‘Lalkaar-Pratibaddh’ Group’s Understanding of Fascism

A Menagerie of Dogmatic Blunders

(Part – IV)
 Abhinav Sinha

13. Sukhwinder’s Account of Rise of Fascism in Germany: An Assault on

History and Theory
Sukhwinder has outdone himself in presenting a brief historical account of the rise of fascism in
Germany, as compared to what he had done with the historical account of the rise of fascism in
Italy. He gives no respite to the readers from his “bare-naked” attacks of ignorance and political
illiteracy. His brief account of fascist rise in Germany is theoretically preposterous and
historically analphabetic. We cannot present here a point-by-point criticism of his account
because that would require me to write at least a 100 printed pages. The beauty of idiocy is that
it is generally very brief like a dumb grin, but warrants an aeonian response, which, in turn,
demands considerable patience and fortitude, and we want to save it for more important
theoretical points in the criticism. Consequently, we will focus only on those points which are
theoretically important. Let us begin this Sisyphean endeavour.
A. The Cases of the German Fascist Rise and the Italian Fascist Rise: Sukhwinder’s
Blindness to Specificities and Particularities
Let us see the very first paragraph where Sukhwinder starts his historical account of German
fascism:
“The economic condition of Germany, emergence of fascism, contemplation
regarding resisting fascism etc., was quite similar to that of Italy. Capitalist
development was not only delayed but also backward in Italy. Capitalist
development in Germany too started late but then progressed at a quick pace.
Germany’s capitalist development was uneven but not backward like that of
Italy. Germany, rapidly emerged as a modern capitalist and imperialist country
on the world’s map.” (Sukhwinder, op.cit., p. 34, emphasis ours)
The very first sentence is incorrect from the historical perspective. It appears that Sukhwinder
did not read any notable Marxist work on the history of rise of Nazism. The economic condition,
the emergence of fascism, and the contemplation regarding resisting fascism, were qualitatively
different from each other in the cases of Italy and Germany. Except two things: first, two
commonalities in the trajectory of development of capitalism in both countries, that we have
mentioned above, namely, the places that these countries occupied in the imperialist chain, and,
the nature and pace of capitalist development in both countries; and second, the type of political
crises faced by Germany and by Italy, that is, a crisis of the ‘power bloc’, namely, the inability of
any fraction of the bourgeoisie in establishing its political hegemony over other fractions, in
order to collectivize the long-term general political interests of the bourgeoisie as a political
class. Except these two generalities of fascism in general, the actual historical experience of
fascism was very different in Germany from Italy. Let us see what some of the specialists of the
subject say on this issue.
After discussing the case of Germany in his book Fascism and Dictatorship, Poulantzas moves on
to discuss the case of Italy. This discussion is in the context of the peculiarities of the economic
history of Germany and Italy and their place in the imperialist chain at the beginning of the
Twentieth century. Poulantzas points out:
“Let us now turn to the case of Italy, which is quite different from that of Germany,
though a similarity can be established if, and only if, we consider its position in the
imperialist chain.” (Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 29, emphasis ours)
While discussing the nature of ‘unevenness’ in economic development, Poulantzas argues that
the nature of ‘unevenness’ in Germany was the unevenness of capitalist development, whereas,
in Italy, the nature of unevenness was that of a ‘breach’ between capitalist North and feudal and
semi-feudal South. Poulantzas points out:
“The same unevenness was present in Germany, but in Italy it had the nature of a
real breach, and took a yet more concrete shape in the emergence of the problem
of the South. The near total absence of agrarian reform… and the persistence of
the great landowners’ feudal exploitation of the South, not only retarded
primitive capital accumulation, but above all deepened the breach in the uneven
internal development, and aggravated its secondary effects on the internal
market and on industry.” (ibid, p. 31, emphasis ours)
Even the process of bourgeois democratic revolution and capitalist development in both the
countries was qualitatively different:
“The process of the bourgeois democratic revolution emerged in Italy in the
midst of the vast counter-revolutionary movement which followed the
upheavals of 1848 in Europe. At the time of this development, the Italian
bourgeoisie was very weak: it suffered firstly from economic weakness, its
position being far inferior to the economic position of the German bourgeoisie.
Cavour’s historical role in this was to begin the process of national unification by
means of an alliance of the nascent Northern bourgeoisie and the largely feudal
big landowners of the South. Bismarck’s role was above all to bring the German
bourgeoisie into political power from above; Cavour’s was rather to create the
conditions for the economic power of the Italian bourgeoisie, to ‘manufacture
manufacturers’, as Gramsci said.” (ibid, p. 32)
Further:
“By contrast with Germany, this process could only be accomplished if the
bourgeoisie had decisive political weight over the Southern landowners within the
alliance…” (ibid, p. 32, emphasis ours)
Finally, the political implications of this economic difference for the class struggle, too, were
very different in the two countries:
“A passive revolution: the very words indicate the similarity to Bismarck’s
revolution from above, pointed out by Gramsci himself. Yet it was very different.
The Italian bourgeoisie capitalized on the broad popular movement, reaching
political power in spite of its weaknesses, but guaranteeing the landowners a
thorough suppression of the movement by the State apparatus. These features of
the Italian process explain both the existence of movements of the Jacobin type
(e.g. Mazzini’s Action Party and the Garibaldi movement) and their inability to
take a real hold over the Italian bourgeoisie.” (ibid, p. 33)
Also, in the very process of the rise of fascism, we can trace many important differences:
“In Italy, for reasons explained above, we also find crisis and contradictions
within the power bloc. On the one hand, these contradictions are deeper than in
the German case; on the other, following from this, fascism as a means of achieving
the hegemony of big capital meets with stronger resistance from the other
 members of the power bloc. So although the rise of fascism was quicker than in
Germany, beginning between late 1920 and early 1921, reaching the point of no
return during 1921 and taking power in 1922, the process of stabilizing fascism in
power was much slower. It was only in 1925, three years after its installation in
power, that Italian fascism was stabilized, with the ultra-fascist laws, and entered
its second phase in power.
“Firstly, the contradiction between big capital and the large landowners was
much deeper than in Germany; it involved the problem of the Mezzogiorno,
which partly consisted in the contradiction between the Northern bourgeoisie
and the Southern landowners. The backwardness of agriculture in relation to
industry was much more serious, in that the existence of a semi-feudal form of
agricultural production made the concentration of capital precocious and
artificial” (ibid. p. 114, emphasis ours)
Further:
“In the Italian case, unlike the German, the traditional alliance between Northern
bourgeoisie and Southern landowners was seriously jeopardized by the process of
capital concentration and by the creation of big capital. Although it held together
politically, the explosive seeds it carried at the economic level were brought into
the light of day.” (ibid. p. 115, emphasis ours)
Moreover, Poulantzas points out, in Italy the establishment of the hegemony of the big
monopoly industrial capital over bank capital and then establishment of the hegemony of the
big monopoly financial capital over entire economy, happened after the rise of fascism to power,
contrary to the German case. Poulantzas finally summarizes the qualitative differences between
the two cases:
“As for fascism in power, the two following characteristics differentiated it from
German national socialism:
“(a) Through a whole series of specific economic measures, Italian fascism
intervened even more strongly than national socialism to effect the economic
domination of big capital over large landed property. In Germany, the
capitalization of agriculture had begun before the advent of national socialism,
and was then only continued and intensified; in Italy, it was fascism which
introduced this process…
“(b) Fascist economic policy also intervened massively in effecting capital
concentration and the economic domination of big over medium capital, but this
was a longer process. Taking into account the economic weakness of Italian big
capital, fascism had for a long time to give much more consideration than did
Nazism to the economic interests of medium capital (the early period of fascist
‘economic liberalism’), and secondarily, to the interests of the consumer goods
industry.” (ibid, p. 117-18, emphasis ours)
Moreover, even the cases of German fascism in power and the Italian fascism in power were
different, precisely due to the above mentioned factors. It has been pointed out by many
scholars that on the one hand the bourgeoisie in Italy was weaker than its counterpart in
Germany, while on the other hand, unlike Bismarckian ‘revolution from above’, the Italian
bourgeois-democratic revolution had certain elements of mass democratic movement. The
reason for this was the alliance that the bourgeoisie formed with the masses against the
Southern landlords, though only to crush the masses once it seized power. However, this was a
major difference having important repercussions for the political situation in which fascist rise
began and finally seized power and existed in power. Poulantzas argues:
 “The resistance to this big-capitalist offensive for hegemony was stronger in Italy
than in Germany. This determined the particular features of the rise of fascism in
Italy:
“(a) The political scene, in this case parliament, where the representatives of
medium capital reigned, gave them a State apparatus fashioned to their
requirements and continued to be more important than in Germany until the
end of the rise of fascism and even after its installation in power. The distinction
between State apparatuses expressing different political forces was less evident
than in Germany, with the exception of the Southern State within the State which
posed a different problem. Here too, of course, there was a dissociation between
real power and formal power; but the parliamentary political scene kept its own
identity. The big-capitalist offensive and the resistance to it continued to have a big
impact on this scene, and Italian fascism was obliged to follow much more of a
policy of compromise here than was Nazism.
“(b) The rupture of the representational tie between medium capital and its
representatives came about more slowly, chiefly because of the strong positions of
medium capital in the State. It was completed only after fascism came to power,
and was one of the reasons for the long first period of fascism in power, and for
its policy of caution towards these representatives.” (ibid, p. 125-26, emphasis
ours)
We can go on to present quotations from various scholars who have pointed to the difference
between the German and the Italian experience. Geoff Eley points out:
“In Italy the process was the more concentrated and dramatic, producing
interesting similarities with Tsarist Russia: for example, the massive spurt of
growth from the 1890s to World War I; the very high levels of geographical,
structural, and physical concentration of industry, which brought masses of
workers together in a small number of centers and created new conurbations
with politically volatile populations; the interventionist role of the state, linked
to a powerful complex of railway, heavy-industrial, shipbuilding, engineering,
and hydro-electrical interests, the selective involvement of foreign capital, and a
well-knit oligopoly of government, industry, and banks; an exclusivist and
oligarchic political system; and a dramatic discrepancy between north and
south, between a dynamic industrial sector that in all respects was highly
advanced and an agricultural one that was equally and terribly backward.”
(Geoff Eley. 2003. “What Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crisis
of the Capitalist State” in Dobkowski, Walliman (eds.) Radical Perspectives on the
Rise of Fascism in Germany, 1919-45, Cornerstone Publications, p. 80-81)
Therefore, Sukhwinder’s belief that Italy’s economic and industrial development was not rapid
is misplaced. The difference from Germany lies more in the unevenness of the economic
development of the country, manifesting itself as what Poulantzas has termed as a ‘breach’
between the North and the South. The industrial development in the Northern Italy was
extremely rapid and concentrated. As Renton points out, “The north, however, contained some
of the most modern areas in Europe, notably the ‘industrial triangle’ of Genoa, Milan and Turin.”
(Renton, D. 1999. op.cit., p. 30, emphasis ours)
The political situation, too, was different in Italy in general, to which we have pointed out above,
and also in the context of the left movement, in particular. Eley argues that in Italy there was no
conventional social-democracy as such and the overall socialist movement in the broadest sense
was more on the left side. PSI was not capitulationist and class collaborationist in the same
sense in which the German Social-Democratic Party was, even though the reformism of PSI
(even its Maximalist faction) was evident in its failure to resist fascism in the concrete sense and
its reliance on legalism.
 “In Italy, where the socialist movement was generally further to the left than in
Germany, and where no equivalent of the SPD functioned as a vital factor of
order, this process of right-wing concentration around the redemptive potential
of a radical-nationalist antisocialist terror was far more advanced.” (Eley, Geoff.
