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Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies

Title
Civil Wars and the African Universities: The University of Ibadan
Example, 1967–1970

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https://escholarship.org/uc/item/06k420fc

Journal
Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 40(2)

ISSN
0041-5715

Author
Adedire, Adegboyega A.

Publication Date
2018

DOI
10.5070/F7402040945

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 Civil Wars and the African Universities:
The University of Ibadan Example, 1967–1970

A. Adegboyega Adedire

Abstract
Civil war is not a new phenomenon in Africa. The Nigerian Civil
War of 1967-1970 represents a dark past but provides an intriguing
basis to develop a history that enables us to understand Nige-
ria’s direction. It is against this backdrop that this paper examines
the impact of the Nigerian Civil War on the educational decline
in the University of Ibadan. While some effects were immediate,
such as diminishing student admissions and enrollments, a decline
in postgraduate studies, and the insecurity of lives and property,
other long-term effects manifested themselves after the war include
problems such as displaced families, ethnic chauvinism, and the
reabsorption of the Easterners into the University community. This
work relies heavily on primary sources, archival materials, newspa-
pers, and secondary sources to make its case.
Keywords: civil wars, universities, University of Ibadan, education

War is one of the oldest human activities, so much so that in

contemporary times nations of the world still devote enormous
resources into the prosecution and preparation for it.1 A review
of educational trends since the eighteenth century reveals a rela-
tion between war and education.2 Thomas Goody has argued that
war is an instrument of the national state, while education has
been termed as an instrument of the national will.3 Provincial sat-
isfaction with one’s nation and a smug belief in its superiority or
underestimation as well as contempt for or hatred of others are
often achieved through education.4 On the other hand, the accep-
tance of war as a means of settling interstate conflicts, an arrogant
“lick the enemy,” or “conquer the world” patriotism, and a docile
readiness to obey commands when national leaders decide that
the favorable moment for conflict has arrived are the various atti-
tudes that have been developed in varying degrees by modern

© 2018 A. Adegboyega Adedire Ufahamu 40:2 Summer 2018

114 UFAHAMU

contestants for victory in the race for national supremacy. Every

war is in one sense or another a struggle for liberty; a powerful,
aggressive state wants liberty to expand to fulfill its “destiny,”
while the weak one fights for freedom or for mere survival. The
Romans saw their wars of expansion as a struggle for liberty, even
though others might have to endure slavery.
However, education, in whatever form it might take, plays
a dynamic role in the development of people, societies, and the
world. For Abel Ishumi, education is an instrument of, a pre-
requisite for, and an outcome of any community’s development
process.5 Hence, despite the crucial roles education plays in solv-
ing many developmental problems, it is still plagued by complex
challenges, which are threatening to weaken its continued con-
tribution to development in many places. Historically, civil wars
have been major threats to educational development. In the case
of Nigeria, the Nigerian Civil War of 1967 signaled the beginning
of an era of upheavals in both the university and country.
This research is a historical evaluation of the Nigerian Civil
War and its effects on the University of Ibadan. It interrogates
links between the 1967 Nigerian Civil War and the University of
Ibadan. One cannot understand the University of Ibadan without
taking into account the role of the Nigerian Civil War.6 Ade Ajayi
calls both milestones in Nigerian history.7
Before and during the war, the University was a reflection of
the ills in the larger community, and not an aberration. Thus, an
interrogation of it allows us to re-understand the effect of the war
on a different community—the scholastic one. The impact of the
University’s policies on its community, the problems of displaced
families, ethnic chauvinism, the problem of reabsorption of East-
erners into the University community during and after the war,
and the repatriation of staff and students are worthy of scholarly
consideration.
It is important to understand these milestones within this
period to broaden our horizon on the nexus between the town and
gown, which should reflect the symbiotic relationship that should
exist between the University and its society. Also of great impor-
tance are the roles of University staff as experts and advisers,
through teaching and research, in identifying and finding solutions
to the problems of their nations. The study of history provides a
solid foundation for understanding the problems of social and
 Adedire 115

economic development. In any case, history provides the basic

foundational structure from which other disciplines take off.8
Moreover, the position of Slavoj Zizek becomes appropri-
ate here when he stated that some “lost causes” may deserve our
renewed attention. He argued that the failed revolutionary move-
ments of the past- Jacobinism, Leninism, Stalism and Maoism
- need to be revisited so that their ‘redemptive’ and ‘revolutionary’
kernels can be separated from their ‘totalitarian’ shells.9 In view of
Zizek’s position, an understanding of the “lost causes,” that is, the
Biafra revolution in relation to the University of Ibadan, deserves
our renewed attention so that the “redemptive” kernels can be
separated from its rebellious shell.
Furthermore, the literature has paid little attention to the
role of the University of Ibadan and its attendant effect on the
Nigerian Civil War. The works of Nwaka (2011), Oparah (2014),
Oyeweso (1992), and Osaghae (2002),10 etc., have contributed
immensely to the historicity of the Nigerian Civil War. For exam-
ple, The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath,11 edited by Eghosa
Osaghae, adopts a thematic approach in its interrogation of the
Nigerian Civil War. The Nigerian Civil War, which remains a
watershed in the history of Nigeria, has in turn affected almost
every aspect of Nigerian life in terms of ethnicity, federalism,
national question, marginalization, and the like. Eghosa’s work
attempts to shed light on the varied issues that have emerged after
the war. Though it provides a footing for the historiography of the
war, which will aid this study, it did not examine the role played by
the Unversity of Ibadan vis-à-vis the war, which is a gap that this
research intends to fill.
In a similar vein, in his book on the Nigerian civil war, the
military and strategic studies expert Siyan Oyeweso12 provides a
good background to understanding the war from divergent points
of view, ranging from historical to the fictional aspect, as reflected
in the authorship’s background. Oyeweso argues that it was as
a response to his duty as an historian to record the recent past.
The book is a departure from the norm, dealing with the relations
between Nigeria and France during the war and dramatis personae
involved in the war. However, it has failed to address issues as
regards education and its impact during the civil war years, which
is a gap my research intend to fill.
116 UFAHAMU

A review of this existing literature reveals that a gap needs to

be filled in the political history of Nigeria with the experience of
the premier University of Ibadan. Within the Nigerian Civil War
historiography, the role of the University of Ibadan is omitted.

1966 Coup d’état in Nigeria and the University of Ibadan

The first coup in the history of Nigeria occurred on January 15,
1966, when a group of young army officers, largely with the rank
of Major, attempted to take over the government of the coun-
try. According to the leaders of the failed coup, their object was
patriotic—it was to clean up the messy Nigerian political table.13
They promised radical reform and called for death sentences for a
variety of crimes ranging from corruption, bribery, and subversion
to rape and homosexuality. The effort was code-named Operation
Damisa (“Leopard”).14 But the manner of casualties of that effort
generated disbelief for the coup plotters15 because the January
coup left the dangerous impression that its leaders—mainly from
the Igbo ethnic group—were out to destroy the Republic’s first
government, led by the Northerners, in order to pave the way for
Igbo political ascendancy.16 It thus brought into play the decision
to abolish the regions and their powers of autonomy, setting into
motion a constitutional crisis about how Nigeria was to be gov-
erned, a crisis that continues until today.
The rioting in the north was a result of the promulgation
of Decree 34. Still resentful over the killing of political leaders
and frightened by the disappearance of their autonomy, northern
officers staged a revenge coup on 29 July 1966, in Ibadan, where
Ironsi had gone to open a conference of traditional rulers. This led
to the killing of Ironsi and his host, the Military Governor of West-
ern Region, Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi. Ten other military officers,
nine of the Igbo or Easterners,17 were killed in the counter-coup,
which was code-named “Operation Araba” (“Sucession”).18 The
code name was suggestive of the fact that those who planned the
operation thought in terms of the North seceding from Nigeria,
which was a replay of threats to secede earlier in 1953, following a
motion passed by the delegates of the West that the independence
of Nigeria should be granted by 1956. This was objected to by the
northern delegates, and the Sardauna of Sokoto in the aftermath
of this regretted the amalgamation as the “mistake of 1914” and
 Adedire 117

