CSE 484 / CSE M 584 (Spring 2012)

Intro to Cryptography

Tadayoshi Kohno

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell,
Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...
Goals for Today
 Cryptography

 Also: Lab part 1 due on Friday

• Don’t all increase in complexity
• Read recommended readings
 Symmetric Setting
Both communicating parties have access to a shared
random string K, called the key.

M M
Encapsulate Decapsulate

K K
Alice
Bob
K
K
Adversary
 Asymmetric Setting
Each party creates a public key pk and a secret key sk.

M M
Encapsulate Decapsulate

pkB,skA pkA,skB
pkB
Alice
pkA,skA pkA Bob
pkB,skB
Adversary
Achieving Privacy (Symmetric)
Encryption schemes: A tool for protecting privacy.

M C M
Encrypt Decrypt

K K
Alice
Bob
K
Message . . . . . . . . . . M K
Ciphertext . . . . . . . C Adversary
Achieving Privacy (Asymmetric)
Encryption schemes: A tool for protecting privacy.

M C M
Encrypt Decrypt

pkB skB
pkB
Alice
pkA,skA pkA Bob
Message . . . . . . . . . . M pkB,skB
Ciphertext . . . . . . . C Adversary
Achieving Integrity (Symmetric)
Message authentication schemes: A tool for
protecting integrity.
(Also called message authentication codes or MACs.)

valid/
M T (M,T) invalid
MAC Verify

K K
Alice
Bob
K
Message . . . . . . . . . . M K
Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T Adversary
Achieving Integrity (Asymmetric)
Digital signature schemes: A tool for protecting
integrity and authenticity.

valid/
M T (M,T) invalid
Sign Verify

skA pkA
pkB
Alice
pkA,skA pkA Bob
Message . . . . . . . . . . M pkB,skB
Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T Adversary
 “Random” Numbers
Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs)

R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, ...

PRNG

Machine State
Alice User Input
... Adversary
 Getting keys: PBKDF
Password-based Key Derivation Functions

Password K
PBKDF
(Key check value)

Alice
 Getting keys: CAs
Each party creates a public key pk and a secret key sk.
(Public keys signed by a trusted third party: a certificate
authority.)

M M
Encapsulate Decapsulate

pkB,skA pkA,skB
Alice
Bob
pkA,skA
pkB,skB
pkB, sign(skCA,B,pkB) pkA, sign(skCA, A, pkA)
Adversary
 Getting keys: Key exchange
Key exchange protocols: A tool for establishing a
shared symmetric key from public keys

K K
K.E. K.E.

pkB,skA pkA,skB
pkB
Alice
pkA,skA pkA Bob
pkB,skB
Adversary
One-way Communications
PGP is a good example

Message encrypted under Bob’s public key

Interactive Communications
In many cases, it’s probably a good idea to just use
a standard protocol/system like SSH, SSL/TLS, etc...

Let’s talk securely; here are the algorithms I

understand

I choose these algorithms; start key exchange

Continue key exchange

Communicate using exchanged key

Let’s Dive a Bit Deeper
 One-way Communications
(Informal example; ignoring, e.g., signatures)
1. Alice gets Bob’s public key; Alice verifies Bob’s public key (e.g., via CA)
2. Alice generates random symmetric keys K1 and K2
3. Alice encrypts the message M the key K1; call result C
4. Alice authenticates (MACs) C with key K2; call the result T
5. Alice encrypts K1 and K2 with Bob’s public key; call the result D
6. Send D, C, T
(Assume Bob’s private key is encrypted on Bob’s disk.)
7. Bob takes his password to derive key K3
8. Bob decrypts his private key with key K3
9. Bob uses private key to decrypt K1 and K2
10. Bob uses K2 to verify MAC tag T
11. Bob uses K1 to decrypt C
 Interactive Communications
(Informal example; details omitted)
1. Alice and Bob exchange public keys and certificates
2. Alice and Bob use CA’s public keys to verify certificates and each
other’s public keys
3. Alice and Bob take their passwords and derive symmetric keys
4. Alice and Bob use those symmetric keys to decrypt
and recover their asymmetric private keys.
5. Alice and Bob use their asymmetric private keys and a
key exchange algorithm to derive a shared symmetric key
(They key exchange process will require Alice and
Bob to generate new pseudorandom numbers)
6. Alice and Bob use shared symmetric key to encrypt
and authenticate messages
(Last step will probably also use random numbers; will need
to rekey regularly; may need to avoid replay attacks,...)
What cryptosystems
have you heard of?
(Past or present)
History
 Substitution Ciphers
• Caesar Cipher
 Transposition Ciphers
 Codebooks
 Machines

