HOW TO READ PIPING & INSTRUMENTATION

DIAGRAM

Safety in P&ID – part 1

By:

Cahyo Hardo Priyoasmoro, B.Eng., M.OHS.

 INTRODUCTION

In our opinion, during work in the upstream oil and gas industry production operations, it is
apparent that a person's imperfections in interpreting P&ID drawings lie in their lack of
knowledge of the operating unit, the relationship between operating units, plant safety, and
attention to detail in the footnotes in the P&ID itself. Not understanding nor reading the Process
Flow Diagram or PFD is also a significant contributing factor. This article is intended for those
who work in front line operations, operators, process engineers, operation engineers, and those
who are interested in surface facility operations.

In this article, we have attempted to eliminate as little as possible things that are too technical
because the main consumers are operators and field workers. In this article, there are several
guesses that provoke readers to think. We have attempted to make the guesses practical things
that will be encountered in the field. The answer is given at the end of the article.

Some parts of this article have been published on the Indonesian oil and gas mailing list, or the
ITB Chemical Engineering mailing list, only slightly changed to support the theme of this article.

Hopefully it is useful.

Cahyo Hardo

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CONTENT

CHAPTER 1 Simple Process Control Principles

Final Control Elements
Step A head: Introduction to Well Characteristic Curve

CHAPTER 2 Centrifugal Pump

Centrifugal pump working principle
Characteristics of centrifugal pump curve
Series-parallel operation
Minimum re-circulation Control principle in centrifugal pump
Lead and lag principle
Step A Head: Power requirement
A field Story

CHAPTER 3 Centrifugal Compressor

Characteristics of the curve
Surge
Stonewall
Principle of centrifugal compressor control capacity vs surge control

CHAPTER 4 Safety in P&ID

Material strength shown in P&ID
MAWP vessel, pipe, and components in piping Pipe strength classes
(ANSI rating, API rating)
Specification Break
Introduction to Pressure Safety Valve: design concept
Instrumented-based Shutdown System
Overpressure protection: separator, pump, compressor
Overpressure protection: by-pass control valve, reducing flow (using RO,
limited pipe diameter), fail-safe condition (control valve fail open, fail
closed, fail at last position), lock open and lock closed
Fluid disposal system (Flare system, burn pit).

CHAPTER 5 Process Instrumentation

CHAPTER 6 Safety Instrumented Process

CHAPTER 7 How to read a P&ID

Introduction to Legend
Introduction to valve
Special signs Control type (selector, cascade, on-off)
Pay attention to footnotes

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Chapter 4

Safety expressed in P&ID

Introduction
Safety can be described via P&ID. However, the ability to see it or review it is another matter.
Sometimes, to be more certain, we can compare the P&ID of an operating system in question
with the manual of the related system. This is valid if both are continuously updated following
design changes made.

The problem is, the ability to see that safety has been given a sufficient or even the highest
portion in a design plan translated into P&ID language sometimes goes unnoticed. For those of us
who work in front line operations, this is a common phenomenon. Either because we cannot
recognize it, are lazy to analyze it, or don't want to know at all. There is an assumption that P&ID
matters are the business of process engineers and not us in the field.

This paradigm or mindset must be thrown away, because in the end, we, who work in the field,
are the last defense before an accident occurs. As an initial example of how safety is realized in a
P&ID drawing, let's look at the following simple figure 38.

Figure 38 below illustrates a simple diagram of a multi-flash separator as a condensate

stabilization unit with off-gas coming out of the condensate body plus existing gas from the feed
flowing to the compressor unit and flare respectively.

Condensate stabilization is necessary to maintain the specifications desired by the buyer.

Question:

20 So, condensate is called stable if (choose):

a. Light hydrocarbon components are still present in the condensate, or
b. Light hydrocarbon components remain in small amounts in the condensate

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 TO FLARE SET @
400 PSIG

SET @
700 PSIG
SET @ 350 PSIG

SET @
670 PSIG
TO MP COMPRESSOR
TO HP
COMPRESSOR
SET @ SET @
PC PC 500 PSIG
PSHH
TO FLARE 450 PSIG PSHH
SET @ SET @ TO FLARE
750 PSIG 800 PSIG

LSHH
LSHH

HP SEPARATOR LC MP SEPARATOR LC
LSLL LSLL

TO PRODUCED
WATER
TREATMENT
SET @
TO PRODUCED TO FLARE 80 PSIG SET @
WATER SET @ PSHH PC 20 PSIG TO FLARE
TREATMENT 100 PSIG

LSHH

LC LP SEPARATOR
LSLL

CRUDE OIL TANK TO PRODUCED

WATER
TREATMENT

Figure 38. Condensate stabilization unit via multi-stage separators.

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Design and Safety Philosophy
The design requires that the HP and MP separators can be isolated for maintenance activities
without stopping production. This means that a bypass line must be provided to accommodate.

When the separator is to be isolated, the right isolation device is required. If the fluid is natural
gas mixed with water and condensate with a well shut-in pressure of approximately 1200 psig,
then double block and bleed isolation and spectacle blinds are selected.

The maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) for HP, MP, and LP separators are 800, 500,
and 100 psig respectively. Gas and off-gas from the HP separator are directed to the HP
compressor. Off-gas from the MP separator is directed to the MP compressor, while off-gas in the
LP separator is directed to the Flare system.

A Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) is installed in each separator. Since this plant is designed to
accommodate the possibility of direct flow from the HP separator to the LP or from the MP
separator to the LP, the PSV design is block discharge and gas blowby. For economic reasons, a
flow reducing device in the form of a restrictive orifice (RO) is installed.

