AKADEMİK HASSASİYETLER DERGİSİ

JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMİC ELEGANCE

Yıl/Year: 2015 • Cilt/Volume: 2 • Sayı/Issue: 3

THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH

BUREAUCRATIC ELITES*
Yasin ÖZCAN**

Abstract
The objective of this article is to study the bureaucratic elites which have always
been the decision making and dominant class in Turkey within an elitist theory framework
and the transforming impact of the EU membership process on these elites within a his-
torical process. As a result of the Ottoman -Turkish state tradition the bureaucratic eli-
tes have had a major role in the modernization and westernization process. The power
struggle of the bureaucratic elites as well as their relations with society has been studied
from a historical and sociological and political perspective. The bureaucracy which was
a disassociated class in society serving the Sultan with loyalty during the classic Ottoman
period enhanced its influence during the recession period of the empire to become a part-
ner in power. During the reform period the bureaucratic elites pioneered the westernizati-
on movements which were perceived as a solution to the collapse of the state and tried to
redesign both the state and society with reforms from the top because they view the people
as masses to be lead. The new Turkish Republic which inherited the political culture and
state traditions of the empire was established by these bureaucratic elites. During the po-
licy making process the bureaucratic elites who were always influential had their golden
age during the first years of the republic. A power struggle between the power elected by
the people and the bureaucratic elites started with the transition into democracy. There
has always been a stressful relationship between the bureaucratic elites which perceived
to know what was best for the state and society and the elected governments. At the cul-
mination of these tensions the military wing of the bureaucratic elites would intervene
and seize the administration. After such interventions the army implemented a system of

*This study is based on the author’s master’s thesis entitled “The European Transformation of Turkish Bureau-
cratic Elites” which he submitted to the Keele University in Politics and International Relations (European Pol-
itics and Culture) in 2014.
** District Governor (Kaymakam), [email protected].

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Yasin ÖZCAN

dominance over the political power and settled in a central position in society and the
country. During the EU accession process and the implemented harmonization laws and
reforms the position of the army has weakened. The Copenhagen political criteria which
are a political condition of the EU have had a vital contribution in the democratization
and normalization of Turkey.

Key Words: Elite Theory, Bureaucratic Elite, Turkish State Tradition,

Civil- Military Relations, European Union.

TÜRK BÜROKRATİK ELİTLERİN AVRUPA

DÖNÜŞÜMÜ***
Özet
Bu makalenin amacı elitist teori çerçevesinde Türk toplumunda her zaman karar
verici ve egemen sınıf olan bürokratik elitleri ve EU üyelik sürecinin bu elitler üzerindeki
dönüştürücü etkisini tarihi süreç içerisinde incelemektir. Osmanlı-Türk devlet geleneği-
nin sonucu olarak bürokratik elitler modernleşme ve batılılaşma sürecinde önemli bir rol
oynamışlardır. Çalışmada bürokratik elitlerin bu süreçte girdikleri iktidar mücadelesi ve
toplumla ilişkileri tarihsel olduğu kadar, sosyolojik ve politik açıdan da ele alınmıştır. Os-
manlının klasik döneminde toplumdan kopuk bir zümre olarak sultana sadakatle hizmet
eden bürokrasi, imparatorluğun gerileme döneminde devlet idaresinde etkinliği arttırmış
ve iktidara ortak olmuştur. Tanzimat döneminde devletin yıkılmasına çare olarak görülen
batılılaşma hareketlerinin öncüsü olan bürokratik elitler, tepeden inme reformlarla hem
devleti hem de toplumu dizayn etmeye çalışmışlar; halkı yönetilecek yığınlar olarak gör-
müşlerdir. İmparatorluğun siyasal kültürünü ve devlet geleneğini devralan Yeni Türkiye
Cumhuriyeti bu bürokratik elitler tarafından kurulmuştur. Politika yapma sürecinde her
zaman etkin olan bürokratik elitler, cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında altın çağlarını yaşamış-
lardır. Demokrasiye geçişle birlikte halkın seçtiği iktidarlarla bürokratik elit arasında
güç mücadelesi başlamıştır. Devlet ve toplum için en iyi kararın kendileri tarafından ve-
rilmesi gerektiğine inanan bürokratik elitler ile seçilmiş hükümetler arasında her zaman
gerilimli bir ilişki olmuştur. Bu gerilimlerin zirve yaptığı dönemlerde bürokratik elitlerin
askeri kanadı askeri müdahalede bulunarak yönetime el koymuştur. Bu müdahaleler son-
rasında siyasal iktidar üzerinde vesayet sistemi kuran ordu, toplumun ve ülkenin merke-
zine yerleşmiştir. Avrupa Birliğine giriş sürecinde yapılan uyum yasaları ve reformlarla
ordunun bu konumu zayıflamıştır. Avrupa Birliğinin siyasal koşulu olan Kopenhag siyasi
kriterlerinin Türkiye’nin demokratikleşmesine ve normalleşmesine yaptığı katkı hayati-
dir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Elit Teori, Bürokratik Elit, Türk Devlet Geleneği,
Sivil-Asker İlişkileri, Avrupa Birliği.

*** Bu makale Keele Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü; Avrupa Siyaset Bilimi ve
Kültürü Anabilimdalında yapılmış master tezinden yararlanılarak hazırlanmıştır.

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Introduction

In the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition bureaucracy is perceived as a power

group, always endeavoring to maintain its power in the political and social sys-
tem which desiring the sustainability of its status. In turn it’s perceived as the
protector of the state and steers the community. For this reason bureaucracy and
bureaucratic elite in the Turkish community does not implement the decisions
taken by political power but partakes in their making. The political culture is
not acceptable in terms of democracy. To democratize and become a modern
state in Turkey; the patrimonial and centralized nature of the political culture
must changed. Besides, state (the ruler) and society (the ruled) relationship must
be redefined. Turkey has created many harmonization laws and a constitutional
amendment package in the process of accession to the EU. The EU has deman-
ded further democratic reforms, human rights and the rule of law as part of the
process of accession to the EU. Borrud& Jones (2010) report “European leaders
have hailed the results of Turkey’s constitutional reform referendum as an impor-
tant step towards Europe. EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele accepts
that these reforms are a step in the right direction towards fully complying with
European Union accession criteria”. In this study Turkish bureaucratic elites whi-
ch are significant actors in terms of administrative tradition and power affairs in
Turkish society will be examined in detail. This research aims to contribute to
how the transformation of Turkey from traditional conservative, highly bureauc-
ratic state into a democracy which is respectful to human rights and upholds the
rule of law.

A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of

data. A choice of research design reflects decisions about priority being given to
a range of dimensions of the research process (Bryman 2011:46). There are four
noticeable research designs, namely experimental design, cross-sectional design,
longitudinal design and case study design. The basic case study entails the detai-
led and intensive analysis of a single case. Yin (2009:4) confirms that as a research
method, the case study is used in many situations, to contribute to our knowledge
of individual group, social, political and related phenomena. I have chosen Otto-
man Turkish state tradition and bureaucratic elites as an explanatory/causal case
study. In this research I will try to find an answer: How does a strong, centralized,
and highly bureaucratic state democratize? Will the relationship between State
(the ruler) and Society (the ruled) change? What is the effect of EU membership
on Bureaucratic elites and the traditional bureaucratic state? This research will
systematically explore the range of possible connections between democratizati-
on and bureaucratic elites in Turkey. I will examine in detail Turkish bureaucratic
elites and their effects to democratization and reforms.

The ontological and epistemological assumptions that we make subsequ-

ently inform the approach that we adopt when we come to do our political analy-

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Yasin ÖZCAN

sis (Savigny& Marsden 2011:28). My position is ontologically anti-foundatio-

nalist and epistemologically interpretivist and hermeneutic approach. Ontology
and Epistemology lead into particular methodologies and together constrain the
methods that are appropriate for research. Qualitative researchers typically provi-
de detailed descriptions of the settings they investigate. They ask questions such
as what is going on. In this vein; qualitative research approach was selected in
this project to explain and explore ‘what is going on’ transformation of Turkish
state tradition in EU Accession Process. If the research design is a case study and
the research strategy is qualitative, the typical form is that the intensive study by
ethnography or qualitative interviewing of a single case, which may be an orga-
nization, life, family or community (Bryman 2011:76). Punch (2006:52) confirms
that in qualitative research methods the researcher is seen as the primary instru-
ment for data collection and analysis. So when I do my research project I benefit
from the personal experience. I have been working as a District Governor, a
senior bureaucrat in a district in Turkey. A qualitative approach will allow me to
interpret this topic. Qualitative data collection instruments are interviews, focus
groups, observation and written materials such as documents, reports, journals
(Punch 2006:52). Yin (2009: 101) stresses that the sources of evidence that are
used in doing case studies are: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct
observations, and participant-observation. In this study official statistics, books,
journals, articles, scholar websites have been used as secondary data sources. I
have used primary documents in conjunction with secondary literature.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW: ELITE, ELITISM AND
CLASSICAL ELITE THEORIES
Political equality is a desired yet unattainable phenomenon in modern
societies. Regardless of the administrative and socio-cultural structure a group
consisting of small numbers who are more privileged than others hold the
power in all modern societies. Many social scientists and political scientists
have endeavoured to study and research society and the distribution of power,
the power structure and power relations in society. Here the terminology of
‘power’ is used in the sense of “the capacity of some persons to produce inten-
ded and foreseen effects on others” (Wrong, 1995 cited in Domhoff 2005). The
main two theories which endeavour to understand and explain this situation
are: the class theory and the elite theory (Etzioni 1993:13, Bottomore 1993).
A very general definition would be that the class theory (fathered by
Karl Marx) separates society into two classes in terms of economy which are
the ruling class and the subject class. The class definition and distinguishing
of the Marxist theory according to the use of economic resources and econo-
mic inequalities (Bottomore 1993:15). Elite theory separates the minority
which holds the power and administers and the remaining society which is
administered. The minority group which administers the community and takes

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all the important decisions is the elite while the administered mass is non-elite
(Bottomore 1993:1, Meisel 1962:33, Mosca 1939:50, Etzioni 1997:47). Elite
theory endeavours to explain society in terms of the relations between elite
and non-elite groups. Elite theory was not limited only to the study of the eli-
tes but also endeavoured to study the social political events in society. It was
a search to find answers as to who had the power in society and who adminis-
tered society or commissioned its administration.

