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i
A D A M PAT R I C K B E L L
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
v
Thanks, libraries
I could learn audio technology.
But where?
I’d start at home.
—Grandmaster Flash
vii
Contents
Preface xiii
Part I DO-IT-YOURSELF
3. Track 1: Michael 75
The Car Stereo Classroom: Learning History 76
CASSETTE CREATIVITY SINCE 1977: SELF-LED EXPLORATIONS IN OVERDUBBING 77
GOING CLASSICAL 78
GOING ELECTRIC AND DIGITAL 80
THE SKEUOMORPHIC ADVANTAGE: NEW TECHNOLOGIES, OLD CONCEPTS 83
4. Track 2: Tara 97
From Scoring Points to Scoring Films: Learning Background 97
“I JUST LEARNED AS I HAD TO”: KARAOKE COMPOSITION AND REFLEXIVE RECORDING
WITH LOGIC 98
C on t e n t s ix
Comping (Saturday) 117
Ongoing: Shopping for a Mixer 121
To Be Continued: Conclusions 123
The Apple Doesn’t Fall Far from the Social Network: Growing a Fictional Family
Tree 137
SINGING ROBOTS 139
C on t e n t s xi
Bibliography 209
Index 221
xiii
Preface
• guitar, vocals
• vocals, guitar
• bass, vocals
• drums
Whenever I listened to this album, I pictured the band playing together in a recording
studio, resembling what Geoffrey Stokes describes as the typical recording processes of
rock and roll in the mid-1950s and early 1960s:
xiii
xiv Prefa ce
With each passing play audiotape gradually erodes, and paralleling this reality, my
adolescent illusion of the studio recording as a real-time event began to disinte-
grate as I studied the guitar parts of my favorite album. With only two guitarists
in the band, how was it possible that they played three different and distinct guitar
parts simultaneously? I deduced that either a ringer was enlisted—a mystery third
guitarist—or some kind of recording wizardry was invoked. Thumbing through my
local library’s card catalogue in search of literature on audio recording proved to
be a fruitless endeavor, and the “information superhighway” I had heard rumblings
about had yet to make a detour to my rural hometown. Lacking the informational
resources to answer my query, I retreated to the basement and took matters into my
own hands.
Armed with a guitar, two tape recorders, and two audiocassettes, I devised my
battle plan to create an audio illusion all my own. I commenced my experiment
by pressing the red record button on one tape recorder and proceeded to play a
four-chord progression that I repeated for a couple of minutes until the monot-
ony of this exercise begged a quick cadence. I stopped the recording and rewound
the tape to the beginning. On the second tape recorder I pressed record, and then
pressed play on the first tape recorder. The rhythm guitar part that I had just finished
recording now played the role of rhythmic accompaniment; I joined in on the jam
by improvising a guitar solo along with it, all of which was recorded by the second
tape recorder. What I stumbled upon was a crude form of overdubbing. It forever
transformed my musical practices, aiding me in developing my instrumental skills
and songwriting ideas. Ignorant of the history of recorded music and oblivious to
the existence of multitrack tape recorders, I did not realize one person could play
multiple parts on a recording, and that the technology to make this possible had
existed for more than half of a century. By the mid-1960s the recording process had
changed drastically in popular music, with musicians harnessing recording technol-
ogy to move the conception of recording beyond that of an audio snapshot captur-
ing a moment in time. Referencing the increasingly elaborate studio productions of
the Beach Boys, Virgil Moorefield writes:
Already in 1966, then, the composer, arranger, and producer are melded
into one person . . . Brian Wilson was at the controls himself, making on-
the-spot decisions about notes, articulation, timbre, and so on. He was
effectively composing at the mixing board and using the studio as a musi-
cal instrument.2
Since the mid-1960s, most recorded music has not been made by a group of peo-
ple playing together in the same room at the same time. Instead, like Brian Wilson,
P re face xv
musicians have used the studio as a musical instrument, either working alone,3 or
in teams.4
Digital DIY-er
Shuffling forward a few years to the more digitally dependent musical milieu of the
twenty-first century, my early adulthood years coincided with a critical period of
transition in the music-recording industry: digital technologies were quickly usurp-
ing their analog predecessors. This change trickled down to the consumer, giving
me access to similar recording technology. A fifty-dollar computer program that
I purchased at a local mall afforded me to overdub as many as sixteen tracks, open-
ing the portal to a new incarnation of the one-man band. By routing a few inexpen-
sive Radio Shack microphones to my computer through a battered mixing console
acquired from a thrift shop, I patched together a humble recording studio of my
own. In my parent’s basement, I diligently recorded myself track-by-track playing
drums, bass, and guitar to shape the foundations for my not-so-original pop songs.
My recordings were not intended for others to listen to; rather they served as sonic
sketches, an aural alternative to writing down musical ideas with pencil and paper.
As I developed my recording skills in tandem with my musical skills, what started
as a hobby evolved into a more serious endeavor. Aside from the skimpy manual
that accompanied the music-recording software, I had no form of instruction. My
music education took place outside of the classroom, after school, and consisted of
a self-directed approach to making music with recording technology. I learned to
use the studio as a musical instrument by teaching myself, much of which entailed
a trial-and-error approach.
3
See for example Bell, “Trial-by-Fire”; Butler, Playing with Something That Runs; Schloss, Making
Beats; Rambarran, “DJ Hit That Button.”
4
See for example Hennion, “The Production of Success”; Seabrook, The Song Machine; Warner,
Pop Music.
5
See for example Campbell, “Of Garage Bands and Song-Getting”; Green, How Popular Musicians
Learn; Jaffurs, “The Impact of Informal Music Learning Practices in the Classroom.”
6
See for example Bennett, On Becoming a Rock Musician; Schwartz, “Writing Jimi.”
7
This section paraphrases parts of Bell, “The Process of Production | The Production of Process.”
xvi Prefa ce
out with all its gestures and nuances intact.”8 “Learn by listening to and copying
recordings” is the second tenet of Lucy Green’s Music, Informal Learning, and the
School: A New Classroom Pedagogy, a model of popular music pedagogy that has
been hugely influential on the field of music education.9 It is undoubtedly true
that popular musicians learn from recordings, but this is not the complete pic-
ture because popular musicians also learn by making recordings. This book aims
to shed some light on the making and learning processes entailed in recording.
Understanding how music-recording processes work can help music educators to
facilitate learning experiences that reflect this important aspect of how popular
musicians learn.
To the credit of the field, music educators have written about using the stu-
dio as a musical instrument, at least inadvertently, since the late 1960s.10 For
example, in 1970 John Paynter and Peter Aston advocated using tape record-
ers to “make music,” recognizing the technology’s potential to not only record
but to edit, make loops (literally), shift pitches via speed changes, layer sounds,
and play sounds backward.11 Under the umbrella of “composition,” several music
education researchers investigated the music-making process with computers,12
all of which resemble the practice of using the studio as a musical instrument.
More recent studies have reported on music-making and learning practices in
which studio technology serves as the instrument, occurring in a broad range
of formal and informal learning settings.13 Despite the significance of these con-
tributions to our understanding of the studio as instrument in music education,
the practices of production that typify how popular music is made remain largely
absent in popular music pedagogies. Music education needs to espouse the pro-
cesses of recording as opposed to the products of recording, and focus on how
popular music is made to create pedagogies that are more reflective of real world
practices.
In a review of eighty-one articles from 1978 to 2010 related to popular music pedagogy, Roger
9
Mantie reported that over half of these cited Lucy Green. See his “A Comparison of ‘Popular Music
Pedagogy’ Discourses.”
10
See for example Ellis, “Musique Concrète at Home”; Ernst, “So You Can’t Afford an Electronic
Studio?”
11
Paynter and Aston, Sound and Silence, 134.
12
See for example Bamberger, “In Search of a Tune”; Folkestad, Hargreaves, and Lindström,
“Compositional Strategies in Computer-Based Music Making”; Hickey, “The Computer as a Tool in
Creative Music Making”; Stauffer, “Composing with Computers”; Wilson and Wales, “An Exploration
of Children’s Musical Compositions.”
13
See for example Egolf, “Learning Processes of Electronic Dance Music Club DJs”; Finney,
“Music Education as Identity Project in a World of Electronic Desires”; King, “Collaborative Learning
in the Music Studio”; Lebler, “Popular Music Pedagogy”; Lebler and Weston, “Staying in Sync”;
Mellor, “Creativity, Originality, Identity”; Tobias, “Composing, Songwriting, and Producing”; Tobias,
“Crossfading Music Education.”
xvii
P re face xvii
The laptop as a mobile instrument or music machine means that it not only
helps to produce and play the sounds that the musician has created, but the
device (as a hardware and instrument) can also serve as a virtual recording
studio and digital workstation, anytime and anywhere.15
Only a few decades ago the cost of producing a professional recording was prohibitively
expensive for most, but with the proliferation of personal computing and the associ-
ated exponentiation of processing power, hobbyists were heralding the wonders of
DAW (digital audio workstation) technology by the 1990s. It is fitting that the record-
ing mediums of human history (cylinders, discs, tape reels, and hard drives) are round,
because we have come full circle, back to a point where DIY recordings can go directly
to the radio just like Les Paul and Mary Ford’s 1951 hit “How High the Moon.” The
once rigidly defined spaces and roles of musician and audio engineer are coalescing.
14
Prior, “OK COMPUTER.”
15
R ambarran, “DJ Hit That Button,” 596.
