IntensionalSemantics 2
IntensionalSemantics 2
K A I VO N F I N T E L & I R E N E H E I M
Kai von Fintel & Irene Heim
Intensional semantics
These lecture notes have been evolving for many years now, starting with
some notes from the early 1990s by Angelika Kratzer, Irene Heim, and
Kai von Fintel, which have since been modified and expanded many times
by Irene and/or Kai, with feedback and contributions from colleagues and
students.
Cite as follows:
von Fintel, Kai & Irene Heim. 1997–2021. Intensional semantics. MIT.
Some advice
1. These notes presuppose familiarity with the material, concepts, and
notation of the Heim & Kratzer textbook.
2. There are numerous exercises throughout the notes. It is highly
recommended to do all of them and it is certainly necessary to do so
if you at all anticipate doing semantics-related work in the future.
3. The notes are designed to go along with explanatory lectures. You
should ask questions and make comments as you work through the
notes.
4. While most of the object language examples are from English,
semantics is a cross-linguistic enterprise. Students (and teachers)
should bring in a cross-linguistic perspective throughout.
5. Students with semantic ambitions should also at an early point start
reading supplementary material (as for example listed at the end of
each chapter of these notes).
6. Prospective semanticists may start thinking about how they would
teach this material.
7. For more advice, see http://kaivonfintel.org/prerequisites/.
1 Beginnings 3
P A R T II E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
P A R T III TIME
P A R T IV QUESTIONS
BI BLIOGRAPHY
PA RT I
1.1 Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 An intensional semantics in 10 easy steps . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Laying the foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Intensional operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Comments and complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Intensions all the way? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.2 Why talk about other worlds? . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.3 The worlds of Sherlock Holmes . . . . . . . 16
1.3.4 What’s next and a general pattern . . . . . . 17
1.4 *Issues with an informal meta-language . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Further readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.1 Displacement
On its own, (2) makes a claim about what is happening right now here in
Cambridge. But there are devices at our disposal that can be added to (2),
4 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
This sentence makes a claim not about snow now but about snow at noon
yesterday, a different time from now. We will look at temporal semantics
in Part 2 of this book.
In Part 1 of this book, we will focus on what might be called the MODAL The terms MODAL and MODALITY descend
dimension. Here’s an example of modal displacement: from the Latin modus, “way”, and are an-
cient terms pertaining to the way a propo-
(4) COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONAL sition holds, necessarily, contingently, etc.
If the storm system hadn’t been deflected by the jet stream, it would For more on the history, see Auwera &
Aguilar 2015.
have been snowing.
If we wanted to be more fanciful, we
This sentence makes a claim not about snow in the actual world but about could call this the Fifth Dimension (after
snow in the world as it would have been if the storm system hadn’t been the four dimensions of space and time).
deflected by the jet stream, a world distinct from the actual one (where Take a look at the original intro to The
the system did not hit us), a merely POSSIBLE WORLD. Twilight Zone: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vB1Ot9MEOOs
Natural language abounds in modal constructions (see Kratzer 1981).
Here are some other examples:
(5) MODAL AUXILIARIES
It may be snowing.
(8) EVIDENTIALS
It appears that it is snowing.
(9) HABITUALS
Ellen smokes.
(10) GENERICS
Bears like honey.
(11) IMPERATIVES
Get your snow shovels ready!
(13) INFINITIVAL
{ RELATIVES
}
an
I know expert to talk to.
the
BEGINNINGS 5
A terminological note: we will call the sister of the intensional operator its
PREJACENT, a useful term introduced by our medieval colleagues.
6 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
Our first step is to introduce possible worlds. This is not the place to dis-
cuss the metaphysics of possible worlds in any depth. Instead, we will
just start working with them and see what they can do for us. Basically,
a possible world is a way that things might have been. In the actual world,
there are two coffee mugs on my desk, but there could have been more
or less. So, there is a possible world — albeit a rather bizarre one — where
there are 17 coffee mugs on my desk. We join Heim & Kratzer in adduc-
ing this quote from Lewis (1986: 1f.):
Previously, our “metaphysical inventory” included a domain of entities It’s possible that your previous inventory
and a set of two truth-values and increasingly complex functions between also included pluralities, events, and/or de-
grees. We’re just adding to the menagerie
entities, truth-values, and functions thereof. Now, we will add possible
now. Questions arise about what the limits
worlds to the inventory. Let’s assume we are given a set 𝑊 , the set of all are and whether the inventory is universal.
possible worlds, which is a vast space since there are so many ways that For some discussion, see the manuscript
things might have been different from the way they are. Each world has “A typology of semantic entities” (Rett
2019).
as among its parts entities like you and me and these coffee mugs. Some
of them may not exist in other possible worlds. So, strictly speaking each
possible worlds has its own, possibly distinctive, domain of entities. What
we will use in our system, however, will be the grand union of all these
world-specific domains of entities. We will use 𝐷 to stand for the set of all
possible individuals.
Among the many possible worlds that there are — according to Lewis,
there is a veritable plenitude of them — is the world as it is described in
the Sherlock Holmes stories by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. In that world,
there is a famous detective Sherlock Holmes, who lives at 221B Baker
Street in London and has a trusted sidekick named Dr. Watson. Our sen-
tence In the world of Sherlock Holmes, a detective lives at 221B Baker Street
displaces the claim that a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street from
the actual world to the world as described in the Sherlock Holmes stories.
In other words, the following holds (until we revise it):
(15) The sentence In the world of Sherlock Holmes, a detective lives at 221B
Baker Street is true in a world w iff the sentence a detective lives at
221B Baker Street is true in the world as it is described in the Sher-
lock Holmes stories.
What this suggests is that we need to make space in our system for
having devices that control in what world a claim is evaluated. This is
what we will do now.
So, the prejacent embedded in (14) will have its truth-conditions de- Recall from H&K, pp.22f, that what’s
scribed as follows: inside the interpretation brackets is a men-
tion of an object language expression.
(16) For any world 𝑤 and assignment function 𝑔: They make this clear by bold-facing all
⟦a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 1 object language expressions inside inter-
pretation brackets. In this book, we will
iff a famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street in world 𝑤.
follow common practice in the field and
It is customary to refer to the world for which we are calculating the not use a special typographic distinction,
but let it be understood that what is inter-
extension of a given expression as the EVALUATION WORLD. In the absence
preted are object language expressions.
of any shifting devices, we would normally evaluate a sentence in the ac-
tual world. But then there are shifting devices such as our in the world of
Sherlock Holmes. We will soon see how they work. But first some more
pedestrian steps: adding lexical entries and composition principles that are
formulated relative to a possible world. This will allow us to derive the
truth-conditions as stated in (16) in a compositional manner.
Among our lexical items, we can distinguish between items which have a
WORLD-DEPENDENT semantic value and those that are world-independent.
Let’s start with the entry for famous:
(17) For any 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and any assignment function 𝑔:
⟦famous⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑥 ∈ 𝐷. 𝑥 is famous in 𝑤.
Other items have semantic values which do not differ from world to
world. The most important such items are certain “logical” expressions,
such as truth-functional connectives and determiners: Again, note the ruthless condensation of
the notation in (c) and (d): variables are
(19) a. ⟦and⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑢 ∈ 𝐷𝑡 . 𝜆𝑣 ∈ 𝐷𝑡 . 𝑢 = 𝑣 = 1. subscripted with the type of the domain
b. ⟦the⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑓 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ : ∃!𝑥 [𝑓 (𝑥) = 1]. the 𝑦 such that 𝑓 (𝑦) = 1. that their values are constrained to come
from.
c. ⟦every⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑓 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . 𝜆ℎ ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . ∀𝑥𝑒 : 𝑓 (𝑥) = 1 → ℎ(𝑥) = 1.
d. ⟦a/some⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑓 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . 𝜆ℎ ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . ∃𝑥𝑒 : 𝑓 (𝑥) = 1 & ℎ(𝑥) = 1.
Step 5: Truth
We will want to connect our semantic system to the notion of the TRUTH
OF AN UTTERANCE. We first adopt the “Appropriateness Condition” from
Heim & Kratzer (p.243):
(22) APPROPRIATENESS CONDITION
A context 𝑐 is appropriate for an LF 𝜙 only if 𝑐 determines a variable
assignment 𝑔𝑐 whose domain includes every index which has a free
occurrence in 𝜙.
10 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
lexical entries and our old composition principles. But with the tools we
⟦𝑂𝑝 𝜙⟧𝑤
have now, all we can do so far is to keep track of the world in which we
=
evaluate the semantic value of an expression, complex or lexical. We will
controls
get real mileage once we introduce INTENSIONAL OPERATORS which are
⟦𝑂𝑝⟧𝑤 ⟦𝜙⟧
capable of shifting the world parameter. We mentioned that there are a
number of devices for modal displacement. As advertised, for now, we
will just focus on a very particular one: the expression in the world of Sher-
lock Holmes. We will assume, as seems reasonable, that this expression is a
sentence-modifier both syntactically and semantically.
since in the world of Sherlock Holmes is not given a separate meaning, but
in effect triggers a special composition principle. This format is very com- The diamond ^ symbol for possibility
mon in modal logic systems, which usually give a syncategorematic se- is due to C.I. Lewis, first introduced in
Lewis & Langford 1932, but he made no
mantics for the two classic modal operators (the necessity operator □ and
use of a symbol for the dual combination
the possibility operator ^). When one only has a few closed class expres- ¬^¬. The dual symbol □ (“Box”) was later
sions to deal with that may shift the world parameter, employing syncat- devised by F.B. Fitch and first appeared
egorematic entries is a reasonable strategy. But we are facing a multitude in print in 1946 in a paper by his doctoral
student Barcan (1946). See footnote 425
of displacement devices. We will therefore need to make our system more of Hughes & Cresswell 1968. Another
modular. notation one finds is 𝐿 for necessity and 𝑀
We want to give in the world of Sherlock Holmes its own meaning and for possibility, the latter from the German
möglich ‘possible’.
combine that meaning with that of its prejacent by a general composi-
tion principle. The Fregean slogan we adopted says that all composition is
function application (modulo the need for 𝜆-abstraction and the possible
need for predicate modification). See Heim & Kratzer, Section 4.3, pp.
What we will want to do is to make (24) be the result of functional ap- 63–72 for a reminder about the status of
predicate modification.
plication. But we can immediately see that it cannot be the result of our
usual rule of functional application, since that would feed to in the world
of Sherlock Holmes the semantic value of a famous detective lives in 221B
Baker Street in 𝑤, which would be a particular truth-value, 1 if a famous
detective lives at 221B Baker Street in 𝑤 and 0 if there doesn’t. And what-
ever the semantics of in the world of Sherlock Holmes is, it is certainly not a
truth-functional operator.
We need to feed something else to in the world of Sherlock Holmes. At
the same time, we want the operator to be able to shift the evaluation
world of its prejacent. Can we do this?
Exercise 1.4 How would you show that in the world of Sherlock Holmes is
not a truth-functional operator? □
Step 7: Intensions
Clause (d) is the addition to our previous system of types. The func- Note a curious feature of this set-up: there
tions of the schematic type ⟨𝑠, . . .⟩ are intensions. Here are some examples is no type 𝑠 and no associated domain.
This corresponds to the assumption that
of intensions:
there are no expressions of English that
take as their extension a possible world,
• The intensions of sentences are of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩, functions from pos- that is, there are no pronouns or names
sible worlds to truth values. These are usually called PROPOSITIONS. referring to possible worlds. We will ac-
Note that if the function is total, then we can see the sentence as tually question this assumption in a later
chapter. For now, we will stay with this
picking out a set of possible worlds, those in which the sentence is
more conventional set-up.
true. More often than not, however, propositions will be PARTIAL
functions from worlds to truth-values, that is functions that fail to
map certain possible worlds into either truth-value. This will be the
case when the sentence contains a presupposition trigger, such as
the. The famous sentence The King of France is bald has an intension
that (at least in the analysis sketched in Heim & Kratzer) is unde-
fined for any world where there fails to be a unique King of France.
• The intensions of one-place predicates are of type ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩⟩, func-
tions from worlds to set of individuals. These are usually called
PROPERTIES.
• The intensions of expressions of type 𝑒 are of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑒⟩, functions
from worlds to individuals. These are usually called INDIVIDUAL
CONCEPTS.
We are ready to formulate the lexical entry for in the world of Sherlock
Holmes: This is not yet the final semantics, see
Section 1.3 for complications. One com-
(29) ⟦in the world of Sherlock Holmes⟧𝑤,𝑔 = plication we will not even start to discuss
𝜆𝑝 ⟨𝑠,𝑡 ⟩ . the world 𝑤 ′ as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories is that obviously it is not a necessity that
is such that 𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1. there are Sherlock Holmes stories in the
first place and that the use of this opera-
That is, in the world of Sherlock Holmes expects as its argument a func- tor presupposes that they exist; so a more
fully explicit semantics would need to
tion of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩, a proposition. It yields the truth-value 1 iff the proposi-
build in that presuppositional component.
tion is true in the world as it is described in the Sherlock Holmes stories. Also, note again the condensed notation:
All that’s left to do now is to provide in the world of Sherlock Holmes “𝜆𝑝 ⟨𝑠,𝑡 ⟩ . . . . ” stands for the fully official
with a proposition as its argument. This is the job of a new composition “𝜆𝑝 : 𝑝 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,𝑡 ⟩ . . . . ”.
principle.
14 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
This is the crucial move. It makes space for expressions that want to
take the intension of their sister as their argument and do stuff to it. Now,
everything is in place. Given (29), the semantic argument of in the world
of Sherlock Holmes will not be a truth-value but a proposition. And thus,
in the world of Sherlock Holmes will be able to check the truth-value of its
prejacent in various possible worlds. To see in practice that we have all we
need, please do the following exercise.
Exercise 1.5 Calculate the conditions under which an utterance in a given pos-
sible world 𝑤 7 of the sentence in the world of the Sherlock Holmes stories, a
famous detective lives at 221B Baker Street is true. □
Exercise 1.6 What in our system prevents us from computing the extension of
Watson is slow, for example, by applying the intension of slow to the extension
of Watson? What in our system prevents us from computing the extension of
Watson is slow by applying the intension of slow to the intension of Watson?
□
Exercise 1.7 What is wrong with the following equation: Please think about this exercise before
looking at Section 1.4, which explores this
(31) (𝜆𝑥 . 𝑥 is slow in 𝑤) (Watson) = Watson is slow in 𝑤 ? issue.
[ Hint: there is nothing wrong with the following:
(32) (𝜆𝑥 . 𝑥 is slow in 𝑤) (Watson) = 1 iff Watson is slow in 𝑤. ] □
With this semantics, the conjunction and would operate on the intensions of the
two conjoined sentences. In any possible world 𝑤, the complex sentence will be
true iff the component propositions are both true of that world.
Compute the truth-conditions of the sentence In the world of Sherlock
Holmes, Holmes is quick and Watson is slow both with the extensional
meaning for and given earlier and the intensional meaning given here. Is there
any difference in the results? □
There are then at least two ways one could develop an intensional system.
(i) We could “generalize to the worst case” and make the semantics de-
liver intensions as the semantic value of an expression. Such systems
are common in the literature (see Lewis 1970, Cresswell 1973).
(ii) We could maintain much of the extensional semantics we have de-
veloped so far and extend it conservatively so as to account for non-
extensional contexts.
We have chosen to pursue (ii) over (i), because it allows us to keep the
semantics of extensional expressions simpler. The philosophy we follow is
that we will only move to the intensional sub-machinery when triggered
by an expression that creates a non-extensional context. As the exercise
just showed, this might be more a matter of taste than a deep scientific
decision. We will turn to questions of expressive power later in this book.
there is no occurrence of 𝑤 on the right hand side. This means that the
truth-conditions for sentences with this shifter would be world-independent.
16 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
We see now that sentences with this shifter do make a claim about the
evaluation world: namely, that the Sherlock Holmes stories as they are
in the evaluation world describe a world in which such-and-such is true.
So, what is happening is that although it appears at first as if modal state-
ments concern other possible worlds and thus couldn’t really be very in-
formative, they actually only talk about certain possible worlds, those that
stand in some relation to what is going on at the ground level in the ac-
tual world. As a crude analogy, consider:
(36) My grandmother is sick.
lives on Abbey Road are not compatible. Some worlds where he lives at
221B Baker Street are compatible (again not all, because in some such
worlds he is not a famous detective but an obscure violinist). Among the
worlds compatible with the stories are ones where he has an even number
of hairs on his head at the moment when he first meets Watson and there
are others where he has an odd number of hairs at that moment.
What the operator in the world of Sherlock Holmes expresses is that its
complement is true throughout the worlds compatible with the stories. In
other words, the operator universally quantifies over the compatible worlds.
Our next iteration of the semantics for the operator is therefore this:
(37) ⟦in the world of Sherlock Holmes⟧𝑤,𝑔 =
𝜆𝑝 ⟨𝑠,𝑡 ⟩ . ∀𝑤 ′ compatible with the Sherlock Holmes stories in 𝑤 :
𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1.
At a very abstract level, the way we parse sentences of the form in the
world of Sherlock Holmes, 𝜙 is that both components, the in-phrase and the
prejacent, determine sets of possible worlds and that the set of possible
worlds representing the content of the fiction mentioned in the in-phrase
is a subset of the set of possible worlds determined by the prejacent. We
will encounter the same rough structure of relating sets of possible worlds
in other intensional constructions.
This is where we will leave things. There is more to be said about fic-
tion operators like in the world of Sherlock Holmes, but we will just refer
to you to the relevant literature. In particular, one might want to make
sense of Lewis’ idea that a special treatment is needed for cases where
the sentence makes a claim about things that are left open by the fiction
(no truth-value, perhaps?). One also needs to figure out how to deal with
cases where the fiction is internally inconsistent. In any case, for our pur-
poses we’re done with this kind of operator.
We will look at the non-trivial issues that arise when several inten-
sional operators interact (modals under attitudes, modals in the conse-
quent of a conditional, etc.). We will also see that constituents of the pre-
jacent can sometimes be evaluated with respect to a world that is not the
world that the intensional operator is taking us to (so-called de re read-
ings). Further, we will move from worlds to times and explore the seman-
tics of tense and aspect. And, for the intrepid, this can all come together
by exploring how tense and aspect interact with attitudes, modality, and
conditionals.
Exercise 1.7 asks what is wrong with writing something like Thanks to Magda Kaufmann, Angelika
Kratzer, and Ede Zimmermann for discus-
(38) (𝜆𝑥 . 𝑥 is slow in 𝑤) (Watson) = Watson is slow in 𝑤. sions of the issues explored in this section,
which is optional on a first pass, as indi-
Think about it. On the left hand side of the “=” sign is a meta-language cated by the star on the section title.
expression consisting of a 𝜆-expression (so some kind of function) applied
to an individual (contributed by the meta-language name “Watson”). The
function is a function from individuals to truth-values that will deliver
the truth-value 1 iff the individual is slow in world 𝑤. So, what we have
on the left hand side is the result of a function from individuals to truth-
values applied to an individual. In other words, on the left hand side we
have a truth-value, namely the truth-value 1 if Watson is slow in 𝑤 and
the truth-value 0 if Watson is not slow in 𝑤.
Now, what do we have on the right hand side of the “=”? We have the
meta-language sentence “Watson is slow in 𝑤”. That is not nor does it
contribute a truth-value. It is a statement of fact. Truth-values are not the
same as statements of fact.
The proper thing to do is to write
(39) (𝜆𝑥 . 𝑥 is slow in 𝑤) (Watson) = 1 iff Watson is slow in 𝑤.
There are actually two ways to parse the statement in (39), both legiti-
mate it appears.
On one parse, the major connective is the meta-language expression
“iff”. On its left hand side is a meta-language statement (that applying
the function to the individual Watson gives the truth-value 1) and on
the right hand side of the “iff” we have another meta-language statement
(that Watson is slow in 𝑤). So, the whole thing says that these two state-
ments are equivalent: (i) that function applied to that individual gives us
the truth-value 1, and (ii) that Watson is slow in 𝑤.
The other parse is perhaps more conspicuously represented as follows: Is this weird? It turns out that natural
{ language, not just our semi-formal meta-
1 if Watson is slow in 𝑤 language, has conditionals that seem very
(40) (𝜆𝑥 . 𝑥 is slow in 𝑤) (Watson) =
0 if Watson is not slow in 𝑤 similar: I fear [the consequences if we fail].
See Lasersohn 1996, Frana 2017, and
Blümel 2019 for some discussion.
BEGINNINGS 19
Here, the “=” sign is the major connective. The left hand side is a meta-
language expression that resolves to a truth-value and the right hand
side as well contributes a truth-value: 1 if such and such and 0 if such and
such.
H&K, of course, introduced a convention that allowed meta-language
statements to be used in a place where a truth-value was expected (p.37,
(9)):
Read “[𝜆𝛼 : 𝜙 . 𝛾]” as either (i) or (ii), whichever makes sense.
(i) “the function which maps every 𝛼 such that 𝜙 to 𝛾”
(ii) “the function which maps every 𝛼 such that 𝜙 to 1, if 𝛾,
and to 0 otherwise”
Since it never makes sense to map anything to a meta-language state-
ment, no ambiguity will ever arise.
So, one might want to extend this leeway and use it in the case of (38) This is the approach of von Stechow 1991.
as well. We could say that in general, meta-language statements supply
truth-values wherever that makes sense. In that case, (38) is just shorthand
for (39).
Alternatively, one can introduce a new notation that indicates that a This is the approach Ede Zimmermann
meta-language statement is being used to contribute a truth-value: (pc) advocates and has been using in his
{ classes.
1 if 𝛼
(41) ⊢ 𝛼 ⊣ =
0 if otherwise
2.1 Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1.1 Hintikka’s idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1.2 Iterated attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Conditionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Modals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Syntactic assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.2 Quantification over possible worlds . . . . . 29
2.3.3 Contingency, flavors, context-dependency . 31
2.3.4 Epistemic vs. Circumstantial . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3.5 Toward an analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Explorations and variations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.1 Accessibility relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.2 Conversational backgrounds . . . . . . . . . 42
Introduction
Towards the end of the first chapter, we identified a general schema for 𝑀 [ 𝑓 (𝑎) ] (𝜙 )
modal displacement operators. It begins with a “flavor function” that 𝑀: a quantificational/modal relation be-
“projects” a set of relevant worlds from an “anchor”, and then a quantifi- tween two sets of worlds (proposi-
tions)
cational claim is made about those worlds and their relation to the preja-
𝑎: the anchor of the modal claim
cent. We will now see this pattern at work in three kinds of constructions:
propositional attitudes, conditionals, and modals. These look superficially 𝑓 : the flavor function that projects a set of
worlds from the anchor
quite dissimilar:
𝜙: the prejacent set of worlds (proposi-
(1) a. Charlotte believes that Lucy is smart. tion)
b. If Lucy is smart, she will cancel the meeting.
c. Lucy might cancel the meeting.
The intensional operator in (1a) is the lexical verb believe, in (1b) it is the
subordinating complementizer if, and in (1c) it is the auxiliary verb might.
Despite this surface variety, the core semantic contributions are very sim-
ilar.
Propositional attitude predicates like believe project a set of worlds from
the mental state of their subject and relate those worlds to the worlds de-
scribed by the prejacent proposition. Conditionals select a relevant subset
22 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
of the worlds described by their antecedent and relate them to the worlds
described by their consequent. And the modal might says that some worlds
in a relevant set make the prejacent proposition true.
We will now look at these ideas in more detail and build some nimble-
ness in deploying the technical notions here.
2.1 Attitudes
with Amandine’s beliefs. For all Amandine believes, 𝑤 ′ may well be the
world where she lives. Many worlds will pass this criterion, just consider
as one factor that Amandine is unlikely to have any precise opinions about
the number of leaves on the tree in front of my house. Amandine’s be-
lief system determines a set of worlds compatible with her beliefs: those
worlds that are viable candidates for being the actual world, as far as her
belief system is concerned.
Now, Amandine believes a proposition iff that proposition is true in all
of the worlds compatible with her beliefs. If there is just one world com-
patible with her beliefs where the proposition is not true, that means that
she considers it possible that the proposition is not true. In such a case, we
can’t say that she believes the proposition.
