Protection 1

Based on “The Art & Science of

Protective Relaying” by C. Russel
Mason published by GE
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE
RELAYING
•We usually think of an electric power system in terms of its more
impressive parts Ð the big generating stations, transformers, high-
voltage lines, etc.
• While these are some of the basic elements, there are many other
necessary and fascinating components.
•Protective relaying is one of these. The role of protective relaying in
electric-power-system design and operation is explained by a brief
examination of the over-all background.
•There are three aspects of a power system that will serve the
purposes of this examination. These aspects are as follows:
A. Normal operation
B. Prevention of electrical failure.
C. Mitigation of the effects of electrical failure.
•The term normal operation assumes no failures of equipment, no
mistakes of personnel, nor acts of God.It involves the minimum
requirements for supplying the existing load and a certain amount of
anticipated future load.
• Some of the considerations are:
A. Choice between hydro, steam, or other sources of power.
B. Location of generating stations.
C. Transmission of power to the load.
D. Study of the load characteristics and planning for its future growth.
E. Metering
F. Voltage and frequency regulation.
G. System operation.
E. Normal maintenance.
• The provisions for normal operation involve the major expense for
equipment and operation, but a system designed according to this aspect
alone could not possibly meet present-day requirements.
• Electrical equipment failures would cause intolerable outages. There must
be additional provisions to minimize damage to equipment and interruptions
to the service when failures occur.
• Two recourses are open: (1) to incorporate features of design aimed at
preventing failures,and (2) to include provisions for mitigating the effects of
failure when it occurs.
• Modern power-system design employs varying degrees of both recourses,
as dictated by the economics of any particular situation
• Notable advances continue to be made toward greater reliability. But
also, increasingly greater reliance is being placed on electric power.
• Consequently, even though the probability of failure is decreased,
the tolerance of the possible harm to the service is also decreased.
But it is futile-or at least not economically justifiable-to try to prevent
failures completely. Sooner or later the law of diminishing returns
makes itself felt.
• Where this occurs will vary between systems and between parts of a
system, but, when this point is reached, further expenditure for
failure prevention is discouraged. It is much more profitable, then, to
let some failures occur and to provide for mitigating their effects.
• The type of electrical failure that causes greatest concern is the
short circuit, or fault as it is usually called, but there are other
abnormal operating conditions peculiar to certain elements of the
system that also require attention.
• Some of the features of design and operation aimed at preventing electrical
failure are:
A. Provision of adequate insulation.
B. Coordination of insulation strength with the capabilities of lightning
arresters.
C. Use of overhead ground wires and low tower-footing resistance.
D. Design for mechanical strength to reduce exposure, and to minimize the
likelihood of failure causable by animals, birds, insects, dirt, sleet, etc.
E. Proper operation and maintenance practices.
• Some of the features of design and operation for mitigating the effects of
failure are:
A. Features that mitigate the immediate effects of an electrical failure.
1. Design to limit the magnitude of short-circuit current.1
a. By avoiding too large concentrations of generating capacity.
b. By using current-limiting impedance.
2. Design to withstand mechanical stresses and heating owing to short-
circuit currents.
3. Time-delay under-voltage devices on circuit breakers to prevent dropping
loads during momentary voltage dips.
4. Ground-fault neutralizers (Petersen coils).
B. Features for promptly disconnecting the faulty element.
1. Protective relaying.
2. Circuit breakers with sufficient interrupting capacity.
3. Fuses.

C. Features that mitigate the loss of the faulty element.

1. Alternate circuits.
2. Reserve generator and transformer capacity.
3. Automatic reclosing.

D. Features that operate throughout the period from the inception of the
fault until after its removal, to maintain voltage and stability.
1. Automatic voltage regulation.
2. Stability characteristics of generators.

E. Means for observing the electiveness of the foregoing features.

1. Automatic oscillographs.
2. Efficient human observation and record keeping.

F. Frequent surveys as system changes or additions are made, to be sure that the
foregoing features are still adequate.
• Thus, protective relaying is one of several features of system design
concerned with minimizing damage to equipment and interruptions
to service when electrical failures occur.
• When we say that relays protect, we mean that, together with other
equipment, the relays help to minimize damage and improve
service.
• It will be evident that all the mitigation features are dependent on
one another for successfully minimizing the effects of failure.
