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Political Religious and Social Conflict in the States of
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Studies Sarah Alyn Stacey (Editor) Digital Instant
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Language: english
cress-79032 cres79032˙fm January 23, 2003 14:51
Evolutionary Dynamics
and Extensive Form Games
i
Economic Learning and Social Evolution

General Editor
Ken Binmore, Director of the Economic Learning and Social
Evolution Centre, University College London.
1. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, Larry Samuelson,

1997
2. The Theory of Learning in Games, Drew Fudenberg and David
K. Levine, 1998
3. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2: Just Playing, Ken
Binmore, 1998
4. Social Dynamics, Steven N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young,
editors, 2001
5. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, Ross
Cressman, 2003
ii
Ross Cressman
The MIT Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
iii

c 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic
or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and
retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
This book was set in Palatino by Interactive Composition Corporation (in LATEX ) and was
printed and bound in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cressman, Ross.
Evolutionary dynamics and extensive form games / Ross Cressman.
p. cm. — (Economic learning and social evolution ; 5)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-03305-4 (hc. : alk. paper)
1. Game theory. 2. Evolution—Mathematical models. I. Title. II. MIT Press
series on economic learning and social evolution ; 5.
QA269 .C69 2003
519.3—dc21 2002038682
iv
Contents
Series Foreword ix
Preface xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Extensive Form versus Normal Form 2
1.2 Biology versus Economics 8
1.3 Imitation 12
1.4 Organizational Matters 15
1.5 Notes 16
2 Symmetric Normal Form Games 19

2.1 The Replicator Dynamic 19
2.2 Dynamics for Two-Strategy Games 23
2.3 Monotone Selection Dynamics 27
2.4 Fictitious Play and Best Response Dynamic 31
2.5 Convergence and Stability: NE and ESS 34
2.6 Three-Strategy Game Dynamics 37
2.6.1 Rock–Scissors–Paper Games 37
2.6.2 ESSets and NE Components 42
2.6.3 More Three-Strategy Games 43
2.7 Dynamic Stability for General Games 46
2.8 Natural Selection at a Single Locus 53
2.8.1 Discrete-Time Viability Selection 53
2.8.2 Continuous-Time Natural Selection 54
2.9 One-Stage Simultaneity Games 56
2.10 Multi-armed Bandits 58
2.11 Appendix 64
2.12 Notes 66
v
vi Contents
3 Bimatrix Games 69
3.1 Nash Equilibria and Strict Equilibrium Sets 70
3.2 Bimatrix Replicator and Best Response Dynamics 71
3.2.1 The Owner-Intruder Game 74
3.3 Dynamics for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Games 75
3.3.1 Nondegenerate Bimatrix Games 76
3.3.2 Degenerate Bimatrix Games 79
3.4 Symmetrized Bimatrix Games 85
3.4.1 The Symmetrized Bimatrix Replicator Dynamic 88
3.4.2 The Symmetrized Best Response Dynamic 93
3.5 Bimatrix Monotone Selection Dynamics 96
3.6 Notes 101
4 Asymmetric Games 103

4.1 The Normal Form 104
4.2 The Extensive Form: NE and ESSets 106
4.2.1 An Age-Structured Owner-Intruder Game 108
4.3 SESets and Agent Normal Forms 110
4.4 Dynamics and the Wright Manifold 113
4.4.1 The Replicator Dynamic and Subgames 114
4.4.2 Best Response Dynamics 116
4.5 Truly Asymmetric Two-Player Games 117
4.5.1 The Age-Structured Owner-Intruder
Game Dynamic 121
4.6 Truly Symmetric Two-Player Games 123
4.6.1 A Truly Symmetric Game Dynamic
Counterexample 125
4.6.2 Parallel Bandits 128
4.7 Asymmetric Games with Two Roles 137
4.7.1 A Family of Asymmetric Games 137
4.7.2 Two-Species Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 140
4.8 A Hierarchical Hawk-Dove Game 146
4.9 Appendix A 150
4.10 Appendix B 152
4.11 Notes 153
5 Natural Selection with Multiple Loci 155

5.1 Continuous-Time Selection-Recombination 155
5.2 Symmetric Extensive Form with Additive Fitness 157
5.3 Recombination 160
Contents vii
5.4 Selection and Recombination 162

5.5 Notes 163
6 Extensive Form Games 165

6.1 N-Player Extensive Form Games 166
6.1.1 Strategies and Payoffs 168
6.1.2 Nash Equilibria, Subgames, and
Backward Induction 171
6.2 Normal Forms and the Replicator Dynamic 173
6.3 The Wright Manifold and Replicator Dynamic 175
6.4 Symmetric Extensive Form Games 180
6.5 Appendix 184
6.6 Notes 185
7 Simultaneity Games 187

7.1 Elementary Two-Stage Simultaneity Games 188
7.2 Two-Stage Two-Strategy Games 192
7.2.1 Two-Stage Two-Strategy Repeated Games 195
7.2.2 Symmetric Signaling Games 197
7.2.3 Cheap Talk Games 200
7.3 Asymptotic Stability of Pervasive NE 201
7.3.1 Simultaneity Games with No
Asymmetric Subgames 201
7.3.2 Simultaneity Games with Asymmetric Subgames 204
7.3.3 Simultaneity Games with Moves by Nature 206
7.4 The War of Attrition 207
7.4.1 The Discrete War of Attrition 208
7.4.2 The Continuous War of Attrition 213
7.4.3 The Discrete War of Aggression 215
7.5 The Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 217
7.5.1 The Replicator and Monotone
Selection Dynamics 220
7.5.2 The Best Response Dynamic and Fictitious Play 222
7.6 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 7.5.3 228
7.7 Appendix B: Maximal Attractor 232
7.8 Notes 233
8 Perfect Information Games 235

8.1 Elementary Perfect Information Games 237
8.2 Equilibrium Selection: Dynamic Approach 240
viii Contents
8.2.1 The Replicator and Monotone

Selection Dynamics 242
8.2.2 Fictitious Play and Best Response Dynamic 248
8.2.3 Behavior Strategy Fictitious Play 252
8.3 The Centipede Game 255
8.3.1 Centipede Games of Lengths Two and Three 256
8.3.2 Centipede Games of Length N ≥ 4 258
8.4 Extensive Form Bandits 260
8.4.1 The Centipede Bandit 268
8.5 Appendix A 276
8.6 Appendix B 283
8.7 Notes 287
9 Subgame Monotonicity 289

9.1 Monotone Trajectories 289
9.2 Subgame Monotone Trajectories 292
9.3 An Imitation Example 301
9.4 Discussion 303
9.5 Notes 304
Bibliography 307
Index 313
Series Foreword
The MIT Press series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution reflects
the continuing interest in the dynamics of human interaction. This issue
has provided a broad community of economists, psychologists, biolo-
gists, anthropologists, mathematicians, philosophers, and others, with
a sense of common purpose so strong that traditional interdisciplinary
boundaries have melted away. We reject the outmoded notion that what
happens away from equilibrium can safelly be ignored, but think it no
longer adequate to speak in vague terms of bounded rationality and
spontaneous order. We believe the time has come to put some beef on
the table.
The books in the series so far are:
• Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, by Larry Samuelson (1997).
Traditional economic models have only one equilibrium, and so fail
to come to grips with social norms whose function is to select an equi-
librium when there are multiple alternatives. This book studies how
such norms may evolve.
• The Theory of Learning in Games, by Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
(1998). Von Neumann introduced “fictitious play” as a way of finding
equilibria in zero-sum games. In this book the idea is reinterpreted as
a learning procedure, and developed for use in general games.
• Just Playing, by Ken Binmore (1998). This book applies evolutionary
game theory to moral philosophy. How and why do we make fairness
judgments?
• Social Dynamics, edited by Steve Durlauf and Peyton Young (2001).
The essays in this collection provide an overview of the field of social
dynamics, in which some of the creators of the field discuss a variety of
ix
x Series Foreword
approaches, including theoretical model-building, empirical studies,

statistical analyses, and philosophical reflections.
• Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, by Ross Cressman
(2003). How is evolution affected by the timing structure of games?
Does it generate backward induction? The answers show that ortho-
dox thinking needs a lot of revision in some contexts.
Authors who share the ethos represented by these books, or who wish
to extend it in empirical, experimental, or other directions, are cordially
invited to submit outlines of their proposed books for consideration.
Within our terms of reference, we hope that a thousand flowers will
bloom.
Ken Binmore
ESRC Center for Economic Learning
and Social Evolution
University College London
Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, UK
[email protected]
Preface
This book is a sequel to my earlier monograph, The Stability Concept of

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Dynamic Approach, published some ten years
ago in the series, Lecture Notes in Biomathematics. The final chapter of
the monograph included material on the (dynamic) analysis of extensive
form games meant to convince the reader of their untapped potential for
models of behavioral evolution in biology. In retrospect, it is clear from
research in the intervening years that the preliminary treatment there
considerably underestimated this potential. Moreover, although the ap-
plication of evolutionary game theory to biology has increased steadily
during these years, it is fair to say its growth has been much more dra-
matic in other disciplines, notably, its explosion in models relevant for
human behavior.
The approach I have pursued in this book is a result of these obser-
vations. In particular, there is no longer a need to justify the importance
of studying evolutionary dynamics as this has been done by numer-
ous authors (see references at the beginning of the Introduction). What
has received much less attention is the analyses of these dynamics for
games that are more naturally specified through their extensive form.
This book then focuses on evolutionary dynamics that are adapted to
extensive form games. It also emphasizes connections between the ex-
tensive form perspective and existing dynamic models that have tradi-
tionally been in applications to biology and economics. The book will be
of particular interest to (evolutionary) game theorists but has also much
to offer a broader readership interested in predicting how behaviors
evolve in both human and other species.
The theory of evolutionary dynamics for extensive form games is
not complete. The purpose of the book is to introduce this fascinating
topic and develop an approach to it that I am confident will remain an
essential method no matter where the theory eventually leads.
xi
xii Preface
There are many colleagues who, perhaps unknowingly, have influ-

enced my thinking about extensive form games and to whom I am
indebted. Of these, Josef Hofbauer and Karl Schlag deserve special men-
tion since I could not have written many parts of the text without their
input. I would also like to thank Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson
for helpful suggestions concerning the content of the text and continual
encouragement along the way.
Bernard Brooks produced the original files for all the diagrams; those
graphing trajectories of the replicator dynamics are taken directly from
numerical approximations of the differential equations using MAPLE.
Bernie, Barbara Carroll, and Karen Cressman provided invaluable as-
sistance with corrections and editing throughout, for which I am most
grateful. Technical assistance on the final diagrams and the format of the
text was provided by Pam Schaus and Mary Reilly. Many people at The
MIT Press have been involved, especially Elizabeth Murry who, along
with Ken Binmore, shares editorial responsibilities for this series on
Economic Learning and Social Evolution. Also acknowledged is finan-
cial assistance from Wilfrid Laurier University and the Natural Sciences
and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
Ross Cressman
Waterloo, Ontario
June 2002
xiii
cress-79032 book January 27, 2003 10:59
1 Introduction
Extensive form games, with an explicit description of the sequential

