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Trends in Logic 45

Holger Andreas
Peter Verdée Editors

Logical Studies
of Paraconsistent
Reasoning in
Science and
Mathematics
Trends in Logic

Volume 45
 TRENDS IN LOGIC
Studia Logica Library

VOLUME 45

Editor-in-Chief
Heinrich Wansing, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Editorial Assistant
Andrea Kruse, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Editorial Board
Aldo Antonelli, University of California, Davis, USA
Arnon Avron, University of Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel
Katalin Bimbó, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada
Giovanna Corsi, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Janusz Czelakowski, University of Opole, Opole, Poland
Roberto Giuntini, University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy
Rajeev Goré, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
Andreas Herzig, University of Toulouse, Toulouse, France
Andrzej Indrzejczak, University of Łodz, Łodz, Poland
Daniele Mundici, University of Florence, Florence, Italy
Sergei Odintsov, Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Novosibirsk, Russia
Ewa Orłowska, Institute of Telecommunications, Warsaw, Poland
Peter Schroeder-Heister, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
Yde Venema, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Andreas Weiermann, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium
Frank Wolter, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
Ming Xu, Wuhan University, Wuhan, People’s Republic of China

Founding editor
Ryszard Wójcicki, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland

SCOPE OF THE SERIES

The book series Trends in Logic covers essentially the same areas as the journal Studia Logica,
that is, contemporary formal logic and its applications and relations to other disciplines. The
series aims at publishing monographs and thematically coherent volumes dealing with
important developments in logic and presenting significant contributions to logical research.
The series is open to contributions devoted to topics ranging from algebraic logic, model
theory, proof theory, philosophical logic, non-classical logic, and logic in computer science
to mathematical linguistics and formal epistemology. However, this list is not exhaustive,
moreover, the range of applications, comparisons and sources of inspiration is open and
evolves over time.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6645

Holger Andreas Peter Verdée
•

Editors

Logical Studies
of Paraconsistent Reasoning
in Science and Mathematics

123
Editors
Holger Andreas Peter Verdée
University of British Columbia Institut Supérieur de Philosophie
Kelowna, BC Université Catholique de Louvain
Canada Louvain-la-Neuve
Belgium

ISSN 1572-6126 ISSN 2212-7313 (electronic)

Trends in Logic
ISBN 978-3-319-40218-5 ISBN 978-3-319-40220-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016949620

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
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or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents

Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics:

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Holger Andreas and Peter Verdée
Adaptive Proofs for Networks of Partial Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Holger Andreas and Peter Verdée
Inconsistency in Ceteris Paribus Imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Francesco Berto
On the Preservation of Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Bryson Brown
Prospects for Triviality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Luis Estrada-González
On Gluts in Mathematics and Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Andreas Kapsner
Contradictoriness, Paraconsistent Negation and Non-intended
Models of Classical Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Carlos A. Oller
From Paraconsistent Logic to Dialetheic Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Hitoshi Omori
Paradoxes of Expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Martin Pleitz
Dialetheism in the Structure of Phenomenal Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Corry Shores
Saving Proof from Paradox: Gödel’s Paradox and the Inconsistency
of Informal Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Fenner Stanley Tanswell

v
vi Contents

On the Methodology of Paraconsistent Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Heinrich Wansing and Sergei P. Odintsov
Paraconsistent Computation and Dialetheic Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Zach Weber
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science
and Mathematics: Introduction

Holger Andreas and Peter Verdée

In this book we present a collection of papers on the topic of applying paraconsistent

logic to solve inconsistency related problems in science, mathematics and computer
science. The goal is to develop, compare, and evaluate different ways of applying
paraconsistent logic. After more than 60 years of mainly theoretical developments
in many independent systems of paraconsistent logic, we believe the time has come
to compare and apply the developed systems in order to increase our philosophical
understanding of reasoning when faced with inconsistencies. This book wants to be
a first step toward an application based, constructive debate to tackle the question
which systems are best applied for which kind of problems and which philosophical
conclusions can be drawn from such applications.
In this introduction we begin with a short but original overview and categorization
of the research area of paraconsistency. We present some often heard reasons to
go paraconsistent, a number of strategies to formally obtain paraconsistency and a
couple of possible objections against paraconsistency. We hope that this way also
readers new to the field can find their way inside a sometimes ill-structured but very
interesting debate. The goal of this overview is therefore not at all encyclopaedic
or historical, but we aim to enable the reader to enter and structure the field with
a problem solving attitude: what are the problems paraconsistent logicians want
to solve, what are the strategies they use for solving them and what are the main
difficulties in the process toward the solution?
Paraconsistency is not a well defined notion. Paraconsistent reasoning could be
seen as any kind of reasoning which is able to deal with inconsistencies. Paraconsis-
tent logics propose systematic ways to reason paraconsistently. In this introduction

H. Andreas (B)
University of British Columbia, Kelowna, Canada
e-mail: [email protected]
P. Verdée
Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016 1

H. Andreas and P. Verdée (eds.), Logical Studies of Paraconsistent
Reasoning in Science and Mathematics, Trends in Logic 45,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_1
2 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

we will not make a distinction between inconsistencies and contradictions. Both

terms are used to indicate information from which, for some sentence A, both A and
not-A can be obtained.
The only characteristic all paraconsistent logics have in common is that the Explo-
sion rule, i.e. “derive B from A and ¬A” where ¬ is a negation connective, is not
valid. To people who have not studied formal logic, this rule usually comes across
as very awkward. It seems always unreasonable that the derivation of arbitrary con-
clusions is possible, no matter what the premises are. Most people will admit that
contradictions and contradictory theories are false, but deny that from false informa-
tion arbitrary conclusions can be obtained. There is no consensus on what should be
the rational alternative to Explosion. Some people will for example rather suggest
the opposite of Explosion: forbid to derive anything further once one has obtained
a contradiction. But this is not the general strategy of paraconsistent logics: most of
them will still allow some more innocent consequences of contradictory theories.
Although Explosion is generally not considered as pre-theoretically valid, and is
(to our knowledge) never applied in actual reasoning or informal proofs, the rule is
valid in the vast majority of theoretically elaborated symbolic logics (classical logic,
intuitionistic logic, fuzzy logic, their extensions - most modal, deontic, temporal
logics, and many more). The reason for this contrast between the counter-intuitive
character and general formal validity of Explosion is its connectedness with other
much more plausible principles of reasoning. Much more intuitive are the principles
of Disjunctive Syllogism (From ¬A and A ∨ B, derive B) and Addition or Disjunc-
tion Introduction (From A, derive A ∨ B). It is impossible to unrestrictedly validate
both rules in a Transitive system (in which formulas derived by means of rules can
be used as premises for the application of other rules), without also implicitly val-
idating the Explosion principle. To see this, consider that Addition enables us to
derive A ∨ B, for each arbitrary formula B, from premises A and ¬A. If we sub-
sequently apply Disjunctive Syllogism to this conclusion and the second premise,
we immediately obtain B, which was an arbitrary formula (possibly unrelated to the
premises).
However, there is no principled reason why a symbolic logic needs to validate
Explosion. For various reasons one may want a logic with exactly the property
not to validate Explosion. Of course one will also lose some other properties of
traditional explosive symbolic logics. We believe that one should not be dogmatic
about symbolic logic. The formal theory of logic is, just like any other theory, but an
attempt to capture external phenomena. Such an attempt is a fallible enterprise. Even
if one believes that there is one true ultimate logic, there is no absolute warrant that
our present most popular logical theories have correctly captured this ultimate logic.
Even if one argues that Explosion is ultimately a valid inference, one should explain
how rational agents deal with inconsistencies. If this can happen in a systematic way,
there is no reason why we should not explain it by means of a logic, where logic is
here understood in a maximally broad sense: as any symbolic way to theorize about
reasoning. Both the reasons why one wants a paraconsistent logic and the ways in
which paraconsistency is obtained may be very diverse. Let us first list some of the
reasons philosophers may have to develop paraconsistency.
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics: Introduction 3

The first and most obvious reason is the need to deal with inconsistent informa-
tion or inconsistent theories. It is rather uncontroversial that every human attempt
to obtain empirical or theoretic information is susceptible to inconsistencies. The
reasons for this may be very diverse. There may be errors in the processing of
information, errors in storing and retrieving information, calculation errors, errors in
observation, discrepancies between theory and observations, unforeseen contradic-
tory outcomes of theories, incompatibilities between different of our best theories
about the world (possibly all empirically adequate w.r.t. past observations), inconsis-
tent sources, inconsistent databases, defeated conclusions of non-deductive reason-
ing…All human epistemic methods are fallible and in case of failure there is nothing
which can warrant the freedom from inconsistencies. Each part of our knowledge can
in principle be wrong and then be in conflict with other parts or future observations. If
this happens, it is rarely easy to solve the issue by diagnosing the problem and simply
contracting the problematic sentences. These conflicts are parts of a structured web
full of useful information. But even if we are able to remove mistaken information,
there usually is no immediate correct alternative at hand which is harmless. As long
as there is no alternative, one seems to be forced to provisionally take this incon-
sistent body of information as it is and continue reasoning from there, until one has
found a way to solve the problem.
An Explosive logic cannot be used for this purpose, because in such a logic every
inconsistent theory is interderivable (from any inconsistent theory one can derive all
statements of any other theory) and thus equivalent. This means that, given an Explo-
sive logic, all inconsistent information becomes inferentially identical and therefore
entirely useless. It should not come as a surprise that this is highly undesired for
the above described type of problems. Instead one may want a logic that maximally
isolates (possible) inconsistencies so that the underlying problems do not infect or
affect other parts of our knowledge. Or, on the other side of the spectrum, one may
rather want a logic which maximally approximates an Explosive logic, but without
Explosion. Similarly, one may want a logic which spreads inconsistencies to all for-
mally related sentences to avoid potentially false assumptions of safety for indirectly
affected sentences. Alternatively, one may want a mechanism to “repair” the incon-
sistency. Yet another project may be to devise a logic which reduces inconsistencies
to more basic/primitive inconsistencies.
A second reason is dealing with inescapable, acceptable or true contradictions.
This concerns several versions of dialetheism (cf. [22]). Semantic paradoxes (among
which the famous Liar Paradox) show that we cannot combine traditional Explosive
logic, certain parts of ordinary language (e.g. unrestricted self reference) and straight-
forward principles of semantics (e.g. transparent truth). Other paradoxes (set theo-
retic, property theoretic, related to informal mathematical proofs or definitions) show
that inconsistencies are obtained by using certain intuitively very attractive principles
of reasoning. In all these cases ways have been found to avoid the inconsistencies
by restricting the modelled domains and the validity of the intuitive principles. But
one may choose to take the intuitions behind the problematic theories seriously and
so to bite the bullet and accept the inescapable inconsistency. Of course one needs a
logic to reason with such an acceptable or even true inconsistency. Even if one does
4 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

not want to make the inconsistency true in a strong truth as correspondence-sense,