even threatened secession because he perceived that the North

was at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the South.19 Earlier in 1948, the
North also showed signs that they wanted to be left alone, and
they were honest about this when Mallam Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, who subsequently became Prime Minister of Nigeria, said:
Many Nigerians deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria
is one . . . this is wrong.20
This time around, there was no sign of readiness to secede, as no
decision about who was to replace Ironsi was made. Brigadier
Ogundipe, a Yoruba, was the most senior military officer, but he
could not assume leadership because of his inability to command
the loyalty of the majority of the officers and men who were of
Northern origin.21 In the long run, it was Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon
who emerged as the new military Head of State.
With the pogrom in the North, Ojukwu was forced to order
the Easterners to return to their place of origin.22 This saw the
mass movement of Easterners from the North, and in the south,
equally venomous attacks were made on the Northerners in the
press as many migrated from different parts of the country. Many
likened the massacre of Easterners to that directed against the
Israelites. They opined:
It was in this kind of catastrophe, massacre, persecution that
the Israelities had to go home and to found what is now
known as Israel in November 1947.
They added:
Israel today is a mighty nation . . . and Eastern Nigeria will
emerge out of this catastrophes one of the strongest . . .23
Others saw it as a call to safety. This was reflected in the interac-
tions of a fleeing Easterner who was believed to be a top civil
servant in Lagos. He succinctly puts it: “Our lives and proper-
ties are not in any way safe as far as we remain in Lagos. The
murderers do not ring bell before their illegal act.”24 Despite this
variant view, another school of thought saw it as a call for regional
development. This was observed in the interactions of two legal
luminaries. They stated: “Now that we have been driven home, we
have to remain in the east to develop our own region instead of
going out to develop other regions.25 The killing in the North in
118 UFAHAMU

September 1966 was an important factor in the events that put a

wedge between the regions. It helped transform secession from a
contingency plan into inevitability.26 The coup and counter-coup
of 1966 greatly altered the political equation and destroyed the
fragile trust existing among the major ethnic groups. By the end
of 1966, the country seems to have settled on the brink of collapse
with the isolation of the East.
However, prior to the official announcement of the coup by
University authorities, students and staff members who heard it
on the radio celebrated the announcement with relief. Nobody
saw any ethnic tone in the coup. Subsequently, when the univer-
sity bulletin announced that the Premiers of the Northern and
Western Regions had been killed, but the Eastern Premier had
not been, some grew suspicious that ethnicity played a role in
the coup. The bulletin, however, made it clear that the situation
in Ibadan (Western region) was calm and that everybody should
remain on campus for as long as possible.27 The selective killings of
the Premiers made many argue that the coup had an ethnic tone.
The consequence for the University of Ibadan was that Alhaji Sir
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Northerner who serves as the Pre-
mier of Northern Nigeria and the Chancellor of the University,
was killed, and Nnamdi Azikiwe (an Easterner) as the Visitor of
the university, had lost his office as the President of Nigeria. In the
light of this, many perceived suspicions that University of Ibadan
academics of Eastern origin may have been associated with the
coup.28 Unluckily for Kenneth Onwuka Dike, the Vice Chancel-
lor and of Eastern origin, he was away on leave of absence from
the university, which prompted many of his colleagues to claim
that he was aware of an impending coup, alleging that this was
the reason he took his leave of absence prior to the coup. Thus,
upon the completion of his leave, he requested an extension.29 In
the same vein, it was well reported that the officials of the Com-
monwealth Relation Office (CRO) heard about Kenneth Dike’s
planned meeting with Ironsi in London as an academic pretext.
Some records available in the CRO offices reveal that officials
were interested in Dike’s “reputed closeness to Ironsi,”30 which
further underscores his awareness of the coup.
Furthermore, as the coup was alluded to as an ethnic one,
the stories of the massacre of thousands of innocent Easterners
were on the increase. A Sierra Leonean living in Northern Nigeria
 Adedire 119

commented that “the mass killing of the Igbo in the north has
become a state industry in Nigeria.”31 Orjinta, a civil war scholar,
also argued that the “horror of the massacre surpasses the atroci-
ties of Hitler.”32 The subsequent reaction of demonstrators in the
Western Region accompanied the singing and shouting anti-Ibo
songs such as “Ibo must go,” “Go and meet Ojukwu,” and “No
more place for the Ibos here.”33 In addition,the July counter-coup
raised fears and suspicions among residents of Eastern Nigeria,
which had its own fair share of the university community. This
led to the mass exodus of students and staff with their families.34
Among these was F.A.O. Udekwu, a Senior Lecturer in Surgery,
I.O.K. Udeozo, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Chemical
Pathology,35 S.J. Akpakip, the Assistant Librarian, W.O. Ikpasa,
Junior Research Fellow in N.I.S.E.R,36 and Mr. Anele of the Estab-
lishment Office, just to mention a few.37 Also, the Pro-Chancellor
and Chairman of Council, Sir Louis Mbanefo, resigned on April
22, 1967, and was immediately replaced with Sir Samuel Manuwa,
effective from May 18, 1967.38 In a letter to the Chancellor of
the University, Sir Kashim Ibrahim, dated April 18,1967, Louis
Mbanefo (an Easterner) wrote from his Enugu residence:
My dear Chancellor,
The national crisis has reached such a stage that I feel I
cannot usefully continue in my post as Chairman of Council
of the University of Ibadan. Since the national crisis began
in August last year I have held on to my post in the hope
that a solution would be found which would make it possible
for me to continue to carry on effectively as Chairman of
Council. That has not happened. I feel that in the present situ-
ation when all dialogues likely to lead to a solution appear to
be making no progress, it would be foolhardy on my part to
think I could continue to be effective in the discharge of my
duties as Chairman. I have, therefore, very regretfully come
to the conclusion that I must resign my appointment as Pro-
Chancellor and Chairman of Council of the University with
effect from the 22nd April, 1967.
He added:
I am painfully aware that this is, perhaps, not the proper time
to relinquish my appointment when the Council is engaged
with the problem of finding a Vice-Chancellor, but consider-
ing all circumstances I am convinced that I should not delay
my decision any longer. I am addressing a letter to you on the
120 UFAHAMU

stage reached by Council and Senate in the appointment of

a Vice-Chancellor. My association with the University, from
its inception, has been a happy one and I shall continue to
watch its progress with keen interest. I take this opportu-
nity to express my gratitude and appreciation to member of
Council with whom I have worked and whose loyalty and co-
operation I have come to value.39
Furthermore, the Vice Chancellor, who was on leave of absence,
never returned. The indefatigable John Harris, the then Librar-
ian and Deputy Vice-Chancellor, acted as Vice-Chancellor from
the summer of 1966 until early 1968.40 Many Easterners never
returned, as the crisis became a Civil War that lasted for three
years. Most of the academics from the Eastern region acquired
lecturing jobs at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka; also, a good
number of the students who fled to “safety” across the Niger were
drafted into the Biafran army immediately. However, while people
from the East left the university amid fear and suspicion, few from
the West returned to their ancestral homes for fear that they might
be killed. Afterward, they returned to the University. On the other
hand, the mid-Westerners, who were regarded as “strangers” in
that part of the region and who did not constitute a major ethnic
group, were determined to stay in the university no matter what
the situation might become.