A. Classical Elite Theories

Field &Higley (2013:1) holds the view that extensive bodies of classical
elite theory were written by Mosca, Pareto and Michels. ‘The Ruling Class’
of Gaetano Mosca, ‘The Mind and Society’ of VilfredoPareto and ‘Political
Parties’ of Robert Michels are significant elite studies (Parry 1988 :30).

a. Mosca: The Ruling Class

Bachrach(1967: 10) recognises that Mosca is the first elitist scholar. In his
Ruling Class theory it is always a small minority group which rules the rest of so-
ciety. Therefore, there are always at least two classes existing in every society at
any give time: the ruling class and the ruled class (Mosca 1939:50). According to
Mosca the ruling class is always a minority and ‘the few’ rules ‘the many’ (Meisel
1962:33; Jary&Jary 1991: 188).Moscagives much emphasis to the capacity of
minority’s organizations. According to Mosca there are two explanatory reasons
of the minority supremacy: well organized and unity of purpose (Bachrach1967:
12).The minority group always has more privileges than the majority. A small
group can be organized easier than a large group. Mosca asserts that (1939:50)

“...the dominion of an organized minority obeying a single impulse, over

the unorganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irre-
sistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone
before the totality of the organized minority. At the same time, the minority
is organized for the very reason that it is a minority.”

The elite always maintain their superiority because of their power, their
organizational abilities, their political abilities and their personal qualities (Parry
1988:30-33).Meisel (1962:16) formulated in three Cs the necessary features of the
elite are group consciousness, coherence and conspiracy. For Mosca (1939:50) all
societies are divided into two groups; one of them governs and other is gover-
ned. The former group is always the minority (elites) which are well organized
and united. All political and government affairs are executed by the minority,
they always retain the power and enjoy the advantages of power. The later group
is always the majority (non-elites) which are disorganized, ruled and controlled
by the minority. From this perspective the public or the masses have no power

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and no options; they have to acquiesce dominance of the elites (Arslan 2006:3).
The public (majority) is ruled and directed to maximize the benefit of the elites
through the medium of ‘manipulation and violence’ (Bachrach1967: 12). In this
vein according to Mosca, representative system, political equality, free elections,
majority rule are myth and this things are very difficult to realise in society.
The ruling minority have decisive control over social forces in society. The ruling
elites always need a moral and legal basis to justify their power. Mosca (1939:71-
72) refers toit as ‘Political formula’. According to Mosca, while the elites rule
the masses, they should respect the moral and ethical values of every segment of
society (Pandey 1989:134). He believes that these practices help the elite’s gover-
ning stability.

b. Pareto: Circulation of Elites

Mosca’s elite concept is held by Pareto; there are always two groups that
exist in society: minority or majority, the ruling class and the ruled class. Pareto
divides society into two classes the lower stratum (non elite) and the superior
stratum (elite) (Etzioni 1997:47). The most talented and successful people of each
professional group create elites in society. The eliteis divided into two groups:
One group of elite have an important role in governing (the governing elite).
They play a crucial role directly or indirectly in policy making process. The other
group of elite is not in the government (the non governing elite) (Pareto 1976:51,
Bottomore 1993:2). Pareto (1935:1573) states that “...the governing elite inclu-
de those who play a significant part in government and political life, while the
non-governing elite comprise the rest of the elite personnel, those who have no
significant role in government and politics.”

According to Pareto the governing elite consist of the: military elite, re-
ligious elite, economic elite, intellectual elite and political elite. The last group
is direct user of political power in the governing elite. The governing elite are
subdivided into‘foxes’ and ‘lions’ by Pareto. Smart and cunning foxes use intri-
gue, diplomacy and deviousness when they rule the masses; lions choose force
in ruling for power, stability and validity (Powers 1987:41). Pareto believes that
ideal elite consist of a balanced mix of foxes and lions.

Pareto (1976:55) argues that “The governing elite is in a state of conti-

nuous and slow transformation”. The elite and non elite are subject to change,
particularly in the governing elite. Some significant non elites have access to
the governing elite in contemporary societies. While they rise from lower class
to governing class, they bring their own moral and ethical values. It is a neces-
sity as social mobility. On the other hand some of the governing elite fall in to
non elite masses. Pareto (1976:55) calls this situation ‘circulation of the elites’.
If this circulation occurs slowly and in an orderly way, social cohesion is not
destroyed. But if it happens suddenly and severely (or elite resist to circulation),

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revolutions occur in societies (Pareto 1976:55).In his view, the cycle of rise and
fall of the governing class is inevitable and necessary (Pareto 1976:55, Borkenau
1936:127).Economic, social and cultural changes lead to transformation of the
elite in society. The elite class is renewed by people rising from lower stratum.
This ineluctable process is expressed that ‘History is a graveyard of aristocracies’
by Pareto (1935:1430).

c. Michels: The Iron Law of Oligarchy

Michels is another important representative of elitist theory. He observes

and examines socialist-democratic parties, unions and their organisation structu-
res in the Europe (Etzioni 1993:21). According to his research, there is a sup-
remacy of the leader in political parties and it is ineluctable and irremovable
(Etzioni 1993:22). The oligarchs dominate the rest of the masses. He explains the
reason for this division of labour and specialization in his words: ‘psychology of
organization itself’ (Michels 1959:401). According to him the ruler and the ruled
exist in each organisation in society. In Michels’s view the oligarchs (elite) rule
the rest of the membership (masses) in the organization(Etzioni 1993:22). Mic-
hels (1959:377) describe the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. All organizations are ruled
by a minority leader group which is intelligent and expert. “It is organization
which gives birth to the domination of the elected over electors, of the mandata-
ries over the mandators, of the delegates over delegators. Who says organization,
says oligarchy” (Michels 1959:401). In this vain, inherently administration and
organisation self-governance is impossible. Democracy is not majority rule and
self-governance, but it is competition between oligarchies (political parties).

d. Wright Mills: The Power Elite

After the Second World War elite theory was applied to the USA by C.
Wright Mills. According to him society is directed and manipulated by political,
military and economic elites. Their power arises from their stra- tegic positions
in institutions (Etzioni 1993:22). In their study of the elite phenomenon elite
theoreticians used different methodological approaches. Mosca and Michels
emphasized the importance of organization with the organizational approach
(Parry 1988:35); while Pareto approached the is- sue from a psychological
approach. Mills underlined the complex relati- ons between elites and used the
institutional approach by underlining the strategic and hierarchic phenomenon of
‘us’ established among the elites. According to Mills power is institutionalized
in modern society and the elite is ‘the institutional landscape’ of the society
(Parry 1988:52).

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Instead of ‘the ruling class’ Mills has used the concept of ‘the power elite’.
Power is the most significant point of Mills’ analysis. According to the Marxist
outlook power is held by those who are the strongest in terms of economy to
form the ‘ruling class’, according to the liberal out- look power is held by the
politicians ‘political elite’ while others claim that power is held by the military
(warlords) (Mills 1959:277, Bottomore 1993:22). According to Mills all these
definitions are not adequate to exp- lain the situation. According to him the best
way to understand and explain the goings on at the top of society is ‘the power
elite’ (Mills 1959:277). According to Mills “Power in modern American society
is not attribute of classes or person but of institutions” (Parry 1988:53). The
concept of the power elite not only indicates the important organizations of
society but the relationships of those who are in charge of these organizations
(Botto- more 1993:23).

The power elite is composed of political, economic and military men (Mil-
ls 1959:276). According to Mills this power elite consists of people who hold
strategic positions in the community. As a result of studies made in the USA the
power elite of this country is collected in three groups. The first group consists of
political leaders and high level bureaucrats, the second group consists of proprie-
tors of large companies and high level administrators and the third group consists
of high level commanders (Hewitt 1974:47). All important decisions involving
the country are taken as a result of the complicated coalition established by the-
se elites from the political, economic and military areas. The Power elite invol-
ve mutual cooperation, solidarity and complex relations. These elites live in the
same neighbourhood, go to the same clubs, are members of the same associations
and interact in the same social activities (Mills 1959:287).

Elite theory emphasizes the fact that power is not distributed equally which
divides the community into the elite and the administered mass- es. This
theory could help explain social events in many countries. Fur- thermore, ‘the
power elite’ concept which consists of a group which has complex
relationships within itself, with a group awareness and sense of belonging, which
lives an introverted social life, which prioritizes the con- tinuation of the status
quo, which is privileged and well to do compared to the others, has a homogenous
structure and which has no opponent appears to be explanatory in terms of how
the power relations operate in Turkey as well as the operation of the social
structure and how the country is ad- ministered.

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

In addition the power elite concept presents some very valuable clu- es to
understanding and comprehending the past as well as the present so- cial,
political, economic and cultural problems of the Turkish community. These
power elites which have a rather influential position in the power structure of
the Turkish society can be determined as political elites, bu- reaucratic elites and
economic elites. The political elites consist of leader cadres of influential
political parties in Turkey and influential politicians. Economic elites consist of
the owners of companies which are significant for the Turkish economy and their
high level executives. Bureaucratic eli- tes-the focal point of this study- are high
level offices deputized in the state administration, the high level members of the
judiciary which occupy the most important positions in the power of justice and
the high level com- manders in the armed forces.

e. Bureaucratic Elite Concept

Weber recommended bureaucracy as the ideal organization model for the

modern society of the 20th century. In Weber’s definition of bureaucracy it is
rational and legal; pre-determined rational legal orders and rules have replaced
traditions (Weber 1964:329-332). Rules and regulations, hierarchy, division of
labour and expertise, impersonality and standardization are the primary charac-
teristics of bureaucracy (Gerth& Mills 1946:196-198, Beetham 1996:9). Weber’s
ideal type of bureaucracy is managed by an objective structure which is due to
its impersonal characteristic. (Weber 2006:6, Heper 1985:192). Weber’s ideal/
rational and legal type of bureaucracy is the product of the rational perspecti-
ve generated by the enterprising class of social change in 19th century Western
Europe. According to this perspective the bureaucracy in a modern state is not
the organizations which makes political decisions but the organization which en-
forces the taken decisions. A look at this definition will not mean much when the
words bureaucrat and elite come together.However, in communities which come
from a patrimonial tradition, where central state organization is strong, where the
enterprising class has not reached its potential, where it is believed that they are
tasked with ensuring the continuity of the state, in communities in which it is not
the entity which enforces political decisions but is active in the political decision
making process itself, in communities in which elite are tasked with steering the
community the words bureaucracy and elite have meaning when they are toget-
her.

According to some philosophers the world has become a bureaucracy, ac-

cording to them bureaucratic elites can grow immensely and become the power
which endangers democracy (Page and Wright 1999: 2). Weber described this
state as the passivation of democracy (Gerth& Mills 1998:224-227).

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In that case the definition of bureaucratic elite can be made as follows; a

high level group of state employees which have the authority to use the will de-
rived from the power of the state, having the knowledge and technical expertise
and the will to control the community/state/economy with an ‘elitist’ approach by
obstructing democratic processes and who have an influential role in the political
decision making process. In this aspect the bureaucratic elites are not limited to
being regular public employees which are involved in administrative affairs but
a privileged group which holds the authority to regulate the political area (Sule-
iman 1984:4).

