14 January 2016

PREFACE

1. Introduction
Today’s security environment continues to change with adversaries more able to challenge U.S.
military capabilities. It is imperative the U.S. joint force develop ways to combine its powerful
capabilities across all domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace). The application of
cross-domain solutions requires developing joint planning experience to enhance the Joint Force
Commanders’ (JFC) capabilities against a wide array of adversaries.

2. Purpose
The purpose of the planner’s guide is to provide information and approaches to integrate
efficiently and effectively each domain’s capabilities to accomplish the JFC’s mission.

3. Development
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the development of the planner’s guide to
operationalize cross-domain synergy as described in the Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC). The guide is neither authoritative nor does it represent consensus across the Joint
Force. However, it is grounded in a comprehensive literature review and over one hundred
interviews with Combatant Command staff officers and Services’ academic faculty.

4. Application
The guide organizes cross-domain planning information for the use of planning staffs. It applies
to the planning activities of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, sub-unified commands, joint
task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and Department of
Defense (DOD) agencies supporting joint operations.

5. Contact Information
Please direct suggestions for improvement to Major Kevin Schieman, Joint Staff J-7, FJFD, JCD;
[email protected], (757) 203-5221.

PAUL E. BAUMAN
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force
Deputy Director, J-7
Future Joint Force Development
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1
CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY OVERVIEW
A. General 1
B. Cross-Domain Synergy 5

CHAPTER 2
ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY
A. General 8
B. Primary Challenge 8
C. Addressing Primary Challenge 8
D. Secondary Challenges 21

CHAPTER 3
CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY VIA THE JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS
(JOPP)
A. General 22
B. Conceptual Planning 22
C. Detailed Planning 23
D. JOPP 24

CHAPTER 4
DOMAINS
A. General 34
B. Air 34
C. Land 38
D. Maritime 44
E. Space 47
F. Cyberspace 50
G. Wrap-Up 56

LIST OF APPENDICES
A Recommended Planning Practices A-1
B Agencies and Partners B-1
C Bibliography C-1
D References for Further Professional Education D-1

GLOSSARY
PART I Abbreviations and Acronyms GL-1
PART II Terms and Definitions GL-7

LIST OF FIGURE
I-1 LtCol Jimmy Doolittle takes off in B-25 from the USS Hornet 3
I-2 Russian Cyber Actions against Georgia August 2008 4

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LIST OF FIGURE (cont.)

II-1 Building Upon the Core Staff 9
II-2 Liaison Officer Guidelines 13
II-3 Basic Working Group Model 16
II-4 B2C2WG, and planning team - "Meeting Design" 17
II-5 Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization w/B2C2WG 18
II-6 Joint Task Force HQ Battle Rhythm Example 20

III-1 Creative Brainstorming Technique 23

III-2 Joint Planning and Execution Community 24
III-3 Joint Operation Planning Process 25
III-4 Mission Analysis Activities 26
III-5 Mission Analysis 27
III-6 Example Mission Analysis Briefing 27
III-7 Course of Action Development 28
III-8 Course of Action Development 29
III-9 Course of Action Analysis 29
III-10 Course of Action Comparison 30
III-11 Staff Estimator Matrix (Intelligence Estimate) 31
III-12 Course of Action Approval 31
III-13 Commander’s Estimate 32

IV-1 Joint Air Tasking Cycle 35

IV-2 Joint Air Operations Planning 36
IV-3 Legal Boundaries of the Ocean and Airspace 44
IV-4 Three Layers of Cyberspace 51
IV-5 Cyberspace Actions 53
IV-6 Cyberspace C2 Concept 55

LIST OF TABLE
TIV-1 JFLCC Interface with Other Joint Forces C2 Mechanism 42
TIV-2 Cyberspace vs. Traditional Warfare Domain Characteristics 52

v
Intentionally Blank

vi
 CHAPTER 1
CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY OVERVIEW

A. General

1. Introduction

The United States currently enjoys significant overmatch in the air, land, maritime, and space
domains. However, adversaries are challenging that overmatch by creatively avoiding traditional
U.S. strengths. This inventiveness allows adversaries to achieve their objectives in spite of U.S.
military dominance in individual domains.

Military operations are becoming more complex with the rise in the number and variety of
options available to commanders. Today’s warriors must contend with computers and satellites
in addition to bayonets and bullets. The expansion of military activity beyond the air, sea, and
land domains to space and cyberspace has broadened the community of warfighters to include
computer scientists and astrophysicists. Integrating this expertise to achieve operational
effectiveness against an adaptive, complex enemy is the mission of Joint Force Commanders
(JFCs) and their staffs.

…future Joint Forces will leverage better integration to improve cross-domain synergy-
the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities across domains
time and space. While the U.S. military maintains unique advantages in every domain, it
is our ability to project force across domains that so often generates our decisive
advantage.
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense,
2012, page 7).

Cross-domain synergy is “the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities

in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the
vulnerabilities of others.” 1 In the conduct of joint operations, the JFC routinely employs air,
land, maritime, space, and/or cyberspace capabilities to overwhelm an adversary’s ability to
decide and act. 2 The commander seeks to optimize the balance between effectiveness and
efficiency when combining joint capabilities. This requires employing capabilities so that they
reinforce each other without undue redundancy or overlap. Synergy occurs when two or more
of these actions combine to produce an effect greater than the sum of their individual effects.
The JFC increases the likelihood of achieving a synergistic effect with the integrated
employment of joint capabilities across multiple domains.

Cross-domain synergy is not an end in itself, but a by-product of effective joint planning.
On rare occasions, a single domain solution is appropriate and better suited to accomplishing the
mission. However, most missions call for capabilities from all five domains thus generating the
need for competence in the integration of cross-domain capabilities. The planner’s efforts to

1
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) Version 1.0. (Washington, DC: United States
Department of Defense, 2012), Foreword. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%2012_Signed.pdf.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, JOAC, ii.

1
 Chapter 1

integrate and synergize cross-domain capabilities will allow the JFC to attain the ultimate desired
goal: mission accomplishment.

Throughout this planner’s guide, the adjective “cross-domain” describes operations, capabilities,
and solutions which employ tools from one domain to create effects in another domain (air, land,
maritime, space, and cyberspace). The guide highlights the importance of cross-domain
solutions, the nuances of the domains, and the requirement for strong partnerships. It offers
methods to engender innovative solutions from a large, diverse group and then merge their ideas
into the planning process. While the planner’s guide will assist all staffs, it targets coordinating
staff (numbered J-directorate) members responsible for orchestrating the contributions from
multiple domains. The planner’s guide is both a ready reference for joint procedures and a basic
source of information about each domain. Improved understanding of each domain will improve
the employment of cross-domain capabilities and increase the potential for achieving cross-
domain synergy. 3

The planner’s guide is structured for quick retrieval of information.

• Chapter 2 addresses the challenges to cross-domain synergy.
• Chapter 3 discusses means to foster cross-domain synergy via the Joint Operations Planning
Process (JOPP).
• Chapter 4 describes each domain along with A) how the DOD has organized to operate
within that domain and B) what it means to a joint planner trying to integrate that domain’s
capabilities into a comprehensive plan.
• Appendix A provides several recommended planning practices. These maxims are useful
practices followed by experienced planners and should be deviated from only after careful
consideration of risks.
• Appendix B discusses the agencies and partners that a joint staff planner may encounter and
how each can be used to develop and improve cross-domain solutions.
• Appendix C is the bibliography of publications cited in this guide.
• Appendix D provides a tailored reference list. Beyond a mere listing, Appendix D describes
publications for staff officers who would like to learn more on a given topic (e.g. planning,
cyberspace).
• Glossary provides a listing of abbreviations (Part I) and terms and definitions (Part II).

2. Historical Background and Examples

History demonstrates that skillful blending of combat arms can achieve decisive effects. 4 The
idea of combining weapons systems in battle is age old: from the coordination of chariots,
archers, and spearmen in the armies of the ancient world to the cavalry, musketeers, and pikemen
at the dawn of the age of gunpowder. In the early 17th century, King Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden combined improved firearms technology with innovative organization to create the
world’s first modern combined arms army. The Swedish monarch employed infantry brigades
comprised of infantry, mobile field artillery, and heavy cavalry in a manner that combined fire,
maneuver, and shock effect in a single fighting unit. Each arm of one of Gustavus Adolphus’
brigades supported and enhanced each other’s effectiveness. 5 The integration of cross-domain

3
U.S. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Defense, 2012, 7.
4 Michael Evans and Alan Ryan (Editors), From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare, Land

Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No.122, (Dunmore, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2003), 9.
5 Evans and Ryan, From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare, 9.

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 Cross-Domain Synergy Overview

capabilities is merely an extension of the principles behind combining arms – the whole can be
greater than the sum of the parts when skillfully integrated and employed.

Cross-domain operations have been a strength of the U.S. Joint Force for decades. 6 Before the
invention of manned-flight, the U.S. military combined land- and sea-based capabilities to win
pivotal victories at Yorktown (1781), Vicksburg (1863), and Santiago (1898). With the advent
of flight, the Joint Force added air-based capabilities to their growing and rapidly modernizing
arsenals. In World War II and Korea, amphibious landings exemplified cross-domain
operations. 7 Below are two examples of successful (Figures I-1 and I-2) cross-domain
approaches.

Cross-Domain Synergy Success: The Doolittle Raid 18 April 1942

The 18 April 1942 Doolittle Raiders attack represents an example of innovative thinking leading to
a cross-domain solution. In one of World War II’s first truly joint operations, 80 crewmembers of
the U.S. Army Air Forces trained under the guidance of U.S. Navy pilots to master taking off in a
B-25 Mitchell medium bomber from the deck of an aircraft carrier. Their efforts resulted in the
first aerial attack of the Japanese home islands by U.S. bombers. Thinking out-of-the-box as a true
cross-domain planner, Captain Francis Low, United States Navy (USN), a submarine officer and
member of the Chief of Naval Operations staff, conceived the idea and worked closely with the
Army Air Forces to turn his idea into reality. Sixteen B-25s took off from the USS Hornet to bomb
military targets in Japan. Led by then-Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle, the Raiders brought
the war to the enemy and, while not inflicting serious damage, the mission’s impact upon
American morale was incalculable. Moreover, the mission compelled the Japanese to reallocate
some of their forces to homeland defense and led Admiral Yamamoto to the Battle of Midway, a
disaster for the Japanese navy which turned the tide of the war in the Pacific. The Doolittle Raid is
a great example of integrating the capabilities of two domains to achieve an effect greater than they
could do individually.
Figure I-1. LtCol Jimmy Doolittle takes off in B-25 from the USS Hornet 8

6
U.S. Department of Defense, JOAC, 16.
7 William O. Odom and Christopher D. Hayes, “Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness”, Joint Forces Quarterly 73 2nd
Quarter 2014, 124.
8 National Museum of the United States Air Force. “The Doolittle Raiders – 18 April 1942”

3
 Chapter 1

Cross-Domain Synergy Success: Russian Cyber Actions against Georgia August 2008

(Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection University of Texas www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/georgia_war_2008.html)

The war between Georgia, Russia, and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia saw some 35,000-40,000 Russian and allied forces, augmented by significant air and naval forces, confront
some 12,000-15,000 Georgian forces with little air and minimal naval capability. Although a short and limited
conflict, it was historic and precedent setting. This appears to be the first coordinated cyberspace attacks
synchronized with major combat actions in the other warfighting domains, primarily land and air.
Russian offensive cyberspace operations began several weeks before the outbreak of kinetic operations.
Russian cyber intelligence units conducted reconnaissance on important sites and infiltrated Georgian military and
government networks in search of data useful for the upcoming campaign. During this period, the Russian government
began organizing the work of Russian cyberspace militias - irregular hackers outside the government - that would
support the campaign and provide cover for some of the government’s operations. Russian government and
cyberspace militias conducted rehearsals of attacks against Georgian targets. When the kinetic battle started on 7
August, Russian government and irregular forces conducted distributed denial-of-service attacks on Georgian
government and military websites. These attacks disrupted the transmission of information between military units and
between offices in the Georgian government. Russian cyberspace forces attacked civilian sites near the action of
kinetic operations with the goal of creating panic in the civilian population. For example, in the town of Gori,
Russians disabled government and news websites with distributed denial-of-service attacks just prior to an air attack.
Cyberspace interdiction (attacks concentrated on tactical data links and data fusion centers) degraded and disrupted
the Georgians’ decision cycle limiting their military response. Russian forces also attacked Georgian hacker forums in
order to pre-empt a retaliatory response against Russian cyberspace targets.
The Russians were very sophisticated in their target selection. For example, Russians refrained from
attacking Georgia’s most important asset, the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and associated infrastructure. By holding this
target in reserve, the Russians gave Georgian policymakers an incentive to quickly end the war. Faced by
overwhelming Russian air power, armored attacks on several fronts, an amphibious assault on its Black Sea coastline,
and devastating cyber-attacks, Georgia had little capability of kinetic resistance. Its best hope lay with strategic
communications: transmitting to the world a sympathetic message of rough treatment at the hands of Russian military
aggression. But Russia effectively used cyberspace operations to disrupt the Georgian government’s ability to
assemble and transmit such a plea thus removing Georgia’s last hope for international support.
In summary, Russian planners tightly integrated cyberspace operations with their kinetic, diplomatic, and
strategic messaging operations. The Russo-Georgian war provides a case study for joint planners preparing for a
future conflict, involving the new domain of cyberspace.

Figure I-2. Russia-Georgia War 2008 9

9
David M. Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal, Modified January 2011/Accessed November
2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf
4
Cross-Domain Synergy Overview

3. Overview of Contemporary Domains

Currently, Joint Force Commanders integrate the traditional air, land, and maritime domains
more easily into joint operations than the newer domains of space and cyberspace. Several
reasons exist for this uneven integration, including staff officers’ unfamiliarity with the new
domains and a centralized command and control (C2) structure for the capabilities of new
domains.

Air
The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects
upon operations become negligible. Source: JP 3-30

Land
The area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the
maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals. Source: JP 3-31

Maritime
The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these,
including the littorals. Source: JP 3-32

Space
A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted to
achieve US national security objectives. JP 1-02

Cyberspace
A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
Source: JP 3-12

B. Cross-Domain Synergy

1. Introduction

The term “cross-domain synergy” first appeared in the 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC) as a solution to anti-access/area denial threats (A2/AD). However, because it applies in
nearly all military situations, it also became a key element of the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO). This ability to operate in multiple domains provides
JFCs with many opportunities to apply force against enemy weaknesses. Cross-domain
approaches enable JFCs to overwhelm an adversary with many, difficult problems at multiple
points in time and space. The disruption of the adversary’s ability to observe, orient, decide, and
act (OODA) achieves synergy when the cross-domain activities result in second- and third-order
effects on the adversary’s ability to fight.

Cross-domain operations require interoperability and routine integration of cross-domain

capabilities. Cross-domain operations are more complex than single domain options, but they
have advantages. The Joint Force maintains extensive C2 networks and mechanisms to offset

5
 Chapter 1

the complexity inherent in coordinating cross-domain operations. JFCs use those networks and
staff expertise (joint, interagency, and multinational) to implement innovative cross-domain
solutions to overwhelm their adversaries and achieve objectives. Proficiency hinges on habitual
integration of capabilities from all domains.

2. Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)

A2/AD strategies are a defining characteristic of today’s operational environment. Confronting

this challenge will require more integration – across all domains and at all echelons – than ever
before. 10

The JOAC defines anti-access as “those capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an
advancing enemy from entering an operational area.” 11 Area denial consists of “those actions
and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit
its freedom of action within in an operational area.” 12

Since the end of the Cold War, the Joint Force has enjoyed largely unhindered access to and
freedom of action within nearly every theater of operation. A constellation of alliances and
partnerships, dominant forward posture, and unchallenged military-technical advantages vis-à-
vis potential military competitors provided U.S. military forces with persistent regional influence
and points of entry into contested theaters of operation. The United States enjoyed unchallenged
operational access to Iraq and Afghanistan. Supplying operations in landlocked Afghanistan, in
particular, would have been much more difficult without unfettered access to the seaports of
Karachi and Kuwait. The Joint Force’s remotely piloted aircraft roamed the skies of Iraq and
Afghanistan free from antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile threats to find, surveil, and
strike insurgent targets. These advantages are eroding due to adversary adoption of sophisticated
A2/AD strategies that combine technical and nontechnical capabilities. 13

A2/AD strategies undermine U.S. power projection by denying freedom of movement and
freedom of action in and around areas of interest. Implications of A2/AD, however, reach far
beyond that of conflict. A2/AD not only increases the dangers of conventional war, but also
offers non-state actors options to increase the effectiveness of irregular or hybrid warfare. 14 To
successfully operate in an A2/AD environment, the U.S. military must prepare by understanding
the operational implications presented by modern technology and weaponry. 15 The proliferation
of A2/AD weapon systems and asymmetric capabilities strongly suggests the U.S. military must
develop innovative concepts and employ cross-domain solutions to address potential A2/AD
contingencies. A future adversary is unlikely to make the same mistake that Saddam Hussein
made - twice - when he allowed a U.S. led coalition to mass a large, decisive military force on
Iraq’s borders. 16
10
GEN Martin Dempsey, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Release of the Joint Operational Access Concept”,
DOD Live, January 12, 2012. http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/01/release-of-the-joint-operational-access-concept-joac/
11
U.S. Department of Defense, JOAC, i.
12
U.S. Department of Defense, JOAC, i.
13
Nathan Freier, “Challenges to American Access: The Joint Operational Access Concept and Future Military Risk,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies csis.org, Published January 5, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/challenges-american-access-
joint-operational-access-concept-and-future-military-risk
14
Maj Christopher J. McCarthy USAF, Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare, (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval
War College, 2012), 10.
15
McCarthy, Anti-Access/Area Denial, 9.
16
Mark Gunzinger with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial
Threats, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011), 19.
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Cross-Domain Synergy Overview

3. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)

The JOAC foreshadows an era of increased constraints on U.S. military actions abroad. U.S.
military power now competes on a substantially more complicated playing field in a number of
important regions around the world. Consequently, U.S. policymakers and military commanders
should anticipate novel obstacles to global access emerging from some combination of improved
adversary military and paramilitary capability. In short, the comprehensive A2/AD challenge is
rapidly compounding, necessitating innovative U.S. military responses.

The JOAC proposes the concept of cross-domain synergy to achieve operational access in the
face of armed opposition under a variety of conditions. 17 Operational access is the ability to
project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the
mission.18 Operational access does not exist for its own sake, but rather serves the United States’
broader strategic interests, whether to ensure access to commerce, demonstrate U.S. resolve, or
defeat an adversary in combat. Operational access is the Joint Force’s contribution to assured
access: the unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters,
airspace, and cyberspace. 19 Confronting this challenge will require more integration – across all
domains – than ever before. 20

The ability to integrate capabilities from across multiple domains affords JFCs with numerous,
powerful options. 21 For example, undersea operations can be used to defeat air defense systems,
air forces can be used to eliminate submarine or maritime mine threats, ground forces can defeat
threats to space systems, or cyberspace capabilities can be used to disrupt adversary command
and control. Put simply, traditional understandings of Service missions, functional
responsibilities, and employment of capabilities from particular domains must not hamper
imaginative joint operational planning. 22

JOAC cites the goal of cross-domain synergy is to establish superiority in some combination of
domains that will provide the freedom of action required by the mission. The combination of
domain superiorities will vary with the situation, the adversaries’ capabilities, and the mission.
Superiority in any domain may not be widespread or permanent; it will usually be local and
temporary. Additionally, domain integration must occur at lower echelons, generating the tempo
that is often critical to exploiting fleeting local opportunities for disrupting the adversaries’
systems, and will require the full inclusion of space and cyberspace operations into the
traditional air-land-maritime battlespace. 23 Chapter 2 describes challenges to cross-domain
synergy in more detail and how JFCs and their staffs might overcome them.

17
The use of operational in this context refers to military operations broadly and is not restricted to the operational level of war.
The 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) describes the national strategy for defeating hostile anti-access/area-denial
strategies. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011; Redefining
America’s Military Leadership, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 8.
18
U.S Department of Defense, JOAC, i.
19
U.S Department of Defense, JOAC, i.
20
U.S. Department of Defense, JOAC, i.
21
Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, (Washington,
DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013), 5. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf
22
Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle, 5.
23
U.S. Department of Defense, JOAC, ii.

