0% found this document useful (0 votes)
27 views7 pages

Lavie 2010

Uploaded by

Lucky Bear
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
27 views7 pages

Lavie 2010

Uploaded by

Lucky Bear
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 7

Attention, Distraction, and Cognitive Control Under Load

Author(s): Nilli Lavie


Source: Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (JUNE 2010), pp. 143-148
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of Association for Psychological Science
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41038558
Accessed: 09-11-2024 04:45 UTC

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41038558?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Sage Publications, Inc., Association for Psychological Science are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Current Directions in Psychological
Science

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Sat, 09 Nov 2024 04:45:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
IlilIIIglilli
aps IlilIIIglilli II ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIATION FORFOR

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Current Directions in Psychological


Science

Attention, Distraction, and Cognitive 19(3) 143-148


© The Author(s) 2010

Control Under Load Reprints and permission:


sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0963721410370295
http://cdps.sagepub.com

#SAGE
Nilli Lavie
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London

Abstract
The extent to which people can focus attention in the face of irrelevant distractions has been shown to critically depend on the
level and type of information load involved in their current task. The ability to focus attention improves under task conditions of
high perceptual load but deteriorates under conditions of high load on cognitive control processes such as working memory.
I review recent research on the effects of load on visual awareness and brain activity, including changing effects over the life
span, and I outline the consequences for distraction and inattention in daily life and in clinical populations.

Keywords
attention, distraction, executive control, perception, load, working memory, capacity limits

Inability to focus attention in the face of irrelevant distractions Load Theory of Attention and
is a common, and often rather frustrating, experience. The con-
Cognitive Control
sequences range from merely reducing the quality of life (e.g.,
not being able to focus while reading a good book, or even this Recent research on the load theory of attention and cognitive
article) to affecting the ability to study or to concentrate at work control (Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004) offers a
resolution to this debate while also clarifying the major deter-
and causing one to be more prone to accidents (e.g., while
driving).
minants of successful focused attention and cognitive control.
A main goal of attention theory is to delineate the determi- The load theory resolves the early- and late-selection debate
nants of focused attention that allow people to ignore irrelevant by combining within one hybrid model the early-selection
distractions. This goal, however, has proved rather hard to assumption that perception has limited capacity and the
reach, and the very question of whether attention can ever late-selection assumption that perception is an automatic pro-
affect the perception of distractors has been controversial ever cess (in the sense that it is involuntary and so cannot be shut
since attention research began in the late fifties. Many striking down at will). It follows, then, that tasks involving high per-
demonstrations of people failing even to notice various distrac- ceptual load that engage full capacity will simply leave no
tors when focusing attention on their task (e.g., people attend- capacity for irrelevant distractor perception (leading to an
ing to a ball game have failed to notice a woman walking across early- selection result). In contrast, in tasks of low perceptual
the pitch and holding up an umbrella) have led to an "early load, spare capacity remaining beyond the task-relevant pro-
selection" view, according to which people have limited per- cessing spills over involuntarily to irrelevant distractor pro-
ceptual processing capacity and will perceive just what they cessing (leading to late-selection results). The efficiency of
attend to. Unattended distractors in this view are fully ignored: late selection (that is, the extent to which distractors that have

They are simply never perceived. But many observations of been perceived can be prevented from gaining control over
interference effects from irrelevant distractors have also accu- behavior) depends on the level of load on cognitive-control
mulated. These seemed to accord with a converse "late selec- functions such as working memory. High working memory
tion" view, in which perception is seen as an automatic process
both in the sense that it has unlimited capacity (so that every-
thing is perceived, whether relevant or irrelevant to the current
Corresponding Author:
task) and in the sense that it is mandatory (so that people cannot
Nilli Lavie, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17
shut down perception of irrelevant information simply because Queen Square, London WCIN 3AR UK
they wish to). E-mail: [email protected]

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Sat, 09 Nov 2024 04:45:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
1 44 Lowe

