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Traffic Anomaly Detection in DDos Flooding

Attack
Yudha Purwanto, Kuspriyanto, Hendrawan, Budi Rahardjo
Bandung Insitute of Technology
Bandung, Indonesia
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract—Researches have been conducted to overcome However, all survey mentioned above haven’t discussed the
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding attack. Beside the spesific research problem in each anomaly detection system.
use of signature based detection, anomaly based detection is also Specific problem will be resolved in specific methods and
used to detect the attack. Several methods such as statistic, process, and lead to system capability focus.
information theory, data mining and forecasting have been
proposed. In several researches, they just focused to detect the This paper contribution are as follow :
traffic anomaly, but not to recognize the types of anomaly that
• Categorize methods based on sistem capability, which are
were detected such as flashcrowd, types of botnet, types of DDoS,
and prevention action. In this paper we categorize anomaly
anomaly detection, type of anomaly detection, differentiate
traffic detection system based on process and capability focus. flashcrowd and DDoS, and prevention action to overcome
Anomaly detection system process including traffic features, the attack.
preprocessing, and detection process. Capability focus based on • Provide overview of research direction due regard to
each main research problem to be solved, there are detectingonly anomaly traffic detection capability focus.
anomaly, types of anomaly, and prevention system that include
process to overcome the attack. At the end of paper, we provide II. OVERVIEW
overview of research direction and opportunities that may be
done in future research. In an attempt to protect the host and service from DoS and
DDoS attacks there are two methods in the IDS / IPS, namely
Keywords—DDoS, anomaly detection, flashcrowd, intrusion signature-based and anomaly-based traffic. Intrusion
botnet, prevention signature-based is done by matching the packet signature with
existing attack signatures in a database (known signature
I. INTRODUCTION attack). This detection technique has the advantage of low
Quality of Service (QoS) is an important factor in false positive for constantly updated database, but has
computer network. Several QoS architecture developed in weakness that can’t detect attacks that haven’t exist in the
networking scope to guarentee QoS requirement. Capability database (unknown attack).This weakness lead to very
that couldn’t be successfully acomplished in QoS architecture vulnerable system to new type of attack or modified attack.
is to deal with flooding traffic. Flood traffic could be happend Flashcrowd is an increasing traffic phenomena as the
as flooding attack DDoS phenomena or normal flashcrowd. number of users who access the server increase significantly
Flashcrowd is legal flooding traffic that tried to rearch the during any spesific event. The natural increasing number of
service as it came from the increasing legitimate users with users occurs gradually, not so instantaneous/drastic as the
normal rate. But DDoS is ilegal flooding trafficthat tried to hit information dissemination of any event.From the QoS
the server down by sending high packet rate traffic (or might perspective, flashcrowd should still be served by the server to
be combined with huge packet size) so legitimate user maintain a good QoS level. The number of packets that
couldn’t access the service. This is because the traverse through the network links and nodes should still be
telecommunication resources that were used to serve the user maintained, and the availability of the server must remain high
traffic is not unlimited. even though the number of packets is very large.
This paper review many researches on traffic anomaly As the opposite, DDoS flooding attack was done to disrupt
detection, esspecially flooding attack, and categorize them the QoS both in network links and nodes. Attack targets is
based capability focus. Almost all anomaly detection survey either link (bandwidth) and node computing resources
paper classify reasearch based on methods as listed in table (processes, memory, and buffer) to make the system crashes
I.[1]categorize system based on fundamental approach of therefore can’t serve any user request. DDoS flooding attacks
detection methods, which explain almost all technical aspects can be either one or a combination of exploited protocol
that influence the detection system in several application area. (communication sequence), many connections, connection with
A modest survey in [2]categorize system in three technical huge message size, address spoofing, reflection and
domain which are statistical mehtod, streaming algorithm, and amplification from open service server.In [4]describe
unsupervised machine learning. A comprehensive survey in flashcrowd as a situation when hundreds of thousands users try
[3]categorize research based on methods/techniques, tools, and to access computing resources in the same time, while DDoS
broad view of in many applications. The paper review almost almost few thousand in [5].
all detection methods in past anomaly detection research.
TABLE I. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE REFERENCE SURVEY PAPER

978-1-4799-7447-4/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE


[1] [2] [3] our B. Detection method
s
Methods Statistical ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ All researches using threshold based detection, identify
anomaly from changes in the pattern of observed traffic
Classification-based ¥ ¥ ¥
exceeds a predetermined threshold. Standard parameter in
Knowledge-based ¥ ¥ traffic anomaly detection system testing is detection rate and
Soft computing ¥ ¥ ¥ false positive rate. In detection rate, detection system accuracy
measuredby numbers ofdetected attacks compared to real
Clustering-based ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ generated attacks. And false positive rateis a measure of the
Hybrid ¥ accuracy of the detected attacks.
