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Educational Research: The Attraction
of Psychology
Educational Research
VOLUME 6
Educational Research:
The Attraction of Psychology
Editors
Paul Smeyers Marc Depaepe
Ghent University and Katholieke Campus Kortrijk, Subfaculteit Psychologie
Universiteit Leuven, Belgium en Pedagogische Wetenschappen,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
v
Contents
vii
viii Contents
P. Smeyers (*)
Ghent University and Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium
e-mail: [email protected]
M. Depaepe
Campus Kortrijk, Subfaculteit Psychologie en Pedagogische Katholieke Universiteit,
Leuven, Belgium
e-mail: [email protected]
and its vocabulary and discourse have become part of our everyday conversations.
Such a success story is likely to attract researchers working in other areas who gladly
take the lead from those who work in a booming field. Educational researchers are
no exception to this, but in their case, more needs to be said.
Obviously, the study of education involves other theoretical approaches as well
such as those of sociology, ethics, history, etc. As all of these aspects come together
at the level of the practitioner and the policymaker in the educational field, all of
them should have a place in educational research conducted to inform practitioners
and policymakers and should also be part of the academic discipline of education,
a field of study in its own right. But this is not the end of the story. By studying
phenomena from different angles, methods are also ‘borrowed’ from other disci-
plines. And thus, a new debate is given ammunition: Which are the proper methods
to study education? Though it may not be easy to determine all the relevant aspects
of an educational problem (in fact opinions differ considerably concerning this),
surely, all of these aspects have to be given a place in educational research. From
this, it follows that educational research not only has to accommodate various
interests but as well various methods or methodologies. For some scholars, either
in the field of educational research or more general in academia, this is a bridge too
far. Answering the question why psychology is particularly relevant (and attractive)
for the field of education and educational research therefore does not suffice with
an answer in general terms; of course in general, its attraction and relevance for
education and educational research are straightforward. Instead, what should be
highlighted is the attractiveness of particular kinds of psychological research and
such as well in terms of content as of method. And it is to these that this collection
of essays turns. It considers this specific attractiveness in the context of education
as well in its historical underpinnings as in its philosophical and educational
presuppositions.
Traditionally, education had deep roots in philosophy, religion and more gener-
ally in values and in what it means to lead a life that is worth living. For various
reasons, this is no longer the case even to the extent that some scholars will claim
that it is now all about means and that ends are shifted into oblivion and no longer
part of a rational debate. Here education is seen as something that has value only in
so far as it aids to acquire a good (or a better) job, as it prepares for society. It is of
course not just understandable but common sense that one tries to have as much
knowledge as possible of whatever kind, but it is nonetheless important to identify
the kinds of knowledge which have a special relevance for a certain area or field.
One can see the attraction of studies in laboratory conditions investigating the relation
between independent and dependent variables hoping to achieve general insights
and conclusions based on statistical reasoning. Yet, in social sciences, much more
than in natural sciences, its laws (or quasi-laws) or regularities can only be applied
ceteris paribus (everything being equal). They are in desperate need of contextual-
ization. And thus, an alternative approach presses itself forward. To this, it should
be added that many take their lead from meaning and intention, from what some-
thing means for us as the material out of which our decisions are composed
(and which should therefore be taken up by the academic discipline).
1 Making Sense of the Attraction of Psychology… 3
illusion of certainty. Thus, the tendency is resisted to look for expert advice which
would bracket the personal commitment of those involved abandoning their respon-
sibility in favour of what is neutral and ‘objectively true’. That the development of
a particular child can be given a place within what is normally to be expected may
give us some confidence that nothing is going wrong. Yet, the alternative should not
necessarily invoke all kinds of measures but start with a more inclusive appreciation
of her behaviour which may or may not lead to specific interventions. Psychology
and educational research that put itself in the nowadays dominant tradition presup-
pose too much that the normal development administers a normative background
and generates aims which have to be observed and aspired at any cost. It goes with-
out saying that there are many psychologists and educational researchers who apply
their insights wisely and who do rely in their advice not exclusively on the limited
insights particular research has to offer. But it seems that when they refer to their
specific expertise (as psychologists or as educational experts) or when they talk
about what their subject should address, they invoke a particular concept of science
(laws and regularities) and use what is ‘scientifically established’ thus putting them-
selves in danger of ignoring other relevant aspects as well as the particularities of
the problem they want to address. Their approach carries a promise they cannot live
up to. Of course, the illusion of certainty that they uphold is very attractive, almost
irresistible to all those who struggle to decide what to do. Yet, their help, often well
intended, cannot do away with the responsibility and the requirement to offer a
justification for the way we interact on behalf of those who are put in our trust. It
cannot do away with the normative stance they themselves are necessarily embracing
as researchers.