In the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition, bureaucracy is perceived as a power

group that always endeavours to maintain its power in the political and social
system, desires the sustainability of its status, which is perceived as the protector
of the state and steers the community. For this reason bureaucracy in the Turkish
community is not the kind which implements the decisions taken by political
power but which partakes in their making. While Weber’s rational legal burea-
ucracy appliers are not decision makers but implementers the bureaucrats in the
Ottoman-Turkish state tradition are decision makers (Heper 1985:55). Particular-
ly in the Reforms period when modern bureaucracy was born bureaucracy was
the organization which made political decisions rather than implemented them. If
expressed in Weberian terminology these bureaucrats were more oriented towar-
ds substantive rationality and less so on instrumental rationality (Heper 1985:
161). The more bureaucratic elites start to see themselves as the single authority
in key issues such as public benefits, state security, the higher interests of the
state which are vague in terms of content as well as limits into practice they are
distanced from being a regular bureaucrat who is a representative of rationality in
the Weberian understanding.

Bureaucratic elites such as those in Turkey example and (particularly if

they come from a long line of paternalist management tradition) view themselves
as protectors of the status quo, responsible for ensuring the continuity of the state
and as the deputized class to steer the community (Chapman 1959:274).

The concept of the bureaucratic elite has been used in this study to portray
the governing elite group consisting of high level cadres of civil bureaucracy
and military bureaucracy. This was generated by the administrative structure of
the Ottoman which bequeathed its political culture and state tradition to the new
Republic of Turkey. A significant characteristics of Ottoman administration was
the fact that the military and administration organizations were intertwined. The
military command and public administration were executed under the orders of
the same person (Ozdemir 2006:54). Scholars and historians define the ottoman
community as two different classes: “The first one, called askeri, literally the
‘military’, included those to whom the Sultan had delegated religious or exe-
cutive power through an imperial diploma, namely officers of the court and the

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

army, civil servants, and Ulema [Doctors of Islamic law]. The second included
the reaya, comprising of all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects” (Inalcik 1964:44).
It is evident that the military were used to cover all the administrative elite other
than the Sultan. Since the Ottoman administrative structure was such that it was
impossible to separate the civil and military bureaucracy clearly from one anot-
her and because the founding elites of the new Turkey consisted of military civil
bureaucrats the concept of bureaucratic elite has been used to indicate administ-
rative elites originating from civil and military organizations in this study.

This study, which portrays Turkey as an example the concept of burea-

ucracy, defines a formation of power in which the state is embodied, where the
concept of the bureaucratic elite is the owner and protector of the state, which
views citizens as a mass to be administered, the roots go way back to the period of
reforms of the ottoman times where modern bureaucracy started to formulate and
civilian and military statesmen who are directly or indirectly the owners of power
and authority occupy high level positions in the state administration rather than
an organization model. In the forthcoming parts of the study the historical deve-
lopment process and formation of Turkish state tradition, the structure of Turkish
bureaucratic elites and their roles in the Turkish community will be studied.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH SOCIETY:

MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC ELITE
In this section the social structure of the heritage of the Ottoman Empire
to the Turkish Republic, its form of administration, political culture, bureaucratic
structure and bureaucratic elites will be studied. Due to the fact that not enough
scientific research has been carried out regarding the Ottoman state and administ-
ration system the thresholds and dates during the transition process from traditi-
onal administrative structure to modern bureaucracy may be less than clear-cut
(Findley 1980:7, Weiker 1968:458). This structural transformation and instituti-
onalization has developed gradually over a long timeline. Due to the limitation
of space here it has been possible only to summarize the most important points.

A. The Classical Age of the Ottoman Empire

“The Ottoman Empire immediate predecessor of present day Turkey came

to an end in 1928, after an uninterrupted sovereign existence of more than
six centuries (1299-1918). In the course of the first three centuries of its
existence it became the world’s most powerful country by gradually ex-
panding from a small dominion in western Anatolia to the three known
continents-Europe, Asia and Africa- through a highly efficient and tightly
interwoven civil and military organization” Karpat (1959:3)

In the Ottoman Empire the ‘Sultan’ was the impersonation of the state as
well as the proprietor of primarily land and all resources as well as the head of

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enforcement (Karpat 2001:315, Tachau 1984:59). Yet this did not mean that the
Sultan had unlimited absolute power. The State was administered by the Sultan
and bureaucracy within an islamic framework of rules with which they could li-
mit each other in a balanced structure (Findley 1980: 8, Karpat 2001:315). A look
at the Ottoman society – with a distinction similar to the elitist intellectuals - it
is evident that there was a dual structure consisting of an executive class which
dealt with administration affairs and served the Sultan and the people (masses)
which produced, served in the military, paid taxes and ensures revenue to the state
but which was not included in the administration (Inalcik 1964:44, Narli 2000:8).
Zurcher (2007:11) state that :
“According to the Ottoman ideology, society in the empire was organized
around a – theoretically strict- distinction between a ruling elite and the
mass of the population. The ruling elite consisted of all servants of the Sul-
tan (the military, the clerks ‘katip’ and the royal household) and religious
scholar ‘ulema’.”
Due to the fact that the bureaucracy possessed characteristics such as being
overly active in political matters as well as independent and accordingly high
level bureaucrats were not involved only with administrative duty areas but were
involved in the policy making structure which made them important actors the
Ottoman Empire can be defined as a ‘historical bureaucratic empire’ (Durgun&-
Yayman 2005:93).
Before the periods of decline and dissolution in the classic period when the
empire was strong the system of ‘Kul’ (servant of the sultan) as the source of mi-
litary and civil bureaucracy was established in the Ottoman state system (Heper
1974:38, Tezel 2010:12, Durgun&Yayman 2005:94). The training of bureaucrats
who would take their place in the Kulsystem of managing the state was done
with the method of ‘devshirmeh’ (Barkey 1994:31, Mardin 1973:171, Weiker
1968:458). The Devshirmeh method consisted of selecting intelligent and talen-
ted Christian children from an early age and having them educated at the ‘En-
derun’ (palace school of the empire) and those who graduated were settled into
state administration duty (Kunt 1974:234, Tachau 1984:60, Basgoz 1973:204,
Tezel 2010:12). The bureaucracy group which was established this way did not
have any relations and ties in society which was why they could devote their
lives to serving the Sultan. In other words the bureaucrats of the Ottoman period
were not elected by the people which segregated them from the community (We-
iker 1968:458). Even if people were literate and wanted to serve the state with
loyalty it was not possible for them to enter the echelons of bureaucracy (Weiker
1968:458).The reason for this was that, the Sultan did not want strong families
occurring within the bureaucracy. This institutional structure which purports the
gap between the bureaucratic elite and the people in Turkish state tradition Mar-
din (1973:172) is considered the border which determines the separation between
the centre and the periphery.

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

Mardin (1973: 171-175) adapted the centre-periphery relationship analy-

sis which Edward Shils (1975: 5-11) had developed to analyze the structure of
society into a ruling-ruled relationship for Turkish society and political culture.
The Centre indicates the values and judgments which are the values establishing
the essence/disposition of the state – central value system and political central
bureaucracy. The periphery is a social area and system of values which is outside
the centre. During the classic period the Centre of the Ottoman society consisted
of bureaucratic elites which were privileged, did not pay taxes, were cultured,
educated, intellectual as a result of the Kul system while the periphery paid taxes,
were uneducated, villagers who tilled the land and had no say so in administ-
ration. In the Classic period there was a symbolical separation between the pe-
riphery and the centre in terms of a political and values system which was not
problematic because there was a consensus in fundamental values and judgments.
However this situation changed in the 18th century when administrative, financial,
military problems emerged in the empire. The bureaucrats who had gained power
politically in the centre endeavored to redesign the state and society with moder-
nizing reforms which they considered way to prevent collapse. While they were
doing this they adopted a western positivist values system which was contrary to
the values system of the periphery which was based on the Islam religion. As a
result a separation over values was established between the centre and the perip-
hery which was beyond symbolic (Mardin 1973:175). This separation continued
into the new Republic of Turkey. While centres and peripheries are harmonized
in western countries (Shils 1975: 93) the affairs between the centre and the perip-
hery have been an area of separation and tension in Turkish society.

The administration system started to deteriorate in the 17th century due to

internal and external factors; in this process the bureaucratic elite turned into a
patrimonial structure (Mardin 2000:122, Heper 1974:63, Chambers 1964:303).
Furthermore a sense of ‘us’ had developed among the bureaucrats and they star-
ted to take precautions to ensure that their elitist structure was nepotistic (Cham-
bers 1964:303).

It would be incorrect to say that the Kulsystem of the classic period Otto-
man administration was a modern bureaucracy because the bureaucrats were not
serving the people who were loyal to the state but informed and educated servants
to the Sultan who obeyed him unconditionally. These bureaucratic minions who
were faultless in their obedience and loyalty to the Sultan were the shadows of the
Sultan’s power among the people and held privileged positions (Heper 1985:110-
111, Durgun&Yayman 2005:94).

In the course of time the high level bureaucrats were gradually and steadily
transformed from the loyal servants of the ruler into statesmen who the ruler had
to please, who refrained from confronting them, who considered it their right to
take important decisions on behalf of the state and society and who did not feel

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the need to be approved by the people (Heper 1985:115). Over time the servants
of the Sultan who lived a privileged life detached from the people had transfor-
med into an independent power centre consisting of bureaucratic elites (Zurcher
2007:12-13). By the 18th century the Ottoman state was administered and society
was steered by an elite group consisting of military, religious, civil bureaucrats
(Heper 1974:60).

B. The Stagnation Period and Emergence of Modern

Ottoman Reforms
For these emerging bureaucratic elites neither the Sultan nor the people
were important, it was more vital to protect their own power and ensure the con-
tinuation of the system (Heper 1985:116). As indicated by Mardin (1973:175)
during the recession period of the empire the bureaucrats had started to give sig-
nals regarding the establishment of their own competency areas against the Sul-
tan as well as the implementation of a ‘eastern style despotism’ on the commu-
nity. When the state system was engulfed in corruption the public servants relied
on their power and recognized no rules and started to persecute society (Shaw
1971:4).

By this time the ideology of the bureaucratic elites had transformed from
loyalty to the Sultan to loyalty to the state which was the sole reason for their
existence (Karpat 1972:87). Their mission had become to restore order and pro-
tect the holy state against both the Sultan and society (the periphery which was in
the process of initiating its own autonomous structure when the centre weakened)
(Heper 1985:128). This was so pronounced that when the occasion arose they de-
posed the Sultan who was the continuity of the state. In future terms this tradition
established the infrastructure for the idea of coups which is one of the incurable
sicknesses of the political life of the Turkish Republic.

