate greater attention to specific and tai-
lored forms of community engagement (beyond the traditional Police and
Community together consultation style meetings in the UK) that take in a
wider range of community groups through (for example) targeted visits to
community centres, places of worship, retirement homes and the like as well
as other sites where police are more likely to engage citizens on the citizens’
own terms.

Asset-based community development

An interesting and again arguably under-developed theme relates to the
concept and practice of what has come to be known as “asset-based commu-
nity development” (ABCD) (Fraser et al. 2014). ABCD describes a panoply
of initiatives designed to empower citizens to use their practical skills and
social capital to make local improvements in the life of their community. In
164 Working within the structures

essence, ABCD represents a strategy for sustainable community develop-

ment. Its appeal lies in its belief that communities can drive the development
process through the identification, mobilisation, and valuing of existing
(though often unrecognised) assets. While the emphasis is on communities,
ABCD is just as much about mobilising private businesses, public-sector
agencies, the third sector, voluntary organisations, institutions, associa-
tions, and other social enterprises in the drive to combine local assets to
tackle locally identified problems.

Important point

Asset-Based Community Development describes an approach which

utilises initiatives designed to empower citizens to use their practical
skills and social capital to make local improvements in the life of their
community. It involves driving the development of positive change
through the use of existing but unrecognised assets and resources al-
ready in the community.

ABCD is attributed to the pioneering work of Kretzmann and McKnight

(1993). In their Building Communities from the Inside Out: A Path Toward
Finding and Mobilizing a Community’s Assets (1993) they distinguish be-
tween a “traditional” approach that is described as a “needs-driven” path
(with an emphasis on outside-in definitions of the “problems” and their
solutions); and an alternative asset-based approach that starts instead
with an internally focussed (i.e. focussed on local people, groups, and or-
ganisations and their existing assets and capacities) path. Kretzmann and
Knight outline three basic principles underpinning ABCD, namely that it
is: asset-based (belief in the idea that everyone has something to offer); in-
ternally focussed (belief in the “inside-out” approach to problem solving
rather than “outside-in” or “top-down”); and relationship-driven (ABCD
thrives on the productive creation of networks, linkages, and local capaci-
ties). These asset-based principles shown seem to chime with the principles
underpinning common understandings of dominant policing orthodoxies
including: intelligence-led policing, community policing, problem-oriented
policing, neighbourhood policing, and community engagement. It also has
clear links to the UK Prime Minister Cameron’s (controversial) concept of
the “Big Society” (see elsewhere in this book).
Table 7.1 outlines the key features of the needs-based and asset-based
approaches.
It should be noted, of course, that in some respects, the concept of the
“community” as an asset or resource for policing is relatively well established
 Working within the structures 165

Table 7.1 N eeds-Based and Asset-Based Approaches to Community

Development

Needs-based approaches Asset-based approaches

Start by looking at a community’s Start by recognising the community’s

deficiencies and problems existing capacities and assets
(internal focus)
Turn to external agencies Belief in local people as agents of
(Government, charity, etc.) to change in their own lives—with
find solutions and achieve change help to self-organise
(outside-in approach)
Tend to characterise people in See local people as their own
poverty as victims or passive greatest asset and resource in
recipients of help building a stronger community
Can reduce community togetherness Encourage collaboration and
as identified problems tend recognise the process as a journey
to attract outside resources, of discovery (of skills, strengths,
professionalised solutions, and and how to cooperate). Pro-
brings own pressures where funding community cohesion
is target achievement linked
Communities become consumers Communities become active agents
and clients of services and service in the co-production of services
providers

Adapted from The Church Urban Fund (2013).

in the literature. In his seminal work on problem-oriented policing (POP),

Goldstein (1990) highlighted the value of police making more of the com-
munity in terms of problem-solving responses (in the specific POP sense,
community is defined as “anyone affected in any way” by the problem under
consideration—Goldstein 1990: 25). Elsewhere, the idea of “co-production”
(Ostrom et al. 1978) has been well discussed and is used to describe a collab-
orative relationship between service users and service providers particularly
as far as the design and delivery of services are concerned.

Community assets in use

One example for mobilising community assets can be seen in the public
health sector in the UK. There, a solution has been found whereby patients
can find ongoing support through online patient communities, such as Pa-
tientsLikeMe (see http://www.patientslikeme.com/). This could be adopted
to provide a similar scheme for crime victims, where victims could access
online informal communities or networks of support for as long as they
needed following a crime. It is not difficult to see how this idea could be
extended beyond volume crime to a range of community harms (subject to
166 Working within the structures

safeguards), including domestic violence and hate crime. In the present po-
licing context, and signalling encouraging messages about a growing polic-
ing awareness of the value of the asset-based approach, the Gloucestershire
PCC has included references to ABCD in his published Police and Crime
Plan 2013–2017 (Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner Gloucester-
shire 2013). As he notes, ABCD is a “large and growing movement” that
considers local assets as the “building blocks” of sustainable community
development supporting safer and stronger communities.
Use of the community policing approach, invoking citizens to engage in
a form of self-policing using community assets may well result in improved
relationships between the police and communities. This should, if success-
ful, provide a greater amount of information and intelligence which will, in
turn, support the idea of Evidenced-Based Policing.

Evidence-Based Policing
Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) is an approach to policy making and tactical
decision-making for police departments. It has its roots in the larger move-
ment towards evidence-based practices. Advocates of EBP emphasise the
value of statistical analysis, empirical research, and ideally randomised con-
trolled trials (Sherman 1998). EBP does not dismiss more traditional drivers
of police decision-making, but seeks to raise awareness and increase the
application of scientific testing, targeting and tracking of police resources,
especially during times of budget cuts and austerity. In 2008 EBP was made
the core of the Police Executive Programme at Cambridge University, a
part-time course of study for senior police leaders from around the world to
earn a Diploma or Master’s in Applied Criminology (Sherman 2013). In that
year, the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) (now the College
of Policing) funded the first international conference on EBP, which was
attended by police executives from Asia, Australia, Europe, and the US.
Since then the conference has been held each July, with the 10th Interna-
tional Conference in 2017 attended by over 300 police and scholars from six
continents. In 2010, a group of UK police officers founded the Society of
EBP, and its twice-annual UK meetings have attracted over 200 attendees
per meeting (including 2015), as well as press coverage.

Important point

EBP is an approach to policy making and tactical decision-making for

police departments. The College of Policing provides a “what works”
facility on its website to illustrate this approach.
 Working within the structures 167

In 2012, the UK Home Office founded the College of Policing, which

took over many of the responsibilities of the National Police Improvement
Agency (formally abolished in 2013). One of the College’s five strategic ob-
jectives is “identifying, developing and promoting good practice based on
evidence.” The College is committed to identifying and sharing with police
practitioners “what works.” In 2013, the UK’s largest police force, London’s
Metropolitan Police Service, committed to crime fighting based on what
we know works. The What Works Centre for Crime Reduction is part of a
network of What Works Centres created to provide easy access to robust
and comprehensive evidence to guide decision-making on public spending.
The Crime Reduction Toolkit is an online tool that allows users to weigh up
evidence on the impact, cost, and implementation of different interventions,
and use this to help shape their crime reduction efforts. The What Works
Centre Crime Reduction Toolkit currently includes 35 evaluations of inter-
ventions and has identified over 300 systematic reviews covering 60 different
interventions.
The question also arises as to why and how the EBP approach could be-
come part of the philosophical approach to policing in England and Wales.
Considering the “why?” question one needs to consider the recent past and
the potential future. The police are still apparently in a period of austerity
with all public services struggling to maintain service delivery. This appears
to be the case for the foreseeable future and will continue regardless of the
recent announcement of recruiting 20,000 extra police officers, which, when
complete, will only take numbers to just under the 2010 strength. After a
long period of decline in recorded crime figures, we are now seeing an in-
crease in total numbers, and more so in specific areas such as knife crime
and cybercrime. In addition, crime in general is becoming more complex and
diverse as technology increases, along with increased use of social media
and the problems that invokes. This has been recognised at an international
level, with the creation of the Campbell Collaboration (Campbell Collabo-
ration 2020) which is an international social science research network that
researches and produces open and policy-relevant evidence-based reports.
The Campbell Collaboration produces reports on crime and justice using
meta-analysis on such topics as disorder policing and its impact upon crime
(Braga et al. 2019) and is part of the greater movement on evidence-based
approach.
These issues coupled with the wider global issues such as Serious Organ-
ised Crime (SOC), political upheavals, migration, environmental issues, etc.
mean we need our police to be “smarter” in their approach to meeting these
challenges. Traditional models of police station and patrol appear no longer
to provide the answers to current and future policing problems.
The World Economic Forum, for example, published a report recently
that considered future risks at the global level, which will affect “the local”
168 Working within the structures

in many countries. The major risks lay around economy; state relationships
and power; climate and the environment; and technological issues, such as
cybercrime. All of these issues will, in some form or another, have implica-
tions for policing. The report concludes that countries and agencies need
to be aware of such future risks and the responses should be new, innova-
tive, and fresh. They conclude by saying that nostalgia was an inadequate
response and that there was a need to safely navigate the new challenges
(World Economic Forum Report 2019). In other words there is a need for
organisations to think differently about how they deal with such issues and
not rely on the approach that is underpinned by guesswork or relies upon
historical solutions alone and the well-worn ideas that states “that’s the way
we have always done things around here.”
This will be an important sea of change for organisations such as the po-
lice, which have strong occupational cultures that are seen as resistant to
change. However, there appears to be some recognition that the police in
England and Wales need to adopt a more evidence-based approach. The Po-
licing Vision 2025 (APCC 2015) document, published by the Association of
Police Commissioners and the National Council for Police Chiefs, stresses
this type of approach for the future whilst also acknowledging that the po-
lice have not been particularly good at it in the past. However, a variety of
meanings has been attributed to EBP from supporters and detractors alike.
EBP can involve many different types of activities, such as:

• Using rigorous evaluation methods to examine the effectiveness of a

police training programme, demand for police resources, or policy.
• Training officers on what is believed about effective crime control meth-
ods, police/community interaction, dealing with disorder and other po-
lice issues.
• Deployment of resources using crime and other analysis, for targeting
hot spots etc.
• Conducting surveys of officers to seek their views on policing and
strategy.
• Using academic research and literature reviews to gain in-depth under-
standing and detailed picture of a particular topic.
(Lum and Koper 2017)

This list is not definitive and the only restriction to the use of EBP is one’s
imagination. The approach requires regular and consistent use of research
analysis and science to inform a broad range of activities. However, this
“new” type of approach faces many challenges surrounding its implementa-
tion, such as organisational and cultural resistance. In addition, it requires
strong partnerships, researchers, and analysts, which are not necessarily
readily available. Therefore, introducing EBP into the practice world of
 Working within the structures 169

policing is challenging as it requires a different way of thinking about po-

licing, and the traditional methods of police practice. Receptivity is a major
challenge for the introduction of the ESP approach.

Receptivity
EBP, as defined by several commentators (Sherman 1998; Lum and Koper
2017, for example), involves activities and structures designed to internal-
ise and normalise its use in practice. The problem of organisational and
occupational culture, including technical issues, makes this very difficult.
Included in these issues are the types of language used by the scientific and
academic communities and the police, as well as differing expectations
from agencies. In addition writers such as Bayley (1998) have pointed to the
historical fact that much research into police and policing has rarely been
translated into practice. One reason for this is the lack of appreciation, un-
derstanding, and knowledge seen by some police agencies in that they see
no value in its use, meaning that EBP will progress no further (Palmer 2011).
Spasic and Siminovic (2018), for example, found in their study of police ed-
ucators and police officers that EBP knowledge in those responsible for ed-
ucating police officers in EBP was only marginally higher than the police
officers being taught, which was quite low. Officers also tend to rely more
upon experience than on scientific knowledge and are reluctant to adopt
more complex research designs (Telep and Lum 2014), and lack a clear un-
derstanding of EBP concepts (Telep and Winegar 2015). Therefore, whilst
the new police professional degree and its curriculum emphasises the use of
EBP throughout, it will progress no further than being a topic to be passed
as part of an educational programme if it is not accepted as a philosophy
of policing or part of a philosophy. Clearly there needs to be a change for
both scientific and academic institutions and police organisations with the
introduction of EBP. One major area is that of receptivity on behalf of the
police organisation.
Receptivity is the willingness of police practitioners to not only be aware
of and understand research and the research process but also to be open to
the value of research and actually to demand it. It is the ability to be aware
of and acceptance of research findings as applicable and “do-able.” How-
ever, police officers need to see the value of products from research. Policing
is a pragmatic occupation, fast moving in the main, and requires flexibility
and quick results from research and evaluations. This is not to deny the
value that some long-term research can provide the police organisation,
but in the main, police appreciate research that can be undertaken quickly,
being methodologically sound, and provides tangible results that can have
some form of positive impact upon their work.
170 Working within the structures

Important point

Receptivity is the willingness of police practitioners to not only be

aware of and understand research and the research process but also to
be open to the value of research and actually to demand it. Without
this, the EBP approach will not be as effective as it should be.