16
Slater, “Processes of Learning in the Project Studio,” 10.
xviii Prefa ce
There is a renewed role in music production reminiscent of Les Paul, a hybrid of musi-
cian and audio engineer, a role where one person is responsible for writing, performing,
recording, and mixing a musical work.
Dawn of the DAW tells the story of how the dividing line between the traditional
roles of musicians and recording professionals has eroded, inadvertently inaugurat-
ing a new music education paradigm. The phenomenon of using the studio as a
musical instrument is illustrated by profiling four Brooklynites who engage in the
practice of DIY recording. Detailing how the DAW is entrenched as an elemental
cog of the twenty-first-century music-making mechanism, Dawn of the DAW illumi-
nates the centrality and criticality of digital recording technologies in the learning
and music-making processes of DIY-ers.
Divided into three parts, part I first examines DIY recording practices within
the context of recording history from the late nineteenth century to the present.
Chapter 1 examines the evolving processes and technologies of DIY recording,
which is followed by an explication of the evolving role of the producer and the stu-
dio as a musical instrument in chapter 2. Taken together, these two chapters serve
to contextualize the primary focus of this book: the music-making and learning that
occurs with DIY recording studios.
Part II continues the story of the evolution of DIY recording by detailing cur-
rent practices of using the studio as a musical instrument. How recording technolo-
gies are incorporated into music-making, and how they are learned by DIY studio
users, constitutes the central focus of c hapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. Each of these chapters
chronicles the music-making processes of a different DIY-er from the musically chic
borough of Brooklyn, and focuses on a different aspect of the music production
process: getting sounds, tracking, editing, and mixing.
Finally, part III examines the broader trends heard throughout the stories pre-
sented in part II. Drawing on Lucy Green’s model for how popular musicians learn,
chapter 7 examines the common practices of music-making and learning with DIY
recording studios. Dawn of the DAW concludes with chapter 8, which discusses the
ramifications of these new directions for music educators.
1
Part I
DO-IT-YOURSELF
3
1
A History of DIY Recording
Striving for Self-S ufficiency
1
Parts of this chapter were first published in Bell, “DIY Recreational Recording as Music Making.”
2
Cohen, Record Men, 64.
3
Posner, Motown, 36.
4
Gillett, Making Tracks, 204.
5
Cook with McCaughan and Balance, Our Noise, 6.
6
Boulware and Tudor, Gimme Something Better, 330.
7
Carson, “R. Stevie Moore.”
8
Ingram, “Here Comes the Flood.”
3
4 Do-I t-Yourself
The sound, the space, the selling, and sharing; these are all critical components of
what constitutes DIY, but for the purposes of this book, when DIY is invoked it
refers to making music, specifically with a focus on how music is made in the record-
ing process and the learning that occurs therein. The history of DIY recording that
I present in this chapter is a purposefully skewed one. While it is important to know
what people use to make music, more emphasis is placed on how recording as a
music-making practice is conceptualized and performed. Therefore, this is a story
about ease of access and ease of use, the two most critical conditions in determining
whether or not a practice can be self-sufficient, which is the essence of DIY.
At present, the digital audio workstation (DAW) is the bedrock of music produc-
tion, DIY or otherwise. DAW is a generic software categorization that has evolved
since its origins as simply an audio editing application that ran on specialized work-
station computers. Most DAWs now share in common the capability to sequence,
record, and mix music, but increasingly can be played using software-based syn-
thesizers that emulate existing instruments or create new tones and timbres with
no existing referent. As a tech-dependent music-making society, have we adapted
our recording practices in parallel, if at all, with the development of our recording
technologies? In this first chapter, I aim to shine a light on DIY practices since the
inception of recording itself, and trace its path to the present. What ought to be
evident is that relatively soon into the history of recording, an industry is estab-
lished and DIY practices coexist in a world with professional protocols, conven-
tions, and equipment. DIY-ers and professionals inform and influence each other,
and at times distinguishing one from another is a difficult task. I attribute “profes-
sional” to the music industry, meaning that professional practices exist to produce
recordings to be commodities. DIY covers the spectrum, as some DIY-ers set out to
9
Coleman, Check the Technique Volume 2, 351.
10
Gonzales, “The Juice Crew,” 103.
11
Considine, “The Big Willies,” 155.
12
Eells, “Vampire Weekend.”
5
make money, while others simply see recording as recreation. What these DIY-ers
share in common is a desire to be self-sufficient; to engage in recording as music-
making. “Recording,” as this history will demonstrate, is a moving target, and over
time comes to mean increasingly more than the literal act of recording sound to a
medium. As the acts associated with recording change and evolve, so too do the
roles of the people that engage with these practices. The music-making and learning
practices of the contemporary DIY-ers profiled in this book are not the result of a
twenty-first century DIY recording revolution; rather, they are exemplary of a DIY
recording evolution that started before audio existed.
13
Bowers, Encyclopedia of Automatic Musical Instruments, 10.
14
Hocker, “My Soul is in the Machine,” 84.
15
Bowers, Encyclopedia of Automatic Musical Instruments, 29.
16
Ibid., 749.
17
Avanti, “Black Musics, Technology, and Modernity.”
6 Do-I t-Yourself
Although the earliest phonographs produced were equipped to record, low pub-
lic demand for this feature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
pushed the phonograph and its competing devices toward being used solely for
sound reproduction. Up until approximately 1900, the phonograph could both rec-
ord and reproduce, and the manufacturers “expected their customers to make their
own recordings.”22 One such example of DIY recording during this era is presented
in How We Gave a Phonograph Party, distributed by the National Phonography
Company in 1899.23 This party is depicted as a fun-filled evening, with anecdotes
such as: “The most effective records we made during the entire evening were two
18
Jones, Rock Formation, 14.
19
Digital restorations of similar tinfoil recordings from 1878 reveal that these recordings were quite
noisy and distorted, making the sound source, such as the voice in this case, difficult to discern.
20
Morton, Sound Recording, 18.
21
Cited in Taylor, Katz, and Grajeda, Music, Sound, and Technology in America, 35.
22
Morton, Off the Record, 14.
23
Reproduced in Taylor, Katz, and Grajeda, Music, Sound, and Technology in America.
7
chorus records. All stood close together in a bunch about three feet from the horn
and sang ‘Marching through Georgia’ and it came out fine. Our success lead us to try
another ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’ and it was every bit as good.”24
During the phonograph’s infancy, people could record themselves. Although
the role of “recordist” existed in professional recording studios, in domestic life the
people operating the recording equipment were the same people performing for it.
Recording in this context was a self-sufficient process that was intended to be fun.
Despite some critics’ concerns that recording technology would replace recreational
music-making, “in good part it [music-making] flourished in response to the pos-
sibilities of these technologies.”25 Emulating Edison—most likely unknowingly—
people self-produced their own recordings in their homes decades before “home
recording” became a household term.
Based on these accounts it seemed that DIY recording was off to a formidable
start in the twentieth century, but with Emile Berliner’s disc-based gramophone
design supplanting Edison’s cylinder-based phonograph system—due to the fact
that it was easier to mass-produce discs than cylinders—came a major conceptual
shift. The inability to record on discs
24
Ibid., 51.
25
Katz, “The Amateur in the Age of Mechanical Music,” 460.
26
Suisman, Selling Sounds, 5.
27
Morton, Sound Recording, 32.
8 Do-I t-Yourself
A vocalist might literally stick her head inside the horn to ensure that her pia-
nissimo would be heard, but then, with the timing of a lion tamer, quickly
withdraw for her fortissimo, so as to avoid “blasting” the engraving needle out
of its groove.33
Some studios even employed a “gentle pusher,” whose duty was to monitor
the performer’s dynamics and push them away from the recording horn when
they were too quiet, and conversely, pull them away when they were too loud.34
Dynamics notwithstanding, mechanical recording could not capture the full
28
According to Allan Williams, “Old drawings of an early Edison recording session indicate that
there was no physical division between musicians and the recording devices and technicians who oper-
ated them.” See his “Divide and Conquer.”
29
Horning, “Chasing Sound.”
30
Schmidt Horning, Chasing Sound, 30.
31
Morton, Sound Recording and Off the Record.
32
Morton, Off the Record, 21.
33
Katz, Capturing Sound, 38.
34
Katz, “Introduction,” 25.
9
extent of the typical human’s hearing range,35 which meant that the frequencies
produced by instruments at the low or high end of the sound spectrum were ren-
dered inaudible. For example, a mechanical recording of a drum set would not be
able to reproduce the low thud of a bass drum nor the high shimmer of a cymbal.
One workaround for this problem was to simply replace an instrument, such as
substituting the double bass line for a tuba part, as was practiced in early-era jazz
recordings.36
In sum, both whom could be recorded and how accurately they could be
recorded—with regard to such basic elements of sound such as pitch and perceived
loudness—were subject to the mediated process of recording. Jonathan Sterne
succinctly concludes: “People performed for the machines; machines did not sim-
ply ‘capture’ sounds that already existed in the world . . . Making sounds for the
machines was always different than performing for a live audience.”37
The perception that the recording studio was once a neutral space where music
was simply captured to a medium is misguided. Recording is not just a product of
performers; it is also a process, one in which participants other than the musicians
as well as the technologies they employ (including the rooms they record in) con-
tribute significantly to the outcome as heard on the final medium. And yet there
remains a longstanding view that recording music is simply the process of capturing
a musical performance in real time.38 Aden Evens suggests that this perception can
be attributed to a cultural bias toward the Western classical tradition: “According
to the audiophile community, every good recording should sound like Beethoven
played live: fidelity = Fidelio.”39
Despite this construct of fidelity being actively promoted by the emerging
music-recording industry in the early twentieth century,40 an undercurrent of DIY
recording practices that eschewed this take on reality would eventually succeed
in selling recordings that purposely foiled the façade of recordings as unmediated
musical moments captured in real time. This sea-change shift in perceptions and
practices took decades to reach a boiling point and evaporate the illusion of fidelity
because accessing (or acquiring) and operating the technology to record contin-
ued to present significant hurdles to those outside of the music industry during the
electrical era.