one may see a mathematical or semantic theory in a less realistic way and, because
of external reasons, argue that an inconsistent theory is preferable over its possible
consistent corrections as the most appropriate theory of a certain domain.
A third reason is dealing with the possibility of inconsistent (counterfactual)
worlds. Even if inconsistent objects do not exists, one may find it useful or even
metaphysically required to be able to reason with them. A Meinongian, for example,
who believes that inconsistent objects do not exist, may still see them as objects that
we can describe in a reasonable language. If they have inconsistent properties, an
Explosive logic cannot be the underlying logic of such a language. One may also
reason that logic should be maximally neutral. If the logic excludes inconsistent
theories already in advance, logic seriously restricts the metaphysical possibilities.
So even if one is strongly convinced that there are no true inconsistencies, one may
see this as a matter of fact and not as an a priori truth determined by logic.
A fourth reason may be dealing with the entailment/implication connective as
used in informal mathematics or science. Independent of one’s considerations about
the nature of negation and inconsistencies, logicians, such as the fathers of relevance
logics (cf. e.g. [1, 12]), have attempted to give a reasonable formalization of implica-
tion connectives (closer to actual usage than material implication). They took it to be
essential for implication to express a link between antecedent and consequent. There
is of course no link whatsoever between p-and-not- p and q, so p-and-not- p cannot
imply q, and so the object language variant of Explosion (A ∧ ¬A) → B cannot be
valid in a logic based on such a view on implication. In a sense then, such logics
are also paraconsistent, even if one often does not define a consequence relation but
merely a set of tautologies.
A fifth reason may be the discovery of ignored domains of mathematics. In the
same way as the generalization of real numbers to complex numbers turned out to be
a rich broadening of mathematics, also taking inconsistent theories and inconsistent
models of existing theories seriously may enlarge the mathematical domain in an
interesting way. Once one has a precise paraconsistent logic to deal with inconsis-
tencies, there is no reason why a mathematical theory could not be inconsistent, as
long as it is as rigorous as the theories of classical mathematics.
For all of these reasons, paraconsistent logicians have developed a plethora of
different systems in the relative short history of paraconsistency. We here list some
of the most prominent approaches, divided into several categories. The categories
may overlap. We certainly do not aim to give a full overview, but merely a more or
less original categorisation of possible approaches.
A first category contains logics in which the consistency of sentences can be
expressed formally by means of a (possibly defined) unary connective. In an Explo-
sive logic, such a symbol would be trivial, because every sentence is supposed to be
consistent in such a logic. The first examples of such logics were so called Da Costa
Cn -logics (cf. [13]) in which ¬(A ∧ ¬A) is interpreted as expressing the consistency
of A. Later this is generalized to the class of LFI’s: Logics of Formal Inconsistency
(cf. [11]). This is a general framework which contains very different paraconsistent
logics with a unary consistency connective. In such logics one has Explosion for
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics: Introduction 5

consistent formulas (and not for all other formulas). The advantage of this approach
is that one can understand and model classical reasoning as well as paraconsistent
reasoning, depending on which formulas are involved.
A second category are the many valued logics. The idea is to allow other truth
values than consistent truth and consistent falsity. An evident choice is of course the
introduction of a third value indicating both true and false. Other options are: going
four valued (adding a value for neither-true-nor-false) or even infinitely valued. In
general Disjunctive Syllogism will not be valid, because there are non-classical truth
values that make both A and ¬A ∨ B true without affecting the value of B. There
are a lot of examples, but prominent ones are these: the three valued logic of paradox
(cf. [20]), the four valued Belnap Dunn logic (cf. [14]) and, recently, paraconsistent
logics based on infinitely valued fuzzy logics [15]).
A third category are systems in which negation is a modal connective. This is a
diverse group, but in general one obtains paraconsistency by interpreting negation in
such a way that the truth of a negated formulas is interpreted as the possible falsity
of that formula. Just like it is consistent in classical modal logic that a formula is
true and possibly false, there are models in which a formula and its negation are both
true, given such a modal paraconsistent negation. The first and best known example
is what is now known as dual intuitionistic logic (cf. [16]). In the Kripke semantics of
intuitionistic logic negation is interpreted as not possibly true, were ‘possibly’ means
provable at some future point in time. In the dual version we could read negation
as possibly false or refutable at some point in time. This treatment of negation as a
modal connective can be based on many other modal logics in several diverse ways
of expressing the paraconsistent negation. A philosophical study of negation as a
modality can be found in [8].
A fourth category are the non-adjunctive or discussive paraconsistent logics (cf.
[17]). Consistencies are here possible because a sentence may be coherently held
by one agent in a discussion and its negation coherently by another agent in the
same discussion. From the point of view of a neutral observer of the discussion we
are dealing with an inconsistency. A ∧ ¬A would still explode, but there is no way
to conjoin A and ¬A. In these logics Addition is unproblematic, but Disjunctive
Syllogism is only valid in its one premise form: from A ∧ (¬A ∨ B) conclude B.
The Adjunction (Conjunction Introduction) rule (derive A ∧ B from A and B) is
blocked.
A fifth category are the non-monotonic logics. They restrict the law of Disjunctive
Syllogism to formulas which could be consistent in view of the premises. For the
other formulas one of the other paraconsistency strategies is used. That way only
those models are selected that verify a minimal amount of inconsistencies. The
advantage of this strategy is that one has the inferential richness of Explosive logics
for consistent premises, but also the inconsistency tolerance when the premises are
not consistent. The most well known examples are inconsistency adaptive logics [5]
and minimally inconsistent LP (cf. [21]).
A sixth category contains logics that are not cautiously transitive. Merely block-
ing (cautious) transitivity makes it possible to validate both Disjunctive Syllogism
and Addition (and in fact all the strength of classical logic for consistent premises)
6 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

without necessarily validating the Explosion rule (cf. [6, 9]). Non-monotonic logics
will usually also be non-transitive but will make sure that they are cautiously transi-
tive (if something follows from the combination of the premises plus a conclusion,
then it is also a valid conclusion of the premises alone). If one does not have cautious
transitivity, one can have both unproblematic rules, as long as both are not applied
in chain (one after the other). In this case one can have a monotonic structural para-
consistent logic which validates all classical consequences of consistent premises.
The price to pay here is the capacity to build on earlier results. Every proof needs to
start again from the basic axioms.
A seventh category are the implication revising logics. It is quite generally recog-
nized that the material implication of classical logic (and many other logics) is far
from the implication connective used in informal reasoning. A first example are the
relevant logics (cf. [2] and the discussion above). Connexive logic (cf. [18]), on the
other hand, are not subclassical; they really contradict classical logic. They make
it false that something could imply its negation. If, by contrast, one also accepts
that it is true that (some) contradictions imply their negations, one easily obtains a
contradiction the logic should be able to deal with.
Still other options are logics with a non-deterministic semantics. In these systems
the semantics of complex sentences are not necessarily reduced/analysed into incon-
sistencies concerning primitive sentences. That way the negation of a sentence A
may for example be allowed to be true independent of the truth value of A. This way
A and its negation may be true together. Of course one loses compositionality, but
this does not need to make the logic inferentially impotent. Examples are the weaker
LFIs such as mbC and Batens’ system CLuN (cf. [4]).
A final category concerns the possibility to block Addition (possibly only for
inconsistent formulas) in order to avoid Explosion. In a logic that merely analyses
sentences into (combinations of) subsentences, of course one can never obtain an
arbitrary formula. This strategy is followed in [19].
It is clear that there are a lot of paraconsistent logics with a diverse set of purposes.
Although, in general, they are well-developed, both technically and philosophically,
there is not much research comparing them in relation to their applicability in sci-
ence and mathematics. It is surprising how little these logics are actively applied
to actual scientific or mathematical theories (other than some historical reconstruc-
tions). Given how common it is that scientists have to deal with inconsistencies
(between theories, between theories and observations, and inside theories) and incon-
sistency resolution, it is surprising that relatively little work has been done to make
the involved type of reasoning logically precise.
There may be several reasons for this. Let us summarize some of the possible
objections one may have against adopting a paraconsistent logic for concrete appli-
cations in science and mathematics. Many people are reluctant to use paraconsistent
logics because when adopting them, one loses the strongest possible argument to
reject problematic hypotheses and theories, i.e. the fact that they are inconsistent. In
a paraconsistent context, logic alone does not suffice to reject inconsistent theories.
Consequently, in such a context new information will never, by pure force of logic,
necessitate the revision of old information. Logic no longer excludes the possibil-
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics: Introduction 7

ity to keep piling up all kinds of inconsistent information without ever contracting
old information. Belief revision is therefore no longer a logical requirement. There
may of course be many other reasonable criteria for rejecting problematic theories
(incoherence, vagueness, lack of elegance, lack of explanatory power, empirical inad-
equacy etc.) and consistency may in a paraconsistent context still be a locally valid
extra-logical requirement, or a property one may want to satisfy as much as possible.
Nevertheless it is dialectically very attractive to possess a logical criterion to dismiss
every theory from which one can derive an inconsistency.
Moreover, the discussion above shows that (most) paraconsistent logics need
to lose some a priori attractive principles of reason. We have become so used to
classical logic that all of the above considered principles (Disjunctive Syllogism,
Addition, Adjunction, Monotonicity and Transitivity) seem very natural principles of
logical consequence often successfully applied in informal mathematical or scientific
reasoning. If such principles are no longer logically valid, one needs to explain the
discrepancy between logic and practice. Are the apparently successful applications
of the invalid principles mistakes, locally correct applications of a generally speaking
invalid principle, or the result of a mistaken formalization? Moreover, if not merely
metalogical principles (Monotonicity, Transitivity) but actual logic rules (Disjunctive
Syllogism, Addition, Adjunction) are blocked, one loses inferential power to the
effect that many theories become much weaker. This may be desirable for those
parts of the considered theory where one is confronted with actual inconsistencies,
but problematic where everything seems to behave consistently.
Logics that have more inferential power but require specific treatment for consis-
tent parts of theories are often computationally highly complex. In order to find out
whether a specific application of a rule is valid, one needs to know already whether
an inconsistency is derivable from certain involved formulas in relation to the rest
of the theory. Calculating this may be very difficult (cf. [25]). Suppose that, inside a
given theory  ∪ {A, ¬A ∨ B}, one wants to apply Disjunctive Syllogism to obtain
B. If the paraconsistent logic only allows this rule if A is consistent, one needs to
find out whether ¬A is derivable from , before one is able to correctly apply this
single rule. If  and A have some non-logical vocabulary in common and  is a large
set or forms a complex theory, finding this out may be immensely time consuming
or even undecidable. Computational complexity is not a conclusive reason to reject a
logic, because the logic may be seen as merely the ideal but difficult or unreachable
standard of reasoning. But in that case one should explain how human agents can at
least approximately deal with the unreachable ideal reasoning standards in practice.
Yet another possible objection is the question whether formal logic is applicable in
an inconsistent context. Those who do accept the importance of inconsistency tolerant
reasoning may object that this type of reasoning (largely) happens extralogically (cf.
[24]). Important extra-logical factors involved in dealing with inconsistencies are:
the sources of information, the priority ordering of information and its sources, the
goals of reasoning, social and dialectical dynamics of reasoning and arguing, and
fallible diagnostic reasoning. Nobody will deny that such factors play a role in dealing
with (at least some) inconsistencies, but that does not mean that one cannot also say
something with logical generality based solely on the form of involved expressions.
8 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