One of the main drivers for change which will undoubtedly influence the
receptivity of EBP by the police organisation lies within the new police pro-
fessional degree curriculum with its emphasis upon EBP projects, linked to
the police workplace. The evolution of modern criminality will see policing
deal with increasingly diverse and complex communities including those
communities that exist online. Developments in technology coupled with
the availability of such technology to many, mean that new constables must
be ready to call upon a range of skills, graduate attributes and knowledge
(Martin et al. 2017). This is recognised in Policing Vision 2025, which artic-
ulates the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) and the
National Police Chiefs’ Council’s (NPCC) strategy for the professional de-
velopment of policing. As we have seen those recruited as police constables
will enter the profession through one of three routes and follow a national
policing curriculum. The new national policing curriculum seeks to prepare
those entering the service as police constables for the challenges they will
face. It also aims to develop police practitioners who have the ability, knowl-
edge, and skills to operate autonomously and with sound decision-making
skills based on a sound evidence base.

The question of evidence

EBP, as the name suggests requires evidence upon which to make important
decisions in policing. However, what do we mean when we consider evidence?
It is a common enough term used in the world of policing as police investiga-
tions gather evidence for use in court. Legal rules, however, restrict the sort
of evidence that is admissible. These legal rules are designed to regulate the
reliability of evidence and the fairness of trials (Redmayne 2008). However,
for the purposes of EBP, police agencies have a very large amount of internal
data available from their accountability and managerialism duties. In the past
decades there have been numerous studies of many aspects of police activi-
ties, interventions, policies, and other management. Many types of research
can inform police practice and underpin EBP. This, coupled with research
activities, such as surveys, can inform us regarding trust and confidence in
the police. Descriptive analysis can inform us of crime and disorder hotspots
 Working within the structures 171

or prevalent road accident locations, whilst in-depth literature reviews can

inform us of what is already known concerning a particular problem and can
provide a starting point for further research. EBP does not, and should not,
discriminate between types of research approach. However, the quality of
some research can vary so this is where discrimination should play a part.
EBP should promote the “best available” approach to evidence use (Lum and
Koper 2017). If data from poorly conducted research or data that is not rep-
resentative of the community is used, for example, the results will be biased
at best and a waste of time for any implementation or initiative that may be
introduced as a result. Bad research evidence that starts with bad data can be
made worse if the research methods employed to draw conclusions about that
information are not scientifically sound.

Important point

All types of evidence should be used in the EBP approach, provided

the data can be shown to have been produced by scientific rigour.

When considering therefore what research the police should use when try-
ing to implement EBP, the result should be that all types of research, namely
surveys, descriptive studies, use of statistics, experiments and other forms
of experiments, social observations, interviews, and so on should be used.
The underlying caveat is that whatever data is used, it should be the best
evidence available.

Conclusion
This chapter has introduced issues that influence the policing structures in
England and Wales and will, in all probability, continue to influence the
way policing is delivered. Performance management, in whatever guise, will
remain a focus for police forces in the UK because as a public service, its
customers, the public should have a right to know what their taxes are be-
ing used for. This is especially so, given the recent history of austerity and
reduction in police workforce numbers. However, there is a danger that the
performance management process becomes so ingrained in the police or-
ganisation that it becomes more important than delivering the service to
the public. In addition a focus upon statistics can divert attention from the
quality of policing the public receive. An over reliance upon crime statistics
alone is also fraught with danger as they appear to be unreliable, although
there appears to be evidence that this is now being addressed, and their
use, coupled with the Crime Survey for England and Wales, will give them
172 Working within the structures

more veracity. Community policing, coupled with community engagement

and the drive for a more self-policing focussed community will remain within
the policing structures for the foreseeable future. However, there is a danger
that increased technology, along with an increasing demand for the police
to become involved in more and more problems within society, may actually
widen the space between them. This technological drive to focus scarce police
resource to where they are needed, can be seen in the Evidence-Based Ap-
proach to policing. However, it is hoped that this approach will actually im-
prove police legitimacy as it should focus resources in a scientifically rigorous
manner to tackle the problems that matter to the community.

Reflective questions
1 What are the problems associated with performance management
within the police?
2 Why are crime statistics reportedly unreliable?
3 What are the main principles behind the community policing approach?
4 What are the advantages in community engagement for the police?
5 What community assets may exist in your community?
6 What is one of the main problems associated with the introduction of
EBP into the police organisation?
7 List at least five items that could be used as evidence in EBP.

Useful websites
College of Policing ‘what works’: https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Pages/
default.aspx.
College of Policing—EBP Approach: https://whatworks.college.police.uk/
About/Pages/What-is-EBP.aspx.
Problem-Oriented Policing: https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/what-pop.
Community Policing: https://www.discoverpolicing.org/explore-the-field/
what-is-community-policing/.
National Expert Citizens Group: http://necguk.org.uk/.

References
Audit Commission. (1995) Local Authority Performance Indicators – Vol. 3, Police
and Fire Services, London, HMSO.
BBC. (2010) David Cameron Launches Tories’ ‘Big Society’ Plan. Available at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10680062 (accessed on 20/2/2020).
Bang, H. (2005) Among Everyday Makers and Expert Citizens, in Newman, J. (ed.),
Remaking Governance, Bristol, The Policy Press, 159–179.
Bayley, D.H. (1998) Policing in America: Assessment and Prospects, Ideas in Ameri-
can Policing, Washington, DC, Police Foundation.
 Working within the structures 173

Beirne, P. (1993) Inventing Criminology: Essays on the Rise of ‘Homo Criminals,’ Al-
bany, NY, State University of New York Press.
Braga, A., Welsh, B. and Schnell, C. (2019) Disorder Policing to Reduce Crime. Avail-
able at https://campbellcollaboration.org/media/k2/attachments/0261_Braga_
Disorder_policing_PLS_EN.pdf (accessed 8/4/2020).
Cabinet Office. (2010) Building the Big Society, London, Cabinet Office.
Campbell Collaboration. (2020) Available at https://campbellcollaboration.org/
(accessed 8/4/2020).
Cassels, J. (1994) Report of an Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Role and
Responsibilities of Police, London, Police Foundation/Policy Studies Institute.
Church Urban Fund. (2013) Tackling Poverty in England: An Asset-Based Approach,
London, Church Urban Fund.
Cockcroft, T. and Beattie, I. (2009) Shifting Cultures: Managerialism and the Rise
of ‘Performance.’ Policing: An International Journal of Policing Strategies and
Management, 32(3), 526–540.
Downes, D. and Morgan, R. (2012) Overtaking on the Left? The Politics of Law and
Order in the ‘Big Society,’ in Maguire, M., Morgan, R., and Reiner, R. (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Criminology (5th Edition), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Eaton, G. (2010) The “Big Society”: New Doubts Emerge, London, New Statesman.
Edwards, C.J. (1999) Changing Policing Theories for 21st Century Societies, Leich-
hardt, The Federation Press.
Fraser, C., Hagelund C., Sawyer, K. and Stacey, M. (2014) The Expert Citizen, Re-
form Ideas. Available at http://www.reform.uk/publication/the-expert-citizen/.
Friedman, R. (1992) Community Policing: Comparative Perspectives and Prospects,
New York, Prentice Hall.
Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Golding, B. and Savage, S.P. (2008) Leadership and Performance Management, in
Newburn, T. (ed.), Handbook of Policing (2nd Edition), Cullompton, Willan.
Goldstein, H. (1990) Problem-Oriented Policing, New York, McGraw-Hill.
Greene, J. (2000) Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure
and Function of the Police, in Horney, J. (ed.), Criminal Justice 2000: Policies,
Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice system, Washington, DC, US
Dept of Justice.
HMICFRS. (2020) Crime Data Integrity Force Reports. Available at https://www.
justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/crime-data-integrity-force-
reports/ (accessed 4/2/2020).
Home Office. (1995) Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks, London, Home
Office.
Home Office/ACPO. (2008) Improving Police Performance: A Practical Guide to Po-
lice Performance Management, London, Home Office ACPO.
Hough, M., Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Myhill, A. and Quinton, P. (2010) Procedural
Justice, Trust and Institutional Legitimacy, Oxford Journal of Policing, 4(3), 203–210.
ITN. (2010) What Is the “Big Society” Initiative? Available at http://itn.co.uk/59eb-
147bcb73391305d1226c9945aa69.html (accessed 20/2/2020).
Kretzmann, J.P. and McKnight, J.L. (1993) Building Communities from the Inside
Out: A Path toward Finding and Mobilizing a Community’s Assets, Evanston, IL,
Institute for Policy Research.
174 Working within the structures

Lloyd, K. & Foster, J. (2009) Citizen Focus and Community Engagement: A Review
of the Literature, London, The Police Foundation.
Lum, C. and Koper, C.S. (2017) Evidence Based Policing: Translating Research into
Practice, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Maguire, M. (2012) Criminal Statistics and the Social Construction of crime, in
Maguire, M., Morgan, R. and Reiner, R. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Crimi-
nology (5th Edition), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Martin, H., Rogers, C., Samuel, A. and Rowling, M. (2017) Serving from the Top:
Police Leadership for the Twenty-First Century. International Journal of Emer-
gency Services, 6(3), 209–219.
Michaelson, S., Kelling, G. and Wasserman R. (1988) Toward a Working Defini-
tion of Community Policing, Working Paper #88-05-09, Cambridge, MA, John F
Kennedy School of Government.
Myhill, A. (2006) Community Engagement in Policing: Lessons from the Literature,
London, Home Office.
Office of National Statistics. (2014) Statistics on Crime in England and Wales. Avail-
able at https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/archive/assessment/assessment/
assessment-reports/assessment-report-268---statistics-on-crime-in-england-and-
wales.pdf (accessed 4/2/2020).
Office of National Statistics. (2020) Crime and Justice. Available at https://www.ons.
gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice (accessed 4/2/2020).
Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner. (2013) Police and Crime Plan 2013–
2017. Available at www.gloucestershire-pcc.gov.uk/wp.../PCP-Revision-201415-v1.
doc (accessed 22/9/14).
Ostrom, E., Parks, R.B., Whitaker, G.P. and Percy, S.L. (1978) The Public Service
Production Process: A Framework for Analyzing Police Services. Police Studies
Journal, 7, 381–389.
Palmer, I. (2011) Is the UK Police Service receptive to EBP? Testing Attitudes towards
Experimentation, PhD Thesis, Cambridge, Cambridge University.
Palmiotto, M.J. (2013) Community Policing: A Police Citizen Partnership, Abingdon,
Oxford, Routledge.
Plehwe D. and Walpen, B. (2006) Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique, London,
Routledge.
Pollitt, C. (2002) The New Public Management in International Perspective: An
Analysis of Impacts and Effects, in McLaughlin, K., Osborne, P. and Ferlie, E.
(eds.), New Public Management: Future Trends and Current Prospects, London,
Routledge.
Ranson, S. and Stewart, J. (1994) Managing for the Public Domain: Enabling the
Learning Society, London, MacMillan.
Redmayne, M. (2008) Evidence, in Newburn, T. and Neyroud, P. (eds.), Dictionary
of Policing, Cullompton, Willan.
Reiner, R. (2010) The Politics of the Police (4th edition), Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Rogers, C. (2012) Crime Reduction Partnerships, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Sherman, L.W. (1998) Evidence Based Policing, Ideas in American Policing,
Washington, DC, Police Foundation.
 Working within the structures 175

Sherman, L.W. (2013) The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, testing, and
tracking. Crime and Justice, 42(1), 377–451. doi:10.1086/670819.
Spasic, D. and Siminovic, B. (2018) Police Officers and Police Educators Recep-
tivity to the Concept of Evidence Based Policing – A comparison Study. Avail-
able at https://www.policija.si/images/stories/Publikacije/RKK/PDF/2018/04/
RKK2018-04_DraganaSpasic_PoliceOfficersAndPoliceEducatorsReceptivity.
pdf (accessed 11/12/2019).
The Telegraph. (2014) Lord Stevens Admits Police Have Been ‘Fiddling’ Crime
Figures for Years. Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/
10557155/Lord-Stevens-admits-police-have-been-fiddling-crime-figures-for-
years.html (accessed 4/2/2020).
Telep, C.W. and Lum, C. (2014) The Receptivity of Officers to Empirical Research
and Evidence Based Policing: An Examination of Officers to Empirical Research
and Evidence Based Policing: An Examination of Survey Data from these Agen-
cies. Police Quarterly, 17(4), 359–385.
Telep, C.W. and Winegar, S. (2015) Police Executives Receptivity to Research: A
Survey of Chiefs and Sheriffs in Oregon. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Prac-
tice, 10(3), 241–249.
Tilley, N. (2008) Community Policing, in Newburn, T. and Neyroud, P. (eds.), Dic-
tionary of Policing, Cullompton, Willan.
Trojanowicz, R.C. (1983a) An Evaluation of the Neighbourhood Foot Patrol Program
in Flint, East Lansing, Michigan State University Press.
Trojanowicz, R.C. (1983b) An Evaluation of a Neighbourhood Foot Patrol Pro-
gramme. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 11(4), 410–419.
Trojanowicz, R.C. (1986) Evaluating a Neighbourhood Foot Patrol Programme:
The Flint, Michigan Project, in Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), Community Crime Pre-
vention, Beverley Hills, Sage, 157–178.
Tyler, T.R. (2003) Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law, in
Tonry, M. (ed.), Crime and Justice – A Review of Research, Chicago, IL, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 30.
Tyler, T.R. and Huo, Y.J. (2002) Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation
with the Police and Courts, New York, Russell Sage Foundation.
WEF (World Economic Forum). (2019) The Global Risks Report 2019. Availa-
ble at https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2019 (accessed
11/12/2019).
Chapter 8

Police structures and the

future?