The bureaucrats of the Ottoman empire were always strong and solid in
their positions, the reform efforts of weak Sultans who succeeded to the throne
were central which was always in their favor ( Weiker 1968:456). The basic cha-
racteristic of a centralized state is a strong bureaucracy which has expertise and
is large and high skilled (Ortaylı 2002: 123). Weiker (1968:456) explains this
situation as follows; “Bureaucrats tended to be reformers, because reform furthe-
red centralization, which increased the strength of the bureaucracy.” As a result
of the efforts to strengthen the central administration which started with Mahmut
the IInd centralization had increased but this power had not passed onto the ru-
ler but to the bureaucrats who advocated the realization of the reforms (Mardin
2000: 110). The developments which took place at that time have been indicated
by the western historian Rosen (cited in Mardin 2000:110) as follows. “The status
of servant of the government changed from that of slaves to the Sultan to that of
servants of the states”.

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

A study of the reasons for the crises of the Ottoman Empire has underlined
two reasons. Firstly, the deterioration in the state administration and secondly the
military supremacy of the west (Mardin 1994: 10). The most painful results of the
crises was the loss of territory which caused a great depression and psychological
breakdown the likes of which had never been encountered since the establish-
ment of the Ottoman empire. Losses of territory in addition to the already existing
administrative and financial problems of the empire was perceived as a sign of the
path to perdition and the bureaucrats started to take precautions rapidly to prevent
this ( Mardin 2000: 142-143). The driving force of the reform process started and
executed by the bureaucratic elites was to prevent this bad ending. The deterio-
ration of the economic and administrative structure due to internal and external
reasons as of the beginning of the 18th century increased the modernization initia-
tives. The military supremacy of the west was perceived as the reason for the loss
of territory so the first reforms were executed in the military area (Lewis 2002:38-
39). However when the recession continued it was believed that reform in the
military area was not sufficient and reforms started in all areas of government.

The modernization of the Ottomans was actually a project to save the sta-
te and this project involved the bureaucratic elites that it did in society (Mar-
din1973:179). During the reform period of the Ottomans the bureaucrats were
the only group who prepared and executed reforms ( Weiker 1968:457). While
the state was reformed, in terms of administration and military aspects, the bure-
aucratic elites thought that it was necessary for society to change as well in order
to solve the problems and they incepted on an adventure of also reforming the
society. During this adventure which would last for long years, the wishes of the
community and the bureaucratic elites were never in synch. Here we are faced
with a critical question which is: why the reforming bureaucrat elites who were
managing the reform process did not undertake reform of their own structures (of
course some structural and cosmetic changes did take place). According to Wei-
ker (1968:457) the answer is as follows : as bureaucratic elites obtained dominan-
ce and power they became conservative and it became more important for them to
conserve and maintain their positions. In fact the bureaucratic elite had conflicts
with elites such as the ‘ulema’ (men of religion) who felt that the deliverance of
the empire lay elsewhere and criticized the reforms for losing their influence with
the new regulations, the ‘ayan’ (notables, provincial magnates) and sometimes
even the Sultan and fortified with their knowledge and experiences they came out
of these conflicts stronger than ever and were able to maintain their existence.
(Mardin 2000:146-149, Heper 1985:139).

C. The Period of Modern Reform: the Tanzimat and the Emergence of

Modern Bureaucracy
The word Tanzimat means reorganization in Turkish and it is used to indi-
cate a period (1839-1878) in Turkish history when the Ottoman Empire was influ-
enced by many political and social reforms from the west. (Mardin 2000:3). The

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great transition in the Ottoman Empire started in the 18th century and the major
role in the reforms were undertaken by the bureaucratic elite (Mardin 2000:139).
While the bureaucratic elites were busy modernizing the state they never forsook
their instinctive protection of their own powers and privileges.

The Tanzimat period started with the Hatt-ıHümayun of Gulhane (rescript

of Gulhane) which has a semi-constitutional quality. The sultan believed that the
rescript which drafted by bureaucrats was for the prevention of collapse and sig-
ned it. According to Heper (1985:153) this declaration has more to do with the
bureaucrats protecting themselves against the arbitrary behavior of the Sultan
than executing reforms in the state. The reason for this is that the lives of the
bureaucrats working in the ‘kul’ system and everything they had could be taken
away with the order of the ruler which is why they felt the need to establish an
institutional structure where they would feel safe (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94).
The reason why the institutionalization initiatives of bureaucracy during the Tan-
zimat period were promoted as reforms was to obtain a more autonomous and
safeguarded structure against the Sultan.

The Tanzimat period had limited the authorities of the Sultan and many
public offices had been opened, public service had become a profession and enab-
led the strengthening of the central structure (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94, Lewis
2002:89). A review of the relationship between the administrator and society in
the classic period Ottoman times shows that the Sultan was the single represen-
tative of power while the rest of people were ruled over (Zurcher 2007:12-13).
During the Tanzimat period the kulbureaucracty, which was absolutely devoted to
the ruler, had been replaced by a central bureaucracy which faced the ruler with a
certain measure of security. “The administrative and political reforms of the Tan-
zimat period (1839-1876) preserved the Sultan’s superior position, while giving
the policy-making authority to the bureaucrats.” (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94).
During this period the administrative organs which were available in the admi-
nistration system of the classic Ottoman period were transformed into ministries
available in western European countries and as a result the need for the knowle-
dge and technical expertise of the bureaucrats increased. For this reason it beca-
me a valuable commodity to be a bureaucrat and as a result the centre of power
moved indirectly from the Sultan to the bureaucratic elites (Lewis 2002:96). In
his memoirs European observer Frederick Millingen (cited in Mardin 2000: 112)
depicts the bureaucratic elites which were institutionalized during the Tanzimat
period as follows: ‘They are a strong power group which dominates all organs
by turning their supremacy in administrative issues, their knowledge and techni-
cal expertise into an advantage. They use their unlimited authorities in politics
as they do in all areas of life. Governors, ambassadors, ministers emerge from
among these strong bureaucratic elites.’

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

The bureaucratic elites of the Tanzimat period perceived that the only way
to resolve the existing problems was to structure the community (bureaucratic
domination over society) (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94). This elite group perceived
the community as a mass which must be steered and structured. This is why the
modernization movement came from the top. The bureaucrats of the Tanzimat
period had become the representatives of an authoritarian administration and this
evolution continued in subsequent periods; power and the authority to administer
the community was always gathered in the hands of the few and never passed to
the people (Tezel 2010:64, Mardin 2000, Lewis 2002).

According to Lewis (2002:65-73) Turkish society had two choices in the

19th century either modernize or perish. The bureaucratic elites who were the dri-
ving forces of these reforms prepared and executed this reform movement which
was mandatory yet never forgot to protect their own sovereignty and their desire
to dominate society. With these desires the pro-Tanzimat transformed the state
and society and undersigned many failures in the process. However, in spite of
this, the Tanzimat period is perceived as a success because the activities of the
bureaucrats laid the foundations for subsequent reforms (Lewis 2002:126-128).
Findley advocates a similar view and purports this process is very significant by
perceiving that the modernization efforts in the Ottoman Empire did not only
shape the Ottoman and Turkish state but the administration tradition of the whole
Islamic world as well. Excluding Russian, one of the few non-western societies
which carried out modernization and westernization efforts in the 19th century
which was the age of empires was the Ottoman Turkish society (Findley 1980:
3-4).

D. Legacy of the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic

With the Tanzimat period, the servants of the Sultan who had been devoted
to the Sultan and implemented his decisions and policies without questioning du-
ring the classic period achieved the status of public servants who served the state
as well as an institutional structure (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94,). The bureaucra-
tic cadre perceived the modernization of the state and society as a solution to the
decline and dispersion of the state they served. This had two significant results.
Firstly the institutionalized bureaucracy within the state gathered power and took
the centre of power from the Sultan to the bureaucracy. Secondly the existing
gap between society and the elites deepened as a result of the modernization for
which there was no demand as well as no infrastructure in the community and the
tension between the centre -periphery increased.

After the Tanzimat period the power conflict did not take place between the
centre and the periphery but among the bureaucrats themselves (Heper 1985:126-
127, Tezel 2010:64). While the bureaucrats of the Tanzimat were endeavoring
to modernize and westernize the state to prevent its collapse in an authoritative

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manner, another elite group which did not approve of this trend emerged. This
formation called TheYoung Ottomans (Mardin 2000:10) consisted of intellectual
state officers who were officers in the bureaucracy yet not elite and who were in
search of a solution to prevent the dispersion of the state. The Young Ottomans
had criticized the Tanzimat bureaucrats because they could not fully perceive
modernization and viewed westernization as merely a superficial emulation of
western habits such as style of dress and lifestyle (Mardin 2000:151). In their opi-
nion the salvation of the Ottoman was embedded in their past and values (Mardin
2000:133). These ideas of The Young Ottomans were also supported by the ulema
(men of religion) and the military who were uncomfortable with the regulations
executed in the name of westernization (Mardin 2000:140-150).

At time the bureaucrats of the Tanzimat who believed they were the sole
people to re-establish the splendor of the former Ottomans faded away and when
most of the bureaucratic elite of the Tanzimat had passed away a new idealist
bureaucratic elite which was nurtured by the ideas of The Young Ottomans: The
JeunesTurc (The Young Turks) (Rustow 1959:516).

As a result of the struggles of The Young Ottomans and The JeunesTurc the
empire was ruled with a constitutional monarchy. the JeunesTurcs who had been
educated in secular schools and who had adopted western ideas were not involved
only in state departments and the military during 1909-1918, they also became a
dominant political group after establishing a political party called The Committee
of Union and Progress (CUP,İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) (Lewis 2002:198, He-
per 1985:160-162Rustow 1959:516). During the administration of this group the
empire entered the First World War. The significance of the JeuneTurc in terms
of recent history is that the founders of the Republic emerged from among these
elites. Although there may have been social, political and ideological differences
between the bureaucratic elite which transformed during the 19th century their
common and sole target was to ‘save the state’. This bureaucratic elitist structure
was inherited by the Turkish Republic along with the political culture and admi-
nistrative tradition of the Ottomans.

2. NEW TURKISH REPUBLIC AND BUREAUCRATIC ELITES

During the Tanzimat period the bureaucratic elites, which were detached
from the people who they considered masses, had to be administered and had
become institutionalized and gained in power. These civil military bureaucra-
tic elites which administered the empire during the First World War became the
founding elite of the new Republic of Turkey which emerged from the debris of
the collapsed empire. The Ottoman did not only leave the new Republic of Tur-
key with a strong and central bureaucracy and a patrimonial state tradition but
also an elitist bureaucratic cadre which used this structure like a power tool and
which did not want to relinquish the power it held (Lewis 2002:463).

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

A. Bureaucratic Elites (Civilian and Military) in the Early Period of

the Turkish Republic

The Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, inherited a strong, centra-

lized, and highly bureaucratic state from the Ottoman Empire (Özbudun 1996,
Durgun&Yayman 2005:95). Zürcher (2010:141) states that ‘the republic created
out of the ruins of Ottoman Anatolia in October 1923 was, of course, legally and
formally a new state’.