2003. op.cit., p. 91)
We can go on quoting such excerpts from the history of the rise of fascism in Germany and in
Italy from various authorities. However, there is no need to do that. The above quotations are
sufficient to reveal Sukhwinder’s ignorance of history. Sukhwinder believes that the difference
between the German and Italian case was only related to the entry of these countries in the
world of industrial capitalism, the pace of industrialization and the unevenness of the capitalist
development, all quantitative economistic factors. On the contrary, the difference was not simply
quantitative economistic; the difference was qualitative and pertained to the very class
dynamic, historically speaking, of the two societies. These differences are precisely the factors
that explain the difference in the process of fascist rise in the two countries.
Moving on.
B. Sukhwinder’s Complete Cluelessness Regarding the History of the Left Movement in
Germany
Here we do not want to focus on the historical inaccuracies of Sukhwinder’s account. Therefore,
we will present only a few examples. Sukhwinder writes:
“It became clear by 1918 that Germany’s defeat was certain in the war.
Revolutionary conditions were ripening in the country. On 3 November 1918,
the navy revolted in Kiel city. Workers of the cities announced a general strike in
solidarity with the soldiers. Workers and soldiers’ soviet was organised which
wielded the administration of the city. On 9th November, a general strike began
in the capital, Berlin. Strike turned into revolt and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II
fled the country. Thus, the November bourgeois democratic revolution began in
Germany.
“This revolution was accomplished mainly by the participation of working class.
Power came in the hands of soviets of people’s representatives which was led by
the social democratic party of Germany. There existed three trends in the party
at that time. Rightist social democrats and reformists, leftist social democrats
(Spartacus group and others) and centrists. Centrists were leftists in theory but
reformists in actions.
“Centrists separated and formed their own party which was named independent
social democratic party of Germany. In most of the soviets in Germany, rightist
social democrats dominated. This restricted the scope of November revolution.”
(Sukhwinder, op.cit., p. 34-35)
Sukhwinder thinks that the Independent Social Democratic Party was formed after the
November Revolution. That is untrue. The USPD was formed in 1917 itself. He argues that after
the November Revolution, three factions existed in the party, which included the centrist faction
which later founded USPD. However, had Sukhwinder read any authoritative book on the
history of the German Revolution, he would not have made such an ignorant claim.
Moreover, the USPD was not “left” even in theory. Lenin’s words are important here where he
defends an alliance between the communists and the independent socialists (USPD) and
critiques the German “left” deviationists for attacking the KPD for forming an alliance with the
USPD:
“It is therefore understandable why attacks of the German Lefts on the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Germany for entertaining the idea of a
 bloc with the “Independents” (the “Independent Social-Democratic Party of
Germany,” the Kautskyites) appear to us to be utterly frivolous and a clear proof
that the “Lefts” are in the wrong. We in Russia also had Right Mensheviks (who
participated in the Kerensky government), corresponding to the German
Scheidemanns, and Left Mensheviks (Martov), corresponding to the German
Kautskyites, who were in opposition to the Right Mensheviks.” (Lenin, V. I. 2021.
“Left-wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Foreign Languages Press, Paris, p.
67)
Lenin was in favour of formation of alliance with the “left”-wing of the USPD and criticized the
“left” German communists for adopting a sectarian line on this question. However, this was not
Lenin’s defence of the German Kautskyites (the “left”-wing of the USPD) in terms of theory.
Lenin points out:
“The real nature of the present leaders of the Independent Social-Democratic
Party of Germany…was revealed once again during the German Kornilov affair,
i.e., the Kapp-Luttwitz putsch. A small but striking illustration is afforded by two
brief articles—one by Karl Kautsky entitled “Decisive Hours” (“Entscheidende
Stunden”) in Freiheit (Freedom, the organ of the Independents) of March 30,
1920, and the other by Arthur Crispien entitled “On the Political Situation” (in
this same newspaper, issue of April 14, 1920). These gentlemen are absolutely
incapable of thinking and reasoning like revolutionaries. They are sniveling
philistine democrats, who become a thousand times more dangerous to the
proletariat when they claim to be supporters of Soviet government and of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, because actually whenever a difficult and
dangerous situation arises they are sure to commit treachery …while “sincerely”
believing that they are helping the proletariat!” (ibid, p. 109)
The fact is that the USPD was not only centrist (read the “left” wing of the right!) in practice but
also in theory. There was a “left”-wing within the USPD to which Lenin prescribed
rapprochement in the hope that they can be won over to communist position, along with the
scores of their proletarian supporters, which was more important for Lenin. However, these
hopes were dashed in part due to the “left” mistakes of the KPD itself and in part due to the
intrinsic nature of the USPD-left itself, theoretically speaking. However, Sukhwinder takes
anything from history or theory and then vulgarizes it in the crudest fashion. As we have
pointed out, he has a knack for not understanding nuances and subtleties, either in theory, or in
history.
It is precisely due to this reason that Sukhwinder makes contradictory claims. For instance, he
writes:
“The most reactionary elements of bourgeoisie wanted to completely abolish the
nominal democratic rights obtained by the people which were reflected in the
constitution. Hitler’s Nazi party came into existence in 1919. It came to power with
the backing of monopoly capital. In December 1923, new bourgeois government
was formed in Germany. This attempted to bring economic and political stability
to the country. During this time of political stability, the German working class
won some rights. Workers fought against reaction and militarism for 8 hour
working day and better working conditions. But reactionary forces succeeded in
enacting a 10 hour working day in 1927.” (Sukhwinder, op.cit., p. 36, emphasis
ours)
Just a few lines before, Sukhwinder writes:
“The new government (after the November Revolution – author) undertook many
reformist steps, controlled the production and administration of many
 departments. Martial law was removed. Freedom of speech, gathering and
organisation, women rights, 8 hour working day etc., were recognised.” (ibid, p.
35)
So, the bourgeois government formed under the leadership of the Social-Democrats introduced
“8 hour workday, etc.” after the November Revolution. However, after the formation of the new
bourgeois government in December 1923, workers again “fought…for 8 hour working day”. Did
the bourgeois government take away the right of 8-hour working day during the period
between 1919 and 1923? No. Then what happened in 1923? How come the working class was
fighting for something that it already had? May be Sukhwinder took it away! Let us see what
happened.
After the November Revolution, the working class indeed had gained the right of 8-hour
working day and the provisional government under Scheidemann and Ebert were willing to
grant this because of, first, the Social-Democratic idea of labour-capital compromise for peaceful
capitalism and, second, in the face of the militant working-class movement, which was not
decisively defeated (politically speaking) till the end of 1920, they had no other choice.
However, the period from 1919 to 1923 was the period of the economic instability of the
German capitalism due to the crisis created as the aftermath of war.
However, since the 1923, recovery began due to relative economic stabilization, which also got
boost from the Dawes Plan in 1924. At the same time, in 1924, the Comintern, too, recognized a
process of economic stabilization, which was equated with working-class defensive. In this
entire context, the German bourgeoisie began its economic offensive with the help of the social-
democrats and this offensive included the demand of the capitalist class to do away with the 8-
hour working day. With the Social-Democratic Party and its trade unions agreeing and with the
complete defeat of the political offensive of the working class by 1920 and its economic
offensive and scattered skirmishes by 1923, the German bourgeoisie was able to snatch away
this right. Kurt Gossweiler writes:
“The short phase of "normal" development between 1924 and 1929 is no
argument against the assertion regarding the absence of a foundation for a
stable development of the Weimar Republic. For, whereas Social Democratic
party and trade-union leaders hurriedly considered this phase a new beginning
for a crisis-free economy that would subsequently grow into socialism along
peaceful lines via "organized capitalism," in reality, as far as the big-capital
opponents of the Weimar democracy were concerned, this period merely
represented an armistice phase. Moreover, this phase had been accepted only
after the SPD and the trade unions had actually renounced the eight-hour day, one
of the principle revolutionary gains of the period…” (Gossweiker, Kurt. 2003.
“Economy and Politics in the Destruction of the Weimer Republic”, in
Dobkowski, Walliman (eds.) Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in
Germany, 1919-1945, Cornerstone Publications, p. 155, emphasis ours)
David Abraham points out:
“This bloc made use of inflation, French occupation of the Ruhr, and aborted
communist uprisings to revoke the eight-hour day, lower real wages, and wipe
out its debt.” (David Abraham. 2003. “State and Classes in Weimer Germany”, in
Dobkowski, Walliman (eds.) op.cit., p. 39)
Here Abraham is talking about the bloc of the ruling class consisting of heavy industry, estate
owners, export industry, which he calls the ‘Anti-socialist Right Bourgeois Bloc’ that existed
from 1922 to 1924 (see p. 40, Table 2). The third bloc continued this policy, which comprised of
export industry, heavy industry in the main and tailended by rural labour, salaried employees
and the proletariat. Abraham calls this bloc the ‘Class Compromise Bloc, 1925 to 1930’. As the
name suggests, the bloc became possible only due to the capitulation of the SPD to the
reactionary bourgeoisie for hopes of ‘peaceful development’ of the “organized capitalism” into
socialism and in hopes of sidelining the KPD.
Poulantzas, too, points out:
“After the 1923 state of emergency – a simple warning shot – and the
memorandum by the big industrial magnates calling for the prolongation of the
working day, the abrogation of many social benefits, the suppression of bread
subsidies, the denationalization of the railways, etc., governments increasingly
satisfied their demands. The eight-hour working day was gradually stretched to at
least nine hours, often ten and sometimes twelve: a situation officially ratified by
the social democratic trade unions in 1927.” (Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 107)
Sukhwinder’s mind has been addled by numerous, discrete, disparate and not-so-discriminate
flap readings, quote-scavenging through index and plagiarizing from variety of sources. And he
makes the historical account of rise of fascism in Germany resemble a non-linear narrative of a
Christopher Nolan-type movie, though sans intelligence!
Also, readers can notice how Sukhwinder absolved the social-democrats of all responsibility and
wants us to believe that extension of the working-day to ten hours was purely due to the
reactionary forces! He totally omits one important little detail: the German bourgeoisie and its
economic organizations succeeded in snatching away the right of the eight-hour working-day
precisely because of the betrayal of the social-democrats. In fact, the social-democrats were the
main reason why the Weimer Republic saw years of so-called stability between 1924 and 1929
due to the labour-capital compromise with the upper hand of capital. From Sukhwinder’s
account, the complicity of the social-democrats in creating the situations that led to the rise of
fascism are mostly absent and appear only at some places and merely as an insignificant
appendix. We will see how even in the case of analyzing the failure of KPD-SPD alliance with the
coming of the peak of fascist offensive, Sukhwinder puts the main responsibility on KPD,
whereas, the truth was that notwithstanding the “left”-right mistakes of the KPD, the main
responsibility lies at the door of the social-democracy.
Further.
C. Sukhwinder’s Gradualist and Economistic Conception of Economic and Political
Crisis, and, Once Again, Total Ignorance of History
Sukhwinder continues to blabber his gibberish:
“The great depression started in 1929. It particularly affected the German
economy adversely. Industrial production in 1932 as compared with 1929 fell
40%. The number of unemployed, semi-unemployed reached 80 lakh. Many
banks went bankrupt. Peasants, artisans and traders started going bankrupt.
“Political forces were sharply polarised in this period. The workers were fed up
with the ruling class’ parties (social democratic and other bourgeois parties).
They were also displeased with the communist party. A considerable portion of
the masses, especially petty bourgeois went into the fascism’s influence. In
parliamentary (Reichstag) elections of September 1930, candidates of Nazi party
received 65 lakh votes. In 1928, it had received only 8.1 lakh votes. In the
parliamentary elections of December 1932, Nazi party received 1 crore 17 lakh
votes. Immediately after the elections, the reactionary ruling classes of Germany
moved towards the setting up of fascist dictatorship. President Hermann
Hindenburg declared Hitler as the head of state on 30 January 1933. This meant
the setting up of naked dictatorship of the most reactionary elements of monopoly
capital in Germany. After this, the already transpiring fascist terror intensified
 further. The arrests, murders of communists, trade union leaders hastened. At
the time, the communist party of Germany was the second largest communist
party of Germany. Fascist state eliminated this party in a week. The first task that
Hitler’s fascist state did was to cripple the organised workers’ movement of
Germany and unshackle the German capital of the danger of worker’s revolution
which was continuously circling over it. (Sukhwinder, op.cit., p. 36-37, emphasis
ours)
Wonderful! This particular excerpt reveals the bourgeois democratic, liberal and reformist
illusions of Sukhwinder, to say the least.