The attraction for education and the mimicking of educational research based on
the success of psychology (a track on the way to a full-fledged evidence-based sci-
ence) come down to embracing a particular methodology and methods which create
the illusion of the possibility of expert advice (and thus of certainty) by offering an
answer that ‘works’ but which brackets each and everyone’s responsibility. Here,
the isolated meritocratic individual replaces the person or subject whose home is a
social practice that can be understood to a large extent by focusing on reasons and
intentions which explain the alternative ways in which human beings can take part.
The simple generalizations that are offered ignore the particularities of the situation
the teacher or parent finds herself in but do also away with the child and her possible
commitment and indeed possible contribution to what is passed on. Though all of
that may be attractive and even successful, an analysis of the presuppositions which
are embraced shows that it needs to be resisted or, to put this more precise, appreciated
in terms of its strengths and weaknesses. Thus, it will also become clear how much
historical and cultural contextualization is required to make sense of what parents,
teachers, policymakers and educational researchers really have to focus on.
Proponents of the approach that we have characterized of psychology and par-
ticularly of educational research in its vein may find the above criticism just another
illustration of sweeping generalizations educational theorists come up with not
helpful at all neither for theory nor for practice in the educational field. It will thus
be matter to substantiate these claims and such will be offered by this collection of
1 Making Sense of the Attraction of Psychology… 5
essays. The chapters address issues which are high on the agenda nowadays. In one
or other way, all of them contribute to the idea that educational research should
reclaim its territory instead of indulging itself in what is rightfully psychology’s
own. And it is tempting to add that psychology itself would not do bad when it
revived in its own approach a certain anthropological, philosophical and historical
dimension. But, surely, that must be left to them.
This is not the first time that the Research Community ‘Philosophy and History
of the Discipline of Education’,1 established by the Research Foundation Flanders
(FWO), Belgium (Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek—Vlaanderen),
addresses an area that is central for educational research. In both the first (1999–
2003) and second (2000–2008) periods, which focused on ‘evaluation and evolution
of the criteria for educational research’, various positions were scrutinized
(see Smeyers & Depaepe, 2003, 2006). In the present (third) 5-year period of this
Research Community (2009–2013), the overall interest is ‘faces and spaces of edu-
cational research’, which is divided into four subthemes (respectively addressed
during the conference in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012): the ethics and aesthetics of
statistics, the attraction of psychology, institutional space, designs and material
culture, and finally the representation of educational research. The papers published
in this volume were first presented at the 2010 Research Community conference in
Leuven. Scholars from philosophy and history of education (some of whom are
particularly interested in history and philosophy of science) combine their efforts to
study psychology as part of both the academic discipline of education and the
broader educational context. Starting from some chapters which address first of all
the historical situatedness of the development and contribution of psychology to
education, child-rearing and educational research, the relevance and presuppositions
of neuroscience are discussed by several authors. Then, a contribution is offered
which discusses the relation with educational theory and what it may lack nowa-
days. Turning to what we should expect from psychology and highlighting how it
narrowed down education to learning, the issue is raised what we need most in
education and whether this could be identified as ‘a theology of education to come’.
