Safety History

of
International LNG Operations
January 2005

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LNG
LNG

Prepared by ~
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CH·IV International
The LNG Specialists
1120C Benfield Boulevard
Millersville, MD 21108

Phone: 410-729-4255
Web Site: CH-IV.com

Technical Document
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Safety History of International LNG Operations

INTRODUCTION:

LNG has been safely handled for many y ears. The industry is not without its
incidents and accidents, but it maintains an enviable “modern-day ” 1 safety record.
The process of natural gas liquefaction, storage and vaporization is not a new
technology . Earliest patents involving cryogenic liquids date back into the mid-
1800s. The first patent directly for LNG was awarded in 1914. In 1939, the first
commercial LNG peak-shaving plant was built in West Virginia. There are over 120
peakshaving and LNG storage facilities 2 worldwide, some operating since the mid
1960s. In addition, there are over 18 base-load liquefaction (LNG export) facilities in
Abu Dhabi, Alaska, Algeria, Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Liby a, Malay sia, Oman,
Nigeria, Qatar and Trinidad currently in operation. LNG is transported by a fleet of
over 130 LNG tankers of vary ing sizes from 18,500 M 3 (cubic meter) to 140,000 M 3 .
This fleet of LNG ships delivers to receiving terminals in the Belgium, Dominican
Republic, France, Greece, Italy , Japan, Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey , the U.K. and,
of course, the U.S., including Puerto Rico.

The LNG storage tanks at these facilities are constructed of an interior cry ogenic
wall, usually made of 9% nickel steel, aluminum or other cry ogenic alloy . The
outside wall is usually made of carbon steel or reinforced concrete. A thick lay er of
an insulating material such as Perlite separates the two walls.

For land-based facilities, an earthen or concrete spill containment having a minimum

capacity exceeding the capacity of the LNG tank(s) surrounds the LNG tank(s). In
some applications a tall concrete wall having an internal diameter slightly greater
than the outside wall of the LNG tank, is used to double the integrity of the LNG
tank. In others, the tanks are buried below ground level. In both cases, the objective
is to minimize the exposed area between the LNG and the secondary containment
based on a catastrophic tank failure 3 scenario. Many tanks are equipped with top tank
penetrations only , i.e., no bottom or side wall penetrations, thus, even in the unlikely
event of a piping failure, tank contents remain in place.

With a few exceptions, LNG handling facilities have revealed an exceptionally

superior safety record when compared to refineries and other petrochemical plants.
With the exception of the 1944 “Cleveland Disaster,” all LNG-related injuries and/or
fatalities, however devastating, have been limited to plant or contractor personnel.
There have been no LNG shipboard deaths. There has not been a member of the
public injured by an incident involving LNG since the failure of the ill-conceived
Cleveland facility . Small LNG vapor releases and minor fires have also been
reported, but impact was limited to the plant and the hazard was promptly handled by

1
Modern Day – Post mid-1950s - Cryogenic technologies came of age during the late 1950s and early 1960s with
the development of the U.S. space program where cryogenic fuels such as liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen
had to be routinely and safely handled.
2
This does not include dozens of small LNG vehicle fueling stations and industrial LNG fuel facilities.
3
There has never been a catastrophic tank failure with any LNG, or similarly designed, storage tank.

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plant personnel. Other accidents have occurred during the construction and repair of
LNG facilities. Some of these accidents have been used to tarnish the exceptional
safety record of LNG, but as no LNG was directly involved in the incident these
accidents can only truly be called “construction” accidents. Damage has alway s been
limited to the plant proper.

The following three sections discuss land-based, LNG ship and over-the-road LNG
transport incidents respectively . Each section references an appendix listing the
various incidents.

S A F E T Y R E C O R D O F L A N D -B A S E D LNG F A C I L I T I E S

The first commercial facility for producing or utilizing LNG was a peakshaving plant
that began operations in 1941 in Cleveland, Ohio. (A peakshaving plant liquefies
natural gas when customer demand for gas is low and then vaporizes the LNG when
demand is high, thus handling periods of peak demand that cannot be met by existing
gas pipelines.) Since then, more than 150 other peakshaving plants have been
constructed worldwide (approximately one-half of these are satellite facilities that
have no liquefaction capability ). In addition, 18 large natural gas liquefaction plants
(export facilities) and about 30 large LNG import terminals have been constructed.

There have been four incidents in operating LNG facilities directly attributable to
LNG that resulted in one or more fatalities – Skikda, Algeria – 2004; P. T. Badak
(Bontang, Indonesia), 1983; Cove Point Mary land, 1979; Arzew, Algeria, 1977; and
Cleveland, Ohio, 1944. There were two other “LNG” incidents (Portland 1968 and
Staten Island 1973) involving death, but these correctly should be classified as
construction accidents since no LNG was present. See Appendix A for more details
on these incidents and a complete listing of land-based LNG facility incidents.

The accident at East Ohio Gas Company ’s peakshaving plant in Cleveland, Ohio, is
the only incident that involved injuries or fatalities to persons not employ ed by the
LNG facility or by one of its contractors. This accident is often used as an example
of the danger or risk involved in the LNG industry . However, the industry has
changed dramatically since 1944. Modern LNG plants are designed and constructed
in accordance with strict codes and standards that would not have been met by the
Cleveland plant. For example, the alloy used in Cleveland for the inner vessel of the
LNG storage tank is now forbidden and each LNG tank must now be located within a
dike capable of containing at least 100% of the tank’s capacity .