First of all, political forces were not simply polarized after the outbreak of the Great Depression.
In fact, serious political crisis (the fragmentation of the political forces of the bourgeoisie and
the breaking of the representational ties of the bourgeois parties with the bourgeoisie and the
widening of the cleavage between the real and formal power) continued to brew since 1927-28
itself. Here, too, Sukhwinder reveals his incorrigible economism. He yet again assumes that it is
economic crisis which incrementally develops into political crisis. Let us understand how this
idea is not only theoretically incorrect, but also betrays ignorance of history.
David Abraham points out:
“The bourgeois governments of 1924-28, under several DVP and Catholic
chancellors, were able to compromise and maneuver as much as they did ·only
at the expense of the parties that constituted the various coalitions. Cabinets and
bureaucracies worked out a host of compromises, but party life showed signs of
becoming moribund as the transmission of interest-group pressures became an
increasingly central activity. Already, formal and real power began to issue from
different sources. Collaboration did not create consensus, and the centrality of
the middle parties masked the decline and splitting of their constituencies. The
political crisis became increasingly acute after 1928, before the economic crisis
had really set in. No member or fraction of the dominant bloc was capable of
imposing its direction on the other members of the bloc, either through
parliament or other organs of the state.” (Abraham, D. 2003. op.cit., p. 54,
emphasis ours)
Abraham points out further:
“The bloc, in brief, could not surmount its own internal contradictions… As the
political crisis deepened and the locus of decision-making narrowed from
parliament to cabinet to presidential circles, the expression of dominant bloc
interests actually became more fragmented. Despite the government's increased
emergency powers, it was faced with increased bourgeois disunity.” (ibid, p. 54)
Similarly, Gossweiler points out:
“Attentive observers, however, have been quick to note a keynote feature,
namely that the offensive against the Weimar Republic began toward the end of
1927 and early 1928, that is to say, the temporary armistice initiated by capital
came to an end considerably before the outbreak of the world economic crisis.
Singularly significant evidence in this context was the forming early in 1928 of
the Association for the Renewal of the Reich, which, in rejecting the Weimar
Republic, echoed the clarion call for establishing a Third Reich. Further
symptoms along similar lines were the right-wing seizure of leadership posts
both in the German National People's party (DNVP) and the Center party,
namely, Alfred Hugenberg and the Prelate Kaas; the lockout of some 250,000
metalworkers by the Ruhr trusts in November 1928, and the memorandum of
 the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie entitled 'Äscent or Demise" in
December 1929.
“All these facts run counter to the viewpoint that the outbreak of the world
economic crisis sparked the employers' onslaught against the Weimar Republic.”
(Gossweilier, K. op.cit., p. 156, emphasis ours)
Poulantzas describes the same process in detail demonstrating how the political crisis, that is,
the crisis of hegemony within the ‘power bloc’ of the ruling class ensued from 1924 itself and
becoming particularly acute since 1927-28. Readers can refer to Poulantzas (Poulantzas. 1979.
op.cit., p. 100-101).
Thus, contrary to Sukhwinder’s belief, the political forces were not simply polarized after the
onset of the crisis in 1929. The political crisis of the bourgeoisie was present even before that
and the bourgeoisie was able to prevent the arrival of the tipping-point only due to the
collaboration of the social-democrats, who are so close to the heart of Sukhwinder. Gossweiler
argues:
“The short phase of "normal" development between 1924 and 1929 is no
argument against the assertion regarding the absence of a foundation for a
stable development of the Weimar Republic. For, whereas Social Democratic
party and trade-union leaders hurriedly considered this phase a new beginning
for a crisis-free economy that would subsequently grow into socialism along
peaceful lines via "organized capitalism," in reality, as far as the big-capital
opponents of the Weimar democracy were concerned, this period merely
represented an armistice phase. Moreover, this phase had been accepted only
after the SPD and the trade unions had actually renounced the eight-hour day,
one of the principle revolutionary gains of the period, and only after the French
waiver in respect to the priority rating of German reparation payments led to a
situation in which other liabilities of American finance capital displayed an
ostensible inclination to bolster up the capital-formation process in Germany by
providing loans. The contradictions between capital and labor was therefore,
during the normality phase, minutely less pronounced because of the partial
abandonment of the revolutionary gains and particularly because of the external
temporary capital inflow. That is why the stabilization of capitalism in Germany
could be only very relative and had to be more fragile than was the case in the
other developed capitalist industrial countries.” (Gossweiler, K. 2003. op.cit., p.
155, emphasis ours)
Abraham points out:
“Bourgeois-working-class collaboration during the period of recovery stabilized
the dominance of the former by at once rewarding and depoliticizing the latter.
Playing by the rules of the game tended to make the SPD a normal, interest-
aggregating Volkspartei…Strikes were invariably about wages and other
distribution questions; gone were vague political demands and political strikes.”
(Abraham, D. 2003. op.cit., p. 51)
Abraham argues further, pointing to the deepening political crisis of the bourgeoisie even before
the onset of the Great Depression and how the latter took this political crisis to the nodal point:
“Consequently, the parliamentary and party format for bourgeois-working-class
collaboration remained inadequate while it simultaneously aggravated existing
cleavages within the bourgeois parties. This was neither the first nor the last
occasion when bourgeois political stability was dependent on SPD and union
support. The latter, in turn, was conditioned primarily by the bourgeoisie's ability
to pay the bill.” (ibid, p. 53)
Further.
D. The Evolution of the Political Crisis in Germany, the Changing Response of the
Bourgeoisie and Its Attitude Towards Hitler and the Nazi Party: Sukhwinder’s
Infantile Illusions
We will not focus too much on asinine statements of Sukhwinder like “They (workers) were also
displeased with the communist party” as it completely misses the fact that it was not the
question of being “pleased” or “displeased”. The question was that the KPD could not rally the
mass of the working class politically to resist fascism through implementation of massline,
repudiation of economism and failure to conceptualize and apply the line of ‘united front from
the below’. Purely in terms of votes that the KPD got since 1924 show a trajectory of increase
(mostly due to workers’ votes shifting from the SPD). KPD’s vote percentage was 9.2 in 1924,
10.7 in 1928, 13.1 in 1930, 14.3 in 1932 (I) and 17 percent in 1932 (II). It fell only in the last
election to 12.2 in 1933 which happened with Hitler in power.
The error was that the KPD failed due to its own “left” deviation, right deviation (yes! At the
same time, simultaneously), economism and lack of massline, to mobilize and organize the
masses politically in resistance to fascism. However, Sukhwinder fails to understand all things
that are nuanced. He has a knack for catching only the crude things and that, too, in the crudest
manner. Politically, the working class was getting farther and separated from the KPD, precisely
because of the incorrect line of the KPD, even though a considerable number of workers were
still voting for the KPD. Thus, the electoral mass support for KPD increased, precisely due to the
more militant economism of the KPD, in comparison to the blunting edge of the economism of
SPD because of the most shameful forms of class collaborationism and capitulation to the
bourgeoisie, especially in the years immediately preceding the fascist rise to power. Poulantzas
has captured this point succinctly:
“In 1930, although it was a year of open crisis, the only notable big strikes,
initiated by the RGO (the communist ‘revolutionary trade-union opposition’) in
the Mansfeld region, and in the metallurgical industries of the Rhine and Berlin,
were solely against wage cuts (though 130,000 workers were on strike for two
weeks). It was as if the RGO itself, at the instigation of the KPD, was trying to by-
pass the passivity of the social-democratic trade-union leaderships simply by
bidding higher on the wages front alone.” (Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 173,
emphasis ours)
It was precisely this economistic line that led to increase of the political influence of social-
democracy in the ranks of the KPD. (see Poulantzas for a description of the entire process:
Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 173-175). Evidently, Sukhwinder fails, once again, to see the
difference between the political and the economic. There is no need to dwell any further on such
asininity.
Sukhwinder claims that “immediately after” the elections of December 1932, the reactionary ruling
class moved to install a fascist dictatorship. This claim has nothing to do with actual historical
facts.
In fact, the larger part of the reactionary ruling class was still reluctant to propel Hitler to power
and wanted to try another option. It was only when this other option did not work for the
resolution of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie that the majority of the reactionary ruling
class rallied behind Hitler. Let us understand this process in a little detail, because Sukhwinder
has not understood this process at all, precisely because of his inability to understand the very
concept of political crisis.
The fact is that from 1930 itself the political crisis of the bourgeoisie was hitting the fan. From
1930 to 1932, the bourgeoisie tried to resolve this crisis through various authoritarian
governments. The first combination that the bourgeoisie tried was that of the Brüning
government. Brüning belonged to the Catholic Zentrum party. His government tried to manage
the labour-capital compromise in order to maintain the mass base for the regime. Abraham
writes:
“Heinrich Brüning, a leader of the Catholic Zentrum party, became chancellor
following the collapse of the Grand Coalition in March 1930. He ruled without a
parliamentary majority through the semiconstitutional mechanism of
presidential decree. The Brüning regime functioned as a surrogate for the
bourgeois parties, which had, by this time, lost nearly their entire electoral
backing. They had become simple transmission belts for economic interests;
under pressure from their industrial backers they had become creatures of
"industrial egotism lacking any social concern."…The first year of Brüning's
regime was, nevertheless, tolerated by the SPD, which could have toppled him.
He attempted to implement a program bridging the differences among the three
dominant fractions, and his economic policies were characterized by brutal
deflationary budget-balancing and belt-tightening. Brüning's modest efforts to
force the estate owners to modernize, give up their huge subventions, or face
massive peasant resettlement (land reform) led them to conspire with President
Hindenburg's camarilla, and Brüning was abandoned. In fact, however, the
heavy-industry fraction had already turned against him because he had not cut
himself off entirely from the pressure of organized labor, Catholic and socialist.
The dynamic-export fraction of industry, on the other hand, was prepared to
continue supporting him, but it was no longer setting the tone or agenda for the
dominant classes as a whole.” (Abraham, D. 2003. op.cit. p. 57)
The three dominant fractions that Abraham is talking about is heavy industry, junkerdom
(estate owners), and export industry. The problem was dual: one, establishing the political
hegemony of one of the fractions within the ‘power bloc’ and two, on the basis of the resolution
of this problem, developing a mass base of the regime. The petty-bourgeoisie had been alienated
from most of the bourgeois parties, except the NSDAP. The capital-labour compromise was
unaffordable anymore for the bourgeoisie in general, so the SPD’s effort to rally organized
labour in support of the regime were bound to fail. When Brüning government was replaced by
Franz von Papen with the support of Hindenburg in May 1932, this problem exacerbated even
more because the latter had even less capability to resolve the above dual problem. Abraham
points out:
“Papen's government was heralded as being fully authoritarian and national, but
throughout its six-month tenure it lacked any base of mass support and failed to
unify the interests of the dominant fractions. lt catered almost exclusively to the
protectionist and autarkic strivings of the rural elite and heavy industry while
failing to integrate the Nazi party as a junior member of the government. Papen
was even less able than Brüning to harmonize the interests of the three
dominant fractions, although he was certainly more energetic and effective in his
repression of the SPD and unions. Because he incurred the wrath of the dynamic-
export fraction and failed to split and enlist part of the Nazi party, Papen was
replaced in early December 1932 by General von Schleicher.” (ibid, p. 57-58)
Papen government mainly represented the estate owners and secondarily the heavy industry,
which were closer to one another in their political reaction, whereas the latter was closer to
export industry in its shared economic interests contra the agricultural bourgeoisie. We know
the issues of dispute between the two fractions: industrial and agricultural. The latter
bourgeoisie wants higher prices for principal wage-good, namely, food, whereas the entire
industry wants to keep the principal wage-good and all wage-goods as cheap as possible.