Here is the same story in the words of Hintikka (1969), the source for
this semantics for propositional attitudes:
Exercise 2.1 Let’s adopt Hintikka’s idea that we can use a function that maps
𝑥 and 𝑤 into the set of worlds 𝑤 ′ compatible with what 𝑥 believes in 𝑤. Call this
function B. That is,
(3) B = 𝜆𝑥 . 𝜆𝑤 . {𝑤 ′ : 𝑤 ′ is compatible with 𝑥’s beliefs in 𝑤 }.
Using this notation, our lexical entry for believe could look as follows:
(4) ⟦believe⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑝 ⟨𝑠,𝑡 ⟩ . 𝜆𝑥 . B (𝑥)(𝑤) ⊆ 𝑝.
Exercise 2.2 Follow-up: The semantics in (6) would have made believe into
an existential quantifier of sorts: it would say that some of the worlds compati-
ble with what the subject believes are such-and-such. You have argued (success-
fully, of course) that such an analysis is wrong for believe. But are there attitude If you can’t find any candidates that sur-
predicates with such an “existential” meaning? Discuss some candidates. □ vive scrutiny, can you speculate why there
might be no existential attitude predicates?
[Warning: this is underexplored territory!]
Exercise 2.3 Propose a semantics for the adjective alleged as in Vera is an
alleged kleptomaniac. Do not assume any hidden structure. Try to relate your After this little exercise, you might be
interested in some really tough questions
semantics to the verb allege as in Romelu alleged that Vera is a kleptomaniac.
about intensionality inside noun phrases:
□ Bogal-Allbritten 2013, Bogal-Allbritten
& Weir 2017 and Hirsch 2017: especially
Chapter 4.
2.1.2 Iterated attitudes
Semantics is a lab science in several ways. The most crucial way is that we
learn a lot about our objects of study when we put them together and see
how they react to each other.
We expect attitudes to be able to iterate: an attitude claim is a sentence
with contingent truth-conditions and thus provides a proposition that
in turn could be the complement of another attitude claim. In fact, one
suspects that much of the fabric of human life involves iterated attitudes:
we wonder whether Emma realizes that Caroline believes that Janet has
invited Preston for dinner without telling Abby.
2.2 Conditionals
These represent the three main subtypes of conditionals (there are more):
(7a) is an “indicative” conditional about the past, (7b) is an indicative con-
ditional about the future, and (7c) is a “subjunctive” conditional. For the
moment, the differences will be left aside.
The basic idea of how conditionals work is this: the if -clause whisks
us away to a particular possible world (or maybe a set thereof ) and the
consequent clause is asserted to be true of that world (or those worlds).
But what world(s) are we being taken to? The most obvious requirement
is that the antecedent of the conditional needs to be true of the world(s).
But there’s more.
Given our discussions of how the semantics of fiction operators anchors Lewis used a rather whimsical example to
them in facts about the actual world (the content of the relevant body of start off his seminal 1973 book on coun-
terfactuals: “If kangaroos had not tails,
fiction) and how the semantics of attitude predicates is anchored in the
they would topple over”. For another ex-
mental states of an individual in the actual world, it shouldn’t come as a ample of counterfactual whimsy, consider
surprise that conditionals are similarly anchored. So, look at the examples this scene from the TV show “Big Bang
in (7): what in the actual world are they about? Theory”: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=0lpY0Kt4bn8. As the examples
Here’s a first attempt of an answer: (7a) is about the local transporta- in the text make clear, conditionals are
tion system, the weather, the traffic, and so on. (7b) is about the sturdiness actually very down-to-earth in real life.
of this house, facts of geology, laws of physics, and so on. (7c) is about
Kai’s proclivities (such as avoiding traffic snarls), the local climate, and so
on. Since the conditionals are anchored in real world facts, they are no
mere flights of fancy and whether they are true depends on those facts. If
today’s traffic was particularly bad, it may be false that Kim’s leaving be-
fore 6am would have got her there in time. If the architects went to great
lengths to make the house earthquake-safe, (7b) may well be false. And if
there was an attendance-mandatory faculty meeting, Kai may well have
come in in spite of a massive snowstorm.
So, the outlines of the semantics of conditionals are clear: if takes us
to worlds where the antecedent is true but that match the actual world in
certain relevant features. And the consequent then is evaluated in those
worlds. There are many details to work out and we’ll keep returning to
that task. But for now, we put forward a placeholder analysis.
26 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
The insight articulated by Lewis here is very important. Applying Strawson 1950 famously wrote: “Neither
mathematical or logical methods to analyzing natural language mean- Aristotelian nor Russellian rales give the
exact logic of any expression of ordinary
ing often arouses severe skepticism, precisely because natural language
language; for ordinary language has no
is often vague and context-dependent. But that just means that an ade- exact logic.”
quate analysis needs to not ignore vagueness and context-dependence and
rather be clear about where they enter.
All the more reason to refine our initial draft of the proposal. We put a
placeholder for context-dependence in the meta-language (“worlds rel-
evantly like the evaluation world”) but that is not really sufficient. We
would like to embed the analysis in a general framework for how context
enters the semantics. For the purposes of this book, we will adopt an ap-
proach that generalizes from the analysis of “free” pronouns in the Heim
& Kratzer textbook.
In H&K, chapters 9–11, a technical implementation of context-dependency
is developed for pronouns and their referential (and E-Type) readings.
Referential pronouns are analyzed there as free variables, appealing to
a general principle that free variables in an LF need to be supplied with
values from the utterance context. If we want to describe the context-
dependency of conditionals (and as we’ll soon see, modals) in a technically
analogous fashion, we can think of their LF-representations as incorpo-
rating or subcategorizing for a kind of invisible pronoun, a free variable
that effects the anchoring of the conditional claim to relevant features of
the evaluation world.
Concretely, we posit LF-structures where if doesn’t just take two We are using the notation for variables of
propositions as its arguments but also an object language variable of type types other than 𝑒 introduced by Heim
& Kratzer, p. 213. An index on a variable
⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩⟩:
now is an ordered pair of a natural num-
(9) ber and a type. The variable assignments
relative to which we calculate semantic
𝜓 consequent values now are functions from ordered
pairs of a natural number and a type to
elements of the domain of objects of that
𝜙 antecedent
type.
if 𝑓 ⟨ 3,⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩⟩
Together this means that a conditional says about the evaluation world
𝑤 0 that among the worlds that are 𝑓 -related to 𝑤 0 , the ones where the
antecedent is true are all worlds where the consequent is also true.
28 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
Both versions seem possible: saying (11a) would talk about worlds where
Caesar with all his ruthlessness is in command, while (11b) would talk
about worlds where Caesar’s own arsenal comes with him.
We will return to conditionals in the next chapter when some addi-
tional complications become necessary.
2.3 Modals
The final empirical addition of this chapter are modal auxiliaries like may,
must, can, have to, etc. Most of what we say here should carry over straight-
forwardly to modal adverbs like maybe, possibly, certainly, etc. We will
make certain syntactic assumptions, which make our work easier but
which leave aside many questions that at some point deserve to be ad-
dressed.
Actually, we will be working here with the even simpler structure be-
low, in which the subject has been reconstructed to its lowest trace posi-
tion. (E.g., these could be generated by deleting all but the lowest copy in
the movement chain.) We will be able to prove that movement of a name We will talk about reconstruction in more
or pronoun never affects truth-conditions, so at any rate the interpreta- detail later.
tion of the structure in (13b) would be the same as that of (14). As a mat-
ter of convenience, then, we will take the reconstructed structures, which We will assume that even though Ann be
allow us to abstract away from the (here irrelevant) mechanics of variable smart is a non-finite sentence, this will
not have any effect on its semantic type,
binding.
which is that of a sentence, which in turn
(14) may [ Ann be smart ] means that its semantic value is a truth-
value. This is hopefully independent of
So, for now at least, we are assuming that modals are expressions that the (interesting) fact that Ann be smart on
its own cannot be used to make a truth-
take a full sentence as their semantic argument. Now then, what do modals
evaluable assertion.
mean?
A necessity modal like must says that all worlds make its prejacent true, Sometimes, people call necessity modals
while a possibility modal like may says that some worlds make its preja- “universal modals” and possibility modals
“existential modals”, which obviously
cent true. Note that our previous intensional operators were all universal
presupposes this quantificational analysis.
30 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
Given that stay and leave are each other’s negations (i.e. ⟦leave⟧𝑤,𝑔 = In logicians’ jargon, must and may behave
𝑤,𝑔 𝑤,𝑔 𝑤,𝑔
⟦not stay⟧ , and ⟦stay⟧ = ⟦not leave⟧ ), the LF-structures of these as DUALS of each other. For definitions of
“dual”, see Barwise & Cooper 1981: p. 197
equivalent pairs of sentences can be seen to instantiate the following schemata:
or Gamut 1991: vol.2, 238.
AT T I T U D E S , C O N D I T I O N A L S , M O D A L S 31
Our present analysis of must, have-to, … as universal quantifiers and of More linguistic data regarding the “paral-
may, can, … as existential quantifiers straightforwardly predicts all of the lel logic” of modals and quantifiers can be
found in Horn’s dissertation (Horn 1972).
above judgments, as you can easily prove.
there is no occurrence of 𝑤 on the right hand side. This means that the Conversely, the plenitude of possible
truth-conditions for may-sentences are world-independent. In other words, worlds would make must-claims very
likely false if they are not reigned in or
they make non-contingent claims that are either true whatever or false
anchored somehow.
whatever, and because of the plenitude of possible worlds they are more
likely to be true than false. This needs to be fixed. But how?
Well, what makes it may be snowing in Cambridge seem true when we
know about a Nor’Easter over New England? What makes it seem false
when we know that it is summer in New England? The idea is that we
only consider possible worlds COMPATIBLE WITH THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE
TO US. And since what evidence is available to us differs from world to
world, so will the truth of a may-statement.
(27) ⟦may⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑝. ∃𝑤 ′ compatible w/ the evidence in 𝑤 : 𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1. From now on, we will leave off type-
specifications such as that 𝑝 has to be of
(28) ⟦must⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑝. ∀𝑤 ′ compatible w/ the evidence in 𝑤 : 𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1. type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡 ⟩, whenever it is obvious what
they should be and when saving space is
aesthetically called for.
32 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
Imagine this sentence being said based on the house rules of the particu-
lar dormitory you live in. Again, this is a sentence that could be true or
could be false. Why do we feel that this is a contingent assertion? Well,
the house rules can be different from one world to the next, and so we
might be unsure or mistaken about what they are. In one possible world,
they say that all noise must stop at 11pm, in another world they say that
all noise must stop at 10pm. Suppose we know that it is 10:30 now, and
that the dorm we are in has either one or the other of these two rules, but
we have forgotten which. Then, for all we know, you have to be quiet may
be true or it may be false. This suggests a lexical entry along these lines:
(30) ⟦have-to⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑝. ∀𝑤 ′ compatible with the rules in 𝑤 : 𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1.
Again, we are tying the modal statement about other worlds down to
certain worlds that stand in a certain relation to the actual world: those
worlds where the rules as they are here are obeyed.
A note of caution: it is very important to realize that the worlds com-
patible with the rules as they are in 𝑤 are those worlds where nothing
happens that violates any of the 𝑤-rules. This is not at all the same as
saying that the worlds compatible with the rules in 𝑤 are those worlds
where the same rules are in force. Usually, the rules do not care what the
rules are, unless the rules contain some kind of meta-statement to the ef-
fect that the rules have to be the way they are, i.e. that the rules cannot
be changed. So, in fact, a world 𝑤 ′ in which nothing happens that vio-
lates the rules as they are in 𝑤 but where the rules are quite different and
in fact what happens violates the rules as they are in 𝑤 ′ is nevertheless
a world compatible with the rules in 𝑤. For example, imagine that the
only relevant rule in 𝑤 is that students go to bed before midnight. Take
a world 𝑤 ′ where a particular student goes to bed at 11:30 pm but where
the rules are different and say that students have to go to bed before 11
pm. Such a world 𝑤 ′ is compatible with the rules in 𝑤 (but of course not
with the rules in 𝑤 ′ ).
Apparently, there are different flavors of modality, varying in what
kind of facts in the evaluation world they are sensitive to. The semantics
we gave for must and may above makes them talk about evidence, while
the semantics we gave for have-to made it talk about rules. But that was
just because the examples were hand-picked. In fact, in the dorm scenario
we could just as well have said You must be quiet. And, vice versa, there is
nothing wrong with using it has to be snowing in Cambridge based on the
evidence we have. In fact, many modal expressions seem to be multiply
ambiguous. The English modal have to is probably the world champion in
this regard:
AT T I T U D E S , C O N D I T I O N A L S , M O D A L S 33
Traditional descriptions of modals often distinguish a number of “read- Beyond “epistemic” and “deontic,” there is
ings”: EPISTEMIC, DEONTIC, ABILITY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL, DYNAMIC, …. Here a great deal of terminological exuberance.
Sometimes all non-epistemic readings are
are some initial illustrations.
grouped together under the term ROOT
(32) EPISTEMIC MODALITY MODALITY (nobody knows why).
A: Where is John?
B: I don’t know. He may be at home.
How are may and can interpreted in each of these examples? What do
the interpretations have in common, and where do they differ?
In all three examples, the modal makes an existentially quantified claim
about possible worlds. This is usually called the MODAL FORCE of the claim.
What differs is what worlds are quantified over, sometimes called the
MODAL FLAVOR. In EPISTEMIC modal sentences, we quantify over worlds
compatible with the available evidence. In DEONTIC modal sentences, we
quantify over worlds compatible with the rules and/or regulations. And in
the CIRCUMSTANTIAL modal sentence, we quantify over the set of worlds
which conform to the laws of nature (in particular, plant biology). What
speaker B in (34) is saying, then, is that there are some worlds conforming
to the laws of nature in which this rhododendron grows very tall.
b. ⟦may⟧𝑤,𝑔 =
𝜆𝑓 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩ . 𝜆𝑞 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,𝑡 ⟩ . ∃𝑤 ′ ∈ 𝑊 [𝑓 (𝑤)(𝑤 ′ ) = 1 & 𝑞(𝑤 ′ ) = 1] in set talk: 𝑓 (𝑤 ) ∩ 𝑞 ≠ ∅
Exercise 2.7 Let 𝑤 be a world, and assume that the context supplies an assign-
ment 𝑔 such that:
(40) 𝑔(𝑓 ⟨ 17,⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩⟩ ) = 𝜆𝑤 . 𝜆𝑤 ′ . the rules in force in 𝑤 are obeyed in 𝑤 ′ .
might mean: ‘I want you to be quiet,’ (i.e., you are quiet in all those worlds
that conform to my preferences). Or she might mean: ‘unless you are
quiet, you won’t succeed in what you are trying to do,’ (i.e., you are quiet
in all those worlds in which you succeed at your current task). Or she
might mean: ‘the house rules of this dormitory here demand that you
be quiet,’ (i.e., you are quiet in all those worlds in which the house rules
aren’t violated). And so on. So the label “deontic” appears to cover a whole Proponents of polysemy accounts of the
open-ended set of imaginable “readings”, and which one is intended and variety of modal flavors will presumably
have to tackle the apparent limitlessness
understood on a particular utterance occasion may depend on all sorts of
of variation in some principle way. See
things in the interlocutors’ previous conversation and tacit shared assump- Viebahn & Vetter 2016 for a polysemy
tions. (And the same goes for the other traditional labels.) account.
A disappointing feature of our analysis in (39) is that a lot of the work
is being done by the modals: they don’t just take a restriction as their ar-
gument but they have to enforce that this restriction is evaluated in the
evaluation world. This is a departure from the ideal that modals are simply
quantifiers over possible worlds. It would be preferable to merely present
them with a set of worlds to quantify over rather than giving them the
responsibility of obtaining this set by applying an accessibility relation to
the evaluation world. We will later put in place a different framework (for
unrelated reasons) that will make good on this vision.
Exercise 2.9 In analogy to the deontic relation 𝑔(𝑓 ⟨ 17,⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩⟩ ) defined in (40),
define an appropriate relation that yields an epistemic reading for a sentence like
You may be quiet. □
Exercise 2.10 Describe the set of worlds that constitutes the understood restric-
tor of have to in each of the examples in (31). □
Exercise 2.11 Describe values for the covert ⟨𝑠, 𝑠𝑡⟩-variable that are intuitively
suitable for the interpretation of the modals in the following sentences:
(43) As far as John’s preferences are concerned, you may stay with us.
AT T I T U D E S , C O N D I T I O N A L S , M O D A L S 37
(44) According to the guidelines of the graduate school, every PhD candidate
must take 9 credit hours outside his/her department.
R = {⟨𝑥, 𝑦⟩ : 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 & 𝑦 ∈ 𝐵}
𝑓 R = 𝜆𝑥 : 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴. (𝜆𝑦 : 𝑦 ∈ 𝐵. ⟨𝑥, 𝑦⟩ ∈ R)
from 𝑤. And since all worlds accessible from 𝑤 are 𝑝 worlds, 𝑤 ′′ must be
a 𝑝 world, in contradiction to (ii). So, as soon as we assume transitivity,
there is no way for the inference not to go through.
Now, do any of the attitudes have the transitivity property? It seems
rather obvious that as soon as you believe something, you thereby be-
lieve that you believe it (and so it seems that belief involves a transitive
accessibility relation). And in fact, as soon as you believe something, you
believe that you know it. But one might shy away from saying that know-
ing something automatically amounts to knowing that you know it. For
example, many are attracted to the idea that to know something requires
that (i) that it is true, (ii) that you believe it, and (iii) that you are justi-
fied in believing it: the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. So, now
couldn’t it be that you know something, and thus (?) that you believe you
know it, and thus that you believe that you are justified in believing it,
but that you are not justified in believing that you are justified in believing
it? After all, one’s source of knowledge, one’s reliable means of acquiring
knowledge, might be a mechanism that one has no insight into. So, while
one can implicitly trust (believe) in its reliability, and while it is in fact re-
liable, one might not have any means to have trustworthy beliefs about it.
[Further worries about the KK Thesis are discussed in Williamson 2000.]
What would the consequences be if the accessibility relation were SYM- In modal logic notation, (52) looks as
METRIC? Symmetry of the accessibility relation R corresponds to the va- follows: 𝑝 → □^𝑝, known simply as B
in modal logic. The system that combines
lidity of the following principle:
T/M with B is often called Brouwer’s
(52) Brouwer’s Axiom [: System (B), after the mathematician L.E.J.
[ ]] Brouwer, not because he proposed it but
∀𝑝∀𝑤 : 𝑤 ∈ 𝑝 → ∀𝑤 ′ 𝑤 R𝑤 ′ → ∃𝑤 ′′ [𝑤 ′ R𝑤 ′′ & 𝑤 ′′ ∈ 𝑝] because it was thought that it had some
connections to his doctrines. Brouwer got
Here’s the reasoning: Assume that 𝑅 is in fact symmetric. Pick a world his own commemorative stamp from the
𝑤 in which 𝑝 is true. Now, could it be that the right hand side of the in- Netherlands:
ference fails to hold in 𝑤? Assume that it does fail. Then, there must be
some world 𝑤 ′ accessible from 𝑤 in which ^𝑝 is false. In other words,
from that world 𝑤 ′ there is no accessible world 𝑤 ′′ in which 𝑝 is true. But
since 𝑅 is assumed to be symmetric, one of the worlds accessible from 𝑤 ′
is 𝑤 and in 𝑤, 𝑝 is true, which contradicts the assumption that the infer-
ence doesn’t go through. So, symmetry ensures the validity of the infer-
ence.
The other way (validity of the inference requires symmetry): the in-
ference says that from any 𝑝-world (“𝑝-world” is a very common way of not p
saying “world of which 𝑝 is true”), we can only access worlds from which,
in turn, there is at least one accessible 𝑝-world. But imagine that 𝑝 is true w2 w3
in 𝑤 but not true in any other world. So, the only way for the conclusion
of the inference to hold automatically is to have a guarantee that 𝑤 (the
only 𝑝-world) is accessible from any world accessible from it. That is, we
need to have symmetry. QED. p
w1
AT T I T U D E S , C O N D I T I O N A L S , M O D A L S 41
If one doesn’t know that 𝑝, then one knows that one doesn’t know
that 𝑝. (¬□𝑝 → □¬□𝑝).
This surely seems rather dubious: imagine that one strongly believes
that 𝑝 but that nevertheless 𝑝 is false, then one doesn’t know that 𝑝, but
one doesn’t seem to believe that one doesn’t know that 𝑝, in fact one be-
lieves that one does know that 𝑝.
42 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
From any consistent set of propositions, we can retrieve the set of worlds
characterized by it: those worlds such that each proposition in the set is
true in them. If we think of propositions as sets of worlds, this corresponds
to the grand intersection of the set of propositions:
(55) For any consistent set of propositions P,
∩
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟 (P) = {𝑤 : ∀𝑝 ∈ P : 𝑝 (𝑤) = 1} = (P)
The semantics of the modal must, for example, can now be rewritten:
∩
(56) ⟦must⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆M ⟨𝑠,⟨⟨𝑠𝑡,𝑡 ⟩⟩⟩ . 𝜆𝑝. (M (𝑤)) ⊆ 𝑝
Exercise 2.14 Imagine that we model individual 𝑥’s belief state with a set of “B S” stands for “belief state”.
propositions BS𝑥 . Now, when 𝑥 forms a new opinion, we could model this by
adding a new proposition 𝑝 to BS𝑥 . So, BS𝑥 now contains one further element.
There are now more opinions. What happens to the set of worlds compatible with
𝑥’s beliefs? Does it get bigger or smaller? Is the new set a subset or superset of the
previous set of compatible worlds? □
Exercise 2.17 [For the intrepid only!] The definition in (57) specifies, in effect,
a function from 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,⟨𝑠𝑡,𝑡 ⟩⟩ to 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩ . It maps each function M of type ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩
to a unique function 𝑓 M of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑠𝑡⟩. This mapping is not one-to-one, how-
ever. Different elements of 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,⟨𝑠𝑡,𝑡 ⟩⟩ may be mapped to the same value in 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩ .
Prove this claim. I.e., give an example of two functions M and M ′ in 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,⟨𝑠𝑡,𝑡 ⟩⟩
for which (57) determines 𝑓 M = 𝑓 M ′ .
As you have just proved, if every function of type ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩ qualifies as a
‘conversational background’, then two different conversational backgrounds can
collapse into the same accessibility relation. Conceivably, however, if we imposed
further restrictions on conversational backgrounds (i.e., conditions by which only a
proper subset of the functions in 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,⟨𝑠𝑡,𝑡 ⟩⟩ would qualify as conversational back-
grounds), then the mapping between conversational backgrounds and accessibility
relations might become one-to-one after all. In this light, consider the following
potential restriction:
(59) Every conversational background M must be “closed under entailment”;
i.e., it must meet this condition:
∀𝑤 .∀𝑝 [∩M (𝑤) ⊆ 𝑝 → 𝑝 ∈ M (𝑤)].
(In words: if the propositions in M (𝑤) taken together entail 𝑝, then 𝑝
must itself be in M (𝑤).)
Show that this restriction would ensure that the mapping defined in (57) will be
one-to-one. □
Further readings
We have just put in place some of the basics of the analysis of attitudes,
conditionals, and modals. Much of the work in this area will become ac-
cessible to you after the following chapter. For now, we recommend just a
few further readings.
Swanson 2011 is a recent survey on attitudes.
Further connections between mathematical properties of accessibility
relations and logical properties of various notions of necessity and possi-
bility are studied extensively in modal logic, see Hughes & Cresswell 1996
and Garson 2018, especially section 7 and 8, “Modal Axioms and Condi-
tions on Frames”, “Map of the Relationships between Modal Logics”. An We encourage you to visit the ad-
open access textbook on modal logic is Zach 2019. mirable Open Logic Project (https:
//openlogicproject.org/), that the Zach
A thorough discussion of the possible worlds theory of attitudes, and
2019 textbook is part of.
some of its potential shortcomings, can be found in Bob Stalnaker’s work
(1984, 1999).