Nigerian Civil War and the University of Ibadan

Administration
With the commencement of the Nigerian Civil War, one of the
immediate impacts of the war was on the University of Ibadan
administration. This came under intense pressure as a result of
staffing. This was openly adumbrated by Harris, the acting Vice-
Chancellor of the University at the graduation ceremony. He
stated thus:
Already we had lost our Chancellor and visitor. We then
found ourselves without most of the Chief Officers of a
University, we had no Vice-Chancellor, and we were with-
out the services of a Registrar, a Deputy Registrar, and even
an Academic Secretary. Two of the largest halls of residence
comprising a thousand students were without their Wardens,
one faculty has no Dean, and four departments have no
 Adedire 121

heads. In the course of the session, some forty other teaching

staff deserted us. It is a tribute to the nature of University
organisation in general and to our own constitution in par-
ticular that Ibadan withers the storm.41
The Pro-Chancellor and Chairman of Council, Sir Samuel
Manuwa, gave a similar speech in 1968:
Many of those in higher posts who were left to carry on were
obliged to do so in various acting capacities: acting Vice-
Chancellor, acting Deputy Vice-Chancellor, acting Registrar,
acting Deputy Registrar.42
The university was understaffed, resulting in the appoint-
ments of two professors as assistants to the Vice-Chancellor.
Professor J.F. Ade-Ajayi was appointed as the assistant on aca-
demic matters, particularly academic planning for development,
and Professor D.H. Irvine as the assistant on administration with
special reference to matters on halls of residence.43 Moreover,
other senior administrative officers were also appointed tempo-
rarily as Registrars and department heads. In Oloruntimehin’s
view, he maintained that some of the posts were later made per-
manent because some fleeing staff had sent resignation letters, and
other positions were advertised in the course of the session.44 This
enabled the Council to take a position on the issue of salary pay-
ment to absconders until the end of March 1967; afterwards, their
appointment would have been terminated.
The postgraduate school established in 1955 felt the impact
of the mass staff exodus. The economy was shattered, postgradu-
ate students could not afford tuition, and many talented faculty
had departed. Ade-Ajayi argued that many students educated at
the University of Ibadan or abroad could not get jobs in Nigeria
due to the country’s economic situation, resulting in a postgradu-
ate admission decline. This led to a reliance on undergraduate
programmes.45
Ade-Ajayi also contended that despite the dwindling of post-
graduate activities, the university broadened its scope beyond the
production of university teachers.46 For example, there was a keen
interest in the development of postgraduate diplomas and profes-
sional training in the field of medicine.
The National University Commission recommended
that a minimum of 10,000 undergraduate students be enrolled
122 UFAHAMU

in Nigerian universities by October 1967. Ibadan was given an

admission quota of 3,012. UI had to increase its enrollment from
1,800 in October 1962 to 3,000 in October 1964. Despite failing to
meet the new requirement, from 1964 to 1966, student enrollment
increased by 60 percent between 1961/62 and 1966/67.47 Therefore,
the sharp drop in student enrollments to 2,569 in October due to
the Civil War was not that large, constituting only 6.7 percent.48
In Okedara’s perspective, while many students left during
the war, many returned after the war to complete their degrees.
At UI, returning students impacted the daily life of the university.
Thus, it extended its registration period to both new and return-
ing students until November 1966. While the crises continued to
threaten the lives and property of non-Eastern Nigerians in the
Eastern region, Col. Ojukwu’s stance compelled many students at
UI to return home. In Harris’s words, “the University of Ibadan
remains what it has always been, a University of and for Nigeria.
Others may claim the name but we maintain the reality.”49 In April
1967, despite 270 students leaving UI to return home, 111 students
(104 from Nsukka and 7 from Ahmadu Bello, respectively) were
admitted, bringing the total number of students enrolled for the
1966-1967 session to just short of 340.50
A case in point was K.P.E. Odili, a student displaced by the
war from University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Odili was on a scholar-
ship from the Ministry of Education, Benin, and had successfully
completed two academic sessions. He wrote to the Head of
Department of Modern Languages at UI to ask if he could trans-
fer to complete his program in French and German. The Registry
of the Undergraduate Admission Division gave his application
considerable attention.51
On the other hand, 12 prospective students from Calabar in
the Southeastern part of the country were unable to take up their
places in the University of Ibadan as a result of a lack of trans-
portation facilities from Calabar to Lagos. These students were
Emmanuel E. Edem, Emmanuel Ndem, Emmanuel E. Asuquo,
Peter E. Ekpo, Nfon Asanga, Bassey H. Bassey, Erete Ikpeme, E.
Orok, Augustine Mfon, Magaret Nakanda, Emmanuel Onoyom,
and Eugenia Bassey. The incident was brought to the University’s
attenion by E.E. Esua, a Federal Ministry of Education official,
who suggested ways to tackle the issue. He stated:
 Adedire 123

It is a fact that the present academic year is far advanced, but

you are well aware that a disappointment of this character
usually demoralizes an intending student and might blast his
prospect for life. I should be grateful if you could request
the Federal Military Government to provide such transport
facilities to these intending students as will enable them to
travel to Ibadan so that they could embark upon direct read-
ing in the library without waiting for the next session. The
local situation in Calabar is such that many houses have been
destroyed in consequences of the battle there, so that these
intending students can find nothing useful to be engaged in
except to loaf about and be demoralised.52
This situation prompted a letter by the Vice Chancellor to Lt.-Col.
B. Adekunle, the General Officer Commanding, Third Division, of
the Nigerian Army in Calabar, requesting that the Commanding
Officer authorise the departure of these students from Calabar
and to help arrange for moving them by means of any available
military aircraft to Lagos as soon as the military situation makes it
possible.53 In a reply to the Vice Chancellor’s letter, E.J. Utuk, the
Assistant Secretary to the Military Governor of the Southeastern
state, maintained that “admission for the affected students for
the current session is impossible because he has been informed
by different universities not to send any more candidates for the
1967/1968 academic year as it is now late for such admission.”54A
different twist was added to the whole scenario when in a private
memo to the Vice Chancellor, a senior member of the Registry,
A.M. Babalola, advised:
We will be setting a dangerous precedent because we will in
effect be committing ourselves to offering admission to the
people concerned and we are not sure of their qualification.
We will also be obliged to provide them accommodation and
boarding. If we do, who will pay for them?55
The Vice Chancellor, Professor T.A. Lambo, finally laid the matter
to rest in his reply to E.E. Esua. He stated:
To assist the students, I would have agreed to request the Fed-
eral Military Government to provide them transport facilities
to Ibadan so that they can start reading against next ses-
sion. But there are many implications if we take this action.
One of this is that once we request the Military authorities
124 UFAHAMU