35
Human hearing is typically 20Hz–20kHz, although with aging, the ability to perceive high fre-
quencies tends to decline. Mechanical recording could capture a much more limited frequency range
of 200Hz–3kHz according to Schmidt Horning, Chasing Sound, 37.
36
Katz, Capturing Sound, 39.
37
Sterne, The Audible Past, 235.
38
Kealy, “From Craft to Art.”
39
Evens, Sound Ideas, 7.
40
Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever.
10 D o-I t-Yourself
41
Winner, “The World of Sound,” 187.
42
Chusid, “Beethoven-in-a-Box,” 10.
43
Holmes, Electronic and Experimental Music, 140.
44
Morton, Off the Record, 26.
45
Chanan, Repeated Takes. Although the separation of musicians from recording technicians did
not become a widespread practice until the electrical era, research by Allan Williams reports that as
early as 1906 an Edison recording studio in New York had a partition to isolate the musicians from the
recording equipment and personnel. See “Divide and Conquer.”
46
Schmidt Horning, Chasing Sound, 41.
47
Millard, “Tape Recording and Music Making,” 158.
11
for avid hobbyists such as Home Recording and All About It, touting: “The home
recordist can achieve results that will be almost on par with commercially-pressed
records.”48 To most people, however, disc-based recording was unwieldy, and “it was
not until tape recorders became available in the 1950s that home recording became
popular again.”49 Fortunately for the future of DIY recording, jazz guitarist Les Paul
was more than up to the task to tinker with two turntables in his garage.
He would record a track onto an aluminum disk, and then record a sec-
ond track on another machine, while the first machine played back his first
track. The second machine would thus capture Paul’s live second perfor-
mance as well as his recorded first performance. Then he’d begin the proc-
ess again with the third performance. In this way, he would layer part upon
part until he had a finished piece.51
48
Schmidt Horning, Chasing Sound, 61.
49
Katz, Capturing Sound, 70.
50
Key examples of Les Paul’s disc-based sound-on-sound recordings include “Lover” (1948) and
“Brazil” (1948).
51
Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever, 125.
52
Katz, Capturing Sound, 100.
12 D o-I t-Yourself
Tibbett’s “the Cuban love song” (1931) on which he sang both the tenor and bari-
tone parts,53 and a decade later Sidney Bechet overdubbed the multi-instrumentals
“The Sheik of Araby” and “Blues of Bechet.”54 Nevertheless, Les Paul, who observed
the use of overdubbing in Hollywood at some point in the early 1930s and honed
his technique using a homemade disc cutter in his garage-turned-studio, is the indi-
vidual who popularized this approach: “He was certainly the first to make it a major
selling point of his disks. This studio technique, which took him roughly two years
to perfect, would ultimately force the industry to reexamine its approach to record-
ing.”55 Historians of the Western art music tradition often point to Pierre Schaeffer
and Pierre Henry as the progenitors of collage-based music,56 but their landmark
works such as Symphonie pour un home seul (1950) premiered after Paul released
tracks like “Lover” (1948) and “Brazil” (1948). Regardless of who was first, the
technique of overdubbing that is now commonplace in music production was pop-
ularized by Les Paul who applied these principles to tape in just a few years follow-
ing his first forays in overdubbing with discs.
53
Barrett, “Producing Performance,” 91.
54
Shaughnessy, Les Paul.
55
Ibid., 143.
56
Prendergast, Ambient Century.
57
Morton, Sound Recording, 114–142. Following World War II, American intelligence investigated
various German technologies including the Magnetophon tape recorder, and one of the investigating
officers, Jack Mullin, shipped two of the units back to the United States. The American-made Ampex
tape recorder based on the Magnetophon was introduced to Bing Crosby by Mullin after he was hired
to record Crosby’s radio show for NBC. Although the Magnetophon had been unveiled in Paris in
1935, “for reasons that have never been clear, the more creative uses of tape for recording music did
not begin until the tape recorder was wrested from its legitimate corporate and institutional sponsors,
who were mainly in Germany, and distributed around the world to new owners.” Ibid., 142. Notably,
Thom Holmes claims that Raymond Scott invented one of the first multitrack tape recorders in the
United States, having figured out how to record “seven or fourteen parallel audio tracks on the same
reel of tape” in 1953, a year in advance of Les Paul designing the first eight-track machine. Electronic
and Experimental Music, 141.
58
Paul and Cochran, Les Paul, 203.
13
First, recording each track separately enables the user to attain a much
higher level of musical accuracy, specifically timing and tuning; second,
each track can be recorded in minute sections, bit by bit and, as a con-
sequence, levels of performance are achieved which would be impossible
“live”; third, the complete separation of each track offers control of vol-
ume, timbre, and spatial positioning of the signal on that track in relation
to the other tracks; and, finally, decisions as to suitability of virtually all the
separate sounds need only be made at the mixdown stage.61
It warrants repeating that Paul’s recordings were produced outside of a professional stu-
dio system without the aid of professional engineers. Paul recalls that he and Mary Ford
often recorded in their kitchen and other rooms in their home to attain different effects:
I would have Mary sing a certain part while standing in the hallway, and
other parts in different rooms to give each track its own sound . . . We had
59
Waksman, “Les Paul,” 270.
60
Morton, Sound Recording.
61
Warner, Pop Music, 23.
14 D o-I t-Yourself
62
Paul and Cochran, Les Paul, 250.
63
Moorefield, The Producer as Composer, 3.
64
Zak, I Don’t Sound Like Nobody, 159.
65
Kealy, “From Craft to Art,” 210.
66
As cited in Kahn, Kind of Blue, 75.
67
Simons, Studio Stories. This list of recording equipment is now highly sought after and very expen-
sive, likely in part due to the acclaimed recordings that they were used on by Laico.
15
The architectural features of the physical space were central to a recording’s essence;
the aim was to “capture” a “natural” performance: “The art of recording was not to
compete for the public’s aesthetic attention to the art that was being recorded.”69
Whereas an engineer like Frank Laico working for a record label during this era
adhered to a preservationist philosophy in recording—capturing the performance
unaltered by editing or overdubbing—DIY-ers like Paul purposely drew attention
to their technical interventions and alterations:
As record production evolved through the 1950s, the result was not
only new music but a new way of making music. It was perhaps the most
enduring musical concept to emerge from the postwar period: records
were no longer simply aural snapshots but deliberately crafted musical
texts.70
In the decades that followed, the ideal of the real-time performance recording
eventually became an exception rather than the rule, as the practice of overdub-
bing became standard in the overwhelming majority of recording sessions. In the
span of just a few years, and in the hands of a few DIY pioneers, the window was
again opened to record oneself. Coupled with tape-recording technology, individu-
als could now produce recordings independently that proffered the audio illusion
68
Kealy, “From Craft to Art,” 210.
69
Ibid., 211.
70
Zak, I Don’t Sound Like Nobody, 162.
16 D o-I t-Yourself
that they could sing and play multiple parts by themselves without the aid of other
musicians or technicians. These developments would have an immediate impact
on a reinvigorated DIY recording community excited about the prospects afforded
by tape.
Upon the arrival of audiotape in the United States following World War II, tape
recording was promoted to the public as an easy-to-do hobby. Publications from the
proceeding decades including consumer magazines such as Tape Recording (1953–
1969), and recreation-oriented books such as Family Fun in Tape Recording72 and
Tape Recording for the Hobbyist,73 covered a wide range of activities related to record-
ing, with music being one of the many possibilities.
Meanwhile, outside of home life, DIY recording studios began to surface, made
possible by the proliferation of reel-to-reel tape recorders. André Millard suggests
that “this was an accessible technology which permitted more people to enter the
professional recording industry.”74 Most DIY studios had little in the way of state-
of-the-art recording technology, lacking the requisite capital to purchase high-end
(usually German) microphones and custom-built recording consoles. Instead, they
repurposed ramshackle radio equipment and more affordable American-made
microphones,75 and set up their studios in “storefronts, garages, and shacks, as well as
radio stations and proper, if spartan, studios . . . Many records were recorded on loca-
tion in a YMCA, church, VFW hall, or house, almost anyplace with roof and walls.”76
In the case of Atlantic Records, the office of Ahmet Ertegun and Jerry Wexler dou-
bled as their studio. They pushed aside their office furniture to make space for their
recording artists, and their engineer, Tom Dowd, recorded them with a single micro-
phone.77 In comparison to the professional recording practices of the period, the
71
Westcott and Dubbe, Tape Recorders, 23.
72
Ahlers, Family Fun in Tape Recording.
73
Zuckerman, Tape Recording for the Hobbyist.
74
Millard, “Tape Recording and Music Making,” 158.
75
Cogan and Clark, Temples of Sound.
76
Zak, I Don’t Sound Like Nobody, 80.
77
Wade and Picardie, Music Man, 34.
17
“anyplace with roof and walls” approach of the DIY-ers was a radically different world,
and it was precisely this deviation from the standard that redefined recording practices.
It is at this mid-century point that determining what counts as a “professional”
recording becomes increasingly difficult. The line demarcating professional is
obscured in the wake of many independent recording companies in the latter half of
the 1950s that realized commercial success in tandem with the rise of rock and roll.
