See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/336320218

Applying a Unified Game-Based Model in a Payment Scheduling Problem and

Design of Experiments sing MOEA Framework

Chapter · October 2019

DOI: 10.3233/FAIA190038

CITATIONS READS

3 1,491

5 authors, including:

Thang Huynh Quyet

Hanoi University of Science and Technology
91 PUBLICATIONS 501 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Thang Huynh Quyet on 08 October 2019.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Advancing Technology Industrialization Through Intelligent Software Methodologies, Tools 55
and Techniques
H. Fujita and A. Selamat (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2019
© 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/FAIA190038

Applying a Unified Game-Based Model in

a Payment Scheduling Problem and Design
of Experiments Using MOEA Framework
Bao NGOC TRINHa, Quyet THANG HUYNHa,1, Xuan THANG NGUYENb,
Phuong CHI LUONGb and Nguyen KHANH HOb
a
School of Information and Communication Technology,
Hanoi University of Science and Technology
b
Hanoi University, Hanoi, Vietnam

Abstract. This paper aims to put a new approach in the picture to the payment
scheduling problem, which looks for a schedule that maximizes the benefit of all
parties in a project. In a project, both sponsor and contractor seek to have a good
payment strategy on their own. The timing of payments and the completion times of
activities in projects are determined simultaneously in order to achieve an equitable
schedule among the sponsor and the development team. In previous research, we
developed a Unified Game-Based Model for conflicts in project management. In
this paper, we applied this model to this problem, implemented in an open sourced
evolutionary computation library named MOEA framework. The use of a Unified
Game-Based Model enables us to figure out a suitable schedule for the problem, and
in the tool, we conducted an experimental test of the model by the used of several
multi-objective optimization algorithms. The experimental results demonstrated that
the presented approach is effective and promising so that both parties could use this
model to choose the proper tactics for each of them in scheduling payment.

Keywords. Scheduling Problem, Payment Scheduling Problem, MOEA Framework,

Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium.

1. Introduction

The schedule is a plan for carrying out a process or procedure, giving lists of
intended events and times. Scheduling problems in project management, which is
considered as one of the most important and challenging aspects, have caught much
attention of both theoreticians and practitioners in the research community [1,2,3,4,5,6].
It is a generic name given to a whole class of problems in which the allocation of the
project resources, the optimizing of the project duration and the estimated project costs
are necessary [3]. In [1], the authors introduced the project scheduling problems by
presenting a survey of the general parameters: the resources, and the activities, as well
as the algorithms used to solve the problems and the differences of the variants of the
problems. This matter was also provided an extensive literature review of the models and
solution procedures with non-deterministic activities duration [2]. There is three

1
Quyet-Thang Huynh, Department of Software Engineering, School of Information and
Communication Technology, Hanoi University of Science and Technology, Hanoi, Vietnam; E-mail:
[email protected]
56 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

fundamental project scheduling problem, which is the resource-constrained project

scheduling problem (RCPSP) and the time/cost tradeoff problem (TCTP) and the
payment scheduling problem [3]. In particular, the scheduling problem referred to as ‘the
payment scheduling problem” involves identifying a schedule of payment for each
project milestone that maximizes the benefit of both sponsor and contractor of the project
and playing an indispensable role in contributing to a successful project. Project sponsor
is a person or group who provides resources and support for the project, program or
portfolio and is accountable for enabling success, and the contractor is a company that
performs work on a contract basis, in a software project, a contractor sometimes called a
development team [26]. Several works have been done on proposing approaches to the
payment schedule problem with the Net Present Value (NPV) criterion. It was first
studied from the contractor’s viewpoint by Dayanand et al. [4]. Richard [5]
recommended that the payment schedule problem can be transformed into an equivalent
linear program which had the structure of a weighted distribution problem. Kazaz et al.
[6] considered the problem for large scale projects with the cash inflows do not occur at
the event realization times and developed a mixed integer programming model to
maximize NPV.
Strategic situations are traditionally analyzed in game theory [12], and the
techniques can be any of the multi-objective algorithms. The multi-objective algorithm
is an area of multiple criteria decision making that is concerned with mathematical
optimization problems involving more than one objective function to be optimized
simultaneously [17]. Such a problem can be solved through the game theoretical concept
of a Nash equilibrium. Trinh et al. [7] have tackled the conflicts in project management
including the payment schedule problem by applying Nash equilibrium model and
introducing the Unified Game-Based model – a solid base for us to develop our model.
Deng Ze-min, Gao Chun-ping and Li Zhong-Xue [8] set up a Nash equilibrium model
based on Game theory and developed a Genetic algorithm (GA) to optimize a project
payment schedule. In detail, they showed that payment schedule at the Nash equilibrium
position permits both the owner and the client to gain their beneficial interests which is
a right in receiving benefits from assets by other parties; this is a win-win solution for
both parties. The game model used to optimize the project payment schedules have been
addressed and processed by Deng Ze-min et al [8]. However, in this model, there are still
some existing problems. First, there was no data of conflict among 2 players (sponsor,
contractor) of the project in the model. Second, the relationship between activities was
simple when each activity has only finish-to-start relationship with others. Last, the pre-
defined order of activities could not be changed to get a better solution.
In this study, we applied a Unified Game-based model to bring a new solution which
can resolve these above issues by attaching conflict information and new characteristic
of activity into the model. As a result, the payoff function of the Game was improved
with new data. We examined the feasibility of this model by applying it to a MOEA
framework which is an open-source evolutionary computation library for Java that
specializes in multi-objective optimization. It supports a variety of multi-objective
evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) [18]. In the implementation process, we used some
typical multi-objective optimization algorithms, compared with GA from the previous
research to access the relevance and effectiveness of these algorithms with this problem.
From this point, this can be a prerequisite for the development of the following studies
to recommend an optimal solution for handling the payment scheduling problems in
project management.
Our main contributions are as follows:
 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model 57

