In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of

1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

FACTS:

The case is concerned with the constitutionality of R.A. No. 972, otherwise known as

the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”The Rules of Court provided under Rule 127, Sec. 14 that "so
that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 percent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 percent in any subject." This is, however, subject to the discretion of the Court,
The President requested the views of the court, who gave their unfavorable views on such,
causing the President to veto the bill. However, Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371 which embodied substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.
Although the court reiterated their views, the bill became a law on June 21, 1952, without the
President’s signature. R.A. No. 972’s objective is to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficient reading materials and inadequate preparation due to the Japanese
occupation.

The unsuccessful candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking the provisions of
R.A. No. 972, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. Others have
sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question.

ISSUE
Whether the Legislature has the authority to adjust the passing rate for admission to the
Bar?

RULING:
NO.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952,
a general average of 70 percent without falling below 50 percent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not legislation; it is a
judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only
this Court, and not the legislative or executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
functions, as is the case with the law in question.
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility
that the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Congress may repeal,
alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility for the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys
at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court
Pimentel v Legal Education Board gr nos. 230642, 24954 september 10. 2019

FACTS:

Among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016
(LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal
education by requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and
pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT.
The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications
and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. It was
designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.
Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were granted
professional civil service eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their
college graduation. Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law
school was allowed admission without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT.
Petitioners filed their Petition for Prohibition principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be
declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with
all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making
power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of law. They prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the
PhiLSAT.
In G.R. No. 230642
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive
to the Court's power to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot create an
administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They also
argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to
education.
Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violates the right to
liberty and pursuit of happiness of the student-applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT
violates the equal protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification not based
on substantial distinctions. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all
citizens to quality and accessible education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair
academic requirement. It is also their position that the PhiLSAT violates due process as
it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course of study. They
also argue that R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers
Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662 infringes upon the power of the Court to
regulate admission to the practice of law. They profess that they are not against the
conduct of law school admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the
PhiLSAT as the power to do so allegedly belongs to the Court. It is also their contention
that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes with the law school's
exercise of freedom to choose who to admit. According to them, the LEB cannot issue
penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of school fees and the ban on
enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.

ISSUE:
Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec.
7(e) of RA 7662 is constitutional.

HELD:
The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board
over legal education is UPHELD.
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does
not encroach upon the Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an exercise of its
inherent police power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being
imbued with public interest.
Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude
test to guide law schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education along
with such other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum
standard

Cayetano v Monsod 201 scra 210

G.R no. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts:
President Corazon C. Aquino in a letter sent to the secretariat of the
Commission of Appointments nominates Christian Monsod to the position
of Chairman of the Comelec. Monsod’s nomination was confirmed by the
Commission of Appointments. Cayetano opposed the nomination and
challenged the Commission’s confirmation and argued that Monsod doesn’t
qualify of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue:
Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position
of the Chairman of COMELEC.

Ruling:
Yes, Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position. The case
of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions.

Atty. Carmen Leonor Alcantara, Vicente Mercado, Severino Mercado and Spouses
Jesus and Rosario Mercado
vs. Atty. Eduardo De Vera
A.C. No. 5859 November 23, 2010

Facts: Rosario Mercado won in a civil case with Atty. Eduardo De Vera as her legal counsel.
Upon execution of the decision and collection of bank deposits for Mercado, Atty. De Vera
refused to turn over the proceeds, saying that the money was used to pay court fees and the
remaining are his attorney's fees. Mercado filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera for
infidelity in custody and handling client’s funds. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines sanctioned
Atty. De Vera with a suspension of practice for one (1) year. Following this, Atty. De Vera filed
baseless lawsuits against most of the members of the Mercado Family under different
jurisdictions. He also filed cases against IBP governors who recommended his suspension.
Mercado contends that Atty. De Vera is exploiting their personal family problems just to pursue
unwarranted cases. She also alleged that Atty. De Vera is guilty of forum shopping and
harassment for the filing of baseless charges. Atty. De Vera contends that he is only exhausting
all the available legal remedies, and that the charges filed against members of the Mercado
family were done in good faith.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. De Vera violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
instituting baseless and unwarranted suits that are only aimed to harass Mercado and her
family.

