Lecture 1-4
Lecture 1-4
Philosophical views originated in Greece, India and China at the same time, in
VII-VI centuries BC.
The first collection of Indian philosophy is the Vedas. The Vedas are “sacred
knowledge”. Philosophical teachings following the Vedas were named orthodox.
These are Hinduism, Yoga, Vedanta and others. These schools which didn’t
follow sacred books were called unorthodox. The most known of them are
Buddism, Charvaka- Lokayata, Jainism.
In China the first philosophical vievs created within Confucianism. Confucianism
is a system of ethical teachings founded by Confucius in VI-V centuries BC. The
first major philosopher was Lav Tru is the founder of the philosophy of Tavism.
The word “Tav” literally means the “way”. This shows the materialist orientation
of the first philosophical school.
PHILOSOPHY OF ANCIENT GREECE
Renaissance philosophy
The designation "Renaissance philosophy" is used by scholars of intellectual
history to refer to the thought of the period running in Europe roughly between
1355 and 1650 (the dates shift forward for central and northern Europe and for
areas such as Spanish America, India, Japan, ' and China under European
influence). It therefore overlaps both with late medieval philosophy, which in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was influenced by notable figures such as Albert
the Great, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and Marsilius of Padua, and
early modern philosophy, which conventionally starts with René Descartes and his
publication of the Discourse on Method in 1637. Philosophers usually divide the
period less finely, jumping from medieval to early modern philosophy, on the
assumption that no radical shifts in perspective took place in the centuries
immediately before Descartes. Intellectual historians, however, take into
considerations factors such as sources, approaches, audience, language, and literary
genres in addition to ideas. This article reviews both the changes in context and
content of Renaissance philosophy and its remarkable continuities with the past.
Particularly since the recovery of a great portion of Aristotelian writings in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it became clear that, in addition to Aristotle’s
writings on logic, which had already been known, there were numerous others
roughly having to do with natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
These areas provided the structure for the philosophy curriculum of the emerging
universities. The general assumption was that the most ‘scientific’ branches of
philosophy were those that were more theoretical and therefore more widely
applicable. During the Renaissance too, many thinkers saw these as the main
philosophical areas, with logic providing a training of the mind to approach the
other three.
While generally the Aristotelian structure of the branches of philosophy stayed
in place, interesting developments and tensions were taking place within them. In
moral philosophy, for instance, a position consistently held by Thomas Aquinas
and his numerous followers was that its three subfields (ethics, economics, politics)
were related to progressively wider spheres (the individual, the family and the
community). Politics, Thomas thought, is more important than ethics because it
considers the good of the greater number. This position came under increasing
strain in the Renaissance, as various thinkers claimed that Thomas’s classifications
were inaccurate, and that ethics were the most important part of morality. [6] Other
important figures, such as Francesco Petrarca (Petrarch) (1304-1374), questioned
the whole assumption that the theoretical aspects of philosophy were the more
important ones. He insisted, for instance, on the value of the practical aspects of
ethics. Petrarch’s position, expressed both strongly and amusingly in his invective
On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others (De sui ipsius ac multorum
ignorantia) is also important for another reason: it represents the conviction that
philosophy should let itself be guided by rhetoric, that the purpose of philosophy is
therefore not so much to reveal the truth, but to encourage people to pursue the
good. This perspective, so typical of Italian humanism, could easily lead to
reducing all philosophy to ethics, in a move reminiscent of Plato’s Socrates and of
Cicero.
If, as mentioned above, scholasticism continued to flourish, the Italian
humanists (i.e., lovers and practitioners of the humanities) challenged its
supremacy. As we have seen, they believed that philosophy could be brought under
the wing of rhetoric. They also thought that the scholarly discourse of their time
needed to return to the elegance and precision of its classical models. They
therefore tried dressing philosophy in a more appealing garb than had their
predecessors, whose translations and commentaries were in technical Latin and
sometimes simply transliterated the Greek. In 1416/1417 Leonardo Bruni, the pre-
eminent humanist of his time and chancellor of Florence, re-translated Aristotle’s
Ethics into a more flowing, idiomatic and classical Latin. He hoped to
communicate the elegance of Aristotle’s Greek while also making the text more
accessible to those without a philosophical education. Others, including Nicolo
Tignosi in Florence around 1460, and the Frenchman Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples in
Paris in the 1490s, tried to please the humanists either by including in their
commentaries on Aristotle appealing historical examples or quotations from
poetry, or by avoiding the standard scholastic format of questions, or both. The
driving conviction was that philosophy should be freed of its technical jargon so
that more people would be able to read it. At the same time, all kinds of
summaries, paraphrases, and dialogues dealing with philosophical issues were
prepared, in order to give their topics a wider dissemination. Humanists also
encouraged the study of Aristotle and other writers of antiquity in the original.
Desiderius Erasmus, the great Dutch humanist, even prepared a Greek edition of
Aristotle, and eventually those teaching philosophy in the universities had to at
least pretend that they knew Greek. Humanists were not, however, great fans of the
vernacular. There is only a handful of examples of dialogues or translations of
Aristotle’s works into Italian during the fifteenth century. Once it had been
determined, however, that Italian was a language with literary merit and that it
could carry the weight of philosophical discussion, numerous efforts in this
direction started to appear, particularly from the 1540s onward. Alessandro
Piccolomini had a programme to translate or paraphrase the entire Aristotelian
corpus into the vernacular. Other important figures were Benedetto Varchi,
Bernardo Segni and Giambattista Gelli, all of them active in Florence. Efforts got
underway to present Plato’s doctrines in the vernacular as well. This rise of
vernacular philosophy, which quite predated the Cartesian approach, is a new field
of research whose contours are only now beginning to be clarified.
It is very hard to generalize about the ways in which discussions of
philosophical topics shifted in the Renaissance, mainly because to do so requires a
detailed map of the period, something we do not yet have. We know that debates
about the freedom of the will continued to flare up (for instance, in the famous
exchanges between Erasmus and Martin Luther), that Spanish thinkers were
increasingly obsessed with the notion of nobility, that duelling was a practice that
generated a large literature in the sixteenth century (was it permissible or not?).
In conclusion, like any other moment in the history of thought Renaissance
philosophy cannot be considered to have provided something entirely new nor to
have continued for centuries to repeat the conclusions of its predecessors.
Historians call this period the ‘Renaissance’ in order to indicate the rebirth that
took place of ancient (particularly classical) perspectives, sources, attitudes toward
literature and the arts. At the same time, we realize that every reappropriation is
constrained and even guided by contemporary concerns and biases. It was no
different for the period considered here: the old was mixed with and changed by
the new, but while no claims can be made for a revolutionary new starting point in
philosophy, in many ways the synthesis of Christianity, Aristotelianism, and
Platonism offered by Thomas Aquinas was torn apart in order to make way for a
new one, based on more complete and varied sources, often in the original, and
certainly attuned to new social and religious realities and a much broader public.
Renaissance philosophers:
Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406)
Gemistus Pletho (1355-1452)
Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444)
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464)
Scholasticism
Scholasticism is a method of critical thought which dominated teaching by
the academics ("scholastics," or "schoolmen") of medieval universities in Europe
from about 1100 to 1700, and a program of employing that method in articulating
and defending dogma in an increasingly pluralistic context. It originated as an
outgrowth of and a departure from Christian monastic schools at the earliest
European universities.111 The first institutions in the West to be considered
universities were established in Italy, France, Spain, and England in the late 11th
and the 12th centuries for the study of arts, law, medicine, and theology,^such as
Schola Medica Salernitana, the University of Bologna, and the University of Paris.
It is difficult to define the date at which they became true universities, although the
lists of studia generalia for higher education in Europe are a useful guide, held by
the Catholic Church and its various religious orders.
Peter Abelard (1079—1142)
Peter Abelard (1079-1142) was the preeminent philosopher of the twelfth century
and perhaps the greatest logician of the middle ages. During his life he was equally
famous as a poet and a composer, and might also have ranked as the preeminent
theologian of his day had his ideas earned more converts and less condemnation. In
all areas Abelard was brilliant, innovative, and controversial. He was a genius. He
knew it, and made noapologies. His vast knowledge, wit, charm, and even
arrogance drew a generation of Europe's finest minds to Paris to learn from him.
Philosophically, Abelard is best known as the father of nominalism. For
contemporary philosophers, nominalism is most closely associated with the
problem of universals but is actually a much broader metaphysical system. Abelard
formulated what is now recognized as a central nominalist tenet: only particulars
exist. However, his solution to the problem of universals is a semantic account of
the meaning and proper use of universal words. It is from Abelard's claim that only
words (потел) are universal that nominalism gets its name. Abelard would have
considered himself first a logician and then later in his life a theologian and
ethicist. He may well have been the best logician produced in the Middle Ages.
Several innovations and theories that are conventionally thought to have originated
centuries later can be found in his works. Among these are a theory of direct
reference for nouns, an account of purely formal validity, and a theory of
propositional content once thought to have originated with Gottlob Frege. In ethics,
Abelard develops a theory of moral responsibility based on the agent's intentions.
Moral goodness is defined as intending to show love of God and neighbor and
being correct in that intention.
Anselm of Canterbury (1033—1109)
Saint Anselm was one of the most important Christian thinkers of the eleventh
century. He is most famous in philosophy for having discovered and articulated the
so-called “ontological argument;” and in theology for his doctrine of the
atonement. However, his work extends to many other important philosophical and
theological matters, among which are: understanding the aspects and the unity of
the divine nature; the extent of our possible knowledge and understanding of the
divine nature; the complex nature of the will and its involvement in free choice; the
interworkings of human willing and action and divine grace; the natures of truth
and justice; the natures and origins of virtues and vices; the nature of evil as
negation or privation; and the condition and
implications of original sin.
In the course of his work and thought, unlike most of his contemporaries, Anselm
deployed argumentation that was in most respects only indirectly dependent on
Sacred Scripture, Christian doctrine, and tradition. Anselm also developed
sophisticated analyses of the language used in discussion and investigation of
philosophical and theological issues, highlighting the importance of focusing on
the meaning of the terms used rather than allowing oneself to be misled by the
verbal forms, and examining the adequacy of the language to the objects of
investigation, particularly to the divine nature. In addition, in his work he both
discussed and exemplified the resolution of apparent contradictions or paradoxes
by making appropriate distinctions. For these reas reasons, one title traditionally
accorded him is the Scholastic Doctor, since his approach to philosophical and
theological matters both represents and contributed to early medieval Christian
Scholasticism.
The Patristic Period
With Proclus ancient philosophy comes to a close. The first period embraces nearly
a thousand years, from Thales, 640 B.C., to Proclus' death, 485 A.D. The second
period reaches to the beginning of the sixteenth century, to the time of the
Reformation, and includes also about a thousand years. Hitherto philosophy fell
within the heathen world. From this point onwards it has its place in the Christian
world. A new religion has entered the world— Christianity, and with its advent a
new note has been struck. Christianity has become a force in life and thought
which has to be reckoned with. An event has taken place in the world's history
which claims to be all-important for the understanding of God and man. The
dualism between subject and object, the separation between the human and the
divine which ancient philosophy attempted to overcome, was met in a practical
way by the Christian religion.
With that first period the history of philosophy has little to do, except to mention
some of the great theologians, whose work it was to formulate the faith of the
Church and defend it against heresies within and attacks from without. Some of
these we have already referred to when speaking of the leaders of the Alexandrian
school, such as Justin Martyr, irenaeus, and Hypolitus, Clemens and Origen. We
have also to mention the name ofCyprian, who was born at Carthage about A.D.
200, and was the greatest theologian of the so-called African school. As one of the
great teachers of the Church, he cannot be passed over, but his work lay not so
much in the field of theology or philosophy as that of Church government and
discipline.
The most prominent figure among the patristic fathers was St. Augustine, who was
born at Tagaste, in Numidia, in 354 A.D. He continued a Pagan till advanced in
years, but through the influence of his mother was converted to Christianity. In 397
appeared his Confessions. It is an earnest, sacred, autobiography of one of the
greatest intellects the world has ever seen. In 426 he finished his De Civitate Dei,
his most powerful work. It is a splendid vindication of the Christian Church,
conceived of as a new order rising on the ruins of the old Roman empire, and is not
only the most philosophic treatise of Christian theology, but one of the most
profound and lasting monuments of human genius.