Introduction
Previous chapters have critically examined the history, structures, and ap-
plication within those structures of policing in England and Wales. Clear
themes have emerged that illustrate the complexity of policing, as well as
the challenges being faced. Important changes are being made which will
attempt to professionalise the police work force through improved recruit-
ment and education, whilst increased use of technology will assist in social
control in diverse communities. Political and social, as well as economic,
influences have helped to shape these changes, which have resulted in ad-
justment to traditional policing structures at the local, national, and inter-
national level. It is fair to say, perhaps, that in terms of policing, we are in
the midst of change which is unprecedented. This of course begs the ques-
tion regarding what the future will bring in terms of change for policing.
Predicting the future is a difficult proposition, and is fraught with danger.
For example, demographics may change which will influence demand for
policing services, leading to perhaps a different type of police response, as
populations grow older and more diverse. This, in turn, may mean the struc-
ture of policing needs amending to meet those needs. Similarly, as technol-
ogy increases in use by the population, structures based upon face-to-face
contact may need to be altered as police try to maintain legitimacy through
the use of technology. Greater use of technology by the police themselves
and other agencies could well alter the structure and relationships between
themselves and those agencies in the criminal justice system. Consequently,
future changes in the political, technological, legal, social, and environmen-
tal landscape have the potential to alter current structures of policing. This
chapter considers those issues that, it would appear, will be critical, and that
may have an impact upon current policing structures in England and Wales.
The main areas for consideration are how police will cope with rising de-
mand for their services, the drive for a more pluralised approach to policing
involving the private sector and other groups, technology in the form of pre-
dictive policing, the use of Big Data sets to inform decision-making, and the
idea of “smart city” policing as urban areas become larger and more dense.
 Police structures and the future? 177

Future demand
All public services are facing unprecedented challenges. Rising demand,
changing demographics, and increasingly strained finances mean pub-
lic services such as the police have to face difficult choices. This includes
changing the way in which they work, whilst also providing a service and
managing public expectations (Randle and Kippin 2020). It is believed that
future demand will not only outmatch supply, but could overwhelm public
agencies with requirements that do not match current models of supply (See
Leigh et al. 2017, for example). In 2015, the College of Policing undertook
an analysis of future demand on the police service in England and Wales
(College of Policing 2015).
This report concluded, amongst other things, that:

• Police Officer numbers had been falling since 2010 so that, at that time,
there was one police officer for every 445 members of the public.
• Time spent on more costly crime investigations such as Child Sexual
Exploitation had increased.
• Incidents involving people with Mental Health Issues appeared to be
increasing.
• Demand on Police associated with protective statutory requirements
appeared to be increasing.
• Two emerging themes of pressure on police resilience were emerging,
namely decreased levels of visibility and increasing requests for mutual
aid.
(College of Policing 2015: 1)

Important point

Future demands upon policing services are likely to increase in scope,

difficulty, and public expectations.

To obtain a better understanding of the impact and complexity of police

work, it is useful to consider the costs associated with crime. Whilst crime
in total has generally dropped for successive years, the costs associated with
investigating crimes has risen, especially those that are complex to inves-
tigate and requires more time. These are increasingly becoming a greater
proportion of police recorded crime (College of Policing 2015). Therefore,
whilst in 2015, crime had reduced by 43% between 2003/2004 and 2013/2014
the average cost per crime for the police increased by 25%. Of course, crime
statistics represent only part of the police workload. There are many types
of work the police undertake which do not appear in crime reports and
178 Police structures and the future?

performance data. These include crime prevention and public protection ac-
tivities. In addition new and emerging crime types, such as cybercrime, mod-
ern slavery, and female genital mutilation, are increasingly being brought to
the attention of the police. Non-Crime Activity and Incidents account for
84% (College of Policing 2015) of all calls to the police. Incidents, known
as “public safety and concern for welfare,” apparently represent the largest
category of recorded incidents, and can consume more resources and time
as they can be complex, involving not just the police, but other agencies. As
we can see, there are many problems for public bodies such as the police, as
future demands not only change in nature, but increase. In addition, a sepa-
rate problem for police organisations will be managing public expectations.

Public expectations
Whilst the public on the whole may not understand the concept of core po-
lice business or structures, they do have expectations of the police. If these
expectations are met, then relations between the police and the public are
not just maintained, but could be improved. (For a discussion on Proce-
dural Justice see Sunshine and Tyler 2003.) However, if the police fail to
live up to the expectations, then perhaps bad feeling is generated, and with-
out public support, the task of policing, especially the democratic policing
model in England and Wales, is made very difficult. Edwards (1999) sug-
gests that the foremost expectation of the public for its police is that they
should be available 24 hours a day, all year-round. This is indeed the case,
but as not always the case for other agencies. Hence the police are often left
to deal with incidents that do not fall into their primary area of business.
Consequently, the police have been described as the only fully 24-hour, fully
mobile social service (Punch and Naylor 1973). Further, as we have seen
in previous chapters, the concept of Community Policing, and policing by
consent rests upon close interaction between police and community mem-
bers. Indeed the whole rationale for community policing requires better co-
operation between police and the public, and this will never be achieved
by police declining to answer calls, either via 999, or 101, or other forms of
contact. However, as we have seen in the report by the College of Policing,
attending calls not directly relating to crime matters is increasing. There-
fore, the problem for the police now and in the future, is one that revolves
around demand for dealing with crime matters, yet still having to deal with
important non-crime issues that the public expect the police to respond to.
It is issues such as these that require non-traditional resolutions.

Future responses?
Whatever response the police provide for dealing with future demands upon
their services, it will have some impact upon current structure for policing
in England and Wales. Whilst at the time of writing, we are still in austerity
 Police structures and the future? 179

measures, there are some “givens” as to the future. First, given that elected
Police and Crime Commissioners will not want to be seen to reduce front-
line policing, this will be preserved (Millie 2014). We have seen police forces
attempting to rationalise their estates by selling off police buildings, includ-
ing police stations. Whist this is a short-term solution, the long-term im-
plications of public confidence and contact may be more serious, if police
are viewed as retreating from the community. Given the large number of
responsibilities and activities the police are engaged in apart from dealing
with criminal matters, it may be that the police will return to their more
fundamental roles: crime control, social control, and order maintenance
(Millie 2014). In some senses, this is a return to the performance manage-
ment ideas of the 1990s, where official reports considered the role of the
police (discussed elsewhere in this book). Should the police’s crime control
function be too widely defined, it will undertake tasks currently undertaken
by others; whilst a clear social service function around public reassurance
to improve public confidence and legitimacy should remain with the police
(Reiner 2000), when discussing the police’s order maintenance function, dis-
tinguishes between preserving social order and producing social order. If it
is about producing social order, such as education, then perhaps it could be
delivered by non-police personnel.
It is issues such as these that need to be considered by police leaders in
the future, despite the fact that they are closely aligned to political positions
such as the Police and Crime Commissioners, and subject to pressure from
media. Whatever the result, policing structure in England and Wales will be
affected by major strategic decisions.

Point to note

There is an ongoing debate concerning the role of the police. Some

believe they should engage in many wide and diverse activities involv-
ing the community, whilst others believe they should be more focused
upon a smaller number of core policing activities.

Plural structures
Police organisations across the world are undergoing changes, the details of
which, if discussed less than ten years ago, would not have been believed.
The reduction in the number of official “sworn” officers, particularly in
England and Wales, has produced a debate concerning the role and effec-
tiveness of the police organisation. Societies are now forced to question
the value of the traditional public police provision to effectively deal with
crime and disorder in the wake of governments’ decisions to reduce budg-
ets, change structures, and open up policing to economic market forces.
180 Police structures and the future?

Not that the use of alternative policing agencies and other “actors,” nota-
bly the community themselves, is new. The history of policing illustrates
the use of security agencies throughout various time periods, as well as the
role of volunteers from within communities. However, in the past these have
been used to complement and support the public police in their duties.
Today, what we may be witnessing is a change in the role of these other
forms of policing. These diverse activities appear to be growing and in
some instances replacing the activities formerly undertaken by the public
police. Additionally the political philosophy of “neo-liberalism,” within
the framework of austerity measures, has provided the opportunity for
dramatic change in the way police and policing is considered, especially
in England and Wales. In truth there has been a form of pluralised polic-
ing for some years in the shape of neighbourhood policing teams, which
draw upon a number of different actors and roles to ensure a problem ori-
ented policing approach takes place. With the dramatic reduction in the
number of public police in England and Wales, the structure and form of
neighbourhood policing teams must surely alter to reflect these changes.
Simultaneously, the public police must attempt to deal with more complex
national and international demands, such as terrorism, internet crime,
and other global issues which affect national infrastructures.
The current structure of 43 police forces in England and Wales reflects
in part the historical fear of a national police force. The historical context
of this concern can be found in the period before the introduction of the
Metropolitan Police Act 1829, with the popular fear that a national police
could easily become puppets of the government which could lead to anarchy
and direct political control. People pointed to examples of the misuse of the
police in European countries, particularly Revolutionary France to support
this argument; hence the fragmentation of British police forces, with the
accent on so-called “local accountability.” However, as Jones (2008) points
out, the general trend in recent times has been one of greater centralised
control of local policing, with the Home Office exerting more influence and
the establishment of national policing bodies such as the Serious Organised
Crime Agency (now the National Crime Agency). Other national bodies in-
clude her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Audit Commission,
and the Police Standards Unit amongst others who have been important
actors in the national governance of policing in England and Wales (Jones
and Van Sluis 2009). Whilst this may have been true of previous Labour
governments the change in government from 2010 seems to have invoked a
looser central control with the introduction of Police and Crime Commis-
sioners (PCCs), elected in November 2012 under the auspices of the Police
and Social Responsibility Act (Home Office 2011) and the end of ring fenced
funding for community policing. The introduction of PCCs, with the re-
vived funding arrangements for that post meaning PCCs can decide how to
spend their budgets, introduces the possibility for further pluralisation of
policing services.
 Police structures and the future? 181

In the first decade of the 2000s, governments in the UK sought to expand

police numbers until by 2010 the number of police officers in England and
Wales stood at 141,000. However, since that time large expenditure cuts have
meant that currently, 20% of funding for police has been removed. In the pres-
ent climate of austerity measures, this economic reduction is likely to con-
tinue. HMIC (2014) projected that there will be 16,300 fewer police officers in
England and Wales in the near future. It is therefore understandable that an
increased interest in a pluralised policing approach would appear to be linked
with the idea of reduced funding for policing. However, even though the times
where police numbers were being increased there is evidence to suggest that
pluralisation of policing was being undertaken, albeit within the police organ-
isation itself. The most obvious example is the introduction of Police Commu-
nity Support Officers (discussed in more depth in Chapter 5). Established by
section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002, these “civilian” or unsworn officers
are directed and controlled by the Chief Constable. They undergo much less
rigorous training and have fewer legal powers than sworn officers. Because
they are cheaper to employ than regular officers they are sometimes viewed as
being the police’s answer to competing with other (non-police) providers for
local markets for patrol (Blair 2003). Even before the introduction of PCSOs,
however, the widening of police provision was contained within the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998 (Home Office 1998), which saw the formalisation of
partnership working and the introduction of many other agencies, such as
Local authorities, education, and health provision, being involved in crime re-
duction work. An interesting approach suggests that the recent developments
in policing are typical of an era that pre-dates the police themselves (Button
2016; Zedner 2006). This approach examines the historical aspect of crime
control, and comes to the conclusion that the apparent monopoly of policing
by the public police can be seen as an historical blip in the longer term pattern
of multiple police providers and markets in security. The extent and import
of changes in contemporary crime control are therefore hotly contested. By
setting these changes in historical perspective, this challenges claims that we
are entering a new era in policing.