nature of the players’ possible actions, played a central role in the
initial development of classical game theory by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). On the other hand, most dynamic analyses of evo-
lutionary games are based on their normal forms, as evidenced by
standard books on the topic (e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988, 1998;
Cressman 1992; Weibull 1995; Vega-Redondo 1996) as well as in other
game theory books.1 This is despite the fact that many interesting games
are specified more naturally through their extensive forms.
The primary objective of this book is to generalize the techniques
of dynamic evolutionary game theory to extensive form games. The
ultimate goal is to gain as prominent a position for dynamic evolution-
ary game theory applied to extensive form games as the corresponding
theory has deservedly attained for normal form games.
For many readers the formal proofs of the insights that the dynamic
analyses of extensive form games provide for models of behavioral evo-
lution will seem overly technical with unfamiliar mathematical manip-
ulations. The more informal discussion in the following three sections
of the Introduction is meant to be accessible to the non-game theorist,
although even here some background knowledge is useful. Section 1.1
below makes a strong case for the importance of studying evolution-
ary dynamics based directly on the extensive form game structure. It
gives a dynamic perspective to the classical game theory debate of how
a game is best represented. Section 1.2 contrasts the reasons researchers
interested in animal behavior as opposed to those interested in human
1. Interestingly many books on game theory published in the past decade include “evo-
lutionary” sections (e.g., van Damme 1991; Binmore 1992; Mesterton-Gibbons 1992, 2000;
Sigmund 1993; Owen 1995; Gintis 2000).
1
2 Chapter 1 Introduction
behavior were initially fascinated with evolutionary game theory. It also

outlines new connections between these two groups that emerge from
the extensive form perspective. Section 1.3 discusses behavioral evolu-
tion based on imitation, an area where the extensive form is indispens-
able for any nontrivial real-life applications.
In mathematical terms the book analyzes dynamical systems that
model the evolution of behaviors (or strategies) in extensive form games.
A great deal of time is devoted to the investigation of the convergence
and stability properties of these dynamic trajectories. For example, as
explained in section 1.2, the demonstration that behaviors converge to
a unique rest point for a particular game has important implications
for the practitioners of evolutionary game theory. Regrettably, it is well
known that dynamic trajectories for many evolutionary games do not
converge. This is especially true if there are a large number of pure
strategies. In general, these high dimensional dynamical systems can
exhibit all the complexities of arbitrary dynamical systems such as peri-
odic orbits, limit cycles, bifurcations, and chaos. However, by the end of
the book, I will have demonstrated that the extensive form structure of
our evolutionary games imparts special properties on the evolutionary
dynamic that makes its analysis more tractable than would otherwise
be expected. This will be shown even when these games have a large
number of pure strategies.
1.1 Extensive Form versus Normal Form
Every (finite) extensive form game has a normal form representation.

Thus one way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the
extensive form structure and study the game instead in its normal form
representation. Many (evolutionary) game theorists share a common
view (see section 1.5):
[that a game’s] extensive-form representation is an unnecessarily complex object

to represent it. The alternative representation in normal (or strategic) form does
not lose any essential information and it is a much more amenable object of
analysis.
This book emphatically rejects the sentiments contained in this quota-

tion taken from Vega-Redondo (1996). The following two elementary
examples serve to illustrate that a game’s normal form representation
often does lose essential information from the perspective of dynamic
evolutionary game theory.
The first example is based on the two-player Rock–Scissors–Paper

Game whereby each player chooses one of the three strategies, R, S,
or P, without knowing the opponent’s choice (i.e., the players make
simultaneous choices). In this game none of these strategies dominate
both of the other two since R beats S, S beats P, and P beats R. No
matter what specific payoffs are taken for interactions between pairs of
strategies (as long as the payoffs reflect the cyclic dominance), it can be
shown that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) where
each player uses the same mixed strategy. One interpretation of such a
mixed strategy is that in repeated plays of the game (e.g., once a day),
the player has a randomizing device whereby he/she uses R, S, and
P on a particular day with fixed positive probabilities that give the
frequency components of the mixed strategy. Dynamic evolutionary
game theory then concerns whether the players’ behavior evolves to this
mixed NE. The extensive form and normal form analyses of this game
are identical—a result that supports the contention that the extensive
form is just an unnecessary complication. In fact, for many such payoff
parameters, evolutionary game theory does predict both players evolve
to play the NE.
Now consider the following seemingly inconsequential additional
player information; namely both players know whether the game is
played on an even numbered day or on an odd numbered day and
that the payoffs between a given pair of strategies do not depend on
which type of day it is. Now each player has nine strategies, each of
which specify a choice of R, S, or P on even days and a possibly differ-
ent choice on odd days. Intuitively, if payoff parameters are such that
both players evolve to the NE of the base RSP Game without this addi-
tional information, we expect evolutionary game theory to predict play
evolves to this same NE in the even numbered subgame (i.e., in the game
corresponding to the even numbered days) and in the odd numbered
subgame. However, as a normal form game, the subgame structure is
hidden (see section 1.5). Moreover the predicted behavior does not al-
ways occur for the original standard dynamic of evolutionary game the-
ory (i.e., the replicator dynamic). Mathematically the problem is that the
evolution of strategy frequencies in the even subgame affects the evo-
lution in the odd subgame. On the other hand, evolutionary dynamics
based on the extensive form of this game, that respect its subgame struc-
ture, continue to agree with the intuitively expected behavior. Thus, for
this example, knowledge of its extensive form is essential; without it
0 2
0 2
R A
1
4
2
N E
1
Figure 1.1.1
Extensive form of the Chain-Store Game.
the conclusions of dynamic evolutionary game theory are dramatically

altered.2
The second example is the Chain-Store Game, a simplified caricature

of the conflict between a potential entrant (player one) into a market
controlled by a monopolist (player two). Its extensive form is given in
figure 1.1.1, which indicates clearly the sequential nature of the players’
actions.
Player one chooses first and decides whether to enter the market (E)
or not (N). The monopolist does not want player one to enter since
he/she then receives his/her highest payoff of 4 (to player one’s payoff
of 1). If player one does enter, then player two must decide whether to
retaliate (R) or to acquiesce (A) and accept player one into the market.
Retaliation leads to both players receiving payoff 0 (corresponding to
a ruined market); otherwise, they share the market payoff of 4 equally
and so each receives payoff 2.
The game has two Nash equilibrium outcomes. Either player one
enters and player two acquiesces—this NE is labeled (E, A)—or player
one does not enter. The outcome of player one not entering the market
can only be maintained by a monopolist who is prepared to retaliate with
a sufficiently high probability (specifically, he/she must be willing to
retaliate at least half the time) if forced to make a decision. The question
2. (Generalized) RSP Games are introduced formally in chapter 2.6.1. The technical dy-
namic analysis for the nine-strategy normal form game is given in chapter 4.6.1. Explicit
payoffs for the RSP Game are given for which all (interior) trajectories of the replicator dy-
namic converge to the unique mixed symmetric NE. It is shown that there are many interior
replicator trajectories for the nine-strategy normal form game that have no single limiting
behavior; rather, they evolve in a seemingly chaotic fashion. Details are provided as to
how and when normal form evolutionary dynamics do not respect the subgame structure.
The importance of the extensive form representation for this example, as a means to moti-
vate evolutionary dynamics that respect the subgame structure (e.g., subgame monotone
dynamics), is also discussed there as well as in chapters 9.2 and 9.4.
of which outcome (if either) predicts player behavior in this example

has received much attention in the literature.3
For now, we concentrate on the game’s normal form given by
R A

N 1, 4 1, 4 (1.1.1)
.
E 0, 0 2, 2
The prediction that players will use the NE (E, A) is easy to justify
on dynamic grounds. Here each player’s payoff decreases if his/her
behavior unilaterally evolves away from (E, A) (e.g., player one’s payoff
decreases from 2 toward 1 in this case). (E, A) is called a strict NE. On the
other hand, the Nash equilibrium outcome where player one does not
enter is given by the set of strategies {(N, λR+ (1 − λ)A) | 12 ≤ λ ≤ 1} that
indicates that the monopolist is prepared to retaliate with probability
λ ≥ 12 if called upon. This set is called a NE component. No point in
it is a strict NE since player two has no payoff incentive to maintain
his/her current (mixed) strategy. Traditional evolutionary game theory
for normal form games (see section 1.5) prefers behaviors converge to a
unique NE, not to such a NE component that appears for (1.1.1) due to
the payoff tie of 4 for player two if player one plays N. One approach
to avoid such sets that is often taken for normal form games is that
since payoff ties are not “generic” in this class of games, it suffices to
consider games whose payoffs are slightly perturbed to break this tie.
However, the normal form gives no indication which of player two’s
actions should be favored by this perturbation (i.e., whether R or A will
have the higher payoff when player one chooses N). This knowledge is
important since (N, R) becomes a strict NE if R is favored but no NE
occurs with player one choosing N otherwise.
As the extensive form game in figure 1.1.1, the NE (E, A) is also eas-
ily distinguished from the other NE outcome; namely it is the only one
3. The question is considered more fully in chapter 3.3.2 as well as in chapter 8.1. The
game is then referred to regularly in the remainder of chapter 8 and in chapter 9 where
the extensive form version is emphasized.
It is no coincidence the Chain-Store Game is also discussed in the introductory chap-
ters of Weibull (1995) and Samuelson (1997), since it is probably the most elementary
example where (evolutionary) game theory does not give an unequivocal prediction of
player behavior. The payoffs used in figure 1.1.1 are from Weibull (1995) where the game
is also called the Entry Deterrence Game to emphasize the difference between it and
the Chain-Store Game considered by Selten (1978) who initially raised the question of
how a monopolist can maintain a credible threat to retaliate in order to continue his/her
monopoly when this game is repeated against a chain of many potential entrants.
that specifies a NE action in the subgame following player one entering