However, within industrial bourgeoisie, the interests of the heavy industry, mainly based in
Ruhr, and the export industry were different too in certain respects. The latter was more
inclined to continue the capital-labour collaboration, whereas the politically reactionary heavy
industry was totally against it. Schleicher represented mainly the export industry. Abraham
writes:
“Schleicher's failings were a mirror image of his predecessor's: if Papen erred on
the side of estate owners, deflation, domestic-oriented heavy industry, autarky,
and failure to seek a mass base, then Schleicher and his left-Keynesian minister
for "Work Creation" erred grievously on the side of opposition to the rural elite,
inflation, the export industries, and too much dickering with the Nazi "left" and
the unions. His public-works program was not unlike that proposed by some
union spokespeople. Although both fractions of industry were opposed to an
inflation, the prospects of a policy shift in favor of the dynamic-export industries
came as a rude shock to those in heavy industry and agriculture who had
previously brought about a shift in their own favor. Conflicts rather than joint
interest had come to the fore among the dominant fractions. Finally, Schleicher's
efforts raised the spectre of state socialism and a possible reparliamentarization
of political life, even in military dress.” (ibid, p. 58)
It was only after the failure of what we can call the “knee-jerk” authoritarian governments of
Brüning, von Papen and Schleicher, that the bourgeoisie finally (not without apprehensions and
fear) resorted to the fascist option and Hindenburg very unwillingly appointed Hitler as the
chancellor. In fact, the first option that the reactionary bourgeoisie tried was to tame and
subordinate the Nazi party, which they saw with suspicion and apprehension. It was only after
testing all other possible options, they selected the Nazi option, as they were left with only that
option. Abraham points out:
“After the failures of the previous two years it was the political fear inspired by
Schleicher's program that was central and that led finally to the appointment of
Hitler on January 30, 1933. Papen's program, this time with a mass base and a
more imperialist tone, appeared to be the least common denominator for the
three dominant fractions.
…
“Since 1924, most industrialists and most bourgeois politicians had remained
somewhat aloof from völkisch (populist radicalism) and had come to look upon
it with disdain. After 1930, however, this new popular mass and the Nazi party it
supported became objects of their intense interest. Once they established that
both the party and its mass were (or could become) supporters of social order,
various governmental possibilities involving the Nazis became feasible. In the
eyes of those professional politicians and economic leaders for whom the NSDAP
was an exogenous force and its supporters potential revolutionaries, the
preferred strategy was to split the party and enlist its masses. It was only
reluctantly that the leading industrial circles became receptive to the idea that the
entire NSDAP had to be called upon to take charge of the state and provide that
popular base that had been lacking since 1930.” (ibid, p. 58, emphasis ours)
Kurt Gossweiler, whose general analysis is quite different from and on certain points opposed to
David Abraham’s analysis, confirms these facts. He has pointed out the same dynamic within the
dominant classes of Weimer Germany in the late-1920s and early-1930s before the rise of Hitler
to power. Gossweiler points out:
“All bourgeois parties, along with other groups and factions of the ruling class,
quickly realized that the NSDAP would have to be directly involved in
government. However, its possible role and the leadership under which this was to
 happen became a matter of contention, resurrecting old rivalries and competitive
bickering. Hereby, as time passed and situations changed ever more, new
considerations and combinations were brought into play. To simplify matters
the following four major groups and strategies can be observed:
“1. Alfred Hugenberg and his party, as well as the circles from heavy industry
and the landed aristocracy behind this party, relying on Reich President Paul von
Hindenberg, resolutely pressed for an alliance with the NSDAP, with the NSDAP
in the role of junior partner, attracting the masses--in other words, an alliance that
would assure the Hugenberg party of supremacy in the bourgeois camp and
leadership in the desired "National Dictatorship," the culmination of which should
in due course be the restoration of the monarchy.
“2. The Center party (Brüning) and those circles in heavy industry, chemicals,
the electrical industry, the export sector, and the bankers behind it, wanted to
win over the NSDAP for a government alliance. With the assistance of the NSDAP
it thereby hoped to move from the Weimar democracy to an authoritarian regime
that in the long run would similarly culminate in the restoration of the monarchy.
“3. In contrast to these strategies, Hjalmar Schacht and Fritz Thyssen--both
principal spokesmen of a group of industrialists and bankers particularly
strongly linked to U. S. finance capital--were not anxious to subordinate the
Hitler party to one of the old bourgeois parties. Instead, using Hermann Göring,
whom they backed very generously as their go-between to the NSDAP, they
pressed Adolf Hitler to stake a claim to the chancellorship as a precondition for
the NSDAP's joining the government. Moreover, they advised Hitler to make his
bid with utmost persistence and without the slightest concessions. Thereby they
hoped that a Hitler government would allow them to triumph over all
contenders and to pursue a foreign policy bent on expansion solely in the East in
alliance with the West.
“4. General Kurt von Schleicher cooperated with NSDAP organization head
Gregor Strasser, the second most powerful NSDAP figure after Hitler, until his
demise early in December 1932, in attempting to set up a military dictatorship.
He sought to anchor this in the working class by means of his "trade union axis"
project ranging from the Free Trade Unions (Theodor Leipart) to the Christian
trade unions to the NSDAP.
“Schleicher tried to implement his project under the Papen government, but
Chancellor Franz von Papen swung toward the Hugenberg line and tried to
"soften Hitler" and to cause him to relent by dissolving the Reichstag during a
period of deep crisis in the NSDAP. He thereby compelled the Nazi party to enter
a further costly electoral campaign. This maneuver proved to be a serious
mistake, ending in von Papen's forced resignation.” (Gossweiler, K. 2003. op.cit.,
p. 162-63)
Finally, Gossweiler points out that the German bourgeoisie in its struggle to overcome its
political crisis tried many options from Brüning to von Papen and finally Schleicher. However,
one faction and its strategists were steadfast in propping up Hitler: Thyssen and Schacht,
representing the faction of industrialists and bankers, supported by the US capital. Hitler
himself was wavering. However, with the support of Hermann Goring, Thyssen and Schacht
continued to prop up his confidence, whereas other lobbies were not so much keen on making
Hitler the chancellor. Finally, when all other options failed, which Thyssen and Schacht had
foreseen, the rest of the fractions, too, willingly or unwillingly, rallied to the Nazi party, which
was the only bourgeois party with a sizeable mass base and representational links. Gossweiler
points out:
 “Thus, one of two remaining possibilities for attaining the dictatorship had to be
chosen: either the risky coup d'etat backed solely by the army or the legal
formation of a government for establishing a national dictatorship on the
conditions demanded by the Nazi party, namely, Hitler's chancellorship. In this
situation the key ruling-class circles opted for the path of (at least) formal
legality, thereby revealing that Schacht and Thyssen were indeed the better
strategists. They had foreseen that, provided Hitler remained steadfast and did
not lose his nerve, all other variants would surely fail. For sound reasons, a coup
d'etat bid had to be avoided, yet the legal path was feasible only with the
cooperation of the NSDAP, which now had more leverage and, being the most
powerful government party, was in a position to insist on its claim to head the
government.” (ibid, p. 164)
Sukhwinder has no clue how the political crisis which propelled the Nazis to power in 1933 had
matured. His ignorant and over-simplistic account presents Hitler as the favored candidate of
the reactionary bourgeoisie since the December 1932 elections itself, whereas even when the
reactionary bourgeoisie moved to lend support to Hitler, it did so with various reservations,
apprehensions and some false hope, too. For instance, Abraham points out:
“The leading representatives of the dominant classes thought the Nazis
manageable, despite their demands for total power.” (Abraham, D. 2003. op.cit.,
p. 58)
Why does Sukhwinder fail to understand this dynamic and think that the entire reactionary
bourgeoisie rallied in unison behind Hitler and the NSDAP after the December 1932 elections?
Precisely because he does not understand the concept of ‘political crisis’, as one, where none of
the fractions of the dominant classes are able to impose their political hegemony within the
‘power bloc’. Secondly, because he sees fascism as the “bare-naked” dictatorship of “the most
reactionary and chauvinist elements of the big monopoly financial bourgeoisie”. In sum, a
deadly combination of dogmatism, economism, mechanistic and metaphysical view and yes, also
unbelievable stupidity and ignorance.
Moreover, who is this Hermann Hindenburg that Sukhwinder is talking about? Hindenburg’s name
was Paul von Hindenburg. Why did Sukhwinder confuse him with some guy Hermann? Well,
this guy was basically the Hermann Müller, the last social-democratic chancellor of Germany,
just before Brüning took over. During Müller’s chancellorship, Paul von Hindenburg was the
president. So, Sukhwinder came up with a brilliant idea. Why not resolve the political crisis of
the German bourgeoisie by fusing Hermann Müller (representative of medium capital and
partially export industry, with mass base in organized labour) with Paul von Hindenburg
(representative of the junkerdom and partially the heavy industry) and create one ‘Hermann
Hindenburg’!
Such are the unique ways of the editor saab of ‘Pratibaddh’!
Moving on.
E. The KPD, the SPD, and the Bourgeois-Democratic and Reformist Afflictions of
Sukhwinder
The last paragraph of the above excerpt of Sukhwinder reveals his bourgeois democratic
illusions and social-democracy in the clearest fashion. Here the readers clearly understand why
Sukhwinder puts all the blame of failure in formation of a united front against fascism on the
KPD, whereas, notwithstanding the “left”-right deviation of the KPD, the main responsibility in
the last years up to the fascist rise to power, lay at the door of the SPD. Sukhwinder says, “the
Communist Party of Germany was the second largest communist party of Germany.” In other
words, the KPD was the second largest communist party of Germany. Then which party was the
largest communist party of Germany? The SPD! Thus, for Sukhwinder, the Social-Democratic
Party of Germany was a communist party! Clearly, some scattered statements in Sukhwinder’s
essay about “treachery of social-democracy”, etc. are only artificial additions to what is actually
a particularly reformist piece. The readers must not forget that it was the social-democratic
party itself (its defence minister Gustav Noske) who had directly recruited the right-wing
militia, including the infamous Freikorps for the assassinations of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht; also, the readers must not forget that it was this same SPD which in alliance with
the bourgeois government, accepted the prolongation of the working day from 8 hours to 10
hours and even accepted its legalization by 1927; this party is considered by Sukhwinder as the
largest communist party of Germany. Any revolutionary communist can only be disgusted at
such a claim. This is nothing short of slander against revolutionary communism.
Another instance of Sukhwinder’s illiteracy of the history of German fascism is his claim that
“Fascist state eliminated this party (KPD) within a week” after Hitler’s rise to power in January
1933. Well, no! In fact, Hitler was reluctant to even formally ban the KPD immediately after his
ascension to power, because he feared a left polarization of votes and also left insurgency. The
initial steps only included severe repression, without formally banning, on the basis of false
pretexts, one of which included Reichstag fire case. In fact, the KPD fought the March 1933
elections, despite severe and brutal repression and fascist attacks, and won 81 seats in the
German parliament. However, by that time, the political opposition of the KPD was crushed, the
Nazis had consolidated their social base, neutralized the working class completely in the
political sense and then these deputies of the KPD were arrested. Following this, the KPD was
formally banned and the same fate befell the rest of the political opposition. Why Sukhwinder
got confused? Because he misplagiarized from Dave Renton! Renton writes:
“Within a week of Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, the Communist Party was
banned.” (Renton, D. 1999. op.cit. p. 37, emphasis ours)
But Sukhwinder by his magic wand of stupidity eliminated the KPD! God knows what grudge
Sukhwinder harbours against the KPD!
Though, even Renton is not accurate here (just like on many other issues), as KPD was banned
formally and properly only on 6 March 1933. Before that, practically there was a wave of
repression against the KPD on the pretext of Reichstag fire. However, there was no formal ban.