Nearest Neighbor Based ¥ To increase detection rate and reduce the false positive
Information Theoretic ¥ ¥ rate, some anomaly detection methods have been developed,
ranging from simple volume-based packet in network layer to
Forecasting ¥
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) of application payload. All
Tools Dataset ¥ methods was done to look for patterns of normal traffic and
Metric ¥ ¥ how to distinguish/detect different patterns of different
attacks. Many research based on any priors belief that the
Applications ¥
attack is (1) significant deviation / not obey legitimate traffic
Process Data Input ¥ ¥ ¥ profile [6] [24], (2) disproportional/heavy change/deviate on
Preprocessing ¥ distributional aspect of chosen features [11][12][13] [14], (3)
have different correlation among features [10], (4) has certain
Methods ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
dominant activities in target [25] [26][10], (5) same botnet
Testing ¥ attacks came with same standar deviation [17]. The detection
Capability focus ¥ method will be reveiwed along with capability focus review.
IV. CAPABILITY FOCUS
III. PROCESSING FLOW
Based from our references, the capability focus of anomaly
A. Preprocessing traffic detection research taxonomy can be form as fig.1.
Based from majority of surveyed papers,The preprocessing
of traffic in each research came with different form, such as ĂŶŽŵĂůLJ
ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐďĂƐĞĚ
ĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ
• global features space in [6] [7][8], ĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽ
ŽŶůLJ ŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ
• defined feature space such as : 5-tuple feature[9], 4 traffic
features [10] [11], packet volume sketch[12][13], Xflow ŽŶůLJ
ƚLJƉĞƐŽĨ ƌĂƚĞ
ĂŶŽŵĂůLJ ĨŝůƚĞƌŝŶŐ
hashbin[14], sender window and buffer size[15], packet ĂŶŽŵĂůLJ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů
ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐ
volume and size [16], ĨůĂƐŚĐƌŽǁĚ ƚƌĂĐĞďĂĐŬ
ĂŶĚŽ^ ƚLJƉĞƐŽĨ ͬƉƵƐŚďĂĐ
• traffic flow such as traffic flow with same destination[17],
ĂƚƚĂĐŬ Ŭ
and IF flowfrom input-output interface [18] [19], ŶŽƉĂƚŚ
ƚLJƉĞƐŽĨ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽ
• transaction such as a set of communication protocol with Ž^ ƚLJƉĞƐŽĨ Ŷ
certain packet and port [20], three-way handshaking that ŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ďŽƚŶĞƚ
ƉĂƚŚ
will include 3 packetin bidirectionalcommunication [15]. ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽƌ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ
The preprocessing step will extract features and do feature Fig. 1. Anomaly traffic detection capability focus.
selection from traffic. In DDoS analysis, there are seveal
dataset that commonly used as traffic data such as KDDCup A. Anomaly Detection
99[21], CAIDA 2007[22], etc. The KDDCUP 99 is an selected Broadly speaking, any anomaly detection research tried to
set of features from extracted real normal and attack traffic detect changes from normal patterns. Most of these studies
example that can directly used as features set in anomaly just focused only on detecting any abnormal traffic patterns,
detection. CAIDA 2007 is a real raw attacks traffic dataset that without finding out what’s really going on. In other words,
has to be processed in preprocessing step before entering will only come with intrusion detection function. Here we
detection step.Beside common datasets, many researchs also categorized the anomaly detection based on method.
use their own data by generating simulated traffic attack as
injection and sythetic attacks. There is also a binary web log 1) Statistical pattern
flashcrowd dataset in [23]. Statistical mean, median and mode of a dataset is
calculated, so that the anomalyis detected wheater it exceeds
the normal threshold. As examples are the detection
pattern[16][11][27][15][19], where the normal pattern was anomalous data as a baseline of adaptive holt-winters, or
characterized from the mean value (ȝ) and standard deviation because prevention is not done soon momentaryly after attack
(ı) of the number of observed features through a detection detected.