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Although Appendix A is intended to be a comprehensive listing of incidents that have

occurred in land-based LNG facilities; it does not include all of the minor, but
reportable incidents. For example, the outer roofs or domes of a few conventional
double-wall LNG tanks have suffered small cracks as a result of low temperature
embrittlement initiated by leaks of LNG from over-the-top piping. These cracks
allowed LNG vapor (i.e., natural gas) to escape from the tanks. In each case, the
tanks were safely repaired without being taken out of service. Similarly , the inner
tanks of several conventional LNG storage tanks (i.e., cry ogenic metal inner tank and
carbon steel outer tank) have been cracked as a result of frost heave brought on by
inadequate or inoperative below-tank heaters. These tanks have been safely entered,
repaired, and put back into service.

S A F E T Y R E C O R D O F LNG S H I P S

The first transportation of LNG by ship took place early in 1959 when the Methane
Pioneer (an ex-Liberty ship that had been extensively modified) carried 5,000 M 3
(cubic meters) of LNG from Lake Charles, Louisiana, to Canvey Island, near London,
England. Commercial transportation of LNG by ship began in 1964 when LNG was
transported from Arzew, Algeria to Canvey Island in two purpose-built ships—the
Methane Princess and the Methane Progress.

The overall safety record compiled by LNG ships during the thirty -nine y ear period
1964 - 2002 has been remarkably good. During this period, the LNG tank ship fleet
has delivered more than 30,000 shiploads of LNG, and traveled more than 100 million
kilometers while loaded (and a similar distance on ballast voy ages).

In all of these voy ages and associated cargo transfer operations (loading/unloading),
no fatality has ever been recorded for a member of any LNG ship’s crew or member of
the general public as a result of hazardous incidents in which the LNG was involved.
In fact, there is no record of any fire occurring on the deck or in the cargo hold or
cargo tanks of any operating LNG ship.

Among LNG import and export terminal personnel, only one death can be even
remotely linked to the loading or unloading of LNG ships. (In 1977, a worker in the
LNG Export Facility at Arzew was killed during a ship-loading operation when a
large-diameter valve ruptured and the worker was spray ed with LNG. His death was
the result of contact with the very cold LNG liquid; the spilled LNG did not ignite.
See Item 6 in Appendix A.)

Appendix B summarizes the historical record of LNG ship incidents. Although a

major effort was made to ensure the record presented is complete, it is possible that
some incidents have been missed. However, it is very unlikely that a major incident
has been omitted. Firstly , nearly every shipping incident that results in an insurance
claim will be published in “Lloy d’s List.” Secondly , even if the ship owners are self-
insured, news of major incidents travels quickly through the LNG industry because it
is composed of a relatively small number of ship and terminal operators that often

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share experiences through industry associations such as SIGTTO (the Society of

International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators).

Also included at the end of Appendix B is a description of a marine incident

involving a liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tanker which is of similar design to many
LNG ships. The incident provides some insight into the integrity of the product
storage sy stems on these ships.

O V E R - T H E R O A D LNG T R A N S P O R T A C C I D E N T S

Appendix C provides a partial compilation of over-the-road incidents. It is not

intended to be comprehensive as reports of these incidents are maintained in different
way s from state to state. However, much as with LNG ships, it is very unlikely that a
major incident has been omitted. The lists do provide examples of the wide range of
potential vehicle accidents that can occur. Most notable, not a single person outside
the driver of the transport was injured and rarely did product spill and far more rarely
did it ignite. The last occurrence listed is the best testimony to the safety of these
over-the-road transports.

SUMMARY

The various incidents discussed, when taken on a case-by -case basis, attests to LNG’s
safety record. The fact that most LNG opponents cite Cleveland and Staten Island as
examples of the dangers of LNG, clearly indicate that there is little else to make their
point. As devastating as both Cleveland and Staten Island were, they have no
relevance when discussing the design and operation of today ’s LNG facilities.

LNG is cry ogenic; it is a liquid; and its vapors are flammable. It is not without its
safety concerns – it, however, can be produced, transported and revaporized as safely ,
and in most cases, more safely , than other liquid energies.

For more information on LNG safety , please see CH·IV’s website, particularly :
http://www.CH-IV.com/lng/lngsafty.htm

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

1. October, 1944 Cleveland, Ohio, USA ~ “The Cleveland Disaster”

LNG Peakshaving Facility
Any time the topic of LNG is introduced to a new audience the “Cleveland
Disaster” is bound to surface. It was indeed tragic, but an unbiased review
will show just how far the industry has come from that horrific incident. The
East Ohio Gas Company built the first “commercial” LNG peakshaving
facility in Cleveland in 1941. The facility was run without incident until
1944, when a larger new tank was added. As stainless steel alloy s were
scarce because of World War II, the new tank was built with a low-nickel
content (3.5%) alloy steel. Shortly after going into service, the tank failed.
LNG spilled into the street and storm sewer sy stem. The resultant fire killed
128 people, setting back the embry onic LNG industry substantially . The
following information is extracted from the U.S. Bureau of Mines report 4 on
the incident:

On October 20, 1944, the tanks had been filled to capacity in readiness for
the coming winter months. About 2:15 PM, the cy lindrical tank suddenly
failed releasing all of its contents into the nearby streets and sewers of
Cleveland. The cloud promptly ignited and a fire ensued which engulfed the
nearby tanks, residences and commercial establishments. After about 20
minutes, when the initial fire had nearly died down, the sphere nearest to the
cy lindrical tank toppled over and released its contents. 9,400 gallons of LNG
immediately evaporated and ignited. In all, 128 people were killed and 225
injured. The area directly involved was about three-quarters of a square mile
(475 acres) of which an area of about 30 acres was completely devastated.

