Unit 4
Unit 4
Digital Evidence, Definition of Digital Evidence, Best Evidence Rule, Original Evidence, Rules
of Digital Evidence, Characteristics of Digital Evidence, Locard’s Exchange Principle, Digital
Stream of bits, Types of evidence, Illustrative, Electronics, Documented, Explainable, Substantial,
Testimonial, Challenges in evidence handling, Authentication of evidence, Chain of custody,
Evidence validation, Volatile evidence.
Digital Evidences:
The field of computer security includes events that provide a successful courtroom experience,
which are both worthwhile and satisfactory. Investigation of a computer security incident leads to
legal proceeding, such as court proceeding, where the digital evidence and documents obtained are
likely used as exhibits in the trial.
To meet the requirements of the judging body and to withstand or face any challenges, it is essential
to follow the evidence-handling procedure. Also, it is necessary to ensure that the evidence-
handling procedures chosen are not difficult to implement at your organization as this can
sometimes become an overhead for an organization.
While investigating a computer security incident, we are sometimes unsure and indecisive whether
an item(viz. a chip, floppy disk, etc)should be considered as an evidence or an attachment or an
addendum.
Digital devices are everywhere in today’s world, helping people communicate locally and globally
with ease. Most people immediately think of computers, cell phones and the Internet as the only
sources for digital evidence, but any piece of technology that processes information can be used
in a criminal way. For example, hand-held games can carry encoded messages between criminals
and even newer household appliances, such as a refrigerator with a built-in TV, could be used to
store, view and share illegal images. The important thing to know is that responders need to be
able to recognize and properly seize potential digital evidence.
Digital evidence or Electronic evidence is any probative information stored or transmitted in digital
form that a party to a court case may use at trial. Before accepting digital evidence a court will
determine if the evidence is relevant, whether it is authentic, if it is hearsay and whether a copy is
acceptable or the original is required.
Digital evidence is also defined as information and data of value to an investigation that is stored
on, received or transmitted by an electronic device. This evidence can be acquired when electronic
devices are seized and secured for examination.
Digital evidence:
❖ Is latent (hidden), like fingerprints or DNA evidence
❖ Crosses jurisdictional borders quickly and easily
❖ Can be altered, damaged or destroyed with little effort
❖ Can be time-sensitive
There are many sources of digital evidence; the topic is divided into three major forensic categories
of devices where evidence can be found: Internet-based, stand-alone computers or devices, and
mobile devices. These areas tend to have different evidence-gathering processes, tools and
concerns, and different types of crimes tend to lend themselves to one device or the other.
Some of the popular electronic devices which are potential digital evidence are: HDD, CD/DVD
media, backup tapes, USB drive, biometric scanner, digital camera, smart phone, smart card, PDA,
etc.
Forms of digital evidence: Text message, emails, pictures, videos and internet searches are most
common types of Digital evidences.
The digital evidence are used to establish a credible link between the attacker, victim, and the
crime scene. Some of the information stored in the victim’s system can be potential digital
evidence, are IP address, system log-in & remote log-in details, browsing history, log files, emails,
images, etc.
Digital Evidences may be in the form:
Email Messages (may be deleted one also)
❖ Office file
❖ Deleted files of all kinds
❖ Encrypted file
❖ Compressed files
❖ Temp files
❖ Recycle Bin
❖ Web History
❖ Cache files
❖ Cookies
❖ Registry
❖ Unallocated Space
❖ Slack Space
❖ Web/E-Mail server access Logs
❖ Domain access Logs
Best Evidence Rule:
The original or true writing or recording must be confessed in court to prove its contents without
any expectations. An original copy of the document is considered as superior evidence.
One of the rules states that if evidence is readable by sight or reflects the data accurately, such as
any printout or data stored in a computer or similar devices or any other output, it is considered as
"original".
It states that multiple copies of electronic files may be a part of the "original" or equivalent to the
"original". The collected electronic evidence is mostly transferred to different media. Hence, many
computer security professionals are dependent on this rule.
Best Evidence: The most complete copy or a copy which includes all necessary parts of evidence,
which is closely related to the original evidence.
Example-A client has a copy of the original evidence media.