The collection2 opens with a chapter by Marc Depaepe (Chap. 2) who addresses
the historical attractiveness of psychology for educational research which he illus-
trates with the case of Nazi Germany. He argues that it is quite easy to formulate a
number of hypotheses on the attractiveness of psychology for educational research
on the basis of the existing literature. Generally spoken, one may assume that
there has been a growing interest during the twentieth century for psychology in
educational research. The takeover of ‘experimental pedagogy’ by ‘educational
psychology’ in the United States as well as in the United Kingdom, even before the
Second World War, may be a good example in this respect. He warns for the sim-
plicity of that kind of conclusions. He considers it essential that a historian of
science tries to historicise his findings not only against the temporal and spatial
backgrounds of the studied developments but also against the specific life stories of
the individual researchers. It is hardly possible, so he argues, to understand the
concrete relationship between psychology and educational research without such a
contextualization. This is illustrated with the development of educational psychology
6 P. Smeyers and M. Depaepe
go beyond matters that can be said to have been learned themselves. A wider
conception of education therefore needs to consider these other factors. This exami-
nation has implications for questions of teaching and how to evaluate it, for thinking
about learning outcomes and whether and how they can be ‘measured’ and for
the normative elements and judgments that must go into any wider conception of
‘education’.
In the final chapter, Stijn Mus (Chap. 12) offers some conclusions concerning the
current appeal of psychology in education and educational research and bases this
on the different angles taken by the chapters. The attractions that have been identified,
he argues, offer a varied picture. He pays attention to the idea of psychology as a
default science of education and to educational research on the track of a full-fledged
evidence-based science. The particular idea of truth and of means-end reasoning is
scrutinized together with the disappearance of rich concepts. It may be too easy, he
argues, to see the attractiveness of psychology in its prestige or professionalization
in society being both external factors, but this ignores the importance of the fact that
an answer is offered in terms of ‘what works’. In a rapidly changing time that is
undermined by uncertainty by breaking down the existential condition, it will not be
easy to recover in educational theory what has been lost. It has yet to be seen whether
the scientism that is embraced by psychology and its counterpart in educational
research can convincingly be refuted.
Notes
1. For further information about previous work of the Research Community, see
Smeyers (2008).
2. For details about the mentioned publications, see the respective chapters in this
collection.
References
Smeyers, P. (2008). Afterword. In P. Smeyers & M. Depaepe (Eds.), Educational research: The
educationalization of social problems (pp. 227–237). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
Smeyers, P., & Depaepe, M. (2003). Introduction. In P. Smeyers & M. Depaepe (Eds.), Beyond
empiricism. On criteria for educational research (pp. 9–23). Leuven, Belgium: Leuven
University Press.
Smeyers, P., & Depaepe, M. (2006). Introduction. On the rhetoric of ‘what works’. Contextualizing
educational research and the picture of performativity. In P. Smeyers & M. Depaepe (Eds.),
Educational research: Why ‘what works’ doesn’t work (pp. 1–16). Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Springer.
Wagemans, J. (2011). Weg met de psychologie!? [Away with psychology!?]. Karakter. Tijdschrift
van Wetenschap, 36, 14–15.
Chapter 2
Struggling with the Historical Attractiveness
of Psychology for Educational Research
Illustrated by the Case of Nazi Germany
Marc Depaepe
A few years ago, when we determined the themes for the upcoming meetings of the
Leuven Research Community, I thought that there could be no easier task than that
which lays before me at the moment: reporting on the history of the attractiveness
of psychology for educational research. On the basis of my work in the history of
educational science on the development of the empirical-analytical paradigm
(Depaepe, 1993), it seemed that one could quite easily formulate a number of
hypotheses with regard to the increasing role of psychology in educational research.
Even before the outbreak of the Second World War, efforts to develop an indepen-
dently conceived ‘experimental pedagogy’ (as a counterpart to the earlier existing
experimental psychology) had, to a large extent, been merged with the further devel-
opment of (an equally independently conceived) ‘educational psychology’ in, among
others, the United States, England and Germany.
