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ON DISCOURSES ON IDENTITY IN RELATION TO POLITICAL CHANGE: THE CASE

OF JAT COMMUNITY OF HARYANA

Preprint · September 2022

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33671.27043/1

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ON DISCOURSES ON IDENTITY IN

RELATION TO POLITICAL CHANGE:

THE CASE OF JAT COMMUNITY OF

HARYANA

ABSTRACT

Jat community at one point in history looked like this, “In Sind, the breeding and grazing of sheep

and buffaloes was the regular occupations of pastoral nomads in the lower country of the south,

while the breeding of goats and camels was the dominant activity in the regions immediately to

the east of the Kirthar range and between Multan and Mansura. The Jats were one of the chief

pastoral-nomadic divisions here in early-medieval times, and although some of these migrated as

far as Iraq, they generally did not move over very long distances on a regular basis.” (Wink, 2004).

While still retaining its pastoralist cultural history, Jats of Haryana have diverged significantly, not

just in terms of migrating over long distances, but also becoming the land-dominant caste in
Haryana, making claims to the Kshatriya caste status and wanting to carve political negotiations

with the Indian state for a Other Backward Classes (OBC) reservation status.

The picture of a modest community described above with a simple pastoralist identity has become

complicated with efforts of assimilation into and negotiations with various power structures in the

subcontinent. Prem Chaudhary argues in her book, “Gender, Power and Identity: Essays on

Masculinities in rural North India'' that “During colonial rule, the designated ‘martial castes’, such

as Jats and military recruitment structurally and ideologically identified with, and privileged, those

trends of existing masculinities in this region that suited their power structure and empire building.

It was a constellation of martial caste status, land ownership, dominant caste syndrome and good

bodily physique or physical strength which came to ideologically connect and configure the

dominant masculinity (of Jat men) in colonial Punjab.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The power structures

of caste and colonialism documented and ‘labeled’ a community to be identified according to their

structural and heirarchichal connotations and created fissures in intra-community and inter-

community ties while forging hegemonic spaces for Jat men over community spaces of women of

the community as well as men and women of other communities, leaving them marginalised.

Sharmila Rege writes in ‘Writing Caste/Writing Gender: Narrating Dalit Women’s Testimonies’

that “The old associations of higher castes with skills of literacy combined with the policies of the

British, had meant that clerical and professional positions in the British administration belonged

to the upper castes and to brahmans in particular. (Omvedt 1976). However this hegemonic control

of the upper castes did not go uncontested. There were contestations of both kinds, those that

claimed brahman or more often kshatriya status and others that proposed real critiques of the

ideology of the caste system. Contestations for higher (kshatriya or brahman) status within the
given hierarchy do not challenge the cultural hegemony of the Brahmans and their

conceptualisation of the caste system. The acceptance of brahmanical hierarchy meant stricter

regulatory codes for women of castes seeking higher status. As against these, were real critiques

that posed a direct threat to the cultural hegemony of the Brahmans and articulated the exploitative

politics of the caste system.” (Chakravarti, 1998). (Rege, 2018) Through this research, I want to

understand how certain processes by which particular groups in communities try to climb

up the ladder of social hierarchy of dominant structures and forge claims to spaces of

habitualisations within hierarchical and hegemonic structures also create a crisis as power

dynamics make disrupting changes in community, family and finally an individual’s life.

METHOD

The ethnographic data has come from interviews with Khap members during the farmers’ protests,

women’s organisations and student leaders. Ethnographic Data has been used as a guidance rather

than quoted within the thesis. The theoretical framework is inspired by the works of Nicholas B.

Dirks, Lucia Michelutti, Ambedkarite scholarly tradition and historians whose works are on caste

and colonialism. Major chunk of Primary Data on the community in this research is attributed to

the works of Dr. Prem Chowdhry.

INTRODUCTION

The first thing we need to understand is that the identity in question as a historical query is flexible.

It has been ‘diverse’, ‘loose’ and ‘encompassing dispersal’ rather than related to a fixed occupation

or a structural label for identifying with a caste or a religion. “The Jats constitute one of the largest

and diverse communities living in northwestern India and Pakistan. According to Westphal-

Hellbusch and Wesphal (The Jat of Pakistan, 1964), give the Arabic equivalent of Jat as Zutt, a

generic term used for ‘men from India.’ The word Jat also means “bunch of hair”. According to

Ibbetson (Punjab Castes, 1916), Jats are of Indo-Aryan (or Indo- Scythian) descent. G.T. Bowles

(The People of Asia, 1977) argues that the word Jat in the Punjabi language means a ‘grazer’ or

‘herdsman’, but notes Ibbetson’s suggestion that a shift from the Punjabi soft ‘t’ to a hard ‘t’ (jutt)

in some Muslim areas means an agriculturalist. ‘Jat’ is a loose and flexible label applied to a wide-

ranging community from simple landowning peasants to wealthy and influential Zamindars.”

(Countercurrents, 2021) The representatives and documentors throughout history have used labels

of identity to establish heirarchies and structural crevices.

Why do local dominant structures try to ‘define’ and ‘label’ it within given structures? It is also

because historically it has been ‘complex’ rather than ‘defined’. The reason it was seeked to be

defined then was political agendas. “Masculinity therefore emerges as a colonial ideology of rule

which effectively countered the rising challenge from educated urban Indians with different

political agendas. The colonial administrative structure deployed new categories of social

aggregation and classification which sharpened the existing caste inequalities and, by encouraging
male hierarchies, it created new norms of dominance and manhood. The British uplifted the

concept of 'loyalists' to new heights by equating it with izzat—honor and prestige—a widely

accepted and acclaimed distinguishing attribute in the rural society of northern India.” (Chowdhry,

2019) In this research paper, I explore a chronological change in the ‘identity’ question for the

Jats. The ‘identity’ here is still a flexible and theoretical question for understanding the community.

From the Brahmans, the colonial rulers to the present dominant, self-proclaimed representatives

of the community, there have been efforts to make sense of the communitarian identity in terms of

relations with existing hegemonic structures. As recent news articles on reservation politics point

out, “For well over a century, the Jats of north India have been engaged in two parallel processes.

They have, via the Arya Samaj movement, clamored for Kshatriya status, which was denied to

them by the higher castes. At the same time, they have persistently appealed for reservations and

fought for their status, in colonial India, as an agricultural caste. The All-India Jat Mahasabha

founded in 1905, forcefully expressed these two demands.” (Datta, 1999). Although, as so many

different groups have tried to ‘label’ and fixate the identity question for the Jats, it gives me an

opportunity as a researcher to delve into how dominant political and social structures at various

historical junctures relate with the community in different ways and how they reconfigure and

create inter and intra-community fissures. Also, among these are groups within the community,

who with negotiation with the structures forge hegemonic spaces for themselves and seek to

‘define’ the identity in accordance with this negotiation.

History is a way of learning about the ‘complexities’ of relations of the community with different

socio-political structures. “During the decline of Mughal rule in the early 18th century, the Indian

subcontinent's hinterland dwellers, many of whom were armed and nomadic, increasingly
interacted with settled townspeople and agriculturists. Many new rulers of the 18th century came

from such martial and nomadic backgrounds. The effect of this interaction on India's social

organization lasted well into the colonial period. During much of this time, non-elite tillers and

pastoralists, such as the Jats or Ahirs, were part of a social spectrum that blended only indistinctly

into the elite landowning classes at one end, and the menial or ritually polluting classes at the

other.” (Bayly, 2001). The economic status within the community of different people was different

and there was not a separate identity per se for those that were ‘ritually polluting”.

The quest for a higher caste status within the varna system started under specific circumstances

during colonial rule. “The caste divide grew more significant even within the community as only

men from certain families were recruited to keep the army units bonded by blood. The recruitment

pattern adopted had a lot to do with the overwhelming representation of certain families, villages

and regions. Apart from flooding the region with civil recruits, as mentioned above, a British

Commander was allowed to recruit by sending his Indian Non-Commissioned Officers (known as

Haveldar or Haveldar Major) to their villages with instructions to get 'more of the same', who could

easily bond by speech, religion, caste and blood to their immediate supervisors.” (Chowdhry,

2019). This research paper talks about the way political ramifications have made a higher caste

identity relevant to Jat community as it has become land-dominant in Haryana because of the

assumed caste identity during the colonial rule and the Khaps and Maha Panchayats have acquired

political capital, social dominance and claimed the right for themselves as the most influential and

rich zamindars and landowners.

They have become deciders of the fate of a cultural history rooted in inter-caste unions and rich

traditions in women’s knowledge and autonomous community spaces. “In April 2014, four Dalit

girls were gang-raped by members of the Jat community in Bhagana village of Hisar. It was an act

that was allegedly intended to teach the Dalit community, who worked as agricultural labourers

on the farms of the Jats, a lesson, after they demanded fair access to government land. It is the

same social influence that is sometimes used to intimidate Dalit rape survivors into withdrawing

their cases against Jat rapists by sanctioning the socioeconomic boycott of Dalits, forcing them out

of employment as farm labourers.” (Dixit, 2016) Khaps have a history being a male-hegemonic

space passing violent rulings on the women of the community, who refuse the patriarchal order

and couples choosing to marry against the norms of endogamy, especially marrying into Dalit

families. “After hearing a case about the rape of a 12-year-old, the court found the girl’s complaint

false because, according to medical reports, she was found to be “habitual of sex”. A few months

before, the girl’s brother had married a girl from his village against the diktat of the clan council,

which had ordered all members of the clan not to marry somebody from the same village. As

punishment, the council ruled that the boy’s 12-year-old sister be raped.” (Dixit, 2016) Over time,

the Khaps and Mahasabhas have sought for Jat identity to become exclusive by shifting to

endogamy, closing boundaries by violent stifling of marriage unions with other castes in the form

of honor killings and organising politically in these hegemonic masculine spaces.