system for every sample. Threshold based is commonly used
3) Information theory
as anomaly was detected when the observed value pass the
normal range. The principle in information theory is to find important
data, with the use of techniques such as Relative uncertainty
A further statistical analysis is in the form of covariance
distribution [26], Dominant state analysis [26], Chi-square
and correlation analysis has conducted in[28][29][6][30]. In
[13], Hellinger distance [11], Mahalanobis distance [29][6],
[30][6] the number of traffic features in the feature space
Kullback-Leibler divergence distance [33], Entropy [14][25]
characterized as Triangle Area Map(TAM) used to detect
[33], Multiscale entropy [18], Mutual information ( [32].The
anomaly in sample-by-sample approach. The normal pattern is
most widelyused technique is the entropy, where the entropy
characterized by mean and variance of TAM’s Mahalanobis
can be known as dispersals grade of features. The interesting
Distance (MD), covariance matrices, and average TAM.
traffic anomaly detection research is the used of the Multiscale
[29]use almost the same approach but obtain the distribution
entropy [18]where the use of a single scale entropy are not
of ASCII characters contained in the message payload as
suitable to be implemented on complex behavior of traffic in
features. This research contributes to the integration of
each time series. In [26]analize realtime traffic patterns in high
geometrical structures and payload-based anomaly detection
speed communication link continuously using relative
that has never existed before,but requires DPI process
uncertainty distribution to automatically classifying traffic
capability and high processing time due to flow and payload
behavior and look for the dominant features. In [11]use a
based data. The approach used in those study wasproven better
combination of information theory and statistical methods to
than [28]which use only covariance matrices directed from
define traffic patterns, as the distance between the average
group-sample of traffic data.
number of 4-definedfeatures of observed trafficwas compared
In [7][31]the use of PCA as feature extraction from to normal historical traffic. Hellinger distancewas used to
covariance matrices result in reduced dimension of observed calculate the distance of traffic features, while statistic
data, making it easier to connect with the features of the data calculate the mean and variance of calculated Hellinger
in the detection system.Another version of PCA mentioned as distance.
robust PCA in [32]used to obtain statistical data results that
4) Soft computing
are more robust to outliers in statistics. This will obviously
In pattern recognition domain, there are two recognized
increase the precision of detection result where the observed
methods are supervised-learning classification and
datawas not affected by outliers that frequently arise and affect
unsupervised-learning clustering which process
the statistical mean of the data.
sometimeinvolving softcomputing/computational intelligent.
2) Forecasting Techniques used in softcomputing include Artificial
The use of forecasting techniques; which is also based on Intelligent, Neural Network, Artificial Neural Network, fuzzy
the statistical analysis; widely used in the detection method. A logic, immunity system,FCM, FCM, Fuzzy [7][14], Gaussian
time serie data can be used to predict thenext value that will Mixture Model[7] [20] [11][34], Likelihood ratio[20][16].
appear in the next state. These methods including Least Mean
Gausian Mixture Model (GMM) is one popular model to
Square[13], Exponentially Weighted Moving Average [12],
represent data. [20]use the mixture density of the feature
Linear regression [8], Non Seasonal Holt-Winters [12], and
vector of each transaction using GMM and calculating the
Holt-Winters [10] [33]. In [12]and[13]research carried out by
likelihood value of the feature vectors.The data traffic is used
the principle of dividing one time series into several time
to make the characteristics of the GMM models which are
series, predict the next value that will appear, and compare the
represented in the mixing coefficient, the mean and covariance
predicted value with real value which will be detected as an
matrices then was used as a normal pattern for the detection
anomaly when it has exceeded the distance difference adaptive
function. The use of GMM is also used in [34]to represent a
threshold. This research uses predetermined dimensional
mixture of multi-traffic generator (kernel) with different
sketch to increase sensitivity which are very influential on the
behavior,while [14]using the method of clustering on Distinct
detection rate and adaptive threshold. Research [33]has some
Feature Number (DFN) and integer-value traffic features.
similarities with [26]where the study [33]adds the forecasting
Prior believe of normal traffic is stable and consistent with
process on the same data [26]with a detection method using
Gausian distribution at short period, sothe anomaly can be
entropy techniques.
seen in the deviation fromdistribution.