This very same hypothesis of a growing interest in psychology within the field of
educational theory could also be derived, without much effort, from the general his-
tory of science (see, e.g., Depaepe, 2010; Porter & Ross, 2003). As we know, the
emergence of the discipline of education (Pädagogik) as a science was closely
connected with the rise of the Enlightenment and, more specifically, with the idea
of the manipulability of mankind and society. As a result, educational theory was
considered to have a highly normative character. It was imbued with social values
M. Depaepe (*)
Campus Kortrijk, Subfaculteit Psychologie en Pedagogische Katholieke Universiteit,
Leuven, Belgium
e-mail: [email protected]
and standards which had to be realised with its help. As shown by, among others,
Fritz Osterwalder (2006), it served as a kind of secularised theology from the
eighteenth century onwards. This could be established not only on the basis of its
content but also based on its language. Its language remained, in a sense, ‘evangelical’:
the educationalist brought, in keeping with the winged words of Immanuel Kant, the
liberating message of (self-)education to maturity (and autonomy). Afterwards,
educational theory and/or educational sciences developed increasingly in the direction
of positivism and experimental science and have been shaped further, from the end
of the nineteenth century onwards, by child study, pedology (and pedotechnics)
and, to some extent, reform pedagogy (or ‘new’ education) (see Depaepe, 1993,
2010). However, this dominant and heterogeneous direction was not a solitary trend.
Numerous ‘new’ substantive research areas as well as methodological ‘paradigms’ led
to the ‘educational sciences’ manifesting themselves increasingly ‘in the plural’
from the end of the 1960s. Besides the empirical-analytical approaches, also critical-
emancipatory ideas took root. These ‘pedagogies’ were generally based on all kinds
of ‘humanistic’ psychologies (like those of Rogers, Maslow and the like; see, e.g.,
Beatty, Cahan, & Grant, 2006; Stauffer, 2009). It was certainly notable that the
‘aim of education’—the normative excuse par excellence of traditional educational
theory—was determined less and less on the basis of one or other ideology but rather
from the standpoint of the optimal development of the ‘self’.
With this, the normativity of the past does not completely disappear, but it has
certainly been exchanged for a different perspective. Educational correctness is
defined less and less on the basis of the ideological and/or moral frameworks within
which a person has to be educated. Instead, it is based on one’s own opportunities
for optimal development. Here, (developmental) psychology seems to have
definitively displaced theology (philosophy and ideology) as a legitimising science
(see, e.g., Ottavi, 2001). Educational interventions are primarily justified by the
criterion that they should not damage the individual or cause her any frustrations.
In addition to these more intra-scientific causes, there are, at first sight, several
extra-scientific elements from the history of educational science that reinforce the
hypothesis that during the twentieth century, educationalists seemed to be increas-
ingly driven into the arms of psychology for their scientific work. One can first of
all refer to the growing professionalisation of the field, where the hunger for status
has undoubtedly been a decisive motive. Desire for social recognition and profes-
sional prestige were by no means foreign to the scientism movement which, from
the end of the nineteenth century onwards, revealed a methodological preference for
experimental studies and quantitative approaches in psychology and afterwards in
educational sciences. This, incidentally, takes us back to the topic ‘ethics and
aesthetics of statistics’, which was the theme of the meeting of the Research
Community in 2009. Very likely, the implicit hierarchy of pure science as compared
to the applied science(s) also played a role here, although it is not immediately clear
in what way this has influenced the relationship between psychology and pedagogy.
On the one hand, one can assume that the discipline of education had every
reason to become, as far as possible, an empirical-analytical science (in terms of the
formulation of inductive laws) on its own, while on the other hand, the linear
2 Struggling with the Historical Attractiveness of Psychology for Educational… 13
period. This journal had been merged with that for educational psychology, but the
title of the latter was retained as the banner of the merged journal. As already
mentioned, an analogous development can be seen in the United Kingdom (see also
Wooldridge, 1994). Here, too, educational psychology, with its extensive array of
tests and measurements, ultimately proved to be a more powerful concept and term
than experimental pedagogy (for which the professional journal would likewise
be merged with that for educational psychology before the Second World War).
In France, where the rise of the late nineteenth-century ‘science of education’
(science de l’éducation) cannot be viewed separately from the political programme
of the Third Republic (Gautherin, 2002), ‘psycho-pedagogy’ (psycho-pédagogie)
also developed after the Second World War to become the core of the—by then
renamed in the plural—‘sciences’ of education. That was a fortiori the case in
Geneva, Switzerland, where the Piagetian tradition had been nurtured for a long
time already by, among others, Edouard Claparède, whose orientation was also, if
not more, psychological than educational.