the market. This is called a subgame perfect NE. There are well-known
arguments that NE which are not subgame perfect are unrealistic pre-
dictions of strategy behavior.4 For example, from figure 1.1.1, it seems
implausible that a monopolist would ever actually use R if called upon
since he/she could do better by choosing A if player one enters the mar-
ket. That is, there is a basic theoretical question of whether the outcome
where player one does not enter is ever expected to occur. On the other
hand, empirical evidence reported in Güth et al. (1982) (see also Gale
et al. 1995), from experiments using human subjects playing the math-
ematically equivalent Ultimatum (Mini)Game in a laboratory setting,
shows people often do play the outcome corresponding to player one
not entering.
Of more immediate interest to us at this point is that the extensive form
can also suggest what direction perturbations will favor. Gale et al. (1995)
show that in certain perturbed dynamics (specifically, when the monop-
olist is much less concerned about the exact (mixed) strategy he/she uses
than the potential entrant near the NE outcome where player one does
not enter), this non–subgame perfect NE outcome can be predicted by
the dynamic approach. The point worth making here is not whether an
assumption stating which player is more careful when choosing his/her
strategy is correct; rather, it is the fact that the reasonableness of such
assumptions requires some knowledge of the sequential nature of the
player decisions, an attribute of the game that is only clearly indicated
through its extensive form.
The Chain-Store Game illustrates in an elementary fashion another
important aspect of the extensive form that is lost in its normal form
representation. The basic problem with justifying the non–subgame per-
fect NE outcome is that this outcome has an unreached decision point
4. Every extensive form game has at least one subgame perfect NE. The subgame perfect
NEs can be found by applying the “backward induction” procedure of classical game
theory (see section 6.1.2). For the elementary game in figure 1.1.1 (and also in figure 1.3.1
below assuming a 1 > c 1 , a 2 > b 2 , and c 2 > d2 ), there is only one subgame perfect NE, and
it is indicated by the double line in the game tree. This latter convention is used regularly
throughout the book.
However, there is typically more than one extensive form game with a given normal
form representation. In particular, it is easy to define an extensive form game, with normal
form (1.1.1), that has no nontrivial subgames and so all NE are subgame perfect by default.
Thus losing the extensive form structure has the perhaps unexpected consequence of
losing a well-defined concept of subgame perfection as well. The question of whether
non–subgame perfect NE can be justified on dynamic grounds is examined in chapters 7
and 8 for much longer extensive form games than the Chain-Store Game of figure 1.1.1.
(i.e., the monopolist’s strategy is not revealed if the potential entrant

chooses N). This automatically leads to insufficient evolutionary se-
lection pressure in the unperturbed normal form dynamic to predict
how player behavior will evolve when their strategies are near this NE
outcome. Although the problem of unreached decision points at NE
(i.e., that the “equilibrium path” does not specify “out-of-equilibrium”
behavior) for extensive form games has received much attention in
traditional (i.e., non evolutionary) game theory where philosophical
arguments on the foundation of rational decision making are often in-
voked, it has been largely ignored by evolutionary game theorists. This
is especially true for longer extensive form games in which player de-
cision points follow earlier decisions by the same player where out-of-
equilibrium behavior is almost guaranteed. For reasons similar to those
discussed above for the RSP Game example, the standard evolutionary
dynamics based on their normal form then rarely respect the extensive
form structure of these longer games.
The approach I take in this book is to develop a dynamic theory of ex-

tensive form games that relies explicitly on the game tree. The examples
analyzed throughout the book are, for the most part, relatively short
extensive form games. It is my contention that one must thoroughly un-
derstand how the general theory applies to such elementary examples
before arbitrarily long extensive form games can be satisfactorily han-
dled. Moreover, with only the normal form (which will typically have a
very large number of strategies), I believe it is a hopeless task to attempt
to build a useful general evolutionary theory of extensive form games.
My own personal experience is that much of human behavior involves
interactions between people who have a long sequence of encounters.
It is inconceivable that current decisions do not depend in an intricate
manner on choices made in previous encounters, a feature that is con-
tained in the concept of a history (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994) of an
extensive form game but is not explicitly revealed by the game’s normal
form. That is, the game’s normal form is based implicitly on all strate-
gies being played at essentially the same time between players who
do not meet again. In fact the two examples discussed above are quite
short extensive form games, and they satisfy the implicit assumptions
that suggest a normal form analysis will be effective. However, as we
have already seen, even here the normal form has serious shortcomings.
Let us now agree that the structure of extensive form games is im-
portant for the analysis of their evolutionary dynamics and concentrate
instead on why this analysis is useful. To begin this process in the fol-
lowing two sections, I first return to the historical roots of evolutionary
game theory in its applications to biology and economics.
1.2 Biology versus Economics
There are two main groups of practitioners of the concepts of evolution-

ary game theory, introduced in the order of when they first appeared.
The first, who I call biological game theorists5 after their founder ( John
Maynard Smith), consider the dynamical system as a model of behav-
ioral evolution in a population where pure strategies (i.e., behaviors)
that have higher payoff (i.e., fitness) increase in relative frequency due
to their higher reproductive success. In particular, individuals in the
population do not make conscious decisions on what strategy to use;
rather, these are predetermined by nature. The evolutionary game the-
ory models of interest to this group typically have an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS). Such a rest point is then automatically dynami-
cally stable and often unique given reasonable biological constraints.
This group expects the ESS behavior to be observed in nature where
evolutionary forces have had a long time to exert their influence. The
obvious benefit to this predictive method is that it avoids the need to
solve the underlying dynamical system. An ESS is especially appealing
since it resists invasions by rare mutants that will appear over evolu-
tionary time.
The later group, called economic game theorists after one of its early
proponents (Reinhard Selten), takes the classical game theory perspec-
tive that individuals make rational decisions on their strategy choice. In
biological terms, the difference between these groups becomes a ques-
tion of nature versus nurture. Economic game theorists assume each
individual chooses his6 strategy based on his own circumstances or envi-
ronment (nurture), while biologists assume nature predetermines strat-
egy perhaps through the individual’s genetic makeup. The interesting
5. Game theory also has interesting historical connections to biology before the advent of
evolutionary game theory in the 1970s. In retrospect, Fisher’s (1930) justification for the
prevalence of 50 : 50 sex ratio in diploid species is an early example of strategic reasoning.
That is, individuals in a population with a biased sex ratio do better by producing more
offspring of the rarer sex and so shift the population toward producing males and females
in equal numbers.
6. From now on, I will use “his” to represent “his/her” and “he” to represent “he/she,”
and the like. This is done for notational convenience and is not meant to suggest conscious
decisions are the exclusive preserve of one gender.
games for economic game theorists tend to have many NE as possible

solutions but often have no ESS. The problem then becomes which NE,
if any, to consider the solution to the game. Elaborate rationality argu-
ments are often needed (e.g., Harsanyi and Selten 1988; van Damme
1991) to select one. Restricting the choice to NE that are dynamically
stable offers an especially appealing equilibrium selection technique
for many economic game theorists (e.g., Samuelson 1997) since it typi-
cally assumes much less rationality on the part of the game’s individual
players.
The comparisons discussed above between the two groups were ini-
tially developed in models of two-player games where both players have
the same set of possible strategies (as in the RSP Game considered in
section 1.1).7 The original ESS concept of Maynard Smith applies most
directly to models in biology of a single species that reproduces asex-
ually rather than to such economic models as monopolists and poten-
tial entrants where players clearly have totally different strategy sets.
The concept has since been extended to the more realistic biological
model of a sexually reproducing species (Cressman 1992; Hofbauer
and Sigmund 1998) and to multi-species frequency-dependent evolu-
tion (Cressman et al. 2001). Special cases of these latter models in-
clude general n-player noncooperative games, a topic that has received
much attention in standard economic game theorists’ books (e.g., van
Damme 1991; Binmore 1992).8
It is my contention that the spectacular growth of evolutionary game
theory (for normal form games) over the past two decades is due in
large part to an unusually strong bond between these two seemingly un-
related disciplines (biology and economics). During this time I have been
continually surprised by unforeseen connections between biological and
economic game theory in both their concepts and their techniques. In
this regard consider the following two normal form connections: On the
grand conceptual level, the general theory of natural selection at a sin-
gle locus in a sexually reproducing species (originally developed with-
out reference to game theory; see chapter 2.8) becomes a special class
of dynamic evolutionary games where contestants split their payoffs
equally—called partnership games in the economic literature (Hofbauer
and Sigmund 1998). On the level of specific techniques, the perturbed
7. Technically these are called symmetric games (see chapter 2).

8. The well-known Buyer-Seller Game (Friedman 1991) is an elementary example of a
two-player noncooperative game where the name already suggests different types of
players.
payoff approach to break payoff ties in the Chain-Store Game discussed

in section 1.1 has its biological counterpart in the Hawk-Dove-Retaliator
Game of Maynard Smith (1982) who used the same technique to break
the selective indifference in Dove-Retaliator contests.9
One means to justify the dynamic analysis of extensive form games as
proposed in this book is then to demonstrate that it continues to build
new connections between biology and economics. Here I mention briefly
two instances. Coevolutionary models in population biology (i.e., the
evolution of individual characteristics in ecological systems with mul-
tiple species) is a biological theory (e.g., Roughgarden 1979) that first
matured without evolutionary game theory. Chapter 4.7 shows that the
frequency component of these coevolutionary models is identical to the
extensive form evolutionary dynamics of a class of asymmetric games
developed by Balkenborg (1994) for economic game theorists. Chapter 5
on multilocus natural selection with additive fitness is another instance
where the extensive form has unforeseen relevance for biological models
through equating each decision point in a different class of asymmet-
ric extensive form games with a particular locus. A by-product of this
equivalence is that the concept of the Wright manifold from multilocus
population genetics can be generalized to an arbitrary extensive form
game (see chapter 6.3). In genetics, the Wright manifold is the set of
genotypic frequencies that are in “linkage equilibrium” (i.e., allele fre-
quencies at one locus are independent of those at the other loci). The
re-interpretation in language more familiar to economic game theorists
is that the Wright manifold is the set of mixed strategies where the
behavior strategy in any subgame is independent of actions taken at
decision points outside this subgame. This Wright manifold for general
extensive form games plays a central role throughout the book, becom-
ing equally useful for economic game theorists. For a specific applica-
tion, the Wright manifold can be used to resolve the counterintuitive
result for the example discussed in section 1.1 based on the RSP Game
(see chapter 4.6.1). In particular, on the Wright manifold, the replicator
dynamic predicts behaviors evolve to the unique NE in both even and
odd numbered subgames, the intuitive result expected by economic
game theorists.
9. The Chain-Store Game in section 1.1 is clearly presented in economic terms. With a
few exceptions besides this section (notably chapters 2.8, 4.7, and all of chapter 5), the
book describes player behavior as if it assumed conscious decisions, so the discussion
may often seem more relevant for researchers whose primary interest is in modeling
human behavior. In most cases the descriptions can be rephrased to be just as appealing
to biological game theorists.
As may be already apparent by the preceding discussion, the line

between these two groups has become increasingly blurred through in-
teractions between them and the spread of evolutionary game theory to
other disciplines. Biological game theorists (e.g., Maynard Smith 1982)
implicitly give rational decision-making powers to their populations
when they justify observed population behavior on arguments using
strategic reasoning. On the other hand, the plethora of learning mod-
els analyzed by economic game theorists (e.g., Weibull 1995; Samuelson
1997; Fudenberg and Levine 1998) where individuals base their rational
decisions on limited information (i.e., individuals are boundedly ratio-
nal) lead naturally to population dynamics similar to those of interest
to biological game theorists when applied to normal form games.
This book attempts to strike a middle ground between these two
groups. Except for the development of dynamics based on explicit mod-
els of imitative behavior (see section 1.3 below), it ignores for the most
part the nature versus nurture issue of which dynamic model is appro-
priate for a particular game (see section 1.5). Instead, it concentrates
on the analyses of well-known dynamics, adapted for extensive form
games, that have proved relevant for arbitrary evolutionary games—
emphasizing their convergence and stability properties. The specific dy-
namics considered are monotone selection, best response, fictitious play
and especially the various forms of the replicator dynamic—the initial
dynamical system developed for (symmetric) normal form games from
a biological perspective (Taylor and Jonker 1978). To appreciate this ap-
proach, it is important to understand the method as it applies to normal
form games. The following paragraph begins this process which is then
continued in chapter 2.
The emphasis on convergence and stability in this book is also
apparent in the literature on the dynamics of normal form games. For
instance, the Folk Theorem of Evolutionary Game Theory (Hofbauer and
Sigmund 1998) forms the basis for evolutionary game theory as an equi-
librium selection technique. It asserts the following three statements for
all “reasonable” dynamics of a normal form evolutionary game:
i. A stable rest point is a NE.