Jagmati Sangwan, an activist who has worked extensively to challenge the norms of Khap

Panchayats and to stand against ‘honor’ killings, reflects on the nature of the Khaps. “People often

perceive the Khap Panchayats as a group of barbarians sitting in the back of beyond, indulging in

these horrific, medieval practices, but actually, they represent a larger, rigid social order which
delves on economic interests that nobody wants challenged….It is land that commands policies

and politics in this region. With women having [an] equal share in their ancestral property, each

time there is an inter-caste or inter-religious wedding, the community’s exclusive right over the

land is diluted…. Like in any patriarchal society, a woman is a commodity. If a woman

transgresses, violates norms, asserts unconventional demands, firstly, it is assumed that it is not at

her behest and free will and, secondly, it is seen as an offence to the honour of the family, clan,

religion, depending on which one the ‘offended’ pick up. It is this notion of honour that the Khap

Panchayats operate upon.” (Dixit, 2016)

Documentations of caste identities were part of the colonial policy and to make use of that the

colonial office introduced the ‘martial race’ or ‘martial caste theory’ to create a group of said

‘loyalists’ to the colonial regime whose status in the military would not be that important as much

as their status within the community and in relations to other communities of their rural life. The

‘men’ who were recruited were given a favorable crevice to forge hegemonic spaces for

themselves. The colonial policies and law created important spaces of habitualisations and

encouragement to ‘dominant masculinities’ to modify the community’s cultural relations and

spaces. “Theoretically, the 'martial race' or 'martial caste' concept (used confusedly and

interchangeably by the British) was based not only on the climatic theory of race and the historical

theory of Aryan conquest but also in the colonial context identified through the use of the varna

system (a four-fold status order system of Hindu society according to the Brahmanical texts) and

their descendants who had or claimed to have Kshatriya (warrior) ancestry. The ideology of

kshatriyahood was consistent with the world view of colonialism. However, it could not include

those who fell outside its orbit. In order to accommodate men with 'proven fighting ability and
loyalty' like the Jats, kshatriyahood also came to be accepted for those who, in the traditional ritual

varna hierarchy, were not identified with the Kshatriyas but with Shudras.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The

documentation and judiciary identified different cultural elements of a community tradition with

different caste identites. The judicial identity still retained the “shudra” traditions, for example,

such as Karewa, widow remarriage to ensure widows do not claim property of the martyrs during

World wars and dead husbands otherwise, but frowned upon inter-caste marriages for the sake of

avoiding ‘dilution’ of the martial races. In this paper, I look at how traditions came under the

scrutiny of colonial rule to be documented and meddled with by putting some on a pedestal and

others declared ‘illegitimate’ to create hegemonic communists spaces to their ‘loyal’ British Indian

Army men.

Jats have faced a shift in their identity politics in Haryana following the rise of the Dalits in politics.

Being the land dominating community that enjoys the higher caste status at the present day,

agricultural decline has affected Jat households. “Rich farmers faced important challenges to their

power in the late 1980s and 1990s. Most notably, economic reforms threatened to undermine the

viability of farming. In 1991, the Indian government embarked on a program of economic

liberalization that would—if carried out fully—lead to a marked reduction in subsidies on key

agricultural inputs and increased foreign competition within the agricultural sector.” (Jeffrey,

2010) With increased social mobility upper middle classes in urban areas have benefited from the

liberalisation of the Indian economy from the early 1900s onwards. The only among these that

were left behind were the ones facing the brunt of decline of rural economy in the villages of India.
The rise of Dalit politics have ensued a threat to the caste capital acquired during the colonial rule.

Efforts to maintain higher caste legitimacy, social and cultural capital without the economic basis

of dominance resulted in “politics of waiting” (Jeffrey, 2010) and behavioral casteism being more

rigidified. “During the 1980s and early 1990s, in disparate regions of India, there were growing

tensions between rich farmers and sets of newly mobilized and increasingly confident lower caste

political agents (see Samata Sanghatana ). This double threat—from economic reforms and low

castes—to the historical privileges of diverse lower middle-class fractions affected not only rich

farmers, but also members of a lower middle-class salariat, who found their access to government

employment curtailed, and merchants and small-business people, whose capacity to extract rental

incomes and subsidies from the local state was put in jeopardy (Harriss-White).” (Jeffery, 2012)

There were social and political tensions in the caste dynamics as a result of this.

Nicholas Dirks’ Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India makes a case for

the regidifying of a consciousness of caste during the colonial period. “While introducing new

forms of civil society and separating them from the colonial state, colonialism also arrested some

of the immediate disruptions of change by preserving many elements of the old regime.

Paradoxically, colonialism seems to have created much of what is now accepted as Indian

"tradition," including an autonomous caste structure with the Brahman clearly and unambiguously

at the head, village-based systems of exchange, isolated ceremo- nial residues of the old regime

state, and fetishistic competition for ritual goods that no longer played a vital role in the political

system.” (Dirks, 2001) I wish to research the question of correlation between the crisis associated

with the dynamics of communal identity of Jats in rural Haryana shaped and reshaped by caste,

politics, urbanisation and industrialisation pressures on the rural economy.

 Caste not only subordinates the political; it also reduces the individual to a position of

relative unimportance. The individual only has ideological signifi- cance when placed

outside society, becoming in Dumont's terms "the individual- outside-the-world" (235).

This is the individual as the renouncer, the sunnyasin who must leave both society and the

mundane world to attain transcendental truth. Dumont's position is stated more forcefully

by Jan Heesterman, an indologist who has also played an important role in defining the

discourse of Indian sociology: Here we touch the inner springs of Indian civilization. Its

heart is not with society and its integrative pressures. It devalorizes society and disregards

power. The ideal is not hier- archical interdependence but the individual break with society.

The ultimate value is release from the world. And this cannot be realized in a hierarchical

way, but only by the abrupt break of renunciation .... Above the Indian world, rejecting and

at the same time informing it, the renouncer stands out as the exemplar of ultimate value

and authority. (Dirks, 2001)

The crosses of these various dynamics and reverberation of communal stricture that make the lives

of the younger generation and women within Jat households more restrictive and expose them to

domestic and generational violence respectively in the lieu of protecting endogamy and

generational social, economic and cultural capital associated with the land-dominant caste of Jats.

“Social identity was importantly political, as too were the contexts in which different units became

formed, represented, and mobilized. And politics took on its shape and meaning in relation to local

and regional systems of power in which headmen (of lineages, temples, villages), gurus (leaders

of sects and monasteries), warrior leaders, chiefs, and kings were figures of central importance,
with authority over constituencies that from certain perspectives could look and act like caste

groups. To read and organize social difference and deference- pervasive features of Indian society-

solely in terms of caste thus required a striking disregard for ethnographic specificity, as well as a

systematic denial of the political mechanisms that selected different kinds of social units as most

significant at different times. Brahmanic texts, both vedic origin stories and the much later dharma

texts of Hinduism's puranic period, provided transregional and metahistorical modes of

understanding Indian society that clearly appealed to British colonial interests and attitudes.”

(Dirks, 2001). I want to find out the manifestations for the Jat households as Jats have shaped and

reshaped their identities variously through politics, caste ramifications and rural economic changes

through a historical overview of the negotiations made with the Brahmanical Caste order, the state

and the influence of the market economy as well as the current narratives and practices surrounding

active use of the “Jat” name in politics and socialisation of children and the patriarchal control of

women within the household and the community at large.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES AND IDENTITY DYNAMICS: FROM

PASTORALISM TO SEDENTARY AGRICULTURE

CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL VIEWPOINT OF THE COMMUNITY LIFE

Transitioning lives and livelihoods from pastoralists to sedentary farmers, meant that they had to

encounter forces of religion, monarchy and the caste order. According to historians, Catherine

Asher and Cynthia Talbot, “The Jats also provide an important insight into how religious identities

evolved during the precolonial era. Before they settled in the Punjab and other northern regions,

the pastoralist Jats had little exposure to any of the mainstream religions. Only after they became

more integrated into the agrarian world did the Jats adopt the dominant religion of the people in

whose midst they dwelt.” (Asher & Talbot, 2006) Depending on the regions they settled in, they

came in the fold of different religious structures. Historian Robert Stern writes, “But only the

Rajputs, As the clansman of the sarkar, the governing power and themselves bona fide Kshatriyas

could grant varna to the Jats. And that Rajputs with some exceptions loathe to do. The Rajput

bhumias, who were distinguished from the local peasants by little more than the honour accorded

to them, were determined to treat Jat as shudras.” (Stern, 1988 ) In the regions of the Indo Gangetic

plains, the varna system defined the socio-economic status quo. Although, Jats fell outside of it,

they aimed to resist the ‘shudra’ status accorded to them.

The history of Jat kingdom, though, is short-lived and that too, a history of not the proposed

Kshatriya rule (which Jat Mahasabha representatives would like to claim) but ‘tribal nationalism’,

a movement against the established rulers. According to the historian, Christopher Bayly, “Men

characterised by early eighteenth century Mughal records as plunderers and bandits preying on the

imperial lines of communications had by the end of the century spawned a range of petty states

linked by marriage alliance and religious practice.” (Bayly, 1983) So, there was negotiation with
structures of caste but not an assimilation instead these can bee seen as acts of rebellion against

the established status-quo where Kshatriyas defined themselves as ‘rulers’ “This was a society

where Brahmins were few and male Jats married into the whole range of lower agricultural and

entrepreneurial castes. A kind of tribal nationalism animated them rather than a nice calculation of

caste differences expressed within the context of the Brahmanical Hindu state.” (Bayly, 1983) The

collectivisation of Jats then constituted an aspect of communication and marriages across different

castes and communities. This was their way of challenging the Brahmanical caste order and the

Rajput rulers who enjoyed the Kshatriya caste rulers. Unfortunately, this sort of communitarian

identity based on, ‘tribal nationalism’ and ‘inter-caste unions’ saw a major setback as the Colonial

rule set in with emphasis on creating documentations of identities where a fixed ‘martial caste’

status that was established in contrast to the inferiority of other castes was set in, as the recruited

Jat men acquired a rise in the socio-economic status and a characterization of ‘dominant

masculinity’ over women of the community and men and women of other communities.