(i) Based on the Unified Game-Based Model, propose a novel solution including 2
players, their strategies, their payoff function, and Nash Equilibrium
(ii) Demonstrate the feasibility of the model by using the MOEA framework and
some multi-objective optimization algorithms in finding Nash Equilibrium point.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduced the basic
knowledge of Game theory, multi-objective algorithms as well as MOEA framework in
Section 2. Section 3 presented the conflicts in project payment scheduling problem. In
this section, we listed all tensions between the sponsor and the development team to have
an objective view on this issue. In Section 4 we applied the Unified Game-Based Model
into the problem mentioned above. We conducted the experimental evaluation in Section
5, and Section 6, concluded with a summary and shows our future work.

2. Background

2.1. Game theory

Game theory, known well as the study of mathematical models of conflict and
cooperation between rational decision-makers, has the ability to address almost the issues
in all fields of social science as well as in computer science. [9]. In project scheduling
problems, game theory plays an essential part in solving its practical applications. Piotr
Skowron and Krzysztof Rzadca [10] modeled the fair scheduling problem as a
cooperative game theory approach to determine the ideal fair schedule. George
Christodoulou et al. [11] studied the mechanism design problem of scheduling tasks at
the intersection of Computer Science and Game Theory. Cyril Briand and J. Billaut [12]
considered a project-scheduling environment assuming that the activities of the project
network are distributed among a set of actors (or agents). Na Fu et al. [13] provided two
new practical mechanisms referred to as Individual Completion based Payments and
Social Completion based Payments no longer only to minimize makespan for the entire
project, but rather, to maximize social welfare. Andres Abeliuk et al. [14] proposed an
independent scheduling game model where each player commands a set of services
scheduled independently.
In the context of the research activities presented in this paper, the focus lays on the
process-related aspects of game theory and players, who are in successive problem-
solving of risk management. Moreover, we take advantage of some extended form of
Genetic algorithm to figure out the solution [8, 15, 21, 24].

2.2. Multi-objective evolutionary algorithms

There are several approaches in solving the multi-objective problem, such as Integer
linear programming, but in this research, we used evolutionary multi-objective
algorithms because of the following reasons:
First, a free and open-source Java named MOEA framework was widely used to
support in building a fast, reliable implementation of many state-of-the-art multi-
objective evolutionary algorithms [18]. This library supports numerous types of MOEAs
and various metrics to evaluate the results and performances of various MOEAs on a
specific problem [19]. In addition to these pre-defined algorithms, new algorithms can
be easily constructed using existing components. Using algorithms in MOEA framework
can help us to have a faster and better experiment.
58 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