For example, whereas the ratio of major to independent labels was a commanding
40 to 11 in 1955, it was 30 to 40 by 1957.78 In just five years after the introduction of
tape into the recording industry, the number of companies releasing albums jumped
dramatically from eleven to two hundred.79 These newly established startups likely
could not compete with the industry titans’ technical standards of high fidelity, but
it is unlikely that their intended audiences—lower-class whites, African Americans,
and teenagers—were familiar with such stringent standards anyway.80 The inability
for these independents to rival this so-called realism, opened up an avenue to a new
aesthetic, one in which popular musics, beginning with rock and roll, would flourish.
The tape techniques that Les Paul popularized were referenced frequently in
how-to guides of the era. For example, consider the following excerpt from ABC’s of
Tape Recording: “You can use a tape recorder to produce your own multiple record-
ings. You can make like a one-man orchestra or choir (as Les Paul and Mary Ford
did so wonderfully a few years ago).”81 Further, in Tape Recording for the Hobbyist,
Art Zuckerman relates how one could adopt Paul’s tape-based “speed trick” to imi-
tate the high-pitched novelty singing of the Chipmunks or feign violin virtuosity by
recording an octave down at three-quarters of the regular tempo and then speeding
up the tape afterward.82
By the mid-1960s, recording practices, especially for emerging styles such as
rock and roll, embraced the creative capacities afforded by tape. Recording was no
longer pitted as a process of capturing but as creating. DIY recording guides from
this period such as Creative Tape Recording positioned editing as an integral part of
the recording process: “The recordist should not feel he is cheating in some way, but
that he is using every means available, in this case his editing skill, to get as flawless
a performance as possible on tape.”83
Editing, however, was not as simple as clicking a camera shutter: “When you get
into editing, you pass the thin boundary that distinguishes tape recording as a mere
pastime from a serious hobby.”84 Tape recording was now becoming an increasingly
78
Stokes, Star-Making Machinery, 5.
79
Kealy, “From Craft to Art,” 212.
80
Ibid.
81
Crowhurst, ABC’s of Tape Recording, 71.
82
Zuckerman, Tape Recording for the Hobbyist, 48.
83
Capel, Creative Tape Recording, 128.
84
Zuckerman, Tape Recording for the Hobbyist, 73.
18 D o-I t-Yourself
technical and less accessible pursuit. On the one hand, the more involved discipline
of editing likely alienated some recreational recorders who found it too technical
and thereby less accessible, but on the other hand, it also gave self-recording musi-
cians new compositional possibilities.
The concept of editing as integral to the recording process constituted a sem-
inal change in both professional and recreational recording practices. Certainly,
recording technologies have changed dramatically since the heyday of Les Paul’s
tape trickery, but the foundational concept that recordings entail a process of crea-
tive construction at the hands of the person wielding the technology perseveres to
the present day. For DIY recording, this development constituted a figurative fork
in the road; with added possibilities beyond simply pressing a button to record
came the necessity for more training.
The DIY-er wanting to edit multiple takes together had to learn how to splice
tape wielding a razor blade. If DIY-ers wanted to sing with themselves like Mary
Ford, they had to master the technique of overdubbing. Most books about tape
recording aimed at DIY-ers from the 1960s and 1970s contained chapters steeped
in more technical topics to cater to this crowd, including but not limited to the
mechanical principles of tape recording, editing techniques, machine maintenance,
acoustics, and microphone selection and placement.85 This more technical and less
accessible path of DIY recording continued along the same trajectory throughout
the remainder of the twentieth century, and in many regards still persists presently
in the digital domain.
It was around this time in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the DIY trailhead
diverged into two distinct paths, the lo-fi (low-fidelity) movement, which contin-
ued to value ease of access and ease of use over quality, and the hi-fi (high-fidelity)
movement, which remained self-sufficient, but often compromised ease of access
and ease of use in its pursuit to rival the quality of professional studios. In the case
of the latter, a significant contributing factor was the ability to access or acquire the
increasingly costly equipment used in professional studios including mixers, signal
processors, and specially built recording rooms.
See for example Capel, Creative Tape Recording; Crawford, Tape Recording from A to Z; Crowhurst,
85
ABC’s of Tape Recording; LeBel, How To Make Good Tape Recordings; Salm, Tape Recording for Fun and
Profit; Westcott and Dubbe, Tape Recorders; Zuckerman, Tape Recording for the Hobbyist.
19
D I V I D E -A N D -I S O L AT E
Meanwhile, ambient recording spaces like Columbia’s 30th Street Studio, which
were once prized in the 1950s and early 1960s, began to fall out of favor. Taking
their place were studios designed to eliminate or minimize natural reverberations
to enable the isolation of individual sounds. This trend, which was widespread in
86
Bushnell and Ferree, From Down Beat to Vinyl, 159.
87
As cited in Cogan and Clark, Temples of Sound, 90.
88
Notable Michael Jackson recordings produced by Quincy Jones, and engineered and mixed by
Bruce Swedien, include Off the Wall (1979), Thriller (1982), and Bad (1987).
89
As cited in Cogan, “Bill Putnam.”
90
Swedien, Make Mine Music, 123.
91
As cited in Simons, Studio Stories, 53.
92
Emerick and Massey, Here, There, and Everywhere, 112.
93
Brown, Rick Rubin, 45.
20 D o-I t-Yourself
recording studios and practices by the late 1970s, is described by David Byrne as
“divide-and-isolate”:
The goal was to get as pristine a sound as possible . . . Studios were often
padded with sound-absorbent materials so that there was almost no rever-
beration. The sonic character of the space was sucked out, because it
wasn’t considered to be part of the music. Without this ambience, it was
explained, the sound would be more malleable after the recording had
been made . . . Dead, characterless sound was held up as the ideal, and
often still is. In this philosophy, the naturally occurring echo and reverb
that normally added a little warmth to performances would be removed
and then added back in when the recording was being mixed.94
Byrne remarks that in the divide-and-isolate approach, reverb would be added dur-
ing mixing, after recording occurred. This was made possible by external reverb
units, which were also prohibitively expensive for the typical DIY-er. The first alter-
native to chamber reverb to emerge was plate reverb, which came into wide use in
the 1960s and 1970s. Plate reverb works on the same principle as chamber reverb,
but instead of sending sound signals to a room, they are sent along a large four-
hundred-pound steel plate measuring three feet wide and six feet long, suspended
by springs within a metal frame and housed in a wooden case. While hardly port-
able, these plate units ushered in a standardization of sorts for reverb. If a studio
could purchase a plate, the unique acoustic properties of its recording space became
significantly less important, effectively devaluing the natural reverberation of a stu-
dio space and its reverb chambers. Essentially, plate reverb led to the homogeniza-
tion of ambience as reverb could now be replicated without using the same studio.
The trend of supplanting the previous technology with a more compact and rep-
licable successor continued with the release of digital reverb in the late 1970s. Using
algorithms to model a surfeit of rooms, digital reverb units expanded the sound
arsenal of recording engineers, displacing the need for older bulkier technologies
like chambers and plates. Using digital models of a room meant that different per-
formances could be recorded in the same room and yet made to sound as if each was
recorded in a different room, all with a turn of a dial or push of a button. Further, the
desired reverb style could be changed quite easily. With chamber and plate reverb,
there was one sound option—all that could be controlled was the amount of reverb
added to the signal. The precedent had been set with digital reverb that soon enough
the studio would cease to be a space at all.
Within professional recording practices the approach to recording and the archi-
tecture of the studios changed in tandem:
94
Byrne, How Music Works, 148.
21
Studios that were built in the next twenty years invariably incorporated
designs that led to the complete isolation of musicians and their instru-
ments, one from another. This, along with the ability to overdub on an
ever-increasing number of tracks, was the seed that eventually became the
common practice of layering-recording one instrument at a time.95
Inside the studio, the facility is insulated as tightly as possible from the noise
of its own operation, for both recording and monitoring purposes. Clean
sound separation is an ideal in studio design, from the overall structure of
the rooms down to the minute electronic circuitry. Ambient sound from
such sources as the ventilation is minimized through design and special-
ized insulating materials. Soundproofing in the booths and control room
blocks out as much external sound as possible and absorbs unwanted inter-
nal frequencies. Specialized double-paned acoustic windows visually con-
nect booths and the control room, while blocking the sound. Additionally,
in a booth large enough to record more than one source at a time, movable,
acoustically insulated baffles partition the area to limit leak-through from
the sound source of one microphone into another.96
95
Johns, Sound Man, 169.
96
Meintjes, “The Recording Studio as Fetish,” 273.
97
Simons, Studio Stories, 160.
Other documents randomly have
different content
his energies which is perhaps his greatest danger. All this is true, but
it does not go to the root of the matter.
Again the educational aspect of the arts is constantly being
stressed, sometimes in a manner which does them disservice.
‘Message’ hunting—the type of interest which discovers in Macbeth
the moral that ‘Honesty is the best policy’; in Othello a
recommendation to ‘Look before you leap’, in Hamlet perhaps a
proof that ‘Procrastination is the Thief of Time’, or in King Lear an
indication that ‘Your sins will find you out*’, in Shelley an exhortation
to Idealism, in Browning comfort for the discouraged and assurances
as to a future life; but in Donne or Keats no ‘message’—this mode of
interpreting the phrase ‘a criticism of life’, though to a minute degree
on the right lines, is probably more damaging than those entirely
erratic theories, of which ‘Art for Art’s sake’ is an example, with
which we have been more concerned.