ii. Any convergent trajectory evolves to a NE.
iii. A strict NE is asymptotically stable.
Similarly the basic version of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection

(Weibull 1995) that asserts populations evolve so as to increase their
mean fitness implies all limit points are NE (in fact, typically an ESS
that is then asymptotically stable) of the corresponding normal form
game.10 Although neither “theorem” is universally true for all relevant
dynamic models of behavioral evolution, their conclusions nonetheless
provide an important benchmark for general techniques of dynamic
evolutionary game theory.
1.3 Imitation
Imitation is clearly an important factor in explaining how humans adapt

to their environments. Whether through formal learning processes (e.g.,
an education system) or through more informal means (e.g., our own
observations), we become aware of how others behave in a given situa-
tion. We then decide on our own course of action, perhaps based on also
knowing the consequences of these behaviors. “Imitative behavior” will
mean that we either decide to adopt the known behavior of someone
else or maintain our current behavior. Since similar processes occur in
most animal species (e.g., parents nurturing their offspring), and espe-
cially in those species that have a societal structure, imitative behavior
seems to be more important in realistic models of behavioral evolution
relevant for biological game theorists than the following excerpt from
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) might suggest:
The replicator dynamics mimics the effect of natural selection (although it bliss-
fully disregards the complexities of sexual reproduction). In the context of games
played by human societies, however, the spreading of successful strategies is
more likely to occur through imitation than through inheritance. How should
we model this imitation processes?
The extensive form is an effective tool for imitation models of real-life sit-
uations. In particular, as argued near the end of section 1.1, interactions
10. See chapter 2 for definitions and/or explanations of the technical terms from the
theory of dynamical systems used in this paragraph (and elsewhere in the Introduction).
In particular, convergence to NE often requires that all strategy types are initially present in
the population. The Introduction also contains many technical terms from game theory (in
particular, for extensive form games) that are not precisely explained here. Their formal
definitions are found in various chapters of the book.
The difference between the first theorem being designated “folk” and the second “fun-
damental” seems to be based more on the discipline in which it originated (economics and
biology respectively) than on its overall validity. It is interesting that the book I chose as a
good reference for each of these theorems is written by researchers whose initial interest
in dynamic evolutionary game theory places them in the opposite group of practitioners.
This clearly illustrates how blurred the line separating these two groups has become.
1.3 Imitation 13
among humans are often based on their past history. Such chains of in-
teractions then translate into long extensive form games where earlier
decisions can affect whether or not later decisions are ever encountered.
Since we cannot imitate behaviors in eventualities that never occur, our
imitation models must only imitate the known part of someone else’s
strategy (i.e., in the language of extensive form games, imitation cannot
occur at unreached decision points).
Several sections in this book examine how such imitative behavior can
be implemented in general extensive form games with a particular em-
phasis on the relationship of the resultant behavioral evolution to other
standard evolutionary dynamics. The rigorous analysis of imitation is
restricted to the subclass of “one-player extensive form games.” Specif-
ically, chapters 2.10, 4.6.2, and 8.4 develop models when the outcome of
one other randomly chosen individual is observed in a one-player ex-
tensive form game. In these three chapters two aspects of the discussion
above are considered; namely why an individual player uses imitative
behavior and then how he uses it (i.e., when does he switch to the ob-
served behavior and the mechanism for doing so). The discussion in the
remainder of this section is limited to the latter aspect as it applies to
the following elementary two-player extensive form game.
Take figure 1.3.1. First consider the decision facing player two.11 He
has four strategies, each of which specifies either or r in the left-hand
subgame (i.e., when player one uses L) and either or r in the right-hand
subgame. Suppose that his random observation is of a player using in
the left-hand subgame together with the resulting payoff a 2 . If he decides
to imitate this behavior, he must still maintain his current behavior in the
unreached right-hand subgame since no observation is available there.
That is, player two cannot switch to the observed player’s entire strategy
(as might be expected if imitative behavior is applied to normal form
games); rather, imitation can only affect subgame behavior along the
observed outcome path.
11. When player one’s strategy is fixed (in which case, this strategy can be replaced by a
“move by nature”), figure 1.3.1 is an example from player two’s perspective of a “parallel
bandit” studied in chapter 4.6.2. This is a special class of one-player extensive form games
(see chapter 8.4). Figure 1.3.1 is analyzed again in chapters 9.2 and 9.3 as a two-player game.
Notice that the orientation of the extensive form in figure 1.3.1 is opposite to that in
figure 1.1.1. That is, there the sequential decisions that are taken later in the game tree
are above the earlier ones, whereas here they are below. There seems to be no universally
accepted orientation with sideways progressions also possible. Different orientations are
used throughout the book but should not cause the reader undue difficulty.
L R
2 2
r r
a1 b1 c1 d1
a2 b2 c2 d2
Figure 1.3.1
Extensive form example to illustrate imitative behavior.
As we will see (e.g., chapter 2.10), for both intuitive and technical
reasons, the most important mechanisms for switching behavior use
proportional imitation. For instance, suppose that a player only con-
templates switching to the observed behavior if the resulting payoff is
higher. Moreover, in this case, suppose the player switches with a prob-
ability proportional to the payoff difference. When these assumptions
are applied to player two’s decision in figure 1.3.1, an evolutionary dy-
namic emerges that respects the subgame structure.12 Combined with a
similar analysis in chapter 9.3 that assumes player one also uses propor-
tional imitation, we find that the agenda outlined in the Folk Theorem
of Evolutionary Game Theory is most easily accomplished by first ap-
plying convergence and stability concepts to the separate evolutionary
dynamics in the two subgames. The resultant limiting behaviors are then
used to shorten the extensive form game (technically, to “truncate” it)
whose dynamic analysis becomes considerably easier. That is, we have a
dynamic version of the backward induction procedure of classical game
theory.
The example above, as well as others based on imitative behavior in

this book, are admittedly oversimplified models of the complex phe-
nomenon of imitation. However, they do serve several purposes. Their
analyses illustrate how dynamical systems develop from underlying as-
sumptions of player interactions. This forces us to deal carefully with
the main issue already raised from other perspectives in the Introduc-
tion; namely how evolutionary game theory concepts that originated
12. Chapter 9.3 shows that this is essentially the replicator dynamic in each subgame. It
is also interesting to note that the Wright manifold for the game in figure 1.3.1 appears
automatically there as a natural feature of the evolutionary dynamics.
1.4 Organizational Matters 15
from applications to normal form games can be adapted to the exten-

sive form.
One such concept, subgame monotonicity, is analyzed in chapter 9.
The theory developed there shows that the Folk Theorem of Evolution-
ary Game Theory remains intact. Furthermore it shows how the dynamic
analysis of a general extensive form game can be decomposed into that
of shorter games before being recombined to give results for the more
complicated original game. Although this process is nominally parallel
to the backward induction procedure to find subgame perfect NE (see
section 1.1), there are significant advantages to the dynamic approach.
In particular, the influence of out-of-equilibrium behavior does not rely
on assumptions of how rational players decide actions in situations they
never encounter. Rather, the strength of selective pressures on such ac-
tions can be included explicitly in the dynamic model (see the discussion
of the Chain-Store Game in section 1.1).
At the present time there is no universally accepted dynamic that evo-
lutionary game theorists agree is important for general extensive form
games. A case is implicitly made in this book that the replicator dynamic
adapted to the extensive form structure may fulfill this role. However,
whether or not this eventually happens, the theory and techniques de-
veloped here should be as important in any dynamic theory of extensive
form games.
1.4 Organizational Matters
The reader may be surprised that the formal definition of an extensive

form game does not appear until halfway through the book in chapter 6.
This was done to avoid the complex formalism of extensive form games
interfering with an intuitive understanding of the dynamic issues as they
arise. For the most part the original dynamic analysis of each of the
topics before chapter 6 is accomplished without specific reference to
the associated game’s extensive form. These include the symmetric and
bimatrix games of chapters 2 and 3 respectively, the multi-locus model
of natural selection in chapter 5, and, to a lesser extent, the general
asymmetric games of chapter 4. In these chapters (beginning at the end
of chapter 2), the book emphasizes how an informal appreciation of the
extensive form assists in understanding the theory.
Chapter 6 summarizes the standard definition of general extensive
form games needed for their dynamic analysis. Also emphasized here is
the subgame structure and its relationship to the replicator dynamic. The
dynamics of extensive form evolutionary games are not well understood
for complex game trees without many subgames. Instead, chapters 7 and
8 consider two important particular classes of extensive form games
(simultaneity games and perfect information games) where there is a
great deal of subgame decomposition. Since much of the material here
is new, there is a greater emphasis on examples to illustrate the tech-
niques. Chapter 9 on subgame monotonicity returns to a more general
perspective as a means to connect the concepts introduced in chap-
ters 6 to 8. These four chapters leave many open problems for general
extensive form games that suggest directions for future research.
The first time technical terms appear, they are indicated by a differ-
ent font than that of the surrounding text. Each chapter concludes with
a Notes section that discusses some of the primary references. These
references should not be regarded as a complete list of the related lit-
erature. I have used the convention that the phrases “see Notes” and
“see Appendix” in a particular chapter refers to the corresponding sec-
tion at the end of that chapter. Another convention used throughout
is that the third section of chapter 3, for instance, is referred to as sec-
tion 3.3 in chapter 3 and as chapter 3.3 elsewhere. Theorems, figures,
displayed equations, and the like, are numbered consecutively starting
at the beginning of each section.
1.5 Notes
There is a considerable literature that argues all extensive form games