 Recommended Reading: The Codebreakers by

David Kahn and The Code Book by Simon Singh.
• Military uses
• Rumrunners
• ....
 Classic Encryption

• Goal: To communicate a secret message

• Start with an algorithm

• Caesar cipher (substitution cipher):

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEF
 Then add a secret key

• Both parties know that the secret word is

“victory”:
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
VICTORYABDEFGHJKLMNPQSUWXZ
• “state of the art” for thousands of years
Kerckhoff’s Principle
 Security of a cryptographic object should depend
only on the secrecy of the secret (private) key

 Security should not depend on the secrecy of the

algorithm itself.
 Checkpoint
• Symmetric cryptography
• Both sides know shared key, no one else knows
anything. Can encrypt, decrypt, sign/MAC,
verify
• Computationally lightweight
• Challenge: How do you privately share a key?

• Asymmetric cryptography
• Everyone has a public key that everyone else knows;
and a paired secret key that is private
• Public key can encrypt; only secret key can decrypt
• Secret key can sign/MAC, public key can verify
• Computationally expensive
• Challenge: How do you validate a public key?
 Checkpoint
• Where are public keys from?
• One solution: keys for Certificate
Authorities a priori known by browser, OS,
etc.
• Where are shared keys from?
• In person exchange, snail mail, etc.
• If we have verifiable public/private keys:
key exchange protocol generates a shared
key for symmetric cryptography
 How cryptosystems work today
 Layered approach:
• Cryptographic primitives, like block ciphers, stream ciphers,
hash functions, and one-way trapdoor permutations
• Cryptographic protocols, like CBC mode encryption, CTR mode
encryption, HMAC message authentication
 Public algorithms (Kerckhoff’s Principle)
 Security proofs based on assumptions (not this course)

OCB auth. encryption CBC-MAC auth.

CBC encryption CTR encryption HMAC auth.

block cipher hash functions

 “Old Days” Cryptanalysis and
Probabilities

From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_frequencies
Attack Scenarios for Encryption
 Ciphertext-Only
 Known Plaintext
 Chosen Plaintext
 Chosen Ciphertext (and Chosen Plaintext)

 (General advice: Target strongest level of privacy

possible -- even if not clear why -- for extra
“safety”)
Chosen-Plaintext Attack

PIN is encrypted and

transmitted to bank

encrypt(key,PIN)

key

key
Crook #2 eavesdrops
Crook #1 changes on the wire and learns
his PIN to a number ciphertext corresponding
of his choice to chosen plaintext PIN

… repeat for any PIN value

Attack Scenarios for Integrity
 What do you think these scenarios should be?
One-Time Pad

----- 10111101…
-----
----- = 10111101…
⊕ 10001111… ⊕
= 00110010… 00110010… =

Key is a random bit sequence

as long as the plaintext Decrypt by bitwise XOR of
ciphertext and key:
ciphertext ⊕ key =
Encrypt by bitwise XOR of (plaintext ⊕ key) ⊕ key =
plaintext and key: plaintext ⊕ (key ⊕ key) =
ciphertext = plaintext ⊕ key plaintext
Advantages of One-Time Pad
 Easy to compute
• Encryption and decryption are the same operation
• Bitwise XOR is very cheap to compute
 As secure as theoretically possible
• Given a ciphertext, all plaintexts are equally likely,
regardless of attacker’s computational resources
• …as long as the key sequence is truly random
– True randomness is expensive to obtain in large quantities
• …as long as each key is same length as plaintext
– But how does the sender communicate the key to receiver?
Disadvantages

----- 10111101…
-----
----- = 10111101…
⊕ 10001111… ⊕
= 00110010… 00110010… =

Key is a random bit sequence

as long as the plaintext Decrypt by bitwise XOR of
ciphertext and key:
ciphertext ⊕ key =
Encrypt by bitwise XOR of (plaintext ⊕ key) ⊕ key =
plaintext and key: plaintext ⊕ (key ⊕ key) =
ciphertext = plaintext ⊕ key plaintext

Disadvantage #1: Keys as long as messages.

Impractical in most scenarios
Still used by intelligence communities
Disadvantages

0
----- 10111101…
-----
----- = 10111101… 0
⊕ 10001111… ⊕
= 00110010… 00110010… =

Key is a random bit sequence

as long as the plaintext Decrypt by bitwise XOR of
ciphertext and key:
ciphertext ⊕ key =
Encrypt by bitwise XOR of (plaintext ⊕ key) ⊕ key =
plaintext and key: plaintext ⊕ (key ⊕ key) =
ciphertext = plaintext ⊕ key plaintext

Disadvantage #2: No integrity protection