Defining plural policing

As Ian Loader (2000) points out, we have seen a shift from “police” to
“policing”
­ and this has resulted in the recent modification of the work of
the state, both as a sole provider and as a broader, more diverse network of
power. Loader provides four distinct categories of policing, namely:

• Private forms of policing have been secured through government;

• Transnational forms of policing are above government;
• The market in policing and security is beyond government;
• Policing activities engaged in by citizens themselves are considered be-
low government.
182 Police structures and the future?

This is a world of plural, networked policing. Consequently, issues attached

to an older, single-style delivery of policing, such as legitimacy, effective-
ness, equity, and human rights now present themselves with regard to plural
policing. Prenzler (2013), writing about the situation in Australia concurs,
pointing to the fact that the time of governments being viewed as the natural
monopoly of many basic services, including health, education, and policing,
may be at an end.

Important point

Police refers to the mainly uniformed organisation we recognise in our

daily lives, whilst policing refers to many other agencies and activities
that maintain the security and well-being of citizens. For example, ed-
ucation, health, and welfare provision.

Historically, of course, the role of the state as the sole provider of services,
particularly policing, is not a consistent one. Johnston (1992) points to the
fact that the field of private security history shows that private and other
forms of non-police security have tended to dominate community business
and individual forms of protection, in the face of a common situation of
absent or inadequate state provision.
For Crawford et al. (2005), the term “plural policing” is utilised for the
following reasons:

1 It recognises the plurality of policing powers and personnel and ac-

knowledges the existence of a mixed economy.
2 It breaks free from the unhelpful dichotomy between “public” and
­“private” police, recognising that sometimes public police serve private
and parochial interests, and police private spaces or privately owned
spaces that have become public in character.
3 It does not prioritise the role of any particular provider.

Wakefield (2009) believes that plural policing is the expanding role of

non-police service providers in policing, and the variety of different public,
private, and voluntary bodies now engaged in the activity. Plural policing
therefore refers to the patchwork of policing provision and authorisation
which involves a mix of the police, municipal auxiliaries, commercial se-
curity, and the activities of the citizens. This replaces the idea of the police
being the sole proprietors of, or having a monopoly over, public security
provision. The term “pluralisation” itself appears to emanate from the early
work of Shearing and Stenning (1983), where they observed a change in the
 Police structures and the future? 183

way formal social control was taking place, particularly in the increasing
use of private security and an increase in different agencies delivering polic-
ing activities. Bayley and Shearing (1996) have argued that in modern dem-
ocratic countries a watershed has been reached in terms of crime control
and law enforcement, and that in the future people will view this time as one
when an old system of policing ended and another took over.
Defining plural policing can be problematic not least because of the dif-
ferent terminology in use to describe the concept. However, pluralised po-
licing is not confined purely to England and Wales and has, to a greater or
lesser extent, found its place in many countries. In other countries this ap-
proach is currently less popular, because profit-making is seen as being in-
compatible with the ideals of impartial justice and universal service intrinsic
to modern policing. Despite criticism of the future of pluralised policing,
it would appear that private sector policing is likely to be an approach of
increasing prominence in a mixed economy of policing provision, both as a
low-cost front-line preventative presence and in specialist corporate opera-
tions. Supporting these changes of course will be an increased investment
and use of predictive policing models.

Predictive policing
Predictive policing refers to the usage of mathematical, predictive analyt-
ics, and other analytical techniques in law enforcement to identify poten-
tial criminal activity. Predictive policing methods fall into four general
categories: methods for predicting crimes, methods for predicting offenders,
methods for predicting perpetrators’ identities, and methods for predicting
victims of crime. Predictive policing uses data on the times, locations, and
nature of past crimes to provide insight to police strategists concerning
where, and at what times, police patrols should patrol or maintain a pres-
ence in order to make the best use of resources or have the greatest chance
of deterring or preventing future crimes.

Point to note

Predictive policing refers to the usage of mathematical, predictive an-

alytics, and other analytical techniques in law enforcement to identify
potential criminal activity.

Police may also use data accumulated on shootings and the sounds of gun-
fire to identify locations of shootings. The city of Chicago uses data blended
from population mapping crime statistics, and whether to improve moni-
toring and identify patterns. As police agencies across the world struggle to
184 Police structures and the future?

deal with increased and more complex demands upon their time and energy,
in some instances also suffering large budgetary cuts and reduction in re-
sources, the attraction to rationalise their activities, trying to maintain a
decent level of service, more for less, or even the same for less, becomes a
constant struggle. It is, of course, no surprise that police, as with many other
public agencies turn to the world of technology in order to assist them in this
struggle. In particular the use of data be it big or small and the introduction
of such as the algorithm and predictive policing, along with other forms of
technology, appears to offer the answer. Such is the dramatic rise and belief
in this new type of policing that it is fair to suggest that we are undergoing
a paradigmatic shift in the way policing is being delivered. For a number
of years, neo-liberal democratic societies have immersed themselves in a
form of policing variously called community policing, community-oriented
policing, or civil policing to use just a few, along with its component parts
of Problem Oriented Policing (POP) and the analytical tool called SARA
(Goldstein 1990). SARA is an acronym for the following steps:

• Scanning: the identifying and prioritising of potential crime and disor-

der problems
• Analysis: the analysis of potential problems, by gathering information
and intelligence to identify underlying causes of the problem
• Response: the development and implementation of tailored activities
to address the causes of the problem, as identified in the analysis phase
• Assessment: the measurement of the impact of the response to test if it
had the desired effect and to make changes to the response if required.

The SARA model is a problem solving tool that enables police and their
partners to resolve issues in an effective and efficient manner (COP 2020).
However, new challenges, as society changes, threatens to undermine the
capability of the police to protect the public, as well as undermining public
perceptions of what the police can actually do. The traditional model of po-
licing is apparently under threat, and probably no longer suited to tackling
new and emerging crime types and the societal behaviours that data and
technology are enabling. Further, there is a complex interplay between the
speed and impact of digitisation that is allowing criminal networks to oper-
ate in a borderless fashion as well as societies changing its cultural norms,
and an increased need to tackle policing online. Much crime is moving in-
doors online and away from the streets. As a result, communities have also
moved online and require online policing, especially when it comes to what
is termed “complex crime.” Police revisionists argue that the model of police
station and patrol is no longer suited to tackling new emerging crime types
and the societal behaviours that data and technology are enabling require a
more technological response, rather than old fashioned approaches. Conse-
quently “old” models of policing are under threat, whilst a new technological
 Police structures and the future? 185

and data-led approach appears to be the preferred method. One of these ap-
proaches under threat, therefore, is the model known as community polic-
ing. These changes manifest themselves in diverse ways. An announcement
by the Chief Constable of one of England’s largest police force namely that
the public do not get the service they expect of as a result of modern day
policing (BBC 2018), may not be as unexpected as some would think. David
Thompsons thoughts on the demands on his force increasing and having
to deal with other calls over the phone is the latest in a line of warnings
from senior police officers and politicians regarding the fact that providing
traditional services to an expectant public is ever more challenging and on
occasions, impossible. Shortages of staff and police cuts are often pointed
out as putting the public safety at risk. The commissioner of the Metropol-
itan Police stated that it would be naive to suggest that reductions in police
officers was having no impact upon rising crime. Why is it, then, that senior
police officers are having to explain and apologise to the community for not
being able to provide the day-to-day services traditionally provided? The re-
sult of all this also includes the potentially widening gap between the levels
of crime and the practical ability of the police to tackle it. This may erode
public confidence and trust in the police, raising the risk of a legitimacy gap
between law enforcement and society. In short, the police may no longer be
the public and the public may no longer be the police.

Explaining change
One way to understand the major change in policing is to place it within
the framework of the paradigmatic shift. A paradigm shift is a concept
identified by the American physicist and philosopher Thomas Kuhn
(Kuhn 1996). It is a fundamental change in the basic ideas and practices
of a scientific discipline and the way of practising that discipline. Kuhn
contrasted these shifts, which characterise a scientific revolution of the ac-
tivity of “normal science,” and which he described as scientific work done
within a prevailing framework (or paradigm). In this context, the word
“paradigm” is used in its original Greek meaning as “example.” Since the
1960s, the concept of a paradigm shift has also been used in numerous
non-scientific contexts to describe a profound change in a fundamental
model or perception of events, even though Kuhn himself restricted the
use of the term to the physical sciences. Some famous examples of a par-
adigmatic shift are the transition between the worldview of Newtonian
gravity and the Einstein general relativity whilst in the world of social
sciences, the move away from Keynesian economic approaches to mone-
tarism is also seen as a paradigmatic shift. Suffice to say the terminology
now relates to the underlying and important changes that means that a
once preferred model of scientific thought and way of doing something is
replaced by a different model.
186 Police structures and the future?

Point to note

A paradigmatic shift occurs when normal science (the normal way of

doing something) is superseded by a different model of doing some-
thing. The causes for such a shift can involve changes in society, tech-
nology, law, etc.

For the purposes of policing, therefore, it could be argued that the dem-
ocratically held view of policing with and through the community utilis-
ing the approach of high visibility and contact with communities through
regular patrols (normal science) is currently being superseded by a differ-
ent approach. The reasons for this are of course complex, as we have seen.
The downturn in the global economy in 2008 affected the budgets of many
neo-liberal democracies especially those who provided many public ser-
vices, whilst the change in political philosophies, with the upsurge of right
wing politics in many countries, challenged the previous ideas of commu-
nity being involved in the delivery of policing. Coupled with the rise of
global threats such as cybercrime, and terrorism, there has been a major
drive to increase the use of technology within the delivery of ever reducing
policing services, whilst attempting to satisfy the traditional expectations
of the public for the way in which they are policed. Thus, the approach has
been fuelled to move the normal science of community-driven policing to
a new paradigm, that of data-driven policing, within a world of pragmatic
rationalisation of services. However, we need to understand and clarify the
basic component of the “normal science” of both community policing, and
data-driven predictive policing, to get some sense of the changes and their
possible implications.

Community policing as a concept

We have seen in previous chapters how important the concept of community
policing is to the democratic model of policing in England and Wales. As
a single philosophy, community policing and problem solving involves the
systematic use of police/public partnerships and problem solving techniques
to proactively address the conditions that give rise to public disorder, safety,
social disorder, crime, and fear of crime.
Community policing, should be therefore:

• An overarching philosophy, not a specific task;

• Proactively decentralised, pushing more decision-making ability down
to patrol officer level;
 Police structures and the future? 187

• Designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime;

• Involving community institutions with their views having greater status;
• A long-term process, involving cultural change.

Once the police and community are entrenched in addressing problems

of crime and disorder, it then becomes necessary to further formulate the
police/community approach to solving problems utilising the POP and
SARA approaches. The key concepts of community policing, which is al-
ways open to problems of definition, however, seem easy to understand. One
of the major component parts of this approach must surely lie with working
closer to the community. Not just working closely with but providing polic-
ing services through and with the community. This, in turn, requires a seri-
ous consultation process, not only that merely informs the public what they
are going to get, but that what they get has been devised and constructed
with the community. It also involves police officers using specialist knowl-
edge of their communities to establish contact with community leaders, to
understand their problems within a community and to work together with
any number of agencies, be they from the private or public sector, in an ef-
fort to resolve problems at source. Community policing therefore considers
the “why” factor—why is the problem of crime in an area? What are the
underlying factors that make this happen? Who can be enrolled to resolve
the factors at source? Thus, community policing seeks to find the cause of
criminality and disorder and put in place methods or a plan to deal with this
cause. It is community-driven policing. However, a report published in 2017
showed the number of visible police officers on the street has dramatically
reduced according to the public, as statistics showed the number of people
who believe police are “highly visible” in their community has fallen by al-
most half. Just one in five (22%) people said they felt officers were highly
visible, according to the then latest Crime Survey for England and Wales,
which looked at the period from April 2016 to March 2017. This compared
with 39% in April 2010 to March 2011, while the percentage of the public
who said they “never” see police foot patrols has risen by more than half,
from 25% to 39%. It follows a survey the previous year, which found that
one in three people in England and Wales had not seen a bobby on the beat
in their local area in the past year. It is difficult to see this picture changing
now or in the foreseeable future. To all intents and purposes, the model of
neighbourhood policing teams appears to be a model that has become re-
dundant in many areas, and allowing for a more organisational focus upon
Big Data and predictive policing.