The "Best Evidence Rule" says that an original writing must be offered as evidence unless it is
unavailable, in which case other evidence, like copies, notes, or other testimony can be used. Since
the rules concerning evidence on a computer are fairly reasonable (what you can see on the monitor
is what the computer contains, computer printouts are best evidence) computer records and records
obtained from a computer are best evidence.
Original Evidence:
The procedure adopted to deal with a situation or case takes it outside the control of the
client/victim. A case with proper diligence or a case with persistence work will end up in a judicial
proceeding, and we will handle the evidences accordingly.
For this purpose original evidence as the truth or real (original) copy of the evidence media which
is given by victim/client.
We define best incidence as the most complete copy, which includes all the necessary parts of the
evidence that are closely related to the original evidence. It is also called as duplication of the
evidence media. There should be an evidence protector which will store either the best evidence
or original evidence for every investigation in the evidence safe.
Evidence collection should also be performed to ensure that it will withstand legal proceedings.
Key criteria for handling such evidence are as outlined as follows:
1. The proper protocol should be followed for acquisition of the evidence irrespective of
whether it physical or digital. Gentle handling should be exercised for those situations
where the device may be damaged(eg. Dropped or wet).
2. Special handling may be required for some situations. For example, when the device is
actively destroying data through disk formatting, it may need to be shut down immediately
to preserve the evidence. On the other hand, in some situations, it would not be appropriate
to shut down the device so that the digital forensics expert can examine the device’s
temporary memory.
3. All artifacts, physical and/or digital should be collected, retained and transferred using a
preserved chain of custody.
4. All materials should be date and time stamped, identifying who collected the evidence and
the location it is being transported to after initial collection.
5. Proper logs should be maintained when transferring possession.
6. When storing evidence, suitable access controls should be implemented and tracked to
certify the evidence has only been accessed by authorized individuals.
Fig.4.1: Evidence transfer in the physical and digital dimensions helps investigators
establish connections between victims, offenders, and crime scenes.
In computer intrusions, the attackers will leave multiple traces of their presence throughout
the environment, including in the fi le systems, registry, system logs, and network- level
logs. Furthermore, the attackers could transfer elements of the crime scene back with them,
such as stolen user passwords or PII in a file or database. Such evidence can be useful to
link an individual to an intrusion.
In an e-mail harassment case, the act of sending threatening messages via a Web-based e-
mail service such as Hotmail can leave a number of traces. The Web browser used to send
messages will store fi les, links, and other information on the sender’s hard drive along
with date-time–related information. Therefore, forensic analysts may find an abundance of
information relating to the sent message on the offender’s hard drive, including the original
message contents. Additionally, investigators may be able to obtain related information
from Hotmail, including Web server access logs, IP addresses, and possibly the entire
message in the sent mail folder of the offender’s e-mail account.
Chain of Custody:
What Is the Chain of Custody in Computer Forensics?
The chain of custody in digital forensics can also be referred to as the forensic link, the paper trail,
or the chronological documentation of electronic evidence. It indicates the collection, sequence of
control, transfer, and analysis. It also documents each person who handled the evidence, the
date/time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose for the transfer.
The procedure of the chain of custody might be different. depending on the jurisdiction in which
the evidence resides; however, the steps are largely identical to the ones outlined above.
4. Consider the safety of personnel at the scene. It is advisable to always ensure the scene
is properly secured before and during the search. In some cases, the examiner may only
have the opportunity to do the following while onsite:
❖ Identify the number and type of computers.
❖ Determine if a network is present.
❖ Interview the system administrator and users.
❖ Identify and document the types and volume of media, including removable media.
❖ Document the location from which the media was removed.
❖ Identify offsite storage areas and/or remote computing locations.
❖ Identify proprietary software.
❖ Determine the operating system in question.
The considerations above need to be taken into account when dealing with digital evidence due to
the fragile nature of the task at hand.
Chain of custody prevents evidence from being tainted; it thus establishes the trustworthiness
of items brought into evidence. The U.S. legal system wants the proponent of evidence to be able
to demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody for items, he wants to have admitted.
❖ Often, there is a stipulation, for example, when there is an agreement between the parties
or a concession by the opponent of the evidence that allows it to be admitted without
requiring testimony to prove the foundational elements. The purpose of stipulation is to
move the trial quickly forward, without pondering idle questions.