• Therefore, the capabilities and the application requirements of
protective-relaying equipments should be considered concurrently
with the other features.
• This statement is emphasized because there is sometimes a
tendency to think of the protective-relaying equipment after all other
design considerations are irrevocably settled. Within economic
limits, an electric power system should be designed so that it can be
adequately protected.
• THE FUNCTION OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING
• The function of protective relaying is to cause the prompt removal
from service of any element of a power system when it suffers a
short circuit, or when it starts to operate in any abnormal manner
that might cause damage or otherwise interfere with the effective
operation of the rest of the system.
• The relaying equipment is aided in this task by circuit breakers that
are capable of disconnecting the faulty element when they are called
upon to do so by the relaying equipment.
• Circuit breakers are generally located so that each generator,
transformer, bus, transmission line, etc., can be completely
disconnected from the rest of the system.
• These circuit breakers must have sufficient capacity so that they can
carry momentarily the maximum short-circuit current that can flow
through them, and then interrupt this current; they must also
withstand closing in on such a short circuit and then interrupting it
according to certain prescribed standards.
• Fusing is employed where protective relays and circuit breakers are
not economically justifiable. Although the principal function of
protective relaying is to mitigate the effects of short circuits, other
abnormal operating conditions arise that also require the services of
protective relaying. This is particularly true of generators and
motors.
• A secondary function of protective relaying is to provide indication of
the location and type of failure. Such data not only assist in
expediting repair but also, by comparison with human observation
and automatic oscillograph records, they provide means for
analyzing the effectiveness of the fault-prevention and mitigation
features including the protective relaying itself.
• FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING
• Let us consider for the moment only the relaying equipment for the
protection against short circuits. There are two groups of such
equipment - one which we shall call primary relaying, and the
other back-up relaying. Primary relaying is the first line of defense,
whereas back-up relaying functions only when primary relaying
fails.
• Figure 1 illustrates primary relaying. The first observation is that circuit
breakers are located in the connections to each power element.
• This provision makes it possible to disconnect only a faulty element.
Occasionally, a breaker between two adjacent elements may be omitted, in
which event both elements must be disconnected for a failure in either one.
• The second observation is that, without at this time knowing how it is
accomplished, a separate zone of protection is established around each
system element.
• The significance of this is that any failure occurring within a given zone will
cause the tripping (i.e., opening) of all circuit breakers within that zone, and
only those breakers.
• It will become evident that, for failures within the region where two adjacent
protective zones overlap, more breakers will be tripped than the minimum
necessary to disconnect the faulty element.
• But, if there were no overlap, a failure in a region between zones would not
lie in either zone, and therefore no breakers would be tripped. The overlap
is the lesser of the two evils.
• The extent of the overlap is relatively small, and the probability of failure in
this region is low; consequently, the tripping of too many breakers will be
quite infrequent.
• Finally, it will be observed that adjacent protective zones of Fig.
overlap around a circuit breaker.
• This is the preferred practice because, for failures anywhere except
in the overlap region, the minimum number of circuit breakers need
to be tripped.
• When it becomes desirable for economic or space-saving reasons to
overlap on one side of a breaker, as is frequently true in metal-clad
switchgear the relaying equipment of the zone that overlaps the
breaker must be arranged to trip not only the breakers within its
zone but also one or more breakers of the adjacent zone, in order to
completely disconnect certain faults.
• This is illustrated in Fig. 2, where it can be seen that, for a short
circuit at X, the circuit breakers of zone B, including breaker C, will
be tripped; but, since the short circuit is outside zone A, the relaying
equipment of zone B must also trip certain breakers in zone A if that
is necessary to interrupt the flow of short circuit current from zone A
to the fault.
• This is not a disadvantage for a fault at X, but the same breakers in
zone A will be tripped unnecessarily for other faults in zone B to the
right of breaker C.
• Whether this unnecessary tripping is objectionable will depend on
the particular application.
• BACK-UP RELAYING
• Back-up relaying is employed only for protection against short circuits.
Because short circuits are the preponderant type of power failure, there are
more opportunities for failure in short primary relaying.
• Experience has shown that back-up relaying for other than short circuits is
not economically justifiable.
• A clear understanding of the possible causes of primary-relaying failure is
necessary for a better appreciation of the practices involved in back-up
relaying.