Big Data and predicting models

The new model of policing, the one that may cause the scientific revolution in
the Kuhnion sense, is already, in part at least, with us and has been gaining
188 Police structures and the future?

momentum as one development has led to another in terms of technological

use. Intelligence-led policing and the use of the National Intelligence Model
(see Maguire and John 1996) in the UK, were early proponents of this shift,
as policing has moved steadily to the scientific approach and data-driven
manner of operation. The use of big data and algorithms, coupled with the
highly thought of predictive policing models, could mean a dramatic limita-
tion on day-to-day police/community interaction, especially when dealing
with apparently so-called less important matters. Due to the access to “Big
Databases,” (Clegg 2017) those large centres, which draw together sources
of information from the myriad of data held on citizens, crime, traffic, and
many other activities carried out by citizens in their daily lives which require
them to use technology, will provide sufficient data in most cases for the
police to take some form of action. The concept and use of Big Data being
utilised to maintain order and security is already in being in many “Smart
Cities” across the globe and will undoubtedly spread as efforts to control
crime and disorder seek efficient, economic, and effective solutions.

Important point

Big data refers to extremely large data sets that may be analysed com-
putationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially
relating to human behaviour and interactions.

Predictive policing relies upon these databases for its source of knowledge
and information. It does not necessarily rely upon close interaction with the
community relying in many cases upon big data sources formulated from a
large number of different data bases such as crime statistics, vehicle owner da-
tabases, census data, social security, and welfare data as well as other real-time
data sources, including vehicle GPS tracking systems. It is data-driven po-
licing with community interaction being reduced to database activity. Pre-
dictive policing employs leading edge crime analysis techniques to assist and
improve crime control and prevention strategies. In its simplest meaning, pre-
dictive policing helps law enforcement agencies respond more effectively to
future crime by anticipating problem before they occur. The next question of
police problem solving could combine existing techniques like crime analysis,
GIS mapping, and police data with emerging techniques such as AI.
Big data in summation can be used for

• Identifying patterns in crime;

• Mapping high-risk areas, times, and days for certain types of crime;
• Software developments allowing police to create profiles of potential
criminals and associated behaviour.
 Police structures and the future? 189

However, the use of big data is not without its critics. For example, crime
analysis is not a new discipline but greater amounts of data are available
which has enhanced known techniques, and concerns about privacy and
civil liberties also emerge when discussing the predictive policing approach.
In addition, there is the high cost of technology for smaller forces, and of
course there is also the need to educate police officers about private polic-
ing and educating the public about predictive policing practices. Therefore,
if the current political and economic philosophy underpinning policing
continues, and chief officers struggle to provide a service with limited re-
sources, we could see a move to larger force structures, including regional
structures, increased use of third party policing approaches, and potentially
less immediate informal contact between police and community members.
Contact with the public may become focussed on the events that are data
driven, with a return to reactive policing being the main form of policing
delivery. This new model may have a profound effect on many traditional
police functions in neo-liberal democratic models of policing, such as the
accountability processes of policing; performance measurement; and, of
course, public expectations of what their police do for them. In particular
there are some major problem areas which may be seen with an overreli-
ance upon predictive policing and the use of Big Data, as primary policing
methods. These problems are best understood by reference to the historical
introduction of other changes in police practice. The first is the concept of
professionalising the police in the USA and doubtless elsewhere, and the
second is reference to the ideas surrounding the introduction of situational
crime prevention in the UK.

Historical “Police” changes

The new professional era—with police labelled crime fighters—demanded an
impartial law and order enforcer who related to citizens in neutral and distant
terms. Citizens became passive in crime control, their role being limited to
calling the police and servicing as witnesses when asked to do so. Technology
in the form of patrol cars, removed the police from their neighbourhoods.
During this era citizens were no longer encouraged to go to their police sta-
tions; officers drove through their neighbourhoods and reacted to calls. How-
ever, this distance approach began to experience problems: namely

• Crimes began to increase and research suggested that conventional po-

lice methods were not effective
• Fear of crime rose as a result the public withdrew from public spaces
• Minority citizens did not perceive their treatment as equitable or adequate
• There was a challenge to the legitimacy of the police
• Rapid response and random patrol did not equate to increased arrests
or fewer crimes recorded.
(Palmiotto and Peak 2013)
190 Police structures and the future?

In the UK in the late 1960s, there was a move to replicate some of these
approaches through the use of Unit Beat Policing, but with very similar
results. However, the consequence of implementing such an approach had
severe consequences for police and community relations. As Moore and
Kelling summed it up:

In professionalising crime fighting the volunteer citizens on whom so

much used to depend were removed from the fight. If anything has been
learned from the history of American policing it is the fact that what-
ever the benefits of professionalization, the reforms ignored, even at-
tacked, some features that once made the police powerful institutions
in maintaining a sense of security.
(Moore and Kelling 1983: 58)

By withdrawing from everyday visible and non-confrontational activities

within communities, the police risk undermining the very nature of public
support that enable them to do their job. Overreliance upon this use of data
and prediction to enable the police to do this job is fraught with danger.
The second historical event that illustrates the danger of change to the del-
icate balance between police and community was the introduction of Sit-
uational Crime Prevention in the UK, as the primary way in which police
and community safety partnerships were encouraged to reduce crime. This
idea is linked to the activity of disruption through the use of prediction and
big data. Disrupting criminal activity seems to be in vogue as intelligence
and police agencies try to rationalise this activity, sometimes in the frame-
work of diminishing budgets, intelligence, and other resources. Disruption
in whatever format takes place, is seen as being far more economical than
working to gather evidence to prove a case, which involves the cost of ar-
resting people, storage of evidence, file preparation, court appearances, and
other activity associated with traditional methods within the criminal jus-
tice system. Disruption means the criminal activity will not take place either
to its fullest effect, or will not take place at all, through more cost effective
methods. However, the approach of big data and prediction rather reminds
one of UK Home Office Criminology of the late 1970s and early 1980s in
the UK, and the push towards situational crime prevention techniques (see
Clarke 1997; Cornish and Clarke 1986). This approach was not concerned
with the reasons why a person would commit a crime. It was primarily con-
cerned with “controlling the environment,” disrupting the commission of
a criminal offence. These included the use of locks, bolts, fences, plastic
drinking glasses, lighting, and other physical items and were an attempt to
manage the environment in which a criminal act may take place. Disruption
of the criminal intent through controlling space was the order of the day.
However, with the idea came the threat of displacement which in ordinary
terms means that if you block an offence taking place in one location, it may
 Police structures and the future? 191

very well displace to another location, a different time, a different type of

offence or indeed a different Modus Operandi, or the way of doing some-
thing. Therefore, it does not prevent or seek to understand why a person
should commit a crime. It assumes, rather like predictive policing, that
people will commit crime whatever. So why waste time and resources try-
ing to understand why? What we may see is an emphasis on correlation
over causality. Correlation is a mutual relationship or connection between
two or more things e.g. crime instances with time and location. This ap-
proach, however, does not completely characterise this relationship. This
deeper information is obtained through causality, which is the relation-
ship between cause and effect. Causality is what connects one process with
another process, where the first is partly responsible for the second and the
second is partly dependent on the first. For example, the “why” element of
a crime incident.
The probability that disruption tactics will therefore cause displacement
remains a high one. Not trying to understand why people commit crime
means that predictive crime and disruption tactics, could enter a cycle of
disrupt, displace, disrupt displace as criminals learn different methods and
activities as a result of being displaced. Law enforcement agencies will al-
ways, therefore, be in a position of playing “catch up.” When the historical
example of change and innovation are considered together, the two areas of
concern that may be replicated with data-driven predictive policing can be
summed up thus:

• A complete lack of community involvement in the delivery, accounta-

bility, and partnership aspect of police work in the democratic policing
model; and
• A lack of trying to understand why people commit crime, merely pre-
dicting when crime events will occur to implement disruption tactics,
possibly introducing forms of displacement with police agencies contin-
ually playing catch up.

When we consider as a whole the data-driven predictive approach and the

community policing approach there appear some real differences. Table 8.1
highlights them.
The impact that this pragmatic shift in policing will have on the public is
profound. Not only will it involve the public having to change their expec-
tations about the police, which police leaders will need to carefully manage,
but could also have an impact upon the legitimacy the police need from the
public to enable them to do their job. We have seen already police chiefs
across the UK becoming highly visible in the media to explain how their
delivery of service under the old model of policing, that is police station
and patrol, appears to be under strain and indeed in some cases appears to
have failed. This is perhaps a natural phenomenon of a paradigmatic shift
192 Police structures and the future?

Table 8.1 Differences between Predictive Policing and Community Policing

Predictive, data-led policing Community policing

Centralised data bases Decentralised, use of discretion

Data driven Community/police partnership driven
Search for correlation Search for causality through problem
solving
Not concerned with causes of Searches for reasons as to why crime
criminality occurs and removes them
Concerned with disruption tactics Concerned with community cohesion
Potential discrimination All members of community involved
Potential black box thinking in terms Accountability to the community and
of accountability and transparency to the law
Raises concerns over civil liberties Community seen as collective and
and marginalised groups partners irrespective of ethnicity,
class, etc.

Source: The Author.

as a former model of policing is gradually replaced by a new and separate

model of policing. The older model of community-driven policing is being
replaced by the newer model of data-driven policing, with the subsequent
need for community to have their expectations about policing managed.
However, perhaps the most important people that need to understand just
what is happening are those who are responsible for the delivery of policing
services themselves. Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Officers
in England and Wales must be aware of the shift from one type of policing
to another with the subsequent challenges it brings for community engage-
ment and of course expectations. Managing the public’s expectations will
be paramount as we move from one scientific approach to another and will
of course require careful handling. Explanations concerning how and why
the new policing approach is introduced will need to be explained, as well
as reassurance for the public. The move to data-driven policing is a con-
tinuous process, and as more officers are drawn to expert roles, such as IT
detectives, cybercrime units, and other online activities, less and less will be
available for patrol duties, unless targeted by the predictive policing mod-
els. Expectations from the public about attendance at so-called “low level”
incidents may not be met, as ever scarcer resources will be needed to follow
the data-driven activities.
If policing focusses on numbers (crime rates, data and patterns) and not
community needs (people and culture), then data-driven focus can overtake
the community caretaking function.
The black box concept, where decisions are made anonymously, should be
a clear glass box, where the ethics etc. of decisions can be examined, a glass
box where police liaise with the community and where community have an
 Police structures and the future? 193

input into the law enforcement governance. Community input into big data
policing choices at the front end will minimise many of the black box data
concerns of these technologies. The friction point here is an old one. Do
the police listen to the community in terms of the type of big data policing
they want, or do the police take the stance that they know better? A reli-
ance or over reliance upon professional knowledge? If the latter is chosen,
then the outcome may be a police-centric and a purely law enforcement-type
approach. In an age of growing tension between police and citizens, big
data outputs may encourage deeper trust problems that will need to be ad-
dressed. Will the metrics chosen for success be accurate in reflecting issues
in the community because reducing crime whilst also reducing trust in law
enforcement may not in the end be much of a success.
Data-driven policing has the potential to ignore the personal emotional
and even symbolic aspects of the process and thereby undercut principles of
individual justice and dignity, leading to a reduction in legitimacy from the
community, a legitimacy that is vital if police are to carry out their func-
tion effectively. There is no doubt that the use of predictive policing and big
data sets have a role to play in law enforcement, and of course we should
pursue them to assist in maintaining a peaceful society, where citizens are
protected. The problem lies in total reliance upon this approach to the ex-
clusion of all other forms of policing. The future of policing should not de-
pend upon a choice between the one approach and the other, but must be
inclusive, and compatible. Big data and prediction are very useful tools to
assist the police, but should not be adhered to at the detriment of commu-
nity involvement, accountability, and inclusion in the process. Paradigmatic
shifts do not generally occur overnight and some can take a long time as new
ideas and concepts come to become accepted as new “normal” science. We
should not of course be afraid of change as it is a natural course of social
events and life itself, but we should recognise the change for what it is, and
try to manage it accordingly, especially when it has the potential to dam-
age relationships within the community. The problem for police agencies
is one of maintaining public support and enhancing the legitimacy of the
police. The history of the police, according to revisionist and traditional
commentators alike, is one of becoming socially acceptable through day-
to-day contact with the public and providing many of those services that do
not count in crime statistics, what some call the service elements of policing.
Given a report by the College of Policing in 2015 highlighted the fact that
some 84% of calls to the police in England and Wales were categorised as
service calls, and not directly linked to criminal activity, then the removal
or reduction of such service provision could have a major effect on police
and community relationships. The fact that the public support the police
in their activities, and believe in procedural justice, is one that makes the
model of policing work well in all neo-liberal democracies including the UK
and Australia. It is a delicate balance of support and collaboration between
194 Police structures and the future?

the two. The changing nature of the way police deliver their services, the
paradigmatic shift from one form of normal science (Community driven)
to a different “normal science” (predominantly Data driven), in part forced
by eternal factors such as economics and political philosophy, means senior
police officers and those responsible for ensuring the delivery of policing
services, need to plan ahead in order to manage and deal with the expec-
tations to the public and ensuring public support for police legitimacy. In
other words, we must be careful that in rushing to seek a technological an-
swer to the problems of modern policy, we do not throw out the community
support baby with the bathwater. Closely aligned to use of predictive polic-
ing is the concept of Smart Cities and how they will be policed and social
order maintained in the future.