Even those who accept that paraconsistent logics correctly formalize some phe-
nomena, may still claim that, to the extent that they are useful, paraconsistent logics
can be translated into more traditional explosive logics. Either one claims that what
paraconsistent logicians would formalize as an inconsistency should actually be for-
malized differently (possibly with the same syntactic consequences). If an agent
receives information A and information ¬A from two equally reliable sources, it
makes sense to formalize this as ‘agent 1 believes A’ and ‘agent 2 believes ¬A’,
using doxastic or epistemic modalities. Even in explosive logics this pair does not
explode. Similar modal solutions work for every kind of inconsistency coming from
different origins (incompatible axioms, theories, observations). In case the incon-
sistency originates from one indissoluble (inconsistent) body of information this
strategy does not work, but one could then argue that the body of information is
simply unreliable and should not be used for doing further reasoning.
Another alternative is to consider the paraconsistent negation as a coherent unary
connective that can be added to classical logic, but not as the negation. One can often
use the usually classical semantics of the paraconsistent negation connective to add it
to classical logic as a conservative extension. Or one can define inconsistency tolerant
databases or inconsistent properties/collections inside a purely classical context as
well-defined mathematical objects. Compare it to fuzzy set theory. People speak of
fuzzy sets (cf. [26]), but they are merely useful classical mathematics tools, which
are defined by means of ordinary sets and real number theory. They behave in such
a way that they are more subtle generalizations of ordinary sets (ones to which the
elements belong to a certain degree, instead of just in or out). They are no alternatives
to classical set theory, but mere extensions of it. People who accept the usefulness of
some paraconsistent logics can claim the same thing about a paraconsistent negation;
a useful tool that can be defined in a rich enough classical logic (plus perhaps some
parts of classical set theory). For many applications of paraconsistent logic it seems
indeed unnecessary to really revise classical logic; it is often sufficient to realize
that classical logic is not the appropriate tool to approach inconsistent collections of
information. But classical logic was never meant for this purpose anyway. The idea
would be that one could keep using classical logic with its inconsistency intolerant
negation for all the more foundational/justifying purposes it was meant for. This may
be a reasonable position if it concerns rather practical applications of paraconsistent
logic, but it does not work for more fundamental applications about the very basics
of mathematics, philosophy and logic.
We have listed a number of often heard objections to the usefulness of paracon-
sistent logic as an alternative to classical logic. None of these objections are suffi-
cient arguments to reject the usefulness of paraconsistent logics, but those defending
paraconsistent logics need to specify how to overcome these issues. This itself is an
interesting debate and the possible answers depend a lot on which logic and which
application one has in mind.
The reader understands by now that paraconsistency is a diverse phenomenon with
different raisons d’être, different technical solution and different ways to respond
to criticism, all of which have to do with the specific application one has in mind.
Nevertheless there is also quite a lot of common ground. Similar techniques have been
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics: Introduction 9

used, similar arguments have been given against Explosion and against the critics
of paraconsistency, and similar inconsistent theories have been studied, all of this
often independently from one another and inside different schools of paraconsistency.
Nevertheless there is relatively little study about the similarities and differences of the
different currents of paraconsistency in relation to the intended real life applications
of paraconsistency.
In order to open the debate on how the different formalisms relate to their real life
applications in the philosophy of science and mathematics, we decided to organize
a conference on this topic in Munich, Germany: the conference Paraconsistent Rea-
soning in Science and Mathematics (June 11–13, 2014) in the beautiful setting of the
Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung. Our aim was to bring the different schools of
paraconsistency together to open the debate on how the different formalisms relate
to their real life applications in the philosophy of science and mathematics.
The level of the talks and the quality of the debate was so high that the participants
of the conference were all in favour of publishing a volume on the topic of the confer-
ence, aiming toward a written and more detailed follow up of this debate. The present
book is the result. We hope the reader will find that it lives up to the expectations. In
what follows, we give a brief summary of every paper of our collection.

1 Holger Andreas and Peter Verdée: Adaptive Proofs

for Networks of Partial Structures

According to Carnap [10], we interpret and understand the theoretical terms of a

theory T in such a manner that the axioms of T come out true. If, however, T is
classically inconsistent, this semantic doctrine fails to work properly. The theoretical
terms remain uninterpreted in this case. This is not satisfactory insofar as numerous
scientific theories turned out to be inconsistent in some way or other – science is full
of inconsistencies. Hence, it is desirable to have a semantics of theoretical terms that
also applies to inconsistent theories.
Holger Andreas and Peter Verdée, consequently, develop a paraconsistent gen-
eralization of the semantic doctrine in question: we interpret and understand the
theoretical terms of a theory T in such a manner that the axioms of T are satisfied to
a maximal extent. Formally, we describe such interpretations in terms of a network of
partial structures, and thereby define a preferred models semantics of paraconsistent
scientific reasoning. This semantics respectively defines an inference relation for flat
and prioritized axiomatic theories.
A preferred models semantics by itself does not give us a proof-theoretic account
of scientific reasoning with theoretical terms. For this to be achieved, the framework
of adaptive logic with its dynamic proof-theory suggests itself. Hence, we present a
flat and a lexicographic adaptive logic which are proven to capture the inference rela-
tion for flat and prioritized axiomatic theories. Because the adaptive logics belong
to the category of standard (lexicographic) adaptive logics, the adaptive characteri-
10 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

zation immediately gives rise to an adequate dynamic proof theory for the inference
relations. The paper concludes with a demonstration of how we can derive sensible
conclusions from Bohr’s model of the atom using adaptive proofs.

2 Franzesco Berto: Ceteris Paribus Imagination

Franzesco Berto explores impossible worlds for an analysis of ceteris paribus imagi-
nation. An impossible world is one where the laws of classical logic may be violated
by the truth-value assignment to atomic and complex formulas. Hence, an impossi-
ble world may verify a set of sentences that is classically inconsistent. Impossible
worlds, therefore, may serve as a model of inconsistent beliefs.
Why should we want to model inconsistent beliefs? The underlying motivation
derives from the limitations of our logical capacities. We are unable to grasp all
logical consequences of a set of explicit beliefs, and we may even fail to recognize
inconsistencies in our explicit beliefs. As is well known, this happened to Frege when
he developed his Basic Laws of Arithmetic. In brief, we are not logically omniscient.
Ceteris paribus imagination is modelled by a conditional: if an agent explicitly
conceives A to be the case, then B is part of the imagined scenario. In formal terms:
[A]B, where [∗] is a modal operator, defined by an accessibility relation on the set
of possible and impossible worlds. [A] B holds true if B is verified by all worlds
(possible and impossible ones) that are reachable from the actual world and in which
A holds true.
Having defined a worlds semantics of [A]B, Berto investigates which axioms
envisioned for variably strict conditionals remain valid for ceteris paribus imagina-
tion. Notably, [A ∧ ¬A]B fails to hold for arbitrary B. Imagining an inconsistent
scenario does not mean that we trivialize what we conceive. In this respect, the ceteris
paribus conditional behaves like a paraconsistent consequence relation.

3 Bryson Brown: On the Preservation of Reliability

Science is full of inconsistencies: first, we have scientific theories that are internally
inconsistent and thus imply a contradiction. Second, we have scientific theories that
make assumptions inconsistent with other accepted scientific theories. Third, we have
numerous approximations and idealizations that are known to be inconsistent with
what we strictly believe about the respective theoretical entities. Fourth, scientific
theories are often times inconsistent with certain predecessor theories, while pre-
serving many of their empirical predictions. These inconsistencies strongly suggest
the need for a paraconsistent treatment of scientific reasoning.
Bryson Brown attempts to provide methodological foundations for a paraconsis-
tent approach to scientific reasoning. His proposal is to view reliability-in place of
truth-as the property to be preserved by proper scientific reasoning, as well as in the
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics: Introduction 11

replacement of earlier scientific theories by new ones. The main focus of Brown’s
paper is on reliable inference patterns in the history of science, including Planck’s
treatment of black body radiation and Bohr’s theory of the hydrogen atom; work
by Nancy Cartwright and Bas C. van Fraassen is also discussed, leading up to an
account of a modestly paraconsistent approach to scientific reasoning.

4 Luis Estrada-González: Prospects for Triviality

This paper studies triviality in mathematical theories, an important enemy of most

paraconsistent logicians. Paraconsistent logics (want to) serve as the underlying logic
of inconsistent theories, exactly because they can avoid triviality. Trivial theories are
usually seen as meaningless and even disastrous. This position was among others
defended by Chris Mortensen.
The author of this paper discusses the central question whether triviality is always
so bad and wants to answer it in the negative, against Mortensen’s position. He argues
that there is a case of an extremely simple mathematical category theoretic universe,
a degenerate topos, in which everything is true. This universe is therefore trivial, but
it is not inherently problematic.
Mortensen’s case is built on a trivialisation result for real number theory. González
shows that either one of the premises of the trivialization result cannot obtain (from
a point of view external to the universe) and thus the argument is unsound, or that
it obtains in calculations internal to such a trivial universe. In the latter case the
calculations in the trivial universe are possible and meaningful albeit extremely
simple. Our actual universe is probably not as simple as and so does not correspond
to this degenerate topos, but that does not mean that what is done inside the universe
is meaningless.

5 Andreas Kapsner: On Gluts in Mathematics and Science

This paper discusses the question whether truth value gluts (both true and false)
should be designated in an analysis of mathematical and scientific reasoning. Prac-
tically speaking the question is whether one should assert sentences that are true
and false and whether they should be used as basis for decisions and actions and
as premises of arguments. The traditional paraconsistent view is that there are truth
value gluts and that they should be designated. In some sense the converse goes
against the very basic starting point of paraconsistency: a non-designated glut will
not block the Explosion rules.
Kapsner defends the view that it is often, but not always, unreasonable to assert
glutted statements. He presents a clear case: if two costumer reviews contradict each
other on the quality of a product, one should not assert the contradicting information
obtained by reading the reviews. Subsequently he presents some cases from the
12 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

history of science (the infinitesimal calculus and the Darwin–Kelvin debate on the
age of the earth) to indicate that also in these case it may be more reasonable not to
designate gluts.

6 Carlos A. Oller: Contradictoriness, Paraconsistent

Negation and Non-intended Models of Classical Logic

This paper concerns the often heard argument that paraconsistent negation is not
a real negation because a sentence and its negation should never be true together.
The author attacks the argument by showing that it could also be used to show that
classical logic’s negation is by the same standards not a real negation either.
Classical logic has certain unavoidable non-intended models. Carnap was the first
to point out that adding a trivial model (in which all formulas are true) to the semantics
of classical logic does not affect the set of valid consequences. In such a model of
course formulas and their negations are both true. It seems thus that it is impossible
even in classical logic to exclude the possibility that a formula and its negation are
both true.

7 Hitoshi Omori: From Paraconsistent Logic

to Dialetheic Logic

This paper proposes a new approach to paraconsistent logic to be applied as the

underlying logic of a dialetheic version of naive set theory and naive truth. The
author proposes an attractive logic which is not only paraconsistent in that it can
tolerate inconsistent formulas, but also dialetheic, in the sense that it also makes
certain inconsistent formulas into tautologies.
Omori returns to the modern origins of paraconsistent logic and proposes a para-
consistent account of negation in line with some ideas by Jaśkowski: that a good
negation should be a connective such that each formula and its negation form con-
tradictory pairs. This is realized by requiring that a formula is true iff its negation
is false, and false iff its negation is true. A necessary condition for paraconsistent
logics respecting this account of negation is that Double Negation rules are valid.
In order for the logic to work with prototypical inconsistent mathematical theories
such as naive set theory, one needs a weak enough biconditional to non-trivially
express axiom schemas like the axiom of Abstraction. To this purpose a strategy
suggested by Laura Goodship is used: opt for the material biconditional of LP.
Omori adds to this concept some ingredients of LFIs (a consistency operator) and
connexive logics (the conditional is false when the antecedent is not true or the
consequent is false). The result is a dialetheic logic with a functionally complete
three valued semantics.
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics: Introduction 13

8 Martin Pleitz: Paradoxes of Expression

The history of the paradoxes and attempted solutions thereof shows many cases
where a certain solution falls prey to another, more refined variant of the original
paradox. The revenge liar is the most famous instance of such cases. Martin Pleitz
adds another chapter to this history of attempted solutions and recurrent paradoxes.
The focus is on a recent proposal by Graham Priest to solve the semantic and
set-theoretic paradoxes using a biconditional that does not detach, i.e., that fails to
satisfy modus ponens. A detachable truth schema, however, is needed for what has
been described as blind endorsement. For example, if one holds that everything that
the Bible says is true, one blindly endorses all the claims made in the Bible. To
solve this problem, Priest entertains the idea of introducing a detachable conditional,
together with an expression predicate that allows us to say that certain propositions
are expressed by certain sentences.
Martin Pleitz formulates a very reasonable principle that an expression operator,
licensing blind endorsements, should satisfy: any meaningful sentence should be
synonymous with itself. Based on an axiomatic formulation of this principle, he
shows that variants of the Liar and the Curry paradox can be formulated. Hence,
we have a contradiction and a way to trivialize the system envisioned by Priest. As
triviality is unbearable even in a paraconsistent setting, this casts serious doubt on
Priest’s proposed solution.