• When we say that primary relaying may fail, we mean that any of several
things may happen to prevent primary relaying from causing the
disconnection of a power-system fault.
• Primary relaying may fail because of failure in any of the following:
A. Current or voltage supply to the relays.
B. D-c tripping-voltage supply.
C. Protective relays.
D. Tripping circuit or breaker mechanism.
E. Circuit breaker.
• It is highly desirable that back-up relaying be arranged so that anything that
might cause primary relaying to fail will not also cause failure of back-up
relaying.
• It will be evident that this requirement is completely satisfied only if the
back-up relays are located so that they do not employ or control anything in
common with the primary relays that are to be backed up.
• So far as possible, the practice is to locate the back-up relays at a different
station. Consider, for example, the back-up relaying for the transmission line
section EF of Fig. 3.
• The back-up relays for this line section are normally arranged to trip
breakers A, B, I, and J. Should breaker E fail to trip for a fault on the line
section EF, breakers A and B are tripped; breakers A and B and their
associated back-up equipment, being physically apart from the equipment
that has failed, are not likely to be simultaneously affected as might be the
case if breakers C and D were chosen instead.
• The back-up relays at locations A, B, and F provide back-up protection if
bus faults occur at station K. Also, the back-up relays at A and F provide
back-up protection for faults in the line DB.
• In other words, the zone of protection of back-up relaying extends in one
direction from the location of any back-up relay and at least overlaps each
adjacent system element.
• Where adjacent line sections are of different length, the back-up relays must
overreach some line sections more than others in order to provide back-up
protection for the longest line.
• A given set of back-up
relays will provide
incidental back-up
protection of sorts for
faults in the circuit
whose breaker the
back-up relays control.
• For example, the back-
up relays that trip
breaker A of Fig. 3
may also act as back-
up for faults in the line
section AC.
• However, Fig. 3.
Illustration for back-up
protection of
transmission line
section EF.
• The back-up relays at locations A, B, and F provide back-up
protection if bus faults occur at station K. Also, the back-up relays at
A and F provide back-up protection for faults in the line DB.
• In other words, the zone of protection of back-up relaying extends in
one direction from the location of any back-up relay and at least
overlaps each adjacent system element.
• Where adjacent line sections are of different length, the back-up
relays must overreach some line sections more than others in order
to provide back-up protection for the longest line.
• A given set of back-up relays will provide incidental back-up
protection of sorts for faults in the circuit whose breaker the back-up
relays control.
• For example, the back-up relays that trip breaker A of Fig. 3 may
also act as back-up for faults in the line section AC.
• However, this duplication of protection is only an incidental benefit
and is not to be relied on to the exclusion of a conventional back-up
arrangement when such arrangement is possible; to differentiate
between the two, this type might be called duplicate primary
relaying.
• A second function of back-up relaying is often to provide primary
protection when the primary-relaying equipment is out of service for
maintenance or repair.
• It is perhaps evident that, when back-up relaying functions, a larger part of
the system is disconnected than when primary relaying operates correctly.
This is inevitable if back-up relaying is to be made independent of those
factors that might cause primary relaying to fail.
• However, it emphasizes the importance of the second requirement of
back-up relaying, that it must operate with sufficient time delay so that
primary relaying will be given enough time to function if it is able to.
• In other words, when a short circuit occurs, both primary relaying and
back-up relaying will normally start to operate, but primary relaying is
expected to trip the necessary breakers to remove the short-circuited
element from the system, and back-up relaying will then reset without
having had time to complete its function.
• When a given set of relays provides back-up protection for several
adjacent system elements, the slowest primary relaying of any of those
adjacent elements will determine the necessary time delay of the given
back-up relays.
• For many applications, it is impossible to abide by the principle of
complete segregation of the back-up relays.
• Then one tries to supply the back-up relays from sources other than those
that supply the primary relays of the system element in question, and to
trip other breakers.
• This can usually be accomplished; however, the same tripping battery may
be employed in common, to save money and because it is considered only
a minor risk.
• In extreme cases, it may even be impossible to provide any back-up
protection; in such cases, greater emphasis is placed on the need for better
maintenance.
• In fact, even with complete back-up relaying, there is still much to be
gained by proper maintenance.