That is why the KPD was able to fight in the Reichstag elections of March 1933. However, the
main point is that Sukhwinder did not understand the difference between ‘banned’ and
‘eliminated’, while plagiarizing from Dave Renton! He is the true-blue kharra-man (kharra are
the chits of paper that students use for cheating in examinations-author) of Punjab’s left
movement!
Moreover, this again reveals his bourgeois-democratic illusions. If a communist party does not
have a legal existence (for instance, in conditions like Czarist Russia or any authoritarian
regime) it is eliminated, for Sukhwinder! We can only say: such are the wonders of noodle-
brained leadership of the ‘Lalkaar-Pratibaddh’ group! Even intelligent plagiarizing is beyond
Sukhwinder.
Finally, in the above quote, Sukhwinder repeats his innumerably repeated false claim that the
threat of workers’ revolution was hovering over the head of German capitalism and Nazis
relieved the German bourgeoisie of this threat. Sukhwinder does not understand that the
proletarian revolutionary offensive decisively ended in 1923 itself. Fascism began to rise in
1926-27 only. Why does Sukhwinder not understand this? Let us discuss the most important
foundational reason for this.
F. The Rise of Fascism, the Origin of Fascism and the Origin and Rise of Sukhwinder’s
Muddle
Sukhwinder is unable to make a distinction between what Poulantzas has called the origin of
fascism and the rise of fascism. It is essential to make a difference between the two. Most serious
scholars of fascism make this distinction clearly, the Marxist ones as well as the non-Marxist
ones. In India, too, the RSS existed since the 1920s itself. This existence had two dimensions: the
derivative ideological impact of Italian fascism and later the Nazism and the limited social base
for reaction in the landlordism and certain sections of the petty-bourgeoisie. However, the fascist
rise in India begins only in the 1980s, because the conditions which lead from fascist origins to
fascist rise were absent for a variety of reasons that we will be able to discuss later, when we
come to the Indian case. The same is true for the German case. Let us understand this through
Poulantzas, because on this point he is correct.
Poulantzas points out:
“The question of the beginning of the growth of fascism should not be confused
with the problem of the origins of fascism, a question to which priority has been
given in the historiography of fascism. First of all, there is the striking fact that the
start of the process is not the ‘birth’ of fascist organizations, which on the one
hand, vegetated for a long time in Germany and Italy before the process really
began, and on the other, often existed elsewhere without getting under way at all.
Secondly, and most importantly, what is characteristic of the start of the process
is the accumulation, or rather the systematic co-ordination of particular
characteristics.” (Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 65-66, emphasis ours)
Again, in the specific German context, Poulantzas exemplifies the above distinction:
“The last question we shall deal with here is that of the relation of the National
Socialist Party (NSDAP) and national socialism in general to the power bloc and,
more especially, to big capital. In fact, the start of the rise of fascism marks a
break in this respect, since this relation cannot be reduced to the question of the
‘origins’ of fascism. In the preceding periods, there had been only armed bands
and free corps, directly under the orders of big landowners and of capital, armed
bands abandoned by their paymasters as soon as their direct military role was
no longer required. The start of the rise of fascism made for a quite different
situation. Coinciding with the step at which the power bloc took the offensive the
NSDAP became a real mass movement, and effective organizational relations
were increasingly established between it and the power bloc.” (ibid, p. 108,
emphasis ours)
Due to not understanding this basic distinction which is clear to most Marxist theorists and
historians who have worked on fascism, Sukhwinder conflates the formation of the fascist bands
in Italy and formation of the Nazi party in Germany, with the process of fascist rise. The former
refers to the origins of fascism, whereas the latter is the process of fascist rise, which begins only
after the political offensive of the proletariat has been decisively defeated. The Nazis, after coming
to power, did not thwart the prospects of a workers’ revolution. The prospects of a workers’
revolution were decisively weakened in 1919 itself and then they were eliminated by 1923. It
was only in 1926-27 that the first phase of the fascist rise begins. In this period, fascism begins
to rise as a mass movement of the petty-bourgeoisie and also begins to get considerable support
from certain sections of the bourgeoisie. Even Quintin Hoare, who is talking about the Italian
case, points out:
“It was in late 1920 and early 1921 that sections of the Italian ruling class – first
landowners in Central and Northern Italy, followed closely by powerful
industrial and financial forces – began to turn to the hitherto insignificant
fascists as an appropriate instrument with which to prosecute their class
interests. Perhaps the foremost consideration which led them to do so was an
awareness of the extreme weakness of the traditional state institutions and
 party-system created in the half-century since national unification. In Italy, by
this time, the revolutionary upsurge had already passed its peak, and the defeats
inflicted upon the working class in April and September 1920 had been decisive
ones…” (Hoare, Q. 2015. ‘Introduction’, Selections from Political Writings, 1921-
26, Aakar Books, p. ix-x, emphasis ours)
The same applies to the German case even more. We have quoted Poulantzas at length above to
demonstrate how the rise of fascism in Italy as well as Germany began only when the political
offensive of the proletariat had subsided and pecuniary logic had become dominant in the
working class. Let us see what David Abraham says about this:
“The defeat of the revolutionary working-class impulse had been completed by
1923: local communist uprisings had been suppressed; previous concessions in
the realm of wages and hours had been reversed in the context of the Ruhr
occupation; the inflation facilitated liquidation of industrial debts; the SPD had
rid itself of most of its revolutionaries…” (Abraham, D. 2003. op.cit., p. 47,
emphasis ours)
In the specific context of the defeat of the revolutionary offensive of the working class in
Germany, Poulantzas points out:
“1918-19. Failure of the German revolution and defeat of the Spartakist militants.
But given the nature of the confrontation, which did not take the form of a
general civil war, the revolutionary forces were not eliminated, and the working
class was far from crushed.
…
“March 1920. The Kapp Putsch. The working class and the masses succeeded in
defeating this by mobilizing in a general strike called by a united committee of
the independent socialists (USPD) and the social-democratic left, joined by the
KPD (Spartakusbund). But considering the conditions in which the putsch ended,
this can be seen as a relative failure of the working class: in effect, no use was made
of its victory.
…
“1921. A series of ‘putschist’ attempts in Prussia by the KPD, probably falling for
police provocations. There was an armed rising at Mansfeld under the
leadership of Max Hölz. The insurgents succumbed at the end of a week of heroic
struggles. The call for open insurrection from the central committee of the KPD
on 16 March, and the call for an insurrectional general strike published in Die
Rote Fahne on 28 March, were not followed. This was a debacle for the KPD. In a
long letter of 14 August 1921, addressed to the German communists, Lenin
wrote that ‘hatred of the opportunists of social democracy pushed the German
workers into premature insurrections’. After this failure, KPD membership fell
from 350,000 to 180,000. “The Comintern, at its Third Congress, passed a severe
judgment on this ‘putschism’.
“1923. The great turn. The Fourth Congress of the Comintern had already taken
place (1922-3); it had interpreted ‘stabilization’ economistically, identifying it
with a ‘defensive’ for the working class, and launched the slogan of ‘workers’
governments’. Based on this slogan, the KPD, which had never attempted in the
meantime to build the rank and file united front, made a volte face towards a
right-wing policy under Brandler and Thalheimer; it somehow missed out the
united front and went straight into parliamentary alliances between the
leaderships. At the KPD’s Leipzig Congress in January 1923, the questions of
 mass action and the alliance between the working class and poor peasantry were
neglected, while ‘workers’ governments’ were formed with the social democrats
in Saxony and Thuringia.
“In July 1923, with inflation, the failure of passive resistance in the Ruhr,
reactionary government policy (Cuno), etc., there was a situation of open crisis.
The influence of the KPD in the working class increased relative to that of social
democracy.
“Was it an objectively revolutionary situation? Opinions are divided. For
Rosenberg, the situation was similar to that of the spring and summer of 1923,
but conditions changed later.
…
“In any case, there was open crisis: it contained certain objective possibilities for
mass action and working-class victories, even if these had fallen short of the
direct seizure of power.
“The KPD, dragging the German working class with it, capitulated without
offering battle… The reversal by the leadership consisted not in that it changed
the forms and aims of the struggle, but in that it fell back into the immobility of
1922-3. It was a very serious setback for the KPD: repression clamped down, the
party was banned and discredited among the working class, which came out of
the experience defeated.
“This defeat heralded in a decisive fashion the step of stabilization: not yet the
defensive as such, for again because of the nature of the confrontation, the
working class was conserving its strength; moreover, the ban on the KPD and
the state of emergency were lifted in 1924. The revolution had missed its chance
for a long time, but for all that, fascism had not yet found its moment. This would
not be long delayed.” (Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 168-169, emphasis ours)
Here, Poulantzas presents a broadly correct historical account of the defeat of the revolutionary
offensive of the working class decisively by the end of 1923. On the other hand, the fascist rise
begins only after 1926, even though the fascist organization had been present.
Poulantzas points out:
“The start of the rise of fascism, in 1927-8, coincided with the lowest point in
their membership, and the 1929 crisis did little to change this. This decline in
trade unionism was not associated with any resurgence of political struggle:
there was rather a demobilization of the working class.” (ibid, p. 173)
More:
“If the start of the rise of fascism coincides with the turning point in the defeat of
the working class, it must not be forgotten that the proletariat, contrary to what
Trotsky thought, does not rise again after this defeat: the bourgeoisie is now
engaged in a permanent offensive. The defeat produces neither a situation in
which big capital means to make the broad masses participate in the
‘normalization’ of the regime, nor a situation which would lead it to civil war
against the uprisen proletariat.” (ibid, p. 156)
And finally:
“With the start of the rise of fascism, around 1927, the problem of reforming and
centralizing the Reich became crucial. In the context of political crisis and failing
 hegemony, the provincial apparatuses operated more and more as ‘autonomous’
centres of State power for different classes and class fractions.” (ibid, p. 339)
Therefore, it was not the hovering danger of proletarian revolution “which was continuously
circling over” the German bourgeoisie throughout the 1920s and early-1930s, which the Nazis
liberated it from! Rather, it is the continuously hovering cloud of dimwittedness over the head
of Sukhwinder, which leads him to nonsensical formulations unabatedly.
The fact is that the threat of the proletarian revolution or even its revolutionary offensive have
long been subsided when the fascist rise in Germany began. It was more due to the particular
type of crisis which leads to fascism: not the equilibrium crisis, where the dominant classes are
faced with the threat of revolution, but a political crisis reflected in the crisis of hegemony
within the ‘power bloc’ of the dominant classes, where no fraction is able to establish its
political hegemony within the ‘power bloc’ to collectivize the long-term general political
interests of the bourgeoisie and ensure a mass base for the regime, as we have discussed time
and again in this essay. It was precisely this crisis which led to the rise of fascism in Italy and
Germany. However, due to total and utter ignorance of history as well as theory, Sukhwinder
keeps broadcasting sheer inanities with the delusions of profoundness.
The origin of this particular mess created in the dizzy head of editor of ‘Pratibaddh’ is the failure
to make a distinction between the origins of fascism and the rise of fascism. Had Sukhwinder
even read an authoritative bourgeois textbook of German history, he would have understood
this.
G. Once Again on the Question of Economism: The Real and Not-So-Nominal Blunders
of Sukhwinder
We have seen earlier in the essay, how Sukhwinder reduced economism to fighting only for
“trivial economic demands”. The readers might have suspected that it might have been a slip of
pen. Even we had suspected that when we read his essay for the first time. However, as we
moved on, we found Sukhwinder standing at every turn with reminding us that he does not
commit slips! He only commits blunders! Let us see.
Sukhwinder argues that the error of economism is basically limiting the working class to
“nominal economic achievements”:
“Like Italy, in Germany too, surely social democracy’s treachery, (which we have
already described briefly and which we shall discuss more further on) its
economistic reformist practice (meaning entangling the working class in the
struggle for nominal economic achievements, not allowing the consciousness of
working class to rise above economic achievements) is responsible but the
mistakes of communist party too played its role in it. (Sukhwinder, op.cit., p. 37,
emphasis ours)
So, had the social-democracy fought not simply for “nominal economic achievements” but real
economic achievements that would not have been economism for Sukhwinder! Editor of
‘Pratibadhh’ reveals his crude and vulgar understanding of economism repeatedly in this essay.