7
 CHAPTER 2

ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY

A. General

Cross-domain solutions inherently incur additional command and control burdens. By

comparison, single domain operations will have less to plan and orchestrate, minimizing C2
friction. However, single domain operations rarely occur. Overcoming the friction of employing
multiple domains requires practice and habitual interaction with domain experts. The primary
challenge to cross-domain synergy is institutionalizing participation in the JFCs’ decision
making processes from a diverse community of warfighters. Other challenges include training
and education shortfalls, sub-optimal manning, and classification/compartmentalization of many
cross-domain capabilities.

CHALLENGES TO CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY

1. Primary Challenge: Bringing varied and specific expertise to bear on the

problem
2. Secondary Challenges:
a. Training and education shortfalls
b. Manning
c. Classification and compartmentalization of capabilities

B. Primary Challenge

The major challenge JFCs face is obtaining domain expertise and integrating it into planning and
operations. It requires greater inclusion of many, diverse subject matter experts in JFC decision
making processes. JFC's must assess the level of experience and knowledge resident in their
staffs. Ideally, staff membership includes experts from across the warfighting communities and
each domain who represent their domain during planning and operations. To this end, JFCs must
recruit subject matter experts (SMEs) and incorporate their contributions within their activities.

C. Addressing the Primary Challenge

JFCs must aggressively secure wide expertise and integrate it into their staff processes.
Fortunately, DOD provides multiple mechanisms for accessing expertise. Through a manning
document, joint staffs may request domain experts from the Services. Several agencies also offer
support for staffs with inadequate resident expertise. Liaison officers help knit headquarters and
organizations by enhancing coordination. Once on board, the JFC must integrate the subject
matter experts into the staff. Again, several mechanisms are available to build cohesion,
including boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups (B2C2WG), planning groups, and
battle rhythm. By carefully structuring and tailoring the interaction of the headquarters staff,
JFC's and staff leads can leverage the best expertise from many diverse elements.

A listing of common mission partners is provided in Appendix B, JP 2-01, JP 3-08, and JP 3-16.

8
Addressing Challenges to Cross-Domain Synergy

1. Core Staff, Augmentation, Support Elements and Liaison Requirements

a. The Core Staff. Combatant Commands (CCMDs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs) core staff
may lack the expertise to address all aspects of the mission. A JTF formed around a single
Service component or headquarters will usually augment the core staff with outside experts
based on the mission and force composition. Mission analysis should consider necessary HQ
capabilities and other related functions.

MISSION ANALYSIS FACTORS An assessment of the core staff’s expertise

will determine the type and amount of
1. Likely duration of the mission. augmentation required to fill the gaps. The
2. Geographic scope of the mission. assessment occurs at initial formation of the
staff and throughout the duration of the
3. Interagency requirements. mission. Generally, the staff mirrors the
JTF composition in proportion of
4. Multinational involvement. membership, experience, and influence of
5. Campaign or joint operation phasing. position and rank of members among
participating Services, functional
6. Communication strategy requirements. components, subordinate task forces,
supporting commands, and multinational
7. Logistic support requirements. forces.

(1) For example, a JTF formed around an Army Corps HQ for a ground combat mission will
likely augment the core staff with experts to assist with planning and executing air, space,
cyberspace, and special operations not to mention the probability of integrating a significant
number of multinational liaisons.
(2) United States led JTFs should expect to participate as part of a Multi-National Force
(MNF) (i.e., a coalition or alliance) in most future military endeavors. Such participation with
multi-national forces may complicate normal unilateral organization, planning, and operations.

There are several sources for building on a core staff that are depicted in Figure II-1 below:

Figure II-1. Building Upon the Core Staff

1
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2012), II-3.
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 Chapter 2

When determining requirements to augment the staff, the Commander, J-5, and the
Joint Planning Group (JPG) Lead should look to assemble subject matter expertise
from across all five domains. This will mitigate one of the initial challenges of
ensuring the JPG includes the right mix of domain expertise.

b. Augmentation. Individual staff officer augmentation is an important mechanism for

providing personnel to a joint staff. The core staff or establishing Combatant Command
identifies individual augmentation requirements and publishes them in a joint manning
document. Augmentation considerations should include core competencies not resident on the
core staff or special subject matter expertise. Often augmentees arrive at the headquarters
requiring additional training to prepare them to serve as functional members of the staff.

Linguists and interpreters often are critical to JTF operations. It is important to identify the
numbers and types of linguists required for an operation early in the planning cycle to facilitate
their procurement and integration.

c. Support Elements. In contrast to individual augmentees, support elements often arrive

at the headquarters as a mission-tailored detachment. Listed below are a number of possible
joint organizations that may provide support elements to bolster a core staff. The list is not all-
inclusive but should provide some insight into the types of augmentation the core staff can
receive and the purpose behind that augmentation.

(1) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). The JCSE provides connectivity
both to and from the JTF HQ. Its purpose is to provide a temporary solution to JTF
communications requirements. The JCSE can support up to two JTFs and two joint special
operations task forces (JSOTFs) simultaneously. The JCSE normally redeploys when unit or
commercial equipment replace its functions. http://www.jcse.mil/

(2) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The JECC provides mission-tailored,
joint capability packages to CCMDs to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters,
fulfill Global Response Force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements.
http://www.jecc.mil/

(a) The Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) provides rapidly deployable,
tailored, joint planners who bring the expertise to accelerate the formation and increase the
effectiveness of a joint force headquarters during emerging operations.
http://www.jecc.mil/Portals/21/Documents/JPSE-Trifold-Web.pdf

(b) The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provides rapidly
deployable joint public affairs professionals who can launch, land, and within minutes implement
the commander’s communication strategy in order to drive the narrative.
http://www.jecc.mil/Subordinates/JointPublicAffairsSupportElement.aspx

(3) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA’s mission is to safeguard America
and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosives [CBRNE]) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and

10
Addressing Challenges to Cross-Domain Synergy

counter the threat, and mitigate its effects. DTRA has the capacity to provide specialists to
support JTF operations. http://www.dtra.mil/

(4) Joint Information Operations (IO) Warfare Command (JIOWC). The joint
information operations warfare command is the principal field agency for joint IO support of
Combatant Commands. The joint information operations warfare command fulfills this role by
planning, coordinating, and executing DOD IO.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Information_Operations_Warfare_Center

(5) Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity (JCMA). JCMA can provide
information security monitoring and analysis support to JTFs.
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA297770

(6) Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). JPRA is the principal joint DOD agency
for coordinating and advancing personnel recovery (PR). http://www.jpra.mil/

(7) Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). JWAC assists in preparation and analysis of
joint OPLANs and Service chiefs’ analysis of weapons effectiveness. JWAC normally provides
this support to JTFs through the supported Combatant Command. http://www.jwac.mil/

(8) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DLA will support the JTF using a variety of
capabilities. DLA has robust logistic planning experience, logistic surge and sustainment
expertise, forward (such as DLA regional commanders and staff, deployable distribution
capability) and expeditionary forces (DLA contingency support teams, liaison officers [LNOs],
and other experts) imbedded physically and virtually with the warfighting and support
organizations. http://www.dla.mil/Pages/default.aspx

(9) National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB provides coordination with the ARNG/ANG
elements that are critical for non-federal domestic cross-domain coordination

(10) Liaison Requirements. JFCs generally have to manage significant liaison requirements
both to and from their HQ. Liaison is the contact by which communications can be maintained
between elements of military forces or other organizations and agencies to ensure mutual
understanding and unity of purpose and action. Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) among
military organizations facilitates innovative collaboration. This collaboration generates cross-
domain solutions. JFCs should only withhold DIRLAUTH from their subordinates in very
specific situations to avoid stifling the collaborative environment which produces cross-domain
synergy. Furthermore, JFCs should pursue DIRLAUTH from their superiors to effectively build
relationships with mission partners.

d. Liaisons: Liaison Officers (LNOs) enhance interoperability and contribute significantly

to mission success. The JFC must identify the requirement for liaison personnel based on
command relationships and mission support requirements. LNOs must be requested at the
earliest opportunity and should be of sufficient rank (recommend equal rank to primary staff
officers) to influence the decision-making process. Ideally, LNOs should possess the requisite
skill sets (technical training or language) to liaise and communicate effectively with receiving
organizations.

11
 Chapter 2

(1) The JFC should establish a familiarization program for all liaison personnel. A joint reception
center (JRC) could perform this requirement. The JFC must determine what staff officer or staff
section will exercise overall responsibility for liaison personnel reporting to the joint staff for duty (e.g.,
Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force (DCJTF), chief of staff, or J-3). Regardless of which staff
section manages the LNO program, liaison personnel perform their duties within the joint staff
directorate that is responsible for functions related to the liaison personnel’s assigned duties.

(2) With the addition of space and cyberspace domains, where actions have global effects,
liaisons from these domains’ proponents become much more important. JFCs and their staffs
should seek assistance in these two domains from two of U.S. Strategic Command’s
(USSTRATCOM) subordinates, Joint Functional Component Command SPACE (JFCC-Space)
and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), to secure critical domain subject matter expertise.

In general, liaison requirements may include (but are not limited to) the following:

(a) Liaison to the CCMD or subordinate Joint Force Commanders.

(b) Liaison to or from supporting commands.

(c) Liaison to or from DOD or other interagency organizations.

(d) Liaison to a U.S. embassy.

(e) Liaison to or from foreign military organizations.

(f) Liaison from JTF components or major subordinate commands

(g) Liaison to and from state or local governments for Defense Support Civilian
Agencies (DSCA) operations.

Some guidelines for the utilization of liaison officers are provided in Figure II-2.

12
 Addressing Challenges to Cross-Domain Synergy

Figure II-2. Liaison Officer Guidelines 24

2. Inter-Agency Considerations. LNOs from non-DOD agencies are sometimes

different from military organizations’ LNOs. Some of these differences are listed below:

a. Most U.S. Government (USG) agencies, IGOs, and NGOs are not equipped and
organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, resulting in the
necessity for joint staff personnel to interface with individuals who are coordinating their
organization’s activities at more than one level.

b. The unique aspects of the interagency, Intergovernmental Organization (IGO), and Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) coordination process require the joint staff to be especially
flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of these entities, including participating host
nations (HNs) and multinational partners.

c. The joint staff must establish organizational structures, processes, and procedures to
consider interagency, IGO, and NGO perspectives and positions into its planning, execution, and
assessment process.

d. Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree
of interagency involvement, the focal point for operational and tactical level coordination with
civilian agencies may occur at the joint staff, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), or the
humanitarian operations center.

24
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, II-18.
13
 Chapter 2

e. The JFC’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is an element that can assist
the JTF with an increased capability to coordinate with other USG agencies and departments.
The JIACG, an element of a JFC’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely,
and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

f. Composed of USG civilian and military experts assigned to joint staffs and tailored to meet
the JFCs’ specific needs, the JIACG provides the capability to collaborate at the operational level
with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACG members participate in theater
campaign planning (including theater security cooperation), contingency planning, and crisis action
planning. They provide a collaborative conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize
joint operations with the efforts of non-military organizations.

3. Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, Working Groups (B2C2WG), Planning Teams, and
Battle Rhythm

a. B2C2WG and planning teams. Effective cross-domain solutions require close

coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The
most common technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the formation of
boards, bureaus, centers, cells, groups, offices, elements, working groups, planning teams, and
other enduring or temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks
in support of mission accomplishment. In designing the joint staff’s B2C2WG schedule, staff
leads must find a balance between the inclusivity which generates innovative solutions and the
efficiency which neatly tailors meetings to time constraints. Distinctions between lethal and
non-lethal effects B2C2WG tend to isolate and marginalize space and cyberspace
capabilities. By eliminating the distinction between lethal and non-lethal effects B2C2WG and
rigidly enforcing meetings’ agendas, staff leads may garner the benefits of both inclusivity and
efficiency.

b. These B2C2WG facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the commander, and
execution by the Joint Force. Although cross-functional in their membership, most
B2C2WG, and planning teams fall under the principal oversight of the staff
directorates. The B2C2WG definitions are included below:

(1) A board is an organized group of individuals within a joint staff, appointed by the
commander (or other authority) that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. Its
responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority, which established the board. Boards
are chaired by a senior leader with members representing major staff elements, subordinate
commands, LNOs, and other organizations as required. There are two different types of boards:

(a) Command Board. A command board is chaired by the commander and its
purpose is to gain guidance or decision from the commander.

(b) Functional Board. A functional board’s purpose is to gain functionally specific

guidance and decisions from the commander (or designated representative) based on a staff
recommendation. These boards often focus on:

14
Addressing Challenges to Cross-Domain Synergy

1. Synchronizing a particular function (e.g., Information Operations (IO), targeting,

collection, and distribution) across multiple planning initiatives.

2. Allocation of resources between ongoing or future operations.

3. Maintaining continuity of purpose across ongoing operations.

(2) A bureau is a long-standing functional organization, with a supporting staff designed to

perform a specific function or activity within a joint staff. A joint visitor’s bureau is an example
of a bureau common to many joint staffs.

(3) A center is an enduring functional organization, with a supporting staff, designed to

perform a joint function within a joint force commander’s headquarters.

(4) A cell is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or

activity within a designated larger organization of a joint force commander’s headquarters. A
cell usually is part of both a functional and traditional staff structures.

(5) A group is an enduring functional organization, which is formed to support a broad HQ

function within a JFC’s HQ. Normally, groups within a joint staff consist of one or more
planning groups. The planning group manages joint staff planning. The functions of joint staff
planning groups include:

(a) Managing designated planning efforts.

(b) Resourcing planning teams.

(c) Coordinating planning activities with other staff directorates.

(d) Managing the subordinate planning teams’ conduct of the operational planning
process.

(6) An office is an enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a
joint staff to coordinate and manage support requirements. An example of an office is the Joint
Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO).

(7) An element is an organization formed around a specific function within a designated

directorate of a joint staff. The subordinate components of an element usually are functional
cells. An example of an element is the Joint Fires Element (JFE).

(8) Working Group (WG) is an enduring or ad hoc organization within a joint staff formed
around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The WG consists of a
core functional group and other staff and component representatives. Members of a WG meet to
discuss specific problems. The WG’s members, then, provide insights on that problem back to
the staff’s decision-making processes. See Figure II-3.

15
 Chapter 2

Figure II-3: Basic Working Group Model 25

(9) Planning Team. A planning team is a functional element formed within the joint staff to
solve problems related to a specific task or requirement. The planning team is not an enduring
element and dissolves upon completion of the assigned task. Planning teams and WGs are
complementary. WGs enhance planning through their provision of functional staff estimates to
multiple planning teams. In contrast, planning teams integrate the functional concepts of multiple
functional WGs into plans and orders.

The staff proponent for a meeting is responsible for clearly communicating the purpose of that
meeting to its participants. From that purpose, other structural components for the meeting will
be derived (e.g. agenda, attendees, inputs, outputs). Communicating a meeting’s organization
and construct can be accomplished through the use of a simple “meeting design.” Drafting and
adhering to a “meeting design” will also ensure participants’ time is used wisely. An example of
a generic “meeting design” is provided in Figure II-4.

25
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, II-13.
16
 Addressing Challenges to Cross-Domain Synergy

Name: Name of Board, working group, etc.

Purpose / Purpose: What does this meeting accomplish?
Frequency Frequency / Location: Date Time Group (DTG) when (in the Battle
Rhythm) and where (potentially, virtual)
Lead J-Code, Chair: Who receives, compiles and delivers information
Composition Attendees: Membership codes, who has to attend (task staff to provide
reps)

Inputs: Suspense DTG for inputs. Staff Outputs: Products and links
Inputs / sections and/or B2C2WG required to to other B2C2WG. DTG
Outputs provide products. when outputs are due.

Agenda
Figure II-4: B2C2WG and planning team - "Meeting Design" 26

After beginning with a core staff and augmenting that staff with the requisite expertise, JFCs
organize the staff and staff leads determine the B2C2WGs to best support the mission. A typical
example of this staff organization, including B2C2WGs, is shown in Figure II-5.

26
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Wargame, Iron Crucible, (Unpublished manuscript dated May 2014).

17
 Chapter 2

Figure II-5: Typical Joint Task Force Staff Organization w/B2C2WG 27

4. Battle Rhythm.

a. The JFCs and their staffs use a number of processes that support the commands’
requirements, activities, and products. The joint staff battle rhythm is especially important for the
efficient management of day-to-day operations. Battle rhythm is the sequencing and execution of
actions and events within a joint staff that are regulated by the flow and sharing of information

27
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters, IV-17.

18
Addressing Challenges to Cross-Domain Synergy

that support all decision cycles.28 A poorly designed battle rhythm will waste staff officers’ time and
paralyze the staff through inefficiency. The benefits of a well-designed battle rhythm include:

(1) Routinizing staff interaction and coordination.

(2) Routinizing commander and staff interaction.

(3) Synchronizing B2C2WG and planning team’s activities.

(4) Facilitating planning by the staff and decision-making by the commander.

b. Factors that Shape a Battle Rhythm. Typically, the chief of staff (COS) manages a
joint staff’s battle rhythm and considers several factors in its design. These factors include (but are
not limited to) the following:
(1) The higher HQ battle rhythm and reporting requirements.

(2) The subordinate HQ battle rhythm requirements.

(3) The duration of the operation.

(4) The intensity of the operation.

(5) The planning requirements within the joint staff (e.g., future plans, future operations, and
current operations).
(6) Rest requirements for the planners (it is important to plan rest into the battle rhythm).

(7) The joint staff’s internal battle rhythm.

Figure II-6, provides an example of what a JFC battle rhythm might look like. As with the
battle rhythm itself, the JFC dictates times based on the situation and operational tempo.

28
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, IV-16.

19
 Chapter 2

Figure II-6: JFC Battle Rhythm Example 29

For more information, refer to Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
With the staff assembled, B2C2WG’s defined, and the Battle Rhythm set, staff leads
should (considering time available) foster creative interaction amongst the HQ’s
diverse communities to cultivate multi-disciplinary thought, leading to cross-domain
solutions.

29
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, IV-24.
20
Addressing Challenges to Cross-Domain Synergy

D. Secondary Challenges

Training shortfalls, education deficiencies, sub-optimal manning, and capability

classification/compartmentalization can create unnecessary friction and stifle cross-domain
synergy.

1. Training and Education. Before staff officers can work efficiently on a joint staff, they
must be prepared through experience, training, and education. Staff officers gain experience
though Service assignments. Service assignments tend to develop expertise in one domain with
only limited exposure to the other domains. Service experience rarely involves exposure to
space and cyberspace capabilities. As a result, staff officers learn to solve problems using the
capabilities in which they are most confident, and overlook some cross-domain solutions.

Training in preparation for assignment to a joint staff is available through: 1) Joint Professional
Military Education Phase 2 (JPME II) offered by the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk,
VA; 2) the onboarding training offered at the joint staff as a new staff officer arrives; and 3)
Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), a large repository of online training lessons maintained by the
Joint Staff J-7. Building familiarity through training and education empowers new joint staff
officers to create innovative cross-domain solutions.

For more information on available training/courses, refer to Joint Knowledge On-line (JKO) at
https://jkodirect.jten.mil/Atlas2/faces/page/login/Login.seam.

2. Manning. Services may opt to assign an unqualified officer to a joint billet rather than
leave it unfilled. This practice degrades staff efficiency as the newly assigned officer requires
time and additional training to develop the skills required by the billet. Close coordination
between the Services’ assignment managers and joint staff personnel sections can help mitigate
this challenge.

The gaining command may opt to assign an officer to a different billet to perform special duties.
This sometimes occurs when commanders divert trained planners from the planning staff. This
practice drains the staff of personnel who are specially trained to develop cross-domain
solutions.

3. Classification/compartmentalization. Classification and compartmentalization hinder

cross-domain planning, especially in the cyberspace domain where capabilities are closely
guarded and security classification guidance is not well understood. To mitigate this challenge,
lead staff officers should include all domain representatives in their activities. While these
domain representatives may not describe their classified capabilities to the entire staff team, they
will build an understanding of the staff’s effort. From that understanding, they can discreetly
work to integrate their capabilities while informing only those with the appropriate clearance and
need-to-know. In this manner, lead staff officers can build cross-domain synergy using
classified capabilities.