The Bureau of Mines investigation showed that the accident was due to the
low temperature embrittlement of the inner shell of the cy lindrical tank. The
inner tank was made of 3.5% nickel steel, a material now known to be
susceptible to brittle fracture at LNG storage temperature (minus 260°F). In
addition, the tanks were located close to a heavily traveled railroad station
and a bombshell stamping plant. Excessive vibration from the railroad
engines and stamping presses probably accelerated crack propagation in the
inner shell. Once the inner shell ruptured, the outer carbon steel wall would
have easily fractured upon contact with LNG. The accident was aggravated
by the absence of adequate diking around the tanks, and the proximity of the
facility to the residential area. The cause of the second release from the
spherical tank was the fact that the legs of the sphere were not insulated
against fire so that they eventually buckled after being exposed to direct
flame contact.

4
“Report on the Investigation of the Fire at the Liquefaction, Storage, and Regasification Plant of the East Ohio
Gas Co., Cleveland, Ohio, October 20, 1944,” U.S. Bureau of Mines, February, 1946.

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

Further, it should be noted that the ignition of the two unconfined vapor
clouds of LNG in Cleveland did not result in explosions. There was no
evidence of any explosion overpressures after the ignition of the spill from
either the cy lindrical tank or the sphere. The only explosions that took place
in Cleveland were limited to the sewers where LNG ran and vaporized before
the vapor-air mixture ignited in a relatively confined volume. The U.S.
Bureau of Mines, concluded that the concept of liquefy ing and storing LNG
was valid if “proper precautions are observed.”

The Cleveland Disaster put an end to any further LNG development in the
United States for many y ears. It was not until the early sixties that LNG
began to be taken seriously through construction of LNG peakshaving
facilities. A number of elements came together to bring LNG back; these
included:
• The advent of the space program and its associated cry ogenic technologies
• Successful large-scale fire and vapor cloud dispersion demonstrations
• Extensive cry ogenic material compatibility studies
• Construction and operation of liquefaction plants in Algeria and receiving
terminals in France and England.

2. May, 1965 Canvey Island, Essex, United Kingdom

LNG Import Terminal
A small amount of LNG spilled from a tank during maintenance. The spill
ignited and one worker was seriously burned. No other details have been
made available.

3. March, 1968 Portland, Oregon, USA

LNG Peakshaving Facility - Construction Accident, no LNG present
Four workers inside an unfinished LNG storage tank were killed when natural
gas from a pipeline being pressure tested inadvertently entered the tank as a
result of improper isolation, and then ignited causing an explosion. The LNG
tank was 120 feet in diameter with a 100-foot shell height and a capacity of
176,000 barrels and damaged bey ond repair. Neither the tank nor the process
facility had been commissioned at the time the accident occurred. The LNG
tank involved in this accident had never been commissioned; thus, it had
never contained any LNG.

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

4. 1971 La Spezia, Italy

LNG Import Terminal - First documented LNG Rollover incident
The LNG carrier Esso Brega had been in the harbor for about a month before
unloading its cargo of “heavy ” LNG into the storage tank. Eighteen hours
after the tank was filled, the tank developed a sudden increase in pressure
causing LNG vapor to discharge from the tank safety valves and vents over a
period of a few hours. The roof of the tank was also slightly damaged. It is
estimated that about 100 mmscf of LNG vapor (natural gas) flowed out of the
tank. No ignition took place. This accident was caused by a phenomenon
called “rollover,” 5 where two lay ers of LNG having different densities and
heat content are allowed to form. The sudden mixing of these two lay ers
results in the release of large volumes of vapor.

5. January, 1972 Montreal, Canada

LNG Peakshaving Facility - Although an LNG facility, LNG was not involved
On January 27, 1972 an explosion occurred in the LNG liquefaction and peak
shaving plant of Gaz Métropolitain in Montreal East, Quebec. The accident
occurred in the control room due to a back flow of natural gas from the
compressor to the nitrogen line. Nitrogen was supplied to the recy cle
compressor as a seal gas during defrosting operations. The valves on the
nitrogen line that were kept open during defrosting operation were not closed
after completing the operation. This resulted in the over-pressurization of
the compressor with up to 250 - 350 psig of natural gas. Natural gas entered
the nitrogen header, which was at 75 psig. The pneumatically controlled
instruments were being operated with nitrogen due to the failure of the
instrument-air compressor. The instruments vented their contents into the
atmosphere at the control panel. Natural gas entered the control room
through the nitrogen header and accumulated in the control room, where
operators were allowed to smoke. The explosion occurred while an operator
was try ing to light a cigarette.

6. February, 1973 Staten Island, New York, USA

LNG Peakshaving Facility - Construction Accident, no LNG present
Proper precautions have been common place in all of the LNG facilities built
and placed in service ever since Cleveland. Between the mid-1960s and mid-
1970s more than 60 LNG facilities were built in the United States. These
peak-shaving plants have had an excellent safety record. This construction
accident has consistently been used by opponents of LNG as a case-in-point
to depict the danger of LNG, after all, “40 persons lost their lives at an LNG
facility .”