Smart City policing

A United Nations report published in 2018 (UN 2018) projected that by 2050,
nearly 70% of the world’s population will live in urban areas, a rise from 55%
in 2018. Cities and urban areas will increase in size, as will problems of
urbanisation, including crime and disorder. The increase in urbanisation
could well have a major impact upon policing structures. One way in which
we may see how structures could be affected is to consider the evolvement of
the Smart City approach to social control. The term “Smart City” is open to
many interpretations, but is generally considered to be an urban area that
uses different types of electronic “Internet of Things” (IOT) sensors to collect
data and then uses that data and insights to manage its assets, resources, and
services efficiently. This includes crime and traffic management (Interesting
Engineering 2019). For example, smart traffic lights installed in Rotterdam
which gives bicyclists precedence over car drivers in rainy weather (see
http://popucity.net/rotterdam-traffic-light-priority-cyclists-when-it-rains).

Important point

Smart Cities are cities generally considered to be an urban area that

uses different types of electronic “Internet of Things” (IOT) sensors to
collect data and then uses that data and insights to manage its assets,
resources, and services efficiently.

This particular example highlights a particular use of Smart City tech-

nology, that of surveillance. Utilising IT systems integration, especially
that of CCTV feeds, and advanced facial recognition software, allows for
swift and immediate problem solving. In an effort to maximise use of IT
 Police structures and the future? 195

products, some software companies now target these products under the
titles of “public safety and justice solutions” at police departments (Moro-
zov and Bria 2018). Smart City technology may, therefore, improve the de-
livery of services such as traffic management, parking spaces, etc., but there
may be other consequences for policing. More cameras, sensors, and access
to information will increase the police surveillance capacity whilst less free-
dom for those being watched. However, concerns such as this echo those in
other forms of surveillance technologies and may be countered by strict con-
trols over data collection, anonymising data and deleting it as soon as possible
(Hardy 2016). However, surveillance is not the only activity that will affect
policing in Smart Cities and large urban areas. As with other forms of public
services, policing will become embedded with the Smart City structure. It will
rely upon both public and private sources of information and data, and may
push police to adopting a more “private security” role. Joh (2019) provides us
with an example of current and future police responses. In her example, cur-
rently the police respond to a call, which, even if the police are able to attend,
an officer’s discretion or personality may influence the outcome. In the Smart
City, controls are contained in the urban infrastructure itself, so that those
identified as probable shoplifters or credit card fraudsters might be banned
from certain places. Some forms of law breaking may even become impossi-
ble, or controlled through denials of entry.
Shearing and Stenning (1983) believe that private police organisations
stress prevention and compliance over apprehension and coercion, with a
greater interest in avoiding disruption of routine activities than they are on
the punishment of wrongdoers. As cities become smarter, urban policing
may become more like private policing, embedded in the urban environ-
ment itself. Sensor-controlled vehicles which regulate speed etc. may remove
the need for traffic law-related stops.
Much of this is not too far away from reality. In the Chinese City of
Shenzhen, facial recognition technology identifies jay walkers and immedi-
ately sends fines to their mobile phones by text message (Tao 2018), and too
many instances of traffic-rule violations will affect a person’s social credit
score, with the Chinese National Banking system due to be rolled out na-
tionwide in 2020. Liberal Democratic and Western Countries are unlike to
adopt such extreme measures, but this provides an example of how social
control and policing can be removed from personal and social interaction,
to one dealt with by information technology.
The use of facial recognition has in fact been controversial in England and
Wales. Recently, The Metropolitan Police have been accused of defying the
warnings of its own watchdogs by beginning operational use of facial rec-
ognition CCTV, despite a scathing assessment of its effectiveness from the
expert hired to scrutinise its trials (The Guardian 2020). During February
2020, thousands of shoppers in east London were scanned by van-mounted
cameras pointed at the doors of the Stratford Centre retail complex, in what
196 Police structures and the future?

a senior police officer at the scene described as an intelligence-led deploy-

ment. The Met police justified this use because it had been the scene of pub-
lic space violence, and that there was support from the community for the
police to use whatever tactic we can to deal with violence. Faces of each
passer-by were scanned and checked against a watch list of 5,000 biometric
profiles of people who are wanted for serious criminality, such as grievous
bodily harm or there may be warrants for their arrest, or they may be wanted
by the courts, or they may be wanted by the police for investigation. Signs
around the van announced that Live Facial Recognition [LFR] was in use,
and that there was no legal requirement for you to pass through the LFR
system. However, a protestor cited research by Big Brother Watch (BBW
2020) that showed 93% of those stopped during all ten public Metropolitan
police trials were wrongly identified whilst opponents point to the low num-
ber of positive facial recognitions. Cleary, despite the apparent utility of
such use, technology such as Facial Recognition Cameras has some way to
go before complete acceptance as part of policing in the future.
As cities become smarter, and more and more technology becomes em-
bedded into policing activities, policing itself may become less visible. Sen-
sors, artificial intelligence may lead not just to an increased surveillance,
but the embedding of policing in the built environments. In terms of police
structure, they may look less like the democratic policing model in England
and Wales, and more like the models of prevention and control seen in pri-
vate policing. However, such a change throws up challenges for the account-
ability processes currently enjoyed, which may also negatively impact upon
police legitimacy and cooperation of communities. However, Smart City
technology, linking different sources of data, offers the promise to ensure
the safety and security for the public.

Conclusion
This chapter has introduced several important topics that may influence
current and historical structures of policing in England and Wales. These
have the potential to dramatically alter current structures in policing, and
need to be seriously considered and debated. Increased demand, for exam-
ple, from a more complex and changing society may require a fresh look at
what the police can actually deliver to communities, possibly meaning less
contact and lower visibility. In addition, there will be a need to ensure that
public expectations are realistic and achievable for the police organisation,
in order to maintain support from the public. Despite the promise of more
police officers being recruited, the drive for more volunteers—be they Spe-
cial Constables or Police Support Volunteers—will continue, as will the de-
bate as to how much plural policing will grow. Given the perceived increase
in demand as discussed, the use of volunteers may not provide the solution,
and perhaps, in the absence of a fully funded, and resourced, public police
 Police structures and the future? 197

organisation, the private sectors influence will continue to grow. The area
of Information Technology will, no doubt, play a significant part in future
policing structures, as police agencies strive to rationalise and provide a
service, especially in crowded urban areas, with transient populations. The
one area that all of these changes must still provide, however, is that of ac-
countability. The accountability processes of policing in England and Wales
appear to be a key factor in enabling the public at large to work with trust
and support current policing structures. Of course, society and the struc-
tures that make up society (including policing structures) will change over
time as society develops and adopts new and different standards. However,
for democratic policing models to continue, whatever changes are invoked,
accountability and transparency for decision-making must remain the fun-
damental if police legitimacy is to be maintained in the future.

Reflective questions
1 How can the police manage demand for their services in the future?
2 What are the main problems associated with the use of private security
in public policing activities?
3 In what ways could technology affect the traditional model of commu-
nity policing?
4 What are the problems associated with the use of technology such as
facial recognition cameras?
5 How can we ensure accountability processes are robust for police use of
technology and Big Data in Smart Cities?

Useful websites
National Police Chiefs Council Digital policing: https://www.npcc.police.
uk/NPCCBusinessAreas/ReformandTransformation/Digitalpolicing.aspx.
Big Brother Watch: https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/.
Home Office Data, Digital and Technology: https://hodigital.blog.gov.uk/
about/.
The Information Commissioner: https://ico.org.uk/.

References
Bayley, D.H. and Shearing, C.D. (1996) The Future of Policing. Law and Society
Review, 30(3): 585–606.
BBC. (2018) West Midlands Police Chief Constable Says Force Offers Poor Service.
Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-44941173 (ac-
cessed 21/2/2020).
BBW. (2020) Stop Facial Recognition. Available at https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/
(accessed 20/20/2020).
198 Police structures and the future?

Blair, I. (2003) Leading towards the Future. The Future of Policing Conference,
LSE, 10th October. http://www.padpolice.com/futureofpolicing.php (accessed
21/7/2019).
Button, M. (2016) Private Policing (2nd Edition), London, Routledge.
Clarke, R.V. (1997) Introduction, in Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention
Studies: Successful Case Studies (2nd Edition), Albany, NY, Harrow and Heston.
Clegg, B. (2017) Big Data-How the Information Revolution Is Transforming Our
Lives, London, Icon Books.
College of Policing. (2015) Estimating Demand on the Police Service. Available at
https://www.college.police.uk/News/College-news/Documents/Demand%20Re-
port%2023_1_15_noBleed.pdf (accessed 5/2/20).
COP. (2020) Problem Oriented Policing. Available at https://whatworks.college.police.
uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=47 (accessed 8/4/2020).
Cornish, D.B. and Clarke, R.V. (eds.) (1986) The Reasoning Criminal. Rational
Choice Perspectives on Offending, New York, Springer.
Crawford, A., Lister, S., Blackburn, S. and Burnett, J. (2005) Plural Policing: The
Mixed Economy of Visible Patrols in England and Wales, Bristol, Policy Press.
Edwards, C.J. (1999) Changing Policing Theories for 21st Century Societies,
Leichardt, The Federation Press.
Goldstein, H. (1990) Problem Oriented Policing, London, McGraw-Hill.
Guardian The. (2020) Met Police Deploy Live Facial Recognition Technology.
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/11/met-police-
deploy-live-facial-recognition-technology (accessed 22/2/2020).
Hardy, Q. (2016) Technology Is Monitoring the Urban Landscape, New York Times,
20th July.
HMIC. (2014) State of Policing, The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and
Wales 2013/2014. Available at www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/ (accessed
21/7/2019).
Home Office. (2011) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, London, The
Stationery Office.
Home Office. (1998) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, London, The Stationery
Office.
Interesting Engineering. (2019) Connected Vehicles in Smart Cities: The Future
of Transportation. Available at https://interestingengineering.com/connected-
vehicles-in-smart-cities-the-future-of-transportation (accessed 5/2/2020).
Joh, E.E. (2019) Policing the Smart City. International Journal of Law in Context,
15, 177–182.
Johnston, L. (1992) The Rebirth of Private Policing, London, Routledge.
Jones, T. (2008) The Accountability of Policing, in Newburn, T. (ed.), The Handbook
of Policing, Cullompton, Willan.
Jones, T. and Van Sluis, A. (2009) National Standards, Local Delivery: Police Re-
form in England and Wales. German Policy Studies, 5(2), 117–144.
Kuhn, T.S. (1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd Edition), Chicago, IL,
University of Chicago Press.
Leigh, J., Dunnett, S. and Jackson, L. (2017) Predictive Police Patrolling to Tar-
get Hotspots and Cover Response Demand. Annals of Operations Research, 283,
395–410 (2019). doi:10.1007/s10479-017-2528-x (accessed 14/4/2020).
 Police structures and the future? 199

Loader, I. (2000) Plural Policing and Democratic Governance, Social and Legal
Studies, 9, 323.
Maguire, M. and John, T. (2006) Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism and
Community Engagement: Competing Priorities and the Role of the National In-
telligence Model in the UK, Policing and Society, 16(1): 67–85.
Millie, A. (2014) What Are the Police For? Re-thinking Policing Post-Austerity, in
Brown, J.M. (ed.), The Future of Policing, Abingdon, Routledge.
Moore, M.H. and Kelling, G.L. (1983) ‘To Serve and Protect’: lessons from police
history, The Public Interest Journal, New York, 70, Winter.
Morozov, E. and Bria, F. (2018) Rethinking the Smart City; Democratising Urban
Technology, New York, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
Palmiotto, M.J. and Peak, K.J. (2013) Community Policing: A Police Citizen Partner-
ship, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge.
Prenzler, T. (2013) Outsourcing of Policing Tasks: Scope and Prospects, Sydney,
Australian Security Industry.
Punch, M. and Naylor, T. (1973) The Police: A Social Service, New Society, 24:
358–361.
Randle, A. and Kippin, H. (2020) Managing Demand: Building Future Public Ser-
vices, London, RSA Publications.
Reiner, R. (2000) The Politics of the Police (3rd Edition), Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Shearing, C. and Stenning, P. (1983). Private Security: Implications for Social Con-
trol, Social Problems, 5, 493–506.
Sunshine, J. and Tyler, T. (2003) Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Commu-
nity, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Repre-
sentatives of a Groups Moral Values, Social Psychology Quarterly, 66(2), 153–165.
Tao, L. (2018) Jaywalkers under Surveillance in Shenzhen Soon to Be Punished via
Text Message, South China Morning Post, 27th March.
United Nations. (2018) World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2018 Revision. Avail-
able at https://population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2018-Report.pdf
(accessed 5/2/2020).
Wakefield, A. (2009) Pluralisation, in Wakefield, A. and Fleming, J. (eds.), The
SAGE Dictionary of Policing, London, Sage, 227–229.
Zedner, L. (2006) Policing before and after the Police: The Historical Antecedents
of Contemporary Crime Control. British Journal of Criminology, 46(1), 78–96.
Index