None the less but in subtler ways the educational influence of the
arts is all-pervasive. We must not overlook bad art in estimating it. “I
should be said to insist absurdly on the power of my own
confraternity” wrote a novelist of the 19th century “if I were to
declare that the bulk of the young people in the upper and middle
classes receive their moral teaching chiefly from the novels that they
read. Mothers would no doubt think of their own sweet teaching;
fathers of the examples which they set; and schoolmasters of the
excellence of their instructions. Happy is the country which has such
mothers, fathers and schoolmasters! But the novelist creeps in closer
than the father, closer than the schoolmaster, closer almost than the
mother. He is the chosen guide, the tutor whom the young pupil
chooses for herself. She retires with him, suspecting no lesson . . .
and there she is taught how she shall learn to love; how she shall
receive the lover when he comes; how far she should advance to
meet the joy; why she should be reticent and not throw herself at
once into this new delight.”
The influence is also exerted in more indirect ways. There need
be, we must remember, no discernible connection or resemblance
whatever between the experience due to the work of art and the
later behaviour and experience which is modified through it. Without
such resemblance the influence may easily be overlooked or denied,
but not by anyone who has a sufficient conception of the ways in
which attitudes develop. No one who has repeatedly lived through
experiences at the level of discrimination and co-ordination
presupposed by the greater writers, can ever, when fully ‘vigilant’, be
contented with ordinary crudities though a touch of liver may of
course suspend these superior responses. And conversely, keen and
vigilant enjoyment of Miss Dell, Mr Burroughs, Mrs Wilcox or Mr
Hutchinson, when untouched by doubts or the joys of ironic
contemplation, is likely to have as a consequence not only an
acceptance of the mediocre in ordinary life, but a blurring and
confusion of impulses and a very widespread loss of value.
These remarks apply even more evidently to the Cinema. People
do not much imitate what they see upon the screen or what they
read of in best-sellers. It would matter little if they did. Such effects
would show themselves clearly and the evil would be of a
manageable kind. They tend instead to develop stock attitudes and
stereotyped ideas, the attitudes and ideas of producers: attitudes
and ideas which can be ‘put across’ quickly through a medium that
lends itself to crude rather than to sensitive handling. Even a good
dramatist’s work will tend to be coarser than that of a novelist of
equal ability. He has to make his effects more quickly and in a more
obvious way. The Cinema suffers still more than the stage from this
disability. It has its compensating advantages in the greater
demands which it makes of the audience, but hitherto very few
producers have been able to turn them to account. Thus the ideas
and attitudes with which the ‘movie fan’ becomes familiar tend to be
peculiarly clumsy and inapplicable to life. Other causes, connected
with the mentality of producers, increase the effect.
The danger lies not in the fact that school-girls are sometimes
incited to poke revolvers at taximen, but in much subtler and more
insinuating influences. Most films indeed are much more suited to
children than to adults, and it is the adults who really suffer from
them. No one can intensely and whole-heartedly enjoy and enter
into experiences whose fabric is as crude as that of the average
super-film without a disorganisation which has its effects in everyday
life. The extent to which second-hand experience of a crass and
inchoate type is replacing ordinary life offers a threat which has not
yet been realised. If a false theory of the severance and
disconnection between ‘æsthetic’ and ordinary experience has
prevented the value of the arts from being understood, it has also
preserved their dangers from recognition.
Those who have attempted to find a place in the whole structure
of life for the arts have often made use of the conception of Play;
and Groos and Herbert Spencer are famous exponents of the theory.
As with so many other Æsthetic Doctrines the opinion that Art is a
form of Play may indicate either a very shallow or a very penetrating
view. All depends upon the conception of Play which is entertained.
Originally the view arose in connection with survival values. Art, it
was thought, had little practical value of the obvious kinds, so some
indirect means must be found by which it could be thought to be of
service. Perhaps, like play, it was a means of harmlessly expending
superfluous energy. A more useful contribution was made when the
problem of the value of play itself was seriously attacked. The
immense practical utility of most forms of play then became evident.
Characteristically play is the preparatory organisation and
development of impulses. It may easily become too narrowly
specialised, and the impulses active may be such as never to receive
‘serious’ exercise. None the less with our present understanding of
the amazingly recondite interactions between what appear to be
totally different activities of the nervous system, the importance of
play is not likely to need much insistence.
There are many human activities which, fortunately or
unfortunately as the case may be, are no longer required of or
possible to civilised man. Yet their total discontinuance may lead to
grave disturbances. For some of these play serves as an opportunity.
The view that art provides in some cases an analogous outlet
through vicarious experience has naturally been put forward, notably
by Mr Havelock Ellis. “We have lost the orgy, but in its place we have
art†.” If we do not extend the ‘sublimation’ theory too far or try to
bring under this Safety-valve heading work with which it has no
concern, it may be granted that in some cases the explanation is in
place. But the temptation to extend it, and so to misconceive the
whole matter, is great.
The objection to the Play Theory, unless very carefully stated, lies
in its suggestion that the experiences of Art are in some way
incomplete, that they are substitutes, meagre copies of the real
thing, well enough for those who cannot obtain better. “The
moralising force of Art lies, not in its capacity to present a timid
imitation of our experiences, but in its power to go beyond our
experience, satisfying and harmonising the unfulfilled activities of
our nature.” † The Copy View, with the antithesis between Life and
Literature which so often accompanies it, is a devastating
misconception. Coupled with the suggestion involved by the word
‘Play,’ that such things are for the young rather than for the mature,
and that Art is something one grows out of, it has a large share of
the responsibility for the present state of the Arts and of Criticism.
Its only rival in obscuring the issues is its close cousin the
Amusement or Relaxation Theory.
The experiences which the arts offer are not obtainable, or but
rarely, elsewhere. Would that they were! They are not incomplete;
they might better be described as ordinary experiences completed.
They are not such that the most adequately equipped person can
dispense with them and suffer no loss, and this loss is not
momentary, but recurrent and permanent; the best equipped are
precisely the people who most value these experiences. Nor is Art,
as by way of corollary is sometimes maintained, a thing which had
its’ function in the youth of the world, but with the development of
Science becomes obsolete. It may very possibly decline and even
disappear, but if it does a biological calamity of the first order will
have occurred. Nor again is it something which may be postponed
while premillennial man grapples with more immediate problems.
The raising of the standard of response is as immediate a problem
as any, and the arts are the chief instrument by which it may be
raised or lowered.
Hitherto we have been concerned chiefly with more or less
specific effects of the experiences of the arts, with the effects, upon
single definite groups or systems of impulses, of their exercise in
these experiences. The Play Theory tends to limit us to these
consequences. Important though they are, we must not overlook the
more general effects which any well-organised experience produces.
They may in certain cases be extraordinarily widespread. Such an
apparently irrelevant test as the ability to stand upon one foot
without unsteadiness has recently been employed, by Mr Burt, as an
index to mental and especially to emotional organisation. All our
activities react upon one another to a prodigious extent in ways
which we can only as yet conjecture.
Finer adjustment, clearer and more delicate accommodation or
reconciliation of impulses in any one field tends to promote it in
others. A step in mathematical accomplishment, other things being
equal, facilitates the acquisition of a new turn in ski-ing. Other things
are rarely equal it should perhaps be remarked. If this is true even
of such special narrowly restricted impulses as are involved in a
scientific technique, it is far more evident when the major, the most
widespread systems, those active in our responses to human beings
and to the exigences of existence, are engaged.
There is abundant evidence that removal of confusion in one
sphere of activity tends to be favourable to its removal elsewhere.
The ease with which a trained mind approaches a new subject is the
plainest example, but equally a person whose ordinary emotional
experience is clear, controlled and coherent, is the least likely to be
thrown into confusion by an unheard-of predicament. Complications
sometimes obscure this effect: a mathematician approaching
psychology may attempt to apply methods which are inappropriate,
and the sanest people may prove stupid in their dealings with
individuals of other races. The specialist, either intellectual or moral,
who is helpless outside his own narrow field is a familiar figure in
inferior comedy. But what would have to be shown before the
principle is invalidated is that, granted equal specialisation, the
successful specialist is not better fitted for life in general than his
unsuccessful confrère. Few people, however, will dispute the
assertion that transference of ability frequently occurs although the
mode by which it comes about may be obscure.
When very widespread and very fundamental impulses are
implicated, where attitudes constantly taken up in ordinary life are
aroused, this transference effect may be very marked. Everybody
knows the feeling of freedom, of relief, of increased competence and
sanity, that follows any reading in which more than usual order and
coherence has been given to our responses. We seem to feel that
our command of life, our insight into it and our discrimination of its
possibilities, is enhanced, even for situations having little or nothing
to do with the subject of the reading. It may be a chapter of Gösta
Berling or of The ABC of Atoms, the close of the Vanity of Human
Wishes, or the opening of Harry Richmond; whatever the differences
the refreshment is the same. And conversely everybody knows the
diminution of energy, the bafflement, the sense of helplessness,
which an ill-written, crude, or muddled book, or a badly acted play,
will produce, unless the critical task of diagnosis is able to restore
equanimity and composure.