with the same (reduced-strategy) normal form are strategically equiva-
lent when played by rational players (e.g., Kolberg and Mertens 1986).
These arguments are usually based on transformations of extensive form
games similar to those introduced by Thompson (1952) and Dalkey
(1953). In particular, Elmes and Reny (1994) show all extensive form
games with the same (reduced) normal form can be transformed into
one another. Moreover Mailath et al. (1993) construct normal form coun-
terparts for many concepts that seem initially to rely in an essential
way on the extensive form structure. For instance, they recover “nor-
mal form subgames” corresponding to subgames of the extensive form.
Thus, technically speaking, the nine-strategy normal form of the first
example (based on the RSP Game) does not hide its subgame structure.
Similarly the subgame perfect NE can be retrieved from the normal
form of the Chain-Store Game. However, in these cases, the normal form
1.5 Notes 17
constructions of elementary extensive form concepts are themselves un-

necessarily complex objects that are certainly no easier to analyze than
in their original extensive form. In fact standard dynamic analyses of
normal form games do not take into account these constructions.
Setwise solution concepts based on the dynamics of normal form
games have also been considered in the literature. These include sets
that may contain nonequilibrium strategies—such as ES∗ (evolutionar-
ily stable∗ ) sets (Weibull 1995) and sets closed under (weakly) better
replies (Ritzberger and Weibull 1995)—as well as sets of NE—such as
EES (equilibrium evolutionarily stable) sets (Swinkels 1992). Every nor-
mal form game contains sets of the first type but not necessarily of the
second type. Of particular interest in this book are the ESSets (evolu-
tionarily stable sets) and the SESets (strict equilibrium sets) introduced
by Thomas (1985) and Balkenborg (1994) respectively. These are finite
unions of NE components with desirable dynamic stability properties
for the symmetric and bimatrix normal form games of chapters 2 and
3 respectively. For the general extensive form games of chapters 7 and
8, the stability of NE components containing a subgame perfect NE
receives special attention.
The issue of which evolutionary dynamic is appropriate to model a
particular game is beyond the scope of this book. As well as the dy-
namics analyzed here, biological game theorists model population be-
havior where individual fitness is a function of aggregate population
strategy (rather than pairwise interactions), the so-called playing the
field method (Maynard Smith 1982). Extensive form reasoning through
sequential effects of such aggregate interactions has recently been rec-
ognized as an important factor for realistic models of biological systems
(e.g., Hammerstein 2001; McNamara and Houston 1999). Other (nor-
mal form) dynamics based on aggregate behavior are also prevalent
among both groups of practitioners, such as payoff positive dynamics
(Weibull 1995) and adaptive dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998).
There is also considerable research by economic game theorists on an-
other means to select NE by evolutionary methods; namely the stochas-
tic models introduced by Foster and Young (1990) and Kandori et al.
(1993) that examine the effect of infrequent mutation. They emphasize
the long-run stationary distribution as the mutation rate approaches
zero rather than the evolutionary dynamic. It is interesting to note that
mutation was also central to the earlier development of the ESS con-
cept (e.g., Maynard Smith 1982) as a strategy that is uninvadable by rare
mutants.
2 Symmetric Normal
Form Games
Although this book emphasizes extensive form games, we begin with

a review of dynamic evolutionary game theory for symmetric normal
form games.1 This is partly for historical reasons as the theory of dy-
namic evolutionary games first developed in the biological literature
where extensive form games were initially of little interest. Moreover
many of the techniques used to analyze the dynamics of extensive form
games are based on those for symmetric normal form games, and so a
good understanding of dynamic evolutionary game theory for symmet-
ric normal form games is essential background knowledge. The proofs
for many of the results included in this chapter are omitted as they are
contained in standard books on the subject (see Notes). The proofs given
here either have, as yet, appeared only in research articles or illustrate
techniques that are required in subsequent chapters.
2.1 The Replicator Dynamic
In a symmetric normal form game, G, there are n possible pure strategies

denoted e 1 , . . . , e n . S = {e 1 , . . . , e n } is then the set of pure strategies. G is a
two-player game where a contest involving players using strategies e i and
e j results in a payoff π(e i , e j ) for (the player using) strategy e i . Mixed
strategies are also important in evolutionary game theory. Each p ∈

n ≡ {( p1 , . . . , pn ) | pi ≥ 0, pi = 1} represents a mixed strategy and n
(also denoted (S)) is called the mixed-strategy space (or strategy simplex).
It is the n − 1 dimensional simplex of frequency vectors in Rn with
vertices at the unit coordinate vectors. The vector (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
which has 1 in the ith component and 0 everywhere else, represents e i .
1. Normal form games are also known as strategic form games, a phrase that will not be
used again in this book.
19
20 Chapter 2 Symmetric Normal Form Games
There are two interpretations of a mixed strategy p. One is as a strat-

egy played by an individual player. In this case, the ith component pi
represents the probability this individual player uses pure strategy e i in
a particular contest. The expected payoff to a player using p in a contest
with a player using p̂ is then

n
π( p, p̂) = pi π(e i , e j ) p̂ j .
i, j=1
For symmetric normal form games, we will usually write this payoff in
matrix form as

n
π( p, p̂) = p · Ap̂ = pi a i j p̂ j ,
i, j=1
where A = [a i j ] is the n × n payoff matrix with entries a i j = π(e i , e j ).2

The second interpretation is the one used most often in dynamic evo-
lutionary game theory. Here it is assumed that there is a large population
of individuals who each use some pure strategy. The population is in
state p ∈ n if its ith component, pi , is the current proportion of indi-
viduals in the population (i.e., frequency) using pure strategy e i . If con-
tests3 occur through random pairwise interactions and population size
is effectively infinite (or if random pairs also include the possibility an
individual plays against himself), then the expected payoff of someone
using pure strategy e i is π(e i , p) = e i · Ap. The dynamic evolutionary
game theory considered in this book assumes that the frequency vector
p evolves over time through some mechanism that translates expected
payoffs into a deterministic dynamic on n .
The original dynamic for evolutionary games interpreted payoff as the
reproductive success or fitness of each individual in the population. When
offspring are assumed to inherit the identical strategy of their single par-
ent in this biological model,4 the standard replicator dynamic emerges
in either its continuous-time overlapping generation version or in its
2. In this notation, p and p̂ are actually column vectors and p · Ap̂ is the dot product of
vectors in Rn .
3. A contest in a two-player game is a play of the game where each player chooses one
of his possible pure or mixed strategies. From a population perspective, such a contest is
often called an interaction between two individuals. In particular, the evolutionary model
developed here assumes payoffs result through pairwise interactions rather than through
a playing the field mechanism mentioned in chapter 1.5.
4. Technically the population is a haploid species or else reproduction is parthenogenetic.
2.1 The Replicator Dynamic 21
discrete-time nonoverlapping generation version. Let us briefly out-

line derivations of these dynamics from first principles (see section 2.10
below for another derivation based on imitative behavior that yields
slightly different versions of the replicator dynamics).
For the discrete generation model, each individual in the population
lives for one generation during which time it interacts with exactly one
randomly chosen opponent. This individual’s payoff is the number of
offspring it produces in the next generation and so must be nonnegative.
Thus, if ni is the number of individuals using strategy e i at generation
t, then the expected number at generation t + 1 is ni = ni (e i · Ap).5 Evo-
lutionary game theory is traditionally concerned with the evolution of

strategy frequency pi = ni / j n j . Here pi = ni e i · Ap/ j n j e j · Ap =

( j n j ) pi e i · Ap/( j n j ) j p j e j · Ap = pi (e i · Ap/ p · Ap), where, to
avoid the possibility of division by zero, we will assume that all en-
tries a i j are positive. Thus the standard discrete-time replicator dynamic is
e i · Ap
pi = pi . (2.1.1)
p · Ap
There are several ways to develop the continuous-time replicator dy-

namic. Perhaps the simplest is to assume that expected individual fit-
ness is the net growth rate (i.e., birth rate − death rate). Notice that
payoffs can be negative in this scenario. Then ṅi = ni e i · Ap, where

ṅi is the time derivative of ni . From calculus, ṗi = d(ni / j n j )/dt =

(ni e i · Ap j n j − ni j n j e j · Ap)/( j n j )2 = pi (e i − p) · Ap. The stan-
dard continuous-time replicator dynamic6 is
ṗi = pi (e i − p) · Ap. (2.1.2)
An alternative derivation using the discrete-time replicator dynamic

leads to the payoff-adjusted continuous-time replicator dynamic. If we
take the approximation ṗi = limt→0 [ pi (t + t) − pi (t)/t] ∼
= pi (t + 1)
− pi (t) as exact, then (2.1.1) implies that

(e i − p) · Ap
ṗi = pi .
p · Ap
5. Notice that the explicit dependence of ni (t) and p(t) on time t is usually notationally
suppressed.
6. Unless otherwise stated, “replicator dynamic” for a symmetric normal form game
refers to this standard continuous-time version. In later chapters we call this the symmetric
replicator dynamic to avoid ambiguities.
Since p · Ap is positive and bounded away from 0 for all p ∈ n , the

trajectories of this are identical to those of (2.1.2) except for a rescaling
of time.7
Some notation is needed here to summarize well-known properties of
the replicator dynamics in (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). Both of these are autonomous
deterministic dynamics that leave n forward invariant. That is, for every
initial state p at t = 0, there is a unique trajectory p(t) ∈ n for all t ≥ 0
(for all t ∈ N) that satisfies (2.1.2) (respectively (2.1.1)). Autonomous
implies that p̂(t) given by p̂(t) = p(t + ε) is a trajectory for the dynamic
for every relevant ε (i.e., ε > 0 or ε ∈ N respectively) whenever p(t) is a
◦
trajectory. Furthermore the interior of n denoted by (S) ≡ { p ∈ n |
pi > 0 for all i} is also forward invariant as is each face ( Ŝ) =
◦
{ p ∈ n |
pi = 0 for any e i ∈/ Ŝ}, where Ŝ is any nonempty subset of S. (S) is also
called the set of completely mixed strategies or set of polymorphic states. The
◦
support of p is supp( p) ≡ {e i | pi > 0}. Thus p ∈ (supp( p)). The rest
points of an autonomous dynamic on n are those frequency vectors p
that satisfy ṗi = 0 (respectively pi = pi ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The rest points
of (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) are exactly those p ∈ n for which e i · Ap = p · Ap
for all e i ∈ supp( p).
A crucial property for us is that both dynamics satisfy the Folk
Theorem of Evolutionary Game Theory (see chapter 1 and theorem 2.5.3
below) when convergence of trajectories is only examined for interior
trajectories. Specifically, a limit point of a convergent interior trajectory
or a stable rest point p ∗ must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium (i.e., p ∗ is
a best reply against itself as defined in section 2.5 below). On the other
hand, although all symmetric NE are rest points, only some are either
stable or the unique limit point of an interior trajectory. Thus, by restrict-
ing attention to these latter two classes of symmetric NE, we have an
initial equilibrium selection technique based on dynamic evolutionary
game theory.
There are other deterministic dynamics that share the properties of the
replicator dynamic discussed above. Of particular interest to economic
game theorists are the general class of monotone selection dynamics
(of which the replicator dynamic is a special case) and the continuous-
time best response dynamic with its discrete-time counterpart fictitious
7. The exact form of (2.1.2) can also be produced in this manner by an “overlapping” gen-
eration model where it is assumed that a fraction τ > 0 of the total population reproduces
each time interval of length τ and then let τ → 0.
play, both of which rely on the players having more information as to

the current state of the population than monotone selection dynamics
require. Convergence and/or stability are also important to biologists
because these properties allow them to predict the observed behavior of
the population without an explicit solution of the dynamical system (see
chapter 1). Biological game theorists are more interested in the replicator
dynamic (for it does not assume individuals make conscious decisions)
and in its generalizations to evolutionary models of diploid populations
(e.g., section 2.8 below).
The alternative dynamics for economic game theorists are introduced
in sections 2.3 and 2.4 after the dynamic classification of symmetric
normal form games with two strategies is completed in section 2.2. These
games provide an elementary illustration of the concepts introduced
so far in a setting where all deterministic evolutionary dynamics are
essentially equivalent.
2.2 Dynamics for Two-Strategy Games