Fig. I . Perceptual load effects on distraction: example stimuli and results. Panel (a) depicts an example
of a high-load display from Forster and Lavie (2007, 2008). The response-competition paradigm shown
in this panel is used to measure distraction. Subjects make speeded responses indicating which of two
pre-specified letters (X or N) is present in the letter circle, attempting to ignore a peripheral
distractor letter. Slower responses in the presence of a response-incongruent distractor (shown)
compared with a congruent distractor (e.g., distractor X for target X) indicate that the distractor
produced response-competition effects. (In the low-load condition, the target letter X or N is
presented among small os so that it appears to "pop out" of the display.) Irrelevant distractor images of
famous cartoon characters are presented on a few of the low- and high-load trials in Forster and Lavie
(2008; Panel b). Panel (c) shows an example display from Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007), used in
both the low- and high-load conditions. In the low-load condition, subjects were instructed to report
which of the cross arms was green (horizontal or vertical); in the high-load condition, they were to
report which was longer (the small length difference makes this task highly demanding). An extra
stimulus (e.g., the small square shown on the top left) is presented unexpectedly on the very last trial,
and as soon as the subjects respond to the task on that last trial, they are asked whether they noticed
the presence of any extra stimulus. The results from Forster and Lavie's (2008) experiments are
shown in (d). In the low-load conditions, the distractor interferes with task performance (mean
distractor cost). Incongruent (compared to congruent) distractor letters produce response
competition effects and the presence (compared to absence) of a task- irre levant distractor cartoon
produces attentional capture effects. These distractor interference effects are eliminated with high
perceptual load. Panel (e) shows the results from Cartwright-Finch and Lavie's (2007) experiments:
The high load significantly reduces the percentage of awareness reports; in this condition, 90% of the
subjects fail to notice the extra task-irrelevant stimulus.

load during task performance results in greater distractor Perceptual Load and Daily Life Distractions
interference.
Some of the early perceptual load studies used the response
The load theory has received much empirical support (see
competition paradigm, since this is the most conventional
Lavie, 2005, 2006 for reviews). In this article, I review some
of the recent research on the effects of load on visual awareness laboratory index of distraction (Fig. la). Response competition

and brain activity, including findings of changes over the effects were found under tasks with low but not high levels of

course of development and aging, and relate these findings to perceptual load (Lavie, 2005, Fig. Id). More recently, Forster
distraction and inattention in daily life (e.g., in educational set- and Lavie (2007) asked how these laboratory findings relate
tings, driving, and at work) and in clinical populations. to individual differences in daily life distractibility. We

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Sat, 09 Nov 2024 04:45:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Attention, Distraction, and Cognitive Control Under Load 1 45

Fig. 2. Working memory load effects on distraction: example stimuli and


results. Panel (a) shows an example trial with a high working memory load
(low perceptual load) from Lavie et al. (2004). Subjects are asked to
memorize the set of digits presented at the start of each trial and rehearse
this set during performance of a selective attention task (a response
competition task was used in this study). A probe digit is presented at the
end of each trial and subjects are asked to indicate whether it was present or
absent in the memory set. In the low-load condition (not shown), only one
memory set digit is presented. Panel (b) shows the results: Working-memory
load has the opposite effect on distraction that perceptual load does:
Distractor response competition effects (mean distractor response time, RT,
costs) are greater in high than in low working memory load.