CHAPTER-2

A HISTORY OF ‘TRIBAL’ NATIONALISM: REBELLING AGAINST

RATHER THAN NEGOTIATING WITH THE CASTE STRUCTURE

Rajput rulers have had to subdue Jat uprisings and stop them from acquiring more land as the

historical record of ‘Raja Bishan Singh's Campaign Against the Jats (1688-1693)’ shows. Jats have

been referred to as raiding tribes causing havoc on the borders or settled peasants collectively

rising against the Rajput rule. The all-powerful Mughals at the time were also worried by the

uprisings. “As the Jats had by this time risen into prominence and had extended their zamindars in

the region between Agra and Mathura to the borders of Amber it was but natural that they should

have caused concern to the Mughal emperor as well as the ruler of Amber.” (Pande, 1967)

The threat, apparently, was not just on the legitimacy of the rulers but also on the Rajputs being

the dominant land-owning caste in the region. The Jats were challenging all kinds of caste

privileges of the Kshatriyas. “The Rajputs were the dominant zamindari group in this region and

the extension of the Jat power in this region would be at the cost of Rajput zamindars. Thus it

threatened the economic interests of the Rajput zamindars. Secondly, since the Rajputs considered

themselves socially superior to the Jats, they were rightly concerned by the activities of the Jats.

Thirdly, a large numbers of Jats had already settled themselves within the territory of the Raja and

the Jats of Ranthambhore had once created disturbance under Raja Ram during the time of Bishan

Singh's father, Raja Ram Singh and seemed to be in alliance with the Jats of Sinsini.” (Pande,

1967) The rebellion, hence worked as long as there was a sense of communal affiliation with other

communities and close relations with them, including marital relations. The installment of

endogamy was a drastic change and came from a time period where ramifications of its imposition

brought in caste imperatives when certain representatives of the community, in the form of Khaps

and Maha Panchayats at the aftermath of the colonial rule started demanding Kshatriya status.
LABELING ‘JAT’ IDENTITY: “AGRICULTURAL TRIBE”/ “CLEAN

SHUDRAS”/ “MARTIAL CASTE”

CHAPTER-3

COLONIAL DOCUMENTING OF COMMUNITY IDENTITY

Prem Chowdhry presents extensive research on transformative sociological change for the Jaat

community in, “Gender, Power and Identity: Essays on Masculinities in Rural North India.” She

writes, “The colonial administrative structure deployed new categories of social aggregation and

classification, which sharpened the existing caste inequalities and by encouraging male

heirarchies, created new norms of dominance and manhood.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The effect was

felt on restriction in women’s autonomy in the family space and in using community resources,

the strengthening of caste endogamy and creation of hegemonic masculine dominance for Jat men

in village life.

Since colonial times, the Jat community in present-day Haryana resides in a region called Barani,

which has been famine-ridden (dependent on rainfall) and had concomitant low yielding crops and

chronic crop failures. Hard work was necessary to ensure mere survival of the community. “A

large section of the peasants tended to be subsistence or deficit producers, because only a

comparatively large holding could be economic. For example, in Rohtak district, a holding of at

least 12 acres was necessary for it to be considered an economic one. This meant that only about
28 per cent of land holdings were in this category. The same was true, more or less, for the entire

Haryana region.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The initial greatly regarded masculine virtue was sweating

and hard work on land. Strong physique, sweat and hard work have been important for the

community where farming has been about survival through a lot of physical strain.

Women of the community were in this time doing more work than men, as they continue to do so,

presently, as an obligation. “The perpetuation of this backward economy proved to be very helpful

to imperial interests. The impoverished tract became a major recruiting area for the British Indian

Army, as fewer human resources and labor, especially male, were needed to manage its agricultural

operations and animal husbandry. This was especially so since women were fully involved in these

activities, and a large number of men could be made available for recruitment. Moreover, under

conditions of severe economic stagnation and rising population, unemployment and prices, the

army in this region provided the only source of employment and sustenance.” (Chowdhry, 2019)

The community still valorises the hard work put down by their ancestors, which was evident to

colonial rulers as well to build their own narrative about the community for the purposes of military

recruitment and maintaining political legitimacy. The hardworking peasant class was spotted by

the colonial masters. “The designated martial castes and military recruitment structurally and

ideologically identified with and privileged those trends of existing masculinities in this region,

which suited their power structure and empire building. It was a constellation of marital caste

status, land ownership, dominant caste syndrome and good bodily physique or physical strength

that ideologically came to connect and configure dominant masculinity in colonial Punjab. An

Army profession fully supported it. During the two world wars it emerged as militarized

masculinity, amply supported by introduced legal and administrative measures or apparently

adopted in deference to certain popular cultural practices—all of which went into stabilizing and

safeguarding a highly 'masculinized’ ”. (Chowdhry, 2019) But, hard work was associated with not

just the men but also with women of this community. Also, most lands yielded crops on the basis

of family labor.

Where hard work was a virtue for both men and women, the Jat men were put on a pedestal by

being uniquely selected within the region as military recruits. “Recruitment, however, was

confined only to certain caste groups designated as ‘martial races’. The concept was based on the

idea that some people were inherently more war-like than others, and hence, better suited than

others to military service. Based upon pre-colonial military cultures which had employed military

identities to recruit local support and secure legitimacy and loyalty for their political authority (O’

Hanlon 1997, 1-19), this concept drew upon earlier British experience to target a few select

communities of ‘natural warriors’ for the colonial army. However, unlike the pre-colonial broad

based recruitment from different social sources, the British concentrated on those caste groups

whom they designated as ‘martial’, thereby stifling the opportunity, for many sections of the rural

population, which was to have a decisive fallout on caste relations and identities.” (Chowdhry,

2019) As the region didn’t yield much in agriculture, military recruitment became the source of

prosperity and Jat men gained a rise in economic status above all other men and women. “A region

marked out for its simple attire and equally simple food intake– remembered in the saying ‘sada

pehaniyo sada khaiyo’ (wear and eat simply)-- made the army recruits stand out in their mill-made

finer cotton, silk, and woolen clothes, all of which enhanced their physicality. The stories of

plentiful food and how well these men were fed in the army also abounded.” (Chowdhry, 2019)

The gathering of dominance by Jat men over family, social and political spaces was done
eventually, more often than not in the colonial era itself with the nudging and benefits from the

colonial rulers.

The British Indian Army’s recruitment politics shaped the region substantially as new dimensions

of power and social hierarchies were introduced in the region, percolating through British offices

and their tactics to establish legitimacy within parts of rural India. “Defined as a 'tribe' in the

nineteenth century, the Jats were recognized as a caste group only in 1931. Under the Punjab

Alienation of Land Act, 1900, they were declared an ‘agricultural tribe be' for all administrative,

political and economic purposes, but in the judicial category, as stated above, they were clubbed

with other menial caste groups under the varna category of Sudras. However, as they also

overlapped the 'martial caste' category from which the British drew their recruits for the British

Indian Army, they were considered by the British to have entered the Hindu hierarchy as high

caste men and being warriors belonged to the Kshatriya category. This contradiction in essence

meant that the administrative and political view of caste as understood and adopted by British

officials was very different from the judicial view enforced by the law courts. This inconsistency

was never resolved.” (Chowdhry, 2019) This was done through promoting hegemonic masculine

spaces that were based on racial politics as well.

The difference in the official labeling and the cultural settings and community identification was

stark and part of the politics of creating loyalists of the British administration out of the army

recruits that could have social dominance in their region, over all other men and women. Nicholas

Dirks writes about colonial policy and a desire for political legitimacy in play here. “The

transformations of Indian society under British rule, as also the contemporary concerns of

comparative sociology, are the products not only of a nineteenth-century orientalism but also of
the colonial intervention that actively removed politics from colonial societies. Neither British

administrators nor orientalists were able to go to India and invent caste through sheer acts of will

and rhetorical fancy, however useful caste was as a social mechanism to assist in the management

of an immensely complex society. Ironically, it was the very political permeability of Indian

society that allowed caste to become India's modern apparition of its traditional being. Under

colonial rule, caste-now disembodied from its former political contexts-lived on. In this dissociated

form it was appropriated, and reconstructed, by the British. What orientalism did most successfully

in the Indian context was to assert the precolonial authority of a specifically colonial form of power

and representation, thereby playing a critical role in disguising the politics of caste.” (Dirks, 2001)

The exclusionary political ramifications on the lives of Dalit men and women as well as Jat women

was related to not only being excluded from chances at economic prosperity given just to Jat men

of certain families but also in the judicial labeling of Jats as martial caste/ race (caste and race

confused by the British) in the new official documentation.

CHAPTER-4

BECOMING LOYAL BRITISH ARMY MEN

When in a region with scant production value from the primary occupation, i.e. agriculture derived

from a lot of hard work and dependency on family labor, the coming of economic resources from

army recruitment became a source of economic rise, but only for the men of certain families. “The

army recruitment was vital in sharpening and even creating, in certain instances, inter-caste and

intra-community differences. These differences marked out the divergence between different
castes, that is, between the chosen or designated caste groups and the others– especially the

surpassed castes; also within the chosen caste groups; it created a hierarchy, between those who

were recruited and those who were passed over.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The illegitimacy of inter-

caste marriages followed a range of cultural ramifications to create hegemony of Jat men in the

region, socially restricting even more starkly than before the community spaces for men from other

castes and classes, Jat women and especially, Dalit women. This was done through encoding in

judicial law the power to those cultural dictates that alienated women further from resources from

the land and declaring widespread marriage unions of Jat men to Dalit women and children born

of the marriages as illegitimate.