It was time for the bureaucratic elite which had become a power center
and which used the modernization and westernization of the traditional empire
as their justification to act on behalf of forming a modern nation state (Lewis
2002:485). This forming started with radical revolutions to change the social stru-
cture and culture (such as clothing, alphabet, calendar reforms).

According to Heper (1985:40) the Ottomans had left the new republic a
legacy consisting of bureaucratic elite which believed itself to be the founder
and protector of the state and had adopted the mission of elevating society to a
civilized level and considered itself competent to decide on behalf of society. In
addition Ottomans had left masses consisting mainly of uneducated peasants with
no desire to modernize, unprepared to become a civilized society. The two ele-
ments which comprise this socio-cultural structure establishing the infrastructure
of Turkish state tradition are the transcendent state and a weak society. Sozen&
Shaw (2003:112) explain the transcendent state structure in the Turkish state tra-
dition as follows: “the patrimonial and centralized nature of the political culture,
coupled with the absence or weakness of any civil society, produced a relations-
hip between the state (the ruler) and society (the ruled) resembling that of father
with son. In folklore, Devlet Baba meant Papa State.”

According to this strong patrimonial state tradition which is a determinant

element of Turkish political culture “father state, an institution that guarantees
the livelihood of the broad strata of the population” (Onis& Webb 1994:135 ).
Tachau (1984:59) describes this as “A strong tradition of the state also prevailed
among the Turks, surviving folk expressions as the father state with the people
cast in the role of children.” The sovereignty of a military civilian bureaucracy
which is the founder and protector of the state and its dominance over the people
is inevitable in a society that reveres the state to this degree.

In the early days of the republic the bureaucratic elites consisting of civi-
lian and military who were the sole owners of the power had two basic tasks: the
first one was to continue with the modernization and westernization activities
which had started during the final throes of the Ottoman era and which had been
interrupted due to the war. And the second was to pioneer a development program
which was necessary to reach a modern civilization level (Zürcher 2010:136).

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Modernization and westernization was a sacred duty for the bureaucratic elites
from the past while the second task was something they had not undertaken pre-
viously. Accordingly the economic development in Turkey which had missed the
industrial revolution and had no bourgeoisie in the western sense, would have to
be state-assisted. For this purpose Ataturk convened the Izmir Economy Cong-
ress in 1923 to establish an economy and development program road map for
the state and the following decisions were made: the private sector would be
supported, national banks would be established to provide incentive credits to
investors (Turan 1984:110, Finefrock 1981:381). However the economic crisis in
1929 unsettled the faith in liberalism and a ‘Statist economy’ policy was adopted
(Hale 1984:154, Lewis 2002:281-285). According to statism, economic develop-
ment project would be controlled by the state and industrial development would
be executed by the government in a planned manner (Shaw & Shaw 2002:388-
391). The bureaucratic elites were very enthusiastic in terms of this development
model for two reasons. Firstly the statist economy model empowered the central
bureaucracy even further and the authoritarian, bureaucratic and paternalistic sta-
te approach would continue for a while longer (Lewis 2002:466-471). The second
reason was that they were concerned that sooner or later a liberal development
model would promulgate a middle class and bourgeois which could become an
elite group to challenge them and in time their power could diminish and they
could evolve into a political opposition.

The bureaucratic elites were in a dilemma; on one hand they wanted to es-
tablish a modern nation state with western values while on the other they viewed
the economic elites and political actors to be promulgated by the middle and
bourgeois class which are the elements of modern society as their competitors
and were concerned that their power would weaken. During the statist economy
period, when the bureaucracy was dominant and the decision maker, these con-
cerns were replaced with the significant and joyous results achieved in industry
and development. Furthermore this period promulgated a social result which was
much more important than the economic results : this was the emergence of the
Turkish middle class consisting of business, managers and technicians which did
not exist before and which is a requirement in becoming a modern western nation
state and which would promulgate the local bourgeoisie in subsequent years (
Lewis 2002:472-474).

Ataturk who was the first president of the new state deemed that the basic
task of the republican state was to elevate the people to a modern level of civiliza-
tion. (Heper 1985:51, Lewis 2002:292). The activities for the transformation and
modernization of society which started in the Tanzimat period would be conti-
nued by the new republican state which meant the bureaucratic elites. According
to Ataturk who believed the people were easily misguided it was the business of
the elite to ensure that the people were modernized and reached a modern level
of civilization. According to Zürcher (2010:136) during the early years of the

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

Republic “the terms to make society ‘modern’ and ‘civilized’ were used as sy-
nonyms referring to Contemporary European civilization”.

During the first years of the establishment of the nation state there was no
will nor capacity in the community to achieve a modern level of civilization. For
this reason the reforms had to be implemented from above (Heper 1985:50-51).
Since the people were easily misguided it was up to the national will to enligh-
ten them and leave their civilization to the elites. According to Ataturk a society
could modernize and become civilized but the elites should play an accelerating
role in this process (Heper 1985:52). Ataturk who himself was a soldier and who
had been affected by the long period of wars preferred military elite to civilian
elites, trusted them more and held them sacrosanct.

B. 1923-1945 Single Party Era

The legacy to a nation state which was struggling to establish itself after
600 years of ruling as an empire consisting of centralization, bureaucracy, pat-
rimony and theocracy was an uneducated society of peasants which had not ac-
hieved a level of modern civilization nor had they participated in administration.
According to Zurcher (2010:213) 10 percent of the population was literate when
the republic was established. After a long period of war (Balkan Wars, First Wor-
ld War, Liberation War) and numerous social traumas the elites believed that this
overwhelmed community could easily be mislead and that the elites were com-
petent to decide what was good for the community and they focused on targets
which would ensure national integrity, economic progress and political moderni-
zation. The final target was to establish a modern nation state with western values
and steer the community in this direction (Zürcher 2010:136,232). During this
period the foundations of the new republic were lain and the political and social
structures were molded by the state and westernization rather than modernization
was prominent. The main characteristics to achieve the mentioned targets were
statism, authoritarianism, command democracy, secularism, nation building. The
single-party system which was implemented in the Republic of Turkey during
1923-1945 when the state and party were embedded emerged as a result of this
whole socio-political pattern.

During the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey and the period
of institutionalization the only party was the Republican People’s Party (RPP)
which was established by Ataturk in 1923 (Zürcher 2010:222). Although RPP
was separate from the state there was a central power which designed the bure-
aucracy (Turan 1984:110) and bureaucratic elites identified with RPP (Ross &
Ross 1971:32). According to Frey (1965:304) RPP was a mechanism for social
control from above; it was policy implementing rather than policy formulating
by a quasi-official party organization. In this period RPP underwent a unification/
identification with the state and became a state party (Frey 1965:233, Zürcher

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2010:180). The Minister of the Interior and the secretary general of the party was
same person, the governor was chairman of the provincial party organization
after 1935 (Lewis 2002:381).

In 1945-1950 periods; the pro-liberal middle class which emerged with

the application of a statist economy and the local bourgeoisie which emerged
from this class became a driving force for the advocacy of liberal policies and
democratization in the areas of economy and politics (Dodd 1990:8, Shaw &
Shaw 2002:402, Frey 1965: 348). For the first time this group had found the
courage and cognizance to query the bureaucratic elites and established an oppo-
sing structure which considered central bureaucracy and statism as an obstacle to
development and progress. The demand of this group to pass into a multi-party
application was also approved by the current President Inonu (Dodd 1990:8).
With the start of the liberalization wave after the Second World War in the ex-
ternal world and as a result of the onset of democracy in Turkey when the west
was used as example a transition into the multi-party system incurred and the first
elections were held in 1946.

A. 1945-1960 Multi Party Era and the First Step Towards Democracy

Regardless of the fact that multi-party phase had been authorized, the sing-
le-party period continued in practice until the elections of 1950. In the 1950 ele-
ctions the reaction of the people against the bureaucratic elites which had been
ongoing for years accelerated a political development against the elite and the
representative of this movement which was the Democrat Party (DP) won the
elections with a landslide (DP won 86,2 % of 487 GNA seats) and Turkey’s ad-
venture into democracy started (Shaw & Shaw 2002:403-405). This election was
a turning point for Turkish political life and social analysis. For the first time with
this right which was recognized to the periphery the passive masses had achieved
the opportunity to access the center and were able to assert their reaction in terms
of the reforms of the elitist center which were promulgated from the top (Dodd
1990:8). In this context the contribution of the emergence of the middle class and
local bourgeoisie in establishing a social awareness is vital. The masses which
had been shaped with the ‘for the people in spite of the people’ understanding
wanted to see and have the party of the periphery which they had elected in power
instead of the bureaucratic elites which applied this understanding. According to
Frey (1965: 349) at the end of this process ‘alternative elite had developed’. With
the transmission into multi-party life a new elite group consisting of merchants
from the middle class and periphery and which was supported by the people star-
ted to take shape (Karpat 1959:316).

After 1950 the bureaucratic elites were obliged to relinquish the political
power which had been granted by the votes of the people and work under their
orders. The DP and its leading cadre opposed elitism were concerned about the

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

hegemony of the bureaucratic elites and wanted them to be mechanical bure-

aucrats who implemented their decisions. They advocated pro-liberal policies
against statism and prioritized private property and private enterprise. They pri-
oritized the values and judgments of the masses who voted for them instead of
top-down reforms. They endeavored to replace a positivist and secular central
values system with a conservative and religious social values system. During this
period the periphery was able to access the center for the first time. With these
characteristics the DP was based on the nation instead of the state and shaping the
administration of the state according to the nation was a situation which funda-
mentally upset the ideology that the bureaucratic elites had been endeavoring to
implement for years. The DP, the party of the local bourgeoisie, the middle class
and the peasants had started to change the gains of the republic which had taken
years to achieve as well as the established regime. The bureaucratic elites were
very much disturbed with this (Dodd 1990:10). According to them protecting the
reforms which had been implemented from top-down ‘for the people in spite of
the people’ and protecting the regime were more important than the establishment
of democracy and this trend had to be stopped.

In addition to this discontent, as a result of the critical mistakes the DP

(which was just learning politics and democracy) made and the poor management
of this transition period the bureaucratic elites were subjected to a coup when the
army (which is defined as the vigorous forces) seized the administration in 1960.
After the coup Prime Minister Menderes and two ministers stood trial and hanged
by military court. These elites are the continuation of the historical bureaucratic
elites who wanted to establish a society based on modern western values (Shaw
& Shaw 2002:414). With the coup in 1960 the bureaucratic elites regained their
strength and with the constitutional law they prepared they eliminated the parlia-
ment from being the single organ where the sovereignty of the nation was mani-
fested and organized the administration of the state between the representatives
elected by the people and bureaucratic elites and put this application under the
protection of the constitution. This constitutional law gave the bureaucratic elites
constitutional legality and supremacy.