Two introductory readings on conditionals are von Fintel 2011, 2012.
AT T I T U D E S , C O N D I T I O N A L S , M O D A L S 45
The most important background readings on modals are the two pa-
pers Kratzer 1981, 1991. There are updated versions of Kratzer’s classic
papers in her volume “Modals and conditionals” (Kratzer 2012). A major
resource on modality is Paul Portner’s book: Portner 2009. You might
also profit from some survey-ish type papers on modals and modality: von
Fintel 2005, von Fintel & Gillies 2007, Swanson 2008, Hacquard 2009a.
3 Restricting and ordering
We have a basic theory of conditionals in place as well as a basic theory Thus continues our “chemistry” exper-
of modals. Both are treated as intensional operators that move us from iments, combining expressions we have
an initial theory about and seeing what
the initial evaluation world to another set of worlds: in the case of con-
happens when they are put in contact.
ditionals, those worlds where the antecedent is true that are otherwise
relevantly like the evaluation world; in the case of modals, to whatever
worlds the contextually supplied accessibility relation assigns to the evalu-
ation world. This means that if a sentence contains both a conditional and
a modal, we expect them to work together to express nested intensional
shifting.
bike — and then we say that in those worlds Iris went to the beach by
bike.
Or consider our friend Howard again:
(2) If Howard has to pay a heavy fine, he will be broke.
Note that by itself, being under the obligation to pay a fine doesn’t auto- In our system, this could be captured
matically mean that one does. So, (2) indirectly signals that if Howard has by saying that the context supplies an 𝑓
that assigns to the evaluation world only
to pay a heavy fine, he will comply and thus he will be broke.
worlds where Howard does what he is
One thing that lots of people think is not straightforwardly possible is obligated to, at least in as much as paying
epistemic modals in conditionals antecedent. Papafragou 2006, for exam- fines is concerned.
ple, finds the following examples problematic:
(3) a. ?If Max must be lonely, his wife will be worried.
b. ?If Max may be lonely, his wife will be worried.
One possible explanation is that conditionals signal that the antecedent What exactly we might mean by “iffy”
is “iffy”. An epistemic modal statement can only be “iffy” if the speaker and how exactly conditionals signal iffiness
is an interesting question. Any ideas?
is not certain about what “the evidence” is. That can only be if “the ev-
idence” is not the evidence that the speaker has full access to. Relevant
examples include the “cancer scenarios” of DeRose 1991 and the “Master-
mind” cases of von Fintel & Gillies 2007, 2011:
(4) a. If John might have cancer [the doctors haven’t told us], he will
have to see an expert in Boston.
b. If there have to be two reds, your next move is obvious.
We will see, however, that there are significant challenges for composi-
tional semantics hiding here. We begin with the interaction of epistemic
modals and conditionals.
RE STRICTI NG AND ORDERI NG 49
since there are worlds compatible with their evidence where they are in
Maynard.
It’s true when they say:
(7) If we’re on Route 62, we’re in Hudson.
because of the three towns that they know they might be in, only Hudson
is on Rte 62.
Our semantics for conditionals has the conditional take us to worlds
that are (i) in 𝑓 (𝑤), here in the set of worlds compatible with their evi-
dence and (ii) are antecedent worlds. Among the worlds compatible with
their evidence, all 𝑝-worlds (worlds where they are in Rte 62) are worlds
where they are in Hudson.
So far so good. But here are some problematic cases (with the intuitive
truth-value judgments in the given scenario):
(8) a. If we’re on Route 117, we might be in Stow. True
b. If we’re on Route 117, we might be in Hudson. False
c. If we’re on Route 62, we must be in Hudson. True
they are in Hudson? Yes. Therefore, we predict that (8b) is true, again
contrary to fact.
Finally, while we do predict that (8a) is true, the reason is simply that
because of their ignorance, any world compatible with their evidence is a
world where any of the relevant might-claims is true. So, the conditional
antecedent is predicted to make no difference to the truth of the epistemic
possibility claim in its consequent, contrary to fact (our intuitions are dif-
ferent for (8a) vs. (8b)).
Before we turn to one of the dominant ways of accounting for the
meanings of the examples in (8), let’s consider a tempting idea about (8c):
what if the epistemic necessity modal must actually scopes over the condi-
tional, even though it appears in its consequent? At first glance, the result-
ing meaning is not far off the target. The claim would be that in all the
epistemically accessible worlds the conditional (7) if we’re on Rte 62, we’re
in Hudson is true. We already saw that that conditional is true in the actual
world, and there’s no reason to say that it isn’t true in other epistemically
accessible worlds. So far, so good.
Unfortunately, there are several reasons for doubting that this LF with
wide-scope for the modal is a convincing solution to our troubles:
This signals that the speaker inferred the truth of it is raining indi-
rectly on the basis of other evidence. The signal is still perceptible
when the prejacent is a generalization or conditional:
(10) a. Elephants must dislike bees.
b. George must have to be home by midnight.
c. It must be that if they’re on Rte 62, they are in Clinton.
But (8c) is not felt to have such a signal, other than that the an-
tecedent would be an additional piece of information in the deduc-
tion that they’re in Hudson.
3. We also need to be able to analyze epistemic conditionals with two
modals in a conjunctive consequent (examples like this are discussed
in Gillies 2010):
RE STRICTI NG AND ORDERI NG 51
We supplied the modal with a covert “pronoun” of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑠𝑡⟩ as its first
argument:
(15)
must we be in Hudson
𝑓3,⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩
if
we are on Rte 62
RE STRICTI NG AND ORDERI NG 53
The idea now is that the two restrictive devices work together: we This implementation of the restrictor the-
just feed to the modal the intersection of (i) the set of worlds that are 𝑓3 - ory was considered (and, without much of
an argument, dismissed) in Section 3.2 of
accessible from the actual world, and (ii) the set of worlds where they are
von Fintel 1994 and is also found in lec-
on Route 62. ture notes from 2004 by von Stechow. In
Obviously, we don’t hear if -clauses where they are located in this tree. Section 3.3 of von Fintel 1994, a different
So, on the way to PF, the if -clause must be moved to the periphery. Note approach is developed, which is adopted
(at least for illustration) by Kratzer 2015.
that if -clauses can appear on the left periphery or on the right. The idea is that if -clauses are variable
modifiers, something very like variable
Exercise 3.1 Write an appropriate lexical entry for if to make the structure binders without entirely overwriting the
in (16) interpretable. The idea is that if takes its antecedent proposition and an current variable assignment. Further ref-
erences about the restrictor theory are
accessibility relation and returns a restricted accessibility relation that a world given at the end of this chapter.
stands in (relative to the evaluation world) iff it stands in the original accessibility
relation plus makes the antecedent true. □
Exercise 3.2 Consider the example with two modals in the consequent we gave
earlier:
(11) If we’re on Rte 62, we must be in Hudson and might be very close to the
Horseshoe pub.
ing rise to what are sometimes called “multi-case” conditionals), and (ii) a
covert (epistemic?) necessity operator akin to must (giving rise to ordinary
“one-case” conditionals):
(17) a. If Polly sees a husky, she pets it.
b. If Kim left before 6am, she got there in time.
3.2 Ordering
Our semantics treats modals as quantifiers over worlds. The set of worlds
they quantify over is supplied by context by way of assigning an acces-
sibility function to a covert pronoun, and is optionally subject to being
restricted by an if -clause, as developed just now.
We have distinguished (at least) epistemic and deontic accessibility
functions:
(18) a. The keys must be in the car. epistemic
b. Your guest can’t stay past midnight. deontic
For deontic modals, and perhaps more generally what Portner 2017
calls “priority” expressions, there is a strong argument that there is more
at play.
54 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
According to our analysis, the deontic modal has to here claims that he
pays a $5 fine in all of the worlds compatible with what the relevant rules
(the library regulations, in this case) require. But wait: surely the rules
really require everyone to return their books on time! And so, the worlds
compatible with the rules are all worlds where all books are returned on
time, including Howard’s, and thus nobody pays a fine. How can (19)
actually be true?
It’s clear that (19) is naturally understood in such a way that its truth
depends both on facts about Howard’s actions and facts about the library
regulations. For instance, it will be judged true if (i) Howard did indeed
fail to return his book, and (ii) the regulations mandate a fine in such
cases. It may be false either because the regulations are different or be-
cause Howard did return the book. Our accessibility relation therefore
needs to be more complex, combining facts and regulations.
A second attempt at specifying the accessibility relation might thus go The proposal in (20) suggests that there’s
something like this: a temporal asymmetry here. But this is
not necessarily so. Prakken & Sergot 1996
(20) 𝜆𝑤 . 𝜆𝑤 ′ . [what happened in 𝑤 ′ up to now is the same as what hap- present the case of a set of formal and in-
pened in 𝑤 and 𝑤 ′ conforms to what the rules in 𝑤 demands]. formal regulations governing the appear-
ance and use of holiday cottages, which
The problem with (20) is that, unless there were no infractions of the say that there are not to be any fences
but that if there are fences, they must be
rules at all in 𝑤 up to now, no world 𝑤 ′ will be accessible from 𝑤. There-
white. In such a case, one could say: This
fore, (19) is predicted to follow logically from the premise that Howard fence should be white, expressing the kind of
broke some rule. This does not represent our intuition about its truth complex flavor we are dealing with.
conditions.
A better definition of the appropriate accessibility relation has to be
even more complicated:
(21) 𝜆𝑤 . 𝜆𝑤 ′ . [what happened in 𝑤 ′ up to now is the same as what hap-
pened in 𝑤 and 𝑤 ′ conforms at least as well to what the rules in 𝑤
demands as does any other world in which what happened up to
now is the same as in 𝑤].
(21) makes explicit that there is an important difference between the ways
in which facts about Howard’s actions on the one hand, and facts about
the rules on the other, enter into the truth conditions of sentences like
(19). Worlds in which Howard didn’t do what he did are simply excluded
from the domain of the modal here. Worlds in which the rules aren’t
obeyed are not absolutely excluded. Rather, we restrict the domain to
those worlds in which the rules are obeyed as well as they can be, consid-
ering what has happened. We exclude only those worlds in which there
RE STRICTI NG AND ORDERI NG 55
are infractions above and beyond those that are shared by all the worlds in
which Howard has done what he has done. The analysis of (19) thus cru-
cially involves the notion of an ordering of worlds: here they are ordered
according to how well they conform to what the rules in 𝑤 demand.
The diagnosis then is that the modal here is not a pure deontic modal.
Rather, its flavor is complex. We take for granted the fact that Howard
did not return his book on time. Consider then just those worlds where
Howard did not return the book. None of those worlds are fully compati-
ble with the rules. But among those worlds, the ones where he pays a fine
satisfy the rules as best as possible. So, the flavor of the modal combines
some actual world circumstances (the book was not returned on time) and
what the rules require (late books incur a fine). And the flavor is essentially
complex. Imagine that Howard is a scofflaw who never pays fines. If this
fact were part of the flavor of the modal in (21), then we would expect
the sentence to be false, but intuitively it is true. And as we already saw, a
purely deontic reading would also predict the sentence to be false.
So, the flavor of the modal in (21) is best characterized as the following
mixture: it quantifies over worlds where (i) the same relevant things hap-
pened as in the evaluation world and (ii) apart from that, things develop as
best as possible according to the rules.
This is a very common pattern: intensional operators have complex
flavors that combine a set of circumstances taken for granted and some
way of identifying the best worlds within the set of worlds characterized
by those circumstances.
If we want to stick to our simple semantics, with its flavor function
(from evaluation worlds to sets of worlds quantified over), we have to lo-
cate the complexity in the pragmatics of determining a salient value to the
context-dependent flavor. For (21), the contextual variable assignment
would have to assign to the accessibility function variable a function like
the one in (21).
Kratzer famously proposed a different diagnosis: modals are doubly rel-
Modal base
ative, requiring two separate contextually supplied pieces of information.
In addition to the accessibility relation or MODAL BASE (a function that as-
Flavor
signs a set of accessible worlds to any evaluation world), modals are also
sensitive to an ORDERING of the accessible worlds.
Ordering
since any element is trivially at least as highly ranked as itself. And it would
be TRANSITIVE, since if 𝑥 is at least as highly ranked as 𝑦 and 𝑦 is at least as
highly ranked as 𝑧, then surely 𝑥 is at least as highly ranked as 𝑧.
When a preorder is also ANTI-SYMMETRIC (no distinct elements can
have the same rank), it is called a PARTIAL ORDER. An order is STRICT if
it actually doesn’t allow elements at the same rank, so it is transitive but
asymmetric. An order is TOTAL if it is a COMPLETE relation: any two dis-
tinct elements are related in one way or the other.
An order is WELL-FOUNDED if for any subset of the domain of the rela-
tion, there are elements in the subset that are “optimal”: there is no other
element in the subset that is strictly better by the ordering. Any order on
a finite set is well-founded, but not every order on an infinite set is.
We provide two handy charts, one list of ours and one from Amartya
Sen’s influential book Collective Choice and Social Welfare (Sen 1970).
𝑅 is irreflexive on 𝑆 ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 : ¬𝑅(𝑥, 𝑥)
𝑅 is reflexive on 𝑆 ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑥)
𝑅 is transitive on 𝑆 ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) & 𝑅(𝑦, 𝑧) → 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑧)
𝑅 is symmetric on 𝑆 ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) ↔ 𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥)
𝑅 is antisymmetric on 𝑆 ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) & 𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥) → 𝑥 = 𝑦
𝑅 is asymmetric on 𝑆 ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) → ¬𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥)
𝑅 is complete on 𝑆 ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 → 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) ∨ 𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥)
𝑅 is dense on 𝑆 ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 & 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) →
∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑆 : 𝑧 ≠ 𝑥 & 𝑧 ≠ 𝑦 & 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑧) & 𝑅(𝑧, 𝑦)
𝑅 is well-founded on 𝑆 ∀𝑆 ′ ⊆ 𝑆 ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 ′ :
¬∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑆 ′ : 𝑅(𝑦, 𝑥) & ¬𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦)
As before, the context supplies a flavor function 𝑓 that yields for any world
as set of 𝑓 -accessible worlds. The context now also supplies a function that
for any world yields a well-founded preorder. We will call this function
the ORDERING SOURCE (a term from Kratzer). The semantics of modals
uses the preorder to order the set of accessible worlds and to find the best
accessible worlds. The modal must, as a necessity modal, claims that all of
the best accessible worlds are worlds where its prejacent is true.
Exercise 3.3 Write a doubly-flavored lexical entry for the possibility modal
may. □
Let’s see how the analysis applies to (19): Howard has to pay a fine.
where books are returned late. It further prefers worlds where fines
are paid for late books to worlds where no fines are paid.
• For our simple example then, any world in the modal base where
Howard pays a fine will count as better than an otherwise similar
world where he doesn’t. The very best worlds simpliciter are worlds
where there’s never any late books, but since there aren’t any such
worlds in the modal base, the ordering has to make do with what
it’s given.
• Modals then make quantificational claims about the best worlds in
the modal base (those for which there isn’t a world in the modal
base that is better than them).
• In our case, (19) claims that in the best worlds (among those where
Howard failed to return his book), he pays a fine.
hold in 𝑤 ′′ also hold in 𝑤 ′ but some hold in 𝑤 ′ that do not also hold
in 𝑤 ′′ .
And of course, once we have such a strict partial order and we assume
well-foundedness, as before, we can define the selection function that
gives us the set of < P -best worlds from any set 𝑋 of worlds:
RE STRICTI NG AND ORDERI NG 59
Exercise 3.4 Give an LF for the sentence Ashlyn must leave that will work
with the entry for must in (26). □
A two-factor analysis of (27) might look like this: In von Fintel & Iatridou 2008, a three-
factor analysis is proposed, distinguishing
• The modal base is circumstantial. It assigns to the evaluation world technically between the primary goal
a set of propositions describing the relevant circumstances. Imagine and a secondary ordering source. There’s
further discussion in work by Rubinstein
that for our world, the following facts are relevant: (i) you are in
(2012, 2014).
Kendall Square, (ii) you can get to Harvard Square on the Red Line,
by taxi or Lyft, or on foot, (iii) the Red Line costs $1.25, takes 10
minutes, and is safe, (iv) the taxi/Lyft costs $10, is fast, and is safe, (v)
walking is free, slow, and possibly unsafe this time of the night.
• The ordering source describes your goals (often called a teleological
ordering source). Your relevant goals in our world are: (i) you get
to Harvard Square, (ii) you pay less than $2, (iii) you are safe.
• What are the best worlds in the modal base according to the given
ordering source? The worlds where you take the Red Line.
• That’s why it seems true to say (27).
In terms of the two-factor analysis, the idea here is that the accessibility Heim herself gives a dynamic semantics
relation is “doxastic”: the modal base contains the worlds compatible with analysis for attitudes that incorporates
these insights. In later work, von Fin-
the agent’s beliefs. In the case at hand, all worlds in that modal base have
tel 1999 gives a static version of a two-
her teach. The ordering is based on her preferences: among the worlds factor analysis that is closely modeled after
in the modal base, she prefers the ones where she teaches Tuesdays and Kratzer’s analysis of modals. See also Ru-
Thursdays. binstein 2017 for a recent discussion.
true. But this can now be fixed. For example, we could say that ought 𝑝
is semantically defective if 𝑝 is true throughout the worlds in the modal
base. This could be a presupposition or some other ingredient of mean-
ing. So, with respect to a modal base which pre-determines that someone
was robbed, one couldn’t felicitously say (31).
Consequently, saying (31) would only be felicitous if a different modal
base is intended, one that contains both 𝑝 and non-𝑝 worlds. And given
a choice between worlds where someone was robbed and worlds where
nobody was robbed, most deontic ordering sources would probably choose
the no-robbery worlds, which would make (31) false, as desired.
Historically, the use of an ordering of possible worlds in the semantics of Even though Lewis’ work appeared five
intensional operatores was first proposed by Stalnaker and Lewis in their years after Stalnaker’s, it was indepen-
dently developed. See Arvan 2015 and
work on conditionals (Stalnaker 1968, Lewis 1973). In our attempt at an
Fn.29 in Starr 2019 for further details
analysis for conditionals in Section 2.2, we used a one-factor approach about the intellectual history of these
where conditionals quantify over all contextually accessible antecedent ideas.
worlds. Stalnaker and Lewis argue that the logic of conditionals, primarily
counterfactuals, reveals the effects of an ordering. Consider the case of a The match makes an early appearance in
perfectly normal match in front of us and the following two counterfac- Goodman 1947.
tual conditionals:
(32) a. If I had struck this match, it would have lit.
b. If I had dipped this match in water and struck it, it would have
lit.
Intuitively, it is clear that (32a) may well be true while (32b) is almost cer-
tainly false. But according to our previous analysis, which is a version of
what in the trade is called a “strict conditional” analysis, this cannot be. If
all of the accessible worlds where I strike this match are worlds where it
lights, then this must a fortiori also be true of that subset of the accessible
worlds where I strike this match after having dipped it in water.
In the Stalnaker-Lewis ordering semantics, (32b) doesn’t anymore fol-
low from (32a). The most highly ranked worlds where I strike the match
might well be worlds where I don’t dip it in water first, and so (32a) could
be true while (32b) is false.
Within this book’s framework, we would replace the meaning for if
from (10) in Section 2.2 with the following two-factor meaning:
(33) ⟦if⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑓𝑠,𝑠𝑡 .𝜆𝑜𝑠,𝑠𝑡𝑡 .𝜆𝑝𝑠𝑡 .𝜆𝑞𝑠𝑡 . ∀𝑤 ′ ∈ O𝑜 (𝑤 ) (𝑓 (𝑤) ∩ 𝑝) : 𝑞(𝑤 ′ ) = 1.
The crucial move here is that the antecedent proposition 𝑝 is used to find
the 𝑝-worlds that are among the 𝑓 -accessible worlds. The resulting set of
accessible 𝑝-worlds is then ordered and the best accessible worlds 𝑝 are
what the universal quantifier makes a claim about.
62 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
We return to Howard and the saga of the possibly late library book. Imag-
ine that we don’t know whether he returned it late but we’re confident
we understand the library regulations. So, we say:
(34) If Howard returned his book late, he has to pay a fine.
There is one analysis that will not work: the restrictor analysis plus the One might think that instead of starting
pragmatically sophisticated but semantically simple idea that modals are with the worlds that match the evalua-
tion world in whether the book was re-
just sensitive to an accessibility relation even when that relation incor-
turned late, we could start with the worlds
porates considerations of ordering. So, assume that the accessibility rela- compatible with our evidence. Then, we
tion is the one that delivers the best worlds among those that match the would include both worlds where the
evaluation world with respect to whether the book was late or not. Now, book was late and where it wasn’t. But
even among those, the not-late worlds
imagine a scenario where unbekownst to us, Howard actually returned are the best. So, then again, the if -clause
the book on time. It would seem that this would not threaten the intu- could not find any antecedent worlds
itive truth of (34). But according to the analysis under consideration, we among the accessible worlds.
predict something odd: the worlds that match the evaluation world are all
worlds where the book was not late and the best ones among them thus
are also not-late worlds (and of course they are worlds without a fine).
The if -clause would then try to find late worlds in that set of accessible
worlds, but since there are none, we would get an empty set of worlds to
quantify over, resulting either in vacuous truth or some kind of infelicity.
This is not correct.
The two-factor analysis (modal base 𝑓 , ordering 𝑜) can help with the
issue. The idea is that the if -clause does not restrict the 𝑜-best 𝑓 -worlds
but restricts 𝑓 before 𝑜 enters into the picture. In other words, we posit an
LF like this one:
RE STRICTI NG AND ORDERI NG 63
(35)
have to
𝑓3,⟨𝑠,𝑠𝑡 ⟩
if
To evaluate this LF, we can use the entry for if you developed in Exer-
cise 3.1 and the entry for modals in (26). Note that for the if -clause not to
be an idle restrictor, the worlds 𝑓 delivers need to include worlds where
the antecedent is true.
Exercise 3.5 In fact, calculate the truth-conditions for (35) with the ingredients
just mentioned. □
Exercise 3.6 At this point, it would be very instructive to read Kratzer 1991.
In particular, you should study her version of the Samaritan Paradox in her Sec-
tion 3.2 and her solution in her Section 8. □
It appears then that we have found vindication both for the two-factor While Zvolensky’s 2002 SALT paper was
semantics for modals and for the restrictor theory. There’s a problem instrumental in bringing the issue into
the natural language semantics literature,
though, illustrated by Zvolenszky 2002 with the following example:
it had been already identified by Frank
1996 and in fact, it had been well-known
as the “if p, ought p” problem in the more
(36) If Britney Spears drinks Coke in public, then she must drink Coke
logico-philosophical world. See Carr 2014
in public. for references and an important recent
contribution.
An intuitively plausible use case for (36) would be a situation where we
consider the possibility of seeing Spears drinking Coke in public. We As a matter of fact, Spears was paid to
endorse Pepsi.
conclude that if we saw her drinking Coke, we would be able to deduce
that she is somehow contractually obligated to drink Coke.
Unfortunately, our current analysis predicts that (36) should, if any-
thing, be vacuously true rather than making a contingent claim. The
if -clause would restrict whatever accessibility relation we’re using and
ensure that we’re only dealing with worlds where Spears drinks Coke in
public. Then, the ordering would apply to find the best such worlds. Fi-
nally, the modal would say that the best such worlds are worlds where she
drinks Coke in public. That is of course trivially true.
Consider what is needed to make the modal claim (that Spears must
drink Coke in public) non-trivial. The domain of quantification needs to
include worlds where she doesn’t drink Coke (perhaps she drinks Pepsi,
64 THE FI FTH DIMENSION
What values for the four parameter would yield the reading we want? 𝑓1
should give us the worlds compatible with our evidence. 𝑜 1 could be triv-
ial or the kind of not entirely reliable evidence that Kratzer 1991 argues
for. Note that the higher modal will pass down only Coke-worlds. Cru-
cially, 𝑓2 would give us both Coke and non-Coke worlds when applied
to the epistemically accessible worlds passed on by the higer operator. 𝑜 2 ,
finally, would encode Spear’s contractual obligations.