The Dalit woman and the child were relegated to the margins and excluded from inheritance. There

was the racial politics of British colonialism at play here as well, through judicial authoritative

means there was impingement on inter-caste unions. “The British bemoaned its 'biological

deterioration' because of this practice. They saw some of their favored martial castes, especially

those of Punjab and Rajputana as descendents of fair complexioned Aryan invaders. They did not

want them to be mixing with the 'dark skinned race of lower type'. The Aryan element of the

martial races theory was closely associated with notions of racial and ritual purity. In the British

world view and vision of imperial India, as mentioned earlier, there was a collapse of the caste and

race categories. Consequently, the British deliberately encouraged a hardening of what was

essentially a fluid social condition, by allowing inter caste marriage cases to be challenged in the

courts. The court cases show sections of different communities accepting and rejecting such

marriages, as well as attempting to challenge them retrospectively.” This favored caste endogamy

and the promotion of Brahmanical elements of exclusions in the name of ‘ritual purity’.
(Chowdhry, 2019) “Attempts were made to declare children of low caste women as illegitimate.

Acceptance of illegitimacy meant that land/property could be retained in the male hands belonging

to 'pure' lineage rather than in the hands of a 'physically impure', in other words, an 'effeminate'

male belonging to a mixed and doubtful race.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The Dalit women who were part

of Jat households and contributed to family labor in agriculture were rendered the most

marginalised along with their children as they could now be excluded from claims over

land/resources of the family from agricultural labor.

Excluding Jat women and snatching away available community resources was done through

judicially enforcing Karewa, which was a levirate marriage, in which the widow was accepted as

a wife by one of the younger brothers of the deceased husband, failing him, the husband’s older

brother; failing him his agnatic first cousin, etc. The judicial enforcement of the cultural dictat by

the British made it possible for men of the family to legally challenge the denial by the said woman

to practise Karewa, in cases where the woman would rather have access to land ownership and

seek choice in marriage. There have been reported cases of the same. One of the more revealing

accounts came from George Campbell, a British official serving in Punjab in the 1870s, who wrote

about his own role in such marriages, “The parties used to come before me with much vociferation

from the female side, and I decided whether the excuse was reasonable. But if the man seemed a

decent man, and the woman could give no better reason than to say ‘I don’t like him’, I said, ‘stuff

and nonsense’, I can’t listen to that– the law must be respected’, and I sometimes married them

there and then by throwing a sheet over them after the native fashion for second marriages. So far

I could hear that those marriages lived out happily.” (Chowdhry, 2019) So according to this

account, the custom was made ‘law’ and the choice of the woman not to marry any man from the
same family as her deceased husband was considered an ‘excuse’ or in Campbell’s own words,

‘stuff and nonsense’.

The logic given was that the man was especially considered a decent man and then why wouldn’t

the law force a woman to marry the man despite her choice? The whole rhetoric was to cull

women’s agency in marriage and stop them from possessing land and other community resources.

Chowdhry writes about the rationale behind this enforcement, “The agricultural interests of the

recruits’ families could not be allowed to be jeopardized by the ever-growing number of widows’

claims to resist levirate or get married to a person of their choice. Consequently, karewa, openly

recognised by the British officials as a men-oriented custom (Rohtak District Gazetteer 1910 III-

A 1911, 51)-- same as many other customs in colonial Punjab that were well-known to strengthen

patriliny and patriarchy– came to be enforced.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The deliberate judicial power

given to these customs was done with the logic of giving more cultural and social dominance in

the hands of the ‘loyalists’ of the British Indian army.

Caste was given importance in the colonial policy and the rationale was to ensure that the social

structures of the ruled are understood clearly and used to design a colonial policy that could benefit

in creating control over the social dynamics as the colonial rules goes unchallenged from the

grassroots. “One of the first indications of the importance of caste-and of the liabilities of official

ignorance about it-came in an official memo of 1816 recommending support for and publication

of a revision of Abbe Dubois's Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies, the first edition of

which was said to contain a large number of errors and omissions. The Board of Control wrote,

"There is nothing perhaps of more importance to the Hindoo community than that their distinctions
of caste should be well understood by the civil officers of the government in the interior of the

country, yet there is no subject at present on which it is so difficult to procure correct information."

In later years, of course, the collection of information about caste structure and customs was

justified less in terms of the needs of Hindu community. Lord Bentinck also gave contemporary

testimony to the importance of the Abbe's work. "I am of opinion that," he wrote, "in a political

point of view, the information which the work of the Abbe Dubois has to impart might be of the

greatest benefit in aiding the servants of the Government in conducting themselves more in unison

with the customs and prejudices of the natives." Here Bentinck suggests that ethnographic

knowledge will contribute to administrative sensitivity, a very different use of ethnography indeed

from what develops later in the century.” (Dirks, 2001) Just to ensure that there is a creation of

‘loyalty’ in the natives, the military recruitment policy, made the sepoys from a particular

community become dominant over the social life and make them stand out. Their associations and

traditions had to be scrutinized and they would be given a greater preference in resource

distribution and given ‘ranks’ and ‘titles’ and would not be allowed to subscribe to their local

traditions but seek dominance over them. That is how the Martial race/caste theory worked to

benefit the British colonial rulers.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE POWER STRUCTURES: LOYALTY

FOR ASSIMILATION

CHAPTER-5
THE MARTIAL RACE/CASTE THEORY

The British colonial policy helped create ‘statutory casteism’ in the region and the groups of men

who got recruited were given an identity as of a ‘dominant, martial caste’, ‘zamindar’ and a

hegemonic masculine space emerged out of this. These so-called martial 'castes' or 'classes' could

be best distinguished by their occupation. In the agrarian milieu of Punjab, these were commonly

known and identified as 'zamindars', in general and by the landowning classes in particular. The

socio-cultural ethos was coloured and determined by them. The word 'zamindar’ in Punjab unlike

in most other Indian provinces, where it is used for owners of very large estates, was and still is

applied to any landowner, however small. British administrators provided a constitutional basis

for this usage, and enlarged the scope of its definition in 1900 by the enactment of the Punjab

Alienation of Land Act which created 'statutory casteism' by designating certain castes as

'zamindar or agricultural tribes', with the result that the word 'zamindar' also came to stand for a

member of any statutory agricultural caste.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The emergence of fissures within

the community and in relations with other communities meant that men of certain influential

families seeked to form political associations post-independence in the form of Khaps and Maha

Panchayats to vouch for an exclusive Jat identity, with strict caste endogamy and violent response

towards any show of a breach of an ‘honor’ code by women that would entail using communit y

resources without the permission of Khaps, asking for land rights, crossing any marital obligations

of patriarchally assigned duties, speaking up against domestic violence or having any

representation in Panchayats.

This claim has been built into the political negotiations since colonial rule. “It is increasingly clear
that colonialism in India produced new forms of society that have been taken to be traditional, and

that caste itself as we now know it is not a residual survival of ancient India but a specifically

colonial form of civil society. As such it both justifies and maintains the colonial vision of an India

where religion transcends politics, society resists change, and the state awaits its virgin birth in the

postcolonial era.” (Dirks, 2001) This history paved way to the demand of ‘Kshatriya’ status as the

recruited men gained economic prosperity and political associations to now demand to be labeled

the ‘dominant caste’ as they were becoming the ‘dominant class’ with the help of the selective

recruitment and the access to administrative positions.

The hegemonic masculine spaces had started to be encouraged and patriarchal norms and bounds

strengthened since colonial rule. “The recruiting handbooks are full of references to the 'manly

independence' of the favored recruits, usually contrasted with the 'weakness' and 'effeminacy of

those who were excluded'. The Indian soldiers also saw themselves in much the same light. In

describing the qualities of these 'war-like rustics', the colonial masters also hailed them for their

'obedience', 'their natural respect for authority', and their 'military fidelity and loyalty.” (Chowdhry,

2019) Chowdhry also writes of alternative masculinities that existed but the political processes

encouraged the ‘dominant masculinity syndrome’ to take over and gifted such men with favorable

rewards, entitlements, land and recognition in documentation of Jat men’s identity. The below

proverbs and sayings were found in official documentation to encourage and applaud these violent

and a will to dominate characteristics in men and as such Jat men were considered fit for the Army.

Jora jis ka gora (The strong hold/own the land)

Jis ki latthi us ki bhains (The staff-weilder controls the cattle)

Thadde ke sirpai kai raah (The mighty chart a different route or the mighty wear the crown)

Thadde ki beer sab ki daadi heenne ki beer sab ki bhabhi (Strong man's wife commands respect

Weak man's wife is familiar to all)

Kasai ke maal n eke kaatada kha saqe sai (A butcher can hardly be harmed by those he can

butcher)

Maar age bhoot nachche (Even the wicked dread a thrashing)

Jis ka koda us ka ghoda (The one with the whip controls the horse)

Thadda mare to roven de na khat khosaya soven de na (The violence of the strong leaves the

victim nowhere. Neither can he complain, nor mourn. (Chowdhry, 2019)

The official recognition of this will to dominate in local proverbial sayings of Jat men enforced by

Patriarchy was strengthened with awards in the form of labeling the identity as a ‘martial caste’

and favorable laws for creating an established endogamy by declaring inter-caste unions and the

children born out of them as ‘illegitimate’ and encouraging widows to take on husbands from the

same instead of the land by making the practice of Karewa into a law, was all in favor of making

Jat men’s dominance translate from proverbs to actual land endowment, strong political

association and a ‘labeled’ dominance over women and Dalits. “The army recruitment was vital

in sharpening and even creating, in certain instances, inter-caste and intra-community differences.