9 Corry Shores: Dialetheism in the Structure

of Phenomenal Time

The very idea of motion seems to be contradictory: if we say that an object is moving,
we imply that it is at different places at different times. So far, things are consistent.
If, however, we want to say that an object is moving right now, we seem to ascribe
the property of changing positions to a specific time point. At a specific time point,
however, an object can only be at one place. Drawing on Zeno’s paradox of the arrow
and assuming that only the present time point has reality, we can thus argue that no
object is really moving. Motion is not part of reality. Likewise, the flow of time is an
unreal phenomenon.
Alternatively, we can accept that motion and time are contradictory but real,
thereby embracing some form dialetheism. This alternative is investigated and sym-
pathetically entertained by Corry Shores in his contribution. Besides the work of
Zeno, he draws on Husserl’s phenomenology and subsequent phenomenological
research to motivate a dialetheist account of change and time. Dialetheist ideas about
the phenomenology of time are thus brought together with recent work in theoretical
psychology.
14 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

10 Fenner S. Tanswell: Saving Proof from Paradox: Gödel’s

Paradox and the Inconsistency of Informal Mathematics

In this paper two of the most popular arguments (by Beall resp. Priest) in favour of
the inconsistency of (informal) mathematics (and so the need to formalize it with a
paraconsistent logic) are discussed. A first argument is based on what is sometimes
called Gödel’s paradox, i.e. a sentence expressing that it is not provable. Accepting
the existence of such a sentence leads to a contradiction in mathematics. The second
argument is based on the incompatibility of completeness and consistency estab-
lished by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Arguing in favour of the completeness
of informal mathematics, thus also forms an argument against the consistency of
mathematics.
Tanswell argues against these arguments that the necessary distinctions between
formality and informality are often ignored. The author also points at problems with
the assumption of the unity of informal mathematics.

11 Heinrich Wansing and Sergei Odintsov:

On the Methodology of Paraconsistent Logic

When we decided to organize our conference on Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science

and Mathematics, we wanted to stimulate discussion, exchange of ideas, and further
research on the desiderata that a paraconsistent logic should satisfy. We argued there
to be three core desiderata: (1) A paraconsistent logic ought to capture the inferential
use of inconsistent but non-trivial theories. (2) A paraconsistent approach should
explain how one can weaken the underlying logic of classical logic to get rid of the
explosion principle and still have enough inferential power to be successful. (3) It is
desirable to have a philosophical motivation for the deviation from classical logic in
terms of epistemological and, possibly, also metaphysical considerations.
We have then been very pleased to see that Heinrich Wansing and Sergei Odintsov
directly address the question of which desiderata a paraconsistent logic should sat-
isfy. While investigating the historical roots of the above desiderata, they cast some
doubt on desiderata (2) and (3). More precisely, they question that the reference logic
of a paraconsistent logic should be classical logic, arguing that the choice of classical
logic as reference logic is at least difficult to justify. As for the philosophical motiva-
tion for developing a specific paraconsistent logic, the notion of information should
play a central role rather than epistemological and metaphysical considerations. As
information about whatever domain is rarely complete and often times inconsistent,
an informational methodology of paraconsistent logic may lead us to choosing a
non-bivalent logic as reference logic.
The paper further discusses in great detail the maximality condition that a para-
consistent logic should satisfy with reference to classical logic, thus drawing on
work by Arieli et al. [3]. Moreover, it examines methodological considerations on
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics: Introduction 15

the desiderata of a paraconsistent logic that have been suggested by Priest and Rout-
ley [23]. Finally, Wansing and Odintsov sketch a universal approach to constructing
a paraconsistent logic for a given reference logic that may well not be classical logic.

12 Zach Weber: Paraconsistent Computation

and Dialetheic Machines

This paper concerns the application of paraconsistent logic and dialetheism to theo-
retic computer science. The question is asked whether there are algorithms which are
essentially paraconsistent, in the sense that only paraconsistent logic can recognize
them. While the question may seem counterintuitive, it is clear that certain objects
can exists in paraconsistent mathematics which cannot exist otherwise (for example
the Russell set or the set of all ordinals). So it is not unlikely that also the concept of an
algorithm should be reconsidered in a paraconsistent setting in order for classically
unknowable but useful objects to be recognized and studied.
The author argues in favour of the existence of such properly paraconsistent com-
putations. Arguments by Sylvan and Copeland, Routley, and Priest support this view.
One of the arguments goes as follows: in view of a straightforward diagonalization,
the algorithm that enumerates all algorithms (intuitively) is but at the same time
cannot be an algorithm. If it is an algorithm (and it sure seems to be one) it has to be
an inconsistent algorithm.
Subsequently Weber investigates the ways in which one could formulate para-
consistent algorithms in a dialetheic mathematical metalanguage. He discusses the
properties of so called dialetheic machines and their relation with finiteness and the
halting problem.

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Adaptive Proofs for Networks
of Partial Structures

Holger Andreas and Peter Verdée

Abstract The present paper expounds a preferred models semantics of paracon-

sistent reasoning. The basic idea of this semantics is that we interpret the language
L(V ) of a theory T in such a way that the axioms of T are satisfied to a maximal
extent. These preferred interpretations are described in terms of a network of partial
structures. Upon this semantic analysis of paraconsistent reasoning we develop a
corresponding proof theory using adaptive logics.

Keywords Adaptive logics · Preferred models semantics · Paraconsistent

reasoning · Structuralist approach

1 How to Reason with Inconsistent Theories?

As is well known, some axiomatic theories remain in use despite the observation
of classical inconsistencies. Axiomatic theories of truth and naive set theory are
prominent examples. Furthermore, there are well established axiomatic theories in
the natural sciences that are not fully consistent with the empirical data or not con-
sistent with certain other well established theories. The postulates of Bohr’s atomic
theory, for example, are not consistent with the set of Maxwell equations. Moreover,
we have internally inconsistent theories in the natural sciences, such as classical
electrodynamics.1 When scientists observe such inconsistencies, they do not always
abandon the scientific theory in question.
How do we reason with such inconsistent theories? Various logics and inference
systems have been devised to answer this question. The present approach builds upon

1 For a detailed investigation of the inconsistency of classical electrodynamics, see [8].

H. Andreas (B)
University of British Columbia, Kelowna, Canada
e-mail: [email protected]
P. Verdée
Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016 17

H. Andreas and P. Verdée (eds.), Logical Studies of Paraconsistent
Reasoning in Science and Mathematics, Trends in Logic 45,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_2
18 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

a proposal by Rescher and Manor [13]. In essence, their analysis of paraconsistent

reasoning consists of two steps:
(1) Consolidation, by means of which we obtain classically consistent subsets of a
given, possibly inconsistent set of premises.2
(2) Classical reasoning is then used to draw inferences from these consolidated
premise sets.
This approach can be motivated by the methodological doctrine ex contradictione
nihil sequitur.3 Contradictions do not have any consequences. Hence, we need to
first consolidate our premises – in the sense of removing inconsistencies – before we
can draw any inferences.
How does consolidation work? [13] describe this operation in terms of maximal
consistent subsets of a given set of premises. A set S  is a maximal consistent subset
of a set S iff (i) S  ⊆ S, (ii) S is classically consistent, and (iii) there is no classically
consistent set S  such that S  ⊂ S  ⊆ S.4
If we strictly apply this consolidation strategy to axiomatic systems in science and
mathematics, it would not yield interesting results. For if a given axiom or axiom
scheme α implies an inconsistency, α is not a member of any maximal consistent
set of premises. Hence, it could not be used for scientific reasoning. The case where
some axiom turns out inconsistent with a set of other axioms is more involved and
will be dealt with in detail in Sect. 2.8. In essence, the problem is that if we restrict
our premises to maximal consistent subsets of an inconsistent axiomatic system, then
some axiom cannot be used to draw inferences in a determinate way, i.e., without at the
same time drawing contradictory inferences. This does not accord with how scientists
actually use inconsistent axiomatic systems. For if an inconsistent axiomatic theory
remains in use, then so do all of its axioms. For example, Maxwell’s equations
and Lorentz’ force law have remained in use despite the fact that they imply an
inconsistency when used to determine the self-force and the self-field of the electron.5
To analyse scientific reasoning from inconsistent theories, we suggest taking a
closer look at the universal quantifier—at occurrences where it is used to express
universal validity. Our main thesis is that we do use classically inconsistent axiomatic
theories by selectively accepting the instances of universal axioms. That is, for a given
universal axiom α and a scientific theory T , only a subset of the whole set of instances
of α may be accepted. We thus refrain from determining the self-force of the electron
by Maxwell’s equations and Lorentz’ force law, while continuing to use these axioms
in other applications of electrodynamics. Likewise, we refrain from applying certain
Maxwell equations to an electron orbiting around a proton, while we continue to
apply these equations to other accelerated electrons.

2 The term consolidation is borrowed from belief revision theory (see, e.g., [9].).
3 Cf.[17]. For a critical discussion of this doctrine, see H. Wansing et al.: On the methodology of
paraconsistent logic (this volume).
4 See [6] for a related strategy of dealing with inconsistencies.
5 See [8, Chap. 2] for a detailed exposition of this inconsistency.
Adaptive Proofs for Networks of Partial Structures 19

The challenge arising here is to differentiate between sound instances of an axiom

(which we continue to use) and inconsistent ones (which we reject). This is a chal-
lenge because the inconsistencies we encounter in science do not always have the
form of a single instance of an axiom (or axiom scheme) that is by itself inconsistent.
In the case of the self-force of the electron, it is rather a set of several axioms that, if
jointly applied to an electron, imply an inconsistency. Also, it is desirable to account
for scientific reasoning with axiomatic theories that fail to be empirically adequate,
and hence are not fully consistent with the empirical facts, while still being used.
We describe the demarcation between sound and inconsistent instances of uni-
versal axioms in terms of a preferred models semantics. Using such a semantics, we
define an operation of consolidation in the following way. First, we define the set of
preferred interpretations of the language L(V ) of a theory T (where V stands for the
descriptive vocabulary of T ): an interpretation of the language L(V ) is preferred iff it
satisfies the instances of the axioms of T to a maximal extent. Then, we can say that
the consolidation of T – understood as a syntactic entity – refers to the set of those
instances of T ’s axioms that are verified by all preferred interpretations. Our preferred
models semantics, furthermore, admits classical reasoning for the consolidated parts
of T .
We expound the preferred models semantics in the first part of the paper.6 In the
second part, we then develop a proof theory for this semantics using the framework
of adaptive logics. The set of adaptive logics contains a wide range of logics that
select interpretations of premises in such a way that a formal property of the inter-
pretations is maximally satisfied. Because the inference relation that corresponds to
the preferred models semantics selects those interpretations that verify a maximal
number of instances of axioms, this inference relation can indeed be characterized
by an adaptive logic (within an existing generic format of adaptive logics—the lex-
icographic format). The purpose of characterizing an existing inference relation by
means of an adaptive logic in lexicographic format is that one immediately obtains a
sound and complete dynamic proof system for the inference relation. These dynamic
adaptive proofs have been developed to model the reasoning processes human agents
use to reason towards ultimately correct inferences in a defeasible ‘hit and miss’-like
way.