Held: Atty. De Vera was found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility for raising unfounded lawsuits against the Mercado family and several IBP board
members who recommended his suspension. Such an act is deemed retaliatory and is
unbecoming of a member of the bar who should uphold the integrity, honesty and dignity of the
legal profession. Atty. De Vera was disbarred permanently from practice.

Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava G.R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959

FACTS:Respondent Director Celedonio Agrava of the Philippines Patent Office (PPO) issued a
circular announcing that he had scheduled for an examination for the purpose of determining
who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the PPO. The said examination to cover
patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the
circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would
appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similarexaminations.It is the
contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyers Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippinesand who is
in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office,and that
consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of the PhilippineBar in good
standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to
their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction andis in
violation of the law.Respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases “does
not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed
examinations as given by the PatentOffice.

ISSUE:Whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

RULING:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing
may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial
or administrative, in the Philippines.The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and social proceedings. The Court held that the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules andRegulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves
the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.

In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar and Oath Taking of Successful Bar Applicant Al
C. Argosino B.M No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the 1993 bar exams. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide. In September 1991, petitioner was involved in a criminal case involving
the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites. Petitioner and 7 other accused all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The trial court rendered judgment
in February 1993 finding them guilty as charged. On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted the
petitioner's application for probation. On 11 June 1994, the trial court issued an order approving
a report submitted by the Probation Office recommending the petitioner's discharge from
probation. On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is eligible to take the lawyer’s oath as a person of good
moral character.

Ruling
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. The Court must "weed out" lawyers who have become a
disgrace to the noble profession of the law and prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's
oath to prevent tarnishing the legal profession’s reputation The senseless beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were irresponsible, irrelevant, and uncalled for, however,
the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether the petitioner has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
On 13 July 1995, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to submit to the
Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
B.M. No. 1678 - PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.
DACANAY

FACTS:
1. The petitioner, Benjamin Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960 and
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments thus he subsequently applied for a Canadian citizenship to avail Canada’s free medical
aid program which was approved in May 2004.
2. In 2006, the petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 and took his
oath of allegiance as Filipino citizen before the Philippine consulate in Toronto, Canada.
3. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and intends to resume his practice of law thus, the
petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine Bar when he gave
up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
2. Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay can still practice law after reacquiring Philippine
citizenship in 2006.

.RULING:
1. Yes. Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that “Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.” The
Rules of Court also stated in Section 2 that every applicant for admission as a member of the
Philippine bar must be a citizen of the Philippines.” Related to the Rules of Court, it is clear that
Dacanay had lost his membership in the Philippine bar.

2. Yes. Under RA9225, if a person intends to practice law in the Philippines, and he reacquires
his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions, he can resume his law practice provided that
he will (1) update and pay in full the annual membership dues in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) pay his professional tax, (3) complete at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education to refresh and update the petitioner’s knowledge in Philippine laws;
and (4) retake the lawyer’s oath. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good
standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

IN RE: VICENTE CHING BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since
his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at
the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that
he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His
parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent.
Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified
public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a
municipality in La Union. The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a
legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was
preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the
OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it
would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due
to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of
the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of
Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied
with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority.
The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The Supreme Court
noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be
extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that
he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was)
serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because
he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained
delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. The Court Resolves to DENY
Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

Caronan v. Caronan AC No. 11316 July 12, 2016

The complainant, Patrick Caronan, filed a complaint-affidavit against his sibling,