We have already presented Lenin’s views on economism above. The theoretical crux of
economism is the inability to raise the political question.
Moreover, even if the working class “rises above economic achievements”, it does not
necessarily mean a class political consciousness for Lenin. It might lead to some kind of
syndicalism, anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism, too, which in essence are finer varieties of
economism itself. However, these tendencies do not necessarily limit themselves to economic
achievements only. The class political consciousness is the highest stage of the development of
the class consciousness of the working class, which begins with the realization of the working
class that it has been born; the next step is seeing, not the machines, but the employers as the
enemy; subsequently, seeing the class of the employers as the enemy; then, seeing the state not
as an impartial third actor, but as a representative of the class of capitalists; and finally,
understanding that to smash the state, the vanguard revolutionary party of the proletariat is
required; this final stage is the stage of what Lenin called ‘party consciousness’ (see, for
instance, among other writings, ‘Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution’ in Volume
15 of the Collected Works of Lenin). It is precisely by reaching this stage, in the very process of
struggle against various forms of economism, that the working class can rise above the short-
term, particular, economic interests and reach the level of the consciousness of the long-term,
general, political interests. Without this, the working class cannot constitute itself as a political
class, the proletariat, and emerge as the leader of the masses. It goes without saying that the
masses includes the masses of the working class, too, besides those of working peasants, lower
and medium middle classes, etc. and also that this process is impossible without the agency of
the vanguard party, which is nothing but the ‘embodiment of the proletarian ideology’ and
‘advanced detachment of the proletariat’ and itself emerges in the proletarian struggle against
various alien bourgeois ideologies. However, for Sukhwinder, all the foundational elements of
the proletariat becoming a political class are reduced to “rising above economic achievements”!
A crude and vulgar economistic critique of economism!
Therefore, economism can assume variety of forms: workerism, productivism, trade-unionism,
syndicalism, anarcho-syndicalism, etc. One particular form is to trap the working-class
movement in the round-about of the pecuniary logic of trade-unionism based on wage gains and
other economic benefits. It is not about “trivial” or significant economic gains, it is not about
“nominal” or real economic achievements, as Sukhwinder thinks. Unbelievably poor
understanding for a person who is leader of a group! Where can such leadership lead to? The
abyss of idiocy, opportunism, national chauvinism, linguistic identitarianism, class
capitulationism and class collaborationism! The sensible and well-read communists of Punjab
need to think about this particular Trot-Bundist, and now we can safely say, a reformist and
social-democratic tendency, as it will prove to be and is indeed proving harmful to the
revolutionary left movement of Punjab, in general.
H. Sukhwinder’s Not-So-Secret Love for Social-Democracy at Full Display: Fascism,
Social-Fascism, the KPD, the SPD and Besotted Editor Sa’ab
Sukhwinder continues his assault on Marxism-Leninism and history:
“Like the communist party of Italy, the communist party of Germany too could
not understand the real character of fascism and underestimated its threat.
Instead of fascism, it continued to consider social democracy as its true enemy. It
primarily targeted it (social democracy) in its attacks. The ‘social fascism’ theses
adopted by Comintern in 1929, which mistermed social democracy as fascist, too
played its role in this. In Germany the communist party could not form a united
front with social democracy and other anti-fascist forces against the rising tide of
fascism. One of the reasons for this was also the fact that social democratic party
too was unwilling to form a united front with communists. But the primary cause
for this was the attitude of communist party towards social democracy
(considering it as the primary enemy instead of fascism). Even though social
democracy was not prepared to forge a united front with communists, still the
attitude adopted by communist party should have been that if making an anti-
fascist front with it. The social democratic party had a larger basis in the workers
of Germany. This entire basis could not have been in agreement with the
capitulationist line of social democratic party. The continued appeals for forging
a united front would have affected its social basis. Either this party would have
been forced to construct a united front or it would have suffered a split and a
section of it would have joined the united front. This could not materialise due to
 Communist party of Germany’s incorrect understanding of fascism, its left
sectarian line.” (Sukhwinder, op.cit., p. 37-38, emphasis ours)
This entire paragraph reeks of ignorance of history and resorts to childish over-simplifications
in order to save the social-democracy from the main culpability in the rise of fascism and rather
puts it on the KPD, which did share the responsibility due to its right-opportunism, its “left”
deviationism as well as its economism and complete lack of massline. It was not simple “left”-
sectarian mistake that the KPD committed, as fact that Sukhwinder would have realized and
known had he read even a single Marxist work on this question. However, Sukhwinder presents
bizarre arguments to save his dear ones, the social-democrats. Let us elaborate point-by-point.
First of all, the claim that the KPD considered “social-democracy as its true enemy and not
fascism” is not only theoretically incorrect but also historically incorrect.
First of all, before 1928, the Comintern and, following it in a poor fashion, the KPD did try to link
the social-democracy and fascism, a mistake about which we have written above, but the line of
social-democracy as the principal enemy became dominant only after 1928 and especially in the
case of KPD. Before 1928, in fact, the KPD formed provincial governments in alliance with the
SPD in Saxony and Thuringia and was open to form a workers’ government at the national level,
too, because the Fourth Congress of the Comintern prescribed such a line, despite the beginning
of theoretical identification of social-democracy with fascism, as its other side. Therefore,
representation of the entire period from the Third Congress onwards, or even the Fourth
Congress onwards, as one homogeneous period of “left” sectarianism by Sukhwinder, reveals
beyond doubt his illiteracy about the history of the Comintern as well as the KPD and its
practice.
Secondly, during the period of ultra-left deviation since 1928, the KPD treated social-democracy
as its main enemy not the true enemy, and fascism as the secondary one, as the former
collaborated with the reactionary forces and fed in to the fascist rise. Fascism as well as social-
fascism (social-democracy) were considered true enemy, though the KPD failed to understand
the distinction between the two different kinds of representatives of the bourgeoisie and
considered social-fascism as its principal enemy, as it thought that without defeating social-
fascists, an effective fight against fascism was impossible. Besides, the views represented within
Comintern vacillated from the tendency of liquidating the difference between fascism and
social-fascism (since the bourgeoisie itself was becoming fascistic in general in the ongoing
phase imperialism in crisis according to the analysis of the Comintern) and the tendency to see a
difference, but considering the two as ‘two cards’ that the bourgeoisie could play in the
conjuncture of crisis. Moreover, this line became dominant only after 1928 till 1933. However,
Sukhwinder presents this line as the general line of the KPD throughout the 1920s, which was
finally corrected by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern!
The Fourth Congress of the Comintern did talk about the social-democracy in terms which can
be called some kind of equating of fascism and social-democracy as equally dangerous for the
working-class movement. However, since 1924 till 1927-28, the KPD was suffering from a
serious right deviation, where instead of forming grass-root alliances with the mass of workers
in the social-democratic party and its unions, the KPD only formed electoral alliances with the
SPD at the leadership level, according to its own understanding of the Comintern line of
‘workers’ government’. This was the period of right deviation where there was no question of
treating social-democracy as the principal enemy. It was only since the Sixth Congress that the
KPD in practice trained its guns mainly on the social-democracy for some time. However, this
tendency weakened gradually after the rise of the authoritarian governments immediately
before Hitler’s ascension to power. Sukhwinder misses all these important elements which are
indispensable to understand the mistakes of the KPD. In order to clear the fog created by editor
of ‘Pratibadhh’, we would require to dig in the details of history and theory for a little bit.
First of all, let us deal with the basic problem with the theory of ‘social-fascism’ as presented by
the Comintern. Poulantzas points to the crux of the error:
“There can be no question about the role of social democracy, which is precisely
to mislead the masses and hold back the revolution. But it is evident that it did
not and cannot fulfil this function in the same way as the fascist party, which is the
only strict point of reference for an examination of the theory of social fascism. In
fact ‘practices’ or ‘methods’ do not exist in a void, but in relation to the
apparatuses which support them: their nature is governed by that of the
apparatus. Social democracy and fascism do not fulfil this role in the same way,
either in the repression of the working class (in the strong sense), or as far as
ideological or organizational forms are concerned.
“Taking all these considerations into account, then not only do social democracy
and the fascist party not ‘supplement each other’, in Stalin’s terms: they negate
each other’. It is absolutely impossible for them to occupy the same place in the
same form of State.” (Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 153-54, emphasis ours)
This was the foundation of the mistake of the theory of ‘social-fascism’ as presented by the
Comintern in the late-1920s.
Within the Comintern itself, as Poulantzas points out (p. 148-49), there were two slightly
different versions of the theory of social-fascism.
One directly identified it with fascism. The other saw fascism and social-fascism as two different
alternatives that the bourgeoisie has in the same conjuncture, which meant to say that in the
same type of political conjuncture, the bourgeoisie could play either the card of fascism or the
card of social-democracy. This, too, was incorrect and failed to understand the peculiarity of
fascism, as Poulantzas argues, but also the peculiarity of social-democracy. However, this much
is true that the other variant did not directly identify fascism with social-fascism. Poulantzas
elaborates on the mistake of the second version of the theory:
“Considered now from the point of view of the strategy of the bourgeoisie, which
at a given moment in time would play either the social-democratic card or the
fascist card, or even both at once, the theory of social fascism is based on a
significant mistake about the rise of fascism and its periodization into steps and
turns, depending on the real relation of forces in the class struggle. It is really no
accident that this conception of social fascism, and the identification of the
‘parliamentary-democratic’ form of State with the fascist State, was accompanied
by a linear conception of the ‘organic process’ which entirely ignored the
problem of the political crisis and the rise of fascism.
“What in fact happens is that the bourgeoisie plays the card of ‘class collaboration’,
to put it that way, at the end of the period of stabilization and the beginning of the
rise of fascism. This card can be played either with social democracy in power (the
German case), or via bourgeois political parties without the direct collaboration of
social democracy. In other words, the move coincides with the turning point in the
process of working-class defeat, and with the upturn of the bourgeoisie’s offensive.”
(ibid, p. 154, emphasis ours)
Sukhwinder also does not understand that the policy of the Comintern itself was not simply a
story of “left” sectarian deviation since the Fourth Congress or the Fifth Congress. While in
words, there were attempts to identify fascism with social-fascism in theory, as we have shown
above, in practice, the alternating currents of (not only) “left” deviation as well as right
opportunism continued. Poulantzas points out:
 “The theses on the united front flowed directly from the Leninist slogan, ‘To the
masses’; but with the Fourth Congress and Comintern policy in the period
straight after it, there was a change to the slogan of workers’ governments
(Arbeiterregierungen), or governments of alliance between communists and social
democrats, with definite objectives: ‘Such a workers’ government is only possible
if it is born out of the struggle of the masses, is supported by workers’ bodies
which are capable of fighting … The overriding tasks of the workers’ government
must be to arm the proletariat, to disarm bourgeois, counterrevolutionary
organizations … Even a workers’ government which is created by the turn of
events in parliament, which is therefore purely parliamentary in origin, may
provide the occasion for invigorating the revolutionary labour movement. It is
obvious that the formation of a real workers’ government which pursues a
revolutionary policy, must lead to a bitter struggle, and eventually to a civil war
with the bourgeoisie.’” (ibid, p. 158, emphasis ours)
Thus, the seeds of a right-deviationist negation of Leninist line of ‘united front from below’ were
present since the Fourth Congress itself; Leninist line meant the winning over of the masses of
workers and working people, including the ones who were members of social-democratic and
other organizations. Instead, the policy of forming leadership-level alliances with the social-
democrats was applied and the line of winning over the masses of workers in social-democratic
organizations was abandoned by the KPD. The Fifth Congress, then, rejected the line of workers’
governments as an intermediate step towards the proletarian power. But the Fifth Plenum of
the Comintern again prescribed the line of maintaining contacts with the social-democrats at
“the highest levels” of the leadership. Poulantzas writes:
“The Fifth Congress made an ‘ultra-left’ turn, neglecting ‘stabilization’ and
changing the position on workers’ governments. While the Fourth Congress had
seen these as a ‘step’ towards the dictatorship of the proletariat through
revolution, the Fifth Congress – the Congress of ‘Bolshevization’ – identified
them with the dictatorship of the proletariat, implying that they could not come
as a particular step before revolution. This amounted in practice to a rejection of
the theory of workers’ governments.