Second, evolutionary computation algorithms can provide a set of solutions in a

single run and they are insensitive to the mathematical properties of the objective
functions of the problem, multi-objective evolutionary algorithms are suitable and very
promising for solving multi-objective optimization problems [15]. Due to the conflicting
nature of the objectives, in multi-objective optimization problems, there is usually no
single optimal solution but rather a set of Pareto optimal solutions or called Pareto front
(PF) in the objective space [16][17]. The Pareto optimal is a state of allocation of
resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or
preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference
criterion worse off.
The MOEA framework allows accessing 24 multi-objective optimization algorithms
by also supporting the JMetal and PISA libraries [18]. In this paper, we apply six state-
of-the-art algorithms including ε-MOEA, NSGA-II, ε-NSGA-II, GDE3, PESA-II and
SMPSO to resolve this problem. The reason why for selecting these algorithms are:
(i) they are well-known algorithms and having a different approach
(ii) in MOEA framework, only these algorithms provide a constraint method for
verifying a right chromosome which is a fair Nash equilibrium point for the Game model
ε-MOEA (Epsilon-dominance Multi-Objective Evolutionary Algorithm) is a steady-
state MOEA using ε-dominance archiving to record a diverse set of Pareto optimal
solutions [18]. In ε-MOEA, we have two to evolving populations: An Evolutionary
Algorithm population ‫ܧ‬ሺ݅ሻ and an archive population ‫ܣ‬ሺ݅ሻ where ࢏ is the generation
counter [20] and the procedure requires ܱሺܰ͵ሻ computations in each generation.
Non-dominated Sorting Genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II) is an improved version of
NSGA which is a Multiple Objective Optimization algorithm using a fast non-dominated
sorting approach to substitute for the original sorting algorithm of NSGA. More to the
point, NSGA-II also reduces its computational complexity from ܱሺ‫͵ܲܯ‬ሻ to ܱሺ‫ʹܲܯ‬ሻ,
where ‫ ܯ‬is the number of objectives and ܲ is the population size [21]. This feature
makes NSGA-II more efficient than NSGA for large population cases. In NSGA-II, the
objective-wise distance computation makes the algorithm computationally faster [20].
Epsilon-Dominance Non-Dominated Sorting Genetic algorithm II (ε-NSGA-II) is
an extension of NSGA-II that utilizes a ε-dominance archive and randomized restart to
upgrade search and find an assorted set of Pareto ideal solutions [18]. This algorithm
takes over all the benefits of the NSGA-II and highlights the advancement of another
crossover operator and an adjusted replacement policy [22]. The specific advantage of ε-
NSGA-II is that the gene-evaluation method can verifiably generate successful genome
without expressly investigating the arrangement space by classical local search
procedures [18].
GDE3 (the third evolution step of Generalized Differential Evolution Algorithm),
which is the extension of diơerential evolution for multi-objective problems [18],
improves earlier GDE versions by giving a better-distributed solution. The GDE3 can
handle any number of ‫ ܯ‬objectives and any number of ‫ ܭ‬constraints, including the cases
where ‫ ܯ‬ൌ Ͳ (constraint satisfaction problem) and ‫ ܭ‬ൌ Ͳ (unconstrained problem) [23].
PESA-II (Pareto Envelope based Selection Algorithm II) is another MOEA that its
grid-based fitness assignment mechanisms maintaining diversity in both environmental
selection and mating selection [16]. PESA-II is a version of PESA which uses region-
based selection, in the k-objective problem using a grid of ݃௞ hyper boxes (efficiency
will be improved if ‫ ܩ‬is a power of 2 but the broad order is just linear in ݊), only ܱሺ‫ܰܯ‬ሻ
comparison operations need be made per generation [24].
 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model 59

Speed-constrained Multi-objective Particle Swarm Optimization (SMPSO) is a new

multi-objective particle swarm optimization algorithm which produces new effective
particle positions in those cases where the velocity becomes too high. Besides, SMPSO
includes the polynomial mutations as a turbulence factor and an external archive to store
the non-dominated solutions [25]. This algorithm requires ܱሺ‫ ܰܯ‬ଶ ሻ computational
complexity for worse case, but in general, is ܱሺ‫݃݋݈ ܰܯ‬ሺܰሻ) [25].

3. Payment Scheduling Problem description

Costs associated with project activities or cash outflows are usually known, but
payments comprising of contractor's cash inflows or sponsor's cash outflows are mostly
made during project execution and their terms can be negotiated within the framework
of the contract agreement. Due to milestones in a contract agreement, there is a pre-
defined payment schedule for both sponsor and contractor, but in fact, a complicated
project involves many changes during their development, planning, and realization. As
a result, the pre-defined schedule has to change regularly too.
There is always a conflict between sponsor and contractor in payment schedule in
terms of time to pay, and the sponsor tends to pay as late as possible. In contrast, the
contractor wants to have a significant amount of money received as soon as possible. Of
course, in terms of financial control, when people have a late payment than usual, they
must pay for an additional interest rate. In the conflict as above, there are some methods
to deal with, but the best way to resolve the conflict is collaborating [26] to find a win-
win solution. In this problem, we utilize the game theory model and Nash equilibrium to
figure out a solution that can satisfy both sides, the sponsor and the contractor to archive
a win-win situation. A directed graph is used for visually presenting the information of
the model, in which: (i) Each node of the graph represents an activity; (ii) Nodes have
no relationship can be performed simultaneously; (iii) Each node contains several
attributes such as: characteristics of resources required to complete the activity, time
needed to finish the activity.
Example:
Assume that in the project is going to be executed there is a set ‫ ܣ‬including ݊
activities that need to define the order of execution. and ݉ constraints on the order of
distinct activity pairs. There are 4 types of constraints: Finish to Start (FS), Finish to
Finish (FF), Start to Start (SS), Start to Finish (SF). Each activity is characterized by two
attributes:
x Time need to complete ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ and
x Number of people or machine needed to calculate the fee of activity ሺ‫ݏ݁ݎ‬ሻ.
Assume a small project with 5 activities ‫ ܣ‬ൌ ܽଵ ǡ ܽଶ ǡ ܽଷ ǡ ܽସ ǡ ܽହ in which there is a
constraint between activities as follows: ܽଵ ‫ܽܵܨ‬ଶ ǡ ܽଶ ‫ܽܵܨ‬ଷ ǡ ܽଵ ܵܵܽହ . As shown in
Table 1, each cell shows attributes of each activity, includes: t in first row, res in second
row.