5
See Section 3.1 of CH·IV’s “Introduction to LNG Safety,” Short Course on LNG Rollover.

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

Here’s the story –

One of Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation’s (TETCO) LNG storage
tanks on Staten Island had been in service for over three y ears when it was
taken out of service for internal repairs. The tank was warmed, purged of the
remaining combustible gases with inert nitrogen, and then filled with fresh
recirculating air. A construction crew entered the tank to begin repair work
in April of 1972. Ten months later, in February of 1973, an unknown cause
ignited the My lar liner and poly urethane foam insulation inside the tank.
Initial standard operating procedures called for the use of explosion-proof
equipment within the tank, however non-explosion proof irons and vacuum
cleaners were being used for sealing the liner and cleaning insulation debris.
It is assumed that an electrical spark in one of the irons or vacuum cleaners
ignited the My lar liner. The rapid rise in temperature caused a corresponding
rise in pressure inside the tank. The pressure increase lifted the tank’s
concrete dome. The dome then collapsed killing the 40 construction workers
inside.

The subsequent New York City Fire Department investigation 6 concluded that
the accident was clearly a construction accident and not an LNG accident.
This has not prevented LNG’s opponents from claiming that since there may
have been latent vapors from the heavy components of the LNG that was
stored in the tank, then it was in fact an LNG incident.

7. March, 1977 Algeria

LNG Export Facility
A worker at the Camel plant was frozen to death when he was spray ed with
LNG, which was escaping from a ruptured valve body on top of an in-ground
storage tank. Approximately 1,500 to 2,000 m 3 of LNG were released, but
the resulting vapor cloud did not ignite. The valve body that ruptured was
constructed of cast aluminum. The current practice is to provide valves in
LNG service that are made with stainless steel.

8. March, 1978 Das Island, United Arab Emirates

LNG Export Facility
A bottom pipe connection of an LNG tank failed resulting in an LNG spill
inside the LNG tank containment. The liquid flow was stopped by closing the
internal valve designed for just such service. A large vapor cloud resulted
and dissipated without ignition. No injuries or fatalities were reported.

6
"Report of Texas Eastern LNG Tank Fatal Fire and Roof Collapse, February 10, 1973," Fire Department of
the City of New York, July, 1973

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

9. October, 1979 Cove Point, Maryland, USA

LNG Import Terminal
The Cove Point LNG Receiving Terminal in Mary land began operations in the
spring of 1978. By the fall of 1979, Cove Point had unloaded over 80 LNG
ships. In 1979, a tragic accident occurred at Cove Point that took the life of
one operator and seriously burned another.
Around 3:00 AM on October 6, 1979, an explosion occurred within an
electrical substation at Cove Point. LNG had leaked through an inadequately
tightened LNG pump electrical penetration seal, vaporized, passed through
200 feet of underground electrical conduit, and entered the substation. Since
natural gas was never expected in this substation, no gas detectors had been
installed in the building. The natural gas-air mixture was ignited by the
normal arcing contacts of a circuit breaker, resulting in an explosion. The
explosion killed one operator in the building, seriously injured a second and
caused about $3 million in damages.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found 7 that the Cove Point
Terminal was designed and constructed in conformance with all appropriate
regulations and codes. It further concluded that this was an isolated incident,
not likely to recur elsewhere. The NTSB concluded that it is unlikely that
any pump seal, regardless of the liquid being pumped, could be designed,
fabricated, or installed to completely preclude the possibility of leakage.
With that conclusion in mind, building codes pertaining to the equipment and
sy stems downstream of the pump seal were changed. Before the Cove Point
Terminal was restarted, all pump seal sy stems were modified to meet the new
codes and gas detection sy stems were added to all buildings.

10. April, 1983 Bontang, Indonesia

LNG Export Facility - Maintenance Accident, no LNG present
A major incident occurred on April 14, 1983 in Bontang, Indonesia. The
main liquefaction column (large vertical shell-and-tube heat exchanger) in
Train B ruptured due to overpressurization of the heat exchanger caused by a
blind 8 left in a flare line during start-up. All the pressure relief sy stems were
connected to this line. The exchanger was designed to operate at 60 psig on
the shell side. The gas pressure reached 180 psig causing the failure of the
exchanger. Debris and coil sections were projected some 50 meters away .
Shrapnel from the column killed three workers. The ensuing fire was
extinguished in about 30 minutes. This incident occurred during dry -out and
purging of the exchanger with warm natural gas prior to introducing any LNG
into the sy stem, so no LNG was actually involved or released.

7
“Columbia LNG Corporation Explosion and Fire; Cove Point, MD; October 6, 1979" National Transportation
Safety Board Report NTSB-PAR-80-2, April 16, 1980
8
A flat plate temporarily installed between flanges during construction and/or maintenance to isolate equipment.

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

11. 1987 Mercury, Nevada, USA

Department of Energy Test Facility
An accidental ignition of an LNG vapor cloud occurred at the DOE, Nevada
Test Site on August 29, 1987. The large-scale tests involving spills of LNG
on water were sponsored by the Department of Energy and Gas Research
Institute to study the effectiveness of vapor fences in reducing the extent of
downwind dispersion of LNG vapor clouds. The cloud accidentally ignited
during Test #5 just after a sequence of relatively strong rapid phase
transitions (RPTs) which damaged and propelled poly urethane pipe insulation
outside the fence.