One can hardly underestimate the importance of the Geneva school in the inter-
national perspective, which is proved by, among others, the numerous studies
devoted to this topic by Rita Hofstetter (whether or not in collaboration with Bernard
Schneuwly: see, e.g., Hofstetter, 2010; Hofstetter & Schneuwly, 1999, 2004, 2006,
2009, 2002; Hofstetter & Schneuwly [with the collaboration of Lussi, Cicchini &
Späni], 2007; Lussi, Muller, & Kiciman, 2002). In one of my first articles on the
history of educational sciences (Depaepe, 1987), I also underlined the importance
of Claparède within the institutionalisation and internationalisation of psycho-
pedagogical thought. Even before the outbreak of the First World War, he acted as
a mediator between two rivalling scientific organisations. What was noteworthy was
that this rivalry seemed to be partly determined by the scientific background of its
players (in this case, the pedologist from Antwerp and the former teacher Médard
Schuyten versus the psychologists Jean Jules Van Biervliet and Alfred Binet, from
Ghent and Paris, respectively). Personal rivalries such as these (which could develop
into real feuds) were far from uncommon in the world of psychologists and educa-
tionalists of the time. One also came across such rivalries in Germany during
the first half of the twentieth century, between Meumann and Wilhelm August Lay
(a former teacher trainer who also called himself an experimental educationalist;
see also Hopf, 2004) in Great Britain, between the educational psychologist Cyril
Burt and the experimental educationalist William Winch in the Netherlands and
between the psychologist Hendrik Brugmans and the pedologist Hendrik Gerard
Hamaker. As a matter of fact, there are yet other Belgian examples which could
be cited: the conflict in Brussels between the pedologist Josepha Ioteyko and the
experimental educationalist (also a former teacher) Tobie Jonckheere and the
tensions between the (educational) psychologist Arthur Fauville and the experi-
mental educationalist Raymond Buyse (also a former teacher) in Leuven.
With a little goodwill, one can perceive a certain pattern in these rivalries. The
more scientifically (usually psychologically) skilled researchers almost always got
the long end of the stick as compared to those who stood closest to the educational
practice (often through their pre-training as a teacher). This might again point to the
2 Struggling with the Historical Attractiveness of Psychology for Educational… 15
fact that the difference in status (and consequently, the greater attractiveness of one
field for the other) can be validated with biographical data. Nevertheless, by doing
so, we risk jumping to conclusions. Biographical research itself proves that one
must be very careful with such generalisations. For example, Meumann was himself
involved in a controversy with his teacher Wundt, precisely with regard to the
expansion of experimental psychology into the field of education (see also Hopf,
2004, pp. 52–58; Herzog, 1999, p. 281). Binet, who missed out twice on obtaining
a prestigious chair in experimental psychology in Paris (Nicolas, 2009, pp. 171–173;
pp. 217–237), ultimately appeared to sympathise with the teachers rather than with
the psychologists (see also Avanzini, 1969). While Piaget, who had studied mala-
cology (the study of molluscs), joked about the fact that he had never taken a single
examination in ‘his field’ psychology and, therefore, did not seem to belong there
(Xypas, 2001, p. 175). In short, these biographical details appear to be, to paraphrase
Mollenhauer, an ‘ironic counterpoint’ to ‘scientific knowledge production’ (cit. in
Cloer, 2006, p. 172). It not only supplements the structural, process-oriented and
therefore often-depersonalised approach seen in history but also problematises this.
Anyone who delves into the biography of individual scientists indeed finds that
simple questions asked of history (of science) often result in a complex answer, full
of ambiguities and paradoxes. Take, for example, the case of Ovide Decroly, on
whose biography our research group has been working for a long time now. In our
view (Depaepe, Simon, & Van Gorp, 2011), his scientific expertise was not primarily
based on pedagogy or psychology but on medical science. It was the medical
standpoint (and all the extra-scientific aspects related to that—usually respect and
prestige) that made him a specialist, even with regard to education. Undoubtedly,
such a dritten im Bunde played a role (although probably not always in the same
way; see, e.g., Stroß, 2002) in the lives of Claparède, Wundt, Hamaker and also
Maria Montessori, who, just like so many other trendsetters in the fields of psychology,
pedology and/or pedagogy of the time, were also doctors.