These differences marked out the divergence between different castes, that is, between the chosen

or designated caste groups and the others– especially the surpassed castes; also within the chosen

caste groups; it created a hierarchy, between those who were recruited and those who were passed

over.” (Chowdhry, 2019). Cultural trends of patrilineal claims and misogyny helped in

smoothening this process. “Masculinity in rural areas is in a very large way perceived and
professed in relation to women - in their supposed inferiority and subordination to men. One of

the most popular rural cultural beliefs among males maintains that lugāī ādmī ki jūttī ho sai

("woman is no better than a man's shoe") and that she is inferior to a man in morality, knowledge,

and wisdom. In fact, a piece of frequent advice given to males by males and senior females is "

lugāī ne sir par nā dharā karm " ("a woman should not be given any importance") and " lujļāī kl

akall te kam nā calať ("a woman's advice should not be heeded"). As an inferior she is considered

unfit to offer advice to a man, and men are instructed not to accept a woman's decision as their

own. The giving of advice is equated with superiority as well as the wield- ing of power and

authority, all of which reside with the man.” (Chowdhry, 2019) Such violent masculinity and

dominant masculinity syndrome was given a distinct hegemony that could forge spaces for itself

in dominating and defining ‘cultural practices’.

CHAPTER-6

BUILDING AN EXCLUSIONARY/HONORABLE JAT IDENTITY

The violent ramifications of this has reverberated in violence on women and dalits due to the

rulings and dominance of the Khaps. “There are several local sayings and proverbs that are

frequently cited by men and voiced in various public gatherings in order to underline this attitude.

Some of these assert the following: naukar setti matta upāve, fhar tiriyã ke cāle sīkh kah ghagha

jī, tīn cutiyã, gāon ßorve bove īkh. Those who consult servants, those who are guided by women,

Those who sow sugarcane near the village are idiots, says Ghaghaji (a mythical sage). This only

evokes the traditional advice given to men: tiriyã tujh se jo kahe , mūl nā tu voh mān Don't accept
a woman's advice, whatever it may be. or tiriyã man par jo calen , voh nar hai nirjnān (Only a

brainless man follows a woman's advice.) (Fallon 1886, 171) A more popular proverb similar in

meaning and very frequently cited nowadays is this: aurat kī salāh par jo cāle voh cütiyä The one

who acts according to a woman's advice is a fool. (Fallon 1886, 22)” (Chowdhry, 2019) A cultural

base and the colonial push was all that was needed for patriarchies to translate into violent

repercussions on women. Scholars of the Phule and Ambedkarite traditions of the time of the

colonial rule also emphasise on the same. “Muktabai (a student in Phule's school), in an essay

entitled 'About the Girls of Mangs and Mahars' draws attention to the deprivation of lower castes

from their lands, the prohibition of knowledge imposed on them and the complex hierarchies

wherein even the lower castes were stratified into more or less polluting. She then compares the

experiences of birthing for lower caste and brahmin women, underlining the specificities of

experiences of lower caste women [Chakravarti 1998]. Savitribai Phule's letters reveal an acute

consciousness of the relationship between knowledge and power and the crucial need for

democratic access to knowledge for the shudras and women.” (Rege, 1998) Such community

spaces and access to them were severely affected for women and I will discuss further in the text.

Women’s oppression is also linked to changes in political structures is an interesting analysis I

came to during my research. “Tarabai Shinde's 'Stri Purush Tulana' (1882), a text against women's

subordination, was written from within the Satya shodhak tradition. This text launched an attack

not only on brahmanical patriarchy but also the patriarchies among the 'kunbi' and other non-

brahmin castes. Going beyond a mere comparison between men and women, Tarabai draws

linkages between issues of de-industrialisation, colonialism and the commodification of women's

bodies.” (Rege, 1998) Even martial caste status, for example, was given in accordance with
proposed masculinity in contradiction with the effeminity of men of certain Indian communities.

“The systematic application of the 'martial race' theory to the British Indian Army recruitments is

credited to Lord Fredreick Sleigh Roberts of Kandhar who served as the commander-in-chief of

the Indian Army from 1885 to 1893. According to him it was not 'a question of efficiency but of

courage and physique'; in those two essentials the sepoys of lower India were seen to be 'wanting'.

Those from the south were dismissed as 'effeminate'. This concept created 'superior' and 'inferior'

castes/classes of Indians. The application of the idealized concept of martial race to select 'superior'

caste groups in colonial India emerged in tandem with its opposite-the concept of the 'effeminate'

Indians as symbolized by the Bengali Babu.” (Rege, 1998) These hierarchies are all the

ramifications of making a martial class ‘loyal’ to the British colonial rulers.

The ‘caste question’ was crucial in maintaining control over the culture such that a ‘stability’ is

maintained, without opposition to colonial rule. “The British defined caste categories as it suited

their requirements. The same caste came to be defined in so many ways. For example, the Jats'

dual identity of Kshatriya and Shudra was important for colonial rulers. As Kshatriya they could

be recruited under the martial race theory and as Sudra they were able legally to hold on to some

of their traditional customary practices, like the widow remarriage, which were not allowed by the

higher caste followers amongst the twice born, and had also been rendered judicially invalid for

those caste groups. Such customs, though greatly despised and looked down upon by the British,

as explained later, were considered essential to maintain the socio-political stability of this

province.” (Chowdhry, 2019) The customs recognised and considered worthy of being challenged

in the courts were all related to the ‘martial caste theory’ and the suitable, parellell of building of

masculine identities according to that. “Ironically, it was the very political permeability of Indian
society that allowed caste to become India's modern apparition of its traditional being. Under

colonial rule, caste-now disembodied from its former political contexts-lived on. In this dissociated

form it was appropriated, and reconstructed, by the British. What orientalism did most successfully

in the Indian context was to assert the precolonial authority of a specifically colonial form of power

and representation, thereby playing a critical role in disguising the politics of caste.” (Dirks, 2001)

The ‘politics’ of caste was disguised as caste was considered as the basis of ‘tradition’ and hence

communities with no assumed caste identities also were encouraged to acquire that consciousness

and forging crevices and permeability to render caste important for communal identification in

relations with broader power structures.

The Jati and Varna categories, for example, collided together. “The term 'caste' as used by the

British included both the varna and the jati categories. For the purposes of evaluating what

constituted caste in judicial terminology, the British adopted the broadest ideological identification

associated with the four-fold primary varna category which roughly coincided with the jati or

occupational category. Varna in Sanskrit is literally 'color'. Originally it referred to the four great

divisions of society outlined in the Brahmanical Texts as Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Sudra

and referred to as a status order system, traditionally assigned to a specific occupation. For

example, Brahmins were the priestly caste, Kshatriyas, the warrior caste, Vaishyas, the trading

caste and Sudras, the menials. Jati referred to an endogamous unit within which one must marry;

members of a jati were members of a descent group. For example, the Marathas (of the former

Bombay Presidency) came to be divided into three groups for recognition of their caste ranking:

the five families, the 95 families, and the rest. The Marathas of the first two categories were

declared to belong to the twice born but the third to the Sudra categories.” (Chowdhry, 2019) Here,
I have tried to identify the historical processes that shaped a claim for hegemonic masculine spaces

within the Jat community to make demands for a higher caste identity and oppress women and

Dalits in rural areas to push under the carpet a history of rebellion against the caste order and the

Kshatriya rule of the Rajputs and most importantly, inter-caste unions. “The caste groups

designated as martial caste became more and more status conscious. Consequently, in the first two

decades of the twentieth century extensive mobilization of different caste groups with differing

results took place. This was done by using both, the help of newly found caste associations and by

strengthening the traditional caste panchayats and Mahasabhas. Both these modern and traditional

forms of caste associations hinged upon claiming and maintaining a separate identity, with its

separate history and culture for its caste followers. In this region for instance, the Hindu Jats were

mobilized and knitted into a strong social and political force and successfully laid claims to all

spheres ranging from political to appointments in the administrative.” (Chowdhry, 2019) Khaps

and Mahasabhas have been spaces for Jat men who are associated with the big landowning families

and administrative associations since colonial rule. They are self-proclaimed deciders of the law

of an entire region. They claim that they are the keepers of traditional norms and cultural practices

and they are defined by them, as is the history of the community.

Although the representatives of Jat Mahasabha could claim the history of ‘tribal nationalism’ for

the evidence of Kshatriya status, this was actually a history of opposition to Kshatriya legitimacy

to rule rather than evidence of a Kshatriya ancestry as I have explained before. The website of Jat

Mahasabha would make such claims in the page titled, ‘History’, “Thakur Deshraj, Ram Lal Hala

and Al-Biruni consider Jats to be the descendants of Krishna. Sir Herbert Risley declared the

Rajput and the Jat to be the true representatives of the Vedic Aryans. Risley has mentioned in the
1901 census report that as per their physique Jats are pure Aryans. Jat states of the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries included Kuchesar ruled by the Dalal Jats, Gohad ruled by Rana Jats, and the

Mursan state (the present-day Hathras district in Uttar Pradesh) ruled by the Thenua Jats. [citation

needed] A recent ruler of this state was Raja Mahendra Pratap (1886–1979), who was popularly

known as Aryan Peshwa. Jat rulers occupied and ruled from Gwalior Fort on several occasions:

Maharaja Suraj Mal captured Agra Fort on 12 June 1761 and it remained in the possession of

Bharatpur rulers till 1774.” An analysis of the ‘History’ section would show that there has been

emphasis on making the claim to Aryan and Vedic-hindu origins and the name of few Jat rulers

are used to identify with the Kshatriya caste identity but the origins as a Pastoralist community are

mentioned in passing and overlapped by such claims as to Aryan origin, with emphasis on ‘Vedic

heritage.’ The influences of connections with also a religious Hindu order, Arya Samaj are also

growing in the community, as urban Jat households make it a point to perform Yajna, a

characteristic ritual of Brahmins and many Brahmanic rituals are being adopted, overpowering the

local festivals.