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables.

accountability: CPS and 139–140; Association of Chief Officers

direct organisational 34; individual Association (ACPO) 35
17, 18, 24–27; local 36, 38, 90, 129, Association of Police and Crime
180; organisational 17, 18, 29–31, 39; Commissioners (APCC) 37–38, 69, 170
police 17, 22, 24, 131; of policing 21; Association of South Eastern Nations
policing structures 18–20; processes Police (ASEANOPOL) 111–112
27, 197; reasons for 18–20 Audit Commission 150, 180
action-orientated communities 160 authoritarian regimes 115
“active citizen” 163 Authorized Firearms Officers (AFOs)
Act of Parliament 9, 14, 19, 58, 66, 126 85, 86
ad hoc approach 51
Afghan National Police (ANP) forces 85 Bail Act 1976 136
AFOs see Authorized Firearms Officers Bang, H. 161, 162
(AFOs) Basic Command Unity (BCU) 47
African Police Office (AFRIPOL) 110 Bayley, D.H. 169, 183
AI see artificial intelligence (AI) BCU see Basic Command Unity (BCU)
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Knife Beke, M. 110
Crime 69 Berkley, G.E. 22
AMERIPOL see The Police Community big data and predicting models 187–194
of the Americas (AMERIPOL) “Big Databases” 188
anti-social behaviour 35, 54, 59, 128, 152 “big society” 159–161, 164
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders Bittner, E. 17, 19
(ASBOs) 53 Blair, Tony 127
anti-terrorism 81 Borough Police Act 10
APCC see Association of Police and Bowling, B. 13, 123
Crime Commissioners (APCC) Bow Street Runners 3–4, 25
apprenticeship 102 Branch Board 94
artificial intelligence (AI) 102, 188, 196 Brexit 122
Art. 2 TEU 121 Bright, J. 128, 129
Art. 7 TEU.10 121 British Crime Survey 152
Ascoli ,D. 9 British police forces 180
Assange v Swedish Prosecution British policing system 26
Authority 120 British Transport Commission
asset-based community development Act 1949 80
(ABCD) 163–166 British Transport Police (BTP) 79–82,
Assets Recovery Agency 79 88, 96
202 Index

Britton, I. 62 Colquhoun, Patrick: “A Treatise on the

broad social changes 23 Police of the Metropolis” 4, 5
Brogden, M. 3, 50 “comes-stabuli” 25
BTP see British Transport Police (BTP) Commercial Victimisation Survey 152
Bullock, K. 52 “community anchor” status 157
business delivery, enabling 71 community assets in use 165–166
community crime prevention 126, 129
Cameron, David 93, 164 community-driven policing 186, 187, 192
Campbell Collaboration 167 community engagement 53, 151,
“carrot and stick” approach 38 156–157, 163, 172, 192
Carter, D. 50 community intelligence 129
Cassels, Lord: “The Role and “community organisers” 160
Responsibilities of Police” 149 community policing 49, 154, 159, 172,
CDRPs see Crime and Disorder 178, 186–187, 192
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) community policing approaches 50, 154,
Centrex 98 166; community engagement 156–157;
CEOP see Child Exploitation and principles 155
Online Protection Centre (CEOP) Community Policing Officer (CPO) 155
CEPOL see European Union Agency for community safety partnerships (CSPs)
Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) 126–127, 130–132, 144
Chaires, R.H. 49, 50 “community skills” 162
Cherney, A. 100 coordination committees 36–37
Chicago Area Project 126 COP see College of Policing (COP)
Chief Constables’ Council 36 “core executive” departments 38
Chief Police Officers Staff Association corruption 3, 12, 14, 118
(CPOSA) 91 “Council Framework decision 2002/584/
Child Exploitation and Online JHA” 119
Protection Centre (CEOP) 77 counter-terrorism activities 129
Chinese National Banking system 195 County and Borough Police Act 1856
Cime Scene Investigation (CSI) 60 10–11
“citizen-focused policing” 163 Court of Justice for the European Union
citizens in policing 61–62 (CJEU) 121
Civil Contingencies Committee CPOSA see Chief Police Officers Staff
(COBR) 89 Association (CPOSA)
civilianisation 58 CPS see Crown Prosecution Service
Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) 45, (CPS)
82–84, 88, 95, 96 CPS Proceeds of Crime Unit 134
Civil Nuclear Police Authority 82 Crawford, A. 61, 128, 130, 182
civil recovery proceedings 79 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 13, 14, 70,
CJS 60, 139 126, 127, 130, 131, 181
CNC see Civil Nuclear Constabulary Crime and Disorder Reduction
(CNC) Partnerships (CDRPs) 14, 126–127,
COBR see Civil Contingencies 130, 131
Committee (COBR) Crime and Security Act 2001 81
Code for Crown Prosecutors 135 crime audits 130
code for prosecutors 135–136 Crime Operations Coordination
College of Policing (COP) 36, 37, 60, Committee 37
62–64, 71, 97–102, 167, 177, 178, 193; “crime prevention” 127
establishment of 99–101; historical crime prevention and criminal justice
context of 97–99; Police Education reform 118
Qualification Framework (PEQF) crime programmes, Interpol 114, 114
101–102 Crime Reduction Toolkit 167
 Index 203

Crime Services Division 47 disciplinary offence 26

crime statistics 151–152; crime survey disruption 190, 191, 195
152; police recorded statistics 152–154 DPP see Director of Public Prosecutions
crime survey 152 (DPP)
Crime Survey for England and Wales drug abuse prevention and health 118
(CSEW) 152, 154, 171, 187 Dublin Police Act 1786 5–7
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 98 Dunleavy, P. 22
Criminal Justice Sector 43–52 Dutch “Stadswacht” scheme 58
criminal justice system 37, 43, 60, 69, 78,
106–107, 118, 132, 138, 143–144, 152, EAW see European Arrest Warrant
156, 176, 190 (EAW)
criminal law act 1967 19 EBP see Evidence-Based Policing (EBP)
criminal law enforcement 19 Ede, James Chuter 97
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Edwards, C.J. 178
Act Codes 139 Edwards, G. 129
Critchley, T.A. 9 effectiveness of force 35
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) Electricite de France (EDF) 83
132–140, 144; and accountability Emergency/Spontaneous deployment 89
139–140; code for prosecutors empowering communities 159–160
135–136; conducting prosecutions Emsley, C. 2, 4, 26
136–137; criticisms of 137–139; Energy Act 2004 82–84
pre-charge advice 134–135 “environmental scanning” activities 113
CSEW see Crime Survey for England European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 119–121;
and Wales (CSEW) and Brexit 122; framework 137
CSPs see Community Safety European Court of Human Rights
Partnerships (CSPs) (ECtHR) 121
cultural dispositions 163 European Exchange Warrant 124
current forensic arrangements 142–144 European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Training (CEPOL)
“damp squib” 13 108–110
“dangerous classes” 1 Europol 107–108
data-driven policing 186, 188, 192–193 evidence-based approach 167, 168, 172
decentralised environment 156 evidence-based policing (EBP) 100,
Defence Police Federation (DPF) 95 166–168; question of 170–171;
degree-holder entry 102 receptivity 169–170
“democratic deficit” 30 Excellence in Policing 63
democratic policing 20, 22–24, 129; expert citizens 161; challenges for 162;
consensus 22–23; freedom and as community bridge 162–163
equality 23–24; models 22, 117, 144, Extradition Act 2003 (EA2003) 119,
157, 197; principles of 24 136–137
democratic societies 23, 39, 157, 184
demographics 176, 177 facial recognition 194–196
Desborough Committee 12 Facial Recognition Cameras 196
detective constable recruitment 66 facial recognition technology 195
de Veil, Thomas 3 Fast Track and Direct Entry
digital forensics 142 programmes 64–65
digital policing 71 Fielding, Henry 2, 4
Direct Entry programme 65 Fielding, John 4
direct entry schemes 24, 65–66 “fire brigade” service 12
direct organisational accountability 34 fixed penalty notices (FPN) 53
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 43-force model 66–69
132, 133 forensic framework for services 142
204 Index

“Forensic Review” 143 HO see Home Office (HO)

forensic science: provision 142, 144; Home Affairs Committee 98–99
structure 140–144 Home Office (HO) 12, 21, 27, 29, 32, 33,
Forensic Science Regulator 143 35, 38, 43, 51, 53, 55, 68, 79, 82, 89,
Forensic Science Strategy 143 95–98, 130, 131, 148, 151, 153,
Formed Police Unit (FPU) 116, 117 154, 180
former tri-partite system, role of 29, 30 host-State policing institutions 116
Foster, J. 3 Hughes, G. 129
Framework Decision on the European
Arrest Warrant 121 Independent Office for Police Conduct
Fraser, C. 161, 163 (IOPC) 27–31; history of 27–29;
Friedman, R. 156 organisational perspective of
Fukuyama, F. 23 accountability 29–30
Full Code Test 135, 136 Independent Office Police
the future, policing structures 176–197 Misconduct 39
Independent Police Complaints
Gates, Thomas 4 Commission (IPCC) 27, 28, 34, 92
Gill, M. 52 individual accountability 17, 18, 26
global policing agencies 112 individual police officer (IPO) 17, 26, 39,
global policing hubs: criticisms 115; 115, 116
Interpol 112–114; United Nations information-based crimes 62
Police (UNPOL) 115–117 Innes, M. 129
Golding, B. 150 inspection services 35
Goldstein, H. 165 intelligence-led policing 164, 188
government reformist politics 10 inter-agency working 130
Greene, J. 154 Interim National Board (INB) 93
International Justice and Organised
Harris, R.E. 97 Crime Division 134
Head, B. 100 international liaison officers 122–123
Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution international police co-operation 106
Inspectorate (HMCPI) 139 international police organisation 112
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of international police structures: global
Constabulary (HMIC) 35, 53, 54, 150, policing hubs 112–117; international
181 liaison officers 122–123; international
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of policing 119–122; regional policing
Constabulary and Fire and Rescue agencies 107–112; United Nations
Services (HMICFRS) 35, 82, 84, 151, Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
153, 154 117–119
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs international policing 117, 123;
(HMRC) 134 criticisms 120–122; EAW and Brexit
Hickinbottom, Justice 78 122; European Arrest Warrant
Higher Education (HE) system 100 119–120
higher level apprenticeships (HLA) 101 “Internet of Things” (IOT) 194
HLA see Higher Level Apprenticeships Interpol 112–114
(HLA) intra-community tensions 129
HMCPI see Her Majesty’s Crown IOPC see Independent Office for Police
Prosecution Inspectorate (HMCPI) Conduct (IOPC)
HMICFRS see Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Joh, E.E. 195
and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) Johnston, L. 58, 182
HMRC see Her Majesty’s Revenue and joined-up approach 130
Customs (HMRC) Joint Branch Boards 94–95
 Index 205