With this, we have rescued the restrictor theory. The existence of such See Geurts 2004 for a discussion of how
nested structures is predicted by the framework and now we see that they this kind of structure is expected.
Now, if this is in fact feasible, why should we then still maintain the
restrictor analysis in the first place? Why not go back to the earlier idea
that if is a modal operator in its own right?
To evaluate this possibility, let’s return once more to our friends who
do not know precisely where they are. Imagine that they have reason to
think that among the two Rte 117 possibilities, Stow is much more likely
than Maynard, perhaps because they know Maynard a bit better and think
that if they were there, they would very likely recognize some build-
ing or other. They have no reason to think that Stow is more likely than
Hudson (which is on Rte 62, remember). So, they say:
(38) If we’re on Route 117, we ought to be in Stow.
Now, to be clear: they are still lost, so their evidence is compatible with
them being on either of the two routes and in any of the three towns.
So, for (38) to have a chance of being true, the modal ought here can’t
simply map the evaluation world to the worlds epistemically accessible
from it (and then potentially order the resulting worlds). We need to nar-
row things down to the Route 117 worlds, even though our friends don’t
know whether they’re there, even if they are. So, as things stand, we still
need the restrictor analysis. And we need the restriction to happen before
the ordering applies. So, for now, (38) provides the strongest argument
we have for both the restrictor theory and the two-factor semantics for
modals.
At this point, we leave this intriguing and complex inquiry and refer
you to the ever-growing literature, some we’ve already mentioned and
more we will list below.
Further readings
more is found in Bhatt & Pancheva 2006. Rothschild 2011 explains the
restrictor theory to philosophers, might be useful as an additional reading.
Gillies 2010 proposes an ingenious alternative to the restrictor theory.
Khoo 2011 files a complaint about the coverage of Gillies’ proposal. The
interaction of conditionals with probability operators is very tricky, see
Egré & Cozic 2011 and von Fintel & Gillies 2015 for some discussion.
Higginbotham 1986 identified the interaction of negative quantifiers
like no student with conditionals as a compositionality puzzle. The restric-
tor theory has sometimes been seen as a solution to the puzzle (von Fintel
1998) and sometimes not (von Fintel & Iatridou 2002). See Dekker 2001,
Higginbotham 2003, Leslie 2009, Huitink 2010, Klinedinst 2011, Kratzer
2015, Lauer & Nadathur 2016 among others.
To understand only if -conditionals, von Fintel 1997 needs to work
hard to neutralize the universal force of bare conditionals stemming from
Kratzer’s implicit necessity modal.
Herburger 2015, 2016, and Bassi & Bar-Lev 2017 consider the possi-
bility that bare conditionals are actually (sometimes or always) existen-
tially quantified.
Attitudes. Linguistic work on attitudes has often been concerned with
various co-occurrence patterns, particularly which moods (indicative or
subjunctive or infinitive) occur in the complement and whether negative
polarity items are licensed in the complement. Mood licensing: Portner
1997. NPI-Licensing: Kadmon & Landman 1993, von Fintel 1999, Gian-
nakidou 1999.
Tamina Stephenson in her MIT dissertation and related work explores
the way attitude predicates interact with epistemic modals and taste predi-
cates in their complements: Stephenson 2007a,b.
Jon Gajewski in his MIT dissertation and subsequent work explores
the distribution of the NEG-RAISING property among attitude predicates
and traces it back to presuppositional components of the meaning of the
predicates: Gajewski 2005, 2007.
Interesting work has also been done on presupposition projection in
attitude contexts: Asher 1987, Heim 1992, Geurts 1998.
Modals. On the syntax of modals, there are only a few papers of un-
even quality: Bhatt 1997, Wurmbrand 1999, Cormack & Smith 2002,
Butler 2003. Follow up on older references from the bibliographies in
these papers. The following paper explores some issues in the LF-syntax
of epistemic modals: von Fintel & Iatridou 2003,
Valentine Hacquard’s MIT dissertation is a rich source of cross-linguistic
issues in modality, as is Fabrice Nauze’s Amsterdam dissertation: Hac-
quard 2006, Nauze 2008.
Some more recent work by Hacquard deals with deriving and corre-
lating modal flavors with syntactic position of the modal auxiliaries: Hac-
quard 2010, Hacquard 2013. A recent handbook article by Hacquard on
RE STRICTI NG AND ORDERI NG 67
Escaping opacity
4 Specificity and Transparency
Imagine that we give the following simplified meaning to want: We know from the previous chapter ex-
actly in what sense this meaning is sim-
(2) ⟦want⟧𝑤,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑝.𝜆𝑥 . ∀𝑤 ′ : 𝑥’s wants in 𝑤 are satisfied in 𝑤 ′ plified: it doesn’t capture the interplay of
→ 𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1. beliefs and preferences.
In other words, 𝑥 wants 𝑝 is true iff 𝑝 is true in all worlds where 𝑥’s wants
are satisfied. Further, assume that the DP a book about soccer is interpreted
within the embedded clause. Then, we claim, (1) will be true iff in all of
the worlds that satisfy all of Emma’s wants, there is a book about soccer
that Taylor buys. (You prove this claim in the following exercise.)
Exercise 4.1 Draw the obvious, if simplified, LF for (1) and calculate its truth-
conditions. □
Now, consider what happens if the object of the lower verb QRs and ad-
joins to the matrix clause:
(3) [a book about soccer] (1 [Emma wanted Taylor to buy 𝑡 1 ])
When you calculate the truth-conditions of (3) [please do so], you will
get a result that is very different from the previous exercise. Now what is
claimed is that there is a book about soccer, call it 𝑥, such that in all of the
worlds satisfying all of Emma’s wants Taylor buys 𝑥.
72 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
Exercise 4.2 Consider the sentence Emma must want Taylor to buy a book
about soccer. One can imagine using this to describe a scenario where we are
seeing Taylor enter a bookstore known to cater to soccer aficionados. For some
reason we won’t go into, we come to the conclusion that there is a specific book
about soccer that Emma must have asked Taylor to buy. But at the same time,
we have no idea what that book might be, so there’s not a specific book about
which we made our deduction. This suggest that we may want to give the object
DP intermediate scope. So, draw an LF that corresponds to this idea and calculate
its truth-conditions. □
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y 73
Here the relevant DP in the complement clause of the verb believe is your
abstract. Again, we detect an ambiguity, which is brought to light by con-
structing different scenarios.
(i) Sari’s belief may be about an abstract that she reviewed, but since
the abstract is anonymous, she doesn’t know who wrote it. She told
me that there was a wonderful abstract about subjacency in Hindi
that is sure to be accepted. I know that it was your abstract and in-
form you of Sari’s opinion by saying (6). This is the specific reading.
In the same situation, the non-specific reading is false: Among Sari’s
belief worlds, there are many worlds in which your abstract will
be accepted is not true or even false. For all she knows, you might
have written, for instance, that terrible abstract about Antecedent-
Contained Deletion, which she also reviewed and is positive will be
rejected.
(ii) For the other scenario, imagine that you are a famous linguist, and
Sari doesn’t have a very high opinion about the fairness of the ab-
stract selection process. She thinks that famous people never get
rejected, however the anonymous reviewers judge their submis-
sions. She believes (correctly or incorrectly — this doesn’t matter
here) that you submitted a (unique) abstract. She has no specific in-
formation or opinion about the abstract’s content and quality, but
given her general beliefs and her knowledge that you are famous,
she nevertheless believes that your abstract will be accepted. This is
the non-specific reading. Here it is true in all of Sari’s belief worlds
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y 75
Exercise 4.3 For the two examples just discussed, we can explain their non-
specific (and opaque) interpretation via LFs where the relevant DP remains inside
the scope of the intensional operator at LF:
(7) Mesut wants [ [ a plumber]1 [ ᴘRᴏ2 to marry t1 ]]
Calculate the interpretations of the four structures in (7) — (10), and determine
their predicted truth-values in each of the (types of) possible worlds that we de-
scribed above in our introduction to the ambiguity.
Some assumptions to make the job easier: (i) Assume that (7) and (9) are
evaluated with respect to a variable assignment that assigns Mesut to the num-
ber 2. This assumption takes the place of a worked out theory of how controlled
PRO is interpreted. (ii) Assume that abstract-by-you is an unanalyzed one-
place predicate. This takes the place of a worked out theory of how genitives with
a non-possessive meaning are to be analyzed. □
What does (12) mean? The appropriate reading for must here is epistemic,
[
so suppose the variable 𝑓 is mapped to the relation 𝜆𝑤 .𝜆𝑤 ′ . 𝑤 ′ is com-
]
patible with the evidence in 𝑤 . Let 𝑤 0 be the utterance world. Then the
truth-condition calculated by our rules is as follows.
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y 77
But this is not the intended meaning. For (13) to be true, there has to be
a person who in every world compatible with the evidence was in my of-
fice. In other words, all the relevant worlds have to have one and the same
person coming to my office. But this is not what you intuitively under-
stood me to be saying about the evidence when I said (11). The context
we described suggests that I do not know (nor have any opinion about)
which person it was that was in my office. For all I know, it might have
been John, or it might have been Mary, or it have been this stranger here,
or that stranger there. In each of the relevant worlds , somebody or other
was in my office, but no one person was there in all of them. I do not
believe of anyone in particular that he or she was there, and you did not
understand me to be saying so when I uttered (11). What you did under-
stand me to be claiming, apparently, was not (13) but (14).
(14) ∀𝑤 ′ [𝑤 ′ is compatible with the evidence in 𝑤 0
→ ∃𝑥 [𝑥 is a person in 𝑤 ′ & 𝑥 was here in 𝑤 ′ ]]
(15) means precisely (14) (assuming that the unfilled Spec-of-IP position
is semantically vacuous), as you can verify by calculating its interpreta-
tion by our rules. So is (15) (one of ) the LF(s) for (11), and what assump-
tion about syntax allow it to be generated? Or are there other — perhaps
less obvious, but easier to generate — candidates for the non-specific LF-
structure of (11)?
Before we get into these question, let’s look at a few more examples.
Each of the following sentences, we claim, has a non-specific reading for
the subject, as given in the accompanying formula. The modal operators
in the examples are of a variety of syntactic types, including modal auxil-
iaries, main verbs, adjectives, and adverbs.
78 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
To bring out the intended non-specific reading of the last example (to
pick just one) imagine this scenario: We are tracking a dangerous virus
infection and have sampled blood from two particular patients. Unfortu-
nately, we were sloppy and the blood samples ended up all mixed up in
one container. The virus count is high enough to make it quite probable
that one of the patients is infected but because of the mix-up we have no
evidence about which one of them it may be. In this scenario, (20) ap-
pears to be true. It would not be true under a specific reading, because
neither one of the two people is infected in every one of the likely worlds.
Excursus. Hopefully the exact analysis of the modal operators likely
and probably is not too crucial for the present discussion, but you may
still be wondering about it. As you see in our formula, we are thinking
of likely (probably) as a kind of epistemic necessity operator, i.e., a uni-
versal quantifier over a set of worlds that is somehow determined by the
speaker’s knowledge. (We are focussing on the “subjective probability”
sense of these words. Perhaps there is also an “objective probability” read-
ing that is circumstantial rather than epistemic.) What is the difference
then between likely and e.g. epistemic must (or necessary or I believe that)?
Intuitively, ‘it is likely that p’ makes a weaker claim than ‘it must be the
case that p’. If both are universal quantifiers, then, it appears that likely is
quantifying over a smaller set than must, i.e., over only a proper subset of
the worlds that are compatible with what I believe. The difference con-
cerns those worlds that I cannot strictly rule out but regard as remote pos-
sibilities. These worlds are included in the domain for must, but not in the
one for likely. For example, if there was a race between John and Mary,
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y 79
and I am willing to bet that Mary won but am not completely sure she
did, then those worlds where John won are remote possibilities for me.
They are included in the domain of must, and so I will not say that Mary
must have won, but they are not in the domain quantified over by likely,
so I do say that Mary is likely to have won.
This is only a very crude approximation, of course. For one thing,
probability is a gradable notion. Some things are more probable than oth-
ers, and where we draw the line between what’s probable and what isn’t is
a vague or context-dependent matter. Some people even believe that must,
necessary etc. arguably don’t really express complete certainty (because in
practice there is hardly anything we are completely certain of ), but rather
just a very high degree of probability. For more discussion of likely, neces-
sary, and other graded modal concepts in a possible worlds semantics, see
e.g. Kratzer 1981, Yalcin 2010, Lassiter 2017.
A different approach may be that likely quantifies over the same set
of worlds as must, but with a weaker, less than universal, quantificational
force. I.e., ‘it is likely that p’ means something like p is true in most of the
worlds conforming to what I know. A prima facie problem with this idea
is that presumably every proposition is true in infinitely many possible
worlds, so how can we make sense of cardinal notions like ‘more’ and
‘most’ here? But perhaps this can be worked out somehow. End of ex-
cursus.
A word of clarification about our empirical claim: We have been con-
centrating on the observation that non-specific readings are available, but
have not addressed the question whether they are the only available read-
ings or coexist with equally possible specific readings. Indeed, some of
the sentences in our list appear to be ambiguous: For example, it seems
that (18) could also be understood to claim that there is a particular New
Yorker who is likely to win (e.g., because he has bribed everybody). Oth-
ers arguably are not ambiguous and can only be read non-specific. This is
what von Fintel & Iatridou (2003) claim about sentences like (16). They
note that if (16) also allowed a specific reading, it should be possible to
make coherent sense of (21).
(21) Everyone in the class may have received an A. But not everybody
did.
In fact, (21) sounds contradictory, which they show is explained if only Some follow up on von Fintel & Iatri-
the non-specific reading is permitted by the grammar. They conjecture dou 2003 can be found in Tancredi 2008,
Swanson 2010
that this is a systematic property of epistemic modal operators (as opposed
to deontic and other types of modalities). Epistemic operators always have
widest scope in their sentence.
So there are really two challenges here for our current theory. We
need to account for the existence of non-specific readings, and also for
the absence, in at least some of our examples, of specific readings. We will
be concerned here exclusively with the first challenge and will set the sec-
80 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
ond aside. We will aim, in effect, to set up the system so that all sentences
of this type are in principle ambiguous, hoping that additional constraints
that we are not investigating here will kick in to exclude the specific read-
ings where they are missing.
To complicate the empirical picture further, there are also examples
where raised subjects are unambiguously specific. Such cases have been
around in the syntactic literature for a while, and they have received re-
newed attention in the work of Lasnik and others. To illustrate just one
of the systematic restrictions, negative quantifiers like nobody seem to per-
mit only surface scope (i.e., wide scope) with respect to a modal verb or
adjective they have raised over.
(22) Nobody from New York is likely to win the lottery.
(22) does not have a non-specific reading parallel to the one for (19) above, For a thorough investigation of low scope
i.e., it cannot mean that it is likely that nobody from NY will win. It can readings of negative DPs, see Iatridou &
Sichel 2011.
only mean that there is nobody from NY who is likely to win. This too is
an issue that we set aside.
In the next couple of sections, all that we are trying to do is find and
justify a mechanism by which the grammar is able to generate both spe-
cific and non-specific readings for subjects that have raised over modal
operators. It is quite conceivable, of course, that the nature of the addi-
tional constraints which often exclude one reading or the other is ulti-
mately relevant to this discussion and that a better understanding of them
may undermine our conclusions. But this is something we must leave for
further research.
As it stands, this structure contains at least one free variable (the trace t 𝑗 )
and can therefore not possibly represent any actual reading of this sen-
tence. May further assumes that traces can in principle be deleted, when
their presence is not required for interpretability. This is not yet quite
enough, though to make (23) interpretable, at least not within our frame-
work of assumptions, for (24) is still not a candidate for an actual reading
of (11).
(24) 𝜆𝑖 [ must 𝑓 [ someone 𝜆 𝑗 [ t𝑖 have been here]]]
We would need to assume further that the topmost binder index could
be deleted along with the unbound trace, and also that the indices i and
j can be the same, so that the raising trace t 𝑗 is bound by the binding-
index created by QR. If these things can be properly worked out some-
how, then this is another way to generate the non-specific reading. No-
tice that the LF is not exactly the same as on the previous two approaches,
since the subject ends up in an adjoined position rather than in its origi-
nal argument position, but this difference is presumably without semantic
import.
What all of these approaches have in common is that they place the
burden of generating the non-specific reading for raised subjects on the
syntactic derivation. Somehow or other, they all wind up with structures
in which the subject is lower than it is on the surface and thereby falls
within the scope of the modal operator. They also have in common that
they take the modal operator (here the auxiliary, in other cases a main
predicate or an adverb) to be staying put. I.e., they assume that the non-
specific readings are not due to the modal operator being covertly higher
than it seems to be, but to the subject being lower. Approaches with these
features will be said to appeal to “syntactic reconstruction” of the subject.
This is a very broad notion of “reconstruction”, where basically any
mechanism which puts a phrase at LF in a location nearer to its under-
lying site than its surface site is called “reconstruction”. In some of the
literature, the term is used more narrowly. For example, May’s downward
QR is sometimes explicitly contrasted with genuine reconstruction, since
it places the quantifier somewhere else than exactly where it has moved
from.
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y 83
Exercise 4.4 Prove the claims we just made in the previous paragraph. Why is
no type for the trace other than ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩ possible? Why is the movement semanti-
cally inert when this type is chosen? How does the correct intended meaning arise
if there is no trace and binder index? □
[Before reading this section, read and do the exercise on p.212/3 in H&K]
84 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
So far in our discussion, we have taken for granted that the LF which
corresponds to the surface structure, viz. (12), gives us the specific read-
ing. This, however, is correct only on the tacit assumption that the trace
of raising is a variable of type e. If it is part of our general theory that all
variables, or at least all interpretable binder indices (hence all bound vari-
ables), in our LFs are of type e, then there is nothing more here to say.
But it is not prima facie obvious that we must or should make this general
assumption, and if we don’t, then the tree in (12) is not really one single
LF, but the common structure for many different ones, which differ in
the type chosen for the trace. Most of the infinitely many semantic types
we might assign to this trace will lead to uninterpretable structures, but
there turns out to be one other choice besides e that works, namely ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡⟩:
(25) somebody 𝜆2,⟨𝑒𝑡,𝑡 ⟩ [ [ must 𝑓 ] [ 𝑡 2,⟨𝑒𝑡,𝑡 ⟩ have-been-here]]
(25) is interpretable in our system, but again, as in the previous approach, That a trace of type ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡 ⟩ does not in
the predicted interpretation is not exactly the non-specific reading as we fact yield the targeted non-specific opaque
reading had not been noticed until we
have been describing it so far, but the non-specific transparent third read-
bothered to calculate the meaning of (25).
ing. For example, Fox 2000, which derives
from a dissertation supervised by us, is un-
Exercise 4.5 Using higher-type traces to “reverse” syntactic scope-relations is a aware of the fact that a high-type but ex-
trick which can be used quite generally. It is useful to look at a non-intensional tensional trace gives a scope-reconstructed
but transparent reading.
example as a first illustration. (26) contains a universal quantifier and a negation,
and it is scopally ambiguous between the readings in (a) and (b).
(26) Everything that glitters is not gold.
a. ∀𝑥 [𝑥 glitters → ¬𝑥 is gold] “surface scope”
b. ¬∀𝑥 [𝑥 glitters → 𝑥 is gold] “inverse scope”
We could derive the inverse scope reading for (26) by generating an LF (e.g. by
some version of syntactic reconstruction”) in which the every-DP is below not.
Interestingly, however, we can also derive this reading if the every-DP is in its
raised position above not but its trace has the type ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, 𝑡⟩.
Spell out this analysis. (I.e., draw the LF and show how the inverse-scope
interpretation is calculated by our semantic rules.) □
Exercise 4.6 Convince yourself that there are no other types for the raising trace
besides e and ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡⟩ that would make the structure in (12) interpretable. (At least
not if we stick exactly to our current composition rules.) □
4. Higher type for trace of raising, variant 2: type ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩
If we want to get exactly the non-specific reading that results from syn-
tactic reconstruction out of a surface-like LF of the form (12), we must
use an even higher type for the raising trace, namely ⟨𝑠, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, 𝑡⟩⟩, the
type of the intension of a quantifier. As you just proved in the exercise,
this is not possible if we stick to exactly the composition rules that we
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y 85
have currently available. The problem is in the VP: the trace in subject
position is of type ⟨𝑠, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, 𝑡⟩⟩ and its sister is of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩. These two
cannot combine by either FA or IFA, but it works if we employ another
variant of functional application.
(27) Extensionalizing Functional Application (EFA) Notice that the problem here is kind of
If 𝛼 is a branching node and {𝛽, 𝛾 } the set of its daughters, then, for the mirror image of the problem that
led to the introduction of “Intensional
any world 𝑤 and assignment 𝑔:
Functional Application” in H&K, ch.
if ⟦𝛽⟧𝑤,𝑔 (𝑤) is a function whose domain contains ⟦𝛾⟧𝑤,𝑔 , 12. There, we had a function looking
then ⟦𝛼⟧𝑤,𝑔 = ⟦𝛽⟧𝑤,𝑔 (𝑤)(⟦𝛾⟧𝑤,𝑔 ). for an argument of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡 ⟩, but the
sister node had an extension of type t.
IFA allowed us to, in effect, construct an
Exercise 4.7 Calculate the truth-conditions of (12) under the assumption that argument with an added “s” in its type.
the trace of the subject quantifier is of type ⟨𝑠, ⟨⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩, 𝑡⟩⟩. □ This time around, we have to get rid of
an “s” rather than adding one; and this is
what EFA accomplishes.
Can we choose between all these options? So we now have three different “func-
tional application”-type rules altogether
Two of the methods we tried derived readings in which the raised sub-
in our system: ordinary FA simply ap-
ject’s quantificational determiner took scope below the world-quantifier in plies ⟦𝛽⟧𝑤 to ⟦𝛾 ⟧𝑤 ; IFA applies ⟦𝛽⟧𝑤 to
′
the modal operator, but the raised subject’s restricting NP still was evalu- 𝜆𝑤 ′ .⟦𝛾 ⟧𝑤 ; and EFA applies ⟦𝛽⟧𝑤 (𝑤 )
𝑤
to ⟦𝛾 ⟧ . At most one of them will be ap-
ated in the utterance world (or the evaluation world for the larger sen-
plicable to each given branching node,
tence, whichever that may be), in other words: a non-specific but trans- depending on the type of ⟦𝛾 ⟧𝑤 .
parent interpretation. It is difficult to assess whether such readings are Think about the situation. Might there
actually available for the particular sentences under consideration, and we be other variant functional application
will postpone this question to the next chapter. We would like to argue rules?
here, however, that even if these readings are available, they cannot be
the only readings that are available for raised subjects besides their wide-
scope readings. In other words, even if we allowed one of the mecha-
nisms that generated these sort of hybrid readings, we would still need
another mechanism that gives us, for at least some examples, the “real”
non-specific opaque readings that we obtain e.g. by syntactic reconstruc-
tion. The relevant examples that show this most clearly involve DPs with
more descriptive content than somebody and whose NPs express clearly
contingent properties.
(28) A neat-freak must have been here.
If I say this instead of our original (11) when I come to my office in the
morning and interpret the clues on my desk, I am saying that every world
compatible with the evidence is such that someone who is a neat-freak
in that world was here in that world. Suppose there is a guy, Bill, whom I
know slightly but not well enough to have an opinion on whether or not
he is neat. He may or not be, for all I know. So there are worlds among
the relevant worlds where he is a neat-freak and worlds where he is not.
I also don’t have an opinion on whether he was or wasn’t the one who
came into my office last night. He did in some of the relevant worlds
and he didn’t in others. I am implying with (28), however, that if Bill
isn’t a neat-freak, then it wasn’t him in my office. I.e., (28) is telling you
86 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
that, even if there are relevant worlds in which Bill is a slob and worlds
in which (only) he was in my office, there aren’t any relevant worlds in
which Bill is a slob and the only person who was in my office. This is cor-
rectly predicted if (28) expresses the “genuine” non-specific reading in
(29), but not if it expresses the “hybrid” reading in (30).