assessed the individual magnitude of distractor response com- In daily life, many sources of distraction are entirely unre-
petition effects under task conditions of either low or high per- lated to the current task. For example, while searching the
ceptual load (Fig. la). Participants also completed the Internet for information related to the topic of study (e.g., some
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, of the references mentioned in this article), you may get dis-
FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), an established measure of inatten- tracted by a popup ad with unrelated content (e.g., advertising
tion and distractibility in daily life. High CFQ scorers report a new Internet dating service) or the sight of your spouse hover-
being more prone to inattention incidences such as "starting ing around, or even simply the sun breaking through a gloomy
doing one thing at home and getting distracted into doing some- sky. Some distractions may feel more welcome than others;
thing else" (a questionnaire item). We found that high CFQ nonetheless they may all interfere with successful concentra-
scores were also associated with greater distractor interference tion on the task, with the irrelevant stimuli effectively captur-
effects in our task as long as it was conducted under a low load. ing attention. Would tasks of higher perceptual load be less
High perceptual load in the task significantly reduced distractor prone to such irrelevant attentional capture? Forster and Lavie
interference for all people, including those highly distracted (2008) introduced a laboratory measure of attentional capture
both in our low-load task and in daily life. by task-irrelevant stimuli, presenting large, meaningful, salient
High CFQ scores are known to be associated with increased distractors (Fig. lb) that are likely to capture attention even
risk of various types of careless errors (e.g., losing unsaved when entirely irrelevant and bearing no relation to the letter-
work when computing) and accidents during driving or on the search task performed. We found that such task-unrelated dis-
job (e.g., Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003). The Forster and Lavie tractors did indeed capture attention and disrupt task perfor-
(2007) findings therefore may be important in two senses. First, mance, but only in conditions of low load. High load in the
the positive correlation between the behavioral distraction letter task eliminated any task-irrelevant attentional capture
measure and propensity to distraction in daily life suggests that (Fig. Id).
this measure can be used as a distraction test. The level of test In another study (Lavie, Lin, Zokaei, & Thoma, 2009),
performance can then be used to predict which individuals are subjects performed a letter-search task while attempting to
more distractible and accident prone in daily life. Second, mod- ignore a wide range of meaningful but task-unrelated distrac-
ifications of some daily tasks to involve a higher level of per- tors (e.g., a pictured spider or car). Following the attention task,
ceptual load may prove useful for focusing attention for all subjects received a surprise memory-recognition task. The
people, even those who are otherwise highly distractible. results showed that even when the distractor objects were

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Sat, 09 Nov 2024 04:45:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
]46
presented directly where people were gazing, they could only
recognize having previously seen these distractors when the
to that important assignment that demands your full concentra-
tion. But soon after starting, you find your mind drifting away
task at exposure involved a low load. Recognition memory fell into unrelated thoughts. You have generated your own internal
to chance levels in task conditions of high perceptual load. This form of distraction and are engaged in mind wandering instead
was also the case when human faces were presented as irrele- of attending to your task. Can this form of distraction be over-
vant distractors (Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2005). The fact that come? Our recent research (Forster & Lavie, 2009) suggests
recognition memory levels are no better than chance in tasks of that it can: Mind-wandering rates are significantly reduced in
high perceptual load has important implications for the reliabil- tasks of higher perceptual load. Note that as the manipulation
ity of eyewitness testimony: Clearly one has to take into of perceptual load in this study mainly increased the amount
account the level of perceptual load involved at exposure when of visual stimulation in the task without adding to the task com-
considering such memory-based testimonies. plexity, the results suggest it may also be possible to reduce