• When primary relaying fails, even though back-up relaying functions
properly, the service will generally suffer more or less. Consequently, back-
up relaying is not a proper substitute for good maintenance.
• PROTECTION AGAINST OTHER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS
• Protective relaying for other than short circuits is included in the category of
primary relaying.
• However, since the abnormal conditions requiring protection are different for
each system element, no universal overlapping arrangement of relaying is
used as in short protection.
• Instead, each system element is independently provided with whatever
relaying is required, and this relaying is arranged to trip the necessary
circuit breakers which may in some cases be different from those tripped by
the short-circuit relaying.
• As previously mentioned, back-up relaying is not employed because
experience has not shown it to be economically justifiable.
• Frequently, however, back-up relaying for short circuits will function when
other abnormal conditions occur that produce abnormal currents or
voltages, and back-up protection of sorts is thereby incidentally provided.
• FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING
SENSITIVITY, SELECTIVITY, AND SPEED
• Sensitivity, selectivity and speed are terms commonly used to
describe the functional characteristics of any protective-relaying
equipment. All of them are implied in the foregoing considerations of
primary and back-up relaying.
• Any relaying equipment must be sufficiently sensitive so that it will
operate reliably, when required, under the actual condition that
produces the least operating tendency.
• It must be able to select between those conditions for which prompt
operation is required and those for which no operation, or time-delay
operation, is required.
• And it must operate at the required speed. How well any protective-
relaying equipment fulfills each of these requirements must be
known for each application.
• The ultimate goal of protective relaying is to disconnect a faulty
system element as quickly as possible.
• Sensitivity and selectivity are essential to assure that the proper
circuit breakers will be tripped, but speed is the pay-off. The
benefits to be gained from speed will be considered later.
• RELIABILITY
• That protective-relaying equipment must be reliable is a basic
requirement.
• When protective relaying fails to function properly, the allied mitigation
features are largely ineffective.
• Therefore, it is essential that protective-relaying equipment be inherently
reliable, and that its application, installation, and maintenance be such
as to assure that its maximum capabilities will be realized.
• Inherent reliability is a matter of design based on long experience, and is
much too extensive and detailed a subject to do justice to here.
• Other things being equal, simplicity and robustness contribute to
reliability, but they are not of themselves the complete solution.
• Workmanship must be taken into account also. Contact pressure is an
important measure of reliability, but the contact materials and the
provisions for preventing contact contamination are fully as important.
• These are but a few of the many design considerations that could be
mentioned.
• The proper application of protective-relaying equipment involves the
proper choice not only of relay equipment but also of the associated
apparatus.
• For example, lack of suitable sources of current and voltage for
energizing the relays may compromise, if not jeopardize, the protection.
• Contrasted with most of the other elements of an electric power
system, protective relaying stands idle most of the time.
• Some types of relaying equipment may have to function only once in
several years.
• Transmission-line relays have to operate most frequently, but even
they may operate only several times per year.
• This lack of frequent exercising of the relays and their associated
equipment must be compensated for in other ways to be sure that
the relaying equipment will be operable when its turn comes.
• Many electric utilities provide their test and maintenance personnel
with a manual that experienced people in the organization have
prepared and that is kept up to date as new types of relays are
purchased.
• Such a manual specifies minimum test and maintenance procedure
that experience has shown to be desirable.
• The manual is prepared in part from manufacturers publications and
in part from the utilitys experience.
• As a consequence of standardized techniques, the results of
periodic tests can be compared to detect changes or deterioration in
the relays and their associated devices.
• Testers are encouraged to make other tests as they see fit so long as they make
the tests required by the manual. If a better testing technique is devised, it is
incorporated into the manual.
• Some organizations include information on the purpose of the relays, to give
their people better appreciation of the importance of their work.
• Courses may be given, also. Such activity is highly recommended.
• Unless a person is thoroughly acquainted with relay testing and maintenance, he
can do more harm than good, and he might better leave the equipment alone.
• In some cases, actual field tests are made after installation and after careful
preliminary testing of the individual relays.
• These field tests provide an excellent means for checking the over-all operation
of all equipment involved.
• Careful maintenance and record keeping, not only of tests during maintenance
but also of relay operation during actual service, are the best assurance that the
relaying equipment is in proper condition.