This ménage à trois (Friedrich, 1999) was not always caused by medicine. As
always, philosophy was also a key player and, in fact, a spoilsport. On the one hand,
it very clearly influenced the interpersonal controversies between educationalists
and psychologists. On the other hand, the fact that chairs were linked to philosophy
was one of the main factors of the German Sonderweg in psychology as well as in
educational theory. This not only explained why Germany seemed to lag behind in
the field of empirical research as compared to other countries, and in particular, the
Anglo-American scene, but also why the Germans devoted more attention to the
16 M. Depaepe
What was discussed in the previous paragraph regarding the historicity of the (due
to the search for a disciplinary identity) usually strongly professed demarcations
between scientific areas may appear to be so obvious that it does not even need
to be mentioned. Nonetheless, there is every indication that researchers—even
renowned ones—pressurised by questions at colloquia such as this, cannot do much
else than distance themselves occasionally from the concrete, chaotic dynamics
involved in the development of science. If not, it would be completely impossible
to make general statements regarding, for example, the historical relationship of
psychology with respect to educational sciences/educational theory (and vice versa).
Interesting for the further development of our argument is that their findings do not
necessarily point in the same direction as suggested by our hypothetical consider-
ations in the first paragraph.
At a colloquium organised almost 10 years ago in Fribourg (Switzerland) (see
Reichenbach & Oser, 2002), none other than Jürgen Oelkers (2002), starting from a
historical perspective, took the edge off the basic question (or rather the basic fears
of the organisers) to a possible ‘psychologising’ (and therefore also, the possible end)
of educational theory. In his view, the educationalists did not need to be concerned
as yet with a possible takeover by psychology. According to him, the dependence of
educational theory on psychology is, certainly as far as educational resources are
concerned, a structural fact that has played a part in the continuity of the history of
the discipline of education. Therefore, the idea of an increased dependence is out of
the question for Oelkers. Instead, such is, according to him, the ‘normal’ relation-
ship—a constant which has unfolded throughout history. Oelkers illustrated this
view with several historical examples: the sensory psychology adopted as the basis
for education in the eighteenth century, the role of Herbartian psychology and, in
particular, the ‘mathematicising mechanics of ideas’ (mathematisierende Mechanik
der Vorstellungen) in Herbart’s scheme of educational theory, Preyer’s basic principles
from the Seele des Kindes [1882] for the construction of a sort of physiological
pedagogy, the role of psycho-pedagogical research in Meumann’s design of experi-
mental pedagogy and, of course, the reform pedagogy which was searching for a
suitable activity principle.
18 M. Depaepe
researchers asserted that the ideological preoccupation of the Third Reich had a
pernicious influence on the development of science, Ulfried Geuter (1992) explic-
itly stated that German psychology during this period was actually heading towards
an increased degree of professionalisation—a process that, however, already started
during the First World War, not so much in Germany but in the United States (see,
in this respect, Depaepe & D’hulst, 2011)! Setting aside all Geuter’s ideologising
(in his opinion, the development of a Nazified typology and racial psychology were
detrimental to the practical challenges accompanying the mobilisation and the war),
applied psychology, through the application of its ‘normal’ theories and methods
(in this case, tests and diagnostics), was gaining popularity. Not only did industrial
psychology get a tremendous boost due to the build-up to the war and the war
economy, but a specific military psychology, for the selection and recruitment of
officers (e.g. pilots for the Luftwaffe [Air Force]), also came into being. All this
resulted in 1941 in the introduction of a specific regulation for the certification of
psychologists at the universities—the so-called DPO (Diplom Prüfungsordnung)
which, again according Geuter, ushered in the definitive liberation of German
psychology from philosophy.