The official explanation was that a spark generated by static electricity

approximately 76 seconds after the spill was the most likely source of
ignition. An independent investigation on behalf of Gas Research Institute
showed that a more likely source of ignition was oxy gen enrichment between
the surface of the LNG pipe and the combustible poly urethane foam
insulation. Oxy gen enrichment occurred during the long cool-down period
with liquid nitrogen that preceded the LNG test. Such enrichment had been
previously observed during tests carried out by an LNG tank design and
manufacturing company . Impacts during the RPTs may have ignited the
insulation but not the nearby fuel-rich vapor cloud. However, when a
smoldering insulation fragment was propelled outside the fence by an RPT, it
ignited the portion of the cloud that was within the flammable limits. The
duration of the fire was 30 seconds. The flame length was about 20 feet
above the ground.

There have been other accidental ignitions involving LNG during large-scale
tests.
• One occurred in England during large-scale fire tests being carried out by
British Gas Corporation. Stray currents from a nearby radar station were
blamed for prematurely igniting the primer that was eventually to be used
to ignite the LNG cloud.
• Another occurred in Japan during similar large-scale tests carried out by
Japan Gas Association. The ignition mechanism was not explained.
• During a test at a research facility near San Clemente, California, a sudden
change in wind direction caused the vapor cloud to encounter a tractor that
was moving some of the test equipment. The tractor ignited the vapor
cloud, badly burning the driver. A researcher was also in the vapor cloud
at the time of ignition. He was able to get out of the vapor cloud before
the flame front reached him by running crosswind and was not injured.

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

12. August, 1985 Pinson, Alabama, USA

LNG Peakshaving Facility
The welds on an 8 1/ 4-inch by 12-inch “patch plate” on a small aluminum
vessel (3 ft in diameter by 7 ft tall) failed as the vessel was receiving LNG
which was being drained from the liquefaction cold box. The plate was
propelled into a building that contained the control room, boiler room, and
offices. Some of the windows in the control room were blown inward and
natural gas escaping from the failed vessel entered the building and ignited.
Six employ ees were injured.

13. 1988 Everett, Massachusetts, USA

LNG Import Terminal
Approximately 30,000 gallons of LNG were spilled through “blown” flange
gaskets during an interruption in LNG transfer at Distrigas. The cause was
later determined to be “condensation induced water hammer.” 9 The spill was
contained in a small area, as designed. The still night prevented the
movement of the vapor cloud from the immediate area. No one was injured
and no damage occurred bey ond the blown gasket. Operating procedures,
both manual and automatic, were modified as a result.

14. 1989 Thurley, United Kingdom

LNG Peakshaving Facility
While cooling down the vaporizers in preparation for sending out natural gas,
low-point drain valves were opened on each vaporizer. One of these drain
valves had not been closed when the pumps were started and LNG entered the
vaporizers. As a result, LNG was released into the atmosphere as a high-
pressure jet. The resulting vapor cloud ignited about thirty seconds after the
release began. The flash fire covered an area approximately 40 by 25 m.
Two operators received burns to their hands and faces. The source of
ignition was believed to be the pilot light on one of the other submerged
combustion vaporizers.

15. 1993 Bontang, Indonesia

LNG Export Facility
An LNG leak occurred in the open run-down line during a pipe modification
project. LNG entered an underground concrete oily -water sewer sy stem and
underwent a rapid vapor expansion that overpressured and ruptured the sewer
pipes. No ignition of the vapor occurred, but the sewer sy stem was
substantially damaged.

9
See description in Section 3.1 of CH·IV’s “Introduction to LNG Safety”

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities

16. September, 2000 Savannah, Georgia, USA

LNG Import Terminal
In September 2000, a 580-foot ship, the Sun Sapphire, lost control in the
Savannah River and crashed into the LNG unloading pier at Elba Island. The
Elba Island facility was undergoing reactivation but had no LNG in the plant.
The Sun Sapphire, carry ing almost 20,000 tons of palm and coconut oil,
suffered a 40-foot gash in her hull. The point of impact at the terminal was
the LNG unloading platform. Although the LNG facility experienced
significant damage, including the need to replace five 16" unloading arms,
there was no indication that had LNG been present in the piping that there
would have been a release. Given the geometry of the Savannah River at Elba
Island, it is doubtful that had an LNG ship been present that a similar
ramming could have penetrated the double hull and released any LNG.

17. January 19, 2004 Skikda, Algeria

LNG Export Facility
A leak in the hydrocarbon refrigerant system formed a vapor cloud that was drawn into
the inlet of a steam boiler. The increased fuel to the boiler caused rapidly rising
pressure within a steam drum. The rapidly rising pressure exceeded the capacity of the
boiler's safety valve and the steam drum ruptured. The boiler rupture was close enough
to the gas leak area to ignite the vapor cloud and produce an explosion and fireball.
The fire took eight hours to extinguish. The explosions and fire destroyed a portion of
the LNG plant and caused 27 deaths and injury to 72 more. No one outside the plant
was injured nor were the LNG storage tanks damaged by the explosions. A joint report
issued by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) was issued in April 2004 under the title of “Report of the
U.S. Government Team Site Inspection of the Sonatrach Skikda LNG Pant in Skikda,
Algeria.” The primary findings in the report indicate that there were local ignition
sources, a lack of “typical” automatic equipment shutdown devices and a lack of hazard
detection devices.