21
 CHAPTER 3

CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY VIA THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

(JOPP)

A. General

Planning blends the collective knowledge of the many diverse communities within the joint staff
into a single, coherent plan which accomplishes the JFCs’ missions. It transforms national
strategic objectives into activities by development of operational products that include planning
for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization
of joint forces. This flexible and adaptable process is applicable to planners across all domains
and mirrors Service planning processes.

Planning involves a combination of conceptual planning and detailed processes. Joint

Publication (JP) 5-0 recognizes this dynamic by describing the benefits of operational art and
design in chapter III before describing the JOPP in chapter IV. Conceptual planning enables
cross-domain and cross-functional collaboration which fosters innovative, cross-domain
solutions. Operational art and the application of operational design provide the conceptual basis
for structuring campaigns and operations. 30 Detailed methods are used to help provide form and
function to the planning process. This section will look at how conceptual planning can feed
detailed planning through discussion, debate, and brainstorming. These methods in combination
assist the joint planner understand the problem and to develop creative solutions.

JOPP is an orderly, analytical, structured process, which consists of a set of logical steps to
examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and
produce a plan or order. 31 JOPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the
commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will
appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission and development
and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission.
Joint Operational Planning integrates military actions with those of the other instruments
of national power in time, space, and purpose to achieve the specified objectives.

B. Conceptual Planning

Conceptual planning, or “brainstorming,” occurs early, often, and regularly throughout the
planning process to generate as many different options for solving the military problem as
possible within the allocated time. Brainstorming sessions should inspire creative thinking,
encourage open discussion from all participants, and drive consideration of many, wide-ranging
options. They should assemble experts with differing perspectives to account for all available
capabilities and elicit novel approaches to solving the problem prior to detailed planning. While
less time and fewer planners may be available for Crisis Action Planning (CAP), planners should

30
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011),
IV-1.
31
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-1.

22
Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP

still attempt to allocate time for unstructured, unconstrained thinking. Figure III-1 depicts a
brainstorming technique.

Figure III-1: Creative Brainstorming Technique

Cyberspace, space, and SOF planners are particularly important participants due to their
expertise in employing these specialized capabilities. LNOs from the U.S. interagency and
foreign nations can add unique experiences. The range of perspectives gained by including
many different subject matter experts in the planning process facilitates the development of
cross-domain solutions. These conceptual sessions will provide dividends to planners through
exchanging knowledge, collaborating on like ideas, and debating differences that can lead to
innovative thought and solutions. The results will assist planners during JOPP or CAP to create
the best possible plan in support of the JFC.

C. Detailed Planning

Joint operation planning occurs within the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system,
which is the department-level system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting
structures. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide (CJCSG) 3130 Adaptive Planning and
Execution Overview and Policy Framework defines APEX as “the Joint Capability to create and
revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require.” APEX is supported by
communications and information technology that is used by the Joint Planning and Execution
Community (JPEC) worldwide to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment,
employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint
operations. Figure III-2 shows the JPEC members. All domain planners are members of the
JPEC.

23
 Chapter 3

Figure III-2: Joint Planning and Execution Community 32

JFCs and the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). The JFC gains an understanding of
the operational environment, defines the problem, and develops an operational approach for the
campaign or operation. JFCs communicate their operational approach to their staff,
subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and multinational/nongovernmental entities in
their initial planning guidance. The JFC’s timely communication with subordinates ensures their
approach can be translated into executable plans. This iterative process between the JFC’s
maturing operational approach and the development of the mission and concept of operations
(CONOPS) through JOPP facilitates the continuing development of possible COAs and their
refinement into eventual CONOPS and executable plans.

D. JOPP

Planners use JOPP to translate the creative thinking developed through conceptual planning into
a plan or order. It is a seven-step process that culminates with a published operations order
(OPORD) in CAP and results in an operations plan (OPLAN), concept plan (CONPLAN), Base
Plan, or commander estimate during contingency planning. 33 The JOPP starts with Mission
Analysis (MA) followed by Course of Action (COA) Development, COA Analysis, COA
Comparison, and COA Selection and ends with OPLAN production and rehearsals. Lead
planners direct these efforts, and all supporting planners analyze, simulate, exercise, and
critique to produce the best plan. The resulting plan should support the foreign and/or
domestic theater campaign plan and global synchronizing plans. The JOPP steps are provided at
Figure III-3.

32
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, II-12.
33
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-44.

24
Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP

Figure III-3: Joint Operation Planning Process 34

1. Planning Initiation. “Joint operation planning begins when an appropriate authority

recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual
crisis. At the strategic level, that authority-the President, SecDef, or CJCS-initiates planning by
deciding to develop military options. The Guidance for Employment of Force (GEF), Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and related strategic
documents provide initial guidance for deliberate planning.” 35 Planners from all domains must
understand the guidance in these documents.

Conceptual planning activity is best scheduled during this step in the JOPP. By
deliberately bringing together a diverse range of planners in a free flowing dialogue,
the lead planner can begin to comprehend the requirements of the mission and
potential approaches.

JFCs and lead planners must integrate all domain planners (air, land, maritime, space, and
cyberspace) as soon as possible. It is particularly important to include space and cyberspace
planners due to the unique authority levels, requirements, processes, and time-sensitivities
associated with employment of their domain capabilities. Some space and cyberspace
employment options could require an inordinate amount of time to gain approval for execution.
JFCs and lead planners must understand the capabilities and limitations early in the planning
process.

2. Mission Analysis. Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose
of the operation and allows the JFC to issue guidance. The first step is defining the problem. It
is the most difficult and the most important step. It involves diagnosing the situation to focus
on the real problem and not on its symptoms.

34
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, IV-2.
35
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, IV-2.

25
 Chapter 3

Domain planners will accomplish all the steps outlined in Figure III-4 for their domain. Planners
should understand that the steps do not necessarily happen sequentially. Although some activities
occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing of
information by the JFC and staff, particularly in a CAP situation.

During mission analysis, it is essential that the tasks (specified and implied) and their purposes
are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations (restraints-cannot
do, or constraints-must do) on actions that the JFC or subordinate forces may take are
understood; and the correlation between the JFC’s mission and intent and those of higher and
other commanders is understood. It is at the end of the mission analysis process that all domain
planners produce their staff estimates. They are the result of the Key Inputs and Key Outputs
seen in Figure III-5. During this step, planners build on their understanding of the problem
developed in conceptual planning activities.

Figure III-4: Mission Analysis Activities 36

If planners fail to account for each of the domains - air, land, maritime, space, and
cyberspace - staff estimates will be incomplete and the resulting COAs, OPORDs, and
plans will be sub-optimal.

36
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-6.
26
 Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP

Figure III-5: Mission Analysis 37

Once mission analysis is complete, the JFC receives a mission analysis brief. An example of
how the brief might be structured is provided at Figure III-6.

Figure III-6: Example Mission Analysis Briefing 38

37
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-5.
38
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-15.

27
 Chapter 3

3. Course of Action Development (COA Dev). “A COA is a potential way (solution,

method) to accomplish the assigned mission. The staff develops COAs to provide unique
choices to the commander, all oriented on accomplishing the military end state. A good COA
accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to meet
unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also
gives components the maximum latitude for initiative.” 39 Figure III-7 provides key inputs and
outputs for COA Dev. The products of mission analysis drive COA development. Since the
operational approach contains the JFC’s broad vision to solving the problem, the role of COA
development is to expand this concept with the additional details. These details must describe
who will take the action, what type of military action will occur, when the action will begin,
where the action will occur, why the action is required (purpose), how the action will occur
(method of employment of forces), and upon whom will the action be directed. COAs must be
substantially distinguishable from each other. The JFC’s involvement in the early operational
design process can help ensure that only viable options are considered. If time and personnel
resources permit, different COAs could be developed by different teams to ensure they are
unique. During this step, planners screen the viable options proposed during conceptual
planning and further develop the COAs considered acceptable, feasible, suitable, and distinct.

Figure III-7 Course of Action Development Inputs and Outputs

Bringing the capabilities of different domains together mandates that planners from all domains
participate and characterize the potential contributions and limitations of their area of expertise.

39
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-17.

28
 Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP

Figure III-8: Course of Action Development 40

4. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming. COA analysis is the process of closely
examining potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the JFC and staff to tentatively
identify COAs that are valid, and then compare these COAs. The JFC and staff analyze each
tentative COA separately according to the JFC’s guidance. While time-consuming, COA
analysis should answer two primary questions: Is the COA feasible, and is it acceptable? Key
inputs and outputs of COA analysis are provided in Figure III-8.

Figure III-9: Course of Action Analysis 41

40
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-17.
41
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, V-28.
29
 Chapter 3

Wargaming is the primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargaming is a disciplined process,
with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation. The process considers
friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and
characteristics of the physical environment.

To accurately consider all aspects of the mission, each domain must be adequately represented
for friendly forces, adversary forces, and wargame control groups.

When time permits, planners should wargame each critical event within a proposed COA using
the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction.
Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated more time than
any other step. At a minimum, each retained COA should be wargamed against both the most
likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. When considering these enemy COAs, the analysis
must consider all domains to ensure JFCs have a complete understanding of the COA they
approve for execution.

5. Course of Action Comparison. COA comparison is a subjective process in which

planners study each COA independently and evaluate/compare it against a set of criteria
established by the staff and JFC. The goal is to identify and recommend the COA that has the
highest probability of success against the enemy COA that is of the most concern to the JFC.
Figure III-9 depicts inputs and outputs for COA comparison.

Figure III-10: Course of Action Comparison 42

42
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-37.

30
Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP

JFCs modify the criteria list as required. Normally, staff officers use a matrix, such as
the example in Figure III-10 to compare COAs with respect to their functional areas.

Figure III-11: Staff Estimator Matrix (Intelligence Estimate)

6. COA Approval. In this step, the staff briefs the COA analysis and comparison results,
then recommends a COA to the JFC. The COA brief include the following:

a. Prepare and present the COA decision briefing.

b. Commander selects/modifies the COA.

c. Refine Selected COA.

d. Prepare the Commander’s Estimate.

Figure III-12 depicts the key inputs and outputs of COA approval.

Figure III-12: Course of Action Approval 43

43 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-40.

31
 Chapter 3

Commanders Estimate. The Commander’s estimate is prepared in the format shown in Figure
III-13.

Figure III-13: Commander’s Estimate 44

7. Plan/Order Development. From the JFC’s COA selection, the staff must now produce
an OPLAN or OPORD. Deliberate planning will produce an OPLAN, while CAP typically will
result in an OPORD.

The JFC and staff, in collaboration with mission partners and planners from across all domains,
accomplish plan/order development. The JOPP transforms the selected COA into a Concept of
the Operations (CONOPS) that accomplishes the JFC’s mission. It describes how the actions of
the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and
phased to accomplish the mission, including branches and sequels.

From the CONOP, staff planners from all domains develop (or graphically portray) the OPLAN or
OPORD in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand their
mission, tasks, and other requirements.

The CJCSM 3130.03 series that provide detailed guidance on CONOPS content and format.

44
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-44.
32
 CHAPTER 4
DOMAINS

A. General

1. Introduction

The employment of cross-domain capabilities to exploit adversaries’ weaknesses and achieve

decisive victory is not a new idea, but much has changed in recent years. Cross-domain
operations have expanded beyond the combination of air, land, and maritime operations to
include capabilities delivered from space and cyberspace. Modern technology has vastly
increased the number of capabilities with military applications. These capabilities are no longer
“owned” by a single Service. Moreover, other government organizations and foreign partners
bring unique capabilities to the battle space. While the problems we face are more complex, we
have a greater quantity, quality, and variety of tools with which to fix them – our potential to
achieve cross-domain synergy is at an all-time high. 45

Cross-domain integration requires familiarity with all the domains. For each domain, this
chapter describes important characteristics, how the DOD organizes and operates within that
domain, and the key implications staff officers need to understand. Staff officers can develop
deeper knowledge by studying the references in Appendix D.

B. Air

1. Introduction.
Air operations will be essential for any intervention operation, providing rapid access to the
theater of operations and enabling air superiority in support of land and maritime forces. While
only the richest nations can afford large air forces, the declining costs of unmanned aerial
vehicles afford even non-state actors use of the air domain. Countering adversary Unmanned
Aerial System (UASs) and other novel developments will require ingenuity. 46

2. Unique Air Capabilities and Characteristics.

Beyond interdicting strategic targets in isolation, air superiority provides the ability to prevent
adversary air and missile threats from effectively interfering with operations of friendly air, land,
maritime, space, and special operations forces. This facilitates freedom of action and movement.
The characteristics of air domain capabilities are:

(a) Speed: Modern air assets can move quickly between locations often engaging adversary
forces before other domains’ capabilities are within range. Speed is also a combat multiplier in
the defense allowing quick responses to enemy activities.

45
William O. Odom and Christopher D. Hayes, “Cross-domain synergy: Advancing Jointness”, Joint Forces Quarterly 73 2nd
Quarter 2014, 124.
46
Elizabeth Quintana, Joanne Mackowski, and Adam Smith, Occasional Paper July 2012: Cross-Domain Operations and
Interoperability, (London: Royal United Services Institute www.rusi.org , July 2012), 6.

33
 Chapter 4

(b) Range: Air assets can cross vast distances, deliver munitions, and return to bases outside
the area of operations (AOR). Range and loiter times may be extended through refueling. These
long range capabilities afford the nation a strategic advantage not available to most adversaries.

(c) Detection: Air operations are generally difficult to conceal and vulnerable to enemy air
defenses. However, use of advanced materials and deception operations can reduce detection by
adversary sensors.

(d) Airspace Overflight: Obtaining permission to fly over through another nation’s airspace
can delay operations.

3. Operations.
Within DoD, the United States Air Force (USAF) is principally responsible for strategic,
operational, and tactical air and space assets. 47 While all Services have air capabilities, the
USAF maintains the preponderance of air and space assets. It coordinates with the other services
to plan and execute joint missions.

These forces are tasked through the JOPP process. The USAF functions in both strategic and
operational roles based on requirements and tasking from DOD. The USAF’s organization
reflects its dual support and operational responsibilities. It consists of major commands
(MAJCOMs), groups, wings, and squadrons. The USAF assigns MAJCOMs to CCMDs to
support air operations. The MAJCOMs provide air and space operations planning and
support elements to the AOR’s CCDR to ensure integrated air and space planning.

Gaining and maintaining air superiority is one of the air domain planner’s top priorities.
Attaining air superiority – and air supremacy when required – helps provide both the freedom to
attack and freedom from attack. Operating without it increases risk to maritime and land
operations. The JFC draws air support from USAF Air Expeditionary Wings (AEW’s) from an
assigned Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF), Naval Aviation from Carrier Strike Groups
(CSG’s) and land based Naval Aviation assets, United States Marine Corps (USMC) aviation
assets from an assigned Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), and United States Army
(USA) aviation assets.

The Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC) is responsible for planning joint air
operations as well as providing space planning for the AOR. The JFACC uses the Joint
Operation Planning Process Air (JOPPA) to develop a Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) for
employment of air assets. The JFC normally designates the component with the preponderance
of air assets and the ability to manage air operations as the JFACC. Common JFACC
responsibilities are to:

(a) Develop a JAOP.

(b) Recommend air apportionment priorities.

47
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2012), II-5.

34
 Domains

(c) Allocate and task the joint air capabilities and forces provided by the Service components
based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision.

(d) Provide the JFACC’s guidance in the Air Operations Directive (AOD) for the use of joint
air capabilities. The JFACC updates the AOD periodically and uses it throughout the planning
and execution of the joint air tasking cycle (ATC). Figure IV-1 depicts the ATC process.

Figure IV-1: Joint Air Tasking Cycle 48

(e) Perform the duties of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA). ACA is a commander
designated by the JFC to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace
control system in the airspace control area. JP 3-30, Command and Control Joint Air
Operations, 10 Feb 2014, pg. I-4 describes this function.

(f) Perform the duties of the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC). AADC is responsible
for Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) operations, which include the integrated air defense system
for the joint operations area. DCA and offensive counter-air operations comprise the counter-air
mission, which is designed to attain and maintain the degree of air superiority desired by the
JFC. In coordination with the component commanders, the AADC develops, integrates, and
distributes a JFC-approved joint area air defense plan.

(g) Perform the duties of the Space Coordinating Authority (SCA). See the section on the
space domain for a complete discussion on the SCA.

The JFACC will normally operate from a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). The
CAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated command center and should be staffed by
members from all participating components, to include key staff positions, to fulfill the JFACC’s
responsibilities. Elements common to all CAOCs are a strategy division, combat plans division,
ISR division, air mobility division, and combat operations division.
48
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-30 Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2014), III-21.
35
 Chapter 4

The Joint Air Operations Command and Control System is the C2 system for joint air operations.
The C2 system for air operations will vary depending on the operational area and missions.
The Air Force’s theater air control system, the Army’s air-ground system, the Navy’s composite
warfare commander/Navy tactical air control system, Marine’s air command and control system,
or the special operations air-ground system typically serves as the nucleus for C2 of joint air
operations.

The JFACC uses the entire staff to compare air capabilities and explore adversary and
friendly COAs. The JFACC must ensure that planners collaborate with other components.
Figure IV-2 depicts the joint air operations planning process.

The JAOP integrates and coordinates joint air operations. It addresses all air capabilities and
forces supported by, and in support of, other joint force components. The JFACC’s planners
must anticipate the need to make changes to plans (e.g., sequels or branches) in a dynamic and
time-constrained environment. Planners should include representatives from all components
providing air capabilities or forces in their efforts to enable their effective integration.

JOPPA parallels the JOPP described in JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning. The JFACC utilizes
JOPPA during deliberate and crisis action planning to produce JAOPs, and supporting plans and
orders. The air planning staffs coordinate the JOPPA and the JAOP with the overall plan.

Figure IV-2: Joint Air Operations Planning

36
Domains

The use of personal contact, established communications and information support systems, and
liaison personnel ensures all staff planners have continuous access to the JFACC and the
JFACC’s staff.

For more information on Liaisons, refer to Section 4 of this planner’s guide and JP 3-33, Joint
Task Force Headquarters, 30 July 2012.

4. Planning Considerations. Joint planners integrating air operations into a joint planning
process, should first seek the expertise of:

(a) Air planners on the joint staff (potentially, the space planners as well)

(b) LNOs from the JFACC or Air Force Service Component Command

(c) Lead planners from the JFACC’s staff

From these experts, gaining insight and understanding of available air capabilities enables
planners to merge these capabilities with the other domains.

Understanding the JFACC’s role is to plan joint air operations in support of the developed
JFC COAs is critical for a joint planner. The joint planner must also recognize that most
often the planning and coordination of space assets are directly linked with air.

As a joint staff planner, it is important to have a basic understanding the internal operational flow
of the JFACC and to maintain awareness of the JFACC’s planning progress. The JFACC
operates on an air tasking cycle; to integrate air capabilities with the other domains,
understanding the JFACC’s tasking cycle is crucial.

For more information refer to Appendix D.

C. Land

1. Introduction.
The land domain is where most humans live. By controlling land, military forces can force
adversary forces to retreat, disperse, reposition, or collapse. Occupation of an adversary’s
land enables military forces to sustain influence on the indigenous population over a long period
of time and increase the likelihood of a permanent solution to the military problem. 49

2. Unique Land Capabilities and Characteristics.

Wars have been decided on land since the beginning of recorded history. The characteristics of
fighting on land are:

(a) Extreme variations in climate and terrain – urban, forest, desert, jungle, mountain, and
arctic – present dramatically different operational environments

49
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), ix.

37
 Chapter 4

(b) Presence of people, especially non-combatants, effects options for use of military force.

(c) The ability to sustain operations over long periods of time.

(d) The speed and duration of movement on land is slower and more arduous than movement
by air and sea.