…
“The Fifth Plenum (1925), accepting stabilization, took up once again the policy
of contact at the highest levels, and the Comintern carried on an intense struggle
against the left party leaders who had attended the Fifth Congress.” (ibid, p. 159)
The Sixth Congress settled this “left”-right vacillation decisively in favour of ultra-left deviation.
However, the KPD implemented it in even more ultra-left way because the Sixth Congress in
principle did talk about rank-and-file united front of the working class, even while maintaining
that social-democracy is the main enemy because in order to defeat fascism, it must first be
defeated. Poulantzas opines:
“With the Comintern’s Sixth Congress (1928), the decisive turn took place. Even
though in Germany the defensive step of the workers’ movement had just begun,
with the start of the rise of fascism, the end of ‘stabilization’ was defined, in
‘economist catastrophist’ terms, as a step of proletarian offensive and imminent
revolution: the ‘offensive strategy’ was openly proclaimed. The theory of social
fascism was put forward, and in the strategy of alliances a turn was made to
‘class against class’ and the ‘rank and file united front’.
“The Third Congress had also spoken of a rank and file united front, but the
difference here lay in the concrete policies of the Comintern and the KPD towards
social democracy and the masses supporting the social-democratic organizations:
 ‘There can clearly be no unity with the social fascists.’ ‘The social fascists know
that for us no collaboration is possible … No communist shares the illusion that
fascism can be fought with the aid of social fascism’. This line was by no means
applied only to the leaders of the socialist party: ‘Hunt the social fascists from
their posts in the factories and the unions’; ‘Hunt the little social fascists from
the factories, the employment exchanges, the apprentices’ schools’; ‘Strike at the
social fascists in the schools and the recreation grounds’. The ‘left’ wing of social
democracy was moreover considered the most dangerous enemy: ‘The new
rising tide of the revolutionary labour movement … urgently confronts the
Comintern and the sections with special acuteness with the task of decisively
intensifying the struggle against social democracy, and especially against its ‘left’
wing as the most dangerous enemy of communism in the labour movement and
the main obstacle to the growth of militant activities of the mass of workers.’ As
for the social-democratic masses, Thälmann has a revealing way of putting it: ‘As
long as they are not delivered from the influence of the social fascists, these
millions of workers (of the German Social-Democratic Party and its associated
trade unions) are lost to the anti-fascist struggle.’
“This strategy was accompanied by the concept of the main enemy being not
fascism but social democracy, the defeat of which was the precondition, even
chronologically, of a victory over fascism…” (ibid, p. 159-60, emphasis ours)
Poulantzas continues:
“This orientation led to disastrous results. But it would be quite wrong to think
that behind this radical terminology, the KPD was carrying out an intransigent, if
sectarian, struggle against fascism, and for the revolution. Not that it failed to
carry out the implacable struggle it advocated against social democracy: the
problem was that it did nothing but that.
“In fact, something very important gradually happened to the Comintern during
this very period, something identifiable precisely in the case of Germany, which
acted as the ‘test’ case for Comintern strategy. Even the distinctive features of the
‘left-right’ turns then began to be confused, in the sense that certain elements
which were to be very much in evidence at the Seventh Congress (the Dimitrov
one), were already developing in the period 1928–35. In other words, the
relationship of the Sixth and Seventh Congresses was quite different from the
classic, simple ‘swing’ from left opportunism to right opportunism, and rather one
of two diametrically opposed expressions of the same wrong general line…” (ibid,
p. 161, emphasis ours)
Then what was the mistake of the KPD? Not simply “left” deviationism all the way from 1920-21
to 1935, as Sukhwinder thinks. It was a constant vacillation between the right opportunist line
and the “left” and ultra-left line, due to the lack of a correct political line, which in turn was owing
to the dominance of economism, social-democratic ideology within the ranks of the KPD and most
importantly the absence of massline, which Lenin had argued for in his slogan of ‘to the masses’ in
the Third Congress of the Comintern. Poulantzas is broadly correct when he says:
“I shall now turn to the policy of the KPD during the rise of fascism. Its policy
was dictated, amongst other things, by an incorrect understanding of the period
(as one of revolutionary working-class offensive) and by an under-estimation of
the fascist danger. The policy as a whole was ‘ultra-left’ only in appearance. I
have given my views above about the description of the Sixth Congress as ‘ultra-
left’, and these considerations are equally applicable to KPD policy, taken as a
whole. This does not mean that the KPD’s specific policies did not have certain
real ‘ultra-left’ aspects during this period.” (ibid, p. 180-81)
What was the main reason that the KPD could not form an effective united front against
fascism? Sukhwinder thinks that it was KPD’s refusal to form party-to-party alliance with the
SPD; he argues that even if SPD was not willing to form the alliance with the KPD, in order to
win over the masses in the SPD and effect a split in the SPD, the KPD should have continued to
appeal the SPD for party-to-party alliance against fascism. Thus, the winning over of the masses
of the SPD and its trade unions was possible only through approaching and appealing the
leadership of the SPD for alliance! This is what Poulantzas has called conflating the class with the
party. And this was precisely the mistake that KPD had been committing between 1924 and 1928,
as a result of non-implementation of the policy of the ‘united front from below’!
Poulantzas points out that the real mistake was, in fact, not approaching the masses of the
working class in the social-democratic organizations directly and winning them over against
fascism. It was not the refusal of the KPD to capitulate to the SPD at the leadership level, as
Sukhwinder demands! The refusal to form even particular anti-fascist alliance (which is
different from forming general anti-fascist front), too, was a mistake committed because the
policy of ‘united front from below’ was not implemented as this policy did include issue-based
particular anti-fascist alliances with the social-democrats. This mistake stemmed from
mistaking social-democracy as the principal enemy. However, the principal mistake was non-
implementation of the line of ‘united front from below’ to win over the masses of workers in all
kinds of organizations, including the social-democratic mass organizations. Poulantzas has
succinctly summarized this mistake:
“As far as the line itself is concerned, the inclusive designation of social democracy
and the social-democratic trade unions as social fascist and as the main enemy,
bore a heavy responsibility for the failure of the united front. This was not so much
because of the refusal of all contact between the leaderships, and even between the
secondary ranks; it was particularly because of the policy towards the social-
democratic masses, considered ‘lost’ as long as they were under the influence of
social democracy.” (ibid, p. 182, emphasis ours)
What Poulantzas is arguing here is remarkably true. The mistake was not the policy of united
front of the working class, as Sukhwinder thinks; in fact, the policy stemmed directly from the
Leninist directive to implement the massline: ‘to the masses’. This policy was dialectical as it
had four basic elements: one, the maintenance of proletarian independence to carry out
propaganda campaigns exposing the role of social-democracy; two, formation of issue-based
particular alliances with the social-democracy; three, most importantly, making a distinction
between the social-democratic party and its mass organizations, in other words, the social-
democratic leadership and the masses in the social-democratic organizations; and therefore, the
principal emphasis was to be on the winning over of the masses of the working class in all kinds
of mass organizations and mobilizing them into anti-fascist united fronts from below; and four,
the independent political work of the communists among the masses of petty-bourgeoisie,
including the peasant masses. This policy in its Leninist theoretical form was perfectly correct
and capable of resisting the fascist onslaught; however, due to the lack of comprehension of this
policy, its non-implementation and the pendulum like motion of “left”-right deviation from the
dialectical centre of this policy, the revolutionary communist movement faced a disaster in the
face of rising tide of fascism.
In fact, the exposure of the social-democrats, too, was not done by the KPD through
revolutionary propaganda among the masses of workers in all organizations. Here, too, the
massline was absent. The exposure was only targeted at a higher level, which totally neglected
the masses, which was reflected in the growing ideological and political influence of the social-
democrats in the masses. Even Dimitrov partially understood this failure of the KPD. Poulantzas
points out:
“Even apart from the fact that the KPD’s main activity was still directed against
social democracy, this activity was conceived of as a struggle between
 ‘organizations’, not as a mass struggle on a mass line. What really happened to the
rank and file united front? The remarkable thing, as Dimitrov was correctly to
recall, was that nowhere did the KPD set up specific forms of rank and file united
front organizations, which as organizations outside the party could cement the
union by steps, combining economic and political struggle, with politics in
command. The only form of rank and file struggle the KPD accepted was trade-
union struggle through the trade-union opposition, the RGO. The RGO was to be
the spearhead of the rank and file united front, in the now all but defunct ‘factory
committees’.
“Nothing came of it: firstly, because of the policy towards workers in social-
democratic unions; secondly, and most importantly, because the RGO tried to cut
out the social democrats simply by putting in higher claims, while the party
leadership proclaimed, from on high, the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. Of
course, trade unions have a part to play, but the crux of the matter was that,
because of the KPD’s lack both of specific rank and file united front
organizations, and of a mass line, the RGO itself constantly ended up just fighting
for rather higher wage increases than the social democrats managed to obtain
through a policy of class collaboration.” (ibid, p. 182-83, emphasis ours)
Beneath the ultra-left phraseology of the KPD, were other serious right opportunist errors,
which included a policy of legalism and quietism in fighting against fascists on the streets, as well
as the non-Bolshevik organizational line of the party, with virtually no underground structure
(see Poulantzas. 1979. op.cit., p. 185-87).
In fact, after the Fourth Congress of Comintern and the right turn introduced by it, the KPD,
which never really attempted to form rank-and-file united fronts, now capitulated to even more
right and eagerly formed parliamentary alliances with SPD and even formed governments in
Saxony and Thuringia, without even attempting to form rank-and-file united front of the masses
of workers. Poulantzas remarks:
“The Fourth Congress of the Comintern had already taken place (1922-3); it had
interpreted ‘stabilization’ economistically, identifying it with a ‘defensive’ for the
working class, and launched the slogan of ‘workers’ governments’. Based on this
slogan, the KPD, which had never attempted in the meantime to build the rank
and file united front, made a volte face towards a right-wing policy under
Brandler and Thalheimer; it somehow missed out the united front and went
straight into parliamentary alliances between the leaderships. At the KPD’s
Leipzig Congress in January 1923, the questions of mass action and the alliance
between the working class and poor peasantry were neglected, while ‘workers’
governments’ were formed with the social democrats in Saxony and Thuringia.”
(ibid, p. 169, emphasis ours)
We have quoted Poulantzas at length because he has captured the right-“left” currents of
deviations within the KPD since 1921 to 1933, better than any other theorist. Moreover, without
quoting him in a detailed fashion it was difficult to reveal the shameful ignorance of the editor of
‘Pratibaddh’ who thinks that KPD was a victim of the “left” deviation all the way, whereas the
story is completely different.
Moreover, Sukhwinder has failed to grasp the crux of error in KPD’s failure to form an anti-
fascist united front. It was not the failure/refusal of the KPD to capitulate to the SPD and sit in
its lap by forming mere leadership-to-leadership party alliances, as Sukhwinder would have
liked, by repeatedly calling for forming a united front despite the refusal of the SPD to do so; on
the contrary, there was no question of forming a general anti-fascist front under the Leninist line
of ‘united front from below’; at the time, formation of particular anti-fascist front (that is, issue-
based alliances) was recommended by the Leninist line of ‘united front from below’. The
principal mistake was the failure of the KPD to approach and win-over the masses of the
workers, especially in the social-democratic trade unions and other mass organizations and
rejected this entire mass as being, in the words of Thälmann, lost to the cause of communism;
and secondary mistake was the refusal to form particular anti-fascist alliance with the social-
democrats and other forces which were anti-fascist. Sukhwinder is hell-bent upon
anachronistically force the KPD to capitulate to the extreme-right from its “left” deviationism!