to transport them to Ibadan, in fact we are not sure of their

academic qualifications. In addition, we will be obliged to
provide them with boarding facilities for which someone
would have to pay. As you probably know, our University is
going through a most critical financial strain and we will not
be able to provide such boarding facilities to the affected stu-
dents. . . . It is with regret that I have to say that I cannot meet
your requests. I wish I could be of help to you.56
Despite the aforementioned development, 766 students joined in
1967. Of these, 558 were from the western region, while only 13
were Igbo. The others came from different parts of the country.57
Also, Yoruba students occupied the spaces left by fleeing Eastern-
ers, which also coincided with the Adamolekun’s reinstatement as
the Registrar in November 1967, five years after his battle with his
boss, Kenneth Dike.58 This signaled the beginning of Yoruba domi-
nation at the University of Ibadan.
Additionally, the Civil War depleted the university’s finances.
Lambo publicly bemoaned on Foundation Day celebration the
university’s financial state:
The most crucial drawback has been one and for three and a
half years to nearly four years in the university we have been
operating standstill budgets. This has had a most incapaci-
tating and disturbing effect not only on the progress of the
university but on the morale of the staff, intellectual quest
and enquiries, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, the
training of young men and women, the inherent capacity for
institutional growth may be incapacitated by lack of funds.59
The issue of funding was so critical that it affected the university’s
postgraduate programmes and other developmental programmes.
Consequently, Lambo sought funds from international agencies.60
While some gave financial support, others offered their support in
the form of staffing. The financial milieu was so strong that vacan-
cies had to be frozen until more funds were made by the Federal
Military Government.61
Describing the situation as tragic, Bolanle Awe, a former
member of staff at the university of Ibadan, stated that it became
challenging to members of staff because they had to shoulder
unusually heavy teaching loads and other commitments—a situa-
tion that was not conducive for research endeavors.
 Adedire 125

UI’s inability to support indigent students was also called

into question, as there was a usual practice of setting up a Spe-
cial Loan Fund for financially destitute students in 1965.62 But
with the lack of funds, it became increasingly apparent that many
students would not take their exams due to their financial status.
This led the University authority to recommend students to the
Federal Government for assistance under the Indigent Students’
Scheme.63 Unfortunately, the FMG could not provide succor, and
by March 1968, the university listed 43 students as indebted and
thus unable to take their forthcoming exams. This included post-
graduates.64 As a result, Ibadan’s prestige did not solely attract
international donors. This led the Vice Chancellor to travel abroad
often for funds.65

Nigerian Civil War and Academic Life in the University of

Ibadan
The Nigerian Civil War also impacted the university academically.
20,000 people lived in the residential areas before the Civil War.
Olatunji Oloruntimehin opines that different regional groups were
suspicious of each other, and feared that the Midwesterners were
infiltrators or collaborators.66 The Midwesterners, however, argued
that their region had being playing the role of mediator during the
war. Conspirator accusations led to deaths. Soldiers shot dead two
Midwestern students, prompting the students to seek protection
from the Military Governor of the Western state, Brigadier (Later
Major-General) Adeyinka Adebayo. Adebayo urged them to be
law-abiding and arranged for their placement at either the Liberty
Stadium or at the University of Ibadan for their safety.67 Okudu,
an alumnus Registrar and a Midwesterner, opined that the reac-
tion of the Western region’s Governor suggested that he thought
that the students were actually collaborators or saboteurs.68 Still,
Igbo students had it worse.
The remaining Igbo students were constantly under suspi-
cion and fear. The campus security situation became so intense
that Harris publicly lamented that “one of the major problems
has been the number of Ibos, mostly western Ibos, still employed
here. They are a considerable source of anxiety because their
presence arouses strong feelings.”69 The terror forced the school
authorities to issue a bulletin to urge their staff to stay in Ibadan,
126 UFAHAMU

and for students to carry out their work without any fear. The
Military Area Commander for Ibadan Province supported Har-
ris’s position:
It has been brought to the notice of the Military Area Com-
mander for Ibadan Province that a number of citizens of
Ibadan have been moving out of the city and taking their
property and family to their place of origin in fear that there
were some plans by certain groups of individuals to attack
them. The Military Area Commander wishes to assure all
citizens that there is no plan or design to attack any group
or persons from a particular area of the Republic. It is the
responsibility of the forces of law and order to ensure ade-
quate protection to all citizens, irrespective of their places of
origin, and all the Military personnel wishes to assure all and
sundry that military and police personnel are being deployed
throughout Ibadan and environs to assure that adequate and
effective protection is ensured to all law-abiding citizens.70
Once the military commander’s position was aired on radio, the
university gave a standing order that staff and students should
continue with their normal activities.71 General Gowon, who vis-
ited the university, also tried to dissuade people from leaving the
university. He reiterated the FMG’s position to keep Ibadan and
other universities safe for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic
origin.72 This led to UI being placed under military guard amid
fears of enemy subversion.
Thus, a local Civil Defence Group was formed. This was
partly to alert members of the university community on the need
for vigilance. It was also to involve them in tackling the problem
of security and civil defense on campus, and thus discourage pur-
poseless panic. This afforded members of staff the opportunity to
volunteer to be part of these vigilante groups. This was subject
to the approval of John Harris, who then issued identity cards to
individuals. The duty of the Civil Defense Group also included
accompanying members of the Armed Forces when carrying out
spot checks and patrols at night. The husband of a lecturer in the
University of Ibadan, Bolanle Awe, was among those who vol-
unteered. The lecturer expressed her fear—one shared by many
in her shoes—of what might possibly happen to her husband, an
“untrained military personnel,” in case of any imminent attack.
 Adedire 127

According to her, she stayed all night until his arrival each time he
went out on patrol duty.73
As the situation continued to be intense, it came to the
notice of the University authorities that accommodation that was
meant for the sole use of members of staff and their dependents
were sublet to other people to bring additional income to such
members of staff. This act was most glaring especially in Abadina
quarters were non-academic staff mostly resided. The situation
prompted University management to order the filling of a form
to gather data on every household, which was required to be sub-
mitted through the Heads of Department before 5 p.m. on Friday,
August, 1967. Non-compliance with the directive could result in
possible eviction from the staff quarters. For the senior mem-
bers of staff who were absent from the University, the Heads of
Department were responsible for the provision of information on
their behalf.74
The step taken by the University as regards the abuse of
University accommodation was made available to occupants in
which the University authority argued that “it is essential in this
period of national emergency to ensure that university hous-
ing is not used to harbor people who, known or unknown to the
householders, may be potential risks to security.”75 In the same
vein, householders who have other dependents besides a limited
number of children below the age of 15 were asked to declare
their name, status and place of origin of those dependents. The
possible reason for this action was due to the fact that the Univer-
sity had the right to limit the number of such dependants.
The directive of the University led to the compilation of
the list of staff members, which revealed the addresses of those
residing on campus. For instance, A.L. Mabogunje of the Faculty
of Arts resided then at 2 Ebrohimie Road, R.A. Adeleye, Flat
1 Block 1, Phillipson Road, O Ikime, Flat 4 Block 5, Phillipson
Road, and O. Aboyade from the Faculty of Social Sciences resided
at 10 Pepple Road, E.U Essien-Udom, Flat 4 No. 4 Barth Road,
just to mention a few.76 After the compilation, a thorough search
was carried out to flush out illegal residence. It is important to
note at this point that nobody was exempted from the search by
the security personnel including Harris, the acting Vice Chancellor
and his deputies. This was made clear in an official bulletin issued
form the Vice Chancellor’s office, stating:
128 UFAHAMU