mind wandering during the performance of cognitively
demanding tasks (e.g., learning in educational settings) without
Awareness and Mind Wandering Under Load altering their semantic content or complexity (e.g., merely by
The aforementioned distractor recognition studies have also enhancing the course material with visual presentations that
tested distractor recognition upon immediate promoting. The provide higher perceptual load).
results indicated that people fail to recognize distractor objects
just viewed under conditions of high perceptual load, exhibit-
Implications for Development, Aging, and
ing a form of inattentional blindness. Inattentional blindness
can also be manifest in people failing to notice the mere pres-
Clinical Populations
ence of simple shapes in tasks of higher perceptual load The effects of perceptual load are due to a limited processing
(Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Fig. le). capacity. Once capacity is reached (in high-load tasks), none
Although blindness to irrelevant distractors can be a benefi- is left for any additional processing. Interestingly, it may be
cial effect of perceptual load (as it helps to focus attention on possible to enhance perceptual capacity with certain types of
the task), there are of course situations in which this blindness training. Moreover, some clinical conditions (e.g., autism spec-
is undesirable. For example, while in daily life tasks such as trum condition, congenital deafness) may involve some atypi-
driving, it is often vital that people are not blind to the presence cal enhancements of perceptual capacity. The higher capacity
of other vehicles on the road and are able to detect and recog- in these cases allows people to perceive both task-relevant and
nize the meaning of the simple shapes used as road signs. This task-irrelevant information under higher levels of perceptual
has begun to be noted by some driving authorities (e.g., Traffic load (e.g., Bavelier, Dye, & Hauser, 2006; Remington, Swet-
for London), which have made recent attempts to improve driv- tenham, Campbell, & Coleman, 2009) than in matched control
ers' awareness with advertisements informing about the poten- groups.
tial consequences of inattentional blindness and requesting What about conditions that involve reduced processing
drivers to watch out for pedestrians, motorcyclists, and so on. capacity? These have been identified for patients with brain
Enhancing drivers' intentions to avoid inattentional blind- damage in areas that are thought to be critically involved in
ness is an important first step, but the implications of the load attentional capacity (e.g., the parietal cortex). It is also known
research are that the effects of intention alone are rather lim- that processing capacity develops throughout childhood and
ited. In tasks of high perceptual load, people may continue to deteriorates in old age. Thus, younger children and elderly peo-
"look but not see" (Fig. le). Indeed, a recent study demon- ple have reduced perceptual processing capacity compared to
strates that people remain inattentionally blind to peripheral middle adulthood. Fortunately when it comes to distraction,
stimuli under high perceptual load even when fully intending reduced processing capacity may actually have some positive
to detect their appearance as instructed (Macdonald & Lavie, implications. According to load theory, reduced capacity
2008). Signal-detection analyses of these data (used to isolate should lead to the benefit of reduced perception of irrelevant
effects on perceptual sensitivity from those on response criter- distractors at a lower level of perceptual load. The benefits for
ion) confirm that high perceptual load reduces perceptual sen- selective attention at smaller increases in perceptual load have
sitivity to other stimuli, rather than affecting response criterion now been found for all of these populations (Lavie, 2005, for
or bias. This suggests that it is important to consider ways of review).
actually lowering the level of perceptual load (e.g., restricting
the number and location of advertising billboards) in parts of
Cognitive Control and the Frontal Lobe
the road that are likely to demand more attention (e.g., at
Under Load
junctions).
So far I have considered external sources of distraction, but The studies reviewed so far clearly indicate that all people fail
perhaps most frustrating is the experience of distraction pro- to ignore distractors in tasks of low perceptual load. Moreover,
duced by one's own mind. Picture the following scenario: You although small increases of load already improve focused
have escaped any source of external distraction, being tucked attention for children and elderly people, both populations were
away in a very quiet place. Now is the time to devote attention found to be more vulnerable to distractor interference at very