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APPENDIX B
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving LNG Ships

1. 1964/1965
25,500 M 3 Jules Verne
While loading LNG in Arzew, Algeria, lightning struck the forward vent riser
of the ship and ignited vapor, which was being routinely vented through the
ship venting sy stem. Loading had been stopped when a thunderstorm broke
out near the terminal but the vapor generated by the loading process was being
released to the atmosphere. The shore return piping had not y et been in
operation. The flame was quickly extinguished by purging with nitrogen
through a connection to the riser.

A similar event happened early in 1965 while the vessel was at sea shortly
after leaving Arzew. The fire was again extinguished using the nitrogen purge
connection. In this case, vapor was being vented into the atmosphere during
ship transit, as was the normal practice at that time.

2. May, 1965
27,400 M 3 Methane Princess
The LNG loading arms were disconnected before the liquid lines had been
completely drained, causing LNG to pass through a leaking closed valve and
into a stainless steel drip pan placed underneath the arms. Seawater was
applied to the area. Eventually , a star-shaped fracture appeared in the deck
plating in spite of the application of the seawater.

3. May, 1965
25,500 M 3 Jules Verne
On the fourth loading of Jules Verne at Arzew in May 1965 an LNG spill,
caused by overflowing of Cargo Tank No.1, resulted in the fracture of the
cover plating of the tank and of the adjacent deck plating. The cause of the
overfill has never been adequately explained, but it was associated with the
failure of liquid level instrumentation and unfamiliarity with equipment on the
part of the cargo handling watch officer.

4. April 11, 1966

27,400 M 3 Methane Progress
Cargo leakage reported. No details.

5. September, 1968
5,000 M 3 Aristotle
Ran aground off the coast of Mexico. Bottom damaged. Believed to be in
LPG service when this occurred. No LNG released.

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Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving LNG Ships

6. November 17, 1969

71,500 M 3 Polar Alaska
Sloshing of the LNG heel in No. 1 tank caused part of the supports for the
cargo pump electric cable tray to break loose, resulting in several perforations
of the primary barrier. LNG leaked into the interbarrier space. No LNG released.

7. September 2, 1970
71,500 M 3 Arctic Tokyo
Sloshing of the LNG heel in No. 1 tank during bad weather caused local
deformation of the primary barrier and supporting insulation boxes. LNG
leaked into the interbarrier space at one location. No LNG released.

8. Late 1971
50,000 M 3 Descartes
A minor fault in the connection between the primary barrier and the tank dome
allowed gas into the interbarrier space. No LNG released.

9. June, 1974
27,400 M 3 Methane Princess
On June 12, 1974 the Methane Princess was rammed by the freighter Tower
Princess while moored at Canvey Island LNG Terminal. Created a 3- foot
gash in the outer hull. No LNG released.

10. July, 1974

5,000 M 3 Barge Massachusetts
LNG was being loaded on the barge on July 16, 1974. After a power failure
and the automatic closure of the main liquid line valves, a small amount of
LNG leaked from a 1-inch nitrogen-purge globe valve on the vessel’s liquid
header. The subsequent investigation by the US. Coast Guard found that a
pressure surge caused by the valve closure induced the leakage of LNG
through the bonnet and gland of the 1-inch valve. The valve had not leaked
during the previous seven or more hours of loading. Several fractures
occurred in the deck plates. They extended over an area that measured about
one by two meters. The amount of LNG involved in the leakage was reported
to be about 40 gallons. As a result of this incident, The U.S. Coast Guard
banned the Barge Massachusetts from LNG service within the U.S. It is
believed that the Barge Massachusetts is now working in liquid ethy lene
service.

11. August, 1974

4,000 M 3 Euclides
Minor damage due to contact with another vessel. No LNG released.

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Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving LNG Ships

12. November, 1974

4,000 M 3 Euclides
Ran aground at La Havre, France. Damaged bottom and propeller.
No LNG released.

13. 1974
27,400 M 3 Methane Progress
Ran aground at Arzew, Algeria. Damaged rudder. No LNG released.

14. September, 1977

125,000 M 3 LNG Aquarius
During the filling of Cargo Tank No. 1 at Bontang on September 16, 1977,
LNG overflowed through the vent mast serving that tank. The incident may
have been caused by difficulties in the liquid level gauge sy stem. The high-
level alarm had been placed in the override mode to eliminate nuisance alarms.
Surprisingly , the mild steel plate of which the cargo tank cover was made did
not fracture as a result of this spill.

15. August 14, 1978

124,890 M 3 Khannur
Collision with cargo ship Hong Hwa in the Strait of Singapore. Minor
damage.
No LNG released.

16. April, 1979

125,000 M 3 Mostefa Ben Boulaid
While discharging cargo at Cove Point, Mary land on April 8, 1979, a check
valve in the piping sy stem of the vessel failed releasing a small quantity of
LNG. This resulted in minor fractures of the deck plating. This spill was
caused by the escape of LNG from a swing-check valve in the liquid line. In
this valve, the hinge pin is retained by a head bolt, which penetrates the wall
of the valve body . In the course of operating the ship and cargo pumping
sy stem, it appears that the vibration caused the bolt to back out, releasing a
shower of LNG onto the deck. The vessel was taken out of service after the
incident and the structural work renewed. All of the check valves in the
ship’s liquid sy stem were modified to prevent a recurrence of the failure. A
light stainless steel keeper was fashioned and installed at each bolt head.
Shortly after the ship returned to service, LNG was noticed leaking from
around one bolt head, the keeper for which had been stripped, again probably
because of vibration. More substantial keepers were installed and the valves
have been free from trouble since that time.