In this period of emergency, we must expect such check,

and it is a good thing that to emphasize that none of us is
exempted from this. It is meant for the security of our lives
and property. We are in duty bound to cooperate fully with
the police in such matters. For our parts, we are considering
various measures to further strengthen security on the com-
pound both to reassure all law abiding citizens and to deter or
detect potential saboteurs.77
Furthermore, the Acting Vice Chancellor attributed the actions of
his administration to the prevalence of fear and suspicion which
had become the order of the day as a result of lack of communica-
tion. To tackle this and at the same time calm the nerves of staff
and students alike, the publishing of an official weekly bulletin
was introduced. The Official Bulletin first appeared on Octo-
ber 15, 1966, and its aim, according to Olatunji Oloruntimehin,
was to provide factual information to the University community
specifically and to the society at large on past, current, and forth-
coming events.78
The first set of the bulletins signed by John Harris was a step
in the right direction to bridging the communication gap between
his office and the larger University community and dispelling
rumors.79 The messages featured in the bulletins were appropri-
ately captioned under various headings. For instance, The Bomb
that Never Was: A Tale of Horror with a Happy Ending, was
intended to dispel rumors that a time bomb has been planted on
the campus, which was like a soothing balm to the University com-
munity when the bulletin was released. Also, when it was rumored
that the university has opened its gates indiscriminately to Igbo,
the Official Bulletin under the caption “Rumours” stated:
May I repeat that there is no truth in the rumour still cir-
culating on the campus that we have opened our gates
indiscriminately to Ibos. After the weekend, when quite a
number of our workers were molested in town, a total of 34
workers who previously lived outside were allocated avail-
able accommodation at Abadina. Like everybody else, they
were subjected to security checks. In addition, we have insti-
tuted regular checks to ensure that only bona fide workers
and their genuine dependents are allowed to stay on the
compound. Instead of trying to create alarm, any members
of the University can check on these facts and establish, for
 Adedire 129

example, that there is no truth in allegations that workers

have been allocated accommodation in any of the halls.80
The bulletins were not just released to dispel rumors but also to
provide the university with the true picture of the situation on
campus. Furthermore, when the situation intensified, individuals
exploited this avenue for stealing and disguising themselves as
security personnel. The Official Bulletin kept its pace by providing
the required advice and instruction to combat such crises under
headings like Burglaries, Thieves and Bogus Policemen. To this
end, it is one of the legacies of the Vice-Chancellor’s office.
Furthermore, vehicle movement was also was also given
adequate attention by school authorities. This was necessary to
combat theft and for such vehicles not to be used as an avenue to
convey materials detrimental to the security of life and property
of members of the University community. This led the authori-
ties to declare:
With effect from 7 a.m. on Friday, 1 September, all cars enter-
ing the University campus by the Main Gate or the University
of Ife Gate will have to be checked and certified by the
Estate Officer as belonging to the University or to a member
of our staff. Every car owner who qualifies for this exemption
should, before 5 p.m. on Thursday, 31 August, return the form
attached listing the type and registration numbers of the car.
This applies to both personal and departmental cars. Our reg-
ister will include only cars to whose ownership we can testify.
Let me emphasis that this exempts such cars only from being
checked in and out of the register at the gates. ALL vehicles
entering the University remain subject to security checks.81
While this measure was appropriate in the record for entries
of cars in and out of the University, it also enabled the University
to have on register the number of cars owned by the University
and members of staff alike. This is also another enduring legacy
the University maintained and improved upon to this day since
the period of the Civil War.
In the midst of the security threat, Harris was away from the
University until January 1968.82 Rather than allow fears to befall
the University community with the absence of the Vice Chan-
cellor, Professor Ade-Ajayi was appointed to act on his behalf,
who brought his dexterity to play amidst the crisis. One his major
130 UFAHAMU

actions was the implementation of curfew on campus in specific

areas that were declared out of bounds between 7 p.m and 6 a.m.
This was to restrict the movement of people from one part of the
University to the other as a result of the increasing fear of infil-
tration of Midwesterners. Ade-Ajayi, the Acting Vice-Chancellor,
made this known while updating members of Senior Staff on hol-
idays abroad:
From the point of the view of the University, the most impor-
tant effect of the Midwest coup is the fear of infiltration into
and sabotage within the Western state. This has heightened
suspicion about possible disloyalty among Igbo members of
the community and has called for increased vigilance to pre-
vent hostility against Ibos developing into molestation as well
as to ensure that infiltrators and saboteurs are not harbored.
For these reasons, a curfew has been imposed on Ibadan from
9 p.m. to 6 a.m. and vehicles are not allowed into the town
after 7 p.m. There is an also increased check at our Main Gate
as well as police and army patrols on the campus at night with
occasional checks on houses. A Civil Defense group has been
formed to assist the police and the army on these checks.83
Because the University was on holiday, some members of staff
had travelled out of the country and had to rely heavily on foreign
news for information. The quantum of letters received by the Vice
Chancellor’s office inquiring about the safety of Ibadan precipi-
tated the above explanation by the Vice Chancellor to keep them
informed about events going on in their University.
Some of the places that were placed under restriction
included the Library and Arts Building, Science Faculty Building,
Pre-Medical and Agricultural Faculty Building and the National
Archives. Not only were patrol men available at these areas but
also military sentries were stationed there throughout the curfew
period. For the rest of the campus, there was no such curfew, but a
caveat was added to it. It stated:
In the general interest, everyone is advised as far as possible
to observe the same hour as the official Ibadan curfew even
on the campus, i.e. 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. This means that people
are advised to stay indoors during these hours unless they
have specific and legitimate business outside. Anyone can be
challenged to explain his mission during those hours, and the
patrolmen and military sentries can detain suspicious people
 Adedire 131

for questioning. Anyone found loitering will be arrested;

those whose duties on the campus necessitate being regularly
out of doors after 9 a.m. are advised to contact Estate Officer
for passes.84
Recounting his experiences as a University teacher, Tekena
Tamuno posited that staff before the national crisis virtually lived
in lecture rooms, laboratories and libraries. The scholarly burning
of the proverbial midnight oil held no fear of armed robberies and
other violent crimes in the University campus. The atmosphere
was not one of panic but was pervaded by a vital ingredient of
peace in the residential and academic areas, a peace that engen-
dered opportunities for sober intellectual pursuits. However, with
the then security threats, members of staff found it difficult to stay
in academic areas at night, as it was their usual practice to read
and work overnight in their offices, laboratories, and libraries.85
However, while the curfew lasted, there were complaints about
the behaviors of soldiers on the University campus. This arose as
a result of incidents that indicated that the soldiers themselves did
not understand the clear terms of their duties. Therefore, there
was the need for the Vice Chancellor to reiterate his position to
them so that they would have a clear understanding of their mis-
sion on campus. He outlined their duties as follows:
1. The sole aim of the small detachment of troops on the campus
is to guard essential and clearly defined buildings and watch
various footpaths leading into the campus. It is essential that
this should continue to be done in the present circumstances.
2. The soldiers have no business within the residential areas
of the university campus; they have no business enforcing
black out regulations. They have no business with conducting
searches or enforcing curfew. These are essentially the duties
of the police and the Civil Defense Group.
3. There is no curfew in the University compound outside the
clearly defined prohibited areas.
He further added that:
I have the assurance of the area commander and other army
officers in charge of the detachment here, as well as of the
N.C.O., that the ideas enunciated above are clearly under-
stood by the soldiers on the campus and that they will be
observed. I will be grateful to have clear and precise infor-
mation about any possible future incidents that seem to
132 UFAHAMU

contravene these principles. I am anxious that, in spite of the

emergency, life on campus remain normal. There is no reason
why members of staff should feel bottled-up or feel unable
to visit friends on the campus or the Senior Staff Club after
9 p.m.86