• Field testing is the best-known way of checking the equipment prior to putting it
in service, but conditions may arise in actual service that were not anticipated in
the tests.
• The best assurance that the relays are properly applied and adjusted is a record
of correct operation through a sufficiently long period to include the various
operating conditions that can exist.
• It is assuring not only when a particular relaying equipment trips the proper
breakers when it should for a given fault but also when other relaying
equipments properly refrain from tripping.
• ARE PROTECTIVE PRACTICES BASED ON THE
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE?
• Protective practices are based on the probability of failure
to the extent that present-day practices are the result of
years of experience in which the frequency of failure
undoubtedly has played a part.
• However, the probability of failure seldom if ever enters
directly into the choice of a particular type of relaying
equipment except when, for one reason or another, one
finds it most difficult to apply the type that otherwise would
be used.
• In any event, the probability of failure should be considered
only together with the consequences of failure should it
occur.
• It has been said that the justification for a given practice
equals the likelihood of trouble times the cost of the trouble.
• Regardless of the probability of failure, no portion of a
system should be entirely without protection, even if it is
only back-up relaying.
• PROTECTIVE RELAYING VERSUS A STATION OPERATOR
• Protective relaying sometimes finds itself in competition with station
operators or attendants.
• This is the case for protection against abnormal conditions that develop
slowly enough for an operator to have time to correct the situation before
any harmful consequences develop.
• Sometimes, an alert and skillful operator can thereby avoid having to
remove from service an important piece of equipment when its removal
might be embarrassing; if protective relaying is used in such a situation,
it is merely to sound an alarm.
• To some extent, the preference of relying on an operator has a
background of some unfortunate experience with protective relaying
whereby improper relay operation caused embarrassment; such an
attitude is understandable, but it cannot be supported logically.
• Where quick and accurate action is required for the protection of
important equipment, it is unwise to rely on an operator.
• Moreover, when trouble occurs, the operator usually has other things to
do for which he is better fitted.
• UNDESIRED TRIPPING VERSUS FAILURE TO TRIP
WHEN DESIRED
• Regardless of the rules of good relaying practice, one
will occasionally have to choose which rule may be
broken with the least embarrassment.
• When one must choose between the chance of
undesired or unnecessary tripping and failure to trip
when tripping is desired, the best practice is generally to
choose the former.
• Experience has shown that, where major system
shutdowns have resulted from one or the other, the
failure to trip or excessive delay in tripping-has been by
far the worse offender.
• THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING
• Although a modern power system could not operate without
protective relaying, this does not make it priceless. As in all good
engineering, economics plays a large part.
• Although the protection engineer can usually justify expenditures for
protective relaying on the basis of standard practice, circumstances
may alter such concepts, and it often becomes necessary to
evaluate the benefits to be gained. It is generally not a question of
whether protective relaying can be justified, but of how far one
should go toward investing in the best relaying available.
• Like all other parts of a power system, protective relaying should be
evaluated on the basis of its contribution to the best economically
possible service to the customers.
• The contribution of protective relaying is to help the rest of the power
system to function as efficiently and as effectively as possible in the
face of trouble.
• How protective relaying does this is as follows?
• By minimizing damage when failures occur, protective relaying minimizes:
A. The cost of repairing the damage.
B. The likelihood that the trouble may spread and involve other equipment.
C. The time that the equipment is out of service.
D. The loss in revenue and the strained public relations while the equipment is out
ofservice.
• By expediting the equipment’s return to service, protective relaying helps to
minimize the amount of equipment reserve required, since there is less
likelihood of another failure before the first failure can be repaired.
• The ability of protective relaying to permit fuller use of the system capacity is
forcefully illustrated by system stability.
• Figure 4 shows how the speed of protective relaying influences the amount of
power that can be transmitted without loss of synchronism when short circuits
occur.
• More load can be carried over an existing system by speeding up the protective
relaying. This has been shown to be a relatively inexpensive way to increase the
transient stability limit.
• Where stability is a problem, protective relaying can often be evaluated against
the cost of constructing additional transmission lines or switching stations.
• Other circumstances will be shown later in which certain types of protective-
relaying equipment can permit savings in circuit breakers and transmission lines.
• The quality of the protective-relaying equipment can affect
engineering expense in applying the relaying equipment itself.