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Sat, 09 Nov 2024 04:45:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Attention, Distraction, and Cognitive Control Under Load 1 47

low perceptual load than were young adults, and some individ- Brain Processing of Distractors Under Load
uals remain more distracted than others in low-load tasks
The load theory makes rather strong predictions regarding
throughout adulthood (Forster & Lavie, 2007). What deter-
mines the level of distractor interference in conditions of low brain activity. In this theory, the brain is expected to respond
to task-irrelevant stimuli even if people wish to ignore these
perceptual load, in which early perceptual selection fails? In
when the relevant task only involves low perceptual load. In
other words, what determines the efficiency with which people
contrast, high perceptual load should reduce or even eliminate
achieve "late selection," ensuring that distractors which have
the brain response to task-irrelevant stimuli. The first study to
been perceived do not gain full control over behavior?
test these predictions used fMRI to image brain activity during
Here it is important to consider higher-level, or "executive,"
task performance and visual distraction, under conditions of
"cognitive" control functions, such as working memory,
either low or high perceptual load. Rees, Frith, & Lavie
that actively maintain current priorities and behavioral goals
(1997) presented a distracting moving star-field array in the
during task performance. Neuropsychological studies have
background while people focused attention on a word task
established the importance of an intact frontal lobe for
presented at the center of the screen. Response to the task-
goal-directed control of behavior. Following damage to the fron-
irrelevant motion was seen in a network of motion-
tal lobe, patients are often characterized as suffering from a
responsive sensory brain areas under low load in the word task,
"disexecutive syndrome," being unable to plan or maintain
but not under high task load.
behavior in line with current goals and to suppress responses
Since then, many neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
to goal-irrelevant distractors. The frontal lobe is known to be the
similar modulations of distractor-related brain responses with
last to develop and the first to deteriorate at older age. One may
manipulations of perceptual load. High perceptual load has
then explain the increase in distraction in the low-load condi-
been reported to reduce or even eliminate the neural signature
tions found for the children and elderly as the result of their
of meaningful distractor images (e.g., depicting a place or a
reduced frontal cognitive control capacity. Indeed, individual
familiar object) in the brain regions that specialize in coding
differences in distractibility are also associated with individual
them. The responses to visually salient, flickering high-
differences in cognitive control capacities (Engle, 2002).
contrast stimuli in early visual cortex (including primary visual
Of course one cannot make causal inferences on the basis of
correlative individual differences results or the co-occurrence cortex) are also significantly reduced in tasks of high (com-
pared to low) perceptual load (Lavie, 2005). These findings
of symptoms following a large brain lesion. We therefore set
demonstrate inattentional blindness in the brain and suggest
out to directly manipulate the availability of cognitive control
that the experience of inattentional blindness under high per-
to an attention task by requesting healthy people to perform the
ceptual load may be the result of the weak sensory brain
task under either low or high cognitive control load (Fig. 2).
response to the distractor stimuli under such conditions.
Note that the high-load conditions in these studies are expected
Interestingly, even the differential brain response (e.g., in the
to mimic the effect of frontal lobe damage and result in greater
amygdala, a brain area known to mediate emotional processing)
irrelevant distraction, the opposite effect to that of perceptual
load. to distractors of different emotional content (e.g., angry versus
happy distractor faces) is eliminated with tasks of high percep-
Cognitive control functions are loaded when people have to
tual load. This effect is found for all people, including highly
switch back and forth between different tasks or when people
anxious individuals who show a larger brain response to emo-
have to actively maintain in working memory some task-
tional stimuli in tasks of low load (Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawr-
unrelated material (e.g., a random sequence of digits) during
ence, 2007). These findings have the positive implication that
task performance. Studies using such load manipulations have
one may be able to reduce emotional distractions (a desirable
shown that irrelevant distraction (measured, for example, with
goal especially when one is highly anxious) by engaging in a
response competition and attentional capture effects) is
task with high perceptual load (e.g., a video game).
increased with higher cognitive control load (Lavie et al.,
In an important contrast with the effects of perceptual load,
2004; Fig. 2; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005). Recent research has
high working memory load has been shown to increase
also shown that tactile distraction (interference by an irrelevant
distractor-related responses in the brain, in line with the load-
touch) is greater under conditions of higher working memory
theory predictions and the behavioral research (De Fockert,
load (Dalton, Lavie, & Spence, 2009) and that multiple-task
Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001).
coordination loads more on cognitive control, hence resulting
in greater distraction, when the tasks involve different modal-
ities (e.g., vision and hearing) than when both recruit the same
Conclusions
modality (Brand-D'Abrescia & Lavie, 2008). The opposite
effects of perceptual load and cognitive control load show that Load theory has generated much research that has furthered our
it is important to consider the precise nature of mental pro- understanding of attention, awareness and cognitive control,
cesses that are loaded in a given task. The opposite pattern and their neural correlates. An important goal for future research
(more distraction with high cognitive control load but less with would be to unravel the exact neural mechanisms mediating the
high perceptual load) also rules out general task difficulty as an effects of load both within and across the different sensory mo-
account for the effects of either type of load. dalities. Further explorations of the potential beneficial effects

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Sat, 09 Nov 2024 04:45:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
148 Lowe
of load for different clinical populations could help these groups
to capitalize on their points of strength and gain greater control
Broadbent, D.E., Cooper, P.F., FitzGerald, P., & Parkes, K.R. (1982).
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates.
over their attention. Research into the applied daily life implica- British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 21, 1-16.
tions of load theory has just begun. Future research advancing Cartwright-Finch, U., & Lavie, N. (2007). The role of perceptual load
this direction should prove useful for improving performance in inattentional blindness. Cognition, 102, 321-340.
and productivity in a wide variety of real-world settings that Dalton, P., Lavie, N., & Spence, C. (2009). The role of working mem-
require focused attention and goal-directed behavioral control ory in tactile selective attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimen-
yet include many potential distractions. tal Psychology, 62, 635-644.
De Fockert, J.W., Rees, G., Frith, CD., & Lavie, N. (2001). The role
of working memory in visual selective attention. Science, 291,
Recommended Reading 1803-1806.