❖ If there is a break in the chain of custody brought to the attention of the court, then the
court has to decide whether the breach is so severe as to meet exclusion of the item from
trial. Alternatively, the court can decide that the Trier (trial judge or jury) need to decide
the value of the evidence. To prevent a breach, a forensic investigation should follow a
written policy, so that necessary deviations of the policy can be argued. The policy itself
should take all reasonable (or arguably reasonable) precautions against tampering.
❖ For example, assume that a PDA is seized from a suspected drug dealer. In the case of an
PDA, there is no hard drive image to mirror, that is, the examination will have to be done
on the powered-on original. The PDA can lose data, for example by disconnecting it from
its battery. On seizure, the device should not be switched on. If it is seized switched on, it
should be switched off in order to preserve battery power. It needs to be put into an
evidence bag that does not allow access to the PDA without breaking the seal (no clear
plastic bag!). The evidence needs to be tagged with all pertinent data, including the serial
number of the PDA and the circumstances of the seizure. The PDA should never be
returned to the accused at the scene, because the device can lose data if reset. To maintain
the data in the PDA, it needs to be kept in a continuously charged mode. It should only be
used to extract evidence by a competent person who can testify in court. As long as the
PDA could be evidence, it needs to be kept in an evidence locker, with check-out logs, so
that it can be determined who had access to the PDA at any time.
Evidence Validation: The challenge is to ensure that providing or obtaining the data that you have
collected is similar to the data provided or presented in court. Several years pass between the
collection of evidence and the production of evidence at a judiciary proceeding, which is very
common. To meet the challenge of validation, it is necessary to ensure that the original media
matches the forensic duplication by using MD5 hashes. The evidence for every file is nothing but
the MD5 hash values that are generated for every file that contributes to the case.
The verify function within the Encase application can be used while duplicating a hard drive with
Encase. To perform a forensic duplication using dd , you must record MD5 hash for both the
original evidence media and binary files or the files which compose the forensic duplication.
Note: Evidence collection calculated by MD5 after 6 months may not be helpful. MD5 hashes
should be performed when the evidence is obtained.
Volatile Evidence: Not all the evidence on a system is going to last very long. Some evidence is
residing in storage that requires a consistent power supply; other evidence may be stored in
information that is continuously changing. When collecting evidence, you should always try to
proceed from the most volatile to the least. Of course, you should still take the individual
circumstances into account— you shouldn’t waste time extracting information from an
unimportant/unaffected machine’s main memory when an important or affected machine’s
secondary memory hasn’t been examined.
You need to respond to the target system at the console during the collection of volatile data rather
than access it over the network. This way the possibility of the attacker monitoring your responses
is eliminated, ensuring that you are running trust commands. If you are creating a forensic
duplication of the targeted system, you should focus on obtaining the volatile system data before
shutting down the system.
To determine what evidence to collect first, you should draw up an Order of Volatility—a list of
evidence sources ordered by relative volatility. An example an Order of Volatility would be:
1. Registers and cache
2. Routing tables
3. Arp cache
4. Process table
5. Kernel statistics and modules
6. Main memory
7. Temporary file systems
8. Secondary memory
9. Router configuration
10. Network topology
Note: Once you have collected the raw data from volatile sources you may be able to
shutdown the system.{Matthew Braid, “Collecting Electronic Evidence After A System
Compromise,” Australian Computer Emergency Response Team}
Registers, Cache: The contents of CPU cache and registers are extremely volatile, since they are
changing all of the time. Literally, nanoseconds make the difference here. An examiner needs to
get to the cache and register immediately and extract that evidence before it is lost.
Routing Table, ARP Cache, Process Table, Kernel Statistics, Memory: Some of these items,
like the routing table and the process table, have data located on network devices. In other words,
that data can change quickly while the system is in operation, so evidence must be gathered
quickly. Also, kernel statistics are moving back and forth between cache and main memory, which
make them highly volatile. Finally, the information located on random access memory (RAM) can
be lost if there is a power spike or if power goes out. Clearly, that information must be obtained
quickly.
Temporary File Systems: Even though the contents of temporary file systems have the potential
to become an important part of future legal proceedings, the volatility concern is not as high here.
Temporary file systems usually stick around for awhile.
Disk: Even though we think that the data we place on a disk will be around forever, that is not
always the case (see the SSD Forensic Analysis post from June 21). However, the likelihood that
data on a disk cannot be extracted is very low.