(29) ∀𝑤 ′ [𝑤 ′ is compatible with the evidence in 𝑤 0 →
∃𝑥 [𝑥 is a neatfreak in 𝑤 ′ and 𝑥 was here in 𝑤 ′ ]]
Of course, this might be explained by appropriate constraints on the move- See Lechner 2007 for an early discus-
ment of modal operators, and such constraints may even come for free in sion of semantic effects of head move-
ment. See McCloskey 2016 for a recent
the right syntactic theory. Also, we should have a much more compre-
re-assessment.
hensive investigation of the empirical facts before we reach any verdict.
If it is true, however, that modal operators only engage in scope interac-
tion with DPs and never with each other, then a theory which does not
allow any movement of modals at all could claim the advantage of having
a simple and principled explanation for this fact.
What about the “semantic reconstruction” option, where raised sub-
jects can leave traces of type ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩ and thus get narrow scope seman-
tically without ending up low syntactically? This type of approach has
been explored quite thoroughly and defended with great sophistication.
The main consideration against semantic reconstruction and in favor of
syntactic reconstruction comes from binding theoretic concerns. We give
some crucial examples from Fox 2000 here.
S P E C I F I C I T Y A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y 87
Consider:
(32) a. [A first year student] seems to David t to be at the party.
b. [Someone from NY] is very likely t to win the lottery.
Fox claims that the (b) cases do not have a non-specific reading. If syntac-
tic reconstruction is the mechanism that gives us non-specific readings of
A-moved subjects, the explanation is straightforward.
(36) a. For these issues to be clarified, many new papers about his1 philoso-
phy seem to Quine t to be needed.
b. #For these issues to be clarified, many new papers about Quine’s1
philosophy seem to him t to be needed. □
tion is unavailable. Fox (2000: p. 171, fn. 41) discusses two ways of ruling
out the high type traces that would give rise to semantic reconstruction:
(i) “traces, like pronouns, are always interpreted as variables that range
over individuals (type 𝑒)”,
(ii) “the semantic type of a trace is determined to be the lowest type
compatible with the syntactic environment (as suggested in Beck
1996)”.
We will return to this issue in a later chapter when we can raise it again
in a slightly different framework.
5.1 A Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2 The Standard Solution: Overt World Variables . . . . 91
5.3 The third reading with conditionals and modals . . . 96
5.4 Binding Theory for World Variables . . . . . . . . . 97
5.5 Excursus: Semantic reconstruction revisited . . . . . . 98
5.6 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1 A Problem
Janet Dean Fodor discussed examples like (1) in her dissertation (1970).
(1) Mary wanted to buy a hat just like mine.
Fodor observes that (1) has three readings, which she labels “specific trans-
parent”, “non-specific transparent”, and “non-specific opaque.”
(i) On the “specific transparent” reading, the sentence says that there
is a particular hat which is just like mine such that Mary has a de-
sire to buy it. Say, I am walking along Newbury Street with Mary.
Mary sees a hat in a display window and wants to buy it. She tells
me so. I don’t reveal that I have one just like it. But later I tell you
by uttering (1).
(ii) On the “non-specific opaque” reading, the sentence says that Mary’s
desire was to buy some hat or other which fulfills the description
that it is just like mine. She is a copycat.
(iii) On the “non-specific transparent” reading, finally, the sentence will
be true, e.g., in the following situation: Mary’s desire is to buy some
hat or other, and the only important thing is that it be a Red Sox
cap. Unbeknownst to her, my hat is one of those as well.
In the system we have developed so far, (2) says that in every world 𝑤 ′
in which Mary gets what she wants, there is something that she buys in
𝑤 ′ that’s a hat in 𝑤 ′ and like my hat in 𝑤 ′ . This is Fodor’s “non-specific
opaque” reading. (3), on the other hand, says that there is some thing 𝑥
which is a hat in the actual world and like my hat in the actual world, and
Mary buys 𝑥 in every one of her desire worlds. That is Fodor’s “specific
transparent.” But what about the “non-specific transparent” reading? To
obtain this reading, it seems that we would have to evaluate the predicate
hat just like mine in the actual world, so as to obtain its actual extension (in
the scenario we have sketched, the set of all Red Sox caps). But the exis-
tential quantifier expressed by the indefinite article in the hat-DP should
not take scope over the modal operator want, but below it, so that we can
account for the fact that in different desire-worlds of Mary’s, she buys
possibly different hats.
There is a tension here: one aspect of the truth-conditions of this read-
ing suggests that the DP a hat just like mine should be outside of the scope
of want, but another aspect of these truth-conditions compels us to place it
inside the scope of want. We can’t have it both ways, it would seem, which
is why this has been called a “scope paradox”
Another example of this sort, due to Bäuerle 1983, is (4):
(4) Georg believes that a woman from Stuttgart loves every member of
the Vf B team.
Bäuerle describes the following scenario: Georg has seen a group of men
on the bus. This group happens to be the Vf B team (Stuttgart’s soccer
team), but Georg does not know this. Georg also believes (Bäuerle doesn’t
spell out on what grounds) that there is some woman from Stuttgart who
loves every one of these men. There is no particular woman of whom he
believes that, so there are different such women in his different belief-
worlds. Bäuerle notes that (4) can be understood as true in this scenario.
But there is a problem in finding an appropriate LF that will predict its
truth here. First, since there are different women in different belief-worlds
of Georg’s, the existential quantifier a woman from Stuttgart must be inside
the scope of believe. Second, since (in each belief world) there aren’t dif-
ferent women that love each of the men, but one that loves them all, the
a-DP should take scope over the every-DP. If the every-DP is in the scope
of the a-DP, and the a-DP is in the scope of believe, then it follows that
the every-DP is in the scope of believe. But on the other hand, if we want
to capture the fact that the men in question need not be Vf B-members in
Georg’s belief-worlds, the predicate member of the VfB team needs to be
outside of the scope of believe. Again, we have a “scope paradox”.
THE THI RD READING 91
Before we turn to possible solutions for this problem, let’s have one
more example:
(5) Mary hopes that a friend of mine will win the race.
spell out some of the technicalities. Later, we will consider a couple of al-
ternatives.
We return to the basic system used in Heim & Kratzer up to chapter
11. The interpretation function is relativized only to an assignment func-
tion, not to any other evaluation parameters such as a world, a time, or an
index. The semantic rules are Functional Application, Predicate Abstrac-
tion, and Predicate Modification, in their formulations from the earlier
part of H&K. There is no rule of Intensional Functional Application. The
only ingredient of intensional semantics that we do retain is the expanded
type system and ontology. We have a third basic type besides 𝑒 and 𝑡, the
type 𝑠. 𝐷𝑠 is the set of all indices, for now possible worlds (later: world-
time pairs).
There are a number of innovations in the lexicon and in the syntax.
As for the lexicon, the main change concerns the treatment of predicates
(verbs, nouns, adjectives). They now all get an additional argument, of
type 𝑠. The decision to make the world-argument
the predicate’s first (lowest) argument
(7) a. ⟦smart⟧ = 𝜆𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑠 . 𝜆𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝑒 . 𝑥 is smart in 𝑤 is arbitrary, and nothing hinges on it.
b. ⟦likes⟧ = 𝜆𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑠 . 𝜆𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝑒 . 𝜆𝑦 ∈ 𝐷𝑒 . 𝑦 likes 𝑥 in 𝑤 For all we know, it could be the highest
argument, or somewhere in between.
c. ⟦teacher⟧ = 𝜆𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑠 . 𝜆𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝑒 . 𝑥 is a teacher in 𝑤
d. ⟦friend⟧ = 𝜆𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑠 . 𝜆𝑥 ∈ 𝐷𝑒 . 𝜆𝑦 ∈ 𝐷𝑒 . 𝑦 is 𝑥’s friend in 𝑤
Note that predicates (ordinary ones and modal ones), like the ones in (7)
and (8) now have as their semantic values what used to be their intensions.
There is no change to the entries of proper names, determiners, or
truth-functional connectives; these keep their purely extensional (“s-free”)
types and meanings:
(9) a. ⟦Ann⟧ =Ann
b. ⟦and⟧ = 𝜆𝑢 ∈ 𝐷𝑡 . [𝜆𝑣 ∈ 𝐷𝑡 . 𝑢 = 𝑣 = 1]
c. ⟦the⟧ = 𝜆𝑓 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ : ∃!𝑥 . 𝑓 (𝑥) = 1. the 𝑦 such that 𝑓 (𝑦) = 1.
d. ⟦every⟧ = 𝜆𝑓 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . 𝜆𝑔 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . ∀𝑥 [𝑓 (𝑥) = 1 → 𝑔(𝑥) = 1]
The verb’s type is ⟨𝑠, 𝑒𝑡⟩, so it’s looking for a sister node which denotes a
world. John, which denotes an individual, is not a suitable argument.
We get out of this problem by adding a couple of items to our lexicon,
which are abstract (unpronounced) morphemes. One is a series of pro-
nouns of type 𝑠 (“index pronouns” or, for now, “world pronouns”). In this
chapter, we will write them as 𝑤𝑛 , with a numerical subscript 𝑛, or even
as 𝑤, 𝑤 ′, 𝑤 ′′ . (Later, we sometimes might write them as pro𝑛 and rely on
context to make clear we are not referring to an individual.) Their se-
mantics is what you expect: they get values from the assignment function.
94 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
We will stipulate that a complete (matrix) sentence must not contain In the 2016 edition of this class, Suzana
any free variables of type 𝑠 and must receive a denotation of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩. Fong noted that this stipulation is prima
facie less appealing than the alternative
This means that we need binders of world pronouns. Many proposals
assumption that type-𝑠 pronouns are ex-
in this line of thought help themselves to freely inserted covert binders. actly like type-𝑒 pronoun in every respect,
We will follow H&K in not doing that. Instead we posit one more lexical including the ability to remain free and
item, analogous to the covert vacuous operator PRO of type 𝑒 in H&K get values from a contextually supplied
assignment. Irene tried to sketch some
(pp.227-228): a semantically vacuous operator, OP, which moves and principled reason why it might not be
leaves a trace of type 𝑠. Its syntactic properties are such that it must end possible to refer to a specific world other
up in C or right below a functional head in the “clausal spine” between C than the world one is in. But as Mitya
Privoznov pointed out, a similar idea is not
and V, and it must get there by a very short movement, a kind of “head
plausible for times, given the existence of
movement”. We are leaving this rather vague. temporal deictics like then. So at best there
So, our sentence John leaves contains OP, generated as the first sister of might be a principled reason why the
the verb and then moved to the “top” of the sentence: world-coordinate of a free index-pronoun
would always have to be 𝑤𝑢 . Irene had
(11) OP 1 [ John [ leaves 𝑡 1 ]] to concede therefore that the ban against
free index-pronouns was just a stipulation.
Our system generates the following denotation for (11): “𝜆𝑤𝑠 . John leaves We want to think more about (a) whether
in 𝑤”, a proposition. We rewrite the definition of truth/falsity of an utter- we really need it, and (b) if we do, what
ance as follows: might explain it.
This will denote the correct proposition (true of a world 𝑤 iff the unique
individual who is a teacher in 𝑤 left in 𝑤).
THE THI RD READING 95
Now comes the payoff. Consider what happens when the sentence
contains both a modal operator and a complex DP in its complement.
(15) Mary wants a friend of mine to win.
There are now three predicates that need world arguments. Furthermore,
since want needs a proposition as its second argument (after its world ar-
gument), there needs to be an OP on top of the embedded clause. There
also needs to be an OP on top of the matrix clause. As before, a friend of
mine can stay in the embedded clause or QR into the matrix clause. When
it moves into the matrix clause, the only way to not leave its world argu-
ment free is to co-index it with the matrix OP. But when it stays below,
we can choose to co-index it with either OP, which is how we gener-
ate two non-specific readings, one opaque and one transparent. Here are
the three LFs (to make the structures more readable, we leave off most of
the bracketing and start writing the world arguments as subscripts to the
predicates): So, instead of writing 𝑡 1 for a trace of type
𝑠 that serves as the first argument of leaves,
(16) a. non-specific opaque: say, we write “leaves𝑤1 ”
OP 1 Mary wants𝑤1 [ OP 2 a friend-of-mine𝑤2 leave𝑤2 ]
b. specific transparent:
OP 1 a friend-of-mine𝑤1 3 Mary wants𝑤1 [ OP 2 𝑡 3 leave𝑤2 ]
c. non-specific transparent:
OP 1 Mary wants𝑤1 [ OP 2 a friend-of-mine𝑤1 leave𝑤2 ]
Notice that the third reading is minimally different from the first reading:
all that happened is the choice to co-index the world argument of friend of
mine with the matrix OP.
In this new framework, then, we have a way of resolving the apparent
“scope paradoxes” and of acknowledging Fodor’s point that there are two
separate distinctions to be made when DPs interact with modal operators.
First, there is the scopal relation between the DP and the operator; the
DP may take wider scope (Fodor’s “specific” reading) or narrower scope
(“non-specific” reading) than the operator. Second, there is the choice of
binder for the world-argument of the DP’s restricting predicate; this may
be cobound with the world-argument of the embedded predicate (Fodor
“opaque”) or with the modal operator’s own world-argument (“transpar-
ent”). So the transparent/opaque distinction in the sense of Fodor is not
per se a distinction of scope; but it has a principled connection with scope
in one direction: Unless the DP is within the modal operator’s scope, the
opaque option (= co-binding the world-pronoun with the embedded
predicate’s world-argument) is in principle unavailable. (Hence “specific”
implies “transparent”, and “opaque” implies “non-specific”.) But there is
no implication in the other direction: if the DP has narrow scope w.r.t.
to the modal operator, either the local or the long-distance binding op-
96 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
Exercise 5.2 For DPs with extensions of type 𝑒 (specifically, DPs headed by
the definite article), there is a truth-conditionally manifest transparent/opaque
distinction, but no truth-conditionally detectable specific/non-specific distinction.
In other words, if we construct LFs analogous to (16)[a-c] above for an example
with a definite DP, we can always prove that the first option (wide scope DP)
and the third option (narrow scope DP with distantly bound world-pronoun)
denote identical propositions. In this exercise, you are asked to show this for the
example in (17).
(17) John believes that your abstract will be accepted. □
So, far our examples of the third reading have all been with attitude pred-
icates but the phenomenon can also be observed in conditionals and with
modals. A famous example is due to Abusch 1994:
(18) Things would be different if every senator had grown up to be a
rancher instead.
What makes conditionals different is that the if -clause is a scope island
for quantifiers so that every senator cannot QR scope out of the if -clause
in (18). But the question of whether its predicate, senator, is interpreted in
the matrix evaluation world (“transparent”) or in the worlds that if takes
us to (“opaque”) remains open. Abusch’s example is constructed to heavily
favor the transparent reading.
Percus 2000 provides a clever minimal pair that shows the expected
ambiguity:
(19) a. If every semanticist owned a villa in Tuscany, there would be
no field at all.
b. If I were a syntactician and if every semanticist owned a villa in
Tuscany, I would be quite envious.
These latter examples are from Yalcin 2015, who proceeds to discuss the
very puzzling fact that transparent readings do not seem to be available
in certain “epistemic” contexts, neither with indicative conditionals nor
modals.
THE THI RD READING 97
One could in principle imagine some indexings of our LFs that we have
not considered so far. In a system (unlike ours) where one freely inserts
“𝜆𝑤” operators on top of every clause, one could generate the following
LF, which indexes the predicate of the complement clause to the matrix
𝜆-operator rather than to the one on top of its own clause.
(21) 𝜆𝑤 0 John wants𝑤0 [𝜆𝑤 1 PRO leave𝑤0 ]
But as Percus points out, there is another indexing that might be gen-
erated:
(24) OP 0 Mary thinks𝑤0 [ (that) OP 1 my brother𝑤1 (is) Canadian𝑤0 ]
In (24), we have co-indexed the main predicate of the lower clause with
the matrix 𝜆-operator and co-indexed the nominal predicate brother with
the embedded 𝜆-operator. That is, in comparison with the transparent
reading in (23b), we have just switched around the indices on the two
predicates in the lower clause.
Note that this LF will not lead to a pathological reading. So, is the pre-
dicted reading one that the sentence actually has? No. For the transpar-
98 E S C A P I N G O PAC I T Y
ent reading, we can easily convince ourselves that the sentence does have
that reading. Here is Percus’ scenario: “My brother’s name is Allon. Sup-
pose Mary thinks Allon is not my brother but she also thinks that Allon
is Canadian.” In such a scenario, our sentence can be judged as true, as
predicted if it can have the LF in (23b). But when we try to find evidence
that (24) is a possible LF for our sentence, we fail. Here is Percus:
(i) may be ruled out by the Binding Theory for world pronominals,
when it gets developed.
(ii) may be ruled out by principled considerations as well. Perhaps,
world-abstractors are only allowed at sentential boundaries.
See Larson 2002 for some discussion of recalcitrant cases, one of which
is the object position of so-called intensional transitive verbs, a topic for
another occasion.
Time
6 Beginnings of tense and aspect
Tense logic, or temporal logic, is a branch of logic first developed by the This chapter is even more the outcome of
aptly named Arthur Prior in a series of works, in which he proposed collaborative efforts than other chapters.
We are very much indebted to Roger
treating tense in a way that is formally quite parallel to the treatment of
Schwarzschild, who has used our notes
modality discussed in Chapter 3. Since tense logic (and modal logic) typi- several times in his teaching and is the
cally is formulated at a high level of abstraction regarding the structure of source of many edits and additions.
sentences, it doesn’t concern itself with the internal make-up of “atomic”
sentences and thus treats tenses as sentential operators (again, in parallel
to the way modal operators are typically treated in modal logic). We will
begin by integrating a version of Prior’s tense logic into our framework.
The first step is to switch to a version of our intensional semantic sys- We remain vague for now about what we
tem where instead of a world parameter, the evaluation function is sen- mean by “times” (points in time? time in-
tervals?). This will soon need clarification,
sitive to a parameter that is a pair of a world and a time. Such a pair will
and we will decide that we should mean
also be called an “index”. We use metalanguage variables 𝑖, 𝑖 ′ , … for in- “intervals”.
dices, and write 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 to pick out the world in 𝑖 and the time in 𝑖 re-
spectively (i.e., 𝑖 = ⟨𝑤𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖 ⟩). Predicates will now have lexical entries that
incorporate their sensitivity to both worlds and times:
(1) ⟦tired⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑥 ∈ 𝐷. 𝑥 is tired in 𝑤𝑖 at 𝑡𝑖
The composition principles from Heim & Kratzer and the preced-
ing chapters stay the same, except that type 𝑠 is now the type of indices,
and intensions are functions from indices to extensions. For example, the
intension of sentence is now a function from world-time pairs to truth-
104 T I M E
values. We might call this a “temporal proposition”, to distinguish it from This necessitates a slight rewriting of our
a function from just worlds to truth-values, but we will often just call it a previous entries for modals and attitude
verbs. We will attend to this when we get
“proposition”.
to relevant examples later on.
In this framework, we can formulate a very simple-minded first analy-
sis of the present and past tenses and the future auxiliary will. As for (LF)
syntax let’s assume that complete sentences are TPs, headed by T (for
“tense”). There are two morphemes of the functional category T, namely
PAST (past tense) and PRES (present tense). The complement of T is an MP
or a VP. MP is headed by M (for “modal”). Morphemes of the category
M include the modal auxiliaries must, can, etc., which we talked about in
previous chapters, the semantically vacuous do (in so-called “do-support”
structures), and the future auxiliary will. Evidently, this is a semantically
heterogeneous category, grouped together solely because of their com-
mon syntax (they are all in complementary distribution with each other).
The complement of M is a VP. When the sentence contains none of the
items in the category M, we assume that MP isn’t projected at all; the
complement of T is just a VP in this case. (TP is always projected in a Many subordinate clauses — those we
root clause, whether there is an MP or not.) We thus have LF-structures call “finite” — also always have a TP. As
for embedded clauses more generally
like the following. (The corresponding surface sentences are given below,
(including infinitives etc.), we don’t need
and we won’t be explicit about the derivational relation between these to take a stand here.
and the LFs. Assume your favorite theories of syntax and morphology
here.)
(2) [TP Svenja [T′ PRES [VP t [V′ be tired ]]]]
= Svenja is tired.
(4) [TP Svenja [T′ PRES [MP t [M′ woll [VP t [V′ be tired ]]]]]]
= Svenja will be tired.
woll in (4) stands for the underlying uninflected form of the auxiliary We use “woll” as the name of the root un-
which surfaces as will in the present tense (and as would in the past tense). derlying will and would, following Abusch
1988 and Ogihara 1989: p.32; Abusch
When we have proper name subjects, we will assume for simplicity that
(1997: fn.14, p.22) attributes the coinage
they are reconstructed into their VP-internal base position. of woll to Mats Rooth in class lectures at
What are the meanings of PRES, PAST, and woll? For PRES, the sim- UT Austin.
plest assumption that seems to work is that it is semantically vacuous. This
means that the interpretation of the LF in (2) is identical to the interpreta-
tion of the bare VP Svenja be tired:
(5) For any index 𝑖: ⟦PRES (Svenja be tired)⟧𝑖 = ⟦Svenja be tired⟧𝑖 = 1
iff Svenja is tired in 𝑤𝑖 at 𝑡𝑖 .
So, the past tense seems to be an existential quantifier over times, re-
stricted to times before the utterance time.
For will, we can say something completely analogous: Are there also tenses with universal force ?
Two possible candidates that call for closer
(8) For any index 𝑖: ⟦woll⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑝 ∈ 𝐷 ⟨𝑠,𝑡 ⟩ . ∃𝑡 after 𝑡𝑖 : 𝑝 (⟨𝑤𝑖,, 𝑡⟩) = 1 examination: gnomic tenses (e.g. in An-
cient Greek), and the (universal reading
Apparently, PAST and woll are semantically alike, even mirror images of of the) English perfect (as in I have been
each other, though they are of different syntactic categories. The fact that tired since yesterday morning). Both have
PAST is the topmost head in its sentence, while woll appears below PRES, been written about in the formal seman-
tics literature (the latter extensively — you
is due to the fact that our syntax happens to require a T-node in every
could start with Iatridou, Anagnostopolou
complete sentence. Semantically, this has no effect, since PRES is vacuous. & Izvorski 2001 and von Fintel & Iatridou
Both (7) and (8) presuppose that the set or times comes with an intrin- 2019.
sic order. For concreteness, assume that the relation ‘precedes’ (in sym- Strict linear orders are transitive, irreflex-
bols: <) is a strict linear order on the set of all times. The relation ‘follows’, ive, asymmetric, and connected. See Sec-
of course, can be defined in terms of ‘precedes’ (𝑡 follows 𝑡 ′ iff 𝑡 ′ precedes tion 3.2.2 on the basics of order theory.
Some rethinking is needed once we move
𝑡).
to intervals.
There are two ideas that come to mind. One is that phrases like on Febru-
ary 1, 2001 are restrictors of temporal operators (kind of like if -clauses
are restrictors of modals). The other idea is that they are modifiers of the
106 T I M E
(11) LF: PAST [VP [VP Svenja be tired ] [PP on February 1, 2001 ]]
Exercise 6.1 Imagine that sentence (9) is not given the LF in (11), but this
one, with the PP attached higher:
(12) LF: [T′ ᴘᴀSᴛ [VP Svenja be tired ]] [PP on February 1, 2001]
What would the truth-conditions of this LF be? Does this result correspond at
all to a possible reading of this sentence (or any other analogous sentence)? If not,
how could we prevent such an LF from being produced? □
The truth conditions that we derive given (10) and (11) look good: the
sentence is predicted true as uttered if there is a time which is both before
the utterance time and within Feb 1, 2001 and at which Svenja is tired,
and it is predicted false if there is no such time. But arguably this is not
exactly right. Suppose that somebody uttered this sentence at an utter-
ance time that preceded the date in the adverbial, say at some time in the
year 2000. Our analysis predicts that this utterance is false. But in fact it
feels more like a presupposition failure; the speaker is heard to be taking
for granted that Feb 1, 2001 is in the past of his speaking. Standard pre-
supposition tests confirm this. For example, the negated sentence (Svenja
wasn’t tired on Feb 1, 2001) and the polar question (Was Svenja tired on Feb
1, 2001?) also convey that the speaker assumes he is speaking after Feb 1,
2001.