• Equipment that can still operate properly when future changes are
made in a system or its operation will save much future engineering
and other related expense.
• One should not conclude that the justifiable expense for a given
protective-relaying equipment is necessarily proportional to the
value or importance of the system element to be directly protected.
• A failure in that system element may affect the ability of the entire
system to render service, and therefore that relaying equipment is
actually protecting the service of the entire system.
• Some of the most serious shutdowns have been caused by
consequential effects growing out of an original failure in relatively
unimportant equipment that was not properly protected.
• HOW DO PROTECTIVE RELAYS OPERATE?
• Thus far, we have treated the relays themselves in a most impersonal
manner, telling what they do without any regard to how they do it.
• This fascinating part of the story of protective relaying will be told in much
more detail later.
• But, in order to round out this general consideration of relaying and to
prepare for what is yet to come, some explanation is in order here.
• All relays used for short-circuit protection, and many other types also,
operate by virtue of the current and/or voltage supplied to them by current
and voltage transformers connected in various combinations to the system
element that is to be protected.
• Through individual or relative changes in these two quantities, failures
signal their presence, type, and location to the protective relays.
• For every type and location of failure, there is some distinctive difference in
these quantities, and there are various types of protective-relaying
equipments available, each of which is designed to recognize a particular
difference and to operate in response to it.
• More possible differences exist in these quantities than one might suspect.
• Differences in each quantity are possible in one or more of the
following:
A. Magnitude.
B. Frequency.
C. Phase angle.
D. Duration.
E. Rate of change.
F. Direction or order of change.
G. Harmonics or wave shape.
• Then, when both voltage and current are considered in combination,
or relative to similar quantities at different locations, one can begin
to realize the resources available for discriminatory purposes.
• It is a fortunate circumstance that, although Nature in her contrary
way has imposed the burden of electric-power-system failure, she
has at the same time provided us with a means for combat.
PROBLEMS

1. Compare protective relaying with insurance.

2. The portion of a power system shown by the one-line diagram of
Fig. 5, with generating sources back of all three ends, has
conventional primary and back-up relaying. In each of the listed
cases, a short circuit has occurred and certain circuit breakers have
tripped as stated. Assume that the tripping of these breakers was
correct under the circumstances. Where was the short circuit? Was
there any failure of the protective relaying, including breakers, and if
so, what failed? Assume only one failure at a time. Draw a sketch
showing the overlapping of primary protective zones and the exact
locations of the various faults. Case Breakers Tripped
a 4, 5, 8
b 3, 7, 8
c 3, 4, 5, 6
d 1, 4, 5, 6
e 4, 5, 7, 8
f 4, 5, 6
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. ÒPower System Fault Control,Ó AIEE Committee Report, AIEE Trans.,
70 (1951),
pp. 410-417.
2. ÒProtective Relay Modernization Program Releases Latent
Transmission Capacity,Ó by M. F. Hebb, Jr., and J. T. Logan, AIEE District
Conference Paper 55-354. ÒPlan System and Relaying Together,Ó Elec.
World, July 25, 1955, p. 86.
3. ÒStandards for Power Circuit Breakers,Ó Publ. SG4-1954, National
Electrical
Manufacturers Association, 155 East 44th St., New York 17, N. Y.
ÒInterrupting Rating Factors for Reclosing Service on Power Circuit
Breakers,Ó Publ. C37.7-1952, American Standards Association, Inc., 70
East 45th St., New York 17, N. Y.
4. Power System Stability, Vol. II, by S. B. Crary, John Wiley & Sons, New
York, 1947.
5. ÒCosts Study of 69- to 345-Kv Overhead Power-Transmission
Systems,Ó by J. G. Holm, AIEE Trans., 63 (1944), pp. 406- 422.
6. ÒA Condensation of the Theory of Relays,Ó by A. R. van C.
Warrington, Gen. Elec. Rev., 43, No. 9 (Sept., 1940), pp. 370-373.
ÒPrinciples and Practices of Relaying in the United States,Ó by E. L.
Harder and W. E. Marter, AIEE Trans., 67, Part II (1948), pp. 1005-1022.
Discussions, pp. 1022-1023. ÒPrinciples of High-Speed Relaying,Ó by W.
A. Lewis, Westinghouse Engineer, 3 (Aug., 1943), pp. 131-134.