RichardCaronan for purportedly assuming his identity and falsely representing that he has the
required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice
of law.The Caronans both obtained their secondary education at Makati High School where
PatrickCaronan graduated in 1993 and Richard Caronan in 1991. The complainant obtained a
degree in Business Administration in 1997 from the University of Makati. After graduation, he
started working for the Philippine Seven Corporation, where he rose from the ranks.Meanwhile,
the respondent stayed for 1 year at PLM before transferring to PMA, where he was discharged
in 1993 to help his father in the family’s car rental business. In 1997, he moved toNueva Vizcaya
with his wife.In 1999, the respondent informed his family that he had enrolled in law school in
Nueva Vizcaya.In 2004, the respondent passed the Bar Examinations and the complainant was
informed that the respondent used his name and college records from the University of Makati
to enroll at St.Mary’s University College of Law. At first, the complainant brushed this off since
he did not see any consequences during the time.The petitioner has been receiving notices and
has realized that his name is being used to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities. In
May 2009, he was called to report to the head office of the PSC, where he was informed that the
NBI was requesting his presence in relation to an investigation that his brother is involved in. He
found out later that the respondent has been involved in a case for qualified theft and estafa
filed by Agtarap, who was one of the principal sponsors at the respondent’s wedding
In 2019, the PSC received a letter from a certain law office requesting the complainant’s contact
details. He was also hearing other instances where the respondent had been using his name to
commit unlawful acts.Due to these incidents, the complainants feared for their safety and
security. He became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which forced him to
resign from his job. He filed for the complaint-affidavit to stop the respondent’s alleged use of
the complainant’s name and identity, and illegal practice of law.Defense of Richard CaronanThe
issue of his identity has been resolved, and the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the
administrative case filed by Agtarap against him, declaring it closed and terminated.IBP’s Report
and RecommendationThe respondent is guilty of illegally and falsely assuming the
complainant’s name, identity and academic records. The Investigating Commissioner
recommended the name “Patrick Caronan”be dropped and stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys. He also recommended the banning of“Richard Caronan” be barred from being
admitted as a member of the Bar. A resolution was signed on June 30, 2015 adopting the
recommendations.

IssueWhether the IBP erred in ordering 1) the name Patrick Caronan be stricken off the Roll
ofAttorneys and b) name of Richard Caronan be barred from being admitted to the Bar

Ruling/HeldThe court found the respondent GUILTY of assuming the identity of the complainant.
The namePatrick Caronan with Roll of Attorneys number 46069 is likewise dropped and stricken
off theRoll of Attorneys. He is likewise prohibited from engaging in the practice of law and is
barred from being admitted as member of the Philippine Bar.The court affirmed the
recommendation of the IBP to strike off the name of Patrick Caronanfrom the Roll of Attorneys
due to falsely using the complainant’s name, identity, and school records to gain admission to
the Bar.On the other hand, Section 6 of Rule 138 of the RoC provides that admission to Bar
requires a satisfactory completed pre-law course. A pre-law course includes 1) the completion of
a four-year high school course and 2) course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor’s degree
in arts or sciences. The respondent was not able to complete his requisite pre-law degree; he
was only able to finish the four-year high school course. The court also notes the dishonesty
and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the bar by falsely assuming the identity of his
brother, which makes him unfit in the legal profession. The Court affirmed that the practice of
law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone, rather it is a
privilege limited to citizens with good moral character.This is imperative in the nature of the
office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between
him and the court.Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

In Re. Torres A.C No 7054 november 11, 2014

CONRADO QUE v. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, AC. No. 7054, 2009-12-04
Facts:
In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla,
Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline... or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development
Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the
homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro
Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of
these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the
complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondent's present clients were the...
defendants.
Court
Issues:
whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional
misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.
Ruling:
he Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer's Oath; Canon
8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27... of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent
should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,vs.THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Facts:Petitioner Mauricio Ulep prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of
said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

It is the submission of petitioner, a member of the legal profession himself, that the
advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, and demeaning of the law
Profession. In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act
of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona.
Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements herein complained of.

Ruling:
The services offered by Respondent constitute practice of law
In Cayetano vs. Monsod, the Supreme Court defines practice of law as the rendition of services
requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
For the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
Respondent corporations give out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so-called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies
of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided
for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition
of "practice of law.