BEGI NN I NGS OF T ENSE AND ASPECT 107
If we want to account for this more fine-grained intuition, the restric- It also has the virtue of avoiding the
tor approach has an advantage after all. Let’s revise the entries for PAST potential overgeneration issue that you
looked at in the exercise above. Q: How
and woll so that they denote 2-place operators, and moreover they encode
so?
a non-emptiness presupposition.
(13) For any index 𝑖:
⟦PAST⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑝 : ∃𝑡 [𝑡 < 𝑡𝑖 & 𝑝 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑡) = 1].
𝜆𝑞.∃𝑡 [𝑡 < 𝑡𝑖 & 𝑝 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑡) = 1 & 𝑞(𝑤𝑖 , 𝑡) = 1]
Describe the different truth-conditions which our system assigns to the two LFs.
Is the sentence ambiguous in this way? If not this sentence, are there analogous
sentences that do have the ambiguity? □
Exercise 6.3 Our official entry for every makes it a time-insensitive (and
world-insensitive) item:
(21) For any 𝑖, ⟦every⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑓 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ .𝜆𝑔 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . ∀𝑥 : 𝑓 (𝑥) = 1 → 𝑔(𝑥) = 1
Consider now two possible variants (we have boxed the portion where they dif-
fer):
(22) For any 𝑖, ⟦every⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑓 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ .𝜆𝑔 ⟨𝑒,𝑡 ⟩ . ∀𝑥 at 𝑡𝑖 : 𝑓 (𝑥) = 1 → 𝑔(𝑥) = 1
Does either of these alternative entries make sense? If so, what does it say? Is it
equivalent to our official entry? Could it lead to different predictions about the
truth-conditions of English sentences? □
All we learn from (24) is that at some point in the past, whenever it was
that Georgia went to school, she went to a private school.
Partee in her famous paper “Some structural analogies between tenses
and pronouns in English” (Partee 1973) presented an example where tense
appears to act more “referentially”:
(25) I didn’t turn off the stove.
“When uttered, for instance, halfway down the turnpike, such a sentence
clearly does not mean either that there exists some time in the past at
which I did not turn off the stove or that there exists no time in the past
at which I turned off the stove. The sentence clearly refers to a partic-
ular time — not a particular instant, most likely, but a definite interval
whose identity is generally clear from the extralinguistic context, just as
the identity of the he in [He shouldn’t be in here] is clear from the context.”
Partee argues, in effect, that neither of the two plausible LFs that our
system from Section 6.1 derives can correctly capture the meaning of
(25). Given that the sentence contains a past tense and a negation, there
are two possible scopings of the two operators:
BEGI NN I NGS OF T ENSE AND ASPECT 109
Exercise 6.4 Using our old semantics from 6.1, show that neither LF in (26)
captures the meaning of (25) correctly.
The question and answer in this dialogue concern the issue of whether
Lea saw Solène at some time in a contextually salient interval.
Stalnaker’s and Ogihara’s conclusions converge with what we already
ended up with in Section 6.2, after considering the interaction of tenses
with time frame adverbials. In order to capture presuppositions of tensed
sentences with frame adverbials, we already modified Prior’s original pro-
posal and made room for a restrictor in the semantics of the past tense.
Given this revised analysis of the past tense as a 2-place existential quan-
tifier, it is unsurprising, in fact expected, that an implicit, contextually
salient restrictor should be present when there isn’t an overt one. What
then about example (24), Georgia went to a private school, for which the un-
restricted analysis seemed to do well? Let us say that the covert restrictor
in this case picks out a very long interval, perhaps Georgia’s entire life-
time, or even the entire past from the big bang to the utterance time, or
110 T I M E
all eternity. (What exactly the right restrictor is in this case, and what
makes it contextually available, may be a bit unclear, but we leave it at
that.)
Exercise 6.5 Assuming the restricted existential quantifier analysis of past tense
that we adopted in Section 6.2, which of the scope constellations in (26) captures
the meaning of (25) correctly?
The difference between ‘at’ and ‘in’ looks small at first, but if we reflect
on the meaning of ‘in’, we see the hidden existential quantifier. When
something happens in an interval, it happens at some part of the interval.
We can make this more transparent in the metalanguage and rewrite (29)
as (30).
(30) ⟦turn-off⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑦.𝜆𝑥 .∃𝑡 ⊆ 𝑡𝑖 : 𝑥 turns off 𝑦 in 𝑤𝑖 at 𝑡
The subset sign here stands for the containment relation between time
intervals. A time interval can be defined as a certain kind of set of mo-
ments, as in (31), so the subset relation is well defined.
(31) A set of moments 𝑆 is an interval iff for any two moments that are
in 𝑆, every moment between them is also in 𝑆.
BEGI NN I NGS OF T ENSE AND ASPECT 111
Another way to clarify the distinction between ‘at’ and ‘in’ is to use the
kind of metalanguage that is familiar from the literature on Davidsonian
event semantics.
(32) abbreviations in “event talk”:
a. turn-off(𝑒, 𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑒 is an event of turning off 𝑦 by agent 𝑥
b. 𝜏 (𝑒) = the (exact) time-interval occupied by event 𝑒
also called the “run-time” or “temporal trace” of e
Let us spell out now how Partee’s proposal for the meaning of past tense
can be upheld after all, once we assume the lexical semantics specified in
(29)/(30)/(34). The first task here is to write new lexical entries for the
tense morphemes, which encode Partee’s idea that tenses refer to spe-
cific time intervals and are semantically and pragmatically akin to per-
sonal pronouns. We will defer the full execution of this task until later
and make do for the time being with a couple of syncategorematic ad hoc
rules for the interpretation of TPs.
′
(35) ⟦PAST 𝜙⟧𝑖 = 1 iff ⟦𝜙⟧ ⟨𝑤𝑖 ,𝑡 ⟩ = 1, where 𝑡 ′ is the contextually salient This contextually salient time is also called
time before 𝑡𝑖 (no truth value defined if there is no such time) the “topic time” (Klein 1994) or the “ref-
erence time” (a term which goes back to
′
(36) ⟦woll 𝜙⟧𝑖 = 1 iff ⟦𝜙⟧ ⟨𝑤𝑖 ,𝑡 ⟩ = 1, where 𝑡 ′ is the contextually salient Reichenbach 1947, but which has various
other uses in the literature).
time after 𝑡𝑖 (no truth value defined if there is no such time)
The fact that both scopal orders yield the same truth conditions is ar-
guably a point in favor of this approach. The English sentence is not in
fact perceived as ambiguous. Our earlier approach, on which past tense
was a contextually restricted existential quantifier, did not make this pre-
diction — at least not without the help of additional assumptions (such as
a syntactic constraint on the position of negation with respect to other
112 T I M E
heads on the clausal spine). Now that the existential quantifier comes
bundled with the lexical verb, its scope is automatically “frozen” below
everything that scopes over the verb.
That depends. Here we follow Kratzer and assume that each event occurs
in just one world and at just one time. It is not possible for a given 𝑒 to be This assumption is made here mostly to
an event of 𝑥 laughing in one world and to be some other kind of event keep things simple. It is not innocuous and
not uncontroversial. See e.g. Hacquard
in another world. Nor is it possible for one and the same 𝑒 to be an event
2009b for an analysis of root modals that
of 𝑥 laughing at one time and something else at another time. Reformu- makes crucial use of the idea that an actual
lations such as (40) are uncalled for then, and we can essentially stick with event exists in non-actual worlds and has
(39). different properties there.
But how then does world and time dependence enter the semantic Strictly speaking, we should now write
computation? And how can tenses and modal operators combine with (41), but since 𝑖 in (39) does not occur on
VPs? VPs are now type ⟨𝜈, 𝑡⟩, which leads to a type-mismatch if we try the right side of =, (39) can be shorthand
for (41).
to combine them directly with a modal operator or with a tense (regard-
less of whether the tense is a Priorian temporal operator or a Partee-style (41) For any index 𝑖, ⟦laugh⟧𝑖 =
𝜆𝑥 .𝜆𝑒. laugh(𝑒, 𝑥 )
referential tense). The way out of this problem is to posit a more complex
clause structure, with a further functional head that intervenes between T
(or M) and V. This is called an “aspect” head (category label “Asp”), and
its semantic job is to existentially bind the event argument of the VP and
return a world- and time-sensitive denotation of type 𝑡.
BEGI NN I NGS OF T ENSE AND ASPECT 113
One instance of Asp is the so-called “perfective”, for which we posit (42) combines the standard formal analysis
the following entry. of perfective aspect (among many oth-
ers: Klein 1994, Kratzer 1998) with the
(42) ⟦PFV⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑃 ⟨𝜈,𝑡 ⟩ .∃𝑒 [𝑃 (𝑒) = 1 & 𝜏 (𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡𝑖 & 𝑒 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 ] semantics of von Stechow & Beck 2015’s
≤ := is part of (= occurs in) Modl head. It locates the event both in a
time interval and in a possible world.
𝜏 := the run time of (temporal trace of )
Using the syncategorematic rule (35) for referential PAST, our entry (42)
for PFV, and a Davidsonian entry for the verb, we compute the following
interpretation. (Do this as an exercise.)
(44) ⟦(43b)⟧𝑖 = 1 iff ∃𝑒 [turn-off(𝑒, B, the stove) & 𝜏 (𝑒) ⊆ 𝑡 ′ & 𝑒 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 ],
where 𝑡 ′ is the contextually salient time before 𝑡𝑖
(no truth-value defined if there is no such time)
This is the same meaning that we obtained in the previous section, when
we had built the existential quantification into the lexical meaning of the
verb. What used to be the meaning of VP is now the meaning of AspP.
We have located the event-quantifier in its own functional head, but oth-
erwise it is the same analysis.
Exercise 6.6 What about the negated sentence that was Partee’s original ex-
ample? Where can we now generate negation in an interpretable LF? Does the
current analysis still predict that the sentence is not in fact ambiguous? □
proposal, but this is beyond the scope of this introduction. Here is a ver-
sion based on Dowty.
(47) second attempt (and final version for us): Apart from introducing quantification
over other worlds, (47) also differs from
[
⟦be-PROG⟧𝑖 = 𝜆𝑃 ⟨𝜈,𝑡 ⟩ .∀𝑤 𝑤 ∈ Inert(𝑖) → ∃𝑒 [𝑃 (𝑒) = 1 & (45) in that it strengthens the requirement
] on the temporal relation between 𝑡𝑖 and
𝑡𝑖 ⊂ < 𝜏 (𝑒) & 𝑒 ≤ 𝑤] 𝜏 (𝑒 ): not only must 𝜏 (𝑒 ) contain all of 𝑡𝑖 ,
but it must moreover extend into the time
where ⊂ < abbreviates: “is a non-final subinterval of” after 𝑡𝑖 . This is intended to capture the
(that is: 𝜏 (𝑒) includes every moment in 𝑡𝑖 as well as some moment intuition that e.g. (46) is not appropriate if
John already reaches the store during his
after the end of 𝑡𝑖 ) encounter with Svenja; see Dowty 1977
for discussion.
(48) Definition: 𝑤 ∈ Inert(𝑖) iff
𝑤 is exactly like 𝑤𝑖 up to the end of 𝑡𝑖 and then develops in such a
way that no events are interrupted.
We will see in a minute that there is a class of VPs for which the truth-
conditions predicted by (47) come very close to those predicted by the
simpler (45). But examples like (46) show that this must not always hold.
BEGI NN I NGS OF T ENSE AND ASPECT 115
Just as it stands, (49c) does not logically entail that any laughing happens
in the world 𝑤𝑖 (i.e., in the utterance world 𝑤𝑢 if this is an unembedded
assertion). It only talks about the inertia worlds. However, there is a prop-
erty of the lexical meaning of laugh that permits us to draw further infer-
ences. Laughing events are made up of lots of sub-events which them-
selves are laughing events, down to very little ones that don’t last much
more than an instant. Given this, consider a world in Inert(𝑤𝑢 , 𝑡𝑢 ), say
𝑤. If (49b) is true in 𝑤𝑢 at 𝑡𝑢 , it follows that 𝑤 contains an event of Sari
laughing whose run-time includes 𝑡𝑢 . Among the subevents of this event,
which themselves are events of Sari laughing, there will most likely be
one that is early enough and small enough to have transpired by the end
of 𝑡𝑢 . And since up to the end of 𝑡𝑢 , the histories of 𝑤 and 𝑤𝑢 are identical, The only condition under which this
this small Sari-laughing event in 𝑤 must have a perfectly matching coun- would not hold is if the laughing starts
right at the beginning of 𝑡𝑢 and 𝑡𝑢 itself
terpart in 𝑤𝑢 . That’s why we infer from (49a) that there is actual laughing
is too short to fit even a minimal laughing
at the utterance time. event. This would have to be a very short
This is the kind of example for which (47) and the simpler entry (45) utterance time, shorter than it realistically
predict almost identical truth conditions. (47) demands something slightly takes to say Sari laughs, so we disregard
this possibility. But we will later see a
stronger, namely that moreover the laughing continues at least a little bit problem with this.
beyond the utterance time unless it is interrupted (which means it would
have continued). So they are not quite equivalent, but the difference is
very subtle.
Importantly, however, this almost-equivalence depends on the par-
ticular property of the meaning of the VP that we just exploited in our
reasoning. Had the VP been Sari go to the store, it would have been a very
different matter. Events of Sari going to the store are not made up of lots
of smaller events which each are events of Sari going to store. They are
made up of smaller events which are events of Sari going towards the
store, but since most of these don’t end with Sari at the store, they are
not events of Sari going to the store. So if we are told that every 𝑤 ∈
Inert(𝑖) contains an event of Sari going to the store which occupies a
super-interval of 𝑡𝑖 , we cannot infer that Sari goes to the store in 𝑤𝑖 . We
can merely infer that 𝑤𝑖 contains an event that is indistinguishable from
those parts of the inertia-worldly trips-to-the-store which fall before the
end of 𝑡𝑖 . In other words, we infer that 𝑤𝑖 contains the beginning of a Sari-
go-to-the-store event, but not necessarily anything more.
The attentive reader may have wondered why we used a past tense
example to illustrate the perfective in the previous section, but a present
tense example for the progressive in the current section. Indeed, it is in-
116 T I M E
cumbent upon us to examine what the theory predicts for every possible
combination of a tense and an aspect.
Apart from not being fully compositional, this is a bit vague for us to
work with when (in the next chapter) we consider complex sentences
with several occurrences of past tense. Let us therefore make it a little
more precise.
Partee suggested that past tense was analogous to a pronoun like he.
We are used to representing pronouns as variables (see e.g. Heim & Kratzer),
so Partee-style tenses too should then have denotations that are sensitive
to a variable assignment. So let’s make two assumptions: First, each oc-
BEGI NN I NGS OF T ENSE AND ASPECT 119
(58) ⟦woll𝑛 ⟧𝑖,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑝 ∈ 𝐷𝑠𝑡 : 𝑔(𝑛) ∈ 𝐷𝑖 & 𝑔(𝑛) > 𝑡𝑖 . 𝑝 (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑔(𝑛)) = 1
(60) ⟦PAST 7 [ PFV [ Barbara turn off the stove ]]⟧𝑖,𝑔 is defined
iff 7 ∈ dom(𝑔) & 𝑔(7) ∈ 𝐷𝑖 & 𝑔(7) < 𝑡𝑖
when defined, ⟦PAST 7 [ PFV [ Barbara turn off the stove ]]⟧𝑖,𝑔 = 1
iff ∃𝑒 [𝜏 (𝑒) ⊆ 𝑔(7) & 𝑒 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 & turn-off(𝑒, Barbara, the stove)]
For example:
(63) Barbara turned off the stove on February 1, 2001.
LF: [ PAST 7 on February 1, 2001 [ PFV [ Barbara turn off the stove]]]
uttered felicitously only if
7 ∈ dom(𝑔𝑢 ) & 𝑔𝑢 (7) ∈ 𝐷𝑖 & 𝑔𝑢 (7) < 𝑡𝑢 & 𝑔𝑢 (7) ⊆ Feb 1, 2001,
and uttered truly iff ∃𝑒 [𝜏 (𝑒) ⊆ 𝑔(7) & 𝑒 ≤ 𝑤𝑢 & turn-off(𝑒, Barbara, the stove)]
Notice that there is still some room for context-dependency, in that the
speaker may be referring to either the whole of Feb 1st or to a proper
part of it (e.g. the morning of that day). But the role of context is greatly
reduced by the contribution of the adverb.
The revised, 2-place, entry for the future is analogous. When we have
frame adverbs with present tense, we also need a non-vacuous semantics
for PRES, but this is no different in the Partee-approach than it was in the
Priorian approach.
To conclude, let us highlight how the Partee-style, “referential”, anal-
ysis of tenses differs from the Prior-as-modified-by-Stalnaker-style anal-
ysis, and also what they have in common. The essential difference is that
Partee-style PAST𝑛 and woll𝑛 do not express existential quantification over
times, but instead rely on a contextually furnished variable assignment to
supply a particular time. In the Partee-approach, the denotations of past
and future clauses are always context-dependent; in the modified-Prior
approach, they only are if there happens be a silent restrictor together
with the existential quantifier. Both approaches assume that the extensions
of PAST (𝑛) and woll (𝑛) are sensitive to the evaluation time, and both assume
that these items shift the evaluation time for their complements. The two
approaches also agree on the treatment of PRES, which, according to both,
does not shift evaluation time and makes no semantic contribution other
than a presupposition when there is a frame adverb.
7 Embedded tenses
[what follows are the lecture notes from 2018; to be revised and retypeset]
122 T I M E
For most purposes of this discussion, we can and will remain neutral about the choice between a
Partee-style ("referential") analysis of tenses and a more traditional Priorian ("existential
operator") analysis. We will cast the main discussion in the latter framework – specifically, we
will take PAST and woll to be contextually restricted existential quantifiers (as spelled out in
section 1 above), and assume that PAST and woll combine directly with a VP whose intension is
of type <s,t>. Footnotes or excursions will be added to show how the relevant issues play out
under the referential analysis and the division of labor between aspect and lexical verb meaning
that we introduced in section 3. In the text, we generally stick to stative VPs and assume that a
stative VP is true at an evaluation time if the state holds throughout that time.
Throughout this section, we will also reduce clutter by disregarding the world-component of the
evaluation index. I.e., we will pretend here that type s is just times (intervals) rather than world-
time pairs. (But this simplification will have to be undone again when we turn to tensed
complement-clauses in section 5.)
Surface sentences of the form [matrix-clause .. tense [VP . ..... [DP .. [relative-clause ... tense ....]]]]
generally should allow two different LFs, depending on where the DP is QRed: either within the
matrix VP or above the matrix tense. Since the relative clause and its tense are contained in the
DP, the scope of the DP determines whether or not the embedded tense is in the scope of the
matrix tense. Let us look at some concrete examples to see how the relative scopes of the tenses
affect the truth-conditions of the sentence.
two LFs then are (2a) and (3a), and the truth conditions that we compute for them, evaluating
the sentence at the utterance time tu, are (2b) and (3b). 41
(2) (a) LF: PRES woll [ [some one 7[PRES t7 be famous] ] 8[John be married to t8] ]
42
But below we consider variants of the example that have added frame adverbs.
40
We use some hopefully self-explanatory abbreviations in the metalanguage, e.g., married(x, y, t) for x is
41
married to y at t.
W simplilify here by disregarding the pro-head-noun one (i.e, treating it as semantically vacuous).
42
Strictly speaking, this contributes a predicate like 'person' or 'human', which is also evaluated at different
EMBEDDED TENSES 123
Our theory also makes correct predictions about what frame adverbs we can coherently add to
this kind of sentence and how their addition narrows down the range of verifying scenarios.
Consider, for example, the sentences in (4) - (6). (# marks a judgment of incoherence.)
(4) In 2020, John will be married to someone who is in jail then (in 2020).
(5) In 2020, John will be married to someone who is in jail now (in 2018).
(6) #In 2020, John will be married to someone who is in jail in 2019.
In order to interpret the adverbials, we need the 2-place meaning for woll and the non-vacuous,
2-place meaning for PRES (see sec 1.2. and fn 12). Spell out the details as an exercise. (4) has to
have an LF where the someone-DP scopes below the matrix woll, and (5) an LF where it scopes
above it. The opposite scope constellations can also be generated, but they receive unsatisfiable
truth conditions (or presuppositions) due to the adverbs. (Assume that tu is in 2018.)
Next we have an example with past tenses in both matrix and relative clause, (7). The two LFs
and their truth conditions are in (8) and (9).
times dependiing on the DP's scope. See below for an example with a more contentful head noun.
43
In a Partee-style theory with a division of labor between tense and aspect, the predicted truth conditions
also depend on the choices of (silent) aspect heads. We assume that, for type-reasons, the someone-DP
cannot be QRed to the edge of VP (below aspect), but it can scope either just above AspP or above woll.
If the aspects in both matrix and relative clause are imperfective, the predicted truth-conditions will be
essentially the same as in the Priorian theory, modulo the difference that the speaker is referring to a
specific future time. Also, if the DP scopes above woll, then no matter what aspects we have we predict a
now-reading, in the sense that fame must hold at tu for the LF to be true. When the DP scopes below
woll, however, this isn't necessarily a "simultaneous" reading. If both clauses are parsed with perfective
aspect, then the truth-conditions can be satisfied if the speaker's intended future topic time contains a
period marriage and a period of fame, but not necessarily overlapping or in any specific order. We may
wonder if such a truth-condition is attested, and if not, may want to constrain the system in such a way
that at least the embedded stative must be parsed with imperfective. Be that as it may – we do still make
the prediction that a now-interpretation for the embedded clause is contingent on scoping the DP above
woll. This prediction is not affected by the switch from Priorian to Partee-style framework. Neither are
the predictions regarding compatible frame adverbs.
124 T I M E
Again there is a difference in how the time of fame relates to the time of marriage. (8b) requires
for its truth that the person be famous (at least) for some time before the marriage. (Though it
does not deny that the person is also famous during or after the marriage.) (9b), by contrast,
leaves the temporal relation between fame and marriage completely open. Both must obtain
somewhere before the utterance time, but the onset of fame could be before, during, or after the
marriage. In this example, one of the predicted readings entails the other; i.e., any scenario that
44
makes (8) true makes (9) true as well – but not the other way round. Again, speaker's judgments
about the sentence (7) are consistent with our predictions. In particular, (7) can be judged true in
a variety of scenarios, including a scenario where the (first) onset of fame is after the end of the
marriage (but before the speech time). Following Kusumoto (2005), we call this type of scenario
a "later-than-matrix" scenario.
Again we can add frame adverbs to sharpen intuitions and further test our predictions.
(10) In 2016, John was married to someone who was rich then (in 2016).
(11) In 2016, John was married to someone who was rich in 2015.
(12) In 2016, John was married to someone who was rich in 2017.
All these sentences are coherent, and we can account for this – provided again that we assume
suitable scopes for the DP. (12), in particular, receives satisfiable truth conditions only if the DP
scopes above the matrix PAST.
44
What about the Partee-style framework? Here we have two past tenses, each with its own variable
subscript, which in principle could be two occurrences of the same free variable or two different
variables. The speaker accordingly must have either just one or else two different salient ("topic") times
in mind. It turns out, however, that coindexing is only an option if neither past is in the scope of the
other; otherwise we generate a self-contradictory presupposition that the embedded topic time precedes
itself. If the embedded past is in the LF-scope of the matrix past, it must refer to a different, and earlier,
interval than the matrix past. The predicted truth-conditions for the LF with narrow DP-scope are then
essentially the same as in the Priorian analysis (and not detectably affected by choice of aspects).
In the LF where the DP scopes outside the matrix tense, the two past tenses can be coindexed or not and
can effectively refer to any two topic times as long as both of them are before tu. Even if they corefer, the
option of construing both predicates as perfective (if available for statives) implies that marriage and fame
need not stand in any specific temporal relation to each other. Overall, the range of possible verifying
scenarios for the wide-scope-DP LF ends up being the same as in the Priorian analysis. The crucial
prediction we are aiming to highlight here – namely that later-than-matrix scenarios can only verify the
wide-scope-DP LF – is made in the Partee-framework just as much as in the Priorian one.