CHAPTER-7

A Different Historical Juncture: Claiming 'Kshatriyahood'

Ambedkar writes that caste is based on strictures of Endogamy. As Jat representatives in Khaps

started passing rulings to promote endogamy, they also demanded Kshatriya status. “In a review

of the different definitions of caste put forth by Nesfield, Risley, Ketkar and others, Ambedkar

points to the inadequacy of understanding caste in terms of 'idea of pollution'. He argues that "the
absence of intermarriage or endogamy is the one characteristic that can be called the essence of

castes" [Ambedkar 1992]. Thus it is the superimposition of endogamy on exogamy and the means

used for the same that hold the key to the understanding of the caste system. Ambedkar then draws

up a detailed analysis of how numerical equality between the marriageable units of the two sexes

within the group is maintained. Thus he argues that practices of sati, enforced widowhood and

child marriage come to be prescribed by brahmanism in order to regulate and control any

transgression of boundaries, i e, to say he underlines the fact that the caste system can be

maintained only through the controls on women's sexuality and in this sense women are the

gateways to the caste system [Ambedkar 1992:90]” (Rege, 1998) Controlling the ‘sexuality’ of

women has been important for Khaps, as even communal song traditions of women have come

into scrutiny. The closing in of marital boundaries and making the identity ‘more’ and ‘more’ fixed

is what Khaps have been wanting to do.

Promoting endogamy is a way of approaching a higher caste status. Ambedkar explains,

“Endogamy is the only characteristic that is peculiar to caste, and if we succeed in showing how

endogamy is maintained, we shall practically have proved the genesis and also the mechanism of

Caste. It may not be quite easy for you to anticipate why I (Ambedkar) regard endogamy as a key

to the mystery of the Caste system. Not to strain your imagination too much, I will proceed to give

you my reasons for it. It may not also be out of place to emphasize at this moment that no civilized

society of today presents more survivals of primitive times than does the Indian society. Its religion

is essentially primitive and its tribal code, in spite of the advance of time and civilization, operates

in all its pristine vigor even today. One of these primitive survivals, to which I wish particularly to

draw your attention, is the Custom of Exogamy. The prevalence of exogamy in the primitive
worlds is a fact too well known to need any explanation.” (Ambedkar & Jadhav, 2016) Endogamy

has been promoted to make economic resources of the region, like land, exclusively dominated by

a particular lineage.

With the growth of history, however, exogamy has lost its efficacy, and excepting the

nearest blood-kins, there is usually no social bar restricting the field of marriage. But

regarding the peoples of India the law of exogamy is a positive injunction even today.

Indian society still savours of the clan (Gotras) system, even though there are no clans ;

and this can be easily seen from the law of matrimony which centres round the principle

of exogamy, for it is not that Sapindas (blood-kins) cannot marry, but a marriage even

between Sagotras (of the same class) is regarded as a sacrilege. Nothing is therefore more

important for you to remember than the fact that endogamy is foreign to the people of India.

The various Gotras of India are and have been exogamous: so are the other groups (tribes

or natives of India) with totemic organization. It is no exaggeration to say that with the

people of India exogamy is a creed and none dare infringe it, so much so that, in spite of

the endogamy of the Castes within them, exogamy is strictly observed and that there are

more rigorous penalties for violating exogamy than there are for violating endogamy. You

will, therefore, readily see that with exogamy as the rule there could be no Caste, for

exogamy means fusion. But we have castes; consequently in the final analysis creation of

Castes, so far as India is concerned, means the superposition of endogamy on exogamy.

However, in an originally exogamous population an easy working out of endogamy (which

is equivalent to the creation of Caste) is a grave problem, and it is in the consideration of

the means utilized for the preservation of endogamy against exogamy that we may hope to
 find the solution of our problem. Thus the superposition of endogamy on exogamy means

the creation of caste” (Ambedkar & Jadhav, 2016).

The Yadavs have had a pastoral history but have also claimed a ‘Kshatriya’ identity post-

independence, this has been done for political mobilisation. Cultural practices and local beliefs

have also sought to be reformed for the claim. “The Yadavs used to be a low- to middle-ranking

agricultural-pastoral caste cluster. By the end of the nineteenth century North India’s Yadav social

and political leaders began to mobilize their caste brothers with the aim of creating a large and

powerful all-India Yadav identity. Yadav ideologues attempted to nullify internal caste hierarchies

and cultural differences within the community by encouraging the adoption of a vegetarian diet

and teetotalism and the rejection of ‘evil customs’ such as blood sacrifice, spirit possession, female

infanticide, child marriage and widow remarriage. Similarly, the substitution of lineage/clan god

cults by the cult of Krishna was fostered. However, Yadav caste reformers did not exclusively

think of ‘social purity’ as an expression of higher rank. The adoption of pure norms and values

was also understood as necessary for the re-establishment of the ‘pure’ Yadav (Aryan) original

essence and to create relatedness within a highly heterogeneous community.” (Michelutti, 2018)

‘Purity’ and ‘homogeneity’ and control over the diverse processes of communal identification has

been essential for this claim, by the Yadavs as well as the Jats.

The honor codes, imposed on women and oppression of Dalits become frequent and differences

and distances from claims to community resources and the representation in the politics of identity

become more and more strenuous for them. “Kinship linkages provided by marriage, and relations
established through marriage, give a caste group its strength, recognition and leverage in wider

society and polity. Any breach in these caste linkages brings down the status of not only the

immediate family but also the clan and finally the entire caste group. This factor was and remains

a most potent consideration behind the enforcement of strict caste and sexual codes. At the center

of these codes stands the female, control of whose sexuality and bestowal of this sexuality in

marriage is crucial to patriarchal forces and their concern with caste purity, caste status, power and

hierarchy. Those who infringe caste and kinship norms in marriage are dealt with extreme

violence. Although emphasis placed upon caste/gender/sexual codes by upper caste and lower

caste groups differs, any infringement of the prescribed codes commonly evokes a violent

response.” (Chowdhry, 1997) The creation of hegemony for Jat men and the associations that now

claim more legitimacy to this dominance want a caste identity to go with it. Violence has been a

way to ensure intra-community and inter-community relations are under supervision and there are

imposition of ‘said’ cultural norms to maintain this hegemony of the Khaps and Mahasabhas.

There have been challenges to these codes and hence more violent rulings to impose ‘rulings’ on

familial relations and infiltration of private familial spaces and married lives of people. “A

challenge to these codes has repeatedly come both from within the caste and outside. The process

of democratisation and opening of economic opportunities, has altered the power dynamics making

for a complexity of relationship between members of different caste groups as well as between

members within a caste group. In the former the growing resentment and assertiveness of the

subordinate lower castes and classes not infrequently has resulted in inter-caste liaisons which

infringe the uppercaste norms and sexual codes. In the latter, the young members are challenging

the caste/kinship ideology upheld by the caste leadership of senior male members by breaching
sexual codes and taboos, defying demands of status and hypergamy or village exogamy and

discarding notions of honour.” (Chowdhry, 1997) Challenges have also come from change in the

economic order as well. Urbanisation has ensured that certain families have escaped the scrutiny

of the Khaps.

Senior male members of the Khaps still see themselves as deciders of the fate of man-women,

inter-caste and inter-generational relations. “In the face of these challenges emanating mostly from

the rural periphery and semi-urban-linked social groups, closely aligned with the nature of

urbanisation which this region has undergone, the earlier areas of flexibility show constriction. In

a situation which is socially and legally drastically changed, such infringements are sought to be

controlled by invoking claims of tradition, culture and honour and enforced through the use of

power, whether that of caste, class, gender, or seniority and finally violence. The running thread

of family and community honour, cultural and customary practice, moral and sexual codes, role of

caste panchayats, emphasis on caste purity and extreme violence, are noticeable in all of them.”

(Chowdhry, 1997) The senior males have self-proclaimed themselves to be definers of the

‘identity’, ‘culture’ and ‘traditions’ of the Jats and even with democratic associations with the help

of electoral representations, these claims go unchallenged. “New dominant castes count on their

numbers, and 'numbers' in electoral politics count. Kanchan Chandra (2004) illustrates why people

vote for caste-based parties and conversely how political parties appeal to caste cleavages. The

argument is that voters in India choose between parties conducting ethnic head counts because

they wish to gain symbolic and material gains. Similarly, long hours spent at political party

headquarters and pre-election campaigning times taught me that politicians are obsessed with

caste' and with numbers'. In my experience, candidate selections in Uttar Pradesh are most of the
time based on caste arithmetic. Thanks to their numerical preponderance lower castes and so-called

'Backward Classes' have gained important political space. In many cases the delegitimization of

hierarchical relations which had changed local patterns of authority and allowed the political

mobilization of subaltern castes had also helped these castes to increment their number and hence

to become politically stronger at the state and national level.” (Michelutti, 2018) The new claims

to a higher caste identity are not that new though, as Khaps also want caste reservations and OBC

status despite being the landowning class.

CONCLUSION: HISTORICAL IDENTITY DYNAMICS AND

PRESENT VULNERABILITIES

CHAPTER-8

ROOTED IN HONOR AND LOYALTY: HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES

ON JAT MASCULINITY AND INTER AND INTRA-COMMUNITY

VIOLENCE

There has been a spate of ‘Honor’ Killings, thanks to the rulings and influence of the Khaps. “On

29 March, a sessions court in Karnal, Haryana, imposed a death sentence on five people for their

role in the murder in June 2007 of a young couple, Manoj and Babli, of Kaithal district. While a

death sentence should have no place in today's world, the crime was a truly extreme one. Despite

the Haryana High Court ordering police protection for the couple, Manoj and Babli were murdered,
possibly on 15 June 2007, and their bodies disposed of. Manoj and Babli's "crime" was that they

had got married in spite of the fact that they were from the same gotra (clan) and from the same

village, for which they were ordered to be killed by the khap or caste panchayat. Such so-called

"honor killings" continue to be carried out in Haryana with sanction/ decrees from the khap

panchayats. Barely days after the courts took a strong view on such killings, a "Mahasabha" held

in Kurukshetra in Haryana on 13 April demanded that the Hindu Marriage Act be amended to ban

marriages within the same gotra within the same village. The khap "heads" also brazenly called

for donations to support those who were found guilty in the Manoj-Babli murder.” (Shreya Roy

Chowdhury | Dec 27) The issue here is none other than ‘honor’ codes maintained by the Khaps to

be true representatives of the culture. As much as they want to claim that their formation emerged

from grassroots’ traditions, their dominance is a result of a negotiation with colonial powers. Their

legitimacy to be the ‘representatives’ of traditions has gone unchallenged in post-independence

India as electoral politics also ensure that they form political associations.