Moreover, the majority of those who resides on campus were pro-

vided with tidbits on safety procedures. This included the use of
such explosives as bombs, poison gas, fire bombs, or anti-personnel
bombs left on the ground or dropped from the air, as well as gun-
fire and small arms. For example, when a bomb is dropped on the
campus, the individual will discern through the loud voice from
the air and the flying object that an explosion has occurred. It is
expected that the individual lies on his/her belly covering his head
with his hands. The individual is expected to remain there until the
blast of air and flying objects, including dust and other materials,
have passed over.87
Each member of staff and students were armed with a three-
page directive from the civil defense, while the patrol teams were
to ensure that most of these directives are carried out. For exam-
ple, it was expected that at night, lights out should be observed
both in the rooms and sitting rooms, street lights should be
switched off, and thick curtains should be fixed at every window.
Other safety aids, such as buckets of earth or sand, first aid boxes,
bandages, and pieces of clean clothes were meant to be handy in
cases of emergency.
Also important was the issue of personal safety of students
on campus. Many from the Eastern parts of the county had dif-
ficulties in their interpersonal relationships with friends and
colleagues in the University from the Western parts who chal-
lenged their citizenry and bullied them about their real identity.
The example of Lawrence Nata Wamo Wachuku stands out. He
wrote to the Assistant Registrar (in Student Affairs) on the rea-
sons why he changed his name. He stated that one of the reasons
was that he was accustomed to soldiers on his way from town
who after checking his identity believed that he was an Igbo
man, even when he refuted the allegation and claimed that he
was from Port-Harcourt. This situation, he opined, was among
the reasons he changed his name for safety’s sake to Lawrence
 Adedire 133

NataWamoWeli Wedge, which he argued is not irrelevant to the

context of his family.
However, the situation did not go down well with colleagues,
who believed he was hiding his Igbo identity. Westerners believed
that anyone who crossed the Niger River was an Igbo. This was
noticeable because Lawrence was a public figure who vied for the
position of the Public Relation Officer of the Student Union in an
election conducted during 1966/1967 session,88 which he later won.
After the election, the Student Union President, Olaleye
Ajayi, a Westerner, continued his derogatory remarks and became
a “rebel.” Writing a letter of protest to the University authority,
Lawrence remarked:
Any day I am missing on this campus, you may ask the
President of the Student Union to give you details of my
whereabouts. ‘My having been cut off from home is the only
advantage he has over me in life.89
Providing a clearer definition of the difference between the Port-
Harcourt region and other Eastern Ibo areas, he further stated:
I come from Port-Harcourt District—Port-Harcourt is not
in the East Central State today because the owner of Port-
Harcourt (not the strangers who live in it) are not Ibos. As
for the accident of names, there is a mid-Westerner (in Kuti
Hall) whose surname is Garuba, and that does not make
him Hausa. All rivers students know me: I am the national
Publicity Secretary of the Students’ Union of River Students
(throughout the country). I only want to do my education
here—playing full parts—not to dominate him in his own
state. I shall go home afterwards to dominate myself.90
Disclaiming the evidence that Weli Wedge was from Port Har-
court, the article “Mr. Lawrence Wachukwu (Weli Wedge): An
Appeal by the Students’ Body” written by Boniface Okoro was of
the opinion that Port-Harcourt is an Igbo Town. His reason had
been that Lawrence Nwachukwu (using his spelling of Wachukwu)
is an Ikwerre man and thus of Igbo origin. He also asserted that
the Ikwerres and the Ikwerre land belong to the Igbo. Debunking
the claim that Boniface O. Okoro is an Igbo man and defending
Weli Wedge’s claim, a rejoinder was written in reply to Boniface
Okoro called “Boniface Okoro: The Man with Multiple Names,”
in which Ohochukwu Stephen affirmed first that an investigation
134 UFAHAMU

revealed that the name Boniface Olaleye Okoro was a fake name
which did not exist on campus and is not associated with Indepen-
dence Hall, as alleged by the writer Boniface Okoro. He added:
Mr. Boniface claims to be an Igbo man and says his town is
adjacent to that of Weli-Wedge. Alright for the people who
don’t know much about the location of Port Harcourt and
Weli-Wedge’s town note this: Weli-Wedge is an Ikwerre man
in fact from Obio. Obio land—which Port Harcourt is a part
of—stretches fourteen miles in land from the sea. The last
Ikwerre town before the Ikwerre-Ibo border is about forty-
seven miles in land then see how possible for that fake Ibo
man, Mr. Boniface Olaeye Okoro—who is of course not an
Ikwerreman—to be a native of a non-existing Ibo town adja-
cent to that of Weli-Wedge.91
The above positions suggest that there was an attempt to foster a
tense relationship between the Rivers people and the Igbo. This
to a large extent caused tensions among the few Igbo who had
nowhere to run to for safety other than remaining in the univer-
sity campus. The fact that Lawrence changed his name also could
be attributed to the fact that though he might have been from Port
Harcourt, he possibly has an Igbo background.

The Nigerian Civil War and Displaced Families

Another major area in which the Civil War impacted the Univer-
sity of Ibadan was with regard to the issue of displaced families.
The phenomenon of displacement was due to the war in the East-
ern parts of the country, where many staff members could not be
reunited with their families.92 On a rare occasion, John Harris, an
acting Vice Chancellor was assisted by the Military Governor of
the South Eastern State, Col. J.U. Esuene, in reuniting with his
family from the Uyo axis during the war. In his letter of appre-
ciation to the Governor which expressed mixed feelings, John
Harris declared:
I have to thank you for all you have done to ensure the
return of my stewards and family to Ibadan from Uyo. It has
been very reassuring to many men from your state in the
University to know that their area is now liberated and that
communication is possible. . . . One of the consequences of
my steward’s return has been a number of applications from
 Adedire 135

other university employees enquiring whether the same thing

can be done for them. Four members of the library staff have
wives and children at Uyo, Calabar and Eket, and all want to
be reunited with their family. I shall be grateful if you can let
me know what is possible in this respect.93
As rightly stated by John Harris, the Deputy Librarian circu-
lated an internal memorandum to all departmental heads in the
library to inquire further if such situations actually existed. This
indeed yielded a favorable response from the Assistant Librar-
ian (NISER) that Mrs. Akinwale had two cousins in the former
Eastern region whose whereabouts she does not know.94 The
application of Mrs. Akinwale could not be processed due to the
fact that adequate information could not be provided on the exact
location of her cousins, which is one of the criteria for process-
ing the application. However, the ones mentioned by Harris in
his letter to the Governor of South Eastern States had adequate
information. They included the following:
1. Mr. S.A. Bassey, who has two wives and six children: Mrs.
Iquo Bassey and five children and Mrs. Akon Bassey and
one child: both of Mbierebe, Obio, c/o Mr. E.E. Akpan, Ikot
Akpan Abia, Ibesikpo, Uyo.
2. Mr. M.O. Ephraim, who has a wife and one child: Mrs. The-
resa Ephraim, 25 Murray Street, Calabar.
3. Mr. S. Isangedige who has a wife and six children: Mrs. A.M
Isangedige, c/o Chief Peter Isangedige, Afaha Atai, P.M.B No.
8, Eket.
4. Mr. A.J. Inyang, who has a wife and four children: Mrs. Lucy
A. Inyang, Okat, Onion Nung, Ndem, Eket Division, South-
Eastern State.95
It is important to state here that the number mentioned
by John Harris to the Governor was possibly a ploy to seek his
assistance, which would serve as an avenue to open the doors of
opportunities to several others. For instance, Mr. S.J. Akpakip, also
from the same library, who also provided adequate information
on the name of his wife and location was on a pending list, while
Mr. Emechete was another person who provided full data on
his family but could not meet the deadline when the Vice Chan-
cellor was compiling his list for the Governor. The Library also
might seem significant here because John Harris was formerly the
Librarian of the University before his appointment as the acting
136 UFAHAMU