B. 1960 Coup d’état and Status of the Turkish Military

The Ottomans established their empire under challenging conditions and

volatile foundations in Anatolia which is an intercontinental crossroads of wor-
ld trade routes and religions. This required a bureaucratic state with a central
structure and a strong army to be dominant in this geographical area. According
to Lybyer (1913:90) “the Ottoman government had been an army before it was
anything else...”. The army has always undertaken significant roles in Turkish
society which is dominated by this political culture and state tradition; it has held
a privilege and decisive position within the state and society. (Heper&Güney
1996:619-620). This political culture has also been reflected in the Republic of

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Turkey and the high level commanders have become inevitable members of the
Turkish bureaucratic elite. Narli (2000:108) states that:

“Ottoman society was divided into two categories: the sultan, the military
and the ulemaat, the top and subjects (reaya) comprising a large propor-
tion of peasants at the bottom. The civil and military bureaucracies acted
as intermediaries between the two classes. This political organisation and
culture survived under the Turkish republic, and the position of the burea-
ucratic military elite at the higher echelon remained very important.”

In the 19th century during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire the
land losses of the state were attributed to the military superiority of the west
and during the terms of Sultan Selim the 3rd and Mahmud the 2nd the army was
subjected to reforms. Another reason behind the reforms was to subordinate the
army to the political authority (Heper&Güney 1996:619). The Ottomans started
the modernization movement in the army and then proceeded to modernize all
the organizations of the state. During this period the army was the subject of mo-
dernization and westernization and was transformed into an agent which shaped
society and played a significant role in the establishment of the new republic after
the war (Heper 2005:34). According to Jenkins (2001:8) instead of dissipating
with the transition into a new republic and a parliamentary system the role of the
army in the area of politics increased in Turkish society.

Ataturk relied more on military bureaucrats than civil bureaucrats in the

new republic. He did not want the army involved in politics yet he considered the
army worthy of guarding the regime. (Ahmad 1969: 48-50, Lerner & Robinson
1960:22). In civilian military relations Ataturk intended that the army would be
a supra-political organization which was loyal to the regime (Harris 1965:56).
In this case the army would not intervene in the political sphere as long as the
regime was not threatened but would be make its presence felt in the background
at all times.

From the establishment of the Republic to the coup in 1960 civil burea-
ucratic elites were prominent among the bureaucratic elites. They had executed
the modernization and westernization reforms and their golden age of power was
during the single party term. The military bureaucratic elite which supported and
gave their patronage to the reform movements executed by the civil bureaucrat
elites did not assert themselves in the political sphere until the 1950’s (Jenkins
2001:8).

However the implementations of the DP which threatened the regime were

perceived as threats by the army which considered itself to be the guard of the sta-
te and regime (Zurcher 2007:340). Furthermore the bureaucratic elites had lost
their political and social influence during the DP era. In order to regain the power
and authority they had lost and to save the system which was endangered (central

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

values system) the military bureaucracy commandeered the administration by

intervening in the political system (Heper 2005:34).

After this intervention the military bureaucratic elites enacted the constitu-
tional law of 1961 as the constituent power. With this new constitution parliament
was removed from being the single organ which manifested the sovereignty of
the nation and the state administration was organized between representatives
elected by the people and bureaucratic elites. Authorities which should have been
implemented by the political power were transferred to various organizations
with the constitution. These organizations were designed in such a way that they
were completely in the management and control of the bureaucratic elites. The
objective of this arrangement was to place the parliament consisted of the elected
and the government under the supervision and control of the bureaucratic elites.
In this new order the bureaucratic elites gained constitutional legitimacy and su-
periority and their power was guaranteed under the constitutional law.

With the constitutional law of 1961 a bicameral parliamentary structure

consisting of the National assembly and a senate, the members of which were
mainly appointed from persons with a military background. The affiliation of the
Chief of General Staff had been removed from the minister of national defense
and affiliated with the prime minister as head of the armed forces. This change
was in favor of the armed forces regarding civilian military relations. This status
continues today and is one of the issues Turkey is being criticized for during the
EU membership process. (Güney&Karatekelioğlu 2005:452).

These are some of the organizations which were established with the cons-
titutional law of 1961. The Constitutional Court which had the duty of supervising
that the laws enacted by Parliament were compliant with the constitutional law
but in reality was keeping tabs on the assembly and under the title of ‘supreme
court’ had the jurisdiction to prosecute the ministers if necessary. The State Plan-
ning Organization which is responsible for the implementation of statist policies
instead of liberal market economy and prepare and implement economic develop-
ment plans. Without question one of the most important organizations founded
under the constitution of 1961 was The National Security Council (NSC) which
consisted of appointed military bureaucrats and was tasked with supervising and
steering the elected political power. This council consists of the president, prime
minister, relevant ministers and the Chief of Staff, the commanders of the 4 ar-
med forces and other high level commanders. It was founded as the authorized
and tasked organ to inform the Council of Ministers the fundamental views regar-
ding taking decisions involving national security and ensuring their coordination
(Hale 1998:163). The NSC operated as a council which ensured that the military
bureaucratic elites participated actively in the policy making process and had the
authority to steer the practices of the council of ministers (Zucher 2004:245). As
soon as it was founded the NSC became a real power center which established

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policies regarding fundamental state issues. After each intervention of the army
with the administration of the country the NSC was reorganized and became
more powerful.. Because of its extraordinary authorities the NSC was defined as
the ‘shadow government’ by Rouleau (2000:105) and indicated that this was one
of the issues Turkey is being criticized for during the EU membership process.

Furthermore the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law was enac-
ted in 1961. With this law the army’s task to protect and be responsible for the
regime became official (Jenkins 2001:44). Article 35 of this law which says ‘to
protect and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey which
has been appointed with the Constitutional law’ became the legal basis for the
1971 memorandum and the military coups in 1980 and 1997 and any other mi-
litary interventions to be carried out thereafter. The post 1960 coup period is a
major milestone in Turkish society which changed the class stratification. After
this breaking point the elite mass segregation or the center periphery tension in
the struggle for power gained a different dimension. After this the power struggle
continued in the context of civil-military relations.

The 1960 coup did not resolve the problems and the economic and political
problems of the country continued. The 1963 elections were won by the Justice
Party (AP) which was a continuation of the DP. The political polarization betwe-
en AP and CHP split the nation in two. As a result the bureaucracy was affected
and became politicized (Zürcher 2004: 379). In 1971 when the political events
turned into anarchy based on the Internal Service Law the army issued a memo-
randum declaring that if the government could not control the course of events
it would have to commandeer the administration. With the issuance of this me-
morandum Prime Minister Demirel resigned and for long years political stability
could not be achieved in the country.

Between the years 1971–1979 two government changes took place. During
the political instability and coalition governments period efforts were made to
politicize the bureaucrats and control them. For this reason the 1970’s were the
beginning of the end for the civil bureaucratic elites. During these years the inf-
luence of the bureaucracy in the political sphere and the understanding of seeing
themselves as the guard of the state and spokesmen of the modernization process
of the bureaucratic elites were broken. The civil bureaucratic elites started to
accept the political authorities of the elected. However the military bureaucrats
never relinquished the role of guardians of the regime and the state and continued
to guard the center against the periphery. At the end of these developments the
bureaucratic elites had legitimized their supremacy regarding the protection of
their power which they considered their main task and which was important for
them rather than the modernization and westernization missions. In summary the
bureaucratic elites had lost their westernization missions on which they had ba-
sed their actions for years. It was time to prioritize the protection of the state and

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

central values system – regime – and their current power.

In the 1970’s the acts of violence between extremist left and right wings
groups had escalated and there was no peace and security in the country. These
years are defined as the years of chaos in the history of Turkish politics or the
lost years. According to Hale (1998:200) as a result of the terror and violence
carried out by right and left wing groups during 1978-1980 the state order had
come to the threshold of disappearing. The army intervened in 1980 with a coup
to remedy the course of events. The military enhanced its autonomy regarding
administration as it did with each military intervention. An inscription was added
into the constitution of 1982 saying that the decisions made by NSC would be
given priority consideration by the council of ministers.

Özal who was a prime ministerial undersecretary before the coup

established the party ANAP and participated in the elections of 1983. ANAP came
to power alone. After the elections in 1983 Özal took care to avoid problems with
the military and his priority in politics was the transition into a liberal market
economy. In 1987 Özal applied for full membership with the EU (Evin 1994:26).
In the elections of 1987 the party came into power for the second time and slowly
Özal started the reforms which intended to eliminate the military domination.

1. THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATİON OF

MODERN TURKEY
A. Reforms, Modernization, Westernization and EU Membership

The Turks migrated westward from central Asia and came to Anatolia. Be-
cause of the geographical characteristics of the territory the Ottoman Empire was
established on it has always faced west. Although only 3% of the Republic of
Turkey which was erected on the heritage of this empire the influence of the west
are much more prevalent in Turkey than the influence of Asia and the Middle
East. The source of this influence is sociological and cultural rather than geog-
raphical. It is assessed as the efforts of a state which has linked its entity and fate
to becoming a European state through modernization without severing ties with
its own traditions (Türköne 1995: 22). As most of the modern states are in the
west the modernization process has developed as a westernization project. The
concept of Westernization is used in the sense of adopting the organizations and
life style of the west (Ülken 1998: 20). According to Findley (1980: 3-4) although
westernization was not common in the 19th century the Ottoman-Turkish society
was one of the few societies which endeavored to westernize at that time.

The diplomats and bureaucratic elites who went to the capitals of Europe
in the 17th century for diplomatic relations observed the innovations in the poli-
tical, social, economic and industrial areas and were impressed (Mardin 1994:
11). In the 18th century with the military defeat and loss of land the bureaucratic

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elites and the sultan realized that they had deteriorated compared to the west
and believed that westernization was the solution (Weiker 1968:456, Mardin
1973:179). The first westernization incurred in the military area. Subsequently
the bureaucratic elites believed that the state and society must westernize as a
whole and started to implement the westernization project (Lewis 2002:38-39).
During the reform period efforts were made to insert administrative, military and
social structures of the west but the westernization movements of this period did
not go beyond a superficial mimicry of westernization and were not a cure for the
recession (Mardin 2000:151). The recession of the state continued until the col-
lapse of the empire and the speed of the westernization movements increased in
parallel (Gungor 1990:101-102). The reforms executed by the bureaucratic elites
were implemented from the top and were not adopted by society. The westerni-
zation movements and central bureaucracy and indirectly the bureaucratic elites
had gained in strength, the elite-mass divide had deepened and the people were
alienated from the system.

The new Republic of Turkey established by the civil-military bureaucratic

elites of the final period of the Ottomans, modernization and westernization had
become the fundamental task of the state (Lewis 2002:292). The bureaucratic
elites had been tasked with the execution of a project consisting of establishing
a modern nation state which had adopted western values and lead a society con-
sisting of people who were easily mislead (Zürcher 2010:136). On the other hand
the people had difficulty accepting fascist and monotype reforms. With transition
into a multi-party life the westernization project started to be executed by the
political power elected by the people. Turkey drew closer to the west because
of its membership in NATO in 1952 and its application to membership with the
European Community in 1959 and its good relations with the US(Shaw & Shaw
2002:400, Frey 1965:349).