Violence against Dalits has been on the rise too because of the rulings of the Khaps and in

maintaining the claims that Jats are higher castes.

In certain other cases the reasons for murder can be different. In 2009, Ved Pal in Kaithal

district was killed not because he had violated any so-called gotra rule but because he and

Sonia had fallen in love and had got married on their own, without the sanction of the

khaps. (Sonia has never been found.) Just a week after the Mahasabha, an elderly villager

and a physically disabled girl - both dalits - were killed and scores left homeless after a

violent attack by members of the Jat community in Mirchpur village of Hisar district of
 Haryana. The attack was targeted at the well-off among the dalit community, pointing to

its planned nature. Even the police have been accused of acting in league with those

involved in the violence against the dalits. Anti-dalit violence is not infrequent in Haryana

and often memories are carried for years. In 2005, a Jat youth was killed allegedly by a

Valmiki dalit gang in Gohana village of Sonepat district. In retribution, dozens of dalit

houses in the village were torched. Exactly two years later, on the anniversary of the 2005

killing, a youth leader among the Valmikis was murdered. Much of the anti-dalit violence

has to do with the growing "prosperity" of a section of the dalits, which has managed to

break free of having to work in low paying and traditionally menial jobs. (Shreya Roy

Chowdhury | Dec 27)

How much democratic institutions make way for answering social cleavages introduced during

colonial rule? “The social legitimacy of the Jat-dominated khaps has been strengthened by the near

absence of formal institutions of panchayati raj in rural Haryana. This, combined with the fact that

khaps have been tapped by political parties for building "vote banks”, has only ensured that there

is very little loosening of the hold of the khaps on rural lives. Even in places where panchayati raj

institutions are present, they are reduced to carrying out civic work while "social issues” are the

province of the khap panchayats. Thus, despite numerous cases of such murders, state Chief

Minister Bhupinder Singh Hooda has re fused to act against the khaps. And neither has the state

administration shown diligence in bringing the perpetrators of caste violence to book.” (Shreya

Roy Chowdhury | Dec 27) ‘Caste’ is still considered in the realm of ‘tradition’ and ‘norms’ of the

community. “Neither education nor knowledge of law may guarantee against this tendency. In

December 2013, the Supreme Court asked for 30-year-old Supriya Rathore, the daughter of a
sitting Rajasthan High Court judge, Justice R.S. Rathore, to be produced in court after a habeas

corpus petition was filed by Siddharth Mukherjee. Mr. Mukherjee alleged that Ms Rathore was

being kept under house arrest by her father, as he was opposed to her marrying outside their caste.”

(The khaps in our home, The Hindu, 4 December, 2021) Thus, electoral representation and law

still continue to mirror these cleavages and lack of representation for rights for Dalits.

‘Honor killing’ is a crime but only as a written criminal code. The sense and awareness that it

reflects a deeper problem of violent ramifications of caste, is not in the social consciousness.

“Academic Uma Chakravarti has noted that the term “honour killing” itself needs to be questioned

for its association with the uniqueness of cultures. She says there is a need to examine what

structures of power make such violence possible. In Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities, caste

has historically determined control over land and resources, and caste and its reproduction is

contingent upon endogamy. While access to money and power is one way of moving up this

hierarchy, actions judged as inappropriate and as per normative codes are also critical. “Action to

uphold izzat is always a male prerogative; women can only ‘incite’ action... the concept of ‘honour’

in punishing ‘defilers’ is essentially a means of maintaining the material structures of social power

and social dominance,” she argues in her 2005 essay “From fathers to husbands: of love, death and

marriage in North India.” ‘Honor’ of ‘family’ and ‘community’ still requires a major emphasis and

there are groups that still want political benefits to be associated with such claims, such as the

Khaps. “The enforcers of this honour are not only groups of old men huddled together and smoking

hookahs in Haryana’s villages, but can also be found in middle and upper middle class households.

From childhood, children in these households are repeatedly told who they should not marry. In

our families and films, daughters are treated as paraaya dhan , to be handed over unsullied to a
man of the right caste at the right time.” (The khaps in our home, The Hindu, 4 December, 2021)

The sense of ‘caste honor’, thus, still runs wide and deep, especially in the communities that seek

to dominate the socio-economic realm through invoking ‘traditional norms of culture’.

In the case of Jats, even the claims to higher caste status, brought about violent ramifications. This

is hence a case study of how caste structures and the practices they propagate create repercussions

for changing a cultural identity that had an alternative, much complex and relatively less violent

element of family and community life. Honor killings became rampant and substantial threats to

any breach of codes of ‘claims to caste honor’ “Most such cases result in the physical elimination

of the girl and the boy. If the boy escapes for some reason, the girl is almost always done away

with, or in unusual cases like that of village Kheri in district Bhiwani, the girl was caught, brought

back and remarried to an old man despite her four-month pregnancy, which was aborted.

Significantly, the girl was an adult and all appeals to the police and district administration

regarding this were ignored. The whereabouts of the low caste boy are not known or disclosed.

The jat biradari remains tight lipped about him. He is rumored to have been disposed of by them.

In fact in most such cases, the crimes have been committed in public. Yet, for want of evidence,

the police are not able to even prepare the challan or muster evidence of the villagers. A few cases

which reach the court stage of trial lead to the perpetrators getting scot free from the lack of

evidence and ultimately no one gets punished. Yet in a candid remark, the Bahadurgarh police

station officer, Risal Singh, opined that such incidents, all too many in Haryana, go unreported and

often even the police close their eyes.” (Chowdhry, 1997) Even the police in this case, cannot

ensure law enforcement against the crime of ‘honor’ killing and even though ‘Khaps’ have been
brought to court for these rulings, their dominance over cultural and community life in the region

has been taken as ‘given’ and ‘as part of tradition’ even in the interactions with democratic

institutions of elections, judiciary and the police.

These honor codes demand ‘sacrifice’ of individual and family choices. “This concept of honour

is explained by sociologist Veena Das, to operate at the expense of human sentiments and values.

According to her, it demands a sacrifice of the natural ties created by biology, and kinship morality

stresses their transcendence. Consequently, the natural bonds of love and kinship are sacrificed for

higher ends of morality and upkeep of 'honour'. This behaviour is grounded on the belief that like

the social order, individual personality is also purified and lifted from a 'lower' to a 'higher' self

by means of sacrifice. This concept of honour and honourable conduct is considered to be a

commonly shared ideology which guides the social behaviour of people in the whole of northern

India. However, this concept of caste/ community honour is mostly appropriated by the upper

castes.” (Chowdhry, 1997) The claimants to upper caste status can put individual life choices and

stake and deal with members of their community with violence just to ensure that the ‘status’ of

‘higher caste’ is maintained.

Jagmati Sangwan, the president of AIDWA ( All India Democratic Women’s Association) who

has led a decades’ struggle against the Khaps tell in an interview about the precariousness of the

fights against such a violent force. “Khaps can tell a married couple with a two-year old baby that

their marriage has violated the gotra laws and they must now tie rakhis and become siblings. If the

couples don’t comply, their families are ostracized. This was common in Haryana. Families got

thrown out of the village, fined for Rs. 21,000, hit with stones, tonsured and urinated on. Even
against these, there should be laws. There are layers to the problem. There are many cases

involving adolescent girls. There is nothing we can do to help them. But if they slip up or their

families suspect anything, they’re killed. In that age-bracket, girls, not boys, are killed regularly.

Schoolteachers in our group report the disappearance of students. Questioned, families say things

like the girl had a stomach ache and died. There’s such strong acceptance of these actions that no

one complains.” (Shreya Roy Chowdhury | Dec 27) She explains the reason for these rulings is to

maintain ‘hegemony’. “We have a hierarchical society and its leaders want divisions to remain. If

the youth choose their right to choose their partners, it has the potential to destroy caste structures.

Property will go from the landed to the landless pushing towards a more egalitarian society. That’s

the cause of the murders; the real threat. Those who understand these implications have, till now,

controlled all social and economic structures. Now they are threatened and political outfits depend

on them for votes. They don’t want their kids to use their right to ‘choice marriage’ because

hegemony will collapse.” (Shreya Roy Chowdhury | Dec 27) Maintaining control over the ‘right

to choice’ to their form of familial and social life to the youths is a big setback to hegemony of the

men of the Khaps in claiming resources for a certain ‘higher caste’ identity. A show of defiance to

their rulings is taken to be against the culture, where cultural norms are not decided by a historical

legacy and the rituals, festivals, local beliefs and knowledge traditions of the community of

women. All of these are associated with the grassroots. The dominance of the Khaps seek to define

cultural norms and endogamy strictures to maintain their local dominance over the community

resources such as land and as the definers of the ‘identity’ of the Jats.
CHAPTER-9

DEFIANCE OF THE NORMS: WOMEN’S SONG TRADITIONS

Women in domestic lives entrenched within the “family values” have faced the ultimate pressure

of roles of bringing up generations with the entrenched communal beliefs. The patriarchal space

has claimed the ‘uterus’, the reproductive freedom and rights of women.. Endogamy is maintained

through control of female sexuality, which is the precursor to the generational stability of caste

capital. But there is a tradition in women’s community, that defies all and sings freely about sexual

desire and encounters with Dalit men and a transgression of violent strictures on female sexuality.