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Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving LNG Ships

17. April, 1979

87,600 M 3 Pollenger
While the Pollenger was discharging LNG at the Distrigas terminal at Everett,
Massachusetts on April 25, 1979, LNG leaking from a valve gland apparently
fractured the tank cover plating at Cargo Tank No. 1. The quantity of LNG
that spilled was probably only a few liters, but the fractures in the cover
plating covered an area of about two square meters.

18. June 29, 1979

125,000 M 3 El Paso Paul Kayser
Ran aground at 14 knots while maneuvering to avoid another vessel in the
Strait of Gibraltar. Bottom damaged extensively . Vessel refloated and cargo
transferred to sister ship, the El Paso Sonatrach. No LNG released.

19. December 12, 1980

125,000 M 3 LNG Taurus
Ran aground in heavy weather at Mutsure Anchorage off Tobata, Japan.
Bottom damaged extensively . Vessel refloated, proceeded under its own
power to the Kita Ky ushu LNG Terminal, and cargo discharged. No LNG released.

20. Early 1980s

125,000 M 3 El Paso Consolidated
Minor release of LNG from a flange. Deck plating fractured due to low
temperature embrittlement.

21. Early 1980s

129,500 M 3 Larbi Ben M’Hidi
Vapor released during transfer arm disconnection. No LNG released.

22. December, 1983

87,600 M 3 Norman Lady
During cooldown of the cargo transfer arms, prior to unloading at Sodegaura,
Japan, the ship suddenly moved astern under its own power. All cargo
transfer arms sheared and LNG spilled. No ignition.

23. 1985
35,500 M 3 Isabella
LNG released as a result of overfilling a tank. Deck fractured due to low
temperature embrittlement.

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Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving LNG Ships

24. 1985
35,500 M 3 Annabella
Reported as “pressurized cargo tank.” Presumably , some LNG released from
the tank or piping. No other details are available.

25. 1985
126,000 M 3 Ramdane Abane
Collision while loaded. Port bow affected. No LNG released.

26. February, 1989

40,000 M 3 Tellier
Wind blew ship from its berth at Skikda, Algeria. Cargo transfer arms
sheared. Piping on ship heavily damaged. Cargo transfer had been stopped.
According to some verbal accounts of this incident, LNG was released from
the cargo transfer arms.

27. Early 1990

125,000 M 3 Bachir Chihani
A fracture occurred at a part of the ship structure, which is prone to the high
stresses that may accompany the complex deflections that the hull encounters
on the high seas. Fracture of the inner hull plating led to the ingress of
seawater into the space behind the cargo hold insulation while the vessel was
in ballast. No LNG released.

28. May 21, 1997

125,000 M 3 Northwest Swift
Collided with a fishing vessel about 400 km from Japan. Some damage to
hull, but no ingress of water. No LNG released.

29. October 31, 1997

126,300 M 3 LNG Capricorn
Struck a mooring dolphin at a pier near the Senboku LNG Terminal in Japan.
Some damage to hull, but no ingress of water. No LNG released.

30. September 6, 1999

71,500 M 3 Methane Polar
Engine failure during approach to Atlantic LNG jetty (Trinidad and Tobago).
Struck and damaged Petrotrin pier. No injuries. No LNG released.
31. December 2002
87,000 M 3 Norman Lady
A U.S. nuclear submarine, the U.S.S. Oklahoma City , raised its periscope into
the ship necessitating her withdrawal briefly from service for repairs due to
penetration of outer hull allowing leakage of seawater. No LNG released

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APPENDIX B
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving LNG Ships

Yuyo Maru No. 10

The following information pertains to a liquid petroleum gas tanker (LPG) which has a similar
construction to an LNG tanker. The information was obtained from a Japanese marine registry
record. The annotations [text] were added by the authors for clarity. This incident is included in
this document to help illustrate the integrity of LNG tanks onboard LNG ships. There is much
discussion today around the impact of a terrorist attack perpetrated on an LNG tanker.

The Motorship “Yuyo Maru No. 10” (gross tonnage of 43,723), laden with 20,831 MT of light
naphtha, 20,202 MT of propane and 6,443 MT of butane, left Ras Tanura, in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, for Kawasaki, and the port of Keihin on October 22, 1974. While the vessel was sailing
northward along the Naka-no Se Traffic Route in Tokyo Bay on November 9, she collided with the
Motorship “Pacific Ares” (gross tonnage of 10,874), manned with a Taiwanese Master and 28 crew
members, laden with 14,835 MT of steel products, en route from Kisarazu for Los Angeles, USA.
The collision occurred about 13:37 hours on the same day slightly northward of the boundary line
of the Naka-no Se Traffic Route.