2 Networks of Partial Structures

2.1 Partial Structures and Their Extensions

We shall use partial structures to represent the semantics of the instances of universal
axioms. This notion is adopted from the framework of partial structures and partial

6 Thispart is based on [1], which develops the network formalism as a paraconsistent semantics of
theoretical terms.
20 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

truth as expounded in [7]. A partial structure is a set-theoretic structure of the form7 :

A = A, Rk k∈K ,

where A is the domain of interpretation, Rk are partial relations, and K an index set.
A thus encodes a partial interpretation of some language L. Partiality of an n-ary
relation Rk is to be understood as follows. Suppose we have an n-tuple a1 , . . . , an 
(where a1 , . . . , an ∈ A) such that a1 , . . . , an  ∈
/ Rk . On the semantics of partial truth,
this does not imply that Rk (a1 , . . . , an ) is false.
Partiality of a relation is more precisely accounted for by distinguishing between
the positive extension Rk+ , the negative extension Rk− , and the “neutral” extension
Rk0 . For simplicity, we assume that Rk+ = Rk and Rk− = ∅. On these two assumptions,
there is no need to notationally distinguish between the positive, the negative, and
the neutral extension of a relation symbol Rk in a partial structure. This has the
consequence that Rk (a1 , . . . , an ) being false is not expressible by a partial structure.
Extensions of partial structures are understood in the standard way:
Definition 1 (Extension) Let A = A, Rk k∈K be a partial structure. Let (Rk )A denote
the relation Rk of the partial structure A. A structure B = A, Rk k∈K of L is an
extension of A iff for all k ∈ K, (Rk )A ⊆ (Rk )B .
Da Costa and French [7] also consider structures with two domains of interpreta-
tion, where one domain contains observable and the other unobservable entities.
Such distinctions between different domains of interpretation can easily be intro-
duced without requiring substantial modifications of the subsequent definitions and
explanations.

2.2 Instances and Applications of Axioms

By an instance of an axiom α we mean a closed formula where all universally

quantified variables—that express the universal validity of α—have been replaced
by a constant. We assume that all axioms come in a standard logical format and
are preceded by at least one universal quantifier. Suppose axiom α has the logical
form ∀x1 , . . . , ∀xn αo (x1 , . . . , xn ), where αo does not start with ∀. Then, any formula
αo (c1 /x1 , . . . , cn /xn ) is an instance of the axiom α, where c1 , . . . , cn are constants.
We understand the notion of an instance of an axiom scheme in the standard way:
instances of axiom schemes are obtained by replacing a schematic letter of the scheme
by an appropriate expression of the formal language L(V ).
The notion of an instance thus understood is a syntactic notion. Instances of axioms
have semantic counterparts insofar as the interpreted symbols of such instances refer
to certain objects with certain properties. For example, an instance of Newton’s law

7 Unlike a simple pragmatic structure in [7], a partial structure does not contain a set P of sentences
that are taken to be true in the correspondence sense.
Adaptive Proofs for Networks of Partial Structures 21

of gravitation is given by a pair of bodies, both of which have a distinct place in space.
Such semantic counterparts of the instances of universal axioms can be represented
by set-theoretic structures, as has been shown in the work of the structuralist school
[2, 15]. We adopt this idea and shall assume that any instance of a universal axiom
has a corresponding partial structure

A = A1 , A2 , Rk k∈K ,

A1 is the domain of entities to which α is applied. A2 may contain mathematical

entities that are needed to express the properties of the objects of A1 . Rk are relations
that partially interpret the descriptive symbols of α. We assume only a partial inter-
pretation of these symbols because the theoretical terms of α may not be completely
interpreted. If the axioms of the non-formalized theory contain functions, these may
be represented by relations. In the case of Newton’s law of gravitation, Rk (k ∈ K)
represent position, mass, and force for the objects of a two-body system.
Partial structures that are the semantic counterparts of the instances of a universal
axiom α are called applications of α. Being the semantic counterpart of the instance
α of a universal axiom means two things. First, the domain A of A comprises all the
entities being referred to by the constants of α. Second, the relations of A are partial
interpretations of the relation symbols of α.
The notion of an application of an axiom is adopted from [2, 15]. It should be
noted, however, that intended applications in the structuralist framework often have
a more complex structure as they may comprise sets of applications of a universal
axiom. For example, they may involve applications of Newton’s law of gravitation
for a whole period of time. For simplicity and conformity to first order logic, we
assume that applications of an axiom α always correspond to an instance of α. An
application in the present framework need not be intended in the sense that some
scientists think or should think that an axiom applies to it.

2.3 Modular Semantics

The core idea of the networks formalism may be described in terms of a modu-
lar semantics. Such a semantics is obtained by two operations upon the standard
semantics: (i) the descriptive vocabulary V of the axiomatic theory T is divided into
subvocabularies according to the axioms of T , and (ii) these subvocabularies in turn
are interpreted by partial structures that represent applications of the correspond-
ing axiom. Let α1 , . . . , αn be the axioms of T with corresponding subvocabularies
V (α1 ), . . . , V (αn ). The partial structure Ai,j represents the application j of the axiom
αi . We assume that there can only be countably many partial structures, a constraint
that should be acceptable since in a finitary language there can only be countably
many instances of a universal axiom. This being said, we can graphically illustrate
the basic idea of a modular semantics for axiomatic theories as follows:
22 H. Andreas and P. Verdée

V(α 1 ) V(α 2 ) ... V(α n )

1,1 1,2 ... n,1 ...

Fig. 1 Modular semantics

This modularization of the interpretation of an axiomatic theory will serve as a

semantic foundation for using the instances of universal axioms selectively. More-
over, it enables us to recognize an ordering of interpretations of L(V ) upon which
we can identify those interpretations that maximally satisfy T (Fig. 1).

2.4 Local Worlds

Let us now go further into the details of a modular semantics for axiomatic theories.
Each axiom has a set of applications to empirical or abstract systems of entities. Each
application of an axiom is represented by a partial structure Ai,j , where i indicates
the axiom αi and j the particular application of that axiom:

Ai,j = Aj , Am , R1 , . . . , Rk .

The second domain Am is introduced for properties that are expressed by mathemat-
ical objects. This domain is optional.
The structuralists describe the result of applying an axiom α to a system of entities
in terms of constraints upon the (model-theoretic) extensions of a given intended
application, i.e., a partial structure.8 We adopt this idea by defining a set of “local
worlds” of an application:

W (Ai,j ) =df Mod(αi , (Ai,j )1 ) ∩ Ext(Ai,j ), (1)

8 Partial structures are used here as a generalization of intended applications. An intended application

of a theory-element T leaves the T-theoretical terms undetermined. This can be represented as

follows: if Rk is T-theoretical, Rk = ∅. Partial structures, however, are a bit more flexible as they
allow us to have a partial determination of the T-theoretical terms for a given intended application.
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supposed to be the Naumachia of Augustus in the Trastevere, but
without authority; and the mention of the gladiators in connection
with them implies that it was at the same place.
[72] See Photos., Nos. 3268, 3269, and the drawing of this
restored in Plates VII. and XV.
[73] See p. 37, and Plate X.
[74] Photos., Nos. 1761, 1762.
[75] Photos., No. 3279, and Plates II. and XX.
[76] It is important to notice this, because some able architects
did not see it at first sight, and imagined that these brick arches
rested upon the stone piers, which was evidently not really the
case, though it appears to be so.
M. Viollet-le-Duc, one of the most eminent architects of our
time, says that an experienced architect would cut through old
tufa walls of this kind as easily, and with as little scruple, as he
would cut through cheese, and the brick facing made no material
difference.
[77] “... item stagnum maris instar, circumseptum ædificiis ad
urbium speciem.” (Suetonii Nero, c. 31.)
[78] Photos., Nos. 3282, 3285.
[79] See Plate XXI.
[80] See Plate XXII.
[81] See Plate XV.
[82] Photos., No. 3268, 3269.
[83] Photos., Nos. 3203, 3205, 3282, 3283. In some parts a
brick wall of the fifth or sixth century has been introduced
between the two old tufa walls, during the repairs after the
earthquakes. This is at first sight rather puzzling, until it is
examined and properly considered.
[84] Photos., No. 3271.
[85] Photos., Nos. 3285, 3286.
[86] For elephants there are four larger dens provided, two on
either side of the central passage. See the Plan.
[87] Photos., No. 3282.
[88] See Plates XVI., XVII.
 [89] This vivarium is a triangular piece of ground, the wide end
of which touches the wall of the Amphitheatrum Castrense; the
narrow end is only just wide enough for the body of a man to
pass through an aperture made in it, as the ground is between a
wall of Aurelian on the inner side, and a wall of the Sessorium on
the outer side, preserved by Aurelian as an outwork. This was the
scene of the celebrated ambuscade of Belisarius, by means of
which the Goths were driven away from Rome, as described by
Procopius (De Bello Gothico, lib. i. c. 22.)
[90]
PRO S. IMP. M. ANTONI . GORDIANI . PII
FELICIS AVG. ET TRANQVILLINAE SABI
NAE AVG. VENATORES IMMVN. CVM CV
STODE VIVARI PONT. VERVS MIL. COH
VI. PR. CAMPANIVS VERAX. MIL. COH. VI
PR. FVSCIVS CRESCENTIO ORD CVSTOS
VIVARI. COHH. PRAETT. ET VRBB
DIANAE AVG. D. S. EX. V. P.
DEDICATA XII. KAL. NOV.
IMP. D. N. GORDIANO AVG. ET POMPEIANO COS.
(Inscription found in Rome in 1710, and printed by Nibby,
Roma Antica, vol. i. p. 386.)
[91] A compartment of this is shewn in one of the graffiti,
found in the excavations of 1874.
[92] “Caius princeps in circo pegma duxit.” (Plinii Nat. Hist.,
xxxiii. 16.)
[93] “Ludiviæ sunt, quæ ad voluptatem oculorum atque aurium
tendunt. His annumeres licet machinatores, qui pegmata per se
surgentia excogitant, et tabulata tacite in sublime crescentia, et
alias ex inopinato varietates, aut dehiscendentibus quæ
cohærebant, aut his quæ distabant, sua sponte coeuntibus aut
his quæ eminebant paulatim in se residentibus.” (Seneca, Epist.,
88, s. 19.)
[94]

“Sic pugnas Cilicis laudabat, et ictus;

Et pegma et pueros inde ad velaria raptos.”

(Juvenal, Satyr iv. 121, 122.)