Neither the subject nor the closeness of correspondence between
the experience and the reader’s own situation has any bearing upon
these effects. But indeed, to anyone who realises what kind of a
thing an experience is, and through what means it comes about, the
old antithesis between subject and treatment ceases to be of
interest (cf. Chapter XVI). They are not separable or distinct things
and the division is of no service. In this case the effects we are
considering depend only upon the kind and degree of organisation
which is given to the experiences. If it is at the level of our own best
attempts or above it (but not so far above as to be out of reach) we
are refreshed. But if our own organisation is broken down, forced to
a cruder, a more wasteful level, we are depressed and temporarily
incapacitated, not only locally but generally. It is when what we are
offered, and inveigled into accepting, is only slightly inferior to our
own developed capacity, so that it is no easy matter to see what is
wrong, that the effect is greatest. Stuff of an evident and extreme
badness is exhilarating rather than depressing when taken from a
discriminating standpoint; and there need be nothing snobbish or
self-congratulatory in such reading. What is really discomposing and
damaging to the critical reader is the mediocre, the work which falls
just below his own standards of response. Hence the rage which
some feel at the productions of Sir James Barrie, Mr Locke, or Sir
Hall Caine, a rage which work comparatively devoid of merits fails to
excite.
These effects are not merely momentary or evanescent; if we
would understand the place of the arts in civilisation we must
consider them more closely. An improvement of response is the only
benefit which anyone can receive, and the degradation, the lowering
of a response, is the only calamity. When we take into account not
merely the impulses actually concerned in the experience but all the
allied groups which thrive or suffer with it, and all the far-reaching
effects of success or failure upon activities which may seem to be
independent, the fact that some people feel so keenly about the arts
is no longer surprising.
Underestimation of the importance of the arts is nearly always
due to ignorance of the workings of the mind. Experiences such as
these, into which we willingly and whole-heartedly enter, or into
which we may be enticed and inveigled, present peculiar
opportunities for betrayal. They are the most formative of
experiences, because in them the development and systematisation
of our impulses goes to the furthest lengths. In ordinary life a
thousand considerations prohibit for most of us any complete
working out of our response; the range and complexity of the
impulse-systems involved is less; the need for action, the
comparative uncertainty and vagueness of the situation, the
intrusion of accidental irrelevancies, inconvenient temporal spacing—
the action being too slow or too fast—all these obscure the issue and
prevent the full development of the experience. We have to jump to
some rough and ready solution. But in the ‘imaginative experience’
these obstacles are removed. Thus what happens here, what precise
stresses, preponderances, conflicts, resolutions and
interinanimations, what remote relationships between different
systems of impulses arise, what before unapprehended and
inexecutable connections are established, is a matter which, we see
clearly, may modify all the rest of life. As a chemist’s balance to a
grocer’s scales, so is the mind in the imaginative moment to the
mind engaged in ordinary intercourse or practical affairs. The
comparison will bear pressing. The results, for good or evil, of the
untrammelled response are not lost to us in our usual trafficking.
CHAPTER XXXII
The Imagination
Reason, in itself confounded,
Saw division grow together;
To themselves yet either neither,
Simple were so well compounded.
The Phœnix and the Turtle.
At least six distinct senses of the word ‘imagination’ are still current
in critical discussion. It is convenient to separate them before
passing on to consider the one which is most important.
(i) The production of vivid images, usually visual images,
already sufficiently discussed, is the commonest and the
least interesting thing which is referred to by imagination.
(ii) The use of figurative language is frequently all that is meant.
People who naturally employ metaphor and simile,
especially when it is of an unusual kind, are said to have
imagination. This may or may not be accompanied by
imagination in the other senses. It should not be
overlooked that metaphor and simile—the two may be
considered together—have a great variety of functions in
speech. A metaphor may be illustrative or diagrammatical,
providing a concrete instance of a relation which would
otherwise have to be stated in abstract terms. This is the
most common scientific or prose use of metaphor. It is rare
in emotive language and in poetry; Shelley’s “Dome of
many-coloured glass” is almost the only example which
springs to mind. More usually the elucidation is a mere
pretence; some attitude of the speaker to his subject or to
his audience is using the metaphor as a means of
expression. “The freedom of my writings has indeed
provoked an implacable tribe” said Gibbon, “but as I was
safe from the stings, I was soon accustomed to the buzzing
of the hornets”. But metaphor has yet further uses. It is the
supreme agent by which disparate and hitherto
unconnected things are brought together in poetry for the
sake of the effects upon attitude and impulse which spring
from their collocation and from the combinations which the
mind then establishes between them. There are few
metaphors whose effect, if carefully examined, can be
traced to the logical relations involved. Metaphor is a semi-
surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements
can be wrought into the fabric of the experience. Not that
there is any virtue in variety by itself, though the list of
critics who seem to have thought so would be lengthy; a
page of the dictionary can show more variety than any
page of poetry. But what is needed for the wholeness of an
experience is not always naturally present, and metaphor
supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be
smuggled in. This is an instance of a very strange
phenomenon constantly appearing in the arts. What is most
essential often seems to be done as it were inadvertently,
to be a by-product, an accidental concomitant. Those who
look only to the ostensible purposes for the explanation of
the effects, who make prose analyses of poems, must
inevitably find them a mystery. But why overt and evident
intention should so often destroy the effect is certainly a
difficult problem.
(iii) A narrower sense is that in which sympathetic reproducing
of other people’s states of mind, particularly their emotional
states, is what is meant. “You haven’t enough imagination,”
the dramatist says to the critic who thinks that his persons
behave unnaturally. This kind of imagination is plainly a
necessity for communication, and is covered by what has
already been said in Chapter XXIV. It has no necessary
connection with senses of imagination which imply value.
Bad plays to be successful require it as much as good.
(iv) Inventiveness, the bringing together of elements which are
not ordinarily connected, is another sense. According to this
Edison is said to have possessed imagination, and any
fantastic romance will show it in excelsis. Although this
comes nearer to a sense in which value is implied, it is still
too general. The lunatic will beat any of us at combining
odd ideas: Dr Cook outstrips Peary, and Bottomley
outshines Sir John Bradbury.
(v) Next we have that kind of relevant connection of things
ordinarily thought of as disparate which is exemplified in
scientific imagination. This is an ordering of experience in
definite ways and for a definite end or purpose, not
necessarily deliberate and conscious, but limited to a given
field of phenomena. The technical triumphs of the arts are
instances of this kind of imagination. As with all ordering,
value considerations are very likely to be implied, but the
value may be limited or conditional.
(vi) Finally we come to the sense of imagination with which we
are here most concerned. The original formulation* was
Coleridge’s greatest contribution to critical theory, and
except in the way of interpretation, it is hard to add
anything to what he has said, though, as we have already
noted in Chapter XXIV, some things might be taken away
from it with advantage.
“That synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively
appropriated the name of imagination . . . reveals itself in
the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant
qualities . . . the sense of novelty and freshness, with old
and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion,
with more than usual order; judgement ever awake and
steady self-possession with enthusiasm and feeling
profound or vehement.” “The sense of musical delight . . .
with the power of reducing multitude into unity of effect,
and modifying a series of thoughts by some one
predominant thought or feeling † ” these are gifts of the
imagination. It was natural, we shall shortly see why, for
Coleridge to carry his further speculations upon Imagination
into the realms of Transcendentalism, but setting this aside,
there is enough in this description and in the many
applications and elucidations scattered through the
Biographia and the Lectures to justify Coleridge’s claim to
have put his finger more nearly than anyone else upon the
essential characteristic of poetic as of all valuable
experience.
In describing the poet we laid stress upon the availability of his
experience, upon the width of the field of stimulation which he can
accept, and the completeness of the response which he can make.
Compared with him the ordinary man suppresses nine-tenths of his
impulses, because he is incapable of managing them without
confusion. He goes about in blinkers because what he would
otherwise see would upset him. But the poet through his superior
power of ordering experience is freed from this necessity. Impulses
which commonly interfere with one another and are conflicting,
independent, and mutually distractive, in him combine into a stable
poise. He selects, of course, but the range of suppression which is
necessary for him is diminished, and for this very reason such
suppressions as he makes are more rigorously carried out. Hence
the curious local callousness of the artist which so often strikes the
observer.
But these impulses active in the artist become mutually modified
and thereby ordered to an extent which only occurs in the ordinary
man at rare moments, under the shock of, for example, a great
bereavement or an undreamt-of happiness; at instants when the
“film of familiarity and selfish solicitude”, which commonly hides
nine-tenths of life from him, seems to be lifted and he feels
strangely alive and aware of the actuality of existence. In these
moments his myriad inhibitions are weakened; his responses,
canalised—to use an inappropriate metaphor—by routine and by
practical but restricted convenience, break loose and make up a new
order with one another; he feels as though everything were
beginning anew. But for most men after their early years such
experiences are infrequent; a time comes when they are incapable
of them unaided, and they receive them only through the arts. For
great art has this effect, and owes thereto its supreme place in
human life.
The poet makes unconsciously a selection which outwits the
force of habit; the impulses he awakens are freed, through the very
means by which they are aroused, from the inhibitions that ordinary
circumstances encourage; the irrelevant and the extraneous is
excluded; and upon the resulting simplified but widened field of
impulses he imposes an order which their greater plasticity allows
them to accept. Almost always too the chief part of his work is done
through those impulses which we have seen to be most uniform and
regular, those which are aroused by what are called the ‘formal
elements’. They are also the most primitive, and for that reason
commonly among those which are most inhibited, most curtailed and
subordinated to superimposed purposes. We rarely let a colour affect
us purely as a colour, we use it as a sign by which we recognise
some coloured object. Thus our responses to colours in themselves
become so abbreviated that many people come to think that the
pigments painters use are in some way more colourful than Nature.
What happens is that inhibitions are released, and at the same time
mutual interactions between impulses take place which only sunsets
seem to evoke in everyday experience. We have seen in discussing
communication one reason for the pre-eminence of ‘formal elements’
in art, the uniformity of the responses which they can be depended
upon to produce. In their primitiveness we find another. The sense
that the accidental and adventitious aspect of life has receded, that
we are beginning again, that our contact with actuality is increased,
is largely due to this restoration of their full natural powers to
sensations.