As a result of the collision, the “Yuyo Maru No. 10” suffered a large hole at the point of collision,
with her cargo naphtha [The naphtha was carried in its outer ballast tank (between the insulated
LPG tanks and the hull of the ship). This is effectively what makes up the “double hull” with LNG
ships. The LPG cargo tank was not penetrated. LNG tankers never carry any thing other than air
or ballast (water) in these tanks.] instantly igniting into flames. As a result of the outflow of
naphtha overboard, the sea surface on her starboard side literally turned into a sea of fire. The
“Pacific Ares” showered with fire burst into flames in the forecastle and on the bridge. While
explosions occurred one after another [naphtha, not propane], attempts were made to tow the
“Yuyo Maru No 10”, outside the bay, but she ran aground in the vicinity of Daini Kaiho. She was
successfully towed out of Tokyo Bay and sunk south of Nojima Saki on the afternoon of November
27 [Thirty-six days after the original collision.] by cannon, air bomb and torpedo attacks staged by
the Maritime Self-Defense Force. [Please note “cannon, air bomb and torpedo attacks” were
required to sink the ship. Other reports indicate that these attacks lasted one and a half days. The
author has seen a black and white film of these attacks. It appeared that the LPG tanks were for
the most part fully in tact prior to the attacks. The ship’s LPG vent stacks were melted down to just
above the decks and on fire indicating that LPG remained within the storage tanks.]

On board the “Yuyo Maru No. 10”, five crew members were killed and seven others injured by this
accident. The “Pacific Ares”, whose forward section was completely crushed and superstructures
burned down, was later repaired. Her crew members were all killed except one person, who was
injured but rescued.

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APPENDIX C
Chronological Summary of LNG Tanker Truck Incidents

Date Location LNG Carrier

1. June 1971 Waterbury, VT Capitol
Blowout, hit rocks by road, tore hole in tank, 20% spilled, no fire, remainder
dumped. Single wall tanker?
2. August 1971 Warner, NH Gas, Inc.
Driver fatigue, drove off road, rollover cracked fittings, small gas leak, no fire.
3. October 1971 N. Whitehall, WI Indianhead
Head-on collision with truck. Gasoline and tire fire, no cargo lost.
4. October 1973 Raynham, MA Andrews & Pierce
Truck side swiped parked car; brakes locked and trailer overturned. No cargo on-
board, no fire
5. 1973 Rt. 80 & 95 JCT, NJ Chemical Leaman
Driver couldn’t negotiate turn off. Rollover demolished tractor and severe
damage to trailer. No fire. $40,000 damage to trailer.
6. February 1974 New Jersey Turnpike Gas, Inc.
Faulty brakes caused wheel fire. Check valve cracked 5% leaked out. No fire.
7. February 1974 McKee City, NJ Gas, Inc.
Loose valve leaked LNG during transfer operation.
8. January 1976 Chattanooga, TN LP Transport
Rollover, no fire, caused by oil spill on exit ramp. Truck righted and continued
delivery of cargo.
9. November 1975 Dalton, GA LP Transport
Rollover, no fire. Driver swerved to avoid pedestrian, hit guardrail and rolled
over and down an 80 foot bank. $18,000 damage to trailer.
10. September 1976 Pawtucket, RI Andrews & Pierce
Car hit trailer at landing wheels, rollover, no LNG loss or fire.
11. April 1977 Connecticut Turnpike Chemical Leaman
Truck parked (with blowout) hit by a tow truck in rear. No leak or fire.
12. July 1977 Waterbury, CT LP Transport
“Single Wall” Lubbock hit in rear by tractor-trailer, axle knocked off. Rollover.
No loss of cargo.
13. December 1977 I5 & I10, Los Angeles Western Gillet/SDG
Rollover with little product loss, no vacuum loss, no fire. Driver had 3 broken
ribs.

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APPENDIX C
Chronological Summary of LNG Tanker Truck Incidents

Date Location LNG Carrier

14. February 1981 Barnagat, NJ LP Transport
Driver failed to negotiate turn due to excessive speed on country road. Driver not
hurt seriously . Loss of some product through relief valve resulted in serious
damage to transport.
15. September 1981 Lexington, MA Andrews & Pierce
Rollover, no fire, no product loss (empty ), driver not seriously hurt. Extensive
damage to transport. Cause: rain and poor road conditions.
16. October, 1993 Everett, MA TransGas
Trailer slide off third wheel just before entering highway . No fire, no product
loss
17. May 1994 Revere, MA TransGas
Trailer over turned when try ing to negotiate a traffic circle at too high of speed.
No product loss, no fire. Trailer emptied into second trailer without incident.
18. October 1998 Woburn, Ma TransGas
Trailer traveling at high speed is sideswiped by car then careens into guardrail
ripping open diesel fuel tanks. Ensuing diesel fuel fire traps driver in cab where
he perishes. Fire engulfs LNG trailer until extinguished. No loss of product
experienced. LNG partially transferred to second trailer. Trailer then uprighted
and sent to transport y ard to complete the transfer of product.
19. September 2003 Woburn, Ma TransGas
Trailer traveling too fast on a highway exit ramp overturned. There was no
leakage of cargo from the overturned truck. The truck driver was slightly injured
and received a speeding citation.

Note: The last four incidents were reported on television and/or presented in
the local Boston print media. In every case the media attempted to
create a disaster scenario using meaningless phases such as “blast
zone” and “police cruisers turned off lights to prevent explosions.” In
one case a totally misinformed fire chief stated that the situation was
“potentially a giant bomb. . . . An explosion would devastate a half-
mile in all directions.” One of the worst “facts” reported was that
“water was hosed onto the tanker to keep the LNG cool”!

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