 [95] See p. 49.
[96] Photos., No. 3283.
[97] Photos., No. 3286, and Plate VII.
[98] Photos., No. 3263.
[99] Those English people who remember Sadler’s Wells
Theatre in London about 1820, must know that there was always
a sheet of water or reservoir under the stage, and trap-doors in
the floor by which sea-monsters could be introduced. The
amusements of the old Roman people seem to have been
frequently of this kind. Naval fights in boats might have been
performed in the Colosseum, and a great deal of machinery must
have been required to remove the floor and replace it.
A wooden Roman bridge still remains under water near
Compiègne in France, of which M. Peigné Delacourt has published
an account, with engravings of it, so that wood under water is
preserved in the same manner as when it is buried in a wet soil.
This is well known in the case of piles for bridges, and in those
under the city of Amsterdam.
[100] See Plate XXVI.
[101] It appears evident from the inscriptions from the College
of the Arvales that the seats were regularly and permanently
allotted to different persons holding different offices, according to
their rank. The lower seats being of marble, the upper ones of
wood.
There are many inscriptions relating to the seats in the different
theatres and amphitheatres in Rome:
LOCA . ADSIGNATA IN AMPHITEATRO
L . AELIO . PLAVTIO . LAMIA . Q . PACTVMEIO
FRONTONE . COS .
ACCEPTVM . AB . LABERIO . MAXIMO
PROCVRATORE . PRAEF . ANNONAE
L . VENNVLEIO . APRONANO . MAG .
CVRATORE . THYRSO . L
FRATRIBVS . ARVALIBVS . MÆNIANO .
I̅ . CVN . X̅ I̅ I̅ . GRADIBVS . MARM . VIII.
GRADVI . P . V = GRAD . VIII . PED .
V≡£ . F . PED . XXXXIIS . GRADV. I . VNO .
P . XXII S . ET . MAENIANO . SVMMO .
I̅ I̅ . CVN . V̅ I̅ . GRADIB . MARM . I̅ V̅ .
 GRADV . I . VNO . P . XXII S . ET .
MAENIANO . SVMMO . IN . LIGNEIS .
TAB . LIII . GRADIBVS . XI . GRADV .
I PED . V = GRAD . XI. PED . V = = —)
F̅. PED . LXIII S = = — SVMMA . PED .
Cxxviiii S = = —
(Gius.-Ant. Guattari, Roma descritta ed illustrata, &c. Roma,
1805, 4to., vol. ii. p. 13.)
[102] Photos., No. 3279.
[103] See p. 6, and Plates II. and XX.
[104] See Photos., No. 367.
[105] One series of these corbels in the upper corridor seems
to have been for a wooden gallery, for the use of the sailors going
to furl or unfurl the awning.
[106] Some clamps of the same form were found, in 1870, in
the interior of the wall of Servius Tullius, (in the part destroyed
for the railway,) where the stones were joined together by them.
[107] sIc PREMIA SERVAS VESPASIANE DIRE PREMIATVS ES
MORTE GAVDENTI LETARE CIVITAS VBI GLORIE TVE AVTORI
PROMISIT ISTE DAT KRISTVS OMNIA TIBI QVI ALIVM PARAVIT
THEATRV̅ IN CELO. This inscription only shews that he was
employed upon the work; it is preserved in the church of S.
Martino a Monti. See Nibby, Roma nell’ anno mdcccxxxviii. parte i.
Antica, p. 400.
[108] See Photographs, Nos. 1500 and 1501, and the Photo-
engraving, Plate XXIII. of Supplement to vol. i.
[109] See Photos., No. 488, and Plates XXIV., XXV.
[110] L’Anfiteatro Flavio descritto e delineato dal cavaliere Carlo
Fontana. Nell’ Haia, m.dc.xxv. fol. max.
[111] These views of buildings on coins appear to have been
made from the architect’s designs before they were carried out,
and were sometimes altered. There is no representation of the
Colossus of Nero in any of them. For the shallow channel of
water, see Photos., No. 1759.
[112] See No. 302, and 488 c.
[113] On bad impressions of this coin the Meta Sudans looks
like a second smaller figure, or of a youth; but on good
impressions the Meta Sudans is distinct, and the figure behind it
overtops it by the head and shoulders only.
[114] See No. 488 c.
[115] “... Romæ templum Hadriani, honori patris dicatum,
Græco-stadium post incendium restitutum, instauratum
amphitheatrum,” &c. (Jul. Capitolinus-Antoninus Pius, c. 8, ap.
Script. Hist. Aug.)
[116] Dionis Cass. lib. lxxii. c. 17-22.
[117] “Postea in theatris tantum umbram fecere: quod primus
omnium invenit Q. Catulus, cum Capitolium dedicaret. Carbasina
deinde vela primus in theatro duxisse traditur Lentulus Spinter
Apollinaribus ludis.... Vela nuper colore cæli, stellata, per
rudentes iere etiam in amphitheatro principis Neronis.” (Plinii Nat.
Hist., lib. xix. c. 6.)
[118] See Plate XVII.
[119] Photos., No. 185.
[120] This is reproduced in Plate XXI.
[121] Photos., Nos. 167, 185.
[122] See Regio III., Castra Misenatium.
[123] Calpurnius has usually been considered as a writer of the
third century, but the most recent editor of his Eclogues (Haupt)
shews that he was contemporary with Nero and Titus, and Dean
Merivale is of the same opinion.
[124]

“Vidimus in cœlum trabibus spectacula textis

Surgere, Tarpeium prope despectantia culmen,
Immensosque gradus, et clivos lene jacentes....
Ordine quid referam? vidi genus omne ferarum....
Non solum nobis silvestria cernere monstra
Contigit: æquoreos ego cum certantibus ursis
Spectavi vitulos, et equorum nomine dignum,
Sed deforme pecus (i.e. Nilo).
Ah trepidi quoties nos descendentis arenæ
Vidinus in partes ruptaque voraginæ terræ
Emersisse feras!
Et coit in rotulam teretem quo lubricus axis
Impositos subita vertigine falleret ungues
 Excuteretque feras auro quoque torta refulgent
Retia, quæ totis in arenam dentibus extant,
Dentibus æquatis: et erat mihi crede Lycota
Si qua fides, nostro dens longior omnis aratro.”

(T. Calpurnii Siculi Bucol. Ecloga vii.)

[125] Dionis Cass. lib. lxxviii. c. 25.
[126] “Opera publica ipsius præter Æden Heliogabali Dei ... et
amphitheatri instauratio post exustionem ... nulla extant.”
(Lampridius, Antoninus Heliogabalus, c. 17, ap. Script. Hist. Aug.)
[127] “... sumptibus publicis ad instaurationem theatri, circi,
amphitheatri, et ærarii, deputavit.” (Lampridius, Alexander
Severus, c. 24.) There are coins of this emperor with the
amphitheatre on the reverse. See Plate XXV.
[128] “Fuerunt sub Gordiano Romæ elephanti triginta et duo,
quorum ipse duodecim miserat, Alexander decem: alces decem,
tigres decem, leones mansueti sexaginta, leopardi mansueti
triginta, belbi, id est hyænæ, decem, gladiatorum fiscalium paria
mille, hippopotamus et rhinoceros unus, archoleontes decem,
camelopardali decem, onagri viginti, equi feri quadraginta, et
cetera hujusmodi animalia, innumera et diversa: quæ omnia
Philippus ludis sæcularibus vel dedit vel occidit.” (Jul. Capit.
Gordianus Tertius, c. 33.)
[129] This celebration shews that the chronology then accepted
by the Roman people is the same as that of Livy, which is used as
the chronological table of buildings prefixed to this work.
[130] Suetonius in Gordiano III., c. 33.
[131] Herodian, lib. i. c. 8. Ammianus Marcellinus mentions the
same exhibition, and the same number of lions leaping out at
once, lib. xxxi. c. 19. See Plates VI. and VIII.
[132] “Centum jubatos leones.” (Vopiscus in Vita Probi, c. 19.)
[133] “Eam autem denunciationem adque interpretationem,
quæ de jactu amphitheatri scripta est, de qua ad Heraclianum
Tribunum, et magistrum officiorum scripseras, ad nos scias esse
perlatum.” (Codex Theodosianus, lib. xvi. tit. x. lex 1. Imp.
Constantinus ad Maximum, a.d. 321.)
[134] “Amphitheatri molem solidatam lapidis Tiburtini compage,
ad cujus summitatem ægre visio humana conscendit.” (Ammianus
Marcellinus, lib. xvi. c. 10.)
 [135] salvis . dd. nn. theodosio . et . placido . valentiniano .
augg. rvfvs caecina . felix . lampadivs . vc. et . inl. praef. vrb.
harenam . amphiteatri . a . novo . vna . cvm . Podio . et . portis .
posticis . sed . et . reparatis . spectacvli . gradibvs restitvit.
[136] Paulus Diaconus, Miscell., lib. xiv.; ap. Murat. Rer. Ital.
Script., vol. i. p. 96, c. 1, A.
[137] This appears from another inscription found in 1813:—
DECIVS MARIVS VENANTIVS BASILIVS V̅ C̅ et INL̅ . PRAEF V̅ RB
PATRICIVS CONSVL ORDINARIVS ARENAM ET PODIVM QVAE
ABOMINANDI TERRAEMOTVS RVIN PROSTRAVIT SVMPTV
PROPRIO RESTITVIT.
[138] “Muneribus amphitheatralibus diversi generis feras, quas
præsens ætas pro novitate miraretur, exhibuit. Cujus spectaculi
voluptates etiam exquisitas Africa sub devotione transmisit.”
(Cassiodori Chronicon, a.d. 519; inter opera ejus, ed. 1679, fol.,
tom. i. p. 195, col. 2.)
[139] “Quamdiu stat Colysæus, stat et Roma; quando cadet
Colysæus, cadet et Roma; quando cadet Roma, cadet et
mundus.” (Bedæ Opera, Basileæ, 1563, fol., vol. iii. col. 651.)
[140] Card. de Aragonia, Vita Innocentii II. apud Muratori,
Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, vol. iii. p. 1, p. 435 B.
[141] Cort. de Senatu Romano, lib. vii. c. 1, §. 168.
[142] Delle Memorie Sacre, e profane dell’ Anfiteatro Flavio di
Roma, &c., dal Canonico Giovanni Marangoni Vicentino. In Roma,
1745, 4to. Cap. l. p. 49, Codice pergameno, Scritto dal celebre
Onofrio Panvino inedito ed intitolato, de Gente Fregepanica.
[143] Card. de Aragonia, Vita Alexandri III. ap. Muratori, Rerum
Ital. Script., tom. iii. p. i. p. 459.
[144] Albertino Mussato, Hist. Aug., lib. v.; ap. Murat. Rerum
Italic. Script., tom. x. c. 454. Nibby, Roma nell’ anno mdcccxxxviii,
parte i. p. 413.
[145] Rainaldi Annal. an. 1244; Panvin. de gente Frangipani;
Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, tom. xii. col. 535, 536.
Nibby gives a more complete and accurate version of this
occurrence from a better text, though modernized. See Roma
Antica, part i. p. 414.
[146] “... et præterea se omnes emendarent de faciendo
tiburtinam (travertini) quod esset commune id quod judicitur.”
(Fea, Dissertazione nelle Ruine di Roma, p. 398.)
[147] F. Vacca, Memorie ap. Fea, lxxiv. p. 72.
[148] Poggio the Florentine, writing in 1425, says that a large
part of the building was reduced to lime by the stupidity of the
Romans:—“... atque ob stultitiam Romanorum majori ex parte ad
calcem delatum.” (Poggio, de Varietate Fortunæ, lib. i.)
[149] Flaminio Vacca, Memorie, 72; Marangoni, Memorie dell’
Anfiteatro Flavio, p. 57, quoted by Nibby, Roma nell’ anno
mdcccxxxviii, parte i., Antica, p. 418.