(e) “With respect to non-lethal effects, only land forces have directly useful capability that
can be precisely applied in complex, human terrain. Non-lethal effects work through example
and the potential threat of violence rather than the execution of that threat. Although all services
have the ability to affect their counterparts through security assistance activities, only land forces
can achieve the position (close to the population dispersed in complex land clutter) and duration
(persistence) that permits sustained non-lethal effect.” 50

3. Operations.
The U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command are the DOD’s
premier land forces. Joint Force Land Component Commanders (JFLCCs) lead the fight on land,
but also support operations in other domains. Coordinated planning between the JFC and JFLCC
staffs is critical to achieving cross-domain synergy.

The JFLCC integrates planning for land operations beneath the level of the JFC. The
designation of a JFLCC enhances the integration and synchronization of operational maneuver
with fires by making the JFLCC the supported commander within their area of operations
(AO). 51 The JFLCC’s overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ
forces in support of the JFC’s mission. They include:

(a) Advising the JFC on the employment of forces. Developing, integrating, maintaining,
and sharing with the JFC the land common operational picture (COP) (people, objects, and
events) within the JFLCC’s operational area, as an input to the JFC’s COP.

(b) Developing the joint land operation plan (OPLAN)/operation order (OPORD) in support
of the JFC’s mission and optimizing land operations. The JFLCC issues planning guidance to all
subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes proposed COAs.

(c) Executing land operations as directed by the JFC, which includes adjusting tasks to forces
and capabilities and coordinating with affected component commanders.

(d) Evaluating the results of land operations to include the effectiveness of interdiction
operations, and forwarding these results to the JFC for inclusion in the combat assessment.

(e) Designating the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.

(f) Performing duties of the joint force supported commander for PR, if designated.

50
MG David A. Fastabend, U.S. Army (Retired), Mechanism of Joint Synergy Version 3, (Unpublished manuscript last modified
December 12, 2012)
51
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, I-9.

38
Domains

(g) Providing mutual support to other components by conducting operations such as

suppression of enemy air defenses and suppression of threats to maritime operations.

(h) Coordinating with other functional and Service components’ sustainment support in
accomplishment of JFC objectives. (Such as: Bulk Fuel, Airfield outer security, Theater C2, etc.)

(i) Providing an assistant or deputy to the area air defense coordinator (AADC) for land-
based joint theater integrated air missile defense operations and coordination as determined by
the JFC.

(j) Supporting the JFCs IO by developing the IO requirements that support land operations
and synchronizing the land force information-related capabilities (IRCs) when directed.

(k) Providing inputs into the JFC-approved joint operational area air defense plan (AADP)
and the airspace control plan (ACP).

The interface between JFLCC planners and their peers in other commands is provided below in the
Table below.

JFLCC Interface With Other Joint Force Command and Control Mechanisms
C2 Mechanism Role/Function JFLCC Interface
JFC’s Joint Targeting Meets daily to provide broad targeting JFLCC’s representative
Coordination Board oversight functions that may include but are attends JTCB meetings to
(JTCB) not limited to coordinating targeting represent land component
information, providing targeting guidance interests. JFLCC’s targeting
and priorities, and refining the Joint coordination board provides
Intelligence Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). input.
JFC’S Joint Planning Group Meets daily or as required to conduct JFLCC’s representative
(JPG) crisis action planning (to include course participates in all planning
of action development and refinement), activities.
coordination of joint force operation order
development, and planning for future
operations (e.g., transition, termination,
follow-on).
JFC’s Joint Intelligence An interdependent, operational intelligence JFLCC’s J-2 and staff
Operation Center organization at the combatant command or maintain daily communication
joint task force (if established) level, that is with the JIOC to provide,
integrated with national intelligence centers, request, and receive
and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence products as
intelligence impacting military operations needed.
planning, execution, and assessment.
JFC’s Information Meets daily or as required to integrate and JFLCC’s representative to this
Operations Cell synchronize information-related capabilities IOWG participates and
with other elements of the operation plan. coordinates with the JFLCC’s
JPG representative and other
staff members.

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 Chapter 4

JFC’s Joint Communicates JFC’s priorities and JFLCC’s representative

Transportation Board adjudicates competing requirements for participates.
intra-theater lift assets and helps resolve
other issues that negatively impact the
Defense Transportation System.
JFC’s Joint Movement Coordinates the employment of all means JFLCC’s representative
Center of transportation (including that provided participates.
by allies or host nations) daily to support
the concept of operations.
JFC’s Joint Petroleum Plans and manages wholesale theater bulk JFLCC’s logistics directorate
Office petroleum support and develops the (J-4) coordinates and provides
petroleum logistic support plan. assistance as needed.
JFC’s Civil-Military Meets daily and will coordinate all civil- JFLCC’s representative
Operations Center military operations (CMO) among other participates.
USG departments and agencies,
intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, coalition,
and host nation members; and plays an
integration and synchronization role with
other elements of the operation plan.
JFACC’s Targeting Processes all potential targets to balance JFLCC provides input and
Effects Team component priorities with the JFC’s participates, coordinates
objectives. Competing concerns are with targeting effects team.
prioritized against available assets to
produce the JIPTL, apportionment
recommendations, and close air support
allocation.
JFACC’s Air Tasking Produces a tasking document transmitted to JFLCC provides input,
Order (ATO) Development components, subordinate units, and C2 participates, and coordinates
Processes agencies on projected sorties, capabilities, for JFLCC-retained air
and specific missions. The ATO normally assets (i.e. rotary and
provides specific instructions to include call available fixed wing).
signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as
well as general instructions.
Airspace Control Produces an ACO transmitted to JFLCC provides input and
Authority Airspace Control components, subordinate units, and C2 participates.
Order (ACO) agencies on joint use of airspace. The Marine Direct Air Support
Development Process ACO normally provides specific Center provides input and
instructions for airspace de-confliction by participates.
time, altitude, or routes as well as general - Army Theater Air
instructions. Operations Group provides
input and participates.

40
Domains

Joint Security Coordinates and oversees overall security JFLCC security coordinator is
Coordination Committee operations within the AOR/ JOA. Monitors typically designated principal
(JSCC) emergency service, force protection, staff officer for the planning of
antiterrorism, physical security, and base joint security operations
/base cluster plans. throughout the AOR/JOA.

Joint Lines of Assesses and reports LOC status and JFLCC/JSCC leads and
Communication Security security capability shortfalls. provides transportation,
Board intelligence, and provost
marshal representatives.

Joint Deployment and A combatant command movement control JFLCC coordinates and utilizes
Distribution Operations organization designed to synchronize and JDDOC.
Center optimize national and theater multimodal
resources for deployment, distribution, and
sustainment.

Joint Interagency Interagency staff group that establishes JFLCC’s representative

Coordination Group regular, timely, collaborative working participates.
relationship between civilian and military
organizations and other agencies.

CCMD’s Joint Combines input from United States Cyber JFLCC’s representative
Cyberspace Center Command and CCMDs to provide a coordinates to provide/request
regional/functional cyberspace situation cyberspace operations products.
awareness/common operational picture.
Facilitates the coordination and de-
confliction of CCDR directed cyberspace
operations.

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 Chapter 4

Legend
ACO airspace control order JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list
AOR area of responsibility JOA joint operations area
ATO air tasking order JPG joint planning group
BCD battlefield coordination detachment JSCC joint security coordination center
C2 command and control
JTCB joint targeting coordination board J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander MARLE Marine liaison element
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC: Joint Force Land Component Commander

Table IV-1: JFLCC Interface with Other Joint Forces C2 Mechanism 52

4. Planning Considerations. The planning efforts required to command and control joint
land operations are extensive. The JFC and JFLCC have processes and procedures to optimize the
use of all capabilities and facilitate cross-domain coordination. 53 Planners integrating land
operations into a joint planning process, should first seek the expertise of:

(a) Land planners on the joint staff.

(b) LNOs from the JFLCC.

(c) LNOs from the Army and Marine Corps Service Component Commands.

(d) LNOs from the CCMD’s theater special operations command (TSOC).

(e) Lead planners from the JFLCC’s or the TSOC’s staff.

These experts can provide information on available land capabilities and how to combine their
effects with other capabilities based in other domains.

Land forces provide much of the support for other domains’ forces (bulk fuel, base security, long
haul transportation, theater network support, air defense artillery, etc.) requiring coordination
with other components and prioritization by the JFC.

Land forces provide the ultimate fidelity on battle damage assessment.

Every activity on land requires security - every patrol, every new base, and every convoy - must
have a land security force, which comes from the overall budget of land forces.

For more information refer to Appendix D.

52
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, II-19.
53
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 18.

42
Domains

D. Maritime

1. Introduction.
Despite an exponential rise in air traffic, over 90 percent of all freight is still shipped by sea.
Piracy in the Horn of Africa and in the Straits of Malacca punctuate the need to secure maritime
trade routes. In addition, with 80 percent of the world’s population living within 100 miles of
the sea, landlocked theaters will be an exception. Furthermore, due to the high bandwidth
capacity of fiber-optic cables, much of the world’s cyberspace traffic flows through the maritime
domain via undersea cables. The ability to access the maritime domain enhances a nation’s
ability to interact with other nations. The application of naval power can also deny
adversaries this same capability.

Maritime power is military, diplomatic, and economic power or influence exerted through use of
the sea. The JFC employs maritime power to influence events on land directly through power
projection (e.g., amphibious assault) or indirectly through control of the maritime domain.

2. Unique Maritime Capabilities and Characteristics.

(a) Movement is relatively inexpensive and constrained only by land formations (islands,
coastlines) and water depth.

(b) Sea lines of communication are vulnerable to subsurface attack. The vast spaces of the
ocean can hide naval forces from detection, however movement on the ocean surface is more
easily detected with modern sensing capabilities.

(c) Maritime capabilities can operate far from home bases more flexibly and at greater
distances than air forces. Additionally, they can assault land objectives from the sea.
However, sea-based capabilities have distinct range and sortie generation disadvantages relative
to land-based capabilities.

(d) The maritime domain also has unique economic, diplomatic, military, and legal
aspects (see figure IV-3). 54 Diplomatic and political issues related to the maritime domain have
increased as many nations have tried to extend their claims over offshore resources. These
claims have led to disputes over the extent of maritime borders and Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs). This is highlighted in diplomatic and legal tension over some archipelagic
waters and international straits. Naval forces may face constraints and restrictions when
operating in territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelves claimed by coastal
states.

54
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, (Washington, DC:
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), I-7.
43
 Chapter 4

Figure IV-3: Legal Boundaries of the Ocean and Airspace 55

(e) The world’s oceans contain about 200 chokepoints and lines of communications
(LOCs) control of which can restrict access or disrupt passage. In the event of regional conflict,
small coastal navies operating in the proximity of these chokepoints can challenge naval
operations and merchant shipping.

3. Operations.
The five core capabilities of U.S. naval forces are: all domain access, deterrence, sea control,
power projection, and maritime security. Additional naval capabilities include foreign
humanitarian assistance (FHA), naval aviation, strategic sealift, sea basing, and homeland
security support. These unique capabilities afford several options to creatively employ the
maritime domain in JFCs’ warfighting efforts. Below are listed several constructs the Joint
Force employs to address the uniqueness of the maritime domain.

(a) Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) are operations performed with maritime forces
and other forces assigned, attached, or made available, in support of the JFC’s operation
or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the Joint Force. The JFC may
designate a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) to C2 a JMO. As a
functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces
and forces made available for tasking.

(b) The degree of integration and coordination between components varies depending on the
situation. For some JMO, the JFMCC will likely operate without the support of other component
forces (e.g., submarine operations in blue water) whereas for others there may be detailed

55
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, I-7.

44
Domains

integration between components (e.g., attack of enemy submarines in port or their supporting
critical infrastructures ashore).

(c) The JFMCC’s staff planning process is consistent with the JOPP as outlined in JP 5-0,
Joint Operation Planning and in conjunction with JP 3-32 Command and Control for Joint
Maritime Operations. The JFMCC’s staff uses a synchronization process similar to a JFC’s staff
to ensure coordination between subordinates. 56

(d) JFMCCs and their staffs not only contribute to the JFC’s planning efforts but also
contribute to the development of other components’ and multinational supporting plans and
OPORDs. Therefore, maritime staffs should be well versed in the JOPP and multinational
procedures. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements
(STANAGs) and Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) may impact the maritime components. 57
Maritime staffs may need to refer to NATO publications, such as AJP-3.1, Allied Joint Maritime
Operations, AJP-3.3.3, Air Maritime Co-ordination, Maritime Tactical Publication-01,
Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures, and Maritime Procedural
Publication-01, Multinational Maritime Voice Reporting Procedures.

(e) A JFC should consider the advantages of establishing a sea base to stage or support joint
operations. Joint sea basing reduces the footprint ashore and allows support and sustainment to
be landed in sufficient quantities, as required, without necessarily placing it in a vulnerable and
essentially immobile location. Additional information related to establishing, maintaining, and
operating from a sea base can be found in Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-62M, Sea Basing.

(f) Most maritime platforms are multi-mission capable and are routinely multi-tasked to
support different missions and commanders. JFMCCs recognize and prioritize requirements,
address conflicts and limitations, and integrate the various capabilities of assigned and
attached forces and those made available for tasking.

(g) Maritime forces use some unique C2 structures. While afloat, Marines and SOF remain
independent of the ship’s captain, but utilize the ship’s communication systems. Similarly, a
CSG commander will have separate commanders for the carrier and the carrier’s air wing.

For more information on Maritime Operations and Legal boundaries, refer to Joint Publication
(JP) 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, 7 August 2013.

4. Planning Considerations.
Joint planners integrating maritime operations into a joint planning process should first seek the
expertise of:

(a) Maritime planners on the joint staff.

(b) LNOs from the JFMCC.

(c) LNOs from the Service Component Commands of applicable maritime Services.
56
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, xxv.
57
For further information refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122 Series, Joint Operation Planning
and Execution System; CJCSM 3130 Series, Adaptive Planning and Execution, JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning; approved joint terminology; and the amphibious planning process contained in JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.
45
 Chapter 4

(d) Lead planners from the JFMCC’s staff.

These experts can provide information on available maritime capabilities and how to combine
their effects with other capabilities based in other domains.

Joint planners should understand the implications of multi-mission tasking (e.g., Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW), Surface Tactical Warfare (STW), CAS, Maritime Air Support, sea control) on
individual platforms and personnel.

Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the extent of a planner’s understanding of the maritime
domain. Accurate MDA is a key enabler of an active, layered maritime defense. MDA
facilitates expeditious and precise actions by the JFC, the JFMCC, and subordinate commanders.

For more information refer to Appendix D.

E. Space

1. Introduction.
Space is becoming increasingly important and contested. In this global common, over sixty
nations rely on space assets for a growing number of services. Anti-satellite technologies,
destructive space weather, and damage from space debris potentially threaten space assets. JFCs
and their staffs must plan for the disruption of space services. 58

2. Unique Space Forces Capabilities and Characteristics.

Joint staff officers must understand the environment in which space forces operate and their
relationship to military operations. These forces have the following unique characteristics:

(a) There are no geographical boundaries in space. As a Global Commons, space

overcomes the international law aspect of a nation’s territorial sovereignty.

(b) Satellites are subject to the laws of orbital mechanics. Adjustments to orbits expend fuel
and reduce asset life span.

(c) Environmental considerations place demands on satellites’ characteristics to include size,

weight, and power further hindering the spacecraft’s performance and life span.

(d) Though space is infinite in expanse, certain altitudes and orbital patterns are
advantageous. These portions of space are becoming crowded.

(e) Electromagnetic spectrum access is vital to space operations because it is the sole
medium for space-based assets to transmit and receive information and/or signals. Therefore,
JFCs must sufficiently control the EMS to interact with space systems. 59

58
Quintana et al., Occasional Paper July 2012: Cross-Domain Operations and Interoperability, 6.
59
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), x.

46
Domains

(f) Space is no longer a domain exclusively transited by state actors. Many non-state actors
maintain assets in orbit and often military capabilities (Iridium satellite phones, Virgin space
tourism, etc.) employ these non-state assets.

3. Operations.

(a) Space Mission Areas: The space mission areas are: 60

1. Space Situational Awareness (SA) characterizes capabilities within the space

domain.

2. Space Force Enhancement operations improve the effectiveness of military

operations. They include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; integrated tactical
warning and attack assessment; command, control, and communications; position, velocity, time,
and navigation; and environmental monitoring. 61

3. Space Support provides essential capabilities, activities, tasks, and functions vital
to operate and sustain all elements of space forces. Its components include Satellite Operations,
Space Lift, and Space Forces Reconstitution.

4. Space Control enables the freedom of action for friendly forces and, when
required, negates or defeats interfering adversary capabilities and efforts. Space Control
involves the offensive and defensive actions required for U.S. and friendly forces’ space
operations. Offensive control entails multiple negating actions to include deception, disruption,
denial, degradation, or destruction.

5. Space Force Application covers the execution of combat operations in, through,
and from space. It includes ballistic missile defense and employment of intercontinental ballistic
missiles.

The most important mission area for a joint staff planner to consider is Space Force
Enhancement. While the other mission areas are important, the Geographic Combatant
Command (GCC) and JTF planners will have little control over Space Force Application or
Space Support. Space Force Enhancement increases joint force effectiveness by enhancing
operational awareness, providing joint force support, and increasing the force’s combat potential.
Its critical advantage is reducing confusion inherent within combat. Space Force Enhancement
also gives JFCs visibility into denied areas and persistence not obtainable by air, land, or
maritime capabilities. However, space force enhancement dependency is a potential
vulnerability. Planning redundancy for space-dependent systems is crucial when
adversaries disrupt, degrade, or deny joint force space capabilities and operations.

For further information on Space Missions refer to JP 3-14 and AF Annex 3-14, Space
Operations.

60
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, II-1.
61
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,(Washington, DC: U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010 (as amended through 15 March 2015)), 226.

47
 Chapter 4

(b) Space Organizational Structure: Command and control of space assets and capabilities
differs from C2 in the traditional domains in that it is globally focused on supporting worldwide
missions and requirements. Planners must coordinate with Commander, United States Strategic
Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) for use of space assets. Consolidating the DOD’s space
responsibilities under USSTRATCOM establishes the unity of command, effort, and purpose
needed to achieve joint force and national security objectives. 62 CDRUSSTRATCOM delegates
the daily management of space operations to the Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command-Space (JFCC-Space) but maintains authority to delegate operational control
(OPCON) or tactical control (TACON). GCCs have the following responsibilities:

1. Provide their prioritized space requirements to CDRUSSTRATCOM.

2. Provide joint force guidance and objectives for space operations for integration
into plans and annexes.

3. Specify Offensive Space Control (OSC) and Defensive Space Control (DSC)
objectives, and provide guidance for the employment of C2 systems, communications systems,
intelligence, logistics, and attack operations for inclusion in plans and annexes.

4. Consolidate, validate, and prioritize subordinates and component commanders’

space operations requirements.

5. Consider designating a space coordinating authority (SCA) and delegating

appropriate authorities for planning, integrating, and coordinating space operations within the
operational area. 63

(c) Space Organizational Structure: The SCA is responsible for all aspects of integrating
space capabilities and coordinating joint space operations. The SCA’s roles and responsibilities
may include:

1. Planning, coordinating, and synchronizing space operations in the operational

area and incorporating input from the joint force staff and components.

2. Maintaining situational awareness of theater space operations and coordinating

with other commands’ SCAs or JFCC-SPACE to integrate theater space operations into DOD
space operations.

3. Consolidating space requirements through the JFC for coordination. 64

For further information on Space Force Command, Roles and Responsibilities refer to JP 3-14,
Space Operations and AF Annex 3-14, Space Operations.

62
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, III-1.
63
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations, III-1.
64
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations, III-2.

48
Domains

4. Planning Considerations.

Joint planners integrating space operations into a joint planning process should first seek the
expertise of:

(a) Space planners on the joint staff (and potentially air planners).

(b) The JFC’s designated SCA.

(c) LNOs from JFCC-SPACE or USSTRATCOM.

(d) Lead planners from JFCC-SPACE.

These experts can provide information on available space capabilities and how to combine their
effects with other capabilities based in other domains.

Considering space operations and assets are global in nature, it is important to understand
these assets can and will be used simultaneously for multiple commanders.

Space operations approvals and capabilities require long lead times. Consider and request space
assets and capabilities early to ensure effective integration.