“In women's songs the significant image (apart from the devar or younger brother-in-law) is that

of the "outcaste" lover. She covets those on the extreme periphery of society: the ascetic, artisans

and craftsmen, and folk singers and performers. These categories of castes and professions occur

repeatedly in the songs. Significandy, the coveted lovers belonging to the marginalized caste

groups, especially the lower castes, are visualized in the songs as highly virile.” (Chowdhry, 2019)

These delve into real scenarios, what to say the songs do not reflect a reality that the Khaps want

to bury and threaten to subdue, the fact of Inter-caste unions forged due to women’s choice and

consent.

There is also a mockery of the domination of higher caste men. “This virility, denied to the

dominant caste men of their own caste groups, casts devastating aspersions on their mardmjjî. In

coveting lovers from among groups in the margins of society, certain important characteristics are

emphasized, and not all of them are caste groups. First, they are all specialists in their field, known
to have mastered a certain craft or art, whether stitching clothes, printing clothes, making and

selling bangles, making pottery or iron tools, carpentry, or oil extracting. Second, these crafts are

crafts with which women's activities and needs are closely associated, making contact with these

craftsmen possible or necessary. Furthermore, these men fulfill professional needs that cannot be

easily fulfilled by anyone else; thus, these men cannot be substituted for other men such as their

husbands or other kinsmen for example. Third, in this region many of these caste groups are known

to alternate the practice of their craft with the rendering of agricultural labor during peak seasons.

For others it remains a means to supplement their earnings. Their dual economic activity increases

their opportunities to interact with high caste women. This interaction can take place at home, in

the market, and at their common workplace in the fields. This last space is crucial, as the

landowning caste women in this region work in their fields, their class status notwithstanding

(Chowdhry 1993). Most labour in the fields is done by Dalits and women. Talking to elder women

in villages, it is a common observation, “Jat men laze around all day smoking hookah and playing

cards while women sweat in the fields, take care of the children, animals in the household and also

domestic chores.” This also means that there is a meeting place for Dalit labourers and Jat women

to meet. In the case of Jat men and Dalit women labourers, there have been instances of sexual

abuse of Dalit women by the Jat landowners. The songs sung by Jat women, mostly talk about a

fantastical desire and a will to give up on luxuries and transgress boundaries to fulfill the union.

mai dhākanī le ke main āgī nai gai

ye mań bābā ne dhūnā ram aya,

meri mai ye maň akek man mein merī īsī īsi āi Mainho luń modheň ke sāth merī māī.

I went out in search of a flame, oh my mother! The modha [ascetic] contemplated by the

fire, oh my mother! He set my heart aflame, oh my mother! I want to run off with him, oh
 my mother! Modhā may be substituted with "ascetic" in the verse quoted above. The

characterization of the ascetic as a lover of women goes back to its importance as a motif

associated with Hindu and Sufi saintly traditions. Indeed the dominant popular religion of

this region operates through the shrines that are shared by both Hindus and Muslims

(Joseph 1911, 60-62), mostly by women of various class/caste groups; the majority of these

shrines have been known to grant boons to their devotees, especially women. Many of

these shrines have been in charge of faqtrs (Muslim mendicants) or sādhus (Hindu men-

dicants) who, in the colonial period, were generally considered by the officials to be "men

of low castes" having "no definite creed or rules of life" (Ibbetson 1981, 226)

sapere bīn bajā de ho chalungī tere sāth,

mahalān mein rahane vālī re tanne jhmparî läge udās,

jhoňpari meiń gujar karungī re, ho chālungī tere sāth,

bhajane khāne āli re tanne tukre lägen udās,

tukroń meiń gujar karungī re, ho cālungī tere sāth

dūdhān pīn āli re , tanne rābari läge udās,

rābarī meiń gujar karuńgt re , ho cālungi tere sāth,

Palangā pae son āli re, tanne gūdara läge udās gūdar,

meiń gudar karungī re, ho cālungi tere sāth ,

sapere bīn bajā de ho chālungī tere sāth

Play the lute, oh snake charmer, I'll come along with you. You dwell in a palace, how will you stay

in my thatched hut? I'll make do with your thatched hut, beloved, I'll come along with you. You
are used to fine dishes, how will you eat my dry crusts? I'll make do with your dry crusts, beloved,

I'll come along with you. You are used to drinking milk, how will you live on my plain gruel? I'll

make do with your plain gruel, beloved, I'll come along with you. You are used to a fine bed, how

will you sleep on my old rags? I'll make do with your old rags, beloved, I'll come along with you.

Play the lute, oh snake charmer, I'll come along with you.

nat ko khele bālūre rate hāth,

karulā khānā gokhdu jī rāj,

dekho bāijī natkā ko rūp,

tharā bīrā se do til aglo ī rāj,

jāo bhābhī natkā kī sāth,

mhārā bīrā ne prańadayan dūsrājī rāj,

pranāo bāijī do-e-cār hum sarīkhi kāl nā mileň,

mhārā bīrā chatursujān tum sarīkhighad le kāth kīji rāj,

ghad lo bāijī do cār,

le nā mukhare na bole kayā kāth kījī rāj

The acrobat is performing, With sand glistening in his hands His earrings twinkle in the sun. Look

sister-in-law, how handsome he is, Much more alluring than your brother. Go sister-in-law with

the acrobat, We'll find another wife for my brother. Wives you may get two or four, But none like

me I am sure. My brother is a clever man, In wood he can carve one like you.
There is an expression of romantic and sexual desire by women in these songs, along with a

mockery of the dominant Jat masculinity. “As faqtrs/ sādhus/ holymen, they are believed to have

the power to remove the barrenness of childless women. The region is replete with their stories of

magically curing the barrenness of women. Known to practice continence, they are consid- ered

more virile than the others. This in a way acknowledges the impotence of the husband or his

class/caste men and underlines the virility and potency of men occupying the margins but for

whom many women would remain barren. The search for this virility came to include the members

of other low caste groups who were socially despised, exploited, and denigrated in this region.

Showing an open preference and desire for low caste men, the song given below has a peasant

woman willing to leave all her comforts for an outcast sāpera (a snake charmer, replaceable with

any other low caste name) in order to get physical satisfaction. The song takes the form of a

conversation between a sapera and a woman. Essentially a dancing song identified with the month

of Phalgun and Holi, it involves two women as major participants, with others joining the singing.

It retains its popular- ity among women on any occasion for revelry and fun.” (Chowdhry, 2019)

Although the Khaps have tried to declare these song traditions as 'vulgar’, women have held onto

them citing ‘tradition’ and ‘custom ', which unlike Khaps has a multi-generational legacy, through

decades.

CHAPTER-10
NEW DISCOURSES: URBANISATION AND RESERVATION

POLICIES

Khaps, now, want an OBC status to proclaim the rewards of caste reservations. The question,

though, is first, do they have any right to claim resources from electoral democracy? Are they the

legitimate representatives? “In a post-Mandal, Market and Mandir India, the politics of

nationalism, economic opportunities of caste and caste-based solidarities have revolutionised the

ways in which both middle class as well as lower caste politics operate. In each case, the specifics

of the engagement vary–the Chamars of eastern UP assert different ambitions than the Chamars of

Western UP and the reasons for middle class suspicions of the state in UP are quite unlike the

reasons for middle class suspicions of the state in Tamil Nadu. In each case, the specific cultural

processes, the historical trajectories and electoral engagements vary, but they all ultimately

demonstrate the particular processes of vernacularisation of democracy in these settings.”

(Michelutti, 2018) Although agricultural communities are facing a lot of economic pressure, post-

liberalisation, Jat Khap members still dominate the rural social life and the community is land-

dominant, which itself translates into gains from the booming real-estate economy and a transition

to a settled urban life by selling the huge agricultural land.

Efforts to maintain higher caste legitimacy, social and cultural capital without the economic basis

of dominance results in “politics of waiting” (Jeffrey, 2010) “Lower-middle classes, especially

lower-middle-class youth, occupy a prominent political and social position in many parts of the

global South. Lower-middle classes in poorer countries often include struggling indigenous elites

cre- ated through colonialism (e.g., Scheper-Hughes 1992), class fractions seeking to protect their
access to state largesse in the face of the downsizing of the state (e.g., Harriss- White 2003), and

entrepreneurs who have taken advantage of nation-building projects to separate themselves from

the poor (e.g., Berry 1985; Fernandes 2006; Mawdsley 2004; Robison and Goodman 1996). What

tends to unite these dis- parate classes is a shared anxiety about the possibility of downward

mobility and a determination to exploit available resources to shore up their positions (Jeffery,

2010).” There have been new pressures of transitioning away from the agricultural base and

emphasis on children’s education.

This is at the center of an alternative basis of status away from possession of agricultural land.

“Middle-class investment in education obviously predated economic liberalization; the middle

class had emerged in the 1960s and 1970s largely through availing of formal schooling. But during

the 1980s and especially 1990s, middle classes intensified and diversified their educational

investments, and a welter of specialist non-state schools and higher educational institutions

emerged to cater for this rising demand. Middle classes sought out schools that enrolled their

children at an early age, offered their offspring English competency and extra-curricular skills and

inculcated in their sons and daughters the cultural norms of “new middle class” India. Parents were

especially keen for their sons to obtain the credentials and skills that would allow them to obtain

secure salaried work, either in government, India’s new economy or abroad. (Jeffrey, 2010). The

variability of a historical experience of a single community under the influence of different

socio-political hierarchies is what I looked at in this research paper. The question of ‘identity’

has been defined in relation to various structures. The ‘identity’ has been labeled, negotiated,

defined and the boundaries closed but history tells a different story. Even through the historical

junctures, where there was a rigidification of identification, complexity in community life is

central to the storyline. Who legitimately defines the identity of a community then is also a

central question? Is it only defined in relation to the socio-economic basis?

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