[150] Bellori, Vita di Domenico Fontana. Roma, nell’ anno

mdcccxxxviii,
&c., parte i., Antica, pp. 414-417. (Le Vite de pittori,
&c., Roma, 1728, 4to. p. 93.)
The space enclosed within the outer walls is six acres, and
there is an extraordinary difference of climate between the
northern and the southern side. Dr. Deakin published a work on
the Flora of the Colosseum: he found 423 species of plants,
belonging to 253 genera.
Over the door now generally used is a painting of the heavenly
Jerusalem and the Crucifixion, of the time of Paul III., a.d. 1534-
50, in the style of the older pilgrimage pictures. At the time it was
painted the passage appears to have been filled up with earth to
such a height as to make the picture a conspicuous object in
leaving the building; at present it is quite above the heads of the
passers-by, and is seldom noticed or seen.
[151] The interior of the building is still grand in its ruins. This
is well shewn in the photograph (No. 1195,) with the cross, and
the altar, and the stations erected by the pope about 1750, and
destroyed in 1874, in order to excavate the whole of the area. A
restoration of the interior according to Canina can also be seen in
another photograph (No. 724).
[152] Etudes Statistiques sur Rome, par le Conte P. N. C. de
Tournon. Paris, Didot, 1821, 8vo., 4 vols., and deuxième edition, 3
Volumes en 8vo avec atlas, Paris, 1858.
The fine set of drawings made for the French Government at
that period are now preserved in the British Museum, and fully
bear out what I had stated before I had seen them. They clearly
shew that the French excavations were not carried down more
than ten feet. The tops of the arches of the lower passage are
shewn in the drawings, but these excavations appear to have
been stopped by water rising to that height. See Plate III.
[153] See No. 1742, and Plate III.
[154] Probably the aqueduct which passes there had a hole
made in it; the same aqueduct goes on from this side of the
building to the south-east end. This occurred again in 1874, and a
steam engine had again to be employed. This passage, before it
turns, goes in the direction of the castellum aquæ of the time of
Alexander Severus, of which there are considerable remains
between this point and the Cœlian. The specus of an aqueduct of
the same period passes along between the Cœlian and the
amphitheatre, near the surface of the ground; a portion of this
was visible in 1874.
[155] See Photograph, No. 367.
[156] See p. 5.
[157] In the summer of 1875 they were again suspended for
want of funds to pay for the steam-engine, which costs a pound
a-day.
[158] Of which an account has been given in pages 5, 6, 10,
13, 14, 21, 35, of this chapter.
[159] See Plate III.
[160] See Plate XV.
[161] About the year 1865 a new drain was made by the
Municipality under that road, and when it was nearly finished the
old drain of the Empire (?), or of the time of Sylla (?), was found
under it at a considerably lower level. It is fifteen metres below
the surface of the ground, and so much filled up with earth that it
is considered (in 1876) quite impracticable to have it cleared out
and repaired.
[162] Photos., Nos. 3203, 3283.
[163] For the pegmata, see p. 14, and the authorities quoted in
the note.
[164] See Plates XVIII., XIX., and Photos., No. 3283, and the
graffito of the net, Plate XXIV.
[165] See Photos., No. 3201, and Plate XIX.
[166] See the evidence of this, p. 13.
 [167] See Plates XIII. and XVI.
[168] Dionis Cass. Hist. Rom., lib. lxxii. c. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.
[169] Some scholars say that those scenes could not have
taken place on this site, because the Flavian Amphitheatre was
not built in the time of Nero. But it has been shewn that an
awning in the amphitheatre of Nero is described by Pliny, writing
at the time, during the life and reign of Nero, as he uses the
expression principis Neronis, which he could hardly have used
after his death. No other site but this can be found for such a
large building as an amphitheatre, and this is close to the Golden
House of Nero. In any case athletes or wrestlers, and naumachia
or naval fights, are part of the tradition of many Roman
amphitheatres, and there are sufficient remains of the
substructures in many places to prove that this tradition is well
founded. The corridors of the Flavian Emperors, though splendid
additions to this great theatre, were not necessary for the
performance of those pantomimes. It has also been shewn that
the old tufa walls must be earlier than the time of Nero, and are
probably of the time of Sylla.
[170] See Plates IV. to X.
[171] They were made at the suggestion of the author of this
work, rather sooner than would otherwise have been the case, in
order that he might be able to see them. Signor Rosa
unfortunately began pulling down the walls of the substructure,
calling them “Frangipani walls.” The Frangipani family had
possession of the Colosseum in the twelfth century, but the
construction of that period is totally different from any of the
walls in the Colosseum, either above or below the level of the
arena. The Minister of Public Instruction fortunately arrived in
Rome in time to stop their demolition, and obtained an Act of
Parliament, in 1875, appointing a general Archæological
Commission for all Italy, with Signor Fiorelli, from Pompeii, at the
head of it; and no individual will in future be permitted either to
destroy antiquities, or to build anything new, without the consent
of the Commission.
[172] See No. 3202, and p. 27.
[173] See No. 3201.
[174] See No. 3263, and Plate VII.
[175] See No. 3203.
 [176] The plan of one section of this enormous building (see
No. 183 and Plate XIV.), and those of the six different floors or
storeys, shew the admirable arrangement of the seats and
passages, and vomitoria for the rapid exit of the people, as well
as the plan of the whole building would do. The magnificent
stone arcades of the Flavian Emperors, a.d. 80, appear in many
parts to be built against brick walls and galleries of the time of
Nero, originally built for the spectators of the old Naumachia.
(See No. 3205, 1762.)
[177] The amphitheatre is 1,837 Roman feet in circuit, 638
long, 535 wide, and 165 high from the ground, besides 21 feet
for the substructures, so that the whole height was 186 feet. The
Roman foot is not quite so long as the English foot, but the
difference is trifling. The number of spectators was 87,000
according to the Regionary Catalogue; modern authorities say
that the measurement shews this number to be rather
exaggerated.
[178] See Nos. 1081, 1762.
[179] See No. 1346.
[180] A coin of Titus shews a colonnade, and one of Domitian
also. See Plate XXV.
[181] See p. 11.
[182] See No. 1761.
[183] See Nos. 1758, 1759, 1760, 1763.
[184] They are more clearly shewn in another photograph, No.
827.
[185] See No. 367.
[186] See No. 185.
[187] They were, however, not always of stone or brick; in
places where stone was scarce, they were frequently of wood
only.
[188] See p. 1.
[189] See p. 7.
[190] See p. 6.
[191] See pp. 2, 9, 23.
 [192] See pp. 1, 8. That the amphitheatres were among the
finest buildings of the Romans in all their cities it is hardly
necessary to say; it seems clear that they were first built for the
favourite amusement of the hunting of wild beasts, and that the
first name for them was Theatrum Venatorium; but the gladiators
were soon introduced, for the further amusement of the people in
the same buildings. Both amusements are believed to have been
used in Greece before they were introduced into Rome, but they
were in use in Rome before the time of the Empire. At first, the
amphitheatres were temporary buildings of wood only (as has
been shewn), but there were several of these. After the great
Flavian amphitheatre was completed, this seems to have been
the only one in Rome; but those of several other cities, such as
Capua and Verona (see the learned work of Scipio Maffei, Verona
Illustrata, Milano, 1876, parte quarta) must have been nearly
equal to it.
[193] The following inscriptions, found upon the spot, agree
with the construction, as is always the case when the true date
can be ascertained. The first is of the time of Hadrian, a.d. 120,
(No. 43 in chapter vii. of the work of Francesco Alvino, which
contains the ancient inscriptions found upon the spot); the
second (No. 48 of the same collection) appears to be of Septimius
Severus and Pertinax, a.d. 192; the third in point of date (No. 16
in the collection) records restorations by Lampridius:—
XLIII.
IMP. CÆS. T. ÆLIO
HADRIANO AVG
PATRI PATRIÆ
SVBLEVATORI ORBIS
RESTITVTORI OPE
RVM PVBLICORVM
INDVLGENTISSIMO
OPTIMAQ. PRINCIPI
CAMPANI
OB INSIGNEM ERGA EOS BE
NIGNITATEM D. D.
XLVIII.
IMP. CÆS. DIVI M. ANTONINI
GERM. SARM. FIL. DIVI COMMODI
FRATRI DIVI ANTONINI PII NEPOTI
DIVI HADRIANI PRONEPOTI DIVI
TRAIANI PARTHICI ABNEPOTI DIVI
 NERVAE ADNEPOTI
SEPTIMIO SEVERO PIO PERTINACI
ARABICO ADIABENICO P.P. PONT. MAX
TRIB. POT. I̅ I̅ I̅ I̅ . IMP. VIII. COS II. PROC
COLONIA CAPVA
XVI.
POSTVMIO LAMPADIO
V. C.
ET INLVSTRI CON. CAMPANIAE
RESTITVTORI PATRIAE
ET REDINTEGRATORI OPERVM PVBLICORVM
By a singular coincidence, Lampadius was also the name of the
Prefect who restored the Flavian amphitheatre in a.d. 445; but
though the surname is the same, the prename is not, he was
probably of the same family.
[194] See p. 45.
[195] This would be at least equal to £200 of modern money.
[196] Anfiteatro Campano illustrato e Restorato da Franceso
Alvino terza edizione col paragone di tutti gli anfiteatri D’Italia ed
un cenno sugli antichi monumenti di Capua. Napoli, 1842.
[197] The Neapolitan palm is ten inches English measure. If the
measurements of Signor Alvino are reduced to English measure,
they do not agree with those of Messrs. Taylor and Crecy for the
Colosseum; as he used the same scale for all three, the
proportions are the same.
[198] In Rome these are Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, Composite; at
Verona, all Tuscan; at Capua, all Doric.
[199] I am indebted for this clear account of the amphitheatre
at Pola to Lord Talbot de Malahide, who was there in October,
1875. The excellent drawings of Mr. Arthur Glennie, who resided
at Pola for one whole summer, also agree perfectly with the
excellent account of that remarkable building, which further
contributes to illustrate the Colosseum at Rome. An excellent
account of Pola appeared about the same time in the Saturday
Review, but this is more general, not so specially written with this
object in view.
[200] “Notissimus eques Romanus elephanto supersedens per
catadromum decucurrit.” (Suetonii Nero, cap. xi. Xiphil. lxi.)
 “Ego eo vocabulo funem intelligo, qui summo theatro alligatus,
declinis ad imum theatri pertinebat solum defigebaturque, per
quem descendere maximi periculi et artis atque adeo miraculi
erat.” (Turnebo, Adv. xxvii. 18.)
[201] “Icarus, primo statim conatu, juxta cubiculum ejus
(Neronis) decidit, ipsumque cruore respersit.” (Suetonii Nero, c.
12.)
[202]

“Vidimus in cœlum trabibus spectacula textis

Surgere, Tarpeium prope despectantia culmen.”

(Calpurnii, Ecloga vii. v. 23.)

[203] “Erat mons ligneus ad instar incliti montis illius, quem

vates Homerus Idæum cecinit, sublimi instructus fabrica, consitus
viretis et vivis arboribus summo cacumine, de manibus fabri fonte
mænante, fluviales aquas eliquans.” (Apulei, Metamor., lib. x. c.
30.)
[204]

“Mobile ponderibus descendat Pegma reductis

Inque chori speciem, spargentes ardua flammas
Scena rotet: varios effingat Mulciber orbes
Per tabulas impune vagus, pictæque citato
Ludant igne trabes, et non permissa morari
Fida per innocuas errent incendia turres.”

(Claudianus, De Consulatu Mallii. v. 325.)