Anticipate degraded access to the space domain. Understand which systems rely on space and
plan alternatives.

Expect taskings to either protect friendly ground stations or target adversary ground stations.
While such taskings may drain other domains’ combat power, they ultimately further the JFC’s
objectives.

Continuous information flow on space capabilities allows planners at different levels to

proactively assess subordinate commanders’ needs against available assets.

For further information on Space Planning refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations and AF Annex 3-
14, Space Operations.

For more information refer to Appendix D.

F. Cyberspace

1. Introduction.
The ability to operate in cyberspace has emerged as a vital national security requirement. The
growing impact of information warfare on military operations further increases the importance of
cyberspace. As technological capabilities and instantaneous access to information continue to
grow, the opportunities for real-time communication and information sharing expand. These
capabilities are vital to economic and national development. However, reliance on these
capabilities demands protection of the networks and information. Adversary activity in

49
 Chapter 4

cyberspace could threaten the United States’ dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space
domains as they become increasingly interconnected and dependent on cyberspace technology. 65

Cyberspace comprises the Internet, networks, systems, associated peripherals, and users in
the information environment. This interconnected environment is important to global
governance, commercial, military, and national security. A major challenge for the United States
and its allies is protecting and defending the environment from adversaries. The host of
cyberspace adversaries and threats include state actors, non-state actors, criminal organizations,
general users, rogue individual hackers, and, in many cases, internal personnel. Conversely,
many of these threats may also be vulnerable through cyberspace.

2. Unique Cyberspace Capabilities and Characteristics.

(a) Cyberspace is a global enabler for expedient, dynamic information exchange impacting
all aspects of life. It allows instantaneous information flow across the globe for financial
transactions as well as the movement and tracking of products and goods. However, it also
allows adversaries to access this information and disrupt vital operations from any location.
Cyberspace is difficult to regulate due to ease of accessibility. From a military perspective,
cyberspace activities rarely require movement of forces, allowing engagement from extended
stand-off ranges. It also enables the influence of populations that are inaccessible through the
other domains.

(b) Can be reverse engineered: Unlike munitions, which are normally destroyed upon use,
cyberspace activities include code that can be saved, analyzed, and recoded for use against allies
or friendly nations. Planners must account for the possibility of a “boomerang effect” in which
cyber activities are turned against the originator through reverse engineering.

(c) No Single National/International Ownership: While someone owns each physical

component of cyberspace, the whole of cyberspace is not under any single nations’ or entities’
complete control. The infrastructure is a disparate combination of public and private networks
without standardized security or access controls. This arrangement enables free information
flow, but the lack of controls hinders global accountability, standardization, and security.

(d) Lack of Cooperation/Collaboration: The lack of international laws and regulations

governing the environment complicates responses to actions in this domain. The difficulty in
tracing the source of a cyberattack makes them easily deniable, especially if conducted by
individual “hackers.” Further hindering collaboration is the tendency to deny that a cyberspace
attack has occurred to prevent loss of trust in an organization’s cyber security measures.

(e) Low Cost: Cyberspace is the most affordable domain through which to attack the United
States. Viruses, malicious code, and training are readily available over the Internet at no cost.
Adversaries can develop, edit, and reuse current tools for network attacks. Inexpensive tools and
training allow an adversary to compete without costly ships, aircraft, or missiles. Furthermore,
an adversary can impose significant financial burdens on nations that rely heavily on cyberspace

65
LCDR Sean Brandes, U.S. Navy, “The Newest Warfighting Domain: Cyberspace”, Synesis: A Journal of Science,
Technology, Ethics, and Policy. Published 2013. Accessed June 2015, G:90
http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol4_g/Brandes_2013_G90-95.pdf

50
Domains

by forcing them to invest in cyberspace defense. Currently, “military-grade” cyberspace

capabilities remain too expensive for most malign actors, but they can buy relatively inexpensive
services of professional hackers.

(f) Volatile: Successful cyberspace attacks depend on vulnerabilities within the adversary’s
network. Identifying these vulnerabilities and creating cyberspace capabilities sometimes
require great expense. If an adversary discovers the targeted network’s vulnerability and closes
it, the cyberspace attack technique is rendered immediately and unexpectedly useless despite the
development expense. For this reason, great care must be taken to prevent alerting adversaries to
vulnerabilities in their networks.

(g) Speed: Cyberspace operations occur quickly. However, preparation for those operations
is often extensive. An intense study of the adversary’s network may be required to learn system
specifications and understand patterns of life. Therefore, a cyberspace unit operating on one
adversary’s networks may not be able to shift focus to another target without substantial
preparation.

(h) Unintentional cascading effects: Another unique characteristic of cyberspace is the

potential for unintended cascading effects. Capabilities and munitions in the natural domains
lose momentum the greater distance from impact. However, physical distance means very little
in cyberspace. While cyberspace capabilities are developed and evaluated in computer labs and
cyberspace ranges, there can never be complete assurances as to how a capability will behave or
where it might spread when introduced to the great expanse of cyberspace.

(i) Layers: Cyberspace consists of three layers: Physical Network, Logical Network, and
Cyber-Persona as reflected in Figure IV-4.

The Three Layers of Cyberspace

Physical Network Logical Network Cyber-Persona

Layer Layer Layer

Figure IV-4: Three Layers of Cyberspace 66

66
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12 (R) Cyberspace Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2013, I-3.

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 Chapter 4

The physical layer includes all hardware assets – computers, servers, routers, satellite
links, etc. – enabling the movement of information in and through cyberspace. Related to the
physical layer is cyberspace’s reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), where much of
cyberspace’s code moves and is, therefore, vulnerable to jamming or manipulation. The logical
layer is the abstract portion of the physical layer. This layer reflects information represented and
accessible in multiple locations through Internet Protocol and uniform resource locator (URLs).
The cyber-persona layer is an extension of the logical layer and represents the users, entities,
and organizations on the network. This layer applies the same rules that govern the logical
layer. 67 Adversaries might attack any of these layers to disrupt, degrade, or destroy
cyberspace capability. Conversely, each of these layers presents a means to attack
adversaries’ use of cyberspace. The table below highlights differences and similarities
between the cyberspace domain, and those of land, air, and sea.

Table TIV-2: Cyberspace vs. Traditional Warfare Domain Characteristics 68

Control of cyberspace is a vital component of national security. The importance of

cyberspace operations is on par with kinetic operations. 69

3. Operations.
Cyberspace is similar to the space domain in its global expanse. Because the information
environment affects all aspects of society, control of cyberspace must consider the global
ramifications of actions within this domain. Cyberspace, unlike the other domains, does not
yet have a permanently defined C2 structure.

(a) DOD information networks (DODIN) are the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of
information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support
personnel, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services,
software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national
security systems. 70

67
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12 (R) Cyberspace Operations, I-3.
68
Brandes, “The Newest Warfighting Domain: Cyberspace”, G:94.
69
Brandes, “The Newest Warfighting Domain: Cyberspace”, G:93.
70
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12 (R) Cyberspace Operations, A-51.
52
Domains

(b) The DOD sub-divides all cyberspace operations in to one of three categories: DODIN
Operations, Defensive Cyberspace Operations, or Offensive Cyberspace Operations. Figure IV-5
depicts DOD’s view of the range of actions in cyberspace.
• Cyberspace Security – install, (re)configure, train, update, monitor, etc. in order to maintain configuration, integrity, and
availability.
• Cyberspace Defense – detect, characterize, counter, mitigate specific threat within a defended network. These are the actions we
take when our cyber security has failed.
• Cyberspace Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) – monitor a target in support of future operations.
• Cyberspace Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) – modify the cyber terrain to prepare for future operations.
• Cyberspace Attack – functional denial, or manipulation leading to denial in Cyberspace or other domains.
• Defensive Cyberspace Operations Response Actions (DCO-RA)
• Defensive Cyberspace Operations Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM)

Offensive Cyberspace Ops DODIN Ops

Defensive Cyberspace Ops
DCO-RA DCO-IDM

Cyberspace Cyberspace Cyberspace Cyberspace Cyberspace

Attack OPE ISR Defense Security

First order effects outside First order effects inside

DODIN DODIN

Figure IV-5: Cyberspace Actions

1. DODIN operations (DODIN Ops): Operations to design, build, control, secure,

operate, maintain, and sustain DOD networks to create information assurance on the DODIN. 71

2. Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO): Passive and active CO intended to

preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect DOD data,
networks, and capabilities and other designated systems. 72

a) DCO Internal Defensive Measure (DCO-IDM) activities involve assessing the

DODIN for advanced internal threats and the responses to those threats. IDM responds to
unauthorized alert information and activity occurring in the DODIN.

b) DCO Response Action (DCO-RA) activities occur external to the DODIN to

counter those ongoing or imminent threats to the DODIN, DOD cyberspace capabilities, and other
systems. RA’s deliberate defensive events must be authorized in accordance with standard rules
of engagement (ROE) and other rules. 73

3. Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO): Cyberspace operations intended to

project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace. 74

71
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12(R) Cyberspace Operations, II-3.
72
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12(R) Cyberspace Operations, II-2.
73
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12(R) Cyberspace Operations, II-3.
74
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12(R) Cyberspace Operations, II-2.

53
 Chapter 4

The authorities for performing defensive and offensive operations are different. For DODIN
Ops and DCO-IDM, the Joint Force may operate without external coordination. However,
DCO-RA and OCO require more coordination with other governmental agencies and to prevent
the Joint Force from exceeding its authority by infringing on the Department of Homeland
Security’s or Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) authority. Centralized control allows authorities
to consider potential second and third order effects.

For additional information on cyberspace related authorities refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace

Operations.

(c) Organization Structure: The current cyberspace command structure begins with the
POTUS and the SecDef. Below the SecDef, USSTRATCOM and its sub-unified command,
USCYBERCOM, serve as global synchronizers for cyberspace operations. USCYBERCOM has
several subordinates, including a Joint Force Headquarters-DODIN to focus on DODIN
operations and service component commands (Marine Forces Cyber Command, U.S. Air Force
Cyber Command, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, and U.S. Army Cyber Command). Additionally,
the Joint Force is developing four varieties of cyber mission forces (CMF) to conduct cyberspace
operations:

1. The Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) is the national element for
cyberspace activities. CNMF and its associated teams are focused on overall national strategic
cyberspace threats that potentially stem from all AOR.

2. Cyber Combat Mission Forces (CCMF) are tasked according to regions and
responsible for providing offensive cyberspace operations when approved and authorized
through the proper authorities.
3. Cyber Support Teams (CST) are the unit assigned within the CCMF to provide
developers, analysts, programmers, linguists, and engineers in support of offensive operations.

4. Cyber Protection Teams (CPT) are assigned across DOD to provide defensive
operations across the DODIN and, sometimes, outside the DODIN. This team manages,
monitors, and defends the assigned networks and applications within their assigned region while
continuously coordinating with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). CPTs are
imbedded at all levels of the DODIN to ensure defensive mechanisms are in place and working
correctly.

To C2 the different CCMTs, USCYBERCOM dual-hatted its service component commands as

Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C). In this capacity, those commands are assigned

54
Domains

CCMTs and cooperate with two or three designated CCMDs to plan and conduct cyberspace
operations. Internal to each CCMD, a Joint Cyberspace Center (JCC) is established to
coordinate the cyberspace operations relevant to that CCMD. Currently, there is no standardized
JCC structure describing how a JCC is manned. Nor are there standardized operating procedures
dictating how a JCC interacts with mission partners. Consequently, CCMDs have taken different
approaches to developing their JCC, including differences in how much manpower to assign the
JCC and which staff directorate should serve as proponent (J-3 or J-6).

SecDef

USSTRATCOM CCMDs x8
JCC

Sub-unified USMC SVC CPT

JTFs USAF SVC
USCYBERCOM CMDs Component
USN SVC
Component
USA SVC
Component
Component
JFHQ- JFHQ-C
CNMF JFHQ-C
DODIN CCMD 1
JFHQ-C
CCMD 1
MARFOR Planning Tm
JFHQ-C
CCMD
Planning
CCMD 2 Tm1
CYBER
AFCYBER CCMD 1
CCMD 2 Tm
Planning
Planning Tm
FLTCYBER
CCMD Planning
CCMD
Planning
3 Tm2 Tm
ARCYBERCCMD CCMD
3 Tm
Planning 2
Planning Tm
Planning
CCMD
Planning Tm3 Tm
CCMD
Planning Tm3
Planning Tm

CCMD Combatant Command

CNMF Cyber National Mission Force
CPT Cyber Protection Team
JCC Joint Cyberspace Center
JFHQ-C Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber
JTF Joint Task Force
JFHQ-DODIN Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information Network
SecDef U.S. Secretary of Defense
USCYBERCOM U.S. Cyber Command
USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command44

Figure IV-6: Cyberspace C2 Concept

4. Planning Considerations. Joint planners integrating cyberspace operations into a joint

planning process should first seek the expertise of:

(a) Cyberspace planners on their joint staff

(b) Their CCMD’s JCC

(c) LNOs from USCYBERCOM or USSTRATCOM

(d) The commander of a CPT assigned to their CCMD

(e) Lead planners from the JFHQ-C with planning responsibility for their CCMD
From these experts, gaining insight and understanding of available cyberspace capabilities
enables planners to merge these capabilities with the other domains. Avoid symmetric
thinking. Merely because the adversary attacks through cyberspace, does not restrict the Joint
Force to solely cyberspace response options. Cyberspace has a physical layer.

55
 Chapter 4

Similar to the space domain, cyberspace capabilities require long approval chains and,
sometimes, long development timelines. Identify potential cyberspace needs early in the
planning process and set cyberspace planners working to secure the necessary permissions.

Tailor requests for cyberspace operations. Given cyberspace operations’ global nature and
potential for cascading effects, authorities rarely grant broad permissions. Planners should craft
requirements which are specific (used only in certain situations, limited in duration, and limited
networks affected). By requesting a discrete operation, planners increase the likelihood of
approval and, potentially, shorten approval time. Planners should coordinate and socialize
desired cyber activities with the IA as early as possible in planning.

Conducting cyberspace battle damage assessment (BDA) through cyberspace is difficult. A

friendly cyberspace operator may report mission accomplishment. However, unlike physical
munitions, there will not be a blast crater to verify results. Planners must use other ways to the
measure success of a cyberspace operation. One approach is to layer assessments. For example,
if a cyberspace operator reports disarming an adversary through cyberspace, probe the
adversary’s system with a remotely piloted vehicle before launching a risky major assault.

All cyberspace operations require branch plans to accomplish similar effects. Because
OCO are often disapproved and susceptible to failure, planners must understand the intent of
those cyberspace operations and develop a branch plan to accomplish that intent through other
domains. Similarly, joint staff officers must understand that most of today’s operating systems
are vulnerable to attack. The Joint Force should prepare to operate with degraded cyberspace
capabilities.

Many cyberspace capabilities are highly classified to avoid exposing vulnerabilities. Lack of
sufficient security clearances will hinder a planner’s ability to integrate cyberspace capabilities.
To mitigate this challenge, lead planners should include cyberspace experts in planning team
meetings to inform them of the plan’s objectives and intent. This enables planners to discreetly
integrate classified capabilities while informing only those with the appropriate clearance and
need-to-know.

For more information refer to Appendix D.

G. Wrap-Up

In today’s dynamic strategic environment the United States faces adversaries capable of
integrated attacks from multiple domains. To counter this, Joint Forces must conduct cross-
domain operations to engage adversaries where the Joint Force holds advantage and present them
with multiple problems.

The planner’s guide provides a ready reference for integrating all domains during planning and
other staff activities. It identifies key internal and external relationships officers should establish
upon joining a joint staff and suggests methods for developing them. Ultimately, the guide will
contribute to the achievement of synergy through employment of efficient, effective cross-
domain operations.

56
Domains

Intentionally Blank

57
 APPENDIX A
RECOMMENDED PLANNING PRACTICES

The following are “Suggestions for Planners,” that may make the job a little easier:

1. If possible, get frequent feedback and guidance from the Joint Force Commander. Get this
feedback throughout the planning process and not just during the formal interactions or
decision briefings.

2. People are not inclined to read lengthy documents thoroughly. Normally, they will only read
what applies to themselves directly. The whole plan may be long. But each section needs to
be as brief as possible. When detail and long explanations are required, put them into
Annexes and Appendixes. This also means the base plan should be very brief, built on simple
task and purpose statements.

3. The role of “Assumptions” in planning is more important than JP 5-0 indicates. They must
be few in number, account for gaps in information that cannot be ignored, and have a
collection plan to confirm or deny them. A failed assumption realized means a new plan is
required.

4. The planning process is more important than the plan. The planning team and collective
understanding developed during the planning process are critical to effective adaptation
during execution.

5. The planning staff is a team – build it carefully and train it regularly.

6. Leading the planning process is based on peer leadership, that is persuasive not authoritarian.

7. Learn to discern competence from confidence.

8. Remember to take breaks. The planning process tends to run people into the ground.

9. Always take great care to maintain version control of the plan and associated planning
documents.

10. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) are not helpful unless they are simple, used often, and
come with concrete examples.

A-1
Appendix A

Intentionally Blank

A-2
 APPENDIX B
AGENCIES AND PARTNERS

The following provides a quick reference to the agencies and partners that the staff planner
may encounter during the planning process.

1. Department of Defense (DOD): The mission of DOD is to provide the military forces
needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country. Additionally, the purpose of the
Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. http://www.defense.gov/

a. Secretary of Defense (SecDef): SecDef is the principal assistant to the President for all
DOD matters, with authority, direction, and control over the entire DOD.

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS): CJCS is the principal military advisor
to the President, the NSC, and SecDef. CJCS functions under the authority, direction, and control
of SecDef, transmits communications between SecDef and CCDRs, and oversees activities of
CCDRs as directed by SecDef.

c. The Military Departments. The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military
Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs
from the President through SecDef to the Secretaries. Then, to the degree established by the
Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service
component commanders assigned to the combatant commands and to the commanders of forces
not assigned to the combatant commands. This administrative control provides for the
preparation of military forces and their administration and support, unless such responsibilities
are specifically assigned by SecDef to another DOD component.
The Military Departments are the Departments of the Army, Navy (including the Marine
Corps), and Air Force. Each Military Department is separately organized under a civilian
Secretary, who supervises the Chief (or Chiefs) of the Service in matters of a Service nature.
The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control (through
the individual Chiefs of the Services) of their forces not specifically assigned to CCDRs. The
Military Departments are responsible for training, organizing, providing, and equipping forces
for assignment to combatant commands.

d. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs): CCDRs exercise combatant command (command

authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to SecDef for the performance of
assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.
Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

e. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA): The mission requires that DISA
remains purposeful in planning, acquisition, operations, and execution. http://www.disa.mil/
As the provider for defensive cyberspace and IT combat support for the DOD, DISA will:

(1) Focus on our global infrastructure of telecommunications and services delivery —

comprised of a hybrid cyberspace ecosystem of mobile, collaboration, internal clouds, and
commercial clouds.