But this restoration is not enough; merely looking at a landscape
in a mirror, or standing on one’s head will do it. What is much more
essential is the increased organisation, the heightened power of
combining all the several effects of formal elements into a single
response, which the poet bestows. To point out that “the sense of
musical delight is a gift of the imagination” was’ one of Coleridge’s
most brilliant feats. It is in such resolution of a welter of
disconnected impulses into a single ordered response that in all the
arts imagination is most shown, but for the reason that here its
operation is most intricate and most inaccessible to observation, we
shall study it more profitably in its other manifestations.
We have suggested, but only by accident, that imagination
characteristically produces effects similar to those which accompany
great and sudden crises in experience. This would be misleading.
What is true is that those imaginative syntheses which most nearly
approach to these climaxes, Tragedy for example, are the most easy
to analyse. What clearer instance of the “balance or reconciliation of
opposite and discordant qualities” can be found than Tragedy. Pity,
the impulse to approach, and Terror, the impulse to retreat, are
brought in Tragedy to a reconciliation which they find nowhere else,
and with them who knows what other allied groups of equally
discordant impulses. Their union in an ordered single response is the
catharsis by which Tragedy is recognised, whether Aristotle meant
anything of this kind or not. This is the explanation of that sense of
release, of repose in the midst of stress, of balance and composure,
given by Tragedy, for there is no other way in which such impulses,
once awakened, can be set at rest without suppression.
It is essential to recognise that in the full tragic experience there
is no suppression. The mind does not shy away from anything, it
does not protect itself with any illusion, it stands uncomforted,
unintimidated, alone and self-reliant. The test of its success is
whether it can face what is before it and respond to it without any of
the innumerable subterfuges by which it ordinarily dodges the full
development of experience. Suppressions and sublimations alike are
devices by which we endeavour to avoid issues which might bewilder
us. The essence of Tragedy is that it forces us to live for a moment
without them. When we succeed we find, as usual, that there is no
difficulty; the difficulty came from the suppressions and
sublimations. The joy which is so strangely the heart of the
experience is not an indication that ‘all’s right with the world’ or that
‘somewhere, somehow, there is Justice’; it is an indication that all is
right here and now in the nervous system. Because Tragedy is the
experience which most invites these subterfuges, it is the greatest
and the rarest thing in literature, for the vast majority of works
which pass by that name are of a different order. Tragedy is only
possible to a mind which is for the moment agnostic or Manichean.
The least touch of any theology which has a compensating Heaven
to offer the tragic hero is fatal. That is why Romeo and Juliet is not a
Tragedy in the sense in which King Lear is.
But there is more in Tragedy than unmitigated experience.
Besides Terror there is Pity, and if there is substituted for either
something a little different—Horror or Dread, say, for Terror; Regret
or Shame for Pity; or that kind of Pity which yields the adjective
‘Pitiable’ in place of that which yields ‘Piteous’—the whole effect is
altered. It is the relation between the two sets of impulses, Pity and
Terror, which gives its specific character to Tragedy, and from that
relation the peculiar poise of the Tragic experience springs.
The metaphor of a balance or poise will bear consideration. For
Pity and Terror are opposites in a sense in which Pity and Dread are
not. Dread or Horror are nearer than Terror to Pity, for they contain
attraction as well as repulsion. As in colour, tones just not in
harmonic relation are peculiarly unmanageable and jarring, so it is
with these more easily describable responses. The extraordinarily
stable experience of Tragedy, which is capable of admitting almost
any other impulses so long as the relation of the main components is
exactly right, changes at once if these are altered. Even if it keeps
its coherence it becomes at once a far narrower, more limited, and
exclusive thing, a much more partial, restricted and specialised
response. Tragedy is perhaps the most general, all-accepting, all-
ordering experience known. It can take anything into its
organisation, modifying it so that it finds a place. It is invulnerable;
there is nothing which does not present to the tragic attitude when
fully developed a fitting aspect and only a fitting aspect. Its sole
rivals in this respect are the attitudes of Falstaff and of the Voltaire
of Candide. But pseudo-tragedy—the greater part of Greek Tragedy
as well as almost all Elizabethan Tragedy outside Shakespeare’s six
masterpieces comes under this head—is one of the most fragile and
precarious of attitudes. Parody easily overthrows it, the ironic
addition paralyses it; even a mediocre joke may make it look
lopsided and extravagant.
This balanced poise, stable through its power of inclusion, not
through the force of its exclusions, is not peculiar to Tragedy. It is a
general characteristic of all the most valuable experiences of the
arts. It can be given by a carpet or a pot or by a gesture as
unmistakably as by the Parthenon, it may come about through an
epigram as clearly as through a Sonata. We must resist the
temptation to analyse its cause into sets of opposed characters in
the object. As a rule no such analysis can be made. The balance is
not in the structure of the stimulating object, it is in the response.
By remembering this we escape the danger of supposing that we
have found a formula for Beauty.
Although for most people these experiences are infrequent apart
from the arts, almost any occasion may give rise to them. The most
important general condition is mental health, a high state of
‘vigilance’; the next is the frequent occurrence of such experiences
in the recent past. None of the effects of art is more transferable
than this balance or equilibrium.
Despite all differences in the impulses concerned, a certain
general similarity can be observed in all these cases of supremely
fine and complete organisation. It is this similarity which has led to
the legends of the ‘æsthetic state’, the ‘æsthetic emotion’ and the
single quality Beauty, the same in all its manifestations. We had
occasion in Chapter II to suggest that the characteristics by which
æsthetic experience is usually defined—that impersonality,
disinterestedness and detachment so much stressed and so little
discussed by æstheticians—are really two sets of quite different
characters.
One set we have seen (Chapters X and XXIV) to be merely
conditions of communication having nothing essentially to do with
value, conditions involved in valueless and valuable communications
alike. We have suggested above, however, that this kind of
detachment and severance from ordinary circumstances and
accidental personal interests may be of special service in these
supremely valuable* communications, since it makes the breaking
down of inhibitions more easy. This same facilitation of response is
also, it should be added, the explanation of the peculiarly pernicious
effect of bad but competent art.
We may now turn to consider that other set of characters which
have been confused with these communicative conditions, and which
may justifiably be taken as defining a special field for those
interested in the values of experience. There are two ways in which
impulses may be organised; by exclusion and by inclusion, by
synthesis and by elimination. Although every coherent state of mind
depends upon both, it is permissible to contrast experiences which
win stability and order through a narrowing of the response with
those which widen it. A very great deal of poetry and art is content
with the full, ordered development of comparatively special and
limited experiences, with a definite emotion, for example, Sorrow,
Joy, Pride, or a definite attitude, Love, Indignation, Admiration,
Hope, or with a specific mood, Melancholy, Optimism or Longing.
And such art has its own value and its place in human affairs. No
one will quarrel with ‘Break, break, break,’ or with the Coronach or
with Rose Aylmer or with Love’s Philosophy,* although clearly they
are limited and exclusive. But they are not the greatest kind of
poetry; we do not expect from them what we find in the Ode to the
Nightingale, in Proud Maisie, in Sir Patrick Spens, in The Definition of
Love or in the Nocturnall upon S. Lucie’s Day.
The structures of these two kinds of experiences are different,
and the difference is not one of subject but of the relations inter se
of the several impulses active in the experience. A poem of the first
group is built out of sets of impulses which run parallel, which have
the same direction. In a poem of the second group the most obvious
feature is the extraordinarily heterogeneity of the distinguishable
impulses. But they are more than heterogeneous, they are opposed.
They are such that in ordinary, non-poetic, non-imaginative
experience, one or other set would be suppressed to give as it might
appear freer development to the others.
The difference comes out clearly if we consider how
comparatively unstable poems of the first kind are. They will not
bear an ironical contemplation. We have only to read The War Song
of Dinas Vawr in close conjunction with the Coronach, or to
remember that unfortunate phrase ‘Those lips, O slippery blisses’!
from Endymion, while reading Love’s Philosophy, to notice this. Irony
in this sense consists in the bringing in of the opposite, the
complementary impulses; that is why poetry which is exposed to it is
not of the highest order, and why irony itself is so constantly a
characteristic of poetry which is.
These opposed impulses from the resolution of which such
experiences spring cannot usually be analysed. When, as is most
often the case, they are aroused through formal means, it is
evidently impossible to do so. But sometimes, as in the above cited
cases, they can, and through this accident literary criticism is able to
go a step further than the criticism of the other arts.
We can only conjecture dimly what difference holds between a
balance and reconciliation of impulses and a mere rivalry or conflict.
One difference is that a balance sustains one state of mind, but a
conflict two alternating states. This, however, does not take us very
far. The chief misconception which prevents progress here is the
switchboard view of the mind. What conception should be put in its
place is still doubtful, but we have already (Chapters XIV and XX)
discussed the reasons which make a more adequate conception
imperative. The rest of the difficulty is due merely to ignorance; we
do not yet know enough about the central nervous system.