[205] “Memorabile maxime Cari et Carini et Numeriani hoc

habuit imperium, quod ludos populo Romano novis ornatos
spectaculis dederunt, quos in Palatio circa porticum statuti pictos
vidimus ... centum pantomimos et gymnicos mille pegma
præterea, cujus flammis scena conflagravit quam Diocletianus
postea magnificentiorem reddidit.” (Vopiscus in Carino, cap. 18,
ap. Script. Hist. Aug.)
[206]

“Hic ubi sidereus propius videt astra Colossus,

Et crescunt media Pegmata celsa via,
Invidiosa feri radiabant atria regis.”
 (Martialis, De Spectaculis, Ep. 2.)
[207] “Catabolum erat locus, in quo feræ erudiebantur sive ad
mansuetudinem sive etiam ad crudelitatem, quam in bestiarios
exercerent.” (Papias.)
“Catabolum est clausura animalium, ubi desuper aliquid jacitur.”
(Vossii, Lexicon Etymologicum.)
The Catabolensis or Catabolici were the men who fed the wild
beasts, and threw down their food from the small passage before
mentioned. (See p. 17.)
[208] “Addidit alia die in Amphitheatro una missione centum
jubatos leones, qui rugitibus suis tonitru excitabant; qui omnes e
posticis interempti sunt, non magnum præbentes spectaculum
quo occidebantur. Neque enim erat bestiarum impetus ille, qui
esse e caveis egredientibus olet.” (Vopisci Probus, c. 19, ap.
Script. Hist. Aug.)
[209] “Ut sæpe faciunt amphitheatrales feræ diffractis tandem
solutæ posticis.” (Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. 27.)
[210] “Stat. Cardine aperto—Infelix cavea.” The door opening
on a hinge or a pivot.
[211] “Feras lybicas una die centum exhibuit, ursos una die
mille.” (Julii Capitolini, i. c. 3, ap. Script. Hist. Aug.)
[212]

“... Auro quoque torta refulgent

Retia, quæ totis in Arenam dentibus extant.
... nec non, ubi finis Arenæ,
Proxima marmoreo peragit spectaculo muro:
Sternitur adjunctis ebur admirabile truncis,
Et coit in rotulam, tereti qua lubricus axis
Impositos subita vertigine falleret ungues
Excuteretque feras.”

(Calpurnii, Ecl. 7.)

[213] “Fertur in euripis vino plenis Navales Circenses

exhibuisse.” (Lampridii Antoninus Heliogabalus, c. 23, ap. Script.
Hist. Aug.)
[214]

“Quidquid et in Circo spectatur et amphitheatro,

 Dives Cæsarea præstitit unda tibi:
Fucinus et pigri taceantur stagna Neronis:
Hanc norint unam sæcula Naumachiam.”

(Martialis de Spect. Ep. 28.)

That is, the stagna in the amphitheatre were supplied by an
aqueduct from the lake of Fucino. This lake has been drained in
1874-75 by Prince Torlonia, by carrying out the project of the
great engineers of the time of the Emperor Claudius, and making
an emisarium, on even a grander scale than the one partially
made in the time of Claudius, on a similar plan to those of the
lakes of Albano and Nemi.
[215]

“Respice terrifici scelerata sacraria Ditis,

Cui cadit infausta fusus gladiator arena,
Heu male lustratæ Phlegetontia victima Romæ.
Nam quid vesani sibi vult ars impia ludi?
Quid mortes juvenum, quid sanguine pasta voluptas
Quid pulvis Caveæ semper funebris et illa
Amphitheatralis spectacula tristia pompæ?
Nempe Charon jugulis miserorum se duce dignas
Accipit inferias, placatas crimine sacro.
Hæ sunt deliciæ Jovis Infernalis: in istis
Arbiter obscuri placidus requiescit Averni.”

(Aur. Prudentius Clem. contra Symmachum, 379-389.)

[216] 2. “Casu in meridianum spectaculum incidi, lusus

expectans et sales et aliquid laxamenti, quo hominum oculi ab
humano cruore acquiescant. 3. Contra est: quidquid ante
pugnatum est, misericordia fuit. Nunc omissis nugis, mera
homicidia sunt. Nihil habent quo tegantur; ad ictum totis
corporibus expositi, nunquam frustra mittunt manum mittunt. Hoc
plerique ordinariis paribus et postulatitiis præferunt non galea,
non scuto repellitur ferrum. Quo munimenta? quo gladii artes?
Omnia ista mortes meræ sunt. Mane leonibus et ursis homines,
meridie spectatoribus suis objiciuntur. 4. Interfectores
interfecturis jubentur objici, et victorem in aliam detinent cædem,
exitus pugnantium mors est ferro et ignores geritur. Hæc fiunt
dum vacat arena.” (Sen., Epistolæ ad Lucilium, 7.)
[217] See Photos., Nos. 3273, 3274, and Plates XXIII., XXIV.
 [218]

“Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camœna,

Spectatum, satis et donatum jam rude quæris,
Mæcenas, iterum antiquo me includere ludo.”

(Horatii Epist., lib. i. 1.)

[219]

“Dum peteret pars hæc Myrinum, pars illa Triumphum;

Promisit pariter Cæsar utrâque manu.”

(Martiali de Spectaculis, Epig. 20.)

[220] “Fuerunt sub Gordiano Romæ elephanti triginta et duo,

gladiatorum Fisculium paria mille.” (Julii Capitolini Gordianus
tertius.)
[221] Suetonii Titus, c. 9.
[222] “Jam ad spectaculum supplicii nostri populus convenerat:
jam ostentata per arenam periturorum corpora mortis suæ
pompam duxerant.” (Quinctil., Decl. 9.)
[223] Lampridii Commodus Antoninus, 16.
[224] “Contra consuetudinem (Commodus) pænulatos jussit
spectatores, non togatos ad munus convenire, quod funeribus
solebat, ipse in pullis vestimentis præsidens. Galea ejus per
portam Libitinensem elata est.” (Lampridii Commodus Antoninus,
ap. Script. Hist. Aug., c. 16.) This circumstance is also mentioned
by Dio Cassius, as quoted previously.
[225] “Inter carnifices et fabros Sandapilarum.” (Juvenal, Sat.
viii. 175.)
[226] “Ruinart Acta Martyrum Sincera.” (ap. Grævii Thesaurus,
tom. ix.)
[227]

“Non omnis moriar, multaque pars mei

Vitabit Libitinam.”

(Horatii Odæ, lib. iii. ode 30.)

[228]
 “Effert uxores Fabius, Christilla maritos,
Funereamque toris quassat uterque facem.
Victores committe, Venus, quos iste manebit
Exitus, una duos ut Libitina ferat.”

(Martial. Epig., lib. viii. 43.)

[229] “Ferrarium vicinum, aut hunc qui ad Metam sudantem
tubas experitur et tibias.” (Senecæ, Epist. 56.)
Some of the tubes or leaden pipes have been found (as before
mentioned).
[230] “Ostium humile et augustum, et potissimum ejus generis,
quod cochleam appellant, ut solet esse in cavea ex qua tauri
pugnare solent.” (Varr. de Re Rustica, iii. 5.)
[231] “Edidit et Circenses plurimos a mane usque ad vesperam,
interjecta modo Africanarum venatione, modo Trojæ decursione:
quosdam præcipuos, minio et chrysocolla constrato circo nec ullis
nisi ex senatorio ordine aurigantibus.” (Suetonii Caligula, 18.)
[232] “Inquietatus fremitu gratuita in Circo loca de media nocte
occupantium, omnes fustibus abegit; elisique per eum tumultum
viginti amplius Equites Romani, totidem matronæ, super
innumeram turbam ceteram.” (Suetonii Caligula, cap. 26.)
A similar mania has sometimes been heard of in recent times in
Paris and in London.
[233] “Bestiariis meridianisque adeo delectabatur, ut et prima
luce ad spectaculum descenderet et meridie dimisso ad prandium
populo persederet præterque destinatos, etiam levi subitaque de
causa, quosdam committeret, de fabrorum quoque ac
ministrorum atque id genus numero si automatum, vel pegma, vel
quid tale aliud parum cessisset. Induxit et unum ex
nomenclatoribus suis, sicut erat togatus.” (Suet. Claudius, c.
xxxiv.)
[234] “Visumque jam est Neronis principis spectaculis arenam
Circi chrysocolla sterni cum ipse concolori panno aurigaturus
esset.” (Plinii Nat. Hist., xxxiii. 27.)
[235] “Subinde intraverunt duo Æthiopes capillati, cum pusillis
utribus, quales solent esse qui arenam in amphitheatro spargunt.”
(Petronii Sat., cap. 34.)
[236] Taciti Annales, lib. xi. c. 11.
 [237] “Lithostrota acceptavere jam sub Sulla: parvulis certe
crustis exstat hodieque, quod in Fortunæ delubro Præneste fecit.
Pulsa deinde ex humo pavimenta in cameras transiere, e vitro:
novitium e hoc inventum. Agrippa certe in Thermis quas Romæ
fecit, figlinum opus encausto pinxit: in reliquis albaria adornavit:
non dubie vitreas facturus cameras, si prius inventum id fuisset,
aut a parietibus scenæ, ut diximus, Scauri, pervenisset in
cameras. Quamobrem et vitri natura indicanda est.” (Plinii Nat.
Hist., lib. xxxvi. 64.)
[238] Friedländer says that a compact floor of glass was found
at Veii (vol. iii. p. 103).
[239] This remarkably fine pavement is still preserved (1876) at
Præneste, now called Palestrina.
[240] Pliny, Nat. Hist., bk. xxxvi. 2, 3.
[241] Ibid. xxxvi. 24, 7.
[242] “Nerone secundum, L. Pisone consulibus, pauca memoria
digna evenere: nisi cui libeat, laudandis fundamentis et trabibus,
quis molem amphitheatri apud Campum Martis, Cæsar
exstruxerat, volumina inplere: cum ex dignitate populi Romani
repertum sit, res inlustres annalibus, talia diurnis urbis actis
mandare.” (Taciti Annales, lib. xiii. c. 31.)
[243] See Plate XXVII.
[244] See Plate XXV.
[245] See Plate XX.
[246] The photo-engraver has unfortunately turned this
photograph upside down, but it is not of much consequence, as
the size and thickness of the bricks of Nero can be seen just the
same. The space is so narrow that it was difficult to get a
photograph of it at all; but this is just one of the cases in which a
photograph is of great importance, because there is nothing in
which artists are so careless as in the thickness of the bricks and
of the mortar between them; there is nothing in which it would
be more easy to play tricks, if they wished to do so.
[247] The fragment of sculpture placed upon this capital has
nothing to do with it, being merely placed there by the workmen,
but a photograph necessarily reproduces things exactly as they
were found at the time the photograph was taken.
 [248] The piers of tufa are represented as transparent, to shew
the insertion of the consoles in them. This insertion, with the
irregularity of the plan of the tufa piers, contrasted with the
mathematical accuracy of the work of the Flavian Emperors,
proves that they belonged to an earlier building.
[249] In other instances, the brick arches of construction
appear to rest on the piers of travertine between them; but as
these have been removed, and the brick walls stand equally well
without them, it is evident that this is not the case. The tall piers
of travertine reach the whole height of the building, to support
the upper gallery. In the following plate the same remarkable
construction is shewn more clearly, because in this instance the
aperture left by the removal of the stone piers is visible in two
storeys, and it is seen that three piers extended from the upper
gallery to the ground, passing through all the other storeys.
[250] In this plate the coins are taken by photograph from the
originals in the British Museum.
[251] Qy. Colonnade of Aqueduct, or Piscina Limaria.
[252] Qy. Reservoir (castellum aquæ) of the time of Alexander
Severus, of which there are remains.
[253] For further details see the Descrizione di Pompeii per
Giuseppe Fiorelli, Napoli, 1875, 12mo., pp. 56 and 70. All who are
interested in Pompeii should have this valuable little work.

THE

ARCHÆOLOGY OF ROME,

BY
JOHN HENRY PARKER, C.B.
 Hon. M.A. Oxon., F.S.A. Lond.;

keeper of the ashmolean museum of history and archæology, oxford;

vice-president of the oxford architectural and historical society,
and of the british and american archæological society of rome;
member of the royal archæological institute,
membre de la societé française d’archéologie,
honorary member of the royal institute of british architects,
and of various archæological societies, english and foreign.

PART VII.

THE FLAVIAN AMPHITHEATRE,

COMMONLY CALLED
THE COLOSSEUM.

OXFORD:
JAMES PARKER AND CO.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
1876.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ARCHÆOLOGY
OF ROME, PART 7 ***

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