Vice Chancellor of the University. However, the entire list was not
merely from the Library. For instance, Mr. A.J. Inyang was from
the Ibadan University Press (IUP) amongst others.

Conclusion
The University of Ibadan was established as a federal Univer-
sity expected to employ staff and admit students from all ethnic
groups in the country. However, the Nigerian Civil War limited
the attainment of these goals, as there were disruptions in the
socio-economic arrangements of the University. It became evi-
dently clear that the Civil War negatively impacted the university
community. One such negative impact was the mass exodus of
members of staff of Eastern origin. This led to a huge vacuum
in the staff population that needed to be filled quickly. The mass
movement of students of Eastern origin out of the University
was also greatly felt by the University community. This created
an atmosphere of fear and mutual suspicion thereafter between
members of staff and students of different ethnic groups who
worked and resided on the university campus. On the other hand,
the challenges it posed kept the university on its toes. It is appo-
site to state that despite the many challenges it encountered, the
University did not stop performing its statutory roles. Thus, it was
practically pushed to adopt important measures to protect the
lives and properties of its students and members of staff. Some of
the measures adopted were continued even after the war and have
thus became part of the tradition of the university community. It
should also be noted that the university was able to ensure peace-
ful coexistence amongst various ethnic groups in the University.

Notes
1
B. A. Mojuetan, Town and Gown, in B. A Mojuetan (eds), Ibadan at Fifty 1948-
1998, Nigeria’s Premier University in Perspectives, (Ibadan: Ibadan University
Press, 2000), 267.
2
Thomas Woody, (1945 )War and Education, Bulletin of the American Associa-
tion of University Professors (1915-1955), Vol 31, No 4, (Winter, 1945), 587.
3
Ibid.
4
Mojuetan, “Town and Gown,” 267.
 Adedire 137

5
Abel. G. Ishumi, Community education and development: A study in the prob-
lems of harnessing community education and development efforts among rural
and peri-urban communities in Tanzania, Ph. D. thesis, (Dar es Salaam: Univer-
sity of Dar Es Salaam, 1974), cited in William A.M Sambo, The Impact of Civil
Wars on Basic Education in the Great Lakes Region (AGLR) A Case Study of
Tanzania, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Organisation for Social Science Research in
Eastern and Southern Africa, 2003). 1.
6
Mojuetan, Ibadan at Fifty, vii.
7
J.F Ade Ajayi, Milestones in Nigeria History, (London: Longman 2nd edition,
1980).
8
Akinjide Osuntokun, The Lagos School Of History: An Exploratory Discourse,
Paper Presented At The Fourth Roundtable Of The Organisation For Histor-
ical Research In Nigeria (Formerly Network Of Nigerian Historians, NNH),
Mcpherson University, Ago Seriki, Ogun State, 30 January 2014, 9.
9
Slavoj Zizek, 2008, “In Defense of The Lost Causes”, London, Versco, 172-3,
cited in Olutayo C. Adesina, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu: The End of an Era?, A
Paper Presented at the Roundtable on Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, College of
Humanities and Culture, Ikire Campus, February 1, 2012. 2.
10
J. C. Nwaka, The Catholic Church and Conflict Management During the Nige-
rian Civil War 1967-1970, An Unpublished thesis Submitted to the Department of
History, University of Ibadan, 2011; O.M. Oparah O.M., The Nigerian Civil War
and the Adaptive Diversity of Biafra’s Research and Production Group 1967-1970,
An bUnpublished thesis Submitted to the Department of History (2014), Univer-
sity of Ibadan; Siyan Oyeweso, Perspectives on the Nigerian Civil War, (Lagos:
O.A.P Publication, 1992); Eghosa E. Osaghae (eds), The Nigerian Civil War and
Its Aftermath, (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers, Limited, 2002).
11
Osaghae, The Nigerian Civil War.
12
Oyeweso, Perspectives.
13
A. Ademoyega, Why we Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup, (Ibadan:
Evans Publishers, 1975), 5.
14
Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis, Ibadan: Spectrum Books
Ltd, 2000), 13.
15
Fred Onyeoziri, “What Caused The Nigerian Civil War?” in, Eghosa E.
Osaghe (et. al), The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath, (Ibadan: John Archers
Publishers, 2002), 94.
16
Rapheal Chijoke Njoku, “An Endless Circle of Secessionism: Intellectual
and Separatist Movement,” In, Bruno Coppieters and Michel Huysseune, (eds)
Nigeria in Secession, History and the Social Sciences, (Brussels: Brussels Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 251.
17
New Nigeria, Those Who Lost Their Lives in the Mutiny, (January, Monday 16,
1967), 12.
138 UFAHAMU

18
Obaro Ikime, “The Nigeria Civil War and the National Question: A Historical
Analysis,” in Eghosa E. Osaghe (et. al.), The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath,
(Ibadan: John Archers Publishers, 2002) 61.
19
Olutayo C. Adesina, Provincialism as Nationalism: Nigerian Nationalism and
Its Discontents. Paper Presented at the Expert Workshop on Nation, Nationalism
and National Integration in Nigeria, (June 19-21, 2013), 11.
20
Akinjide Osuntokun, (2012), “Nigeria and The Curse of Elections” in B.
Olatunji Oloruntimehin, (ed), Nigeria Election in Nigeria Historical Perspective,
The Nigerian Academy of Letters, Number 10, (Ibadan, Nigeria, 2012).
21
Ikime, “The Nigerian Civil War,” 62.
22
C.P, Wolle, Migrating to Place of Origin, Daily Times, (Saturday, March 11,
1967), 7.
23
S.B.C Obiora and Linus Ogbonna, Lawyers Advise on Caretaker Council,
Eastern Nigeria Guardian, (Tuesday, November 1, 1966), 1.
24
Isaac Odinkonigbo, 600 Arrive PH By Sea From Lagos, Eastern Nigeria
Guardian, (Tuesday, November 1, 1966), 1.
25
S.B.C Obiora and Linus Ogbonna 1966, 1.
26
Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, (London, Heinemann Educational Books
Ltd. 1980), 7.
27
John Harris, Today’s Event, Official Bulletin of the University of Ibadan
announcing the Coup, January 15, 1966.
28
S.J Okudu, Diary of an Alumnus Registrar in Tekena Tamuno (eds), Ibadan
Voices: Ibadan University in Transition, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1981), 181.
29
Olatunji Oloruntimehin, The University in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, in J.F.A Ade Ajayi and Tamuno (eds), The University of Ibadan
1948-1973: A history of the First Twenty Five Years, (Ibadan: Ibadan University
Press, 1973), 111.
30
Commonwealth Relation Office to High Commission, Lagos, 22 June 1966,
TNA DO 195/309 cited in Timothy Livsey.
31
Chinua Achebe, The African Writer and the Biafran Cause, A Paper read at a
Political Science Seminar at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, 25th
August, 1968, Ade-Ajayi Papers, Box 39, 230.
32
Orjinta, The Death of Biafra: Genocide in Nigeria, 1967-1970, (University of
Nigeria Press, 2012), 62.
33
New Nigerian, Anti-Ibo Riot in Ibadan, Wednesday, 15 March, 1967, 1.
34
Oloruntimehin, The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
111.
35
University of Ibadan Gazette, June 1967, No. 89, Vol 14 No 4, 8.
36
University of Ibadan Gazette, June 1967,October 1969, No 94, Vol. 15, No. 5., 14.
37
U.A.I, Request for Possible Reabsorption of MrAnele of Esablishment Office
in the Library, 1972, 3.
38
University of Ibadan Gazette, June 1967, No. 89, Vol 14 No 4., 1.
 Adedire 139