Joint National Disclosure Improvement Mawby, R.C. 11, 52

Plan (NDIP) 138 Mawby, R.I. 34
Jones, T. 18, 38, 58, 180 Mayhall, P.D. 50
Mayne, Richard 8–9
Kelling, G.L. 190 Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime
Key Forensic Services Ltd 143 (MOPC) 31
Klockars, Karl 18, 19 May, Theresa 93
Knight, L. 62 McKnight, J.L. 164
Kretzmann, J.P. 164 medium- to small-sized police force 45, 46
Kuhn, Thomas 185 Metropolitan Police Act 2, 3, 5–9, 11, 43,
48, 80, 180
laissez faire approach 159 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 31,
law enforcement 83; agencies 77, 188, 36, 96, 153, 167
191; governance 193; system 66 Middlesex Justices Act 1792 25
Lawrence, Stephen 13, 137 Ministry of Defence Police (MODP)
Laws, D. 101 84–87, 95
Leadership of British Policing 150 Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987
Lee, Melville 2, 25, 50 85–87, 95
legislative powers 55–56 “Mission creep” 60
legitimacy 29; degree of 11; level of 20; Mitchell, Andrew 92
police 35, 53, 156, 157–161, 193, 194, “Modern Police” 1, 5, 6, 11, 43, 84, 149
196, 197; public confidence and 179; Modern Policing 11, 48, 78, 183
public’s perception of 139 MODP see Ministry of Defence Police
Lentz, S.A. 49, 50 (MODP)
LFR see Live Facial recognition (LFR) Modus Operandi 191
Liang, H.H. 23 money-saving collaboration
Lister, S. 38, 128 agreements 67
Live Facial Recognition (LFR) 196 Moore, M.H. 190
Loader, Ian 34, 129, 181 MOPC see Mayor’s Office for Policing
local accountability 36, 38, 90, 129, 180 and Crime (MOPC)
Localism Act 2011 32 Moscow-based anti-corruption
local police structures: case for reform organisation 115
66–69; Criminal Justice Sector and MPS see Metropolitan Police Service
the police service 43–52; direct entry (MPS)
schemes 65–66; Police Community Muir, R. 34
Support Officers (PCSOs) 53–60; multi-agency approach 127
police support volunteers (PSV) Municipal Corporation Act of 1835 9
60–62; policing vision 2025 69–71; mutual aid 90; national arrangements
types of recruitment 62–65 for 87–89
local policing 20, 31, 38, 70, 148, mutual recognition-based instruments 121
180; abolition of 6; arrangements mutual recognition in EU criminal
10; fundamental practices of 106; law 121
structures 43, 71, 76 mutual trust 121
local taxation 20 Myhill, A. 156, 157
Lowenthal, David 1
Lowe, T. 129 national arrangements for mutual aid
“low level” incidents 192 87–89
Lustgarten, L. 30 National Chair of the Police
Federation 56
Manning, P.K. 23 “National Citizen Service” 160
“Marxist” framework 1 National Crime Agency (NCA) 36, 69,
Mathew, Sir Theobald 132 70, 76–79, 103, 143
206 Index

National Crime Recording Standard NPCC see National Police Chiefs

153–154 Council (NPCC)
National Executive Committee (NEC) NPOCC see National Police
97 Coordination Centre (NPOCC)
National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)
36–37, 61, 69, 88, 95, 144, 170 Oaksey, Lord 96
National Police Coordination Centre oath of impartiality 32–34
(NPoCC) 88–89 “old police” 2–3
national police forces 79, 110, 180 “old-style” policing 69
National Police Improvement Agency O’Leary, B. 22
(NPIA) 77, 98, 166, 167 online crime 71
national policing bodies 36, 180 operational policing 29, 36, 84, 100
national policing structures: British Operational Support Division 47
Transport Police (BTP) 79–82; Civil Operation Dragon 112
Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) 82–84; Operation Stovewood 77
College of Policing (COP) 97–102; organisational accountability 17, 18,
Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) 30, 39
84–87; national arrangements for organisational perspective of
mutual aid 87–89; National Crime accountability 29–31
Agency (NCA) 76–79; Police Organisation for Security and
Superintendents’ Association 95–97; Cooperation Europe (OSCE) 24
Police Federation of England and organised crime and trafficking 118
Wales (PFEW) 91–95; Strategic OSCE see Organisation for Security and
Policing Requirement 89–91 Cooperation Europe (OSCE)
National Policing Vision 2025 65
National Reassurance Policing Palmer, S.H. 2
Programme 128 Palmiotto, M. 50
national training standards 64 Parker, Sir Nick 36
NCA see National Crime Agency “partnership approach” 70, 127
(NCA) Partnership Development Fund 131
needs-based approaches 164, 165 partnership structures: community
“needs-driven” path 164 safety partnerships 126–127,
Neighbourhood Policing: approach 52, 131–132; Crown Prosecution Service
163; programme 128, 129 (CPS) 133–140; Director of Public
Neighbourhood Watch Schemes 61 Prosecutions (DPP) 132; forensic
neo-liberal democracies science structure 140–144; historical
186, 193 context 127–130; partnership
neo-liberal democratic models of problems 130–131
policing 189 party politics 34, 51
neo-liberal democratic societies 184 PCC see Police and Crime
neo-liberalism 156, 180 Commissioner (PCC)
Neuberger, Baroness 60, 62 PCSO see Police Community Support
Newburn, T. 11, 13 Officers (PCSOs)
“New Police” 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14 Peacekeeping Operation 116
New Public Management (NPM) Peach, S. 64
150, 159 Peak, K.J. 50
Newsam, Sir Frank 97 Pearce, Dame Shirley 63
Neyroud, P. 58 “Peelian Principles” 48–50
Nijhar, P. 50 P.E.E.L. programme 151
Non-Crime Activity and Incidents 178 Peel, Sir Robert 5, 7, 8
non-geographic police authorities 38 Peels principles 49–50
“Norm Derivative” 18 PEQF see Police Education Qualification
Normington, Sir David 93 Framework (PEQF)
 Index 207

performance management 148–151, national 79, 110; resident 85; special

171, 179 86; territorial 82, 83, 91; types of 11
personal responsibility 26, 102, 132 police funding 31–32, 38, 68
PFEW see Police Federation of England Police Innovation fund 38
and Wales (PFEW) police legitimacy 35, 53, 156–161, 193,
Phillips, C. 13 194, 196, 197; action-orientated
planned deployment/event 89 communities 160; decentralised
plebgate affair 92 power 160; empowering communities
pluralisation 182 159–160; greater social enterprises
pluralised policing approach 181 160; information ability 161
plural policing 181–183 police officers and attestation 50–51
plural structures 179–181 police organisation 48
police accountability 17, 22, 24, 131 Police Performance Assessment
Police Act 25, 29, 38, 52, 91, 96 Framework (PPAF) 150
police agencies 12, 49, 71, 79, 87, 106, police professionalism 156
107, 115, 169, 170, 183, 190, police professional programme 71
193, 197 police recorded statistics 152–154
Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) Police Reform Act 2002 14, 27, 55, 58,
31–33, 36–39, 67, 89, 90, 94, 132, 151, 130; section 38 of 181
179–180, 192 Police Reform and Social Responsibility
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Act 2011 30–34, 89; oath of
(PACE) 12 impartiality 32–34; police and crime
Police and Justice Act 98 panels 32; police and crime plans 31;
Police and Social Responsibility police funding 31–32
Act 180 police reforms 36
Police Bill 5 Police Regulations 51, 96
Police Community of the Americas 110 police service 12, 13, 26, 31, 34, 39,
The Police Community of the Americas 43–52, 54, 58, 63–68, 70, 71, 149
(AMERIPOL) 110–111 Police Service Volunteers 62
Police Community Support Officers police staff 44, 53, 55, 62, 64, 65, 86, 96
(PCSOs) 44, 53–60, 71, 128, 181; “Police Staff College” 98
critical reaction to 56–59; evaluation Police Superintendents Association
of role 59; in future 59–60; historical (PSA) 91, 95–97
context 54–55; legislative powers Police Support Units (PSUs) 88
55–56; powers delegated to 56, 57 police support volunteers (PSV) 60–62
Police Complaints Authority (PCA) 27 police systems 3, 7, 9, 11, 22, 66, 161
Police Council 96 Police Transformation fund 39
police culture 12, 20–22, 71 Police Volunteers 62
police decision-making 158 police workforce 47, 48
Police Education Qualification Policing and Crime Act 2017 28
Framework (PEQF) 101–102 Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for
Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Reform 55
Legitimacy Programme (PEEL) 35 policing policy 67
Police Federation 56, 58, 60, 92 Policy Vision 2025 69–71, 143, 168, 170
Police Federation of England and Wales Pollitt, C. 150
(PFEW) 91–96 POP see Problem Oriented Policing
police forces 6, 28, 36, 43, 45, 53, 55, 58, (POP)
70, 71, 88, 135; civilian 84; dominant Posen Inquiry 13
and violent 23; duties of 6; efficient positive facial recognitions 196
and effective 31; in England and Wales “posse comitatus” of Medieval times 51
44, 44, 94, 142, 180; establishment pre-charge advice 134–135
of 7, 10; funding 68; individual 77, predictive policing 183–185, 188, 192
141; medium- to small-sized 45, 46; pre-join degree 102
208 Index

Prenzler, T. 182 Reiner, R. 1, 20, 21, 30, 49, 50, 98

principle of proportionality 120 Rein, M. 101
principles of policing 48–50 Reith, C. 2, 8, 50
“private security” role 195 responsibilisation policy 156
Problem Oriented Policing (POP) 165, ‘Review of Police Core and Ancillary
180, 184 Tasks’ 149
procedural justice 158 Robertson, N. 49
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA Rogers, C. 128
2002) 134 “The Role and Responsibilities of
“professionalisation agenda” 44 Police” (Cassels) 149
professionalism 4, 7, 63, 93, 107 Rose, Christopher 83
professional policing 12, 102 Rowan, Charles 8–9
professional standards departments Rowe, M. 110
(PSDs) 28 Royal Commission on Policing 26
prosecutions, conducting 136–137 Royal Military Police 84
provincial police, creating 9–10 “rule at a distance” approach 38
PSA see Police Superintendents Rural Constabulary Acts of 1839 and
Association (PSA) 1840 9
PSD see professional standards
departments (PSDs) SARA 184
PSUs see Police Support Units (PSUs) Saunders, Alison 132
PSV see police support volunteers (PSV) Savage, S.P. 150
“public approval” 1 SC see Special Constable (SC)
public confidence in police 12 Scarman, Lord 12
public expectations 178; of police 69 Scottish Police Authority 31
public police 23–24, 49, 59, 129, 179–181 Section 22A of the Police Act 1996 36
“public safety and justice solutions” 195 Section 24 of the Police Act 1996 88
public-sector workers 160 Section 91 of the Police Act 51
public services 68–70, 167, 177, 186, 195 self-policing in communities 161;
Punch, M. 23, 39 challenges for expert citizen 162;
expert citizen as community bridge
Radelet, L.A. 50 162–163; neighbourhood policing 163
Radzinowicz, L. 5 self-servicing tactics 23
The Railway Policeman (Whitbread) 80 sensor-controlled vehicles 195
railway safety accreditation scheme 56 Serious Fraud Office (SFO) 77, 79
Railways and Transport Safety Serious Organised Crime (SOC)
Act 2003 80 77, 167
ranks and roles, police structure 45–47 Sexual and Gender-based Violence
“reassurance gap” 54 (SGBV) 117
receptivity 169–170 SFO see Serious Fraud Office (SFO)
recruitment, types of: changes in police Sharples, J. 100
education and 62–63; degree entry Shearing, C. D. 182, 183, 195
63–65 Siminovic, B. 169
Regional Organised Crime Units single-style delivery of policing 182
(ROCUs) 77 Situational Crime Prevention 190
regional policing agencies: AFRIPOL “smart city” policing 176, 194–196
110; AMERIPOL 110–111; Smith, K. 34
ASEANOPOL 111–112; CEPOL Smith, M.J. 61
108–110; EUROPOL 107–108 SOC see Serious Organised Crime (SOC)
regional policing hubs 112 social capital 61, 128, 163
Regulation Codes of Practice and social service function 179
Conduct 143 societal behaviours 184
 Index 209

Spasic, D. 169 traditional acquisitive crime 62

Special Constable (SC) 44, 51, 71 Transforming Forensics Programme
Special Constables Act 51, 85 (TFP) 143
special constabulary 51–52 Transport Police (Jurisdiction)
Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Act 1994 80
Division 134 Treasury Grant 10
specialist capabilities 70 “A Treatise on the Police of the
Specialist Fraud Division 134 Metropolis” (Colquhoun) 4, 5
specialist staff deployments 89 The Tulley Report 143
special police forces 86
Special Political Mission 116 UK law enforcement 78
SPR see Strategic Policing Requirement Unit Beat Policing 12, 190
(SPR) United Nations Office on Drugs and
Standing Police Capacity 117 Crime (UNODC) 117–119
state-sponsored policing 156 United Nations Police (UNPOL) 112,
Statuary Instrument 59 115–117; component 116
Steedman, C. 10 UNODC see United Nations Office on
Stenning, P. 182, 195 Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Stevens, John 153 UNPOL see United Nations Police
Stott, M. 61 “unused material” 138
Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR)
38, 89–91 “value for money” approach 148
structures 43, 71, 76, 176–197; policing Van Sluis, A. 58
18–20; see also individual entries Victim Liaison Units (VLUs) 139
Successive Acts of Parliament 11 Vulnerability Agenda 35

technological skills 102 Wakefield, A. 182

technology 12, 68, 69, 71, 106, 114, 161, Westmarland, L. 21
170, 176, 184, 188, 189, 196 Whitbread, J.R.: The Railway
Telford 53 Policeman 80
territorial police force 83 wider community activities 58
terrorism prevention 118 Wild, Jonathan 3
Thatcher, Margaret 148 Williams, K.L. 49
Thompsons, David 185 Winsor, Sir Tom 65
Thornton, Sara 36 workforce 70–71; police 47, 48
Threshold Test 135, 136 working-class police, loyalty of 3
Tilley, N. 154 World Economic Forum 167
Tong, S. 102 Wrekin 53