B-1
Appendix B

(2) Synchronize command and control (C2) and senior leadership support to effectively
streamline decision making within all echelons of National and DOD leadership.
(3) Enable warfighter capabilities from a sovereign cyberspace domain, focused on speed,
agility, and access.
(4) Reduce costs by eliminating duplication in production and operations.

f. U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USAF ISR): USAF
ISR Enterprise is America's leading provider of finished intelligence derived from airborne,
space, and cyberspace sensors. The USAF ISR Enterprise delivers decision advantage in order
to enable commanders to achieve kinetic and non-kinetic effects on targets anywhere on the
globe in support of national, strategic, operational, and tactical requirements. The AF/A2 is the
USAF's Senior Intelligence Officer and is responsible for functional management of all Air
Force global integrated ISR capabilities, including oversight of planning, programming, and
budgeting, developing and implementing the Air Force policies and guidance for managing Air
Force global integrated ISR activities. www.af.mil

g. Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM): The Army’s principal intelligence

staff officer and functional manager for intelligence is the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, also known as the Army G-2. Within the IC, the Army’s Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM), headquartered at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, represent the Army. INSCOM
provides all-source intelligence to Army Commands and other IC agencies at all levels.
www.army.mil and www.inscom.army.mil

h. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity: The Marine Corps’ intelligence department

conducts intelligence, CI, terrorism, and cryptologic activities. The Marine Corps’ Director of
Intelligence is its principal intelligence staff officer. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity in
Quantico, Virginia is the service production center. www.usmc.mil

i. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI): ONI is the leading provider of maritime

intelligence to the U.S. Navy and joint warfighting forces, as well national decision makers and
other consumers in the Intelligence Community. Established in 1882, ONI specializes in the
analysis, production and dissemination of vital, timely and accurate scientific, technical,
geopolitical and military intelligence information to key consumers worldwide. While ONI is
the largest Naval Intelligence organization with the largest concentration of Naval Intelligence
civilians, most of Naval Intelligence is comprised of active duty military personnel serving
throughout the world. www.navy.mil

j. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA): The National Geospatial Agency

(NGA) is the manager for all imagery intelligence activities, both classified and unclassified,
within the government including the Department of Defense. The exploitation and analysis of
imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and
geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) consists of
imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. GEOINT supports the
multidirectional flow and integration of geospatially referenced data from all sources to achieve
shared situational understanding of the operational environment, near real-time tracking, and
collaboration between forces. The GEOINT cell in a J-2 interfaces directly with the user to

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 Agencies and Partners

define user requirements. Then the cell interfaces with the National System for Geospatial
Intelligence to obtain and provide the best quality GEOINT product possible to support planners
and warfighters. www.nga.mil

2. Department of State (DOS):

The Department's mission is to shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic
world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and
people everywhere. This mission is shared with the USAID, ensuring we have a common path
forward in partnership as we invest in the shared security and prosperity that will ultimately
better prepare us for the challenges of tomorrow. DOS manages America’s relationships with
foreign governments, international organizations, and the people of other countries. The
management of all of these relationships is called diplomacy. DOS diplomats carry out the
President’s foreign policy and help build a freer, prosperous, and secure world.
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#mission DOS is a vital part of the U.S. foreign policy
because it:

• Represents the United States overseas and conveys US policies to foreign governments
and international organizations through American embassies and consulates in foreign
countries and diplomatic missions;

• Negotiates and concludes agreements and treaties on issues ranging from trade to nuclear
weapons;

• Coordinates and supports international activities of other US agencies, hosts official

visits, and performs other diplomatic missions;

• Leads interagency coordination and manages the allocation of resources for foreign
relations; and

• Promotes mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people
of other countries around the world.

a. United States Agency for International Development (USAID): The USAID is an

independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of
State. It is the principal US agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster,
trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. USAID supports long-term and
equitable economic growth and advances US foreign policy objectives by supporting economic
growth, agriculture, and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict prevention, and
humanitarian assistance. USAID works in agriculture, democracy and governance, economic
growth, the environment, education, health, global partnerships, and humanitarian assistance in
more than 100 countries to provide a better future for all. http://www.usaid.gov

b. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR): INR provides the Secretary of State with
timely, objective analysis of global developments as well as real-time insights from all-source
intelligence. It serves as the focal point within the Department of State for all policy issues and

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activities involving the Intelligence Community (IC). The INR Assistant Secretary reports
directly to the Secretary of State and serves as the Secretary's principal adviser on all intelligence
matters. INR's expert, independent foreign affairs analysts draw on all-source intelligence,
diplomatic reporting, INR's public opinion polling, and interaction with U.S. and foreign
scholars. Their strong regional and functional backgrounds allow them to respond rapidly to
changing policy priorities and to provide early warning and in-depth analysis of events and
trends that affect U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. www.state.gov

3. Department of Justice (DOJ):

The DOJ, represents the citizens of the United States in enforcing the law in the public interest
and plays a key role in providing protection against criminal activity.
http://www.justice.gov/

a. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): The FBI’s mission is to uphold the law through
the investigation of violations of federal criminal law; to protect the United States from foreign
intelligence and terrorist activities; to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to
federal, state, local, and international agencies; and to perform these responsibilities in a manner
that is responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to the Constitution of the United
States.

b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF): The ATF is a

principal LEA within the DOJ dedicated to preventing terrorism, reducing violent crime, and
protecting our Nation. The men and women of ATF perform the dual responsibilities of
enforcing federal criminal laws and regulating the firearms and explosives industries. ATF is
committed to working directly, and through partnerships, to investigate and reduce crime
involving firearms and explosives, acts of arson, and illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco
products.

c. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): The DEA is the primary narcotics

enforcement agency for the USG. The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled
substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice
system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and
principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to
recommend and support no enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit
controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.
DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) became a member of the IC in
2006. ONSI facilitates full and appropriate intelligence coordination and information sharing
with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and homeland security elements. Its
goal is to enhance the United States’ efforts to reduce the supply of drugs, protect national
security, and combat global terrorism. DEA has 21 field divisions in the U.S. and more than 80
offices in more than 60 countries worldwide. www.dea.gov

d. International Criminal Police Organization, United States National Central Bureau

(INTERPOL-USNCB): INTERPOL-USNCB serves as the United States’ representative to the

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 Agencies and Partners

INTERPOL. The INTERPOL-USNCB is the central POC for all INTERPOL matters in the
United States, including secure communications with police authorities in INTERPOL’s 187
member countries and access to INTERPOL’s various databases containing information on
wanted persons, terrorists, missing persons, stolen and lost passports and travel documents,
stolen vehicles, and other law enforcement information. On a daily basis, the INTERPOL-
USNCB coordinates and transmits requests for criminal investigative and humanitarian
assistance between United States federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities and their
foreign counterparts. http://www.interpol.int/

4. Department of Homeland Security (DHS):

The Department of Homeland Security has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many
threats the nation faces. This requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in jobs
that range from aviation and border security to emergency response, from cyberspace security
analyst to chemical facility inspector.
DHS/FEMA will often be the primary federal agency involved in federal response to
emergencies which may involve cross-domain response involving active and reserve component
non-federalized forces. DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for using
information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future
threats to the United States. DHS Intelligence focuses on four strategic areas:
• Promote understanding of threats through intelligence analysis
• Collect information and intelligence pertinent to homeland security
• Share information necessary for action
• Manage intelligence for the homeland security enterprise.

The Under Secretary for Information and Analysis (I&A) also serves as DHS’ chief intelligence
officer and is responsible to both the secretary of Homeland Security and the director of National
Intelligence. http://www.dhs.gov/

a. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): CBP protects US borders from terrorism,
human and drug smuggling, illegal migration, and agricultural pests while simultaneously
facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. CBP’s priority mission is to prevent terrorists
and terrorists’ weapons, including WMD, from entering the United States. http://www.cbp.gov

b. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE): ICE’s primary mission is to

protect national security, public safety, and the integrity of the U.S. borders through the criminal
and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.
ICE has approximately 19,000 employees in over 400 offices, including 63 Attaché offices in 44
countries around the world. The agency’s law enforcement authorities encompass more than 400
US federal statutes that ICE is responsible for enforcing in its commitment to ensuring national
security and public safety. http://www.ice.gov

c. Transportation Security Administration (TSA): The TSA protects the Nation’s

transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.
http://www.tsa.gov

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Appendix B

d. US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): USCIS is the government agency

that oversees lawful immigration to the United States. Refugee status or asylum may be granted
to people who have been persecuted or fear they will be persecuted on account of race, religion,
nationality, and/or membership in a particular social group or political opinion. US Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) officers conduct interviews overseas, so the military could be
interacting with them in some joint operations. For example, officers were interviewing Iraqi
nationals, many of whom had associations with the USG and the US military in particular, for
refugee resettlement to the United States. In some cases a USCIS officer may believe a refugee
has information that the military should hear, or USCIS may request information from the
military that might support an applicant’s refugee claim or identify a ground of ineligibility.
USCIS asylum officers posted to one of eight domestic asylum offices interview aliens
physically present in the United Sates who are applying for asylum status. http://www.uscis.gov

e. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG): U.S. Coast Guard (USCG): The USCG is the Nation’s
primary maritime operating agency with resources organized, trained, and equipped to be “multi-
mission capable.” while carrying out its Homeland Security or Homeland Defense mission. The
USCG is unique as it is a branch of the Armed Forces at all times and an agency within DHS.
The USCG may also operate under the Department of the Navy during time of war or when
directed by the President. The USCG protects the public, the environment, and US economic
interests—in the Nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any
maritime region as required to support national security. Its broad responsibilities include
protecting citizens from the sea (maritime safety), protecting America from threats delivered by
the sea (maritime security) including terrorists and terrorist weapons (i.e., WMD), and protecting
the sea itself (maritime stewardship). http://www.uscg.mil

f. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): The primary mission of FEMA is

to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation
in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation. http://www.fema.gov

g. U.S. Secret Service (USSS): The USSS safeguards the Nation’s financial infrastructure
and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy and protects national leaders,
visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and national special security events.
When an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a national special security
event, the USSS assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation
of the operational security plan. The USSS has developed a core strategy to carry out its security
operations, which relies heavily on its established partnerships with law enforcement and public
safety officials at the local, state, and federal levels. The goal of the cooperating agencies is to
provide a safe and secure environment for USSS protectees, other dignitaries, the event
participants, and the general public. There is a tremendous amount of advance planning and
coordination in preparation for these events, particularly in the areas of venue and motorcade
route security, communications, credentialing, and training. http://www.secretservice.gov

5. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

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 Agencies and Partners

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was established by a 2004 act of
Congress to lead the integration of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the IC. The DNI is responsible for the
performance of the nation’s intelligence capability, even though it is dispersed across six
governmental departments. The DNI is appointed by the President to serve as the principal
advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for
intelligence matters related to national security. The staff elements of ODNI include the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Office of the National Counterintelligence (CI) Executive,
and the National Counter-proliferation Center, each responsible for IC-wide coordination and
support, as well as offices that set policy for the IC. The ODNI’s focus is to promote its vision
of a more integrated and collaborative IC. www.dni.gov

a. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): DIA is an intelligence combat support agency.

The Director, DIA reports to the SECDEF through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS). DIA’s mission is to satisfy the military and military-related intelligence requirements of
the SECDEF, the CJCS, and the DNI, and provide the military intelligence contribution to the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and CIA. DIA serves as the DOD lead for
coordinating intelligence support to meet combatant command requirements. DIA also leads
efforts to align ISR activities, and links and synchronizes national, defense, and military
intelligence. DIA also provides analytical and operational support in areas such as CI,
counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, computer network operations, personnel recovery,
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), United Nations peacekeeping and
coalition support, MASINT, Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) efforts, Indications and
Warning (I&W), targeting, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), current intelligence, collection
management, intelligence architecture and systems support, and document and media
exploitation capability. The Director, DIA is dual-hatted as the Director, Defense Intelligence
Operations Coordination Center and also serves as the Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) under
USSTRATCOM. www.dia.mil

b. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): CIA’s primary areas of expertise are in HUMINT
collection, all-source analysis, and the production of political and economic intelligence. The
Director, CIA, also serves as the national Human Intelligence (HUMINT) manager and the
National Clandestine Service Director. The CIA has three Deputy Directors: Deputy Director for
Intelligence, Deputy Director for Science and Technology (S&T), and Deputy Director for
Support. CIA is the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S.
policymakers and provides extensive political and economic intelligence to DOD senior decision
makers. CIA also oversees the Open Source Intelligence Center. www.cia.gov

c. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO): NRO designs, builds and operates the nation's
reconnaissance satellites. NRO products, provided to an expanding list of customers like the
CIA and the DOD, can warn of potential trouble spots around the world, help plan military
operations, and monitor the environment. As part of the Intelligence Community, the NRO plays
a primary role in achieving information superiority for the U.S. Government and Armed Forces.
A DOD agency, the NRO is staffed by DOD and CIA personnel. It is funded through the

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Appendix B

National Reconnaissance Program, part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

www.nro.mil

d. National Security Agency (NSA): NSA is an intelligence combat support agency under
the SECDEF and is also a member of the IC under the DNI. The Director, NSA, exercises
operational control over the United States Cryptologic System (USCS). The Director is the
principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the DNI, and the JCS, and is
designated as the national manager responsible for securing the government’s national security
telecommunications and information systems. USCS is the term that describes both the SIGINT
and information assurance activities of the U. S. Government. The Central Security Service
(CSS) is comprised of the Service cryptologic elements of the military services. NSA/CSS is a
unified organization structured to provide for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the
United States and to ensure the protection of national security systems for all departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government. The Director, NSA is also Commander, United States Cyber
Command, a sub unified command subordinate to USSTRATCOM. NSA provides direct
support to the combatant command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) through the
CSS. www.nsa.gov

6. Department of Energy (DOE): DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

(CI) are responsible for the intelligence and CI activities throughout the DOE complex, including
nearly 30 intelligence and CI offices nationwide. The mission is to protect, enable, and represent
the vast scientific brain trust resident in DOE's laboratories and plants. The office protects vital
national security information and technologies, representing intellectual property of incalculable
value, and provides unmatched scientific and technical expertise to the U.S. government to
respond to foreign intelligence, terrorist and cyber threats, to solve the hardest problems
associated with U.S. energy security, and to address a wide range of other national security
issues. www.energy.gov

7. Department of the Treasury (DOT): The Department of the Treasury (TREAS)

strengthens national security by managing the USG’s finances effectively, promoting economic
growth and stability, and ensuring the safety, soundness, and security of the U.S. and
international financial systems. TREAS also performs a critical and far-reaching role in
enhancing national security by implementing economic sanctions against foreign threats to the
United States, identifying and targeting the financial support networks of national security
threats and improving the safeguards of our financial system. http://www.ustreas.gov

a. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA): OIA, a sub-directorate of the Department

of Treasury (DOT), was established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 2004. OIA
is responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and
foreign CI information related to the operation and responsibilities of the Department of the
Treasury. OIA is a component of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence (TFI). TFI marshals the Department’s intelligence and enforcement
functions with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and

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 Agencies and Partners

combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, money
launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. www.treasury.gov

8. Department of Commerce (DOE): The mission of the Department of Commerce

(DOC) is to promote job creation, economic growth, sustainable development, and improved
living standards for all Americans by working in partnership with businesses, universities,
communities, and workers. DOC is a participant in the whole-of-government approach to
Reconstruction & Stabilization operations led by the Department of State Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. DOC provides ongoing technical assistance in
many countries and can develop coordinated Department of Defense Civil-Military Operations
and DOC projects for given countries or regions. DOC has demonstrated ability to support post-
conflict operations through its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. https://www.commerce.gov

9. Other Pertinent Agencies and Partners:

a. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): NATO is an alliance of 28 countries

from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty.
In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and
security of its member countries by political and military means. It provides a forum in which
countries from North America and Europe can consult together on security issues of common
concern and take joint action in addressing them. The Alliance is committed to defending its
member states against aggression or the threat of aggression and to the principle that an attack
against one or several members would be considered as an attack against all.

For more information, refer to Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine,
and Annex A, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” to Appendix B, “Intergovernmental
Organizations.”

b. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO): Working alone, alongside the US military,

with other US agencies, or with multinational partners, NGOs are assisting in many of the
world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size
and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in
developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a
particular emergency or disaster. The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise
vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are
often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state, which they had no
part in determining. Many NGOs view their relationship with the military under the United
Nations Office for Coordination of Human Affairs (UNOCHA) Guidelines on the Use of
Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief, commonly referred to as the “Oslo
Guidelines,” that emphasize the principle of “humanitarian space” (humanitarianism, neutrality,
and impartiality) as defined in the “Oslo Guidelines.”
The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) may determine that it is in the national interest to task US
military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) NGOs.
In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all

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Appendix B

participants. A climate of cooperation between NGOs, and military forces should be the primary
goal. The secondary goal would be establish as good a rapport as possible with NGOs
maintaining neutrality. The tertiary goal (although often critical) is to monitor openly hostile
NGOs and, when applicable, develop mitigation strategies. The Guidelines for Relations
between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or
Potentially Hostile Environments agreed by the DOD, and the United States Institute of Peace
should facilitate interaction between the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs.

c. Interagency Relationships: DOD has a major role in the interagency arena. It interacts
with almost every government agency and department and is involved in interagency
coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. SecDef is a member of the National
Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and serves as an advisor
to the NSC. DOD is significantly involved in the entire NSC interagency process, with
representatives (i.e., Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)(OUSD[P]) and joint staff
(JS)) assigned to all NSC subgroups (i.e., National Security Council/Principals Committee
(NSC/PC) and Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC/DC)) and most
National Security Council/interagency policy committees (NSC/IPCs).

For further information see Joint Publication 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to
Military Operations, 5 January 2012 and Joint Publication 3-08 Interorganizational
Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011.

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 Agencies and Partners

Intentionally Blank

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 APPENDIX C
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ballard, William H. Maj, USAF and Col Mark C. Harysch, USAF (Retired). “Operationalizing
Air-Sea Battle in the Pacific.” Air & Space Power Journal January-February 2015.

Brandes, Sean LCDR, USN. “The Newest Warfighting Domain: Cyberspace.” Synesis: A
Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy Volume 4, 2013.

Dempsey, Martin GEN, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Release of the Joint
Operational Access Concept. DOD Live. January 12, 2012.
http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/01/release-of-the-joint-operational-access-
concept-joac/

Eassa, Charles N. COL, USA. “Research Paper: Enabling Combatant Commander’s Ability to
Conduct Operations in the Cyber Domain.” Research Paper, U.S. Army War College,
2012.

Evans, Michael and Ryan, Alan (Editors). From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on
Combined Arms Warfare, Land Warfare Studies Centre. Duntroon, Australia: The Land
Warfare Studies Centre, 2003.

Fastabend, David MG USA (Retired). Domain Power. Unpublished manuscript, date unknown.

Fastabend, David MG USA (Retired). Mechanism of Joint Synergy. Unpublished manuscript,

last modified December 12, 2012.

Freier, Nathan. “Challenges to American Access: The Joint Operational Access Concept and
Future Military Risk.” Center for Strategic and International Studies csis.org. Published
January 5, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/challenges-american-access-joint-operational-
access-concept-and-future-military-risk

Gallemore, John B. Maj, USAF. Cross-Domain Synergy: Warfare in the 21st Century. Quantico,
VA: U.S. Marine Corps Command and General Staff College, 2013.

GlobalSecurity.org. July 2013. “Report on US Military Power 2012.” GlobalSecurity.org.

July 2013. “Report on US Military Power 2012.”
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power2012_cscpa04.htmp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/us-
military-power2012_cscpa04.htm

Gordon IV, John and John Matsumura. The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area
Denial Challenges. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013.Gunzinger, Mark with
Chris Dougherty. Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and
Area-Denial Threats. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2011.

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 Appendix C

Hollis, David. “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008.” Small Wars Journal. Modified January
2011/Accessed November 2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-
hollis.pdf

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783. Gretna, LA:
Pelican Publishing, 2003 (First published in 1890).

McCarthy, Christopher J Maj, USAF. “Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of

Warfare in the Western Pacific.” Paper submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Operations, U.S. Naval War College, 2010.

National Museum of the U.S. Air Force. “The Doolittle Raiders – April 18, 1942.” Accessed
June 1, 2015. http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-150417-
021.pdf

Odom, William O. and Christopher D. Hayes. “Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness.”

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Quintana, Elizabeth, Joanne Mackowski, and Adam Smith. “Cross-Domain Operations and
Interoperability.” Royal United Services Institute Occasional Paper July 2012.

Tangredi, Sam J. Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies. Annapolis, MD: U.S.
Naval Institute Press, 2013.

U.S. Department of Defense. Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access &
Area Denial Challenges. Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013.

——. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020. Washington, DC: U.S.
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——. Joint Operational Access Concept Version 1.0. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Defense, 2012.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS Wargame Iron Crucible 2014. Unpublished manuscript dated
May 2014.

Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
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——. Joint Publication 3-0 Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011.
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——. Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2011.

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 Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

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 APPENDIX D
REFERENCES FOR FURTHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

This appendix is intended to offer greater professional education in each of the individual
domains as well as planning in general. Each reference is briefly described along with its
bibliographical information.