Pressure Control Valve (PCV) functions as a pressure controller in the separator. If the pressure
in the separator increases, the PCV will open wider to remove or channel excess gas to the
downstream system. If the pressure decreases, the PCV will close to maintain pressure in the
separator.

If the pressure increases sharply for some reason and the PCV is fully open, then another PCV,
which has a higher-pressure setting, will open and release gas into the flare system. This system
only applies to HP and MP separators.

The PCV installed in each separator is designed to accommodate the gas or off-gas flow that
occurs in the separator and the possibility of additional gas when the by-pass operation is carried
out on the HP or MP separator. This means that the PCV in the MP separator must be able to
accommodate additional off-gas if the operation is directly channeled to the MP separator.
Likewise with the PCV in the LP separator. When the MP separator is isolated for maintenance
purposes, the off-gas from the flow originating from the HP separator must also be anticipated by
the PCV in the LP separator. For economic reasons, a flow reducing device in the form of a
restrictive orifice is installed.

Level Control Valve (LCV) is installed on each separator to maintain its liquid level. For the
separator output flow to produced water treatment, the picture is simplified because it is assumed
to be depicted in a more integrated produced water system. LCV operation is controlled by a level
controller or LC. If the condensate liquid level becomes too high even though at that time the
LCV is fully open, then the level switch high-high (LSHH) will work and order the Shutdown
Valve (SDV) in the separator inlet pipe to close. If the condensate liquid level in the separator
continues to drop even though the LCV is closed, then the level switch low-low (LSLL) will
order the SDV in the condensate outlet pipe to close.

In addition to being equipped with PSV and level switch, each separator is also equipped with a
pressure switch high-high (PSHH), which will operate if the setting pressure is reached or
exceeded by ordering the SDV at the separator input to close. PSHH will operate, usually, before
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the PSV operates. Instrumentation equipment including PSV, in terms of its connection to the
pipe or vessel (or its tapping point), is equipped with a valve that is locked open (LO). For HP
and MP pressures, the valve installation application is double block and bleed.

For economic reasons again, ANSI class 600, 300, and 150 specification breaks were applied to
the three separator systems.

The plant design adheres to the fail-safe philosophy, by applying fail close (FC) to almost all
valves equipped with actuators to minimize discharge to flare if the instrumentation is out of
control. In this case, the plant will go to the shutdown process if this happens. An exception is
given for the Blowdown Valve (BDV), where if the valve fails, it will fail open (FO).

For separator maintenance purposes, where vessel entry is required, each separator is installed
with a spectacle blind as minimum isolation.

All writing in italics and in blue is depicted in more detail in figure 39. Now, compare figure 38
with figure 39 on the following page.

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 TO FLARE SET @ LO
400 PSIG

FC FO BDV
SET @
700 PSIG
SET @ 350 PSIG
FC
BDV NC
LO
SET @
TO 670 PSIG SET @

RO
FLARE TO MP COMPRESSOR
LO 450 PSIG
FO TO HP FC
COMPRESOR NC PSHH SET @
FC PC 500 PSIG
PC TO FLARE LO
PSHH LO
SET @ LO SET @
LO LO
TO FLARE
LO LO
750 PSIG LO 800 PSIG
LO
LSHH
LSHH
LO LO
LO LO
HP SEP. LC MP SEP. LC
FC FC
MAWP 800 PSIG LSLL ANSI 600 300 MAWP 500 PSIG LSLL
LO LO LO LO ANSI 300 ANSI 150
NC
RO
NC

FC FC FC FC
ANSI 600 TO PRODUCED
ANSI 150 WATER TREATMENT
RO

LO SET @ FC
TO PRODUCED TO FLARE 80 PSIG SET @
WATER SET @
PSHH PC 20 PSIG TO FLARE
TREATMENT 100 PSIG LO
LO
FC

LSHH
LO
LC LP SEPARATOR
LSLL
LO MAWP 100 PSIG

CRUDE OIL TANK TO PRODUCED

WATER
FC FC
TREATMENT

Figure 39. Condensate stabilization complete with mechanical isolation and specs break.

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Can you distinguish the P&ID drawings in Figure 38 and 39? If you can distinguish them, it is
advisable to make a list of differences. Every addition in Figure 39 relative to Figure 38, that is
your area to ask further questions.

Figure 39, although it looks quite complete, it still leaves many questions. Some that are worth
asking and that may need to be completed are, for example:

21. Why is an alarm not installed so that the operator can still intervene before the process goes
to a condition that is unsafe in terms of the process?
22. How to determine the condition of a control valve or shutdown valve if the device fails, FC or
FO? Then, where is the application of FL (Fail at last position)?
23. How to determine the spec break? What do ANSI 150, ANSI 300, and ANSI 600 mean?
24. What are the by-pass line requirements for a control valve?
25. Why is there no further information on the separator design and its capacity? When the MP
separator operates without the HP separator, is the LCV in the MP separator still able to
anticipate the additional fluid load? What about the LP separator?
26. What are the design criteria for a PSV
27. What is a BDV, and why does the LP separator not have a BDV?
28. Why must the manual valves in the upstream and downstream PSV, PSHH, LSHH, BDV be
locked open? What about spare PSVs, are they treated the same?
29. How do you determine the setting pressure value for PSVs, PSHHs, and PCVs?
30. Where are the flanges located?
31. And others…

I hope the various questions above will lead us to a discussion of a chapter in this ongoing story,
which will guide how safety is described in a P&ID.

To be continued ….

Vivat Process Engineering!

References
1. Cahyo Hardo, (modified) Technical interview material for the position of Sr. Facility
Engineer – Premier Oil Natuna Sea B.V.

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