‫ݎ‬ଵ ‫ݎ‬ଶ ‫ݎ‬ଷ ‫ݎ‬ସ ‫ݎ‬ହ

2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 3 days
1 staff, 1 PC 1 staff, 1 PC 1 staff, 1 PC 1 staff, 1 PC 1 staff, 1 PC
Table 1. Activity data
60 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

The project's resource consists of 1 staff and 1 personal computer (PC), and they
cost $10000 per day. The sponsor requests the contractor to follow the initial order of
activities from 1 to 5. Assume that the currency depreciates by 1% each day. When
paying for 5 activities, the money will be $110000. In case, the sponsor chooses the
strategy of arranging activities order such as: ܽଵ ǡ ܽଶ ǡ ܽଷ ǡ ܽସ ǡ ܽହ , only use one person and
one machine for 11 days. Due to the price depreciation, this planned $110000 must be
actuall ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻଶ ൅ ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻସ ൅ ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻ଺ ൅ ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅
ͳΨሻ଼ ൅ ̈́͵ͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻଵଵ ൌ ̈́ͳͳ͹ǡͷ͹ͳ to achieve the original value for the
contractor. Therefore, the contractor lose ̈́ͳͳ͹ǡͷ͹ͳwhereas the sponsor actually lose
the less money than expected.
So, the contractor has re-ordered the activity chain in a different order to do activity
5 first to avoid the impact of the devaluation. However, activity 5 still have to stand
behind activity 1 due to the impact of the conflict between activity 1 and 5, these
alternatives would be ܽଵ ̴̴ܽହ Ǣܽଶ Ǣܽଷ . FS is sequence (;) and SS is parallelism (___).
Therefore, the contractor recommends the sequence of activity is ܽଵ ǡ ܽହ ǡ ܽସ ǡ ܽଶ ǡ ܽଷ .

Figure 1. The strategy of the sponsor.

If the project is done as the solution mentioned above, this planned $110000 must be
actuall ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻଶ ൅ ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻସ ൅ ̈́͵ͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻ଺ ൅ ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅
ͳΨሻ଼ ൅ ̈́ʹͲͲͲͲሺͳ ൅ ͳΨሻଵଵ ൌ ̈́ͳͳ͹ǡͲʹͻ . Therefore, the value of money that the
contractor receives will be more $542 than the plan of the sponsor.

Figure 2. The strategy of the development team

4. Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

According to [7], the Unified Game-Based Model is defined as follows:

‫ ܩ‬ൌ ‫ۃ‬ሼܲ଴ ǡ ܲሽǡ ሼܵ଴ ǡ ܵ௜ ሽǡ ሼ‫ݑ‬଴ ǡ ‫ݑ‬௜ ሽǡ ܴ௖ ‫ۄ‬ (1)
 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model 61

As introduced in Section 1, we applied this model into our Project Payment

Scheduling Problem. There are only two players in this game (sponsor, contractor), so
that the Unified Game-Based Model can be described as follows:
‫ ܩ‬ൌ ‫ۃ‬ሼܲ଴ ǡ ܲଵ ሽǡ ሼܵ଴ ǡ ܵଵ ሽǡ ሼ‫ݑ‬଴ ǡ ‫ݑ‬ଵ ሽǡ ܴ௖ ‫ۄ‬ (2)
In which,
ܲ଴ is a sponsor;
ܵ଴ ൌ ሼܵ଴ଵ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵ଴௝ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵ଴௄ ሽ is a set of the sponsor strategies which is a sequence
activities process that is good for the sponsor;
‫ݑ‬଴ is a benefit of the sponsor is the cost difference compared to the sponsor’s
pre-defined strategy (payment schedule);
ܲଵ is a contractor;
ܵଵ ൌ ሼܵଵଵ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵଵ௝ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵଵெ ሽ is a set of the contractor’s sequence activities process;
‫ݑ‬ଵ is a benefit of the contractor;
ܴ௖ is a conflict of a payment order and the non-empty vector ‫ݒ‬Ԧ ‫ܴ  א‬௘ denotes conflict
between desired payment order of 2 players in strategy (ܵ଴௄ ǡ ܵଵ௛ ሻ, in which ܵ଴௞ ‫א‬
ܵ଴ and ܵଵ௛ ‫ܵ  א‬ଵ , ݇ ‫ א‬ሼͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ‫ܭ‬ሽ and ݄ ‫ א‬ሼͳǡʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ‫ܯ‬ሽ.
To set up a project schedule, the sponsor’s strategy ܵ଴ ൌ ሼܵ଴ଵ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵ଴௝ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵ଴௄ ሽ is the set
of payment schedule, each schedule ܵ଴௝ of which is represented as follows ܵ଴௝ ൌ
ሺ‫ݕܽ݌‬ଵ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ‫ݕܽ݌‬௜ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ‫ݕܽ݌‬௡ ሽ.
The payment schedule needs to meet the following constraint:
σ௡௜ୀଵ ‫ݕܽ݌‬௜ ൌ ͳ (3)
In the above expression, ‫ݕܽ݌‬௜ is the percentage of the total budget that the sponsor
intended to pay to the contractor for activity ݅ of project, ݊ is the total number of
activities in the project, Ͳ ൑ ‫ݕܽ݌‬௜ ൏ ͳ.
Set of the contractor’s strategies ܵଵ ൌ ሼܵଵଵ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵଵ௝ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵଵெ ሽ consists of ܵଵ௝ represented
by the vector ܲ having the dimension ܵଵ௝ ൌ ሼܵଵ௝ଵ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵଵ௝௞ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ܵଵ௝௣ ሽ denoting the number of
resources ሺͳǡ Ǥ Ǥ ݇ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ‫݌‬ሻ which the strategy ܵଵ௝ uses [7].
The payoff of the sponsor is:
‫ܨ‬௦௣௢௡௦௢௥ ൌ ሺ‫ݔ‬ଵ ሻሺͳ ൅ ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௬భ ൅ ሺ‫ݔ‬ଶ ሻሺͳ ൅ ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௬భା௬మ ൅ ‫ ڮ‬൅ ሺ‫ݔ‬ே ሻሺͳ ൅ ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௬భ ା௬మାǤǤା௬ಿ (4)
The payoff of the contractor is:
‫ܨ‬௖௢௡௧௥௔௖௧௢௥ ൌ ሺ‫ݔ‬ଵ ൅ ‫ݔ‬ଶ ൅Ǥ Ǥ ൅‫ݔ‬௡ ሻ௬భା௬మାǤǤା௬ಿ ൅ ሺ‫ݔ‬ଵ ൅ ‫ݔ‬ଶ ൅Ǥ Ǥ ൅‫ݔ‬ே ሻሺͳ ൅ ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௬భା௬మାǤǤା௬ಿ െ
‫ݔ‬ଵ ሺͳ ൅ ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௬భ ൅  ሺ‫ݔ‬ଶ ሻሺͳ ൅ ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௬భା௬మ ൅ ‫ ڮ‬൅ ሺ‫ݔ‬ே ሻሺͳ ൅ ‫ݎ‬ሻ ௬భ ା௬మାǤǤା௬ಿ 
(5)
Therefore, the payoff of both party in scheduling project payment is:
‫ ܨ‬ൌ ‫ܨܣ‬௦௣௢௡௦௢௥ ൅ ‫ܨܤ‬௖௢௡௧௥௔௖௧௢௥ (6)

in which,
ܰ: the number of activities in the project;
‫ݔ‬: the money needed to complete activities;
‫ݕ‬: the time needed to complete activities;
‫ݎ‬: banking rate;
‫ܣ‬ǡ ‫ ܤ‬: tuning constants that can be adjust by decision maker of the payment
scheduling problem.
62 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

5. Experimental results

5.1. Experimental setups

5.1.1. Problem constraints

In fact, the problem of choosing the most appropriate proposals are very diverse
about both activities sets and evaluation criteria. Furthermore, project activities also
come along with many attributes and constraints. There are some main constraints within
the bounds of this paper related to MOEA framework: (i) Tuning constant ‫ܣ‬ǡ ‫ ܤ‬which is
used to adjust the quality of Nash equilibrium point needed to be modified easily in
framework; (ii) Every attribute is non-negative; (iii) All of the activities have to appear
in the solution which show the order of activities in an array, but each activity just appear
one time; (iv) Conflicts only occur between 2 activities.

5.1.2. Model of chromosomes

In the MOEA framework, to define the input data for all MOEAs, we need to convert
all possible in-game player characteristics into chromosomes. From the hypothesis of the
problem, it is totally possible to find out the basic figures of the project (a number of
activities, a number of solutions for each activity). Take one valid solution as an example:

Day 1 2 3 4 5 6

Activity 1 1 2 2 3 3

Activity 4 4 5 5 5

Table 2. Activities are performed in each day

This result is converted into a chromosome with the number of genes equal to the
number of activities in the project, genes take values which are the orders of activity in
the set of all activities done in each day: 1, 4; 1, 4; 2, 5; 2, 5; 3, 5; 3

5.2. MOEA framework setups

Figure 3. Illustration of changing MOEA framework

In this research, we modified the MOEA framework to match with the proposed
solution's data and architecture. In detail, the input data needed for MOEA framework
algorithms is the data of activities, the data of resources, the data of constraints of
activities. The constraints of activities were implemented to verify the correct answer
(chromosome); there are 6 MOEA well-known algorithms which provided this
mechanism as mention in Section 2.2. The core modules of MOEA framework were kept
 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model 63

the same, in which implemented the processes of all algorithms. In the output module of
the MOEA framework, we modified some library to show the needed information for
analysis such as: running time, payoff value, best strategy found (Nash Equilibrium).
The MOEA framework provides access to 24 standard multi-objective evolutionary
algorithms, but they have the same execution routine. So that, modification for an
algorithm could apply to others: NSGA-II, PESA-II, ε-MOEA, GDE3, ε-NSGA-II, and
SMPSO. The next step in using the MOEA framework is that customize this framework’s
parameters for the implementation of 6 above algorithms. The process of utilizing
MOEA framework follows the evolutionary algorithms process includes these steps:
initialization, selection, hybridization, mutation. In detail, the modifying in MOEA
framework source code is described as follow:

5.2.1. Initialization
Following the constraints and chromosome principles defined above, it generates
randomly some individuals and arranges the adaptability of the first generation by
evaluating fitness. We modified the MOEA framework library to assign the population
for each generation by 100. This constant can be changed later.

5.2.2. Selection
To improve the fitness of the next generations, the algorithms must elect most
compatible individuals for the hybrid process. The chromosomes, fitness values of which
are minimum in the sorted population, will be the best solutions produced after each
generation.

5.2.3. Hybridization
After population arrangement completes, it takes half of the population which have
a high adaptability value to pair with each other. Then, the new generations, which are
hybridized from grafted pairs, replace ½ populations have less ability to adapt. The
number of chromosomes in the new generation is equal to that in the old population but
only include those with high adaptability and the new generation.
The hybrid process includes: select cutting point randomly, generate 2 children (one
inherits gene fragments from head to cutting point of mother chromosome and from the
cutting point to the end of father chromosome, the other inherits conversely).

5.2.4. Mutation
The mutation will be conducted interchangeably with the hybrid. A mutation is
usually applied with a low probability ‫݌‬௫ to preserve diversity in the genetic population.
There are many kinds of mutation but all of them need to split chromosomes into
segments to carry out mutation on selected ones.

5.3. Data Description & Data Analysis

The data used in the experiment are being collected from paper [8] and two
outsourcing software projects which need a fair payment schedule arrangement. It is
being filtered and finally tabulated in SQL format then. All 3 projects are developed in
64 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

different areas, either in different environments. Research has shown that the Unified
Game-Based Model and its application can work with all data sets pretty well.
The computer configuration for algorithms comparison is Windows 10 Pro 64-bit in
CPU 2.80 GHz Intel(R) Core i5. For each particular algorithm, we run continuously 10
times, each time we record the Nash equilibrium results found. Results of each run for
each algorithm contains the following 3 primary information: (i) Payoff function of the
solution; (ii) The running time; (iii) Nash Equilibrium that includes a percentage of
budget spend for each activity.
In which the shorter the running time, the better the algorithm's relevance and the
higher the model. The payoff function value indicates the quality of the answer found.
The smaller this value is, the better the results are found. In Table 6, Table 7, due to the
limit of paper, we only show the first 2 information: payoff value, running time.

5.3.1. Data from two outsourcing software project

In this part, we will mention the project information of two of our outsourcing software
projects:
No Project name ID Starting time Expected budget
1 E-commerce website JP_EC 2015 Jan 2015 1.547.500.000 VND

2 Integrated IS management VN_BT 2014 Jan 2014 1.147.500.000 VND

software
Table 3. The project information of two our outsourcing software project
Data from 1st software project has a large sample with 74 tasks is shown in Table 4.
Each task needs a specific amount of time to finish, and it requires two units of resource
in the process. The relations between 2 different activities are illustrated in Table 5. Table
6 shows the experimental results in 10 runs.

No Resource 1 Resource 2 Time No Resource 1 Resource 2 Time

1 10 7 6 38 7 7 7
2 3 8 1 39 3 2 18
3 4 10 1 40 2 6 7
4 2 6 2 41 9 5 20
5 6 8 2 42 10 6 9
6 3 2 4 43 3 4 9
7 6 5 6 44 4 2 9
8 1 9 12 45 1 9 9
9 6 8 7 46 4 8 9
10 7 3 8 47 5 2 9
11 6 1 7 48 4 6 11
12 10 5 6 49 1 1 13
13 2 1 5 50 6 9 13
14 9 8 5 51 7 10 15
15 10 8 1 52 6 5 15
16 9 6 1 53 7 3 15
17 7 4 1 54 9 8 20
18 7 2 1 55 1 2 49
19 2 9 1 56 7 7 60
20 8 7 6 57 4 8 1
21 6 9 7 58 8 10 1
22 4 3 3 59 6 4 1
23 2 7 4 60 8 10 1
24 7 6 3 61 9 9 1
25 8 10 12 62 3 4 1
26 9 10 11 63 5 3 12
 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model 65

27 2 1 12 64 9 10 1
28 10 5 21 65 6 1 1
29 5 10 3 66 3 3 1
30 4 6 3 67 8 4 3
31 3 7 10 68 8 10 1
32 3 9 10 69 8 7 1
33 6 5 14 70 5 4 27
34 9 4 28 71 10 9 15
35 9 6 35 72 5 2 15
36 6 7 6 73 6 2 17
37 1 8 34 74 4 4 10
Table 4. The parameters of the activity network from Project 1
No Activity 1 Activity 2 Relation
1 16 27 FS
2 56 58 FS
3 13 62 FS
4 45 61 FS
5 37 43 FF
6 50 34 FF
7 65 41 FF
8 26 29 FF
9 8 20 FF
10 34 15 FF
11 32 33 SF
12 63 74 SF
13 19 7 SS
14 27 45 SS
15 4 56 SS
16 12 70 SS
17 1 2 FS
18 1 3 FS
19 1 4 FS
20 1 5 FS
Table 5. The parameters of the relationship between activities in Project 1’s data
In Table 6, each row contains the payoff value of the Nash equilibrium point found, and
the running time in second of each algorithm. Eg: in the first run with NSGA-II, the value
in Table 6 is “301343880/7s” means the payoff value of Nash equilibrium point is
301343880, the running time of NSGA-II is 7 seconds.
No NSGA-II ε-NSGA-II ε-MOEA GDE3 PESA2 SMPSO
1 301343880/7s 301343880/9s 301343880/9s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/13s
2 301343880/8s 301343880/8s 301343880/10s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/13s
3 301343880/9s 301343880/9s 301343880/10s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/11s
4 301343880/8s 301343880/8s 301343880/9s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/13s
5 301343880/11s 301343880/9s 301343880/10s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/11s
6 301343880/7s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/13s
7 301343880/8s 301343880/10s 301343880/10s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/13s
8 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/9s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/11s
9 301343880/9s 301343880/9s 301343880/9s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/11s
10 301343880/11s 301343880/8s 301343880/10s 301343880/10s 301343880/9s 301343880/11s
Table 6. Testing results from Project 1’s data bucket after 10 times running
Also using the above model and putting it into the input of MOEAs in this problem,
Table 6 shows that the algorithms as mentioned above are compared in order to check
which of them is most efficient in solving the matter and finding the Nash Equilibrium
point for the Unified Game-Based Model. As demonstrated in Table 6, the payoff values
66 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

are equal, but the running time is dissimilar among these algorithms. NSGA-II is
considered as the fastest MOEA with 8.8s, which is faster than 12.27% than the average
running time of five remain algorithms, following is PESA2 with 9s.

Figure 4. Comparison of running time in Project 1

nd
Data from 2 project has a medium sample with 48 tasks and 50 constraints between
activities. However, due to the limitation of paper, we only describe the experimental
results after 10 times running in Table 7. Through experiments on simulation data set
named Project 2, it was found out some results.

No
NSGA-II ε-NSGA-II ε-MOEA GDE3 PESA2 SMPSO
1 280675880/11s 280675880/9s 259276750/10s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/12s
2 280675880/11s 280675880/10s 280675880/9s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/13s
3 259276750/10s 280675880/8s 280675880/9s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/11s
4 280675880/7s 280675880/10s 280675880/8s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/13s
5 280675880/7s 280675880/9s 259276750/10s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/12s
6 280675880/10s 280675880/9s 219878880/9s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/11s
7 280675880/11s 219878880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/12s
8 280675880/7s 280675880/8s 280675880/8s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/13s
9 259276750/10s 280675880/6s 219878880/9s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/12s
10 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 219878880/9s 280675880/9s 280675880/8s 280675880/11s
Table 7. Testing results of Project 2’s data bucket in 10 times running
In Table 7, each cell of table contains the payoff value of the Nash equilibrium point
found, and the running time in second of each algorithm. Eg: in the first run with NSGA-
II, the value in Table 7 is “280675880/11s” means the payoff value of Nash equilibrium
point is 280675880, the running time of NSGA-II is 11 seconds.
Different from the two above data bucket, there is a slight change in the payoff
values. The payoff values fluctuate when using NSGA-II, ε-NSGA-II, and ε-MOEA. In
this test, PESA2 is the fastest MOEA in the experiment to find the Nash Equilibrium
point after 10 runs in project 2’s data. In detail, the running time of it is 8.75% higher
than ε-NSGA-II, 7.5% higher than ε-MOEA, 12.5% higher than GDE3, 15% higher than
NSGA-II and 50% than SMPSO. The difference between the effectiveness of MOEAs
 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model 67

in 2 tests may come from the small size data. Some randomly step in algorithms such as:
initialize, the mutation has a significant impact on the convergence of the algorithm.

Figure 5. Comparison of running time in Project 2

6. Conclusion

In this research, we presented the solution of the Payment scheduling problem in

project management by using the Unified Game-Based Model and experimenting six
algorithms ε-MOEA, NSGA-II, ε-NSGA-II, GDE3, PESA-II, SMPSO on MOEA
framework. We bring out conflicts appearing in the payment schedule. Based on the
Unified Game-Based Model which put forward, we applied it to solve the existing
problem. Based on the characteristics of the proposed model, ε-MOEA, NSGA-II, ε-
NSGA-II, GDE3, PESA-II, SMPSO were chosen to solve the model. Then, we
conducted the experiment evaluation to show that the optimal payment stages vary
depending on the different perspectives. Exploratory outcomes exhibit that the proposed
methodology is successful and promising. This study shows that describing the
completion times of activities and the timing of payments in projects can precisely mirror
the real interests of the sponsor as well as the development team and both parties together.
Both the parties involved in the payment arrangement could use this model to select
appropriate strategies for negotiations.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by Vietnam’s National Foundation for Science and
Technology Development (NAFOSTED), funded by the Ministry of Science and
Technology (Project Code 102.03-2019.10).
 68 B. Ngoc Trinh et al. / Applying a Unified Game-Based Model

References

[1] Jorge A. Ruiz-Vanoye, et al, Editorial for Volume 9 Number 3: Models, Resources and Activities of
Project Scheduling Problems, International Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Problems and
Informatics, Vol. 9, No. 3, Sep-Dec 2018, pp. 1-17. ISSN: 2007-1558.
[2] Nestor Raul Ortiz-Pimiento, Francisco Javier Diaz-Serna, The Project Scheduling Problem with Non-
Deterministic Activities Duration: A Literature Review, JIEM, 2018 - 11(1): 116-134 - Online ISSN:
2013-0953 - Print ISSN: 2013-8423 https://doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2492
[3] Icmeli, Oya., Scheduling problems in project management, University of Florida, George A. Smathers
Libraries, 1992, pp.7-22.
[4] Dayanand, N. and Padman, R. Payments in projects: a contractor’s model, Technical Report, The Heinz
School, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh 1993
[5] Richard C. Grinold, The payment scheduling problem, Volume 19, Issue 1,
https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800190110
[6] Kazaz, B. and Sepil, C.B. Project scheduling with discounted cash flows and progress the payments,
Journal of Operational Research Society, 47 (1996), 1262-1272
[7] Bao Ngoc Trinh, Quyet Thang Huynh, Xuan Thang Nguyen, Nash Equilibrium model for conflicts in
project management, Journal of Computer Science and Cybernetics, Journal of Computer Science and
Cybernetics, V.35, N.2 (2019), 167–184; DOI: DOI 10.15625/1813-9663/35/2/13095
[8] Deng Ze-min, Gao Chun-ping, Li Zhong-xue, Optimization of project payment schedules with Nash
equilibrium model and genetic algorithm. J Chongqing Univ, ISSN 1671-8224, 2007, 6 (2):107-112.
[9] José Ramón San Cristóbal, The use of Game Theory to solve conflicts in the project management and
construction industry, International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management
[10] Piotr Skowron, Krzysztof Rzadca, Non-monetary fair scheduling — cooperative game theory approach,
in Annual ACM symposium on parallelism in algorithms and architectures, pp 288–297, 2013
[11] George Christodoulou et al., A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms, Article in Algorithmica 55,
December 2009
[12] Cyril Briand, Jean-Charles Billaut, Cooperative project scheduling with controllable processing times:
a game theory framework, IEEE 5-9 Sept. 2011
[13] Pradeep Varakantham, Na Fu, Mechanism Design for Strategic Project Scheduling, in Twenty-Sixth
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, August 2017
[14] Andres Abeliuk et al., Interdependent Scheduling Games, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
[15] K. Deb, A. Pratap, S. Agarwal, and T. Meyarivan, A fast and elitist multiobjective genetic algorithm:
NSGA-II, IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 182–197, 2002.
[16] Miqing Li, Shengxiang Yang, Xiaohui Liu, Kang Wang, IPESA-II: Improved Pareto Envelope-Based
Selection Algorithm II, EMO 2013: Evolutionary Multi-Criterion Optimization, pp143-155
[17] L.C. Jiao, Handing Wang, R.H. Shang, F. Liu, A Co-evolutionary Multi-Objective Optimization
Algorithm Based on Direction Vectors, Information Sciences 228:90 – 112, April 2013, DOI:
10.1016/j.ins.2012.12.013
[18] MOEA framework, A Java library for multi-objective evolutionary algorithms,
http://www.moeaframework.org/, accessed: March 10, 2-15.
[19] DTIC ADA615240: Tactical AI in Real Time Strategy Games, Defense Technical Information Center,
2015-03-26.
[20] Deb, K. et al., A Fast Multi-Objective Evolutionary Algorithm for Finding Well-Spread Pareto-Optimal
Solutions, KanGAL Report No 2003002, Feb 2003.
[21] Chih-Hao Lin and Pei-Ling Lin (2010), A New Non-dominated Sorting Genetic algorithm for Multi-
Objective Optimization, Modeling Simulation and Optimization Focus on Applications, Shkelzen Cakaj
(Ed.), ISBN: 978- 953-307-055-1.
[22] Lin, C.H. & Chuang, C.C. (2007), A rough set penalty function for marriage selection in multiple-
evaluation genetic algorithms, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 4481, pp. 500-507.
[23] Kukkonen and Lampinen (2005), GDE3: The Third Evolution Step of Generalized Differential Evolution,
KanGAL Report Number 2005013.
[24] David W. Corne, Nick R. Jerram, Joshua D. Knowles, Martin J. Oates (2001), PESA-II: Region-based
Selection in Evolutionary Multi-objective Optimization, In Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary
Computation Conference (GECCO’2001), Pages 283-290, ISBN:1-55860-774-9
[25] A.J. Nebro, J.J. Durillo, J. Garcıa-Nieto, C.A. Coello Coello, F. Luna, E. Alba (2009), SMPSO: A New
PSO Metaheuristic for Multi-objective Optimization. Conference: Computational intelligence in multi-
criteria decision-making, DOI: 10.1109/MCDM.2009.4938830
[26] A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide)—Sixth Edition, Project
Management Institute, 2017.

View publication stats