Now let us come to the next question: who bears the main responsibility in the failure of
formation of an anti-fascist united front, the SPD or the KPD? Sukhwinder believes that even
though the SPD was unwilling to form such an alliance and refusing to do so, the main culprit
was the KPD. Is that true? No. Notwithstanding the “left” mistakes of the KPD, the SPD appears
to be the main culprit.
First of all, it must not be forgotten that whenever there was a real threat of proletarian
revolution or the rise of the KPD in Germany, till 1923 arrived, when the revolutionary offensive
of the proletariat was completely neutralized, the SPD not simply colluded with the arch-
reactionary forces of the bourgeoisie behind the doors; in fact, the SPD directly recruited, helped
and gave all support to the extreme-right to suppress and kill revolutionary communists (whatever
their deviations might be!). The first example was the assassinations of Rosa Luxemburg and
Karl Liebknecht by the right-wing armed groups, like Freikorps. Sukhwinder lays the blame
completely on “the reactionary forces” alone for the martyrdom of these great leaders of the
proletariat. However, here, too, either he does not know the history or he is intentionally
protecting the social-democrats. What had happened? It was the social-democratic defence
minister Gustav Noske who actually recruited the right-wing militia to kill Rosa and Liebknecht.
Renton writes:
“Many of the leading Nazis had been members of the Freikorps, demobilised
patriotic soldiers and middle-class youth assembled by the Social Democratic
Defence Minister, Gustav Noske, to end the November revolution. The Freikorps
were responsible for the murders of prominent Communists, including Rosa
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and almost seized power during the attempted
Kapp putsch.” (Renton, D. 1999. Fascism: Theory and Practice, Pluto Press, p. 34)
Today, most of the revolutionary communists of the world know how social-democracy was
directly responsible for the murders of Rosa and Liebknecht. The likes of Noske represented the
leadership of SPD that considered communists as greater danger than the fascists:
“Firstly, the leadership: apart from leaders of the kind of Noske and Severing, who
well deserved their sinister reputation among the working class, and who always
openly considered Nazism the lesser evil to ‘Bolshevism’, there was the centre,
which went into exile after Hitler’s seizure of power, and the ‘left’. The latter,
represented in particular by Rosenfeld and Seydwitz, had for a long time been
favourable to a united front with the communists. Certain left elements were to
split in 1931 to create the Socialist Workers’ Party (SAP)” (Poulantzas. 1979.
op.cit., p. 180)
It goes without saying that even in the “left” and ultra-left deviationist phase of the KPD, there
was a centrist and “right” faction within the KPD which wanted an alliance with the SPD.
However, due to the dominance of the “left” faction particularly due to the “left” line of the
Comintern since the Sixth Congress, this faction did not have its say.
Poulantzas also points out, which can be seen as a rebuke to the right-wing positions of the likes
of Sukhwinder:
“In conclusion, SPD policy was faithful to its counter-revolutionary nature and
function. There was no actual collusion between social democracy and fascism;
throughout the rise of fascism, it still tried in its own way to defend and preserve
 the ‘economic interests’ of the working class, which it had to do to keep its
representational base in the class. None the less, it certainly bears the greatest
share of responsibility for fascism’s coming to power.” (ibid, p. 180, emphasis ours)
Poulantzas makes the same argument elsewhere in the same book (p. 156).
Now let us focus on the very possibilities of formation of a particular anti-fascist united front
during the fascist rise in Germany and who was principally responsible for the waste of these
possibilities. Kurt Gossweiler has presented a relatively more balanced analysis of this question.
Gossweiler points out that the first opportunity to form a broad united front was lost after the
SPD’s victory in 1928 elections and formation of Müller government. The principal task at that
time was breaking the back of junkerdom by introducing certain radical land reforms. However,
the SPD government shied away from its own program (which, on this particular question, was
shared by the KPD). Gossweiler argues:
“Thus a program aimed at dividing up the Junker landed estates could have been
a point of departure for creating a powerful, campaigning democratic front
alongside it, thereby seriously weakening the most reactionary wing or the
ruling elite.
“The principal force of such a front could only be the working-class movement. A
commensurate initiative along these lines would have had the chance to bring
about a decisive shift in the balance of power in favor of bolstering up and
consolidating the democratic content of the Weimar Republic. If the SPD and the
allied Free Trade Unions had taken such an initiative following the overwhelming
social-democratic electoral success in May 1928, this would most probably have
resulted in a series of positive effects.
“The first and most important commensurate outcome would have been the
prevention of the disastrous further division of the working-class movement.
The unity of action so aptly displayed during the expropriation campaign of the
princes would have been given new impetus in the struggle for agrarian reform. As
long as the Weimar Republic existed, even though its formation did not
completely reflect the overall demands of the German Communist party (KPD),
the party had backed every real move in defense of democracy notwithstanding the
fact that the Communist party never once relinquished its goal, namely the aim of
Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg to establish a socialist German republic.
Moreover, the Communist party would never have hesitated to back to the hilt any
initiative for the elimination of the hotbed of reaction, namely the East Elbe
Junkerdom as, indeed, such action would have been fully consistent with the
agrarian program of the KPD.” (Gossweiker, K. 2003. op.cit., p.157-58, emphasis
ours)
Gossweiler argues that this would have won over the peasantry to the side of anti-fascist
resistance and would have exacerbated the political crisis of the bourgeoisie by widening the
cleavage between the agrarian bourgeoisie on the one hand and the industrial-financial
bourgeoisie on the other:
“…by engaging in this struggle, the working-class movement would have proved
itself the most resolute advocate of peasant interests and, thereby, real
possibilities would have emerged for dismembering the grip of the most
reactionary forces on the land.
“Fourth, if such policies had been pursued, severe restrictions and obstacles
would have been imposed, in particular, on the possibility of fascism's
developing into a mass movement. Fascism would have been denied one of its
main arguments (namely, that Marxism in the guise of the SPD ruined the middle
 classes and the peasantry) and, moreover, would have faced a united working-
class movement. As a result, fascism would not have found itself in a position of
merely having to combat a powerless, divided working-class movement,
engaged in constant bickering.
“Fifth, such an attack on the Junkers would have brought out the differences
within the big bourgeoisie and weakened - for both political and economic
reasons - that element within the heavy-industry faction which tended to form
coalitions with the Junkers and was the major enemy of the Weimar Republic.”
(ibid, p. 158)
However, the SPD committed its major betrayal and destroyed the possibility of formation of a
particular united front against fascism and reaction, which the KPD was ready to support:
“However, as is known after its electoral gains and victory, German social
democracy took no initiative whatsoever in implementing a program to promote
and consolidate democracy. Moreover, the SPD did not even revert to its own
agrarian program, the draft of which, adopted on January 12, 1927, proclaims
that for reasons of both production and population politics the SPD advocates a
fundamental change in basic property ownership conditions and, therefore, a
"planned land reform."” (ibid, p. 159, emphasis ours)
Gossweiler points out:
“In reality, SPD policies were not geared to changes and reforms but solely to
retaining what had been achieved through the alliance with that wing of the big
bourgeoisie which had displayed a willingness to enter into an alliance with social
democracy on conditions decreed by the big bourgeoisie. This had been succinctly
expounded by Paul Silverberg, who, on September 4, 1926, when addressing the
members' meeting of the RDI, declared that social democracy should "return to
reality" and should "renounce radical doctrinarism along with the ever
destructive never constructive policy of the streets and force" and cooperate in a
responsible manner "with the employers and under their direction."” (ibid, p.
159, emphasis ours)
The words of Silverberg might encourage the readers to recall the words of Buddhadeb
Bhattacharjea of CPM, when he was the chief minister of West Bengal. He uttered almost the
same words regarding “abandoning street strategy” and the desirability of labour and capital
walking hand-in-hand. Anyway, the consequences of this betrayal were disastrous, even for the
SPD. Gossweiler argues:
“In practice this meant that the Hermann Müller government, in defiance of the
SPD's electoral promises, had to follow (and indeed followed) the basic policies of
the preceding bourgeois bloc parties, that is, to step up the struggle against the
Communist party and to continue the armaments program of German imperialism.
This led to the Bloody May of 1929 with the subsequent banning of the Red Front
Union (while the fascist SA and SS terror groupings could legally continue to exist!)
and to the decision to build the armored cruiser, a project that was clearly rejected
prior to the elections. Basically, this was a suicidal policy. It even more profoundly
widened the divisions within the working-class movement, weakened the
reputation and standing of social democracy with large segments of the
population, undermined the confidence SPD members had in their own party, and
thereby decidedly weakened the entire left. The counterforces on the right,
however, in particular the Nazi fascists, gained ground as a direct consequence.
Adhering to a policy that renounced positive political change was bound to pave
the way for successive decline: from a policy that defended the status quo to a
 policy that tolerated the "lesser evil" to the final capitulation to the greatest evil
without even a semblance of a fight.” (ibid, p. 159-60, emphasis ours)
Gossweiler has here perfectly demonstrated the main culpability of the SPD in the failure to
form a united front against fascism, to which, on a particular issue of land reforms, the KPD was
also ready. Moreover, Gossweiler has also described in a more-or-less correct fashion in the
overall culpability of the social-democracy in the demobilization of the working class and
resultant rise of fascism, which was resistible but became ‘irresistible’ in principal due to the
betrayal of the social-democracy.
There is no denying the fact that the KPD did commit suicidal “left” blunders (as well as right
blunders). However, they did not consist in particular in their refusal to capitulate to the SPD, as
Sukhwinder would have wanted them to do, but in the failure to forge particular anti-fascist
alliances with the SPD (the equal responsibility of which lies with the SPD, too) and the failure to
implement the line of the united front from below: which would have meant approaching the
masses of workers in social-democratic organizations and winning them over to the communist
cause of anti-fascism. It was precisely this policy which would have caused a rift and split within
the SPD (which did actually happen when SAP was formed, but it would have been a much
bigger split) rather than simple ‘appeals to the leadership of the SPD for a united front’ as
Sukhwinder thinks. This again is tantamount to conflating the class with the party. The
Comintern, too, understood this fact by the end of 1938, as we shall see.
After the above excerpt, Sukhwinder has foolishly equated the Second United Front with the
KMT formed by the CPC under the leadership of Mao with the line of ‘the popular front’. We
have dealt with this utter idiocy in sufficient detail above. The readers can refer to that.
In the next subhead, we will demonstrate in detail, first, how the line of the ‘popular front’ led to
disastrous outcomes for communists everywhere and failed miserably in practice in Europe and
elsewhere; second, we will show that Dimitrov and the rest of the Comintern itself abandoned
this line after the collapse of the ‘popular front’ in France and elsewhere due to the treachery
and betrayal of the social-democrats; third, we will show that the Comintern itself reverted to
the Leninist policy of ‘united front from below’ and asked the revolutionary communists to train
their guns on social-democratism, in order to win the masses of working class under the social-
democratic influence to their side, to be able to form a truly Leninist ‘united front from below’;
and four, the Comintern tacitly accepted that the ‘popoular frontism’ preached by the Seventh
Congress did not work in practice. The problem with Sukhwinder is that he fragmentarily read
Dimitrov’s work on the ‘popular front’, but did not go through the documents of the Comintern
between 1935 and 1943. Had he read that, he would not have made this preposterous claim that
the policy of the ‘popular front’ is the universal policy against fascism and it is applicable even
today. He would have known, and thus saved himself from embarrassment, that even the
Comintern had abandoned this policy of the ‘popular front’ after its miserable failure. Today
being ‘popular frontist’ is nothing short of being a reformist, social-democrat of the worst kind,
a class collaborationist and a class capitulationist. We will demonstrate all these things with
evidence from the documents of the Comintern itself, besides other sources.