Lecture 3
Lecture 3
Lecture Note 3
3. Multiperiod market models
Model assumptions:
1, 2, ..., where
xj (n) denotes the units invested in the
j th risky asset from time n − 1 to n
y(n) denotes the units of the risk-free
asset held from time n − 1 to n. We
assume that xj (n) and y(n) can be ran-
dom (not known at time 0) and take
any value in R.
We call a strategy
• x1(n), ..., xm(n), y(n) , n =
1, 2, ... self-nancing if
m
X
V (n) = y(n + 1)A(n) + xj (n + 1)Sj (n)
j=1
for all n = 1, 2, ...
=⇒ value before portfolio reallocation is
the same as value after portfolio realloca-
tion.
=⇒ No consumption or injection of funds
from outside.
90, scenario ω3
m
y(n + 1)A(n) +
P
xj (n + 1)Sj (n) for
j=1
n = 1, 2, ....
• Remarks:
Proposition 3.1: a self-nancing strat-
egy is determined by initial value and
position in risky assets
=⇒ investments in the risk-free asset
are made so that the strategy is self-
nancing.
Proposition 3.1 does not say that there
exists an admissible strategy. The value
of the resulting strategy does not need
to be nonnegative.
x(2) =
0 if S(1) = 90
in scenarios ω1, ω2
120
=
90 in scenarioω3
V (1) − x(2)S(1)
y(2) =
A(1)
for ω1, ω2
120−240 = −1.2
= 90−0100
100 = 0.9 for ω3
(b) Yes, by Proposition 3.1 (or check directly).
(c) Yes, it is predictable and self-nancing by
Proposition 3.1 and the value process is non-
negative:
V (0) = 100 > 0,
for ω1
280 − 1.2 · 110 = 148
for ω2 > 0
= 220 − 1.2 · 110 = 88
for ω3
0 + 0.9 · 110 = 99
for ω1, ω2
120 = 1.2
= 100
90 = 0.9
100 for ω3
which is not deterministic.
3.2 No arbitrage
Denitions:
for
−7x(2) ω1
=
−22x(2) for ω
2
As arbitrage opportunity, we choose
x(1) = 0, y(1) = 0
x(2)(ω1) = x(2)(ω2) = c
x(2)(ω3) = y(2)(ω3) = 0
for some constant c < 0.
(b) No. To benet from the arbitrage oppor-
tunity, we need to be able to short sell the
stock.
(c) By investing or short selling the stock at
time 1, we have transactions costs
5 = 6|x(2)| for ω , ω ,
time1:|x(2)| · 120 · 100 1 2
time 2: 5 = 6.25|x(2)|
|x(2)| · 125 · 100 for ω1,
5 = 5.5|x(2)|
|x(2)| · 110 · 100 for ω2.
Total transaction costs in time 2 values are
(6 · 1.1 + 6.25)|x(2)| = 12.85|x(2)| for ω1,
(6 · 1.1 + 5.5)|x(2)| = 12.1|x(2)| for ω2.
for ω1
3/2
for ω2
S2(0) = 150, K2 = 1/2
for ω3
−1/2
for ω1
25x1 + 150x2
for ω2
= −25x1
−125x1 − 150x2 for ω3
−25x1 > 0 =⇒ x1 6 0
6 x1 .
−125x1 − 150x2 > 0 =⇒ x2 6 − 5
hence − 75
19 x 6 x 6 − 59 x .
1 2 75 1
For example, x1 = −1 and x2 = 1/2 satisfy
the inequalities so that there is an arbitrage
opportunity.
Example 3) Assume that
there is a predictable,
self-nancing strategy x1(n), ..., xm(n), y(n) ,
if V (i) < 0
x (i + 1)
j
xj (i + 1) =
0 if V (i) > 0
if V (i) < 0
y (i + 1) − V (i)
j A(i)
y j (i + 1) =
0 if V (i) > 0
and put after time i + 1 everything into the
bank account. The corresponding value pro-
cess satises
V (i) − V (i) = 0 if V (i) < 0
V (i) =
0 if V (i) > 0
=⇒ strategy is self-nancing.