1. United States Laws

a. Title 10, USC: Gives the responsibility to the services to man, train, and equip forces to
support the mission and operation of the DOD and CCMD. http://www.gpo.gov/

b. Titles 22, USC: Outlines the role of foreign relations and interaction with the U.S.
http://www.gpo.gov/

c. Title 32, USC: Outlines the role of the National Guard in defense of the U.S.
http://www.gpo.gov/

d. Title 50, USC: Governs how the United States conducts wars and intelligence operations
in defense of the United States to include cyberspace. http://www.gpo.gov/

2. Strategic Guidance and Policy.

a. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century. Washington, D.C:
President of the United States, January 2012.
Description: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century
is the President of the United States’ guidance to the Department of Defense for
engagement of forces for the future. It is based off the 2011 Congressional
Budget and potential adversaries.

b. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015. Washington, DC:
U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015.
Description: The National Military Strategy describes how the United States will
employ its military forces to protect and advance its national interests. The 2015
NMS continues the call for greater agility, innovation, and integration. The NMS
discusses projecting power across all domains to stop aggression and win our
Nation’s wars by decisively defeating adversaries and the need for cross-domain
synergy.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications.

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.01A: Campaign Planning Procedures
and Responsibilities. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, J-5,
November 2014. http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m313001.pdf
Description: Establishes procedures and responsibilities for the preparation of
strategies and campaign plans. A campaign plan operationalizes the CCDR’s
strategy by organizing and aligning all operations, activities, and investments with

D-1
 Appendix D

resources to achieve the CCMD’s objectives and complement related USG efforts
in the theater, functional area, or domain over an approximately five year time
frame.

b. U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) Version 1.0.
Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, January 17, 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf
Description: The JOAC describes how joint forces will operate in response to
emerging anti-access and area denial security challenges. The JOAC describes
how future joint forces will achieve operational access in the face of such
strategies. The JOAC’s central tenet to achieve access is cross-domain synergy.

c. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Operating Procedures for Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (JOPES) – Information Systems Governance. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.05. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 15,
2011 (current as of November 18, 2014).
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m312205.pdf
Description: The current JOPES IT is a solution developed by the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA), whose goal was to solve the data
synchronization issues inherent in the JOPES Classic architecture and modernize
the database architecture for JOPES. The Block IV JOPES v4.0 release provides a
more robust infrastructure and a greatly enhances the method of synchronization
for the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).

d. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010
as amended March 15, 2015.

e. Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff:
October 22, 2013. Pages IV-13 (Air, Land, and Maritime)

f. Joint Publication 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 5, 2012.

g. Joint Publication 2-01.3 Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

(JIPOE). Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: May 21, 2014. Pages IV-14 (Air, Land,
and Maritime)

h. Joint Publication 2-03 Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations. Washington, DC: U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 31, 2013.

i. Joint Publication 3-0 Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: August 11,
2011. Pages III-2, III-3, III-5, III-6, VI-26, and (Joint C2)

D-2
References for Further Professional Education

j. Joint Publication 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff: March 23, 2012.

k. Joint Publication 3-02 Amphibious Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff: July 18, 2014.

l. Joint Publication 3-09 Joint Fire Support. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff:
December 12, 2014.

m. Joint Publication 3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, November 13, 2014. Pages I-1, I-2, I-3, I-5, and I-6 (Protection)

n. Joint Publication 3-12 (R) Cyberspace Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, February 5, 2013. Pages vii, vii, ix, x, ix, xii (Air, Land, Maritime, Space, Cyberspace,
Joint C2, Fires, Protection), pages; II-7, II-9, II-11, (Air, Land, Maritime, Joint C2, Fires,
Protection, Sustainment)

o. Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff: November 27, 2012 with Change 1 November 20, 2014.

p. Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 29, 2013.

q. Joint Publication 3-15.1 Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. Washington,

DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 9, 2012.

r. Joint Publication 3-30 Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. Washington, DC:
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 10, 2014.

s. Joint Publication 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. Washington,
DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 24, 2014. Page: ix, II-19, II-20 (Land- B2C2WG)

t. Joint Publication 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.
Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 7, 2013.

u. Joint Publication 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, July 30, 2012. Page III-2, II-18 (Land), II-10 – II-18 (B2C2WG, Liaison, Support
Elements, Augmentees)

v. Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013.

w. Joint Publication 4-0 Joint Logistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
October 16, 2013. Pages II-15, IV-16, and VII-2, IX-11 (Air, Land, and Maritime)

D-3
 Appendix D

x. Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, August 11, 2011. Pages x-ii, xix, xxv, III-3, III-8, IV-3, IV-6, (Air, Land, Maritime,
B2C2WG, and Battle Rhythm)

y. Joint Publication 6-0 Joint Communications. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Aug 11, 2011.

z. Joint Publication 6-01 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.

Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 20, 2012.

4. Other References.
Planning
a. Santacroce, Mike. Joint Strategic & Operational Planning: Planning for Planners.
Lakeland, FL: The Lightning Press, 2014.
Description: Volume 1 of the Joint/Interagency Smartbook series. The book was
developed to assist planners at all levels in understanding how to plan utilizing the
Joint Operational Planning Process. Planning for Planners has been used since
2007 by war colleges, joint staffs, Services, and combatant commands as a step-
by-step guide to understanding the complex world of global planning and force
management. The goal of the book is to help develop flexible planners who can
cope with the inevitable changes that occur during the planning process.

b. Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Planning Solution Guide. 2012. Suffolk, VA: Joint
Staff, J-7 Future Joint Force Development, 2012. https://portal.js.mil/sites/J7/DC/Documents/
(U)-BMD-C2I-BMDOperationalPlanningSolutionGuide-2012.pdf
Description: The purpose of the BMD Operational Planning Solution Guide is to
provide planners new approaches to solve gaps and shortfalls for Combatant
Command and Component BMD planners. The Guide will help better integrate
air and missile defense planning across joint air and maritime operations centers
within and across geographic combatant commands.

c. Theater Campaign Planning: Planners’ Handbook. Washington, DC: Office of the

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, February 2012.
https://portal.js.mil/sites/J4/DC/Documents/Planners_Handbook_Master__Final Draft 02-22-
12.pdf
Description: This handbook is intended to provide combatant command planners
with a conceptual approach to developing theater campaign plans (TCPs). It is
based on insights from a variety of sources over the last several years. This
booklet is designed to assist planners by presenting a broad approach to TCPs and
country-level planning that considers ongoing security cooperation efforts, current
operations, the Phase 0 component of contingency plans, and resourcing
constraints as part of the combatant commander’s implementation of his strategic
approach to the area of responsibility.

D-4
References for Further Professional Education

d. Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), United
States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Joint Innovation & Experimentation
Directorate, 1 March 2007.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
Description: This handbook serves as a bridge between the evolving JIACG and
its migration into doctrine. As such, it is intended to inform doctrine writers,
educators, and trainers about the JIACG and its potential for further inclusion in
joint doctrine, education, and training. It fills the existing void between emerging
concepts and published joint doctrine. It also presents well developed definitions
that have been harmonized with current and evolving joint doctrine and discusses
those “best practices” that have proven of value during on-going military
operations, exercises, and experimentation. This handbook provides potential
joint and Service users a definitive publication on “how” a JIACG may be
organized and employed to support interagency coordination at the operational
level, particularly during the planning and execution of a joint operation.

e. Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution. Version 1.0.

Washington, DC: Joint Staff, J-7 - Joint and Coalition Warfighting - 9 September 2011.
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/assessment_hbk.pdf
Description: This handbook provides an understanding of the processes and
procedures being employed by joint force commanders and their staffs to plan and
execute assessment activities. It provides fundamental principles, techniques, and
considerations related to assessment that are being employed in the field and are
evolving toward incorporation in joint doctrine. Furthermore, this handbook
supplements doctrinal publications by providing detailed guidance to conduct
effects assessment, task assessment, and deficiency analysis. This handbook
provides users with a pre-doctrinal reference describing how to conduct
assessment execution and planning. Its primary purpose is to improve the U.S.
military’s assessment process through educating the user on basics, best practices,
and processes. This handbook complements and expands upon the overarching
concepts and principles that have been incorporated into keystone joint doctrinal
publications, to include joint publications 3-0, Joint Operations; 5-0, Joint
Operation Planning; and 2-0, Joint Intelligence. It supports requirements of joint
operation planning and offers techniques and procedures currently used in the
field. It is intended as a reference for joint forces conducting assessment as an
element of a joint operation.

Cross-domain synergy
a. Cordesman, Anthony H. with George Sullivan and William D. Sullivan. “Lessons of the
2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War CSIS Significant Issues Series Volume 29 Number 4. (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2007)
http://csis.org/files/publication/120720_Cordesman_LessonsIsraeliHezbollah.pdf
Description: The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict shows that every effort must be
made to learn from experience. The war showed that high-technology forces,
optimized to defeat conventional enemies, can be vulnerable to asymmetric
attacks and can create political problems that offset their military advantages.

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 Appendix D

Israeli reliance on high technology applied to force transformation efforts based

on using technology – particularly precision long-range strike capabilities and
advanced ISR capabilities – as a substitute for force numbers and for human skills
and presence. The Israelis failed to properly employ Joint Synergy, much less
cross-domain synergy, in the conflict.

b. Kreuder, Gregory. “The Joint Operational Access Concept and Joint Doctrine.” Joint
Forces Quarterly Issue 69, (2nd Quarter 2013)
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-69/JFQ-69_103-108_Kreuder.pdf
Description: This article discusses how the changing operational environment,
combined with emerging anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, is creating
doctrinal gaps. It then discusses the relationship between doctrine, policy, and
concepts, along with ways to accelerate the transition from concept to doctrine.
Finally, this article draws current concepts from the JOAC and suggests tools that
proponents can use to make their concept reality and to ensure U.S. operational
access for future joint operations.

c. Luck, Gary GEN, U.S. Army (Retired) and the JS J7 Deployable Training Division.
Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper – Mission Command and Cross-Domain Synergy.
Suffolk: Deployable Training Division, Deputy Director Joint Staff J7, March 2013.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/joint_operations_fp.pdf
Description: The juxtaposing of mission command and cross-domain synergy
has clear utility at theater-strategic and operational level for operating at the speed
of the problem. Mission command is important in setting conditions for military
subordinates. Cross-domain synergy leverages the capabilities of our many
mission partners to increase overall effectiveness.

d. Odom, William O., Ph.D., COL, U.S. Army (Retired) and Christopher D. Hayes, LCDR,
U.S. Navy. “Cross-Domain Synergy: Advancing Jointness.” Joint Forces Quarterly 73, 2nd
Quarter 2014. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/JointForceQuarterly73.aspx
Description: Achieving cross-domain synergy is ultimately about evolving the
understanding of jointness, which cross-domain perspectives on military problems
advances. Improved jointness enables more effective combination of the
capabilities of the Armed Forces and the achievement of cross-domain synergy in
joint operations. To improve jointness the military needs to shift from Service-
centric approaches to a mindset that holistically views the military problem and
considers the full range of available capabilities. It also requires changes in the
way the military accesses and integrates capabilities, essentially transcending
Service and combatant command ownership of capabilities and assuming a global
perspective on military operations to achieve globally integrated operations.

e. Quintana, Elizabeth, Joanne Mackowski, and Adam Smith. “Occasional Paper: Cross-
Domain Operations and Interoperability.” London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), July
2012. https://www.rusi.org/publications/occasionalpapers/ref:O4FF47E156E9D7/

D-6
References for Further Professional Education

Description: RUSI and the Royal Air Force convened two workshops to look at
the evolving relationship between the RAF and industry in the light of the new
structural changes within the UK Ministry of Defense, and the implications of the
U.S. Joint Operational Access Concept – and associated Air-Sea Battle and Joint
Forced Entry Concepts – for the UK and other forces. This paper, looking at
cross-domain capabilities and interoperability, is the result of the second
workshop and explores some of the concepts, capabilities and force structures that
might be adopted. Smaller countries like the UK with fewer military resources
than the U.S. have made good use of cross-domain synergy to maximize
capabilities.

f. Both Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) and Joint Knowledge On-Line (JKO)
provide a myriad of articles that complement the topics of this planner’s guide.
http://www.alsa.mil/library/mttps/airfield_opening.html;
https://portal.js.mil/sites/Matrix/JKO/SitePages/Home.aspx
Description: Provides the reader an understanding of the planning factors that
should be considered for airfield opening in a hostile or permissive environment.
In particular, it addresses the specific expertise that is required to build an
effective plan and the need to designate a senior airfield authority (SAA).

Air Domain
a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-0 Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance,
& Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations. Washington, DC: Chief of Staff of the Air Force, January
6, 2012. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/Doctrine/du_afdd2-0.pdf
Description: AFDD 2-0 Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations, is the Air Force’s keystone doctrinal
publication on global integrated ISR and defines how the Service plans and
conducts these operations to enable Joint Operations. It compiles the best
practices of how an Airman conducts and employs ISR capabilities and why
global integrated ISR is unique. Global integrated ISR is defined as cross-domain
synchronization and integration of the planning and operation of ISR assets.

b. “Cross-Domain Integration” U.S. Air Force Annex 3-0 Operations & Planning to Joint
Publication 3-0. Maxwell AFB, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine and Education,
November 9, 2012. https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-0-D08-OPS-Cross-
Domain.pdf
Description: Military operations take place in and through the air, land,
maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and the information environment. The
Air Force exploits advantages in the air, space, and cyberspace domains to
achieve joint force commander (JFC) and national objectives in all domains and
the information environment. In either a supporting or supported role, these
functions can be conducted independently from, or in concert with, land and
maritime operations. Air Force operations are crucial to the success of operations
in all domains.

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 Appendix D

c. U.S. Air Force Strategic Master Plan. Washington, DC: Secretary of the Air Force and
Chief of Staff of the Air Force May 2015.
http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/Force%20Management/Enlisted/Strategic%20Master%2
0Plan%20May%202015.pdf?timestamp=1432224521926
Description: This Strategic Master Plan (SMP) translates the United States Air
Force’s 30-year strategy, America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future, into
comprehensive guidance, goals, and objectives. The SMP discusses pursuing a
“Multi-Domain” approach to Air Force missions integrating and employing
capabilities operating in or through the cyberspace and space domains in addition
to the traditional air domain.

Land Domain
a. Gordon IV, John and John Matsumura. The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and
Area Denial Challenges. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2013.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR229.html
Description: The U.S. military has become increasingly concerned about the
challenges it could face in gaining access to an operational area. Given their
global responsibilities, the U.S. armed forces must be prepared to deploy to a
wide range of locations that include almost any type of terrain and confront
adversaries that span the threat spectrum from very poorly armed bands to peer-
level foes. Research indicates that, in most situations, anti-access challenges
require a joint solution, in which the capabilities of the different services can be
brought to bear based on the threat and the mission. This study examines the
nature of those future challenges and the Army’s role as part of a larger joint or
combined force.

b. Lindsey, Eric. Beyond Coast Artillery: Cross-Domain Denial and the Army. Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), October 15, 2014.
http://csbaonline.org/publications/2014/10/beyond-coast-artillery-cross-domain-denial-and-the-
army/
Description: In this brief, CSBA Research Fellow Eric Lindsey argues that
Army missiles forces can do far more than defend coastlines. By enhancing its
land-based anti-air, anti-ship and surface-to-surface strike capabilities, he says,
the Army could field a forward-deployed anti-access/area-denial force that would
deny adversaries sanctuary and freedom of action and help the Army deter and
prevail in a wider spectrum of conflict.

c. Shunk, Dave. “Area Denial & Falklands War Lessons Learned. Small Wars Journal
(December 12, 2014). http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/area-denial-falklands-war-lessons-
learned-implications-for-land-warfare-2030-2040-after-the
Description: In 1982 Great Britain fought Argentina over the Falkland Islands in
the South Atlantic. The Falklands war forced Britain to fight an expeditionary
conflict 8,000 miles away from home station. It is one of the best examples of
lessons learned for both anti-access and area denial in a modern conventional

D-8
References for Further Professional Education

conflict. As such, it may prove far more relevant for the future than any conflict
in the past three decades.

d. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 The U.S. Army
Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040. Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014. http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-
1.pdf
Description: Army operations are inherently cross-domain operations. U.S.
forces depend on and complement joint efforts in the land, air, maritime, space,
and cyberspace domains to enable operations on land. Because joint force
freedom of movement and action across all domains are increasingly challenged
by elusive land-based threats, this concept emphasizes Army operations to gain,
sustain, and exploit control over land, to deny its use to the enemy. Future Army
forces will support joint force freedom of movement and action through the
projection of power from land across the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace
domains.

e. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6 US Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver
2016-2028. Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 13, 2010.
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-6.pdf
Description: TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 describes corps, division, and brigade
operations in the future. It identifies the capabilities required to enable them to
conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security successfully. The
document requires the Army to develop adaptive and agile soldiers and leaders to
lead combined arms formations capable of functioning effectively in predicted
complex operational environments as integral members of a joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational team.

Maritime Domain
a. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Washington, DC: Chief of Naval
Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commandant of the Coast Guard, March
2015. http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf
Description: This maritime strategy describes how the United States will design,
organize, and employ the Sea Services in support of national defense and
homeland security strategies. The document discusses all domain access as the
ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of
action to operate effectively. In today’s security environment, that access is
increasingly contested by state and non-state actors that can hold even our most
advanced forces and weapon systems at risk with their own sophisticated anti-
access/area denial strategies. Employed in coordination with the Navy–Marine
Corps team’s sea control and power projection capabilities, all domain access
allows Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders to provide cross-domain
capability to the Joint Force.
b. Greenert, Jonathan, ADM, U.S. Navy. “Opening Remarks at the Brookings Institution
Air-Sea Battle Doctrine Conference.” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, May 16, 2012.

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 Appendix D

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Greenert/Speech/120516%20Air%20Sea%20Battle_B
rookings.pdf
Description: On May 16, 2012 the 21st Century Defense Initiative at The
Brookings Institution hosted Air Force Chief of Staff General Norman Schwartz
and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral (ADM) Jonathan Greenert for a
discussion of the Air-Sea Battle Concept and their joint efforts to assure access
and maintain stability. ADM Greenert stressed the need for cross-domain synergy
to ensure access in the Global Commons, especially the Maritime Domain.

c. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783. Gretna,
LA: Pelican Publishing, 2003 (First published in 1890).
Description: One of the most important treatises written about the Maritime
Domain. The essence of Mahan from a naval viewpoint is that a great navy is a
prerequisite of national greatness. Geopolitical principles, to include geographic
position, population size, character of the people, extent of territory, and character
of the government underlie national and maritime greatness. The Chinese
People’s Liberation Army Navy has closely studied Mahan as it expands its fleet,
blue water capabilities, and A2/AD weapon systems.

Space Domain
a. Air Command and Staff College Space Research Electives Seminars. AU-18 Space
Primer. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2009. http://www.au.af/au/awc/space/au-18-
2009/index.htm
Description: This primer is a useful tool both for individuals who are not “space
aware” – unacquainted with space capabilities, organizations, and operations –
and for those who are “space aware”, especially individuals associated with the
space community, but not familiar with space capabilities, organizations, and
operations outside their particular areas of expertise.

b. Association of the U.S. Army. “U.S. Army Space Capabilities: Enabling the Force of
Decisive Action: An AUSA Torchbearer National Security Report.” Washington, DC:
Association of the United States Army. May 2012.
https://www.ausa.org/publications/torchbearercampaign/tnsr/Documents/TB_SMDC_web.pdf
Description: This document discusses how Army space-based capabilities fit
within land power. A discussion of warfighting integration, force structure,
training and materiel development provides a snapshot where Army space is now
and where it must go in the future.