Bishop, S.J., Jenkins, R., & Lawrence, A. (2007). (See References). Engle, R.W. (2002). Working memory capacity as executive attention.
An interesting application of the load theory to research of the brain Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 19-23.
mechanisms involved in emotional control. Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2007). High perceptual load makes every-
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., De Fockert, J.W., & Viding, E. (2004). (See body equal: Eliminating individual differences in distractibility
References). Discusses the load theory and its relation to research with load. Psychological Science, 18, 377-382.
of executive control in more detail than the current article. Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2008). Failures to ignore entirely irrelevant
Lavie, N., & Robertson, I. (2001). The role of perceptual load in visual distractors: The role of load. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
neglect: Rejection of ipsilesional distractors is facilitated with Applied, 14, 73-83.
higher central load. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13, 867- Forster, S., & Lavie, N. (2009). Harnessing the wandering mind: The
876. Provides an empirical example of the beneficial effects of per- role of perceptual load. Cognition, 111, 345-55.
ceptual load for patients with visual neglect. Jenkins, R., Lavie, N., & Driver, J.S. (2005). Recognition memory for
Lavie, N., & Tsal, Y. (1994). Perceptual load as a major determinant distractor faces depends on attentional load at exposure. Psycho-
of the locus of selection in visual attention. Perception & Psycho- nomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 314-320.
physics, 56, 183-197. Discusses the early versus late selection Lavie, N. (2005). Distracted and confused? Selective attention under
debate and reviews the related literature in more detail than the cur- load. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 75-82.
rent paper. Lavie, N. (2006). The role of perceptual load in visual awareness.
Brain Research, 1080, 91-100.
Lavie, N., & De Fockert, J.W. (2005). The role of working memory
Acknowledgments
in attentional capture. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12,
I am grateful to Jon Driver, Sophie Forster, and Nick Berggren for
669-674.
their valuable feedback. I also thank my husband and boys for letting
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., De Fockert, J.W., & Viding, E. (2004). Load the-
me write this article with minimal distractions while being on holiday
in a beautiful, remote, and quiet island, leaving me only prone to mind ory of selective attention and cognitive control. Journal of Experi-
wandering as the main source of irrelevant distraction. mental Psychology: General, 133, 339-354.
Lavie, N., Lin, Z., Zokaei, N., & Thoma, V. (2009). The role of per-
ceptual load in object recognition. Journal of Experimental Psy-
Funding
chology: Human Perception and Performance, 35, 1346-1358.
Preparation of this article was supported by Wellcome Trust Grant
Macdonald, J., & Lavie, N. (2008). Load induced blindness. Journal
WT080568MA.
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor-
mance, 34, 1078-1091.
References
Rees, G., Frith, C, & Lavie, N. (1997). Modulating irrelevant motion
Bavelier, D., Dye, M.W.G., & Hauser, P. (2006). Do deaf individuals perception by varying attentional load in an unrelated task.
see better? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 512-518. Science, 278, 1616-1619.
Bishop, S.J., Jenkins, R., & Lawrence, A. (2007). The neural process- Remington, A., Swettenham, J., Campbell, R, & Coleman, M. (2009).
ing of task-irrelevant fearful faces: Effects of perceptual load and Selective attention and perceptual load in autism spectrum disor-
individual differences in trait and state anxiety. Cerebral Cortex, der. Psychological Science, 20, 1388-1393.
17, 1595-603. Wallace, J.C., & Vodanovich, S.J. (2003). Can accidents and indus-
Brand-D'Abrescia, M., & Lavie, N. (2008). Task coordination trial mishaps be predicted? Further investigation into the relation-
between and within sensory modalities: Effects on distraction. Per- ship between cognitive failure and reports of accidents. Journal of
ception & Psychophysics, 70, 508-515. Business and Psychology, 17, 503-514.

This content downloaded from 142.150.190.39 on Sat, 09 Nov 2024 04:45:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

You might also like