Topics that may be analyzed and investigated further is the
5) Signal processing
use of adaptive threshold, which prones to gradually increase
and continously flooding attacks. In[10]where the use of Holt- In some literature, signal processing can be categorized as
winter forecasting to find the normal trafficbaseline, it had a a statistical method which is mostly done in a preprocessing
very poor detection rate when given any continously attack stage. Anomaly performed as identification of noise in the
intensity. This may be due to the inability of choosing a non-
signal by means of noise reduction and implement signal-to- command and control (cnc) handler ina botnet will always
noise ratio as a detector. This can be seen in [9] which use the communicate intensively for status updates and cnc, therefore
signal to noise ratio on the time series classification of will produce similarity among flows in botnet.[39] use cross-
previous 22counter. Wavelet transform also applied to detect epoch correlationin flow-correlation determine the similarity
anomalies in which noise can be portrayed as an anomaly of of flows towards the target. Adaptive sampling based on
traffic.Signal processing with image-based detection was also similarity group performed to monitor the activity of the host
applied in [35] in which the anomaly depicted in the form of a associated with botnet cnc server. Beside cross-correlation,
two-dimensional image in three levels. This study uses a line similarity also can be measure by Kulczynski, Cosine, Jaccard
detection and degree of concentration to detect flooding and Tanimoto similarity as in [43] to measure similarity
attacks at the network. Unfortunately, these systems can only among DNS-based payload. High detection rate in [40][41]
be used to distinguish three types of attacks and can only be use BotDel clustering algorithm based on number of instances
implemented on an IPv4 B class network. in k clusters to cluster 256-dimensional n-gram payload byte
distribution. Payload signature also used in[42] to discover
B. Type ofAnomaly payload group similarity by calculating Normalized
Further research of traffic anomaly detection is to answer Compression Distance (NCD) and discover group correlation
what type of traffic anomalies occur. Type of anomaly is by calculating cross correlation coefficient between sequence
associated with type of attack (DDoS, probe, U2R, L2R, etc), of flows.[44]use Hidden Markov Model to model cnc traffic
flashcrowd, type of botnet (TFN2K, shaft, mstream, sasser, from Zeus botnets. Zeus botnet communicate periodically with
etc), and type of DDoS (SYN flood, ICMP flood, Xmas SYN cnc handler that can be modeled by HMM to obtain cnc
flood, etc).Theoretically, the ability to detect the type of communication patterns. This model was developed of the the
anomaly will be a step ahead of the detection method, as it can model [45]by considering several parameters to minimize
be passed to different action of prevention. entropy HMM.

1) Types of Attack C. Prevention Actions


The main capability focus in [28][30]was the detection of Prevention is the action choosen to overcome the attacks,
several types of flooding attacks, with the use ofcovariance and very important to avoid damages.The main concern is to
matrixfeatures space through multistage detection. The main drop attacks packet and maintain the QoS level for the
contributionis theproof of greater detection accuracyin group- legitimate user.Prevention system is usually done in
sample approach than sample-by-sample. But the main collaboration with other fields, including the method of
concern ingroup-sample approach is to drop the entire routing, packet scheduling, queuing systems, classification,
contents ofthe group-sample when it identified as anomaly, and others. Issues raised is the inability of the detection and
where it is clearly very adverse for legal user in group-sample. prevention systems to choose whichever packets come from
The result of detection accuracy is really depend on the the attacker,so unproportional action can lead to collateral
number of different features that used to detect types of DDoS. damage.
2) Flashcrowd and DDoS Many research still proposed unfit actions such as drop
entire packet in a group sample without choosing which
Research [17]capability focus was to distinguish between
packets are from legitimate users [28], will lead to QoS drop
legal flash-crowd and flooding attacks as both seen as
for legitimate users. Approach to drop packets in[46]will
anomalous event. This research was conductedby calculating
perform a gradual drop packets (each 10%) on the aggregate
flow-correlation on the packet volume-based dataamongtwo traffic.If the drop occurs after the traffic rate decrease is
different flows (number of flows with the same destination). believed to be normal/flashcrowd traffic, but when inremains
Almost the same approach used in [36] that use pearson’s
or increases it is believed the attack traffic and will continue to
correlation betweenitself arrival rate, arrival rate and time;
be the addition of percentage drop packets.
[37] using total variation and Bhattacharyya coefficient; and
[38]use entropy to detect traffic anomalies and Sibson distance Another prevention concern is to stop the flooding traffic
to measure similarity of flow in Local Area Network (LAN). from the attack source, so the determination of source
Almost all similarity based system will clearly distinguish (traceback) will be very important. Traceback can be done by
flashcrowd and DDoS traffic, one DDoS flow must be in adding path identification in packet header, or not.In [19]
steady-state and constant high rate traffic, and the accuracy which use a multistage cooperative in monitoring a distributed
will decrease along with the increase of DDoS noise (number change-point detection (DCD) traffic. Research based on
of normal traffic still exist in DDoS flow). statistical traffic data to calculate the deviation ratio of traffic
volume on each router interface. The alarm will be sent to a
3) Types of Botnet specific server (CAT server) via secure protocol to create a
subtree alarm of lines experiencing anomalies to then detect the
The anomaly from botnet communication that lead to attack sources. IP Source history used in [47] to filter the
determination of botnet type has conducted in incoming traffic by only allowing IP source that exist in history
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