Het is niet omdat iets voorbij is, dat het niet heeft bestaan3
(Kristien Hemmerechts, 2005, p.162)
Starting from the change of power in 1933, the notion of ‘totality’ (Ganzheit), which
had already made its appearance during the 1920s in German psychology in general
and in juvenile studies in particular, began to be applied more and more explicitly to
serve the needs of the Nazi totalitarian regime. The role of ‘pedagogical’ psychology
20 M. Depaepe
was redefined on the basis of the emerging ‘revolutionary’ reform of all aspects of
social life (Depaepe, 1997; Oberfeld, 1996). To summarise, the social task of edu-
cational psychology was the following. Through a study of the characteristics and
developmental stages of an ‘organically’ conceived psychological functioning of
child, youth and man, pedagogical psychology was to get to the very core of the
educational process (both within and outside the school). In this way, it could
contribute to ‘national education’, that is, to giving ‘organic’ shape to public life in
the new Germany (which had to be put into effect within the church, state, art,
science, justice and education). As a result, educational psychology was described
as ‘ideological’ (Weltanschaulich; see, e.g., Glaeser, 1933). It was part of a broader
biological-intellectual whole that could be defined as a ‘popular human science’.
The best exponent of this rhetoric was Oswald Kroh—successively Professor
of Psychology and Pädagogik in Tübingen (1924), Munich (1938) and Berlin
(1942). Almost every year, he would publish an article explaining the theoretical-
methodological position of the field (see consecutively Kroh, 1933, 1934, 1937,
1938, 1940, 1943). In 1933 (when he replaced William Stern, who had immigrated
to the United States as editor on the main editorial board), he pointed out that the
concept of total education, in the service of the ‘race’ that was to be newly devel-
oped, must be imbued with the principles of the Führeridee—the concept of the
leader (Kroh, 1933, p. 318). Five years later, he refuted the criticism that implied
that applied psychology was inferior with respect to pure psychology. Rather, the
opposite was true according to him. This purely hypothetical science, perceived
as being divorced from reality, could finally serve the purposes of a social project.
In 1940—when the realisation of this project began to take clear shape—he called
for a permanent closing of the ranks. That also applied, and especially so, to the
scientists whose duties were viewed in a particular light due to the social needs of
the war. And in 1943, he reiterated that education was a social task in the service of
the people, which implied, among other things, the Reinhaltung des rassischen
Erbguts [preserving the purity of the racial genotype] (Kroh, 1943, p. 14).
Apart from Kroh, who was not only a member of the NSDAP (National Socialist
German Workers’ Party) but who also reportedly taught lessons in uniform, it was
mainly Erich Rudolf Jaensch (Marburg—the President of the Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Psychologie who died in 1941), Wilhelm Hische (Hannover) and Gerhard
Pfahler (Giessen [1934], Göttingen [1938], Tübingen [1938]) who served as spokes-
men for the regime, along with various epigones following in their footsteps. They
repeated in various ways (Hische, 1937, 1939; Jaensch, 1938; Pfahler, 1939) the
importance of a practically oriented pedagogical psychology in the service of the
German people. Rooted in German mysticism, the Sturm und Drang and neo-
humanism, this science could not be international: just as psychopathology, military
psychology and vocational guidance, it had to lead to a better understanding of the
German youth, bearer of the ‘popular destiny’ (Schicksal)—youth who had to com-
mit themselves to defending the national community (an idea whose foundations
had already been laid after the debacle of First World War; see, e.g., von Bühler,
1990). It goes without saying that the introduction of the DPO was used as a unique
opportunity to deal with the ‘unworldly’ nature of the hitherto apolitical psychology.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
What was Kenneth Fortescue doing that day? Was he
still living in that poor dismal neighbourhood? Was he still
denying himself in countless different ways for their sakes?
Or had he discovered the missing word in the letter? Had he
found the father who had cast him off as a child? Had he
been owned and reinstated in his rightful position? Perhaps
he had; perhaps now he was taking his place amongst the
great ones of the earth, and they would hear of him no
more.
Yes, there they were, her mother and Phyllis and Louis
Verner. It seemed too good to be true! What a drive home
that was, and how much they had to say to each other!
How beautiful it all looked! She had never thought that the
mountains were so high, or the Lake so lovely, or
Borrowdale so fine, or Castle Crag so magnificent. She had
loved them all from her childhood; but she thought she had
never fully appreciated them until that day.
"A letter for you, Marjorie," said Phyllis, who had gone
to meet the postman at the gate, "and it has such a black
border."