When S = {e 1 , e 2 }, let the 2 × 2 payoff matrix be denoted by A = ac db .
Since p2 = 1 − p1 , the mixed strategy space 2 is the one-dimensional
line in figure 2.2.1. The qualitative behavior of a one-dimensional au-
tonomous dynamic can be understood to a large extent by its phase
portrait (see figure 2.2.1) which shows the direction of the vector field
at each point of 2 . For instance, the replicator dynamic (2.1.2) is
ṗ1 = p1 (e 1 · Ap − p · Ap)
= p1 p2 (e 1 · Ap − e 2 · Ap)
= p1 p2 (a p1 + bp2 − (cp1 + d p2 ))
= p1 (1 − p1 )((a − c + d − b) p1 + b − d). (2.2.1)
The rest points of this dynamic (i.e., those 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 for which

ṗ1 = 0) are p1 = 0, p1 = 1, and any solutions of (a − c + d − b) p1 = d − b
satisfying 0 < p1 < 1. These latter are called interior rest points. The three
possible phase portraits can be classified by the signs of a − c and d − b.8
8. It is clear from (2.2.1) that the actual trajectories for (2.1.2) only depend
on the payoff
differences a − c and b − d. Thus the payoff matrix can be taken as a −c 0
0 d−b for these
games.
p2 p2 p2
p1 p1 p1
p*1 p*1
(a) Prisoner’s Dilemma (b) Coordination (c) Hawk-Dove
Figure 2.2.1
Phase portrait of the replicator dynamic for two-strategy games. Trajectories lie on the
line p1 + p2 = 1. Circles indicate rest points of the dynamic (solid are stable and empty
unstable) while arrows indicate increasing t.
We label these three classes by a particularly well-known game that is

an example of each.
Prisoner’s Dilemma Class (Payoffs satisfy (a − c)(d − b) ≤ 0)9 We

can assume, by reordering the strategies if necessary, that a ≤ c and
d ≥ b. From (2.2.1), there are no interior rest points since
(a − c + d − b) p1 + b − d ≤ min{(d − b)( p1 − 1), (a − c) p1 } < 0
for all 0 < p1 < 1. The phase portrait is given in figure 2.2.1a where
every initial interior point evolves monotonically to p1 = 0 as ṗ1 is
always negative. This is called the Prisoner’s Dilemma Class since it
includes the payoff structure for the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game that
has
C D

C R S
A=
D T P
with T > R > P > S. In this game players either Cooperate (C) or Defect
(D) and receive payoffs that are known as Temptation (T), Reward (R),
Punishment (P), and Sucker (S). In dynamical terms, the dilemma is
that the population evolves to mutual defection (i.e., everyone receives
P) even though individuals are better off if they mutually cooperate and
receive R. We call the case (a − c)(d − b) = 0 the Degenerate Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
9. We discard the case d = b and a = c since every point 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 is then a rest point
and so the dynamic is uninteresting.
Coordination Class (Payoffs satisfy a > c and d > b) Since (a −c)(d−

b) > 0, the dynamic (2.2.1) can be rewritten as ṗ1 = (a − c + d − b) p1 (1 −
p1 )( p1 − p1∗ ), which has
p1∗ = (d − b)/(a − c + d − b) (2.2.2)
as the unique interior rest point. Then ṗ1 > 0 if and only if p1 > p1∗ .
Thus any initial point p1 (0) > p1∗ evolves monotonically to p1 = 1,
whereas p1 (0) < p1∗ implies p1 evolves to 0 (see figure
2.2.1b). The typical
Coordination Game that has payoff matrix A = a0 d0 where a and d are
both positive is in this class. The replicator dynamic demonstrates that
different convergent trajectories may have different stable limit points
(i.e., one population may eventually coordinate itself on one of the two
pure strategies in figure 2.2.1b, while another evolves to the other pure
strategy). In particular, the replicator dynamic does not initially suggest
a means for all individuals to coordinate mutual play on the first pure
strategy in the Coordination Game that has a > d.
Hawk-Dove Class (Payoffs satisfy a < c and d < b) As shown in

figure 2.2.1c, every interior point p1 (0) now evolves monotonically
under (2.2.1) to the interior rest point p1∗ given by (2.2.2). This is called
the Hawk-Dove class after the Hawk-Dove Game with payoff
matrix
H D
 
V
H  2 −C V

A=  V
,
D
0
2
where C > V/2 > 0. The Hawk-Dove Game is one of the earliest games
considered by biological game theorists who used it as a model of pair-
wise animal conflict over a resource of value V. Hawks (H) fight over
the resource at a cost of C, whereas Doves (D) simply split the resource
and Hawk-Dove contests are won at no cost by H. The dynamic in fig-
ure 2.2.1c illustrates the intuitive idea that a polymorphic population
should emerge if strategies do well (i.e., have the higher payoff) when-
ever they are rare.
The three qualitatively different dynamic behaviors exhibited in fig-

ure 2.2.1 can all be described by a comparison of payoffs to the two
pure strategies (i.e., e 1 · Ap compared to e 2 · Ap). Specifically, p1 is
p*1 1兾2
t
0 5 10
Figure 2.2.2
Typical trajectories for the Hawk-Dove Game. Two trajectories of (2.2.1) for the Hawk-
Dove Game with C = V = 2. The trajectory above p1∗ = 12 has initial point p1 = 23 , and
the one below has p1 = 25 .
strictly increasing (i.e., ṗ1 > 0) at an interior point if and only

if e 1 · Ap > p · Ap if and only if e 1 · Ap > e 2 · Ap. Analogously, for the
discrete-time replicator dynamic, p1 is strictly increasing (i.e., p1 > p1 )
if and only if e 1 · Ap > e 2 · Ap. Thus the qualitative dynamics for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Class are the same for both the continuous-time and
discrete-time replicator dynamics. The same is true for the Coordination
Class.
The Hawk-Dove Class must be treated more carefully since it is pos-
sible that p1 is on the opposite side of p1∗ than p1 (i.e., evolution may
not occur monotonically). A priori p1 could even be farther away from
the rest point than p1 which would then suggest that the discrete-time
dynamic may not converge to p1∗ . The details given in the partial proof
of the following theorem show these possibilities cannot occur for the
discrete-time replicator dynamic (but see example 2.3.3 in section 2.3
below). The remainder of the straightforward proof of theorem 2.2.1
is omitted. Figure 2.2.2 shows some sample trajectories for the replica-
tor dynamic (2.2.1) of the Hawk-Dove Game with C = V = 2 which
clearly indicate convergence takes infinite time as p1 approaches p1∗ = 12
asymptotically as t → ∞.
Theorem 2.2.1 For symmetric normal form games with two strategies, every
interior trajectory of (2.1.1) or (2.1.2) evolves monotonically toward a rest point
of the dynamic that is a symmetric NE. If not initially at rest, this convergence
takes infinite time.
Proof Consider (2.1.1) for the Hawk-Dove Class (i.e., 0 < a < c and
0 < d < b). Without loss of generality, assume 0 < p1 < p1∗ . To show
p1 evolves monotonically to p1∗ in infinite time, it is sufficient to prove
2.3 Monotone Selection Dynamics 27
that p1 < p1∗ since e 1 · Ap > e 2 · Ap implies p1 < p1 in this case. To show
p1 < p1∗ , notice that this inequality is equivalent to each of the following
four conditions:
i. p1 (e 1 · Ap/ p · Ap) < (b − d)/[b + c − (a + d)]

ii. (c − a ) p1 e 1 · Ap < (b − d) p2 e 2 · Ap
iii. (c −a ) p1 < cp1 +d p2 , since (b −d) p2 −(c −a ) p1 = e 1 · Ap −e 2 · Ap > 0
for p1 < p1∗
iv. (d − a ) p1 < d
Clearly, if a ≥ d, then p1 < p1∗ . On the other hand, if a < d, then p1 < p1∗ if
and only if p1 < d/(d − a ). But d/(d − a ) > (b − d)/[b + c − (a + d)] =
p1∗ , since dc + a b > a d + a d and so p1 < d/(d − a ).10
2.3 Monotone Selection Dynamics
This section and the following introduce other deterministic dynamics

for general symmetric normal form games and compare the properties
of these dynamics to those of the replicator dynamic when there are
two strategies. One such class of dynamics is the monotone selection
dynamics. These are autonomous dynamical systems that, in continuous
time, have the form
ṗi = f i ( p) (2.3.1)
and in discrete time,
pi = pi + f i ( p), (2.3.2)
where the vector field f ( p) = ( f 1 ( p), . . . , f n ( p)) satisfies the relevant

conditions in the following two definitions:
Definition 2.3.1 The continuous-time dynamic (2.3.1) is a (regular) selec-

tion dynamic if, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
i. f i ( p) is Lipschitz continuous on some open neighborhood in Rn of n .
n
i=1 f i ( p) = 0 for all p ∈ .
n
ii.
iii. f i ( p)/ pi extends to a continuous real-valued function on n .
10. Note that p1 = b/(b + c) = p1∗ after one generation if a = d = 0. Otherwise (e.g., if
a > 0 and d > 0 as we assume for the discrete dynamics), the trajectory does not reach p1∗
in finite time.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
possession of a Negro, called John Conny. Ships
constantly stop here to water, as the most convenient
Place for taking in any large Quantity, and pay, each
Ship, an Ounce of Gold for the Privilege.
W. Thence, and anchored the 15th at Dixcove, an 14.
English Factory. This, Succonda, Anamaboo, and
others, tho’ called Factories, are the Residence only of
two or three People from the principal one at Cape
Corso, who have Commission over and above their
Salary, for what Trade they transact.
W. Dixcove, and anchored next Day before Cape Corso 16.
Castle, our African Company’s chief Fort; the
Residence of their Governor, stiled Director General;
two Merchants, a Secretary, Chaplain, Surgeon,
Factors, Writers, Artificers, and a Company of
Soldiers; with Buildings and Conveniencies inside, for
themselves or Slaves.
A. Anamaboo (just below it) a noted Place of stopping, June
for all our Windward trading Ships, to compleat their 26.
Slave Cargoes.
A. and W. Montford; the 30th, Barkee, and then Shallo. 28.
Through the whole from Sierraleon, it may be
observed, that Wood, Candles, or any other Ships
Necessaries are hard to get; the former, not from a
Want in the Country (it being over-run) but an
impassable Beach, where there is no navigable River,
and the Diffidence of the Negroes, where it might be
best supplied; and the other, because Merchant-Ships
do not expect a Trade of that sort, and therefore
unprovided.
A. Whydah. The whole Coast runs in a strait Line July 4.
(without Gulphs or Bays) is thick set with Trees, a
Tendency of the Sea with the Wind, and every where a
very rough and turbulent Beach.
W. Whydah, and arrived the 28th at the Island of 20.
Princes, belonging to the Portuguese. In our
Approach, saw every Day abundance of Whale,
Thresher, and Petrel.——Cleaned our Ships, heaving
down by one another, but became exceeding sickly by
the Fatigue, each burying three and four Men a Day,
for six Weeks together.
W Princes, both having purchased their Anchors with Sep.
difficulty. 20.
A St. Thomas’s, another Portuguese Island (the 28.

principal of three) on this Coast, abounding with fresh
Provisions, especially Hogs and Fowls, exchanged like
other Places of Poverty, at very easy Rates.
W Hence, and stretched with our Starboard Tacks to Oct. 5.
the Westward, designing to reach as far to Windward
as possible, that if any Pyrates should be on the
Coast, we might have them under our Lee. The 20th
we fell in with Cape Apollonia, went from thence the
23d, and anchored at Axim.
W Axim, and came to Cape 3 Points, where neglecting 24.
to pay John Conny his Duties for Water, he panyarr’d
some of our Men, till satisfied.
Left Cape 3 Points, and arrived next Day in Cape Corso 30.
Road again; it being every where confirmed to us in this
Return down, that the Pyrates in August last (the time we were at
Princes) had committed great Ravages upon the Merchant Ships.
W. Cape Corso Road, leaving the Weymouth, (now too Nov.
disabled to weigh her Anchor,) and plying to 10.
Windward, fell in with Succonda the 15th, repeating
our Visits in a Month’s Cruise, to Dixcove, cquedah,
Cape 3 Points, Axim, Cape Apollonia, Assinee,
Bassam, Jaque a Jaques, &c. our Purpose in it being
to secure Trade, air a sickly Ship, be in the way of
Intelligence, and impress Men from the Merchant-
Ships. Many prevented this indeed, by escaping to us
themselves from ill Treatment (they said) bad or short
Diet; but then, as more again on the same Pretence
took on with the Pyrates, it shews Caprice and
Humour to be the principal Point that determines
Seamen to this or that Service.
A De Elmina, the Dutch African Company’s principal 1721/2
Fort, of great Trade, there being seldom less than 5
Jan. 6.
or 6 Sail of Dutch Ships in the Road, often more.
A. Cape Corso Road, and left it the 10th in pursuit of the 7.
Pyrates; the Governor here, having received two or three
Expresses, that they had chased and taken a Ship nigh Axim, a
Place we had just come from.
A Apong to Leeward, not following too fast lest we over- 11.
shot them, but after certain Intelligence that the
Rogues had passed this Road (off at Sea) we
followed.
A Accra, a considerable trading Place, (for Salt 12.
particularly) and where the Dane, the Dutch, and
English, have a Castle.
A Whydah, and learned that the Pyrates had plundered Jan 15.
and ransomed 11 Sail of Ships, and left the Place two
Days before, on the Report of our following them.
W. Thence, and followed the Pursuit, coming before the 19.
Isle of Princes the 29th, and found the Portuguese
Strangers to the News.
A. The Mouth of the River Gabone, a snug Harbor we Feb. 1.
thought, for their Reception, the Navigation being
difficult; but finding by our Boats we had missed them,
left it the 3d, and continued our Search to Cape
Lopez.
Made the Cape, and soon after discovered the three
Pyrate Ships at Anchor in that Bay. One of them upon
the Heel, righted at sight of us, slipped her Cable and
chased, bending some of her Sails as she came out,
by which we judged the Rashness of our Enemy, who
fell a Prize to us before Night.
Recovered the Cape again, and found the Prize’s 10.
Consorts (according to expectation) very easy in the
Bay, and stayed so long that we doubted whether they
would stir for us; but at length, as their Eyes cleared in
our nearer Advance, all mad and frightned, they cut
their Cable, set their Sails, up went the black Flag,
and down their Courage; they continued a running
Fight, while only our chace Guns could play upon
them, and struck presently when our Broadside
reached, without the least Damage done to us.
A. Cape Lopez Bay, seizing there the third Pyrate Ship, Feb.
that had been deserted for a better Escape or 12.
Defence in the other.
W. Thence, having wooded and watered, bound with 18.
our Prizes and Prisoners to Cape Corso; the General,
and chief Merchants there, being in the Commission,
(brought out of England with us) for the Tryal of them.
Stopped at Princes, from the 21st to the 24th.
A. Cape Corso Road; the Pyrates in this Passage were Mar.
very troublesome to us, from a Project or two they 15.
had formed for their Deliverance, and hoped by the
Weakness of our Ship’s Company, would have
succeeded.
W. Cape Corso, the General’s Daughter of the Coast 1722
taking a Passage with us to England, a fair, flaxen- May 1.
hair’d, young Lady, tho’ born of a Mulatto.
I shall here observe at leaving the Center, that in respect
to Trade, Guinea needs only this threefold Division,
viz. the Gold, the Ivory, and the Slave-Coast; all to
Windward of this, might be called the one, and all to
Leeward the other; not because either of these Parts
of Trade would be entirely wanted in such respective
Division, but each abounds more under that
Denomination.
A Whydah, and left it the 5th, arriving at Cape Lopez May 3.
the 26th, where both Ships wooded, watered, and
purchased Wax for making Candles, now exceeding
scarce; and is the most convenient Place for Ships of
War, at leaving the Country.
W. Cape Lopez, and after a few Days at Sea, by foggy June 5.
Weather lost Company with our Consort the Swallow.
Made Cape Augustine in Brasil, a Portuguese Colony, July 1.
and anchored the 4th in Pernambuca Road, the next
great Port of Trade in this Province, to Bahia.
W Brasil, having found the Trade-Winds blow home, 12.
and increased in their Strength to this Continent,
bringing a dangerous Swell into the Road.
A Barbados, took in a Supply of Rum and Provisions, August
and left it the 9th. 3.
A Port-Royal in Jamaica, where we found the Swallow 23.

had arrived, a Week before.
A Hurricane[39] that drove the Prize ashore, blew away Aug.
all our Masts, with other Damages that detained us 28.
here 6 Months to repair.
W Port-Royal, and anchored at the Kays. 1722/3
W. The Kays, bound for England. Jan. 1.
A Donna Maria Bay in Hispaniola (the Windward Feb. 7.
Passage) to water, &c. 19.
W. Thence, and arrived at Spithead, April 8th, whence 22.
we were ordered to Woolwich, and paid off May 11th,
1723.
F I N I S .
E R R ATA .
P. line
32 19 for to r. too.
67 22 for he r. they.
72 27 After r. Aft.
75 24 and will be paid not only &c.
115 4 Ch. x.
115 5 Ezion
125 16 r. some other Parts.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Put metaphorically for a Ship’s Cockpit; and answers to the
dark Cellaring of a House.
[2] At the Changes of the Moon appears a Pillar of Fire in the
North, which darting its Rays every way, moves from Place to
Place, enlightning not only Greenland, but Iceland and Norway;
and sometimes further, till the returning Sun obscures it. (Harris,
p. 635. Vol. II.)
[3] Finis Terræ, the Westermost Extremity of Europe, and formerly
thought a Ne plus ultra.
[4]
Sold 2 half-worn Suits for a Pipe of Wine.
3 Second-hand Wigs — — Ditto.
Loaf-Sugar sells 20d. per lib.
Cheshire-Cheese, 8.
Bisket, 2.
Beef per piece 10.
Bought Citron at 15d.
Lemons per C. 20.
[5] Vide Harris’s Voyages.
[6] Ten-pounders are like Mullets, but full of small Bones, like
Herring-bones.
[7] Old-wives; a scaly, flat Fish, half as thick as long, called so
from some Resemblance the Face is fancied to have, with that of
a Nun’s.
[8] Cavalloes; a bright, silver-colour’d Fish, with a prickly Ridge on
each side, half its length.
[9] Barricudoes; a well-tasted Fish, one Foot and an half long, not
wholesome if the Roof of the Mouth be black.
[10] Sucking-Fish; something like the Dog-Fish; underneath he
has an oval Flat, of three Inches and an half over, granulated like
a Nutmeg-grater; with this he sticks so fast, as difficultly to be torn
from the Deck. He often infests the Shirk, sticks fast, and sucks
his Nourishment from him.
[11] Cat-Fish, so called from four slender Fibres like Whiskers,
sprouting from the under part of his Mouth.
[12] Lollas, are Places cleared of Wood, but barren; the
Habitations only of Bug a bugs, the Species of an Ant; build not
above a Foot and half high; are whitish, smaller than the common
sort, sting, and devour Cloaths.
[13] Lugars; open, clear Places, sowed with Rice, &c.
[14] Plantanes and Bananoes are a very common Fruit, shaped
like Cucumbers, but slender and longer; peeled of their Coat, they
are roasted and eat as Bread, fried, or eaten raw. The latter is the
juicier, and of a preferable Taste. The Plant bearing them grows
as high as a Cherry-tree, with a Leaf three Yards long, and one
over; an admirable Detergent in foul, sanious Ulcers, stripped of
the inner Skin, and applied as you do Housleek in Corns.
[15] The Pine-Apple is their Prince of Fruits; does not grow so
high, but about the Bigness of a Pæony; a beautiful green and
yellow; firm and juicy as a Melon; eaten with Wine and Sugar.
Some of strong Fancy, imagine all sorts of Fruit to be tasted in it;
to me, it always left a stinging abstergent Flavour.
[16] Lime-trees, about as big as our Apple, arise by several Roots,
and have an oval Leaf; the Fruit smaller, but of sharper Scent and
Flavour than Lemons. In the Woods also are many Sevil-Orange
Trees, the Fruit largest and best tasted of any I ever met.
[17] Papais, the Size of a moderate Melon, green as that, and full
of Seeds, which thrown out, and the outside pared, is used with
Meat, buttered and salted. They grow 20 or 30 Foot high. Bosman
says, Male and Female (the Alcoran, that all Fruits grow so, p.
213.) the Male blossoming, but bearing no Fruit.
[18] Rice is sown in swampy Grounds; grows the height of our
Wheat, and from the top of the Stems shoot very slender Stalks,
bearing the Rice grained one above another to a vast Increase; a
Peck yielding above 40 Bushels: Yet such is their Idleness, there
is often a Deficiency supplied from Sherbro, &c.
[19] The Civet is about as large as a Ram Cat, comes from about
Sherbro; it’s Head like a Foxes. The Male only affords this, at the
rate of 3 or 4 Grains a day, gathered with a Quill out of a little Cod
or Hole, near the Intestin. rectum.
[20] General Phips at Cape Corso, was so nettled at this (he
receiving but 19 for 21) that it took his Stomach off Victuals two or
three Days.
For as in Fight the Gun or Drum
Will make the Warriour’s Stomach come;
So eke in Play; if two miss Fire,
The Stomach palls with wax’ning Ire.
[21] The Word Fetish is used in a double Signification among the
Negroes: It is applied to Dress and Ornament, and to something
reverenced as a Deity (a Lake, a Stone, a Tree, &c.) both so far
agree, as to be regarded as a Charm. That by a Peculiarity, and
this by some inherent Essence, can attract Good, or divert Evil.
Here they sometimes hide the Fetish in secret parts of the Woods;
on urgent Occasions make a sort of Appeal to them, separating
some the Friday, some the Saturday, and keep within doors the
whole day, in a Moaning, or what you may call a Devotion to it.
[22] Salaries 80l. per Ann.
[23] Boiled by the Negroes to the bigness of half-penny Rolls, and
an Accy purchases nine a day of them for a Month. The English
bake it.
A lean Goat you may get by chance for five Accys; a Muscovy
Duck, a Parrot, or couple of Chickens, for one.
[24] Miscell. Curiosa. Vol. iii. has a Journal of the Weather at
Cape Corso for 12 Months, from Mr. Hillier, who says, that was a
Year of the most Rain that could be remembred.
[25] Tittwees, like a large Wolf or Mastive, very fierce, and rob
their Towns in the Night, of what Kid or Poultry they find.
Tigers, not so adventurous, but are seen by them sometimes:
There are two now in the Castle.
Serpents. I have heard the Gentlemen of the Factory say, they
have been seen here 30 foot long, able to swallow a Child whole;
(Bosman says, a Man, or a full-grown Deer.)
Deer. Those whose Feet are tipped, and used as Tobacco-
Stoppers, are the bigness of a large Cat. The General had one in
his Kitchen, the Feet as thick as the middle Finger; whence I
judge, those very slender ones we see, are the Abortives of this
Animal.
[26] These sort of Tryals have much the same View with the
Water of Jealousy among the Jews, or Ordeal with our Saxon
Ancestors, that is, a Tryal by Fire or Water: The former was
proving their Innocency by walking on hot Plough-Shears un-hurt:
The latter was used hot or cold. They run their Arm into it scalding
hot; or the Priest gave an Imprecation to a Draught of Holy-Water.
The Person swore to his Innocence, and being tied Hands and
Feet, was thrown into a River or Pond; if he sunk, he was
adjudged innocent, if he floated, guilty: And these ways continued
till K. Hen. III.
Another way with the Saxons, was single Combat; if a Woman,
she appointed her Champion.
Another, since we are upon Tryal, was by two Ounces of Bread
and Cheese taken after the Communion, the Priest thus
imprecating; May it stick in your Throat, turn pale, your Limbs
convulsed, &c. if guilty; but if innocent, may you swallow it easily,
&c.
Rapin.
[27] Hæmac is a Brasil word, and signifies a Net slung to rest in;
made there from the Rind of a Tree.
[28] Milton. B. 10, & 11.
[29] A Negrish Name.
[30] See the Appendix to the Navy-Surgeon, in which are Physical
Observations on the Moisture and Density of the Air.
[31] There is a square Fort on the Larboard Point of the Bay, and
Anchorings about a League from it.
[32] Some pretend to have found what they call a material
Thunder-bolt; such a one is said to have fell on the Turkish
Mosque at Adrianople A. D. 1693; and such are shewn in the
Museums of Princes. At Copenhagen they have a large piece of
metallick Substance, said to be Thunder-bolt.
[33] A Word used by our Sailors, for the Grout is made of it.
[34] Moquissin is a name given to any thing they think has an
incomprehensible Virtue. V. Geographic. Atlas.
[35] The Portuguese, who trade hither from Erasil, chuse their
Cargoes all Boys and Girls, if they can, as more ductile for
Conversion; there being Fathers appointed to instruct them in
their Creed, and to baptize them, on their arrival; but then they are
Papists.
[36] Made of a peculiar Earth from Germany, and bear (those that
are good) the most intense heat.
[37]
There’s but the twinkling of a Star,
Between a Man of Peace and War.
Hud.
[38] At this Place I would observe, in relation to heaving the Lead,
that there is a Nisus in Bodies of Water from below upwards,
which makes ’em to sink neither so fast, nor so direct, at any
considerable Depth, as near the Surface; all at 200 Fathom or
less, being bottomless; i. e. unfathomable.
This Nisus, or resisting Motion to the Descent of Bodies, is not
only perceptible in the Lead, but more sensibly declares itself,
first, in that black or green Skim, seen sometimes on the Surface
(even smelling) after long Calms, the Product of some intestine
Motion.
2. That Divers, or any floating Bodies, emerge with greater Force
than they sunk.
3. Mr. Boyle’s 20th Experiment observes, that a glass Bubble let
open into the Receiver, on the Exsuction of the Air, the Water in it
manifestly rises a greater Height; consequently the Expansion
and Rarefaction of the Air by the Heat of the Sun, makes room for
this Spring in the Water, to exert itself; and therefore the Tides
themselves would more difficultly yield to the distant Attractions of
the Sun and Moon (I should think) without adding to that Theory
this conjoined Force, or natural Propensity of the Sea, to swell
before.
In respect to sinking the Lead, also may be added, a greater
Coldness, and a greater Saltness of the Sea, in proportion to the
Depths; (both which are very probable,) and will create a greater
Buoyancy, or Resistance to sinking, as will likewise the drawing
out a greater Quantity of Line, (less apt to demerge.) So that
although falling Bodies in Air, have their Velocities encreased, the
nearer they approach the Earth, yet contrarily in Water, it
diminishes with the Descent.
[39] Depend much on the preceding Season, (hot and dry
Weather) apt to raise greater Plenty of elastick Vapours on the
Terra firma, and will explode themselves now here, now there, as
the greater Rarefaction of Air (more towards one Island than
another) may invite.
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Illi Robur & Æs triplex
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
The numerical dates in the Sidenotes (on pages 255 to 265) have all been
italicized for consistency eg Mar. 10..
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and
inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Pg 35: ‘some hunred Leagues’ replaced by ‘some hundred Leagues’.
Pg 48: the footnote anchor [16] was missing, and has been added to ‘[16]Limes,
Oranges’.
Pg 68: ‘weighed Auchor’ replaced by ‘weighed Anchor’.
Pg 97: ‘our Rigth of’ replaced by ‘our Right of’.
Pg 97: ‘The Heigth of’ replaced by ‘The Height of’.
Pg 104: ‘ars sold’ replaced by ‘are sold’.
Pg 132: ‘a Change full as bad’ replaced by ‘a Charge full as bad’.
Pg 193: ‘joined also in in a’ replaced by ‘joined also in a’.
Pg 199: ‘ridiculous, scaramouch’ replaced by ‘ridiculous, and scaramouch’
(catchword ‘and’ was missing).
Pg 202: ‘we re- our’ replaced by ‘we repeated our’.
Pg 207: ‘off the 1sland’ replaced by ‘off the Island’.
Pg 209: ‘Food or Necessarieis’ replaced by ‘Food or Necessaries’.
Pg 243: ‘Bitts of 7d½’ replaced by ‘Bitts of 7½d’.
Pg 261: ‘1721/2’ inserted before ‘Jan 6.’ as a new Sidenote.
Pg 263: ‘1722’ inserted before ‘May 1.’ as a new Sidenote.
Pg 265: ‘1722/3’ inserted before ‘Jan 1.’ as a new Sidenote.
Catalog: ‘by furnish- them’ replaced by ‘by furnishing them’.
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1. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, Larry Samuelson,

The MIT Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

2 Symmetric Normal Form Games 19

4 Asymmetric Games 103

5 Natural Selection with Multiple Loci 155

5.4 Selection and Recombination 162

6 Extensive Form Games 165

7 Simultaneity Games 187

8 Perfect Information Games 235

8.2.1 The Replicator and Monotone

9 Subgame Monotonicity 289

approaches, including theoretical model-building, empirical studies,

This book is a sequel to my earlier monograph, The Stability Concept of

There are many colleagues who, perhaps unknowingly, have influ-

Extensive form games, with an explicit description of the sequential

behavior were initially fascinated with evolutionary game theory. It also

1.1 Extensive Form versus Normal Form

Every (finite) extensive form game has a normal form representation.

[that a game’s] extensive-form representation is an unnecessarily complex object

This book emphatically rejects the sentiments contained in this quota-

1.1 Extensive Form versus Normal Form 3

The first example is based on the two-player Rock–Scissors–Paper

the conclusions of dynamic evolutionary game theory are dramatically

The second example is the Chain-Store Game, a simplified caricature

1.1 Extensive Form versus Normal Form 5

of which outcome (if either) predicts player behavior in this example

that specifies a NE action in the subgame following player one entering

1.1 Extensive Form versus Normal Form 7

(i.e., the monopolist’s strategy is not revealed if the potential entrant

The approach I take in this book is to develop a dynamic theory of ex-

1.2 Biology versus Economics

There are two main groups of practitioners of the concepts of evolution-

1.2 Biology versus Economics 9

games for economic game theorists tend to have many NE as possible

7. Technically these are called symmetric games (see chapter 2).

payoff approach to break payoff ties in the Chain-Store Game discussed

1.2 Biology versus Economics 11

As may be already apparent by the preceding discussion, the line

i. A stable rest point is a NE.

Similarly the basic version of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection

Imitation is clearly an important factor in explaining how humans adapt

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1.4 Organizational Matters 15

from applications to normal form games can be adapted to the exten-

1.4 Organizational Matters

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Since p · Ap is positive and bounded away from 0 for all p ∈ n , the