When Turkey launched into the world with liberal policies during the Özal
period it wanted to be included in Europe which had lived through the EEC, EC
and EU phases and realize its westernization wish which went back 200 years.
As indicated by Sozen and Shaw (2003:115) ‘Turkey has turned her face towards
Europe in order to become a modern, westernized country. Today, this historic
aspiration finds expression in the wish to become a member state of the EU. Tur-
key’s accession to the EU as a full member state would mean the realization of
her modernization project.’ The phenomenon of modernization which was known
previously as reform, modernization, westernization and which was the sole legal
source of the bureaucratic elites in terms of ideology as well as power had beco-
me identified with EU membership. The accession process towards the EU was
led by the political power elected by the people instead of the bureaucratic elites.
As of the 1960’s a social change incurred in Turkey due to internal factors such
as industrialization, migration from rural areas to urban areas, enhanced level of
education, liberal economy policies and external factors such as globalization,

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

developments in information and communication technologies and neo-liberal

economy policies. Western values had gone through a period of acceptance and
internalization by society and had adopted the EU accession process executed by
the political power they had elected. According to a survey made in 1987 when
Özal applied for full membership with the EC this membership was supported by
60% of the respondents (Bozkurt 2001:307). In 1989 this percentage was 63.95
according to the survey(Bozkurt 2001: 309). According to the survey carried out
by the European Commission in 2001 71% of the respondents believed that EU
membership would be beneficial for Turkey(Eurobarometer 2001).

The EU had been an opportunity during the Westernization and moderniza-

tion process for the normalization of civil-military affairs. The reason for this was
that the EU stipulated that elimination of the influence of the military over politi-
cs as a primary matter in terms of political conditions for the full membership of
Turkey(Güney&Karatekelioğlu 2005:440). With the westernization movement,
the decisiveness of the elected political power to enter the EU would accelerate
and the influence of the bureaucratic elites in the political sphere would be redu-
ced. It must be pointed out that the fact that Turkey is becoming a member of the
EU does not mean that the adventure of westernizing which has taken two cen-
turies is over and society has completely internalized western values and that the
modernization project is concluded. Even if institutional changes have realized a
cultural change cannot be expected immediately.

B. The Role of the Turkish Military in Politics

After the coup in 1960 the strained relations in society continued between
the political power elected with the votes of the people and the army which did
not perceive the elected power to be worthy of this power. After the 1950’s the
civil wing of the bureaucratic elite had been estranged from being the nucleus of
power. On the other hand the military wing of the bureaucratic elites had become
the nucleus of power with their military interventions. The democratic consoli-
dation of Turkey was delayed due to the continuous suspension of democracy.

Actually a look at the historical background reveals that the bureaucratic

elite which made the mission of modernization and westernization its focal point
is in a dilemma. Why has democracy the most precious commodity of the west
been continuously suspended by the bureaucratic elites? In compliance with their
mission of westernization the bureaucratic elites adopted democracy as a dimen-
sion of westernization and believed democracy to be the best regime. However
they viewed politicians as persons, who spent state resources unwisely, caused
economic crises and who were ready to take the country to the brink of an abyss
at any time. For this reason the gains of the republic and the regime had to be
protected against the inept politicians elected by the uneducated majority. It was
the job of the bureaucratic elites to fix the order which had been disrupted by the

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mistakes of the politicians and which endangered the regime. For this reason the
army did not remain in power for long after military interventions and the democ-
ratic order was soon restored (Heper 1976:515).

The intervention of the army in Turkey in terms of politics in 1960, 1971

and 1980 differ from the interventions in Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt,
Iran, Spain and Greece where the interventions were more tough or in which di-
ctatorial regimes were established. The difference of the Turkish army was that
after each intervention it held the power for a short time after which return to
democracy was ensured (Rustow 1988:242). In the example of Turkey instead
of administrating the army elected to be the protector of the constitutional order
which it had prepared as a founding power and which was based on the dominan-
ce of the military (Cook 2007:38). After the interventions the bureaucratic elites
released the power to the civilians of their own will.

The army did not disrupt this tradition after the coup in 1980 and allowed
elections to be held in 1983. Özal emerged as prime minister from this election.
The beginning of the 1980’s was the starting point of privatization for the whole
world, a time when states were downsized and liberal policies were implemented.
As of 1983 the import substitution economy policies were eliminated, the living
standards of people had increased and the economy was growing and Turkey
had rapidly started to resemble other countries. It was during the era of Özal that
privatization policy and struggle with bureaucracy could be discussed in Turkey
for the first time. Even if the army was not completely subjugated to the civil
administration its role in the political sphere had decreased. According to Ahmad
(1993:13) the election victory of Özal in 1983 was a defeat of the military junta
and a victory of civil administration. Özal also won the elections in 1987 and star-
ted to implement reforms which were targeting to decrease the impact of military
bureaucratic elites in the political sphere.

C. Turkey EU Affairs
The affairs between Turkey and the EU started with the application of pri-
me minister Menderes in 1959 to join the European Community. In 1964 with
the Ankara Convention Turkey became a partner member of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC). However, because of the stormy years in the political
life of Turkey the accession process into the community was interrupted and the
application for full membership in the European Community was started again in
1987 by Özal’s application. According to Onis& Webb (1994:128) in the 1980’s
significant structural reforms were carried out in the areas of political liberaliza-
tion and economic reforms.

On the 1st of January in 1996 Turkey entered the Customs Union. In the
report dated 13th October 1999 prepared for candidate countries the EU commis-

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

sion indicated that the Copenhagen criteria needed to be fulfilled in order to grant
Turkey candidacy status. These criteria are:

-stability of organizations which ensure democracy and the continuation

of democracy,
-human rights,
-respect and protection of minorities,
-ensure the rule of law.
The Copenhagen political criteria require a ‘democratic administration for-
mat’. A democratic administration format also entails the subjugation of the army
under civilian oversight. Within this framework it was necessary that the army
which had been influential in politics since the establishment of the republic with
institutional or non-institutional mechanisms had to be subjected to civilian over-
sight. This was a feature that changed the traditional Turkish state and weakened
the dominance of the bureaucratic elites. The period after the Helsinki summit
was a milestone in the affairs of Turkey and the EU as well as a breaking point
in the social structure of Turkey. All the constitutional and legal orders executed
in order to ensure the Copenhagen criteria enhanced the civil-army relations in
Turkey. As a natural result of this after the civil wing of the bureaucratic elites the
military wing was eliminated as a power nucleus and started to lose its political
independence.

D. EU Membership Process and Its Effects on Turkish

Civil-Military Relations
Democratic consolidation requires that the army is subjugated to the de-
mocratically elected civil administration. The civil-military relations in Turkey
differ from the relations in European countries. The army has always been in-
tertwined with politics in Turkey, has eliminated four civil governments with
coups and taken an active role in politics with the institutional structure it has
established. Since there is no specific legislation regarding civil-military relations
the EU requires that Turkey standardizes its administrative structure and applica-
tions with other member countries.

In order to ensure the political criteria which is a prerequisite Turkey has

enacted constitutional reforms and nine legal harmonization packages between
the years 2001 and 2004. During this period changes were made in 49 articles of
the Constitution of 1982. The harmonization packages have ensured democra-
tization in many areas and had a significant function in Turkey approaching the
liberal democratic values of the EU. Reforms which expand the scope of funda-
mental rights and freedoms and strengthen and guarantee areas such as democ-
racy, the rule of law, freedom of thought and expression and human rights have
been made. These arrangements and the institutional reforms which are explained
below have alienated the military from the political sphere and as a result the ac-

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tors of the power struggle have also started to change. As Turkey approaches the
EU standards the military bureaucratic elites have become alienated from being
a power nucleus.

In the progress reports published by the EU as of 1998 until 2000 it has

been indicated that there is no civilian oversight in Turkey in terms of the army
and particularly the power of NSC in politics has been a source of criticism (EC
Regular Reports 1998:13-14, 1999:10, 2000:14). The reports have emphasized
that the NSC is a major factor in the formation of national security policies and
has a fundamental role in many issues of interest in political life. With a change
in the constitution in 2001 the number of civilian members in the NSC was inc-
reased and the decisions were given the status of recommendations to the council
of Ministers. However the progress report of 2002 indicated that the NSC had a
de facto influence on politicians and criticized NSC for expressing views which
went beyond recommendations (EC Regular Reports 2002:24). As a result the
reforms which targeted the democratization of civil-military relations in Turkey
and turning the balance in favour of civilians was accepted as the most significant
reforms in the 7thHarmonization package in 2003. This order turned the NSC
into a consultant organ. The chairman could be a civilian, they would convene
every two months instead of every month and the council of Ministers would
be free to implement the NSC decisions. The NSC which was established with
the constitution of 1961 and the tasks and structure of which was continuously
changed in favour of the military after the memorandum of 1971 and the chan-
ges in the Constitution of 1982 lost a major part of its political power with the
changes incurring during the EU harmonization process. This breaking point is
also significant in terms of our study subject. The active army tradition over the
political power was the institutional heritage of the Ottomans to Turkey has been
eliminated.

The political power of the army in Turkey is beyond the level of organizati-
ons. Many factors deriving from the history and culture of Turkey – non-instituti-
onal – enable the army to be active in politics. The army has had a significant role
in politics since the history of the Turks in Central Asia began. The Ottoman Em-
pire was able to survive for 6 centuries because of its army and the army was the
only organization which maintained its power from its initial establishment to the
fall of the empire (Hale 1998:17). The army had an important role in the establis-
hment of the nation-state. The army saw itself as the protector of the regime and
the state. It was soldiers who established the Republican regime and subsequently
structured the new Turkish state. According to Rustow as of the establishment of
the republic until 1955 “men of military background have served as President of
the Republic (I7 years), Prime Minister (16.5 years), Minister of Defense (16.5
years), of Public Works (15 years), of Communications (9 years), and in other ca-
binet posts.” (Lerner &Robinson 1960:28). All the presidents between the years
1960- 1989 had military backgrounds.

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

Starting with 2003 when the comprehensive institutional reforms were be-
ing made and particularly in the MGK the EU Commission has repeated in all the
published progress reports that the Turkish army has continued to influence po-
litics through informal (non-institutional) mechanisms. As indicated by Jenkins
(2001:41-42) the army has had an active role in public policies deriving from the
autonomy and prestige it enjoys from Turkish political culture. The above men-
tioned institutional mechanisms which help the army to display power in terms
of politics have deteriorated in a major way with the harmonization packages
generated during the EU accession process. It is possible that institutions which
have an impact on political decisions may change in time. The thing that will not
change in a short time and which might take generations is culture. Culture may
change of course but it takes much longer in comparison to changes involving
organizations.

E. EU Membership and Turkish Democratic Consolidation

According to Diamond (1997: xix -xxviii) the conditions for a democratic

consolidation are as follows: a state with a strong structure, institutionalized po-
litical parties, a pluralist civil society, fundamental rights and freedoms, rule of
law and finally the supremacy of a civilian administration. Diamond argues that
as long as the army is not definitely subjected to civilian oversight and a solid
democratic constitutional order, democratic consolidation cannot be achieved.
These criteria of liberal democracy have always been problematic in Turkey th-
roughout history. On the other hand according to Agüero (1995:19 who uses the
concept of ‘Civilian supremacy’ an elected government is the undisputed aut-
hority in all political spheres. According to his opinion the army should have
nothing to do with internal security and should hold a position which is restricted
to subjects involving national defense under the supervision of the ministry of
defense. When we look at Turkey we see an army which has undertaken the
mission of guardian of the state and regime and protector against external threats.
Through the NSC it has endeavored to affect and control the elected political
powers during all policy making processes. However, during the recent period
the institutional power of the army has been decreased in a major degree by the
reforms executed within the scope of EU harmonization and significant progress
has been achieved in establishing civilian supremacy.

No matter how much the institutional functions which assist in the in-
tervention of the army with politics are weakened by constitutional changes and
harmonization packages the army can still be effective through non-institutio-
nal mechanisms in politics particularly for reasons of ‘internal threats’. Desch
(1999:14-15) explains the increase or decrease of internal threats and external th-
reats with the increase in the role of the army in politics and claims that the army
is intervening on a maximum level in a country when internal threats rise and
external threats are minimal. In Turkey the PKK terror organization and political

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Islam continue to be internal threats which are factors in the continuation of the
army’s intervention in politics (Güney&Karatekelioğlu 2005:443).

In conclusion institutional mechanisms which are the structures of institu-

tes or organizations can change within a certain time period but changing pheno-
menon which are not institutional such as culture and traditions takes generations
to change. It will take time for the bureaucratic elites who have always mainta-
ined to hold on to their power in the political and social system of the Turkish
state tradition, who have endeavored to ensure their existence and who percei-
ved themselves to be a power nucleus with the mission of protecting the state to
relinquish these positions. The more society adopts western values, democracy
solidifies, transparency and accountability are embedded in state administration,
the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed, bureaucratic
elites will become isolated and will be obliged to respect the values of society. At
the point arrived today the full EU membership is an important phase in enabling
the Turkish society to enjoy affluence on a modern civilized level.

Conclusion

According to the elitist theory people are not politically equal in societies.
Society is divided into two classes: the elites which are powerful privileged and
take important decisions on behalf of society. The other class consists of the mas-
ses which are led by the decisions taken by the administrative minority. A look
at the structure of the Ottoman-Turkish society structure reveals that most of the
administrative elites came from bureaucracy. From this perspective bureaucracy
can be defined as an elite group which wants to hold on to its own power rather
than an organizational model which implements the decisions of the political
power. Bureaucratic elites are removed from being regular bureaucrats represen-
ting rationality in the Weberian sense parallels the degree that bureaucratic elites
start to view themselves as the single authority in implementing concepts with
imprecise boundaries such as public benefit, state security and the surplus profits
of the state.

In an ideal system with political stability bureaucracy implements poli-

tical decisions, is not involved in the decision making mechanism and does not
participate in any discussion. In societies where the position of the bureaucracy
has not been completely determined, where organizations and agencies outside
the bureaucracy are weak, bureaucracies want to get involved in the political
decision making process and comply with the taken decisions. Such countries
are in a constant state of tension. This tension reaches its summit when one of
the groups seizes power through a coup. The bureaucracy in Turkey wants to be
a power centre holding the policy making process and replace the legal political
organs instead of being a tool for the execution of public services (rational-legal

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 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

in a Weberian sense).
The new Republic of Turkey was established by the Ottoman bureaucra-
tic elites in the 19th century. Although the established republic is called new its
political culture, tradition of administration, strong central bureaucratic structure
and bureaucratic elites are the continuation of the Ottomans. The legacy to the
Republic of Turkey: bureaucratic elites that were independent within the political
system, that endeavoured to hold onto the power and preferred to be involved in
political decision making in addition to dealing with administrative duties and
the downtrodden people who were perceived as the masses to be administered.

In the classic Ottoman era the bureaucrats held a privileged position in so-
ciety and lifestyles as servants of the Sultan. This system demanded a cadre whi-
ch was isolated from society, without ties to family and society and who devoted
themselves completely to serving the Sultan and the state. The bureaucracy was
a community of people who served the Ottoman state with loyalty in the persona
of the Sultan. During the deterioration and dispersion era of the Ottomans the
central administration system, the military and economic systems deteriorated
and the slave system was transformed in parallel and the bureaucrats became
servants of the state rather than loyal servants of the Sultan. Two factors had a
significant role in this transition. The first factor was the lack of skills and aut-
hority of the sultans who had taken the throne in the last stages of the Ottomans.
The second factor was that the empire was inferior to the western states in terms
of military and the economy issues which was the main source of encountered
problems initially loss of land and it was realized that this would be the downfall
of the empire. The bureaucratic elites believed that the only way to stop this poor
trend was to modernize and westernize and the Sultans who supported this view
started the modernization process. The bureaucratic elites became the nucleus of
power as the decision makers and implementers of the modernization process of
the state and society. In summary the bureaucratic servants isolated from society
who served the Sultan unconditionally in the slave system underwent a long and
slow transition process during the 18th and 19th centuries to become regents to the
authority and power of the Sultan they had served.

As of the 19th century the project of modernizing the state and society was
executed by these strong bureaucratic elites. Since the modern states were in the
west and with the influence of the bureaucrats deputized in the west the moderni-
zation movement turned into a westernization movement. During this period the
Sultans had perceived the westernization movement as a cure for the collapse of
the empire and they had acted in concert with the bureaucratic elites. The wester-
nization carried out during this period is revealed as the transmission of the or-
ganizations and social life in the west by copying them into the Ottoman sphere.

181
Yasin ÖZCAN

During the reform period the bureaucrats wanted the state to be represented
with various state organizations instead of the persona of the Sultan. This was a
requirement of being modern and western. The bureaucrats advocated that they
had to have the initiative in the Policy making process. For this to be possible the
first thing that the bureaucrats needed to do was to guarantee themselves and the-
ir positions and achieve an autonomous structure. This was the main topic with
the reform era bureaucrats. They were demanding rights and guarantees which
were determined through legislation instead of the slave system in which lives
and properties hung on the words of the Sultan. Within this framework the first
regulation was prepared in the form of an imperial edict of reorganization which
was presented to the Sultan for signature. Thus the bureaucrats were guaranteed
against the Sultan and established organizations which ensured that the Sultan
could not meddle in state affairs too much.

In the end the reform era which the Sultan had supported because he be-
lieved that it would prevent the poor trend had steered the active management
of the state in Istanbul into the hands of the bureaucrats. Ministries resembling
those in western countries and an institutionalized administrative organization
had been established. This way bureaucracy became dominant in every phase of
government. The bureaucratic elites of the reform period believed that the best
policy for the ‘state’ was to ally and identify with the West, in other words to
westernize. The bureaucratic elites of this era were a tight cadre which had been
schooled in western style ideology, had a positive thought process and in which
secularity prevailed.

This bureaucratic cadre which was transformed from doing as they were
told to political independence and shaping policies would try their best in the
future not to lose this habit and their political independence. This perspective
regarding the political life of Turkey which is riddled with crises will help to un-
derstand the social and political crises in the new Republic of Turkey which was
established on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

The newly established republic resumed the exact bureaucratic structure of

the Ottomans. The 30 years that passed as of the declaration of the republic until
transition into the multi-party system was the golden age for the bureaucratic
elites. During this period the reforms were imposed on the people from the top
by the bureaucracy. During the transition phase the elite cadres had to pioneer to
enable the ignorant, easily deceived rural population without the necessary know-
ledge and skills to achieve the level of modern civilization. For this the single
party administration was necessary because the easily confused people might be
nonplussed if faced with a political system with more than one party and this in
turn would have a negative impact on the success and speed of the reforms.

182
 The European Transformation of Turkish Bureaucratic Elites

During this period the only decision making power were the bureaucra-
tic elites. There was no competitive power to challenge their power. There was
no awareness of civil society, labor unions and associations. With the transition
into a multi-party system from a single party system due to internal and external
factors competition to the power generated by the votes of the people emerged.
For the first time the periphery got the opportunity to access the center through
democracy. This opportunity was given by the votes which put Menderes into
power. However, in the eyes of the bureaucratic elites politicians were unreliable
people and could endanger the gains achieved by the republic and the regime.
The political elites knew what was best for the state and society, not the elected
politicians.

However the DP power did not agree with this idea and wanted to trans-
form the bureaucracy into a structure which implemented its decisions. Consequ-
ently a conflict ensued between the elected political power and the bureaucratic
elite. As a result of this tension the military wing of the bureaucratic elites exe-
cuted a coup in 1960 and suspended the democratic regime. After the coup of
1960 the military wing of the bureaucratic elites came into power. After 1960
the interventions in 1971 and 1980 every time the military enhanced its politi-
cal independence and influence. The new constitutional laws prepared after each
intervention consolidated and strengthened the position of the bureaucratic elite
within the constitutional system. The NSC included in these constitutional laws
made military bureaucracy the most important actor in the state administration
and policy generation mechanism.

Özal became the power in the elections of 1983 after the 1980 coup and the
gates opened onto a new era. Theyears of Özal’s power were a time when Turkey
globalized and affairs with the west were revived. With Özal the EC membership
process was reinstated and was continued by subsequent political powers. In 1996
Turkey became a member of the Customs Union. In 1999 it was decided that
Turkey could achieve candidate country status if the EU Copenhagen political
criteria could be fulfilled. These criteria foresee a democratic administration
form. This means that bureaucracy and the military must be under the oversight
of the elected power. On the path into the EU Turkey will democratize, civilian
military affairs will normalize and a very important phase in the westernization
process will be reached. One of the most important issues in the history of
Turkish politics is elitism, in other words the tendency of a small privileged
group to dominate society. The EU accession process has been an opportunity
to resolve this problem and the enacted laws have changed the organizations and
laws which enabled the dominancy of bureaucratic elites over the political power.
However in order for this problem to be fixed once and for all it is necessary that
the political culture rather than organizations change and this will take a long
time. There is the potential for political crises at any time in a Turkey in which the
bureaucratic elites are not harmonized with the political power.

183
Yasin ÖZCAN

Putting everything to one side and looking at the general history of Turkish
society which has always faced the west there is a long stable process albeit with
interruptions which has gone from the reform period to constitutional monarchy,
from there to the republic and thereafter to democracy. This process can be perce-
ived as the successful journey of a Muslim society from an empire into a modern
and western society.

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