A(i + 1)
+y(i + 1)A(i + 1) − V (i)
A(i)
A(i + 1)
=V + 1)} −
(i {z V (i)} > 0
| A(i) | {z
>0 <0
=⇒ strategy is an arbitrage opportunity.
Example 4) Consider a binomial tree model
with d < r < u, but rather than being indepen-
dent, the one-step returns K(n) satisfy
if K(n − 1) = d for all n > 2
u
K(n) =
d if K(n − 1) = u
Does there exist an arbitrage opportunity?
Solution: Yes, we can benet from this be-
cause we know the returns in advance. For
some n > 2, choose
1 if K(n − 1) = d
x(n) =
−1 if K(n − 1) = u
if K(n − 1) = d
− S(n−1)
A(n−1)
y(n) =
S(n−1)
A(n−1)
if K(n − 1) = u
so that V (n − 1) = 0 and
A(n)
V (n) = S(n) − S(n − 1)
A(n − 1)
= S(n − 1)(u − r) > 0 if K(n − 1) = d,
A(n)
V (n) = −S(n) + S(n − 1)
A(n − 1)
1 A(1) 1
⇐⇒ Sd < < Su
S(0) A(0) S(0)
⇐⇒ d < r < u
In a multiperiod model, consider an admis-
sible strategy with V (0) = 0. Then there
exists an arbitrage opportunity ⇐⇒ there is
n : P (V (n) > 0) > 0
⇐⇒ there is n : P (V (n) > 0) > 0 and
V (n − 1) = 0
⇐⇒ there is a one-step subtree with
V (n − 1) = 0 at its root and V (n) > 0 for at
least one node
⇐⇒ a one-step subtree has arbitrage
⇐⇒ d > r or u 6 r.
"(2) ⇐⇒ (3)": p∗ = u−d
r−d
satisfy
E∗[S̃j (n + 1) S(n)] = S̃j (n) (3.1)
for all j = 1, ..., m and all n = 0, 1, 2, ...
Proof: Those of you who are interested can
click here (but you are not expected to know
the proof for this class).
Note:
Denition:
Note:
Or, alternatively,
A(0) A(0)
D(0) = E∗(D(2)|S(0)) = E∗(D(2))
A(2) A(2)
100 2
= · · 11 ≈ 6.667
110 3
Example 2) Consider the similar two-period
model:
risk-free A(0) A(1) A(2)
assets 100 100 110
Scenarios S(0) S(1) S(2)
ω1 100 120 140
ω2 100 120 110
ω3 100 90 99
ω4 100 80 88
Consider a European call option with strike
price 110 in this model. Calculate the arbitrage-
free prices at times 0 and 1.
Solution: Only in the scenario ω1, the option
has a positive payo. The price at time 1 is
A(1)
D(1)(ω1,2) = E∗(D(2)|S(1))(ω1,2)
A(2)
100 11 4
= ·( · 30 + · 0) = 20
110 15 15
D(1)(ω3,4) = 0 At time 0, we have
A(0)
D(0) = E∗(D(1)) = 20p∗
A(1)
for 1 < p < 1.
3 ∗ 2 So,
D(0) ∈ (6.667, 10)
Solution: From
for ω1
140
for ω2
120
D(2) =
100 for ω3
for ω4
100
we conclude that
100 ( 11·140 + 4·120 ) = 122.4242 for ω1, ω2
110 15 15
for ω3
100
D(1) = 110 · 100 = 90.9091
for ω4
100
110 · 100 = 90.9091
The prices at time 0 are
A(0)
D(0) = E∗(D(1))
A(1)
= 122.4242p∗ + 90.9091(2 − 4p∗)
+ 90.9091(3p∗ − 1)
= 90.9091 + 31.5151p∗
for 1 < p < 1.
3 ∗ 2 So,
D(0) ∈ (101.4141, 106.6667)
for ω1
9
for ω2
S2(0) = 7, S2(1) = 5
for ω3
13
What is the fair price at time 0 of the payo
max{3S1(1), S2(1)} at time 1?