D-10
References for Further Professional Education

c. Berkowitz, Mark J. “Protecting America’s Freedom of Action in Space.” High Frontier

The Journal for Space and Missile Professionals Volume 3, Number 2. March 2007.
http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070322-103.pdf
Description: As a matter of national policy, U.S. space systems are sovereign
property with the right of passage through and operations in space without
interference. The preservation of this right will be the space policy issue for the
United States in the coming years. The article discusses challenges to the
freedom of space and proposed measures to protect it.

d. George C. Marshall Institute. “A Day Without Space: What would happen with a day
without space?” Accessed July 15, 2015. https://adaywithoutspace.wordpress.com/
Description: Space systems provide significant benefits to American commerce
and national security. The George C. Marshall Institute and the Space Enterprise
Council have co-hosted a series of events called “A Day Without Space” to
discuss the implications of losing access to space-borne assets and information for
the U.S. economy and national security. The website contains archives of the
findings of the seminars.

e. Office of the President of the United States of America. National Space Policy of the
United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House, 2010.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf
Description: The National Space Policy expresses the President’s direction for
the Nation’s space activities. The policy articulates the President’s commitment
to reinvigorating U.S. leadership in space for the purposes of maintaining space as
a stable and productive environment for the peaceful use of all nations.

f. Shipp, Jac W. “Space and Cyberspace: Key Areas of Intersection.” Fires May – June
2012. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a559424.pdf
Description: Article discusses how space and cyberspace domains and their
associated operations overlap and intersect, and the synergies and opportunities
created by each. Article goes on to describe ways to improve integrated space
and cyberspace to full spectrum operations.

g. U.S. Air Force. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-1: Air Force Satellite
Control Network. February 2013. Doctrine Annex 3-14 Space Operations. Published June 19,
2012. https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmspace.htm
Description: Airmen should understand space capabilities are vital to joint
campaign and operational planning. Integration of space capabilities occurs
within Air Force, joint, and combined operations in uncontested, contested, and
denied environments, and throughout the range of military operations. Since
space assets like Global Positioning System (GPS) complement existing
capabilities (e.g., navigation aids, long-haul communication), space capabilities
are inherently cross-domain. Integration of space capabilities requires diligent
establishment of command relationships.

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 Appendix D

h. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). “Joint Functional Component Command for

Space Factsheet.” Published December 2011.
https://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/7/JFCC_Space/
Description: Factsheet describes the Mission, Background, Current Operations,
Personnel, and Budget of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space
(JFCC Space), a component of USSTRATCOM. JFCC Space is responsible for
executing continuous, integrated space operations to deliver theater and global
effects in support of national and combatant commander objectives. JFCC Space
coordinates space operational-level planning, integration, and coordination to
ensure unity of effort in support of military and national security operations, and
support to civil authorities.

Cyberspace Domain
a. U.S. Department of Defense. The DOD Cyber Strategy April 2015.
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DOD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf
Description: The purpose of this cyberspace strategy, the Department’s second,
is to guide the development of DOD’s cyberspace forces and strengthen U.S.
cyberspace defense and cyberspace deterrence posture. It focuses on building
cyberspace capabilities and organizations for DOD’s three cyberspace missions:
to defend DOD networks, systems, and information; defend the U.S. homeland
and U.S. national interests against cyberspace attacks of significant consequence;
and support operational and contingency plans.

b. U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet. Strategic Plan 2015-2020. Published 2015.
http://www.fcc.navy.mil
Description: This Plan plots Fleet Cyber Command’s course to deliver on its
responsibilities by leveraging its strengths and shrinking the Navy’s
vulnerabilities. The Plan lays out five pivotal strategic goals: (1) Operate the
Network as a Warfighting Platform; (2) Conduct Tailored Signals Intelligence; (3)
Deliver Warfighting Effects through Cyberspace; (4) Create Shared Cyber
Situational Awareness; and (5) Establish and Mature the Navy’s Cyber Mission
Forces. The Plan describes a detailed Execution Plan to achieve those goals.

c. U.S. Air Force. Doctrine Annex 3-12 Cyberspace Operations. 30 November 2011
https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmcyberspaceops.htm
Description: Contains chapters on the integration of cyberspace operations across
domains, design of cyberspace operations, and considerations across the range of
military operations.

d. Ackerman, Robert K. “Destructive Cyber Attacks Increase in Frequency, Sophistication.”

Signal, July 2015. http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=Article-destructive-cyber-attacks-increase-
frequency-sophistication

D-12
References for Further Professional Education

Description: Short, recent, unclassified article discussing cyberspace threats and

attacks including the hack into OPM data. A more diverse group of players is
generating a growing threat toward all elements of the critical infrastructure
through cyberspace. New capabilities have stocked the arsenals of cyber-
marauders, who now are displaying a greater variety of motives and desired
effects as they target governments, power plants, financial services and other
vulnerable sites.

e. Bae, Sebastian J. “Cyber Warfare: Chinese and Russian Lessons for U.S. Cyber Doctrine.”
Georgetown Security Studies Review. Published May 7, 2015.
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2015/05/07/cyber-warfare-chinese-and-russian-
lessons-for-us-cyber-doctrine/
Description: As Sun-Tzu said, “Know your enemy.” The victors in cyberspace
will not be the states with the best technology, but those who effectively
manipulate and control information. China and Russia have already demonstrated
their ability to wage information warfare in the digital age – understanding
cyberspace is a means to an end. Without a strategic overhaul in conceptualizing
cyber warfare, the U.S. will be unable to compete in cyberspace where
information superiority will define success. The first step in winning the cyber
wars of the future will be understanding ends, ways, and means – a lesson the
United States could learn from China and Russia.

f. Bender, Jason M. “The Cyberspace Operations Planner: Challenges to Education and

Understanding of Offensive Cyberspace Operations.” Small Wars Journal. Published November
5, 2013. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-cyberspace-operations-planner
Description: While this monograph does not answer “What is a cyber-planner?”
it does present multiple points for discussion based on existing challenges in
doctrine, training, and leader development. In light of these challenges, the
Services must approach solutions at both the individual and institutional levels.
In the case of the individual planner, the requirement is for units to identify those
personnel who show shown an aptitude for planning and target them for specific
functional training and development. In the case of the institution, the Services
must pursue broad and comprehensive education for all potential commanders and
planners regarding cyberspace operations. Article concludes with an outstanding
Recommended Professional Reading List for Commanders, Staffs, and Planners
(Especially Offensive Cyberspace Operations Planners).

g. Brewster, William M., Maj., USMC and Gerald W. Kearney, Jr., LtCol., USMC. “Integrating
Cyber Fires into MAGTF Operations: Putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma.” Marine
Corps Gazette, July 2015.
Description: The article provides a realistic NEO scenario in which cyber fires
can be incorporated into expeditionary MAGTF operations. The article focuses
on the process as well as the roles and responsibilities to plan, request, integrate,
and execute cyber fires. The goal of the article is to demystify U.S. Cyber
Command’s process to request cyber fires and develop an understanding of the

D-13
 Appendix D

role each organization plays in the planning and execution of offensive cyber
operations (OCO).

h. Chavana, Staff Sgt. Jarrod USAF. “Airmen train for ‘new wild, wild west in cyber domain.”
Air Force Space Command Inside AFSPC. Published October 2014.
http://www.afspc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123427359
Description: Article describes activities at the 39th Information Operations
Squadron located at Hulbert Field, FL to train cyber warfare operators for the Air
Force. “Cyber is the new wild, wild west,” said Gen. John E. Hyten, Air Force
Space Command Commander. “It took us 30 years to figure out how to make
space a real warfighting domain and operate in it accordingly. We do not have
that time in cyber, because cyber is under threat every day.”

i. Corrin, Amber. “Army experiments now underway that integrate cyber and land operations.”
C4ISR & Networks, (July 10, 2015). http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-
tech/cyber/2015/07/10/army-testing-cyber-integration-in-land-operations/29976545/
Description: The Army is conducting a series of experiments to find the best
ways to integrate cyber operations into more traditional land operations, including
in the formations closest to the ground. The experimental initiative, known as
“cyberspace operations corps and below” started with a first event held in the
May-June 2015 timeframe with a brigade combat team at the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk, LA.

j. Denning, Dorothy E. “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence.” Joint Forces Quarterly
Number 77 2nd Quarter 2015.
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/581864/jfq-77-
rethinking-the-cyber-domain-and-deterrence.aspx
Description: Article starts with a discussion of two key attributes of cyberspace
resembling traditional domains: Man & Nature and the malleability of the
domain. Article then moves to a discussion of deterrence in cyberspace including
the differences between deterrence in cyberspace and deterrence in the traditional
domains. Because cyberspace is such a rich domain, studies of “cyber
deterrence” raise as many problems as would be raised by a comparable study of
“land deterrence.” This does not mean that deterrence in cyberspace is
impossible, only that a more focused approach is needed, as has been followed in
traditional domains of warfare.

k. Eom, Jung ho. “Roles and Responsibilities of Cyber Intelligence for Cyber Operations in
Cyberspace. International Journal of Software Engineering and its Applications Volume 8
Number 9 (2014). http://www.sersc.org/journals/IJSEIA/vol8_no9_2014/11.pdf
Description: This paper focuses on the roles and responsibilities of cyberspace
intelligence in each phase of cyberspace operations. Cyberspace intelligence
must properly support cyberspace commanders and units for ensuring cyberspace
intelligence superiority. Cyberspace intelligence is a cyber-discipline that

D-14
References for Further Professional Education

exploits a number of information collection and analysis approaches to provide

direction and decision to the cyberspace commander and units.

l. Headquarters, U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army. U.S. Army Landcyber White Paper:
2012-2030. Published September 14, 2012. https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-171583
Description: This white paper describes Army cyberspace operations in the
2012-2030 timeframe, to include Army cyberspace operations needs and required
capabilities. The white paper informs future Army cyberspace force development
and serves as the conceptual basis for developing solutions to the future force
pertaining to Army cyberspace operations across the DOTMLPF.

m. Rivera, Jason. “A Theory of Cyber warfare: Political and Military Objectives, Lines of
Communication, and Targets. Georgetown Security Studies Review. Published June 10, 2014.
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/06/10/a-theory-of-cyberwarfare-political-and-
military-objectives-lines-of-communication-and-targets/
Description: This paper develops a framework that military planners can use to
understand cyberspace as a battlefield terrain upon which cyber forces secure,
exercise, and dispute control of computer systems and networks in order to
achieve political and military objectives. The paper’s theory of Cyber warfare is
undergirded by three critical assumptions. First, all state-sponsored military
operations are conducted for the purpose of accomplishing nation-state political or
military or objectives. Second, cyberspace, inherent to the initial design of the
Internet, is formulated upon lines of communication designed to transport
information from Point A to Point B. Third, like military concepts of key terrain
or centers of gravity, there are key targets within cyberspace for which positon
and possession yield a decisive military advantage. Using the theory presented,
the paper concludes by illustrating three lines of effort necessary for a state to
effectively engage in cyberspace.

n. Samad, Musa A., Maj., USMC. “Cyber Operations: Putting MAGTF commanders in control.”
Marine Corps Gazette, July 2015.
Description: In terms of the Marine Corps, the basic premise behind cyber teams
should be to enable a commander to apply military cyber power within the
commander’s area of operations. For that to happen, commanders need to be
taught the capabilities and limitations of what cyber operations can provide. The
article discusses the potential for conducting cyberspace operations in support of
Marine missions.

o. Singer, Peter W. Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2015.
Description: Ghost Fleet tells of a near-future world war, using a large and
diverse cast of well-developed characters. Even the most unexpected
developments and plot twists are based on real-world trends and technologies.
Cyberspace plays an especially prominent role, and much of the action revolves
around how the flow of ones and zeros affects strategy and operations. One
review states the book should be required reading for the entire Pentagon.

D-15
 Appendix D

p. VanDriel, Martha S. H., COL, USA. “Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating Cyberspace
into Operational Planning. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Published May 4,
2015. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Bridging-the-planning-
gap/2015/05/04
Description: While there are examples of how cyberspace support to military
operations has advanced over the last decade, one gap has not been addressed in
detail- operational planning. Incorporating cyberspace operations into
operational-level planning has proven more difficult than anticipated. Joint and
Army senior leaders have identified operational-level cyberspace planners to be a
critical shortage. Several major systemic problems hinder the incorporation of
cyberspace into operational planning. The Army needs to take actions now to
successfully incorporate cyberspace operations into operational-level planning.

q. Williams, Brett T, Major General, USAF. “The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to
Cyberspace Operations.” Joint Forces Quarterly Number 73 January 2014.
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/577499/jfq-73-the-joint-
force-commanders-guide-to-cyberspace-operations.aspx
Description: The intent of this article is to advocate for making cyberspace
operations part of the powerful synergy we currently create with joint force
operations. Today’s commanders must be prepared to defend the Nation in all
domains including cyberspace. They cannot do so without trained and ready
forces, situational awareness of cyberspace, effective command and control,
defensible architecture, appropriate delegation of authority for execution, and an
operational approach to tie it all together. The operational approach described in
the article provides a starting point for commanders to integrate cyberspace
operations within the joint doctrinal framework employed every day to
accomplish their assigned missions.

D-16
References for Further Professional Education

Intentionally Blank

D-17
 APPENDIX G
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A2 Anti-Access
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial
AADC Area Air Defense Command
AADP Area Air Defense Plan
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACP Airspace Control Plan
AD Area Denial
ADM Admiral
AEF Air Expeditionary Forces
AEW Air Expeditionary Wings
AJP Allied Joint Publication
AO Area of Operations
AOD Air Operations Directive
AOR Area of Operations/Area of Responsibility
APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATC Air Tasking Cycle
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
ATO Air Tasking Order

B2C2WG Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups

BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment
BDA Battle Damage Assessment

C2 Command and Control

CA Civil Affairs
CAOC Combined Air Operations Center
CAP Crisis Action Plan
CAS Close Air Support
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high-yield
Explosives
CCDR Combatant Commander
CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CCMD Combatant Command
CCMF Cyberspace Combat Mission Force
CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command

CI Counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

GL-1
Appendix G

CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force

CMF Cyberspace Mission Forces
CMO Civil-Military Operations
CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center
CNMF Cyberspace National Mission Force
COA Course of Action
COA Dev Course of Action Development
COIN Counterinsurgency
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CONPLAN Concept Plan
COP Common Operational Picture
COS Chief of Staff
CPT Cyberspace Protection Team
CSG Carrier Strike Group
CSS Central Security Service
CST Cyberspace Support Team
CYBERCOM Cyber Command

DCA Defensive Counter-Air

DCJTF Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force
DCO Defensive Cyberspace Operations
DCO IDM Defensive Cyberspace Operations Internal Defensive Measures
DCO RA Defensive Cyberspace Operations Response Actions
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH Direct Liaison Authorized
DISA Defense Information System Agency
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DOD Department of Defense
DODIN Department of Defense Information Network
DODIN Ops Department of Defense Information Network Operations
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DSC Defensive Space Control
DTG Date Time Group
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EMS Electromagnetic Spectrum

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDO Foreign Disclosure Office/Officer
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GL-2
 Glossary

FHA Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

GCC Geographic Combatant Command

GEF Guidance for Employment of Force
GPS Global Positioning System

HN Host Nation
HQ Headquarters
HUMINT Human Intelligence

I&W Indications and Warning

IC Intelligence Community
ICE US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IDF Israeli Defense Force
IGO Intergovernmental Organizations
INR Intelligence and Research
INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command
INTERPOL-USNCB International Criminal Police Organization, United States
National Central Bureau
IO Information Operations
IRC Information Related Capabilities
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JAOP Joint Air Operations Plan
JCC Joint Cyber Center
JCMA Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity
JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
JECC Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander
JFCC Joint Functional Component Commander
JFCC – ISR Joint Functional Component Command – Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JFCC – Space Joint Functional Component Command - Space
JFE Joint Fires Element
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIOC Joint Intelligence Operations Center
JIOWC Joint Information Operations Warfare Command
JIPOE Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
JIPTL Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List
JKO Joint Knowledge On Line
JMAO Joint Mortuary Affairs Office
JMO Joint Maritime Operations
JOA Joint Operations Area
JOAC Joint Operational Access Concept

GL-3
Appendix G

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JOPP Joint Operation Planning Process
JOPPA Joint Operation Planning Process for Air
JP Joint Publication
JPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element
JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPG Joint Planning Group
JPME Joint Professional Military Education
JPRA Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JRC Joint Reception Center
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JS Joint Staff
JSCC Joint Security Coordination Committee
JPSE Joint Planning Support Element
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF Joint Task Force
JWAC Joint Warfare Analysis Center

LNO Liaison Officer

LOC Line of Communication
MA Mission Analysis
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAJCOMS Major Commands
MARLE Marine Liaison Element Joint Force Commander
MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MNF Multi-National Force
MOE Measures of Effectiveness
MOP Measures of Performance
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO STANAG North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement
NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO Non-Governmental Organizational
NIST National Intelligence Support Team
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSC/DC Deputies Committee of the National Security Council
NSC/IPC National Security Council/Interagency Policy Committee
NSC/PC National Security Council/Principals Committee
NWP Naval Warfare Publication
OCO Offensive Cyberspace Operations
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

GL-4
 Glossary

OIA Office of Intelligence and Analysis

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
ONSI Office of National Security Intelligence
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act
OPCON Operational Control
OPLAN Operational Plan
OPORD Operation Order
OSC Offensive Space Control
OSINT Open Source Intelligence
OUSD[P] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

PA Public Affairs
S&T Science and Technology
SA Situational Awareness
SCA Space Coordinating Authority
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SME Subject Matter Expert
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOP Standing Operating Procedures
STW Surface Tactical Warfare
TACON Tactical Control
TFI Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSOC Theater Special Operations Command

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

URL Uniform Resource Locator
U.S. United States
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USAF ISR United States Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCG Unites States Coast Guard
USCIS US Citizenship and Immigration Services
USCS United States Cryptologic Systems
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG United States Government
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USS United States Ship
USSS U.S. Secret Service
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

GL-5
Appendix G

WG Working Group
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

GL-6
 Glossary

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise stated, all definitions are from JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

Acceptability: The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the contemplated
course of action is proportional, worth the cost, consistent with the law of war; and is
militarily and politically supportable. See also adequacy; feasibility. Source: JP 1-02.

Assumption: A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of

events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to
enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation
and make a decision on the course of action. Source: JP 1-02

Cross-domain synergy: The complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities

in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the
vulnerabilities of the others. Source: JOAC.

Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of the

interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures, and resident data,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers. Source: JP 3-12 (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Cyberspace superiority: The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the
secure, reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and
space forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.
JP 3-12 (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Cyberspace operations: The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to
achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Source: JP 3-0.

Domain superiority: That degree of dominance of one force over another in a domain that
permits the conduct of operations by the former at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the latter. Source: JOAC.

Joint synergy: The combination of Service capabilities such that each enhances the
effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others. Source: CCJO v3.0.

Line of communications: A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating
military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces
move. Source: (JP 2-01.3)

Maritime superiority: That degree of dominance of one force over another that permits the
conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a

GL-7
Appendix G

given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Source: JP
3-32

Maritime supremacy: That degree of maritime superiority wherein the opposing force is
incapable of effective interference. Source: JP 3-32

Military options: A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish
assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action,
humanitarian assistance, civil affairs (CA), and other military activities to develop
positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures to
reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries as
well as truth projections; military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines,
blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention operations; armed conflict
involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare operations; support for law
enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress
domestic rebellion; and support for insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), and civil war
in foreign countries. See also civil affairs; foreign humanitarian assistance; military civic
action. Source: JP 5-01.3.

Objective Area: A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be

captured or reached by the military forces. This area is defined by competent authority
for purposes of command and control. Source: JP 3-06

Operational Access: The ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient
freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Source: JOAC

Operational Area: An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of
responsibility and joint operations area) for geographic areas in which military operations
are conducted. Source: JP 3-0

Sea Basing: The deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-
employment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the
operational area. Source: JP 3-02

Space: A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted
to achieve US national security objectives. Source: JP 1-02.

Space Situational Awareness: The requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space
environment and the operational environment upon which space operations depend -
including physical, virtual, and human domains - as well as all factors, activities, and
events of friendly and adversary space forces across the spectrum of conflict. Source: JP
3-14

Staging: Assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining
materiel in preparation for onward movement. The organizing and preparation for

GL-8
 Glossary

movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel at designated areas to incrementally

build forces capable of meeting the operational commander's requirements. Source: JP 3-
35

Strategic Distance: A descriptor for action originating outside the operational area, often from
home station. Source: JOAC.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable

of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of
transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part
from the weapon. Also called WMD. Source: JP 3-40

Unmanned Aircraft: An aircraft or balloon that does not carry a human operator and is capable
of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. Source: JP 3-52

GL-9