Remote Logging and Monitoring Data that is Relevant to the System in Question: The
potential for remote logging and monitoring data to change is much higher than data on a hard
drive, but the information is not as vital. So, even though the volatility of the data is higher here,
we still want that hard drive data first.
Physical Configuration, Network Topology, and Archival Media: Here we have items that are
either not that vital in terms of the data or are not at all volatile. The physical configuration and
network topology is information that could help an investigation, but is likely not going to have a
tremendous impact. Finally, archived data is usually going to be located on a DVD or tape, so it
isn’t going anywhere anytime soon. It is great digital evidence to gather, but it is not volatile.
Case Studies:
Case-1: Credit Card Fraud
State : Tamil Nadu
City : Chennai
Sections of Law : Section of Law: 66 of the Information Technology Act 2000 &
120(B), 420,467,468,471 IPC.
Background:
The assistant manager (the complainant) with the fraud control unit of a large business process
outsourcing (BPO) organization filed a complaint alleging that two of its employees had conspired
with a credit card holder to manipulate the credit limit and as a result cheated the company of INR
0.72 million.
The BPO facility had about 350 employees. Their primary function was to issue the bank's credit
cards as well as attend to customer and merchant queries. Each employee was assigned to a specific
task and was only allowed to access the computer system for that specific task. The employees
were not allowed to make any changes in the credit-card holder's account unless they received
specific approvals.
Each of the employees was given a unique individual password. In case they entered an incorrect
password three consecutive times then their password would get blocked and they would be issued
a temporary password.
The company suspected that its employees conspired with the son (holding an add-on card) of one
of the credit card holders. The modus operandi suspected by the client is as follows.
The BPO employee deliberately keyed in the wrong password three consecutive times (so that his
password would get blocked) and obtained a temporary password to access the computer system.
He manually reversed the transactions of the card so that it appeared that payment for the
transaction has taken place. The suspect also changed the credit card holder's address so that the
statement of account would never be delivered to the primary card holder.
Investigation: A procedure to find the Digital Evidence
The investigating team visited the premises of the BPO and conducted detailed examination of
various persons to understand the computer system used. They learnt that in certain situations the
system allowed the user to increase the financial limits placed on a credit card. The system also
allowed the user to change the customer's address, blocking and unblocking of the address,
authorisations for cash transactions etc.
The team analysed the attendance register which showed that the accused was present at all the
times when the fraudulent entries had been entered in the system. They also analysed the system
logs that showed that the accuser's ID had been used to make the changes in the system.
The team also visited the merchant establishments from where some of the transactions had taken
place. The owners of these establishments identified the holder of the add-on card.
Current status: The BPO was informed of the security lapse in the software utilised. Armed with
this evidence the investigating team arrested all the accused and recovered, on their confession,
six mobile phones, costly imported wrist watches, jewels, electronic items, leather accessories,
credit cards, all worth INR 0. 3 million and cash INR 25000. The investigating
team informed the company of the security lapses in their software so that instances like this could
be avoided in the future.
This case won the second runner-up position for the India Cyber Cop Award, for its investigating
officer Mr S. Balu, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crime, Chennai Police. The case was
remarkable for the excellent understanding displayed by the investigating team, of the business
processes and its use in collecting digital evidence.
Background: The complainant stated that some unknown person had created an e-mail ID using
her name and had used this ID to post messages on five Web pages describing her as a call girl
along with her contact numbers.
As a result, she started receiving a lot of offending calls from men.
Investigation: A procedure to find the Digital Evidence
After the complainant heard about the Web pages with her contact details, she created a username
to access and view these pages.
Using the same log-in details, the investigating team accessed the Web pages where these profiles
were uploaded. The message had been posted on five groups, one of which was a public group.
The investigating team obtained the access logs of the public group and the message to identify
the IP addresses used to post the message. Two IP addresses were identified.
The ISP was identified with the help of publicly available Internet sites. A request was made to
the ISPs to provide the details of the computer with the IP addresses at the time the messages were
posted. They provided the names and addresses of two cybercafes located in Mumbai to the police.
The investigating team scrutinised the registers maintained by the cybercafes and found that in one
case the complainant's name had been signed into the register.
The team also cross-examined the complainant in great detail. During one of the meetings, she
revealed that she had refused a former college mate who had proposed marriage.
In view of the above the former college mate became the prime suspect. Using this information
the investigating team, with the help of Mumbai police, arrested the suspect and seized a mobile
phone from him. After the forensic examination of the SIM card and the phone, it was observed
that phone had the complainant’s telephone number that was posted on the internet. The owner of
the cyber cafes also identified the suspect as the one who had visited the cyber cafes.
Based on the facts available with the police and the sustained interrogation the suspect confessed
to the crime.
Current status:The suspect was convicted of the crime and sentenced to two years of imprisonment
as well as a fine.
Background: The accused in the case were working in a BPO, that was handling the business of a
multinational bank. The accused, during the course of their work, had obtained the personal
identification numbers (PIN) and other confidential information of the bank’s customers. Using
these the accused and their accomplices, through different cybercafes, transferred huge sums of
money from the accounts of different customers to fake accounts.
During the investigation, the system server logs of the BPO were collected. The IP addresses were
traced to the Internet service provider and ultimately to the cyber cafes through which illegal
transfers were made.
The registers maintained in cyber cafes and the owners of cyber cafes assisted in identifying the
other accused in the case. The e-mail IDs and phone call printouts were also procured and studied
to establish the identity of the accused. The e-mail accounts of the arrested accused were scanned
which revealed vital information to identify the other accused. Some e-mail accounts of the
accused contained swift codes, which were required for internet money transfers.
All the 17 accused in the case were arrested in a short span of time. The charge sheet was submitted
in the court within the stipulated time. In the entire wire transfer scam, an amount to the tune of
about INR 19 million was transferred, out of this INR 9 million was blocked in
transit due to timely intimation by police, INR 2 million was held in balance in one of the bank
accounts opened by the accused which was frozen. In addition the police recovered cash,
ornaments, vehicles and other articles amounting to INR 3 million.
During the investigation the investigating officer learned the process of wire transfer, the banking
procedures and weakness in the system. The investigating officer suggested measures to rectify
the weakness in the present security systems of the call centre. This has helped the local BPO
industry in taking appropriate security measures.
The investigating team visited the cyber cafŽs but was not able to get the desired logs as they were
not maintained by the cyber cafŽ owners. The investigating team was able to short list the persons
present at cyber cafes when the bookings were made. The respective owners of the cyber cafes
were able to identify two persons who would regularly book railway tickets.
The investigating team then examined the passengers who had travelled on these tickets. They
stated that they had received the tickets from the accused and identified the delivery boy who
delivered the tickets to them. On the basis of this evidence the investigating team arrested two
persons who were identified in an identification parade.
Current status: The charge sheet has been submitted in the court.
Background: The complainant received an obscene e-mail from an unknown e-mail ID. The
complainant also noticed that obscene profiles along with photographs of his daughter had been
uploaded on matrimonial sites.
The investigating officer took the original e-mail from the complainant and extracted the IP
address of the same. From the IP address, he could ascertain the Internet service provider.
The IP address was traced to a cable Internet service provider in the city area of Hyderabad. The
said IP address was allotted to the former husband sometime back and his house was traced with
the help of the staff of ISP.
A search warrant was obtained and the house of the accused was searched. During the search
operation, a desktop computer and a handicam were seized from the premises. A forensic IT
specialist assisted the investigation officer in recovering e-mails (which were sent to the
complainant), using a specialised disk search tool as well as photographs (which had been posted
on the Internet) from the computer and the handicam respectively. The seized computer and the
handicam were sent to the forensic security laboratory for further analysis.
The experts of the forensic security laboratory analysed the material and issued a report stating
that: the hard disk of the seized computer contained text that was identical to that of the obscene
e-mail; the computer had been used to access the matrimonial websites on which the obscene
profiles were posted; the computer had been used to access the e-mail account that was used to
send the obscene e-mail; the handicam seized from the accused contained images identical to the
ones posted on the matrimonial Websites. Based on the report of the FSL it was clearly established
that the accused had: created a fictitious e-mail ID and had sent the obscene e-mail to the
complainant; posted the profiles of the victim along with her photographs on the matrimonial sites.
Current status: Based on the material and oral evidence, a charge sheet has been filed against the
accused and the case is currently pending for trial.