With this preliminary disavowal of undue certainty we may
proceed. The equilibrium* of opposed impulses, which we suspect to
be the ground-plan of the most valuable æsthetic responses, brings
into play far more of our personality than is possible in experiences
of a more defined emotion. We cease to be orientated in one
definite direction; more facets of the mind are exposed and, what is
the same thing, more aspects of things are able to affect us. To
respond, not through one narrow channel of interest, but
simultaneously and coherently through many, is to be disinterested
in the only sense of the word which concerns us here. A state of
mind which is not disinterested is one which sees things only from
one standpoint or under one aspect. At the same time since more of
our personality is engaged the independence and individuality of
other things becomes greater. We seem to see ‘all round’ them, to
see them as they really are; we see them apart from any one
particular interest which they may have for us. Of course without
some interest we should not see them at all, but the less any one
particular interest is indispensable, the more detached our attitude
becomes. And to say that we are impersonal is merely a curious way
of saying that our personality is more completely involved.
These characters of æsthetic experiences can thus be shown to
be very natural consequences of the diversity, of their components.
But that so many different impulses should enter in is only what may
be expected in an experience whose ground-plan is a balance of
opposites. For every impulse which does not complete itself in
isolation tends to bring in allied systems. The state of irresolution
shows this clearly. The difference between any such welter of
vacillating impulses and the states of composure we are considering
may well be a matter of mediating relations between the supporting
systems brought in from either side. One thing only perhaps is
certain; what happens is the exact opposite to a deadlock, for
compared to the experience of great poetry every other state of
mind is one of bafflement.
The consciousness which arises in these moments of completed
being lends itself inevitably to transcendental descriptions. “This
Exstasie doth unperplex”, we seem to see things as they really are,
and because we are freed from the bewilderment which our own
maladjustment brings with it,
The heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lightened.
Wordsworth’s Pantheistic interpretation of the imaginative
experience in Tintern Abbey* is one which in varying forms has been
given by many poets and critics. The reconciliation of it with the
account here presented raises a point of extreme importance, the
demarcation of the two main uses of language.
CHAPTER XXXIII
There are two totally distinct uses of language. But because the
theory of language is the most neglected of all studies they are in
fact hardly ever distinguished. Yet both for the theory of poetry and
for the narrower aim of understanding much which is said about
poetry a clear comprehension of the differences between these uses
is indispensable. For this we must look somewhat closely at the
mental processes which accompany them.
It is unfortunate but not surprising that most of the psychological
terms which we naturally employ tend to blur the distinction.
‘Knowledge’, ‘belief’, ‘assertion’, ‘thought’, and ‘understanding’, for,
example, as ordinarily used, are ambiguous in a fashion which
disguises and obscures the point which must be brought out. They
record distinctions which are oblique to the distinctions required,
they are cross-cuts of analysis made in the wrong place and in the
wrong direction, useful enough for some purposes no doubt, but for
this present purpose very confusing. We shall do well to put them
out of mind for a while if possible.
The chief departure made from current conceptions in the sketch
of the mind given in Chapter XI lay in the substitution of the causes,
the characters and the consequences of a mental event, for its
aspects as thought, feeling and will. This treatment was introduced
with a view to the analysis which now occupies us. Among the
causes of most mental events, we urged, two sets may be
distinguished. On the one hand there are the present stimuli
reaching the mind through the sensory nerves, and, in co-operation
with these, the effects of past stimuli associated with them. On the
other hand is a set of quite different factors, the state of the
organism, its needs, its readiness to respond to this or that kind of
stimulus. The impulses which arise take their character and their
course from the interaction of these two sets. We must keep them
clearly distinguished.
The relative importance of the two sets of factors varies
enormously. A sufficiently hungry man will eat almost anything which
can be chewed or swallowed. The nature of the substance, within
these limits, has very little effect upon his behaviour. A replete
person, by contrast, will only eat such things as he expects will taste
pleasant, or regards as possessing definite beneficial properties, for
example, medicines. His behaviour, in other words, depends almost
entirely upon the character of his optical or olfactory stimulation.
So far as an impulse owes its character to its stimulus (or to such
effects of past accompanying or connected stimuli as are revived) so
far is it a reference, to use the term which we introduced in Chapter
XI, to stand for the property of mental events which we substitute
for thought or cognition.* It is plain that the independent internal
conditions of the organism usually intervene to distort reference in
some degree. But very many of our needs can only be satisfied if the
impulses are left undistorted. Bitter experience has taught us to
leave some of them alone, to let them reflect or correspond with
external states of affairs as much as they can, undisturbed as far as
possible by internal states of affairs, our needs and desires.
In all our behaviour can be distinguished stimuli we receive, and
the ways in which we use them. What we receive may be any kind
of stimulus, but only when the reaction we make to it tallies with its
nature and varies with it in quasi-independence of the uses we make
of it does reference occur.
Those to whom visual images are of service in considering
complex matters may find it convenient at this point to imagine a
circle or sphere constantly bombarded by minute particles (stimuli).
Within the sphere may be pictured complex mechanisms continually
changing for reasons having nothing to do with the external stimuli.
These mechanisms by opening little gateways select which of the
stimuli shall be allowed to come in and take effect. So far as the
subsequent convulsions are due to the nature of the impacts and to
lingering effects of impacts which have accompanied similar impacts
in the past, the convulsions are referential. So far as they are due to
the independent motions of the internal mechanisms themselves,
reference fails. This diagrammatic image may possibly be of
convenience to some. By those who distrust such things it may with
advantage be disregarded. It is not introduced as a contribution to
neurology, and is in no way a ground for the author’s view.
The extent to which reference is interfered with by needs and
desires is underestimated even by those who, not having yet
forgotten the events of 1914-1918, are most sceptical as to the
independence of opinions and desires. Even the most ordinary and
familiar objects are perceived as it pleases us to perceive them
rather than as they are, whenever error does not directly deprive us
of advantages. It is almost impossible for anyone to secure a correct
impression of his own personal appearance or of the features of
anyone in whom he is personally interested. Nor is it perhaps often
desirable that he should.
For the demarcation of the fields where impulse should be as
completely as possible dependent upon and correspondent with
external situation, those in which reference should take prior place
from those in which it may be subordinated to appetencies with
advantage, is not a simple matter. On many views of the good and
of what should be, themselves results of subordinating reference to
emotional satisfactions, there could be no question. Truth, it would
be said, has claims prior to all other considerations. Love not
grounded upon knowledge would be described as worthless. We
ought not to admire what is not beautiful and if our mistress be not
really beautiful when impartially considered we ought, so the
doctrine runs, to admire her, if at all, for other reasons. The chief
points of interest about such views are the confusions which make
them plausible. Beauty as an internal quality of things is usually
involved, as well as Good the unanalysable Idea. Both are special
twists given to some of our impulses by habits deriving ultimately
from desires. They linger in our minds because to think of a thing as
Good or Beautiful gives more immediate emotional satisfaction than
to refer to it as satisfying our impulses in one special fashion (cf.
Chapter VII) or another (cf. Chapter XXXII).
To think about Good or Beauty is not necessarily to refer to
anything. For the term ‘thinking’ covers mental operations in which
the impulses are so completely governed by internal factors and so
out of control of stimulus that no reference occurs. Most ‘thinking of’
includes reference in some degree, of course, but not all, and
similarly much reference would not commonly be described as
thinking. When we drop something which is too hot to hold we
would not usually be said to have done so through thinking. The two
terms overlap, and their definitions, if there be a definition of
‘thinking’ as commonly used, are of different types. This is why
‘Thought’ was on an earlier page described as marking an oblique
distinction.
To return, the claims of reference are by no means easy to adjust
with other claims. An immense extension of our powers of referring
has recently been made. With amazing swiftness Science has
opened out field after field of possible reference. Science is simply
the organisation of references with a view solely to the convenience
and facilitation of reference. It has advanced mainly because other
claims, typically the claims of our religious desires, have been set
aside. For it is no accident that Science and Religion conflict. They
are different principles upon which impulses may be organised, and
the more closely they are examined the more inevitable is the
incompatibility seen to be. Any so-called reconciliation which is ever
effected will involve bestowing the name Religion upon something
utterly different from any of the systematisations of impulses which
it now denotes, for the reason that the belief elements present
would have a different character.
Many attempts have been made to reduce Science to a position
of subjection to some instinct or emotion or desire, to curiosity for
example. A special passion for knowledge for its own sake has even
been invented. But in fact all the passions and all the instincts, all
human needs and desires may on occasion supply the motive force
for Science. There is no human activity which may not on occasion
require undistorted reference. The essential point, however, is that
Science is autonomous. The impulses developed in it are modified
only by one another, with a view to the greatest possible
completeness and systematisation, and for the facilitation of further
references. So far as other considerations distort them they are not
yet Science or have fallen out of it.
To declare Science autonomous is very different from
subordinating all our activities to it. It is merely to assert that so far
as any body of references is undistorted it belongs to Science. It is
not in the least to assert that no references may be distorted if
advantage can thereby be gained. And just as there are innumerable
human activities which require undistorted references if they are to
be satisfied, so there are innumerable other human activities not less
important which equally require distorted references or, more plainly,
fictions.
The use of fictions, the imaginative use of them rather, is not a
way of hoodwinking ourselves. It is not a process of pretending to
ourselves that things are not as they are. It is perfectly compatible
with the fullest and grimmest recognition of the exact state of affairs
on all occasions. It is no make-believe. But so awkwardly have our
references and our attitudes become entangled that such pathetic
spectacles as Mr Yeats trying desperately to believe in fairies or Mr
Lawrence impugning the validity of solar physics, are all too
common. To be forced by desire into any unwarrantable belief is a
calamity. The state which ensues is often extraordinarily damaging
to the mind. But this common misuse of fictions should not blind us
to their immense services provided we do not take them for what
they are not, degrading the chief means by which our attitudes to
actual life may be adjusted into the material of a long-drawn
delirium*.
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