39
U.A.I, COMED 10.21.23, Resignation of Sir Louis Mbanefo as Pro-Chan-
cellor and Chairman of Council, University of Ibadan due to the National Crisis.
1966/67, 7.
40
F.J Ellah, My Era at Ibadan, in Tekena Tamuno (eds), Ibadan Voices: Ibadan
University in Transition, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1981), 54.
41
An Address by John Harris, Acting Vice-Chancellor, Given at Trenchard Hall
on Graduation Day, 30 june,1967, 1.
42
Speech by Sir Samuel Manuwa Pro-Chancellor and Chairman of Council,
Introducing The New Vice-Chancellor Professor T. AdeoyeLambo on Gradua-
tion Day, 29 June 1968, 4.
43
Oloruntinmehin, The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion, 113.
44
Ibid.
45
J.F Ade Ajayi (1973), Postgraduate Studies and Staff Development, 162.
46
Ibid., 164.
47
R.A Adeleye, The Independent University, 1962-68 (in J.F.A Ade Ajayi 1973),
80.
48
J.T Okedara, Employment Status of University of Ibadan Graduates, 1950-1971,
(Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1984) 27.
49
University of Ibadan: An Address By John Harris, Acting Vice-Chancellor, Given
in Trenchard Hall on Graduation Day, 30 June, 1967,Minevera, Vol 6, No 1, 82.
50
Oloruntinmehin, The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion, 115.
51
U.A.I, S.A.O 25: 6.1, Mr. K.P.E Odili, Application for Transfer to U.I (Depart-
ment of Modern Languages) From a War Displaced Student from Nsukka, 20
May, 1969, 1-2.
52
U.A.I, S.A.O, 25.6.1, E.E. Esua, Prospective University Students at Calabar,
February 8, 1968, 5.
53
U.A.I, S.A.O, 25. 6.1, T.A Lambo, Transport for University Students, February
19, 1968, 4,
54
U.A.I, S.A.O, 25. 6.1, T.A Lambo, Transport for University Students March 20,
1968, 6.
55
U.A.I, S.A.O, 25. 6.1, Internal Memorandum fromT..A Babalola to T.A Lambo
on Transport for University Students 18th March, 1968, 6.
56
U.A.I/ S.A.O 25.6.1, The Case of 12 Students who were Stranded at Calabar,
March 20,1968. 8.
57
Timothy Livsey, (2014), Unpublished P.h.D Thesis, 282.
58
Oloruntinmehin, The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion, 119.
59
Address by the Vice-Chancellor Professor T. AdeoyeLambo in Support of the
Honorary Graduands at The Liberty Stadium, Ibadan on Foundation Day, 1970, 11.
60
Oloruntimehin,The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
120.
140 UFAHAMU

61
Ibid.
62
Comment, Hip, Hip to Ibadan, West African Pilot, 23rd January, 1965.
63
U.A.I/S.A.O 25.6.2, The Vice Chancellor to Address the Student Body in the
Trenchard Hall, April 16, 1968, 55.
64
U.I.A, S.A.O 25.6.3, List of Indebted student students as at 14th March, 1968,
Non-Residential.
65
Oloruntimehin,The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
120.
66
Ibid., 115.
67
Personal Communication with ObaroIkime, February 14, 2014.
68
S.J Okudu, Diary, 182.
69
Oloruntimehin, The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
115.
70
Text of Statement Issued By the Military Area Commander for Ibadan Prov-
inces on 1st August 1966.
71
J.B, Lawson, Message to Members of Staff and Students of the University of
Ibadan, August 3, 1966, 1.
72
A Report of the Meeting of the Vice-Chancellor, John Harris, and Dean
of Medicine, Professor T. AdeoyeLambo, with General Yakubu Gowon, see
“Message from His Excellency the Supreme Commander, Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon
to the Acting Vice –Chancellor, University of Ibadan, Official Bulletin, No. 3, 29
October 1966 cited in Oloruntimehin The University in the Era of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, 114.
73
Personal Communication with Bolanle Awe 21/4/2014.
74
J.F.A Ade-Ajayi, Internal Memorandum from the Acting Vice-Chancellor to
all Heads of Department, August 24, 1967, 4.
75
J.F.A Ade-Ajayi, Internal Memorandum To all Householders on the University
Campus,August 24, 1967, 1.
76
J.F.A Ade-Ajayi, Internal Memorandum on List of Campus Residents, 3.
77
See Official Bulletin, No 43 of 24 August 1967.
78
Oloruntimehin, The University in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
116.
79
Ibid.
80
See Official Bulletin, No 43 of 24 August 1967.
81
J.F.A AJayi, Further Security Measures, 30 August, 1967, 1.
82
J.F.A Ajayi, From the Vice- Chancellor’s office, 1 September, 1967, 2.
83
J.F.A Ajayi, To all Memebers of Staff on Holiday Abroad, September 1, 1967.
84
See Official Bulletin, No. 42 of 22 August 1967, and J.F.A, Ajayi, Campus
Curfew, September 2, 1967.
85
Tekena Tamuno, Challenges and Services in Tekena Tamuno (eds), Ibadan
Voices, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press), 266.
86
J.F.A AJayi, Further Security Measures, 30 August, 1967, 2.
87
Civil Defense, Nigeria Western State, Notes for Civilian, 1967, 1.
 Adedire 141

88
Tekena Tamuno,(eds), Ibadan Voices, 395.
89
U.A.I/S.A.O 25.6.2, Change of name of Mr. WamoWeliWegbe following his
Experience During the Civil war, February 26, 1968, 13.
90
U.A.I/S.A.O 25.6.2, Change of name of Mr. WamoWeliWegbe following his
Experience During the Civil war, February 26, 1968, 13.
91
Ohochuku Stephen, Boniface O.Okoro-The Man with Multiple Names, March
11, 1968, 1.
92
Personal Communication with Mr. AlabiOgundosu 5/3/2015
93
U.A.I/LIB 7.6..30, A Letter from the Librarian- Late John Harris to the Military
Governor of South Eastern-Colonel U.J Esuene, July 2, 1968, 3.
94
NISER, Internal Memo, 6.
95
U.I.A/LIB: 7.6. 30, Acting Librarian, Displaced Families, 28 June 1968, 4.