Then Mrs. St. Hellier went on to say that she had heard
from Colonel Verner that Miss Douglas was looking for
something of the kind, and she wanted to know whether
she would like her to name her to Lady Earlswood. She
thought she was at liberty to tell her that the remuneration
would be a handsome one; fifty pounds a year was the
amount mentioned by Lady Earlswood when she spoke to
her on the subject.
Then she went to the window. It was not yet dark, and
she could see hills and woods in every direction, whilst close
to the house were three long terraces, one above another,
from the various heights of which glorious views of the
surrounding country could be obtained. What a strange
contrast to the views from her bedroom window in Colwyn
House!
Marjorie laughed, and told her she did not think that
was possible.
"Marjorie, I've been horrid all day; why don't you tell
me so?"
"I don't mind one from you; but I do think it's a shame,
a horrible shame."
"Oh, I'm so sorry," said Marjorie. "I had not heard about
it."
"Oh, didn't you know? We were going to London to get
my trousseau the very week that this accident happened.
We were making all the plans about the wedding, and
actually had patterns in the house for choosing the
bridesmaids' dresses; and now here I am, lying helpless on
my back, and my wedding put off indefinitely. It is an awful
shame!"
"He doesn't like to see you suffer, Lady Violet. Oh, don't
ever think that! It is because He loves you He has let this
trouble come."
"I don't see much love in it! I suppose you mean that
God thinks I need punishing; but I've never done anything
to deserve it, and I do think it's a horrid shame!"
"I was thinking about the eagle's nest, and that you
were like one of the eaglets."
"What do you mean by that?"
"You know how the eagle makes her nest on the ledge
of some high rock, building it of sticks and briars, and then
lining it with moss, and hay, and wool, and soft feathers out
of her own breast."
"And then she lays her eggs, and the eaglets are
hatched, and they lie down in the soft nest, and are so cosy
that they never want to leave it. But, as they grow older,
the mother-bird wants them to learn to fly, that they may
be able to soar up with her towards the sun. So she hovers
over them and tries to persuade them to stretch their
wings; but the nest is far too cosy and snug for them to
want to leave it, and they nestle down again in the moss
and hay. But the mother knows all they will lose if they do
not learn to fly, so she rakes out the wool and feathers with
her strong beak, and makes the thorns and briars come to
the top. Then, when all the soft lining is gone, the young
birds shuffle about uncomfortably. The nest is not such a
nice place after all, and by degrees they creep to the edge
of it and sit there very miserably. And now the mother-bird
again tries to get them to fly, and they spread their small
wings, and she puts her great strong wing underneath
them, so that they may not fall, and soon they are soaring
with her into the glory above."
They were silent for some time after this, and then Lady
Violet said suddenly—
"Why?"
"But the doctor hopes you will be all right soon; doesn't
he?"
CHAPTER XXI
LORD KENMORE
Marjorie was very thankful for all this, and for the
letters from home, which were very cheering. Leila was
becoming quite strong again, and the money Marjorie was
earning, and which she had been able to send home at the
end of her first three months at Grantley Castle, had
enabled her mother to buy many much-needed things for
the household, and had considerably relieved the strain
consequent upon the loss of the insurance money.
But all that was over now, and she took the letter from
Lady Violet, when it was finished—the letter to him,—and
carried it down to the bag.
"LORD KENMORE,
"Rockcliffe Castle."
That, then, was his address. She saw that, but she saw
no more. What right had she to look at the letter to see his
address? She would put it in the letter-box at once. It was
nothing to her where he lived.
Once a wild hope darted across her mind that after all
she had jumped to a wrong conclusion. Perhaps Captain
Fortescue and Lord Kenmore were after all not the same;
and if so, could it be that he had found out where she was,
and had come to see whether she was happy at Grantley
Castle, just as once before he had come to Daisy Bank?
And so more than an hour went by, and then came the
sound of a bell, the bell of Lady Violet's sitting-room. This
bell rang upstairs in Collins' room, so that her mistress
could summon her whenever she required her. She heard
Collins come down and go into the next room, and soon
afterwards there came a knock at her bedroom door.
"No, not for ages; he has lost all his money, poor fellow,
and is as poor as a church mouse. I don't know what has
become of him."
CHAPTER XXII
MR. NORTHCOURT'S OPINION
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