EMBEDDED TENSES 125
There are a number of other combinations of a matrix tense and an embedded tense that we could
consider at this point, but mostly this will not teach us much more. The one exception concerns
sentences with a matrix past and an embedded present or will.
(13) John was married to someone who is famous.
(14) John was married to someone who will be famous.
Given that will spells out PRES + woll, both (13) and (14) really are instances of PRES embedded
under PAST. We focus our discussion on (13), and you should be able to work out how it extends
to (14).
As with the earlier examples, our theory predicts a scopal ambiguity due to multiple possible
landing sites for QR of the someone-DP.
(15) (a) LF: PAST [ [some one 7[PRES t7 be famous] ] 8[John be married to t8] ]
(b) ∃t [t < tu & ∃x [famous(x, t) & married(j, x, t)] ]
(16) (a) LF: [some one 7[PRES t7 be famous] ] 8[ PAST [John be married to t8] ]
(b) ∃x [famous(x, tu) & ∃t [t < tu & married(j, x, t)] ]
In (15), famous is evaluated at the same (past) time as the predicate married-to, and in (16),
45
famous is evaluated at the utterance time. Unfortunately for our theory, only (16) corresponds to
an attested reading of the English sentence. Present under past can only have a "now reading".
(13) doesn't have an additional "simultaneous" reading with the truth-conditions (15b) that are
expressed by LF (15a). This fact is further highlighted by the deviance that results from adding
simultaneity-forcing adverbs as in (17).
(17) # In 2016, John was married to someone who is famous at that time/then (in 2016).
So here we have a problem of overgeneration. How might we fix it? For the time being, we will
just hint at three general directions for a solution, without trying to make any one of them
precise. We will return to this task after we have gathered a bit more evidence that tells us which
directions are more likely to be correct.
Since the problem stems from the fact that we generate the LF in (15), one idea is to block the
generation of this LF. In (15), PRES is in the scope of PAST. Perhaps this scope constellation is
for some reason not allowed. Stowell (1993, 1995) suggested an analogy with polarity-sensitive
items such as any and some, which mean the same thing but are subject to different distributional
constraints at LF. any is a negative polarity item (NPI) and as such is required to be in the scope
45
Again, the Partee-framework yields essentially the same prediction. In particular, since present tense in
that framework too is vacuous (except for possible presuppositions), a present AspP within the scope of
the matrix past tense will be evaluated at the past topic time that the speaker intends for the matrix
predicate. Whether this amounts to a genuinely simultaneous reading depends again on the choice of
embedded aspect, but either way, it is a reading according to which fame holds in the past and need not
hold at tu. So the overgeneration problem carries over.
126 T I M E
scope of negation. Stowell called the present tense an "anti-past-polarity item", meaning an item
that is barred from occurring in the scope of PAST at LF – just as some is barred from occurring in
the LF-scope of not. If we place some in the surface c-command domain of not, as in John didn't
solve some problems, QR must apply to give it wide scope at LF, and only an inverse-scope
reading is therefore attested. Similarly, Stowell suggested, if PRES is in the surface c-command
domain of PAST, as in our sentence (13), the only way to satisfy its anti-past polarity requirement
is to change scope relations by means of covert movement – in this case by QRing the DP that
contains the PRES above the matrix PAST. So the only licit LF for (13) will be (16) – which
indeed is the LF that captures the attested meaning.
A second, completely different, approach to the problem says that (15a) is basically a fine LF –
except it doesn't get pronounced as (13). Rather, it gets pronounced as John was married to
someone who was famous. In other words, when PRES is in the LF-scope of PAST, it gets
pronounced like a past tense. (This is reminiscent of the "Sequence of Tense" rules of traditional
grammar.) If a PRES that is in the LF-scope of PAST can't be pronounced as a morphological
present, then a morphological present can't be parsed as a PRES that is in the scope of PAST at LF.
So again we get rid of the overgeneration problem and predict correctly that the surface sentence
(13) doesn't have the reading in (15b). This second approach places the burden on a theory of
morphological spell-out which is far from trivial to work out.
Yet another direction to take is to question our assumptions about the semantics of present tense.
So far we have assumed that PRES is either vacuous or, if restricted by an adverb, introduces a
presupposition about the evaluation time. Either way, PRES doesn't shift the evaluation time, and
therefore the sister-VP of a PRES is evaluated at the same time as the material right above it,
whatever time that may be. Our semantics recognizes no intrinsic connection between PRES and
the utterance time tu. Only when a PRES happens to be topmost in a matrix clause (or embedded,
but not under any operators that shift evaluation time), will its sister-VP be interpreted at tu.
This is then due to the Utterance Rule (see (6) in sec 1.1.) and not to the meaning of PRES. But
perhaps what the data in (13) and (17) should be teaching us is that this was wrong. Even when
embedded under an evaluation-time shifter such as the matrix PAST in LF (15a), PRES seems to
select tu as the evaluation time for its VP. So perhaps we must refer to tu in the semantics of
PRES itself rather than just in the Utterance Rule. On this type of approach, (15a) would be a
well-formed LF and also a possible parse of the surface sentence (13), but it wouldn't have the
meaning in (15b).
This is grossly oversimplified. (For one thing, NPIs can also be in the scope of downward-entailing
46
operators other than negation.) We are just pointing to Stowell's analogy here, not being serious about
NPIs and PPIs.
EMBEDDED TENSES 127
We will consider two types of examples that turn out to violate these predictions. One is a kind
of example discussed by Keshet (2010) , in which the head noun of the relative clause gets
47
The second type of example, due to Kusumoto (2005) , contains a negative polarity item in the
48
49
DP whose licenser is below the matrix tense, as in (21).
(21) Next year, he will try not to rent to anybody who lives in this building now.
(22) They failed to write a single law that was signed by the Governor.
The point of using NPIs (here anybody, a single) is to confine scope of the DP. Since the NPI
must be in the scope of its licencer (here not, fail), it is ipso facto in the scope of the matrix tense.
In (21), NPI anybody must be in the scope of negation and hence it must be in the scope of woll.
But lives is interpreted relative to the time of utterance, which as the theorem in (18) says,
Semantics 13.4:317–357
(21) and (22) were provided by Roger Schwarzschild. See below for Kusumoto's own examples.
49
128 T I M E
Homework: Kusumoto uses failed to rather than didn't in order to make sure that the semantic
negation is clearly within the scope of the matrix PAST and not e.g. right above it. (If the
negation were above the tense, the NPI could be licensed by scoping the DP between them, and
this way we could capture the desired reading that's true in the later-than-matrix scenario.)
However, this makes sense only within a Partee-style referential approach to tense, not in the
modified-Prior framework we have employed here in the main text. To see the issue, consider a
50
(a) Show that, in the context of the Partee approach to tense (as spelled out above in the
Appendix to section 3), this meaning for fail allows us to assign a reasonable syntactic
analysis and intuitively appropriate interpretation to example (i). Explain why the same
is not true for the modified Priorian approach.
(b) Analyze example (22) within the Partee approach and spell out how it makes Kusumoto's
point.
(c) [To be done after you have read to the end of section 4.4.2.] Show how the problem is
solved in the "extensional" framework (Partee-style version) that we introduce in the next
section below (incl. footnote).
Kusumoto's original examples are the past-under-past sentences (23) and (24), to which we can
also add present-under-past variants (25) and (26).
(23) (At the audition last month), I tried not to hire anybody who put on a terrible performance
(tonight).
(24) (At the Open House last week), she failed to talk to any prospective student who (later)
decided to come to UMass.
Kusumoto's paper does employ a version of the Partee approach, so this is not a criticism of her
50
argumentation.
Perhaps there is an additional modal component to the meaning of fail, something like 'didn't, but should
51
have'. Even so, this won't affect the argument regarding the scope of the negation in fail.
EMBEDDED TENSES 129
scenarios. Kusumoto offers the following verifying scenarios. "Suppose we are watching a play
with a casting director. Some of the cast members are very bad and the play is a failure. The
casting director can truthfully say something like [(23)], claiming no responsibility for the failure
of the play." (Kusumoto 2005, p. 327) For (24), "..., suppose that ten prospective students
53
showed up at the UMass open house, all of whom had not decided whether to come to UMass
yet. A faculty member talked to only five of them, and none of them decided to come. Among
those who she failed to talk to, four decided to come to UMass. In this situation, sentence [(24)]
is judged true." (loc.cit.)
Kusumoto's conclusion is that, to avoid these false predictions, we need a theory which allows
embedded tenses to be evaluated with respect to the utterance time, even when these embedded
tenses are in the LF-scope of higher tenses that shift the evaluation time for their sisters. This
situation should remind you of a problem we discussed earlier in the semester: the "third
readings" of DPs in the scope of modal operators. Indeed we will join a widespread consensus in
the field that the two problems are the same and have a single solution.
4.4. Relative clauses in a framework with index variables in the object language
We return to the basic system used in Heim & Kratzer up to chapter 11. The interpretation
function is relativized only to an assignment function, not to any other evaluation parameters
such as a world, a time, or an index. The semantic rules are Functional Application, Predicate
Abstraction, and Predicate Modification, in their formulations from the earlier part of H&K.
There is no rule of Intensional Functional Application. The only ingredient of intensional
semantics that we do retain is the expanded type system and ontology. We have a third basic
Since Kusumoto's example (23) has past tenses in both clauses, she imagines the casting director to be
53
speaking after the performance. For the pres-under-past version (26), he would have to be speaking
during the play.
54
from ch. 8 of 2011 lecture notes
130 T I M E
There are a number of innovations in the lexicon and in the syntax. As for the lexicon, the main
change concerns the treatment of predicates (verbs, nouns, adjectives). They now all get an
additional argument, of type s. 55
Finally, there are two new kinds of abstract (i.e., unpronounced) morphemes. One is a series of
pronouns of type s ("index pronouns" or "world-time pronouns"). We write them as pron, with a
numerical subscript n. (This makes them look just like covert pronouns of type e, but the
environment will disambiguate. Besides, we won't be using examples with both types of
pronouns in them.) Their semantics is what you expect: they get values from the assignment
function.
55
The decision to make the index-argument the predicate's first (lowest) argument is arbitrary, and nothing
hinges on it. For all we know, it could be the highest argument, or somewhere in between.
56
(12) is the version for the Priorian framework (as modified to accommodate frame adverbs). A Partee-
style tense now gets an entry like (i):
(i)(a) full version that accommodates frame adverbs:
[[PASTn]]g = λi ∈ Ds.λp ∈ D⟨s,t⟩: g(n) is a time interval & g(n) < ti & p(wi, g(n)) = 1.
λq ∈ D⟨s,t⟩. q(wi, g(n)) = 1.
(b) simplified (no adverb):
[[PASTn]]g = λi ∈ Ds: g(n) is a time interval & g(n) < ti.
λq ∈ D⟨s,t⟩. q(wi, g(n)) = 1.
Rewriting the entries for aspect heads is also routine, e.g.:
(ii) [[PFV]] = λi ∈ Ds. λP<v,t>. $e [P(e) = 1 & t(e) Í ti & e ≤ wi].
57
We take this modal to be accidentally homophonous with the spell-out of PAST+woll. That's probably
not right, but this is a complex research area beyond the scope of this class. (See Iatridou's 2000 LI-
article and current work by Kai and Sabine.)
EMBEDDED TENSES 131
(matrix) sentence must not contain any free variables of type s and must receive a denotation of
type <s,t>. This implies that there is a CP layer in matrix clauses and there is always an instance
of OP in the matrix C. 59
We have everything in place now to return to the discussion of tense. Let's just finish our review
session with a quick reminder of the analysis for third readings in modal contexts.
(13) If everyone in here were outside, Building 56 would be empty.
LF (ignoring tense):
OP1 [[would-t1 [if OP2. everyone in-here-pro1 be outside-t2]] [OP3. Bg56 be empty-t3]]
To make interpretable the node immediately above each lexical predicate or modal, some
pronoun or trace must occupy its innermost (type-s) argument position. We can't just use
pronouns everywhere, because then they would all remain free. There is no free insertion of
lambda-binders in this theory. All binding depends on movement, so we need to generate
operators in at least some of the argument positions and we must move them. The semantic type
of the modal would furthermore demands two arguments of type <s,t>, and constituents of this
semantic type can only be created by moving an operator to their edges. The complete sentence
also must be of type <s,t> and therefore have an operator at the very top. These strictures
together determine almost everything in the LF in (13) – except the fact that the if-clause must
have a pronoun in the subject and an operator in the predicate and not the other way round. We
attribute the latter fact to (vaguely stated) syntactic constraints on the operator's movement path
and landing site (pending a deeper explanation).
As noted in the lectures on the "third reading", there is a substantial recent literature exploring various
58
ways to give principled explanations for Percus's "Generalization X" and similar constraints on the
distribution and binding of world variables. Here we just assume that some principles or other are in
place to prevent overgeneration (e.g., the unattested reading of Percus's Mary thinks that my brother is
Canadian).
It also requires rewriting the definition of truth/falsity of an utterance. Instead of (6) in section 1.1, we
59
now need this: An utterance of a sentence φ that is made in a world w at a time t is true iff [[φ]](w,t) = 1.
132 T I M E
moved OP, because these temporal operators select for arguments of type <s,t>. (Furthermore
61
we need to merge an OP in the inner argument position of the matrix tense, so that we can move
this to the matrix C and satisfy our requirement that the matrix clause denote a proposition of
type <s,t>.)
Let us illustrate all this with one of our examples from section 2.1. 62
60
Or the argument of Asp, if we use the Davidsonian framework in which VPs are type <v,t>.
61
Could we avoid this OP and instead move the tense operator itself from the argument position of the
verb"? That kind of syntax has indeed been explored by Junri Shimada
http://research.nii.ac.jp/~kanazawa/semantics/2007/0817/Head_Movement_Binding_Theory_Ph
rase_Structure.pdf, who credits the idea to Kai von Fintel http://web.mit.edu/fintel/choicepoints.pdf.
62
Here we simplify again in various ways. First, we omit the world-component of the index. Second, we
ignore the tenses' restrictors. Third, we disregard the dummy head noun 'one'. Notice that the relative
clause nevertheless needs to be of type <e,t>, since this is the type that the determiner some combines
with.
Please draw yourself some trees, they will be more readable than the bracketed strings. Some notational
conventions I have used to improve readability at least a little: low numbers (1, 2, ...) and boldface for
variables of type s, higher numbers (6, 7, ...) and plain font for variables of type e; hyphenating type-s
arguments with the predicates they saturate; small italics for semantically vacuous items.
EMBEDDED TENSES 133
4.4.3. Present under past again: the overgeneration problem is still with us
Switching to the extensional framework has addressed Kusumoto's argument against the scopal
theory of later-than-matrix interpretations, but it has not done anything yet to fix our
overgeneration problem. We still predict an unattested simultaneous reading for present
embedded under past. Here is its new LF.
(18) John was married to someone who is famous.
(19) LF with narrow scope DP and local binding:
OP1 PAST-t1
OP2 [ [some who6[PRES t6 be famous-pro2]] 7[John be married-t2 to t7] ]
li. ∃t [t < ti & ∃x [ famous(x, t) & married(j, x, t)] ]
(unattested "simultaneous" reading, i.e., famous when married)
But we have made some progress. For one thing, we have learned something about how not to
fix the problem. We don't want to legislate against the scopal relations that we see in (19).
Whatever we do must not rule out the scopally isomorphic LF in (20).
(20) LF with narrow DP scope and non-local binding:
OP1 PAST-t1
OP2 [ [some who6[PRES t6 be famous-pro1]] 7[John be married-t2 to t7] ]
li. ∃t [ t < ti & ∃x [ famous(x, ti) & married(j, x, t)] ]
(attested "famous now" reading)
This means that Stowell's analogy with polarity sensitivity is coming to look unhelpful. What
about the traditional idea that a Sequence of Tense rule governs morphological spell-out and
ensures that the LF in (19) is paired with the PF John was married to someone who was famous?
This still also looks rather unappealing, given the lack of locality between the affected verb form
and the environment that must trigger the rule. (Again, the rule must not apply indiscriminately
to both (19) and (20), yet these structures are indistinguishable in the immediate local vicinity of
the affected verb.) Nevertheless, something like a Sequence of Tense rule, a non-local
morphological agreement mechanism, turns out to be the favored solution in much of the recent
literature. We present this in the next section. And we will see that the switch to our current
63
extensional framework, while not by itself the solution to the problem, was a necessary
prequisite for it. The solution to be presented is one that could not have gotten off the ground
without a syntax that posits world-time pronouns and traces as part of syntactic representations.
For a dissenting view and counterproposal, see two recent papers by Altshuler & Schwarzschild
63
presuppositional semantics for 1st-person presumably would say that [[myn]]g is undefined
unless g(n) is the speaker. But this would make it impossible for my in (21) to take on a range of
alternative values, as it has to if it is to be bound by the quantifier only I.
We will not engage here in a serious discussion of fake indexicality, just sketch the analysis
developed in Kratzer (1998) and related work. This assumes that grammar does not produce a
perfect match between semantically interpreted and phonologically realized phi-features. In
particular, what we witness in (21) is a 1st-person feature on my that is present at PF but absent
at LF – hence not contributing to the meaning of this sentence (whatever the actual semantics of
1st person may be). Implementations use either a mechanism that deletes certain base-generated
features in the LF-branch of the derivation while retaining them in the PF-branch , or else a
66
mechanism that adds (copies) features in the PF-branch onto nodes that are feature-less
underlyingly and at LF. Either way, the mechanism is crucially sensitive to a syntactic
representation of semantic binding relations (such as coindexing) and it (probably ) operates
67
non-locally. For concreteness we state the following rule (22), which employs the concept of
"binding" defined in (23). 68
64
Philippe Schlenker pursued a related but distinct approach to SOT-phenomena in his 1999 MIT thesis.
For Schlenker, the essential analogy was between SOT and indexical shifting (in languages like Amharic)
– or rather, actually, between indexical shifting and the absence of SOT (in non-SOT languages such as
Japanese and Russian). How different the two approaches ultimately are depends on how one views the
relation between fake indexicals and shifted indexicals, a question on which both Kratzer and Schlenker,
as well as a number of later authors, have taken evolving positions over the years.
65
Cooper, Heim & Kratzer. If one doesn't treat 1st-person pronouns as variables in the first place, but as
indexicals in the sense of Kaplan, one has an even more basic problem. They cannot be bound variables
then.
66
see von Stechow 2003
67
Kratzer (1998, 2005) argues that it obeys certain locality constraints after all, but this is controversial.
Most other authors (Schlenker 1999, von Stechow 2003, Heim 2005, 2008, Wurmbrand 2015) assume or
argue for non-local versions.
68
See also H&K p. 263.
EMBEDDED TENSES 135
daughters n (a binder index) and g, such that g dominates bn (and does not dominate any
other occurrence of n that c-commands bn).
Applying this rule to examples requires a few more ancillary assumptions about feature traffic.
E.g., for (21) we must assume that the 1st-person feature base-generated on I first percolates to
the quantifier only I, from whence it then can be transmitted down to the possessive pronoun by
rule (22). So the derivation of (21) goes like this.
(24) base-generate: [only [pro7 1st]] brush pro8's teeth
subject moves spec-V to spec-I: [only [pro7 1st]] 8[t8 brush pro8's teeth]
derivation to LF: no further changes
derivation to PF: percolate in only-DP: [only [pro7 1st]]-1st 8[t8 brush pro8's teeth]
transmit under binding: [only [pro7 1st]]-1st 8[t8-1st brush pro8-1st's teeth]
The point is that the trace and possessive pronoun bound by only I have 1st-person features at
PF, but not at LF. At LF, the only 1st-person feature is on the subject I, where indeed it is
interpreted and constrains the reference of the free variable 7 to pick out the speaker. The trace
and bound pronoun are feature-less variables and thus have well-defined denotations under any
assignment that assigns something to the variable 8.
Let us return to tense now and begin to spell out Kratzer's analogy between fake indexicals and
Sequence of Tense. The first step is to clarify the relation between abstract tense morphemes
(such as PAST) and tense morphology (such as an -ed suffix or a suppletive form like was). The
idea is that this is similar to the relation between interpreted and uninterpreted phi features.
There is the item, or – as we will now say – the "(interpreted) feature" PAST, which is part of the
underlying structure and of the LF, and which is semantically contentful. (Its meaning is what
we have been assuming, e.g., (12) in section 4.4.1). And there is an uninterpreted twin of it –
we'll write it PAST in little italics – which shows up in various places at PF and informs the spell-
out of verbs in its vicinity. The actual spell-out rules (e.g. go PAST ® went) can work on very
local configurations (and we won't say much more about them here – that's what we have
morphologists for). But the mechanism by which the uninterpreted tense features get to be
where they are is sensitive to a not necessarily local structural configuration with abstract
ingredients like variables and binders. It is, in fact, the very mechanism that is behind fake
indexicals. Let us see how our rule (22) "feature transmission under semantic binding" can apply
to tense features.
This proviso becomes relevant later: the rule should apply also if there is a vacuous operator together
69
with the binder index. For the moment you can ignore it.
136 T I M E
What about present tense? As long as we are treating it as vacuous, it isn't binding any variables
and thus can't be a source of transmitted features. The most natural move at this point is to
abolish the item or feature PRES altogether, and leave it to the morphology to spell out verbs
without a tense feature in the form that we traditionally call their "present tense" form . Given71
that present tense morphology is actually zero (once we factor out subject agreement), this is also
reasonable from a morphologist's perspective. But bear in mind that we are not really wedded to
the vacuous treatment of the present, but have entertained a non-vacuous version too (when we
considered frame adverbs). There might then also be an uninterpreted twin PRES of a non-
vacuous PRES, and the the analysis of John likes Mary might be (28). But here we go with (27)
for simplicity.
(27) John like-OP Mary
move operator: OP2 [John like-t2 Mary]]
spell out: John likes Mary.
The issue disappears, or at least changes, when we integrate aspect into the structure. The PAST feature
70
will then end up no lower than the type-s argument of the Asp head – in both copular sentences and those
with regular main verbs. When Asp is morphologically zero, the tense feature next to Asp gets spelled
out on the verb immediately below. For a recent discussion of verbal morphology and the role of
semantically vacuous auxiliaries like do and be, see Bjorkman's 2011 MIT thesis.
At least it does this in finite environments. We must assume that the morphology somehow knows
71
whether it is dealing with e.g. an infinitive or a participle, where all tense distinctions are systematically
neutralized.
EMBEDDED TENSES 137
The only trace or pronoun that receives a PAST feature by transmission is the argument of the
matrix predicate be married, so the embedded verb remains without a tense feature and surfaces
as present tense.
Now let's convince ourselves that we no longer generate the unattested simultaneous reading.
An LF that expresses this reading must have the argument of the embedded predicate
semantically bound by the matrix tense, as in the LF in (30).
(30) OP1 PAST-t1
OP2 [ [some one who6[t6 be famous-pro2]] 7[John be married-t2 to t7] ]
But with semantic binding comes feature transmission, and therefore the embedded predicate
would then have to surface as a past tense form. We can't have semantic binding without a
morphological reflex. This is what is behind the phenomenon called "Sequence of Tense".
The system makes further predictions. One (closely related to the above) pertains to sentences
with embedded future. Consider (31).
Our old theory predicted, falsely, that this sentence, as spoken in 2016, could be verified by a
scenario in which John and Mary were married from 2004 to 2006 and Mary was famous from
138 T I M E
Indeed (32) sentence has a different meaning from (31) and can describe our scenario. (Perhaps
it's most felicitous with added adverbials, e.g., John was married to someone who would later be
famous, or In 2005, John was married to someone who would be famous in 2009.)
The new theory does not affect predictions for any of the sentences that have a matrix present. It
also does not affect predictions for sentences with matrix future, i.e. will – provided we assume
that woll (unlike PAST) is not a feature in the first place and has no uninterpreted twin-feature.
(So if there is a feature at all that enters into spelling out will, it's just PRES.)
As for configurations with matrix past, we have already looked at embedded present and
embedded future. What about matrix past embedding another past?
Now consider n=2 in (35). Meaning-wise, this imposes a requirement that the fame held before
the marriage (i.e., either the fame began and ended before the marriage or it continued from
before the marriage into it or beyond). Since that kind of scenario is already allowed as a special
case of the truth conditions of the n=1 LF, it is hard to determine with truth-value judgments
whether the grammar ought to generate this as a separate reading. But it won't hurt, it seems.
Now let's look at the PF side for this case. Given what we have made explicit about percolation
and transmission, we get the following pre-spell-out structure in the lower clause.
(35) lower clause for (34) with n=2, after percolation and transmission:
... who6 [ [PAST-[pro2-PAST]]-PAST OP3 [t6 be famous-[t3-PAST] ] ]
The left-most PAST (the one on pro2) has been transmitted from the higher clause. The second
PAST, the one attached to the complex phrase [PAST-[pro2-PAST]], got there by percolation from
the PAST-head of that phrase itself. And the third PAST (on t3) has been transmitted from that
complex phrase. How does all this get spelled out? Presumably the only place where
morphology does something is in the predicate (be) famous, so we expect was famous. The
structure in the complex phrase headed by PAST presumably must stay silent, because there is no
verbal element there to carry tense inflection. So this is homophonous with the outputs of the
other two derivations – an okay prediction, if not one that we can distinguish empirically at this
point from another possibility that might be entertained as well, namely that the structure in (35)
is not well-formed or not spell-out-able at all (for some reason to be identified).
A question that tends to come up at this point is whether we should work out a morphology
which spells (35) out as a pluperfect, i.e., who had been famous. After all, this is intuitively the
English sentence which best matches the interpretation we computed for the n=2-version of (34):
John was married to someone who had been famous does entail fame before the marriage.
Morphologically, however, it would seem to take a bit of ad hoc machinery to get from (35) to
had been famous. We may have a more elegant way to generate the pluperfect. Assume (as was
briefly mentioned earlier) that our lexicon contains an item that is synonymous with PAST, but
syntactically different in that it is generated lower (below M, if any) and qualifies as "verbal" in
the sense that's relevant to whether morphology can realize tense inflection on it. Then we can
72
We assume, as we did for woll, that have is not a feature and ipso facto doesn't have an uninterpreted
73
twin.
140 T I M E
(2) [[think]] = λi. λp⟨s,t⟩. λx. ∀w [w is compatible with x′s beliefs in wi at ti ® p(w, ti) = 1]
74
There is another natural way to go, which is what you find in most of the contemporary literature
(Ogihara, Abusch, Kratzer, von Stechow, Kusumoto, etc).
(i) [[think]] = λi. λp⟨s,t⟩. λx. ∀i′ [i′ is compatible with x′s beliefs in wi at ti ® p(i′) = 1]
(i), unlike (2), quantifies over both worlds and times. The difference between (2) and (i) becomes
important in the analysis of so-called de se readings, but it won't matter for the modest purposes of this
introduction.
EMBEDDED TENSES 141
The meaning we computed in (7a) amounts to a "simultaneous" reading. The worlds compatible
with John's beliefs at the future time we are talking about are worlds in which Mary has the keys
then, at the time of his thinking. This is indeed what the English sentence (6) means. In fact, it
is its only possible reading. In distinction to the case of a present relative clause in a future
matrix, there is not an additional reading here on which the present in the complement clause
evaluates at the utterance time. The theory predicts this unambiguity. Because the attitude verb
selects an argument of type <s,t>, we must generate an operator with the lower verb and move it
to the embedded C. We cannot put a pronoun there and bind it non-locally. That would result in
a type-mismatch, because the sister of think would be type t.
If we do want to talk about a belief that someone will hold in the future about our current
utterance time, how do we express this in English? We have to use an embedded past.
(8) scenario: Arriving at the office one morning, Mary realizes that she left her keys at
home. But as luck would have it, someone forgot to lock up the night before, so she can
get in anyway. As she is entering the office, she thinks about the boss (John), who will
arrive later and, not knowing any of the above, will not be surprised to find her sitting at
her desk. She says:
John will think that I had my key.
(The analysis of this sentence in our theory is straightforward; do it as an exercise.) These
examples provide an illustration of Ogihara's (1996) principle of "temporal directionality
isomorphism", i.e., the generalization that tenses in an attitude complement must always reflect
the attitude holder's temporal perspective on the embedded event (rather than the speaker's).
Kratzer (1998) and Kusumoto (2005) proposed to derive temporal directionality isomorphism
from the semantic type of attitude verbs, and we have implemented this approach.
Interpretability requirements once again determine the presence and landing sites of the OP's. (9)
is interpretable and expresses what is called a "back-shifted" ("earlier-than-matrix") reading.
75
think does not spell out as thinks, because it is not in a finite VP. woll (like the other auxiliaries of
syntactic category M) governs infinitival morphology on its complement VP, and it is irrelevant in this
case what tense features, if any, might have been transmitted to the type-s-argument of V. Even when
there is a PAST on the inner argument of an M (as in 'John could see the ocean', or 'John thought he would
see the ocean'), the VP still spells out as a bare infinitive.
142 T I M E
But the same surface sentence also has a "simultaneous" reading. In fact, this may be the most
prominent reading out of context. The simultaneous reading is standardly attributed to Sequence
of Tense. Let's see how our implementation of SOT as feature-transmission-under-binding
might cover this case. To get the simultaneous truth-conditions, our LF must not have a PAST
operator in the lower clause, so we don't base-generate one there. The structure needs to be as in
(12).
(12) OP1[ PAST-t1 OP2[ John think-t2 OP3[Mary have-t3 the key] ] ]
λi. $t [ t < ti & ∀w [w compatible with J′s beliefs in wi at t ® M has the key in w at t] ]
Does this structure wind up at PF with a transmitted PAST feature on the argument of the
embedded verb have? That actually doesn't quite yet follow from the assumptions we have in
place. Percolating the feature in the phrase headed by PAST and then transmitting it down to
variables bound by that phrase only gets us as far as (13).
(13) OP1[[PAST-t1]-PAST OP2[John think-[t2-PAST] OP3[Mary have-t3 the key] ] ]
We need a further assumption here, namely that there is percolation in the phrase headed by the
verb think, in such a way that the tense feature from the argument of think gets passed up.
(14) Percolation in the verbal complex: 76
76
For this to work as intended, it is actually crucial that the index-argument be the innermost argument of
the verb – a decision which up to now was an arbitrary matter of exposition.
EMBEDDED TENSES 143
A second remark is that the analysis as it now stands does not generate the sentence in (19) at all.
(19) John thought that Mary has the keys.
If we base-generate no temporal operator in the lower clause, the only possible derivation is the
one we saw above in (12) - (15), which leads to past tense morphology in both clauses.
Interpretability constrains us to generate a locally bound operator in the embedded clause, not a
pronoun that might be bound from higher up, i.e., from the matrix C. There is simply no way to
derive (19), and the prediction is therefore that present tense in the complement of a past tense
matrix attitude verb should be ungrammatical. Unfortunately the empirical facts are not so
simple – a complication that we discuss in the following section.
Present-under-past attitude and speech reports are not simply another way to express a
simultaneous reading (in which case we could simply have dealt with them by making the new
percolation rule in (14) optional). Nor do they simply report someone's past thought about the
present time which was in the future of their thinking (which would make them counterexamples
to temporal directionality isomorphism). Rather these sentences have a distinctive and peculiar
meaning of their own, known in the literature as a "double access" reading. We introduce the
phenomenon by quoting from a paper by Altshuler & Schwarzschild : 77
"Suppose that ... at the mall, I ask Sylvia where her friend, Mary, is. She replies: “Mary is at
home today”. Later that day, when I’m at the beach and asked for Mary’s whereabouts, I can
truthfully say:
(9) Sylvia said that Mary is at home.
77
(2013, Amsterdam Colloquium)
144 T I M E
A&S propose, in effect, that "double access" is hard-wired into the meaning of the English
present tense: this tense shifts to a new evaluation time that is constrained by its relations to two
other times. We adopt a related idea , but without actually departing from our assumption that
78
the present tense is vacuous and therefore does not shift evaluation time at all. We instead draw
a parallel to a phenomenon with personal plural pronouns known as 'split antecedents' or 'split
binding'. An example is (20a), which has an LF like (20b), in which the +-sign denotes a
79
function (of type <e,<e,e>>) which maps two individuals to the smallest (plural) individual that
contains them both as parts. The truth-conditions of (20a) on this parse are fulfilled by a
scenario in which everyone told someone "You and I should get together".
(20) (a) Everyone told someone that they should get together.
(b) everyone 1[someone 2[ t1 told t2 that [pro1 + pro2] should get together ] ]
The idea that we want to spell ou here is that the topmost type-s argument in a double-access
complement is a world-time pair in which the time is kind of a plural time. This requires a
special sum-operator for world-time pairs, whose definition is admittedly a little funny, since it
uses both input times but effectively "throws away" one of the worlds.
78
Among other differences from A&S's proposal, we are not requiring either of the two arguments to be
the utterance index. Empirical consequences of this difference will show up only in sentences with
multiple levels of embedding, whose examination we leave to another occasion. There are several other
differences too.
79
refs
EMBEDDED TENSES 145
principle be bound by any one of the three higher OP's (OP1, OP2, or OP3). There is, however, one
more principled constraint that we can identify before we examine the remaining options one by
one. The trace of the operator OP3 will have to go to the left of +, not to the right. This has to do
with the asymmetry regarding the worlds in definition (21). Let's compute what would happen if
OP3 were to bind (only) a variable on the right. (23) shows the result of interpreting the say-VP,
assuming n ≠ 3.
(23) [[Sylvia say-t2 OP3. Mary be at-home-(pron + t3)]]g = 1 iff
∀w [w is compatible with what Sylvia says in wg(2) at tg(2)
® Mary is at home in wg(n) at [tg(n), tg(2)] ]
The universal quantifier over worlds binds vacuously here, so this is a pathological meaning.
We are down to three ways of filling the blanks in (22).
(24) OP1[ [PAST t1] OP2[Sylvia say-t2 ...
(a) ... OP3[ Mary be at-home-[t3 + pro3] ] ] ]
(b) ... OP3[ Mary be at-home-[t3 + pro2] ] ] ]
(c) ... OP3[ Mary be at-home-[t3 + pro1] ] ] ]
(24a), with the two arguments of + coindexed, amounts to the same meaning as if we had simply
put t3 instead of t3 + pro3. (Definition (20) implies that [[+]](i)(i) = i.) This expresses a
simultaneous reading. (24b) turns out to be equivalent with this as well (prove as exercise).
(24c) is the only interesting choice. We compute the proposition in (25).
(25) λi. $t [ t < ti & ∀w [w is compatible with what Sylvia says in wi at t
® Mary is at home in w at [t, ti] ] ]
This represents our desired double-access reading. It implies that, according to what Sylvia said
at tmall, Mary was at home at the interval from tmall to the utterance time.
80
It is worth noting that this is another illustration of Ogihara's "temporal directionality isomorphism".
Ogihara (1996) actually introduced that principle in the context of discussing the double access
phenomenon. He thereby drew attention to the fact that even in this case – which may superficially look
as if an embedded tense were chosen to reflect solely the utterer's perspective – we have a tense that upon
careful examination turns out to relate the embedded event also to the subjective "now" of the subject in
the reported past thought/speech act.
146 T I M E
81
refs include Podobryaev 2014 MIT PhD
P A R T IV
Questions
8 Interrogative clauses
In this chapter, we will expand the system to deal with a central kind of Another important kind of non-
non-declarative clause: interrogatives. These also can stand on their own: declarative are imperatives, if you’re in-
terested in which, you should consult
(1) a. Did Sakina see Emily? Portner 2007, M. Kaufmann 2012, von
b. Did Sakina see Emily or did Sakina see Julie? Fintel & Iatridou 2017.
Leaving semantics out of the picture for the moment, interrogative clauses
differ from declarative clauses in their syntax and in their pragmatics. In
English, interrogative clauses can be told apart syntactically from declar-
ative clauses by the presence of a clause-initial wh-phrase and/or the
inverted order of subject and auxiliary. The terminology “interroga-
tive”/“declarative”, however, alludes to a distinction not in grammatical
form but in communicative function. When uttered as main clauses (i.e.,
not embedded in a larger structure), declarative sentences typically serve
to make assertions, whereas interrogative sentences serve to ask questions.
These two clause-types serve to perform different kinds of speech acts.
Stalnaker 1978 outlined an influential formal model of what happens
in a conversation and what it means to make an assertion. The central
concept is that of a body of publicly shared information, or “common
ground”, which evolves as the conversation proceeds. A proposition is
in the common ground if each interlocutor is “disposed to act as if he as-
sumes or believes the proposition is true, and as if he assumes or believes
that his audience assumes or believes that it is true as well”. The common
ground can be characterized by the set of worlds in which every propo-
sition in the common ground is true; Stalnaker calls this set of worlds the
“context set”. The act of making an assertion is a proposal to update — in
fact, to shrink — the context set. The particular way in which the context Not “shrink” in the sense of reducing car-
set is to be shrunk depends on the semantic value of the asserted sentence, dinality. The cardinality of the context set
may never become less than uncountably
more specifically, on its intension. To assert a sentence 𝜙 is to propose that
infinite.
the current context set 𝑐 be replaced by a new context set which is the
intersection of 𝑐 with the intension of 𝜙, i.e., 𝑐 ∩ ⟦𝜙⟧¢ . We’re leaving off the variable assignment
Against this backdrop, how might we think about the speech act of parameter, which is legitimate if there are
no free variables in 𝜙.
asking a question? What is the point of this speech act? Questions, un-
like assertions, don’t provide information about the world and therefore At least this is true if we stick to ques-
do not in themselves lead to updates of the common ground. Their pur- tions that don’t have presuppositions (or
to questions whose presuppositions are al-
pose rather is to constrain the future course of the conversation in a cer-
ready common ground at the point when
tain way. In the absence of any particular question under consideration, they are asked). When a question that
has a presupposition is asked in a context
where the presupposition is not yet in
the common ground, a listener can get
new information by accommodating this
presupposition.
I N T E R R O G AT I V E C L A U S E S 151
With this definition in hand, we refine Stalnaker’s model of conversa- The idea of refining the Stalnakerian
tion. Each stage in a conversation is now characterized not by its context model of the context by moving from
the context set to a partitioned context
set, but by its “partitioned context set”, i.e., by a partition of some set of
set goes back to Groenendijk 1999. A
possible worlds. The union of this partition corresponds to Stalnaker’s old formally equivalent way is to model the
context set, i.e., it contains the worlds compatible with every proposi- context as an equivalence relation (see, for
tion in the common ground. The partitioning represents the interlocu- example, Jäger 1996 and Hulstijn 1997).
We will later see approaches that give a
tors’ shared commitment not to make distinctions between worlds that partition semantics to interrogatives. It’s
are “cell-mates” — at least not for the time being. This is a renegotiable important to distinguish the two moves.
commitment and, as we will see, it only stays in force until someone raises As we’ll see in this section, one can have
a partition pragmatics without a partition
a new question. The definition of “relevant assertion” in Definition 3 be-
semantics. This theme is explored in much
low spells out precisely what the commitment amounts to. In Definition more sophisticated detail in Fox 2018.
2, we adapt Stalnaker’s characterization of the context-changing role of
assertions to our new, more elaborate set-up. Starr 2020 adds to the partitioned context
set model a way of tracking the speech act
Definition 2 (Update by assertion) To assert a sentence 𝜙 is to propose effect of imperatives.
that the current partitioned context set 𝐶 be replaced by a new partitioned
Our proposed context model is simple
context set which is constructed by intersecting each cell of C with the compared to some other well-known
intension of 𝜙. More precisely, C is to be replaced by systems, such as Roberts 2012 and Farkas
& Bruce 2010.
{𝑝 : 𝑝 ≠ ∅ & ∃𝑝 ′ ∈ C. 𝑝 = 𝑝 ′ ∩ ⟦𝜙⟧¢ }
The notion of “relevance” that is formalized here calls for a bit of clari-
fication. First, here are a couple of more commonly used (and more trans-
parent) definitions.
152 Q U E S T I O N S
Now the only piece of our story that is missing is a recipe for “update
by question”. The idea, as we have said, is that asking a question amounts
to proposing a specific replacement of the current partitioned context set
by a new one. As in the case of assertions, the construction of the new
partitioned context set should be determined by the semantic value of the
sentence that was uttered. We know what we have in mind for particular
examples. E.g., when someone asks Is it raining?, the intended outcome is
a two-membered partition, with one cell consisting of worlds in which
it is raining and the other cell of worlds in which it is not raining. If the
question is a so-called “alternative question” like Is Julie in Barcelona or did
Emily call them on the phone?, the result should be a four-celled partition
corresponding to the four possible configurations of truth-values for the
two component sentences. If the question asked is Who among these two
(Carli and Jodie) came to the party?, the result should be a partition with
four cells: one with worlds in which Carli and Jodie both came, one with
worlds in which Carli but not Jodie came, one with worlds in which Jodie
but not Carli came, and one with worlds in which neither Carli nor Jodie
came.
What is the general recipe by which these outcomes are obtained as a
function of the semantic value of each interrogative sentence? To answer
this question, we have to carry out the semanticist’s task, i.e., assign se-
mantic values to interrogative clauses. We will do so in the next section,
but for now we will articulate a basic intuition about the semantic value of
interrogatives and explore how they can be used to construct a partitioned
context set.
Perhaps the most widespread idea about the semantic value of inter-
rogatives is that they denote sets of propositions. The particular structural
features of interrogatives are taken to serve to both “lift” the type of the
denotation from the type of propositions (the denotation of declaratives)
to the type of sets of propositions, and to generate the individual proposi-
tions in the set. We will look at the mechanics of this in the next section.
For now, let’s assume the following semantic value for the sample wh-
questions Who among these two (Carli and Jodie) came to the party?:
(3) ⟦Who among these two (Carli and Jodie) came to the party?⟧ =
{𝜆𝑤 . Carli came to the party in 𝑤, 𝜆𝑤 . Jodie came to the party in 𝑤 }
Now, notice that the propositions in this set are not disjoint (they can
both be true of the same world) and that their union leaves out the worlds
where neither Carli nor Jodie came to the party. So, this set of proposi-
tions is not a partition of the set of all possible worlds and also not a par-
tition of any context set with minimal information about who came to
the party. So, there’s apparently not a seamless link between our partition
pragmatics for question acts and our semantic values for interrogatives.
154 Q U E S T I O N S
Should we therefore redo our semantics so that it does, after all, map
interrogative clauses to semantic values that are partitions? This can be
done and has been argued for, and we will return to a discussion of this
possibility. For now, however, we observe that it is not necessary. An
equally reasonable take on the discrepancy between our semantics and
our pragmatics is that it simply reflects the division of labor between se-
mantics and pragmatics. We don’t necessarily need a semantics that di-
rectly delivers partitions as semantic values. All we need is to make precise
how the semantic values delivered by the semantics help determine the
partitions that figure in the pragmatics. In other words, we need to for-
mulate our pragmatic rule for “update by question” in such a way that
it spells out how the partition effected by a question-act is determined
by the semantic value of the uttered sentence. We will work up to this
formulation in a few steps. As we will see, there is a straightforward and
general recipe for converting an arbitrary set of propositions into a par-
tition of a given set of worlds, and our update principle will make use of
that recipe.
Informally speaking, each proposition in the question-denotation de-
fines a “dividing line” across the space of worlds in the context set, and
as we use multiple propositions to draw multiple lines across this space,
we get increasingly fine-grained partitions as the number of propositions
goes up. The first proposition cuts the space into two cells (the region This assumes that the propositions are
where it is true and the region where it is false). The second proposition all “logically independent” of each other
and of the propositions in the original
subdivides these two cells further into four; the third proposition leaves us
common ground. That is, none of them
with eight cells; and so on. contradicts or is entailed by any other (or
Another way of describing this process is that each new proposition any conjunction or disjunction of oth-
introduces a new condition that cell-mates must satisfy. At the beginning, ers). If there are logical relations between
the propositions, then the total number
before any line has been drawn, all of the context set is one big cell and of cells is smaller. Note that the defini-
every world counts as a cell-mate of every other one. Then we draw a tion of “partition” requires all cells to be
line for the first proposition (call it 𝑝 1 ), and if two worlds differ with re- non-empty, so the intersection of two
incompatible propositions is not a cell.
spect to the truth-value of 𝑝 1 , they now are no longer cell-mates. 𝑤 and
𝑤 ′ are cell-mates now only if 𝑝 1 (𝑤) = 𝑝 1 (𝑤 ′ ). With the second propo-
sition, 𝑝 2 , we draw a second line and “break up” yet more of the original
cell- mate relations. At this point, only those pairs of worlds remain cell-
mates which are treated alike by both 𝑝 1 and 𝑝 2 . I.e., 𝑤 and 𝑤 ′ are cell-
mates now iff 𝑝 1 (𝑤) = 𝑝 1 (𝑤 ′ ) & 𝑝 2 (𝑤) = 𝑝 2 (𝑤 ′ ). And so on for the third
and all other propositions in the given set of propositions.
So a set of propositions can be used to define a “cell-mate relation”, and
thus a partition.
I N T E R R O G AT I V E C L A U S E S 155
Who did Sakina see? or who Sakina saw (we will ignore tense and auxil- In other words, it would be a function that
iary do, and thereby ignore the difference between matrix and embedded maps each proposition to the singleton set
versions), this gives rise to a structure like (7): that has it as its only member.
156 Q U E S T I O N S
OP1
who2
? 𝑡1 Sakina
see 𝑡2
We will usually drop the type-labels on the traces, but keep in mind
that the operator leaves a trace of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩ (i.e., a variable over proposi-
tions, not individuals). Accordingly the topmost application of Predicate
Abstraction will yield a function from propositions to truth-values (type
⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩, the characteristic function of a set of propositions). Let’s compute We leave out the vacuous operator OP
the meaning of this LF: and just interpret the predicate abstract it
creates. ∅ in the superscript stands for the
(10) Computation for LF (9): empty variable assignment, see H&K ch.5
⟦1. who 2. [? 𝑡 1 ] Sakina see 𝑡 2 ⟧𝑤,∅
= (by Predicate Abstraction)
𝜆𝑝. ⟦who 2. [? 𝑡 1 ] Sakina see 𝑡 2 ⟧𝑤,[ 1→𝑝 ]
= (by entry for who and lambda reduction)
𝜆𝑝. ∃𝑥 [ 𝑥 is human in 𝑤 & ⟦2. [? 𝑡 1 ] Sakina see 𝑡 2 ⟧𝑤,[ 1→𝑝 ] (𝑥) = 1 ]
= (by Predicate Abstraction and lambda reduction)
𝜆𝑝. ∃𝑥 [ 𝑥 is human in 𝑤 & ⟦[? 𝑡 1 ] Sakina see 𝑡 2 ⟧𝑤,[ 1→𝑝,2→𝑥 ] = 1 ]
= (by IFA)
′
𝜆𝑝. ∃𝑥 [ 𝑥 is human in 𝑤 & ⟦? 𝑡 1 ⟧𝑤,[ 1→𝑝,2→𝑥 ] (𝜆𝑤 ′ . ⟦Sakina see 𝑡 2 ⟧𝑤 ,[ 1→𝑝,2→𝑥 ] ) = 1 ]
I N T E R R O G AT I V E C L A U S E S 157
This characterizes a set of propositions that contains one proposition per This is the ANSPOSS in Hagstrom 2003’s
human-in-𝑤: the proposition that that human was seen by Sakina. terminology.
How about polar and alternative questions? Can we just posit the same
operators in the C-head? Let’s try.
Here we show an LF and computation
that includes the vacuous operator. As
(11) Did Sakina see Emily? an exercise, convince yourself that in the
case of polar questions, a simpler structure
[𝐶 ? OP] Sakina see Emily without OP is likewise interpretable, with
equivalent results.
OP 1 [ ? 𝑡 1 ] Sakina see Emily
To complete the current section, we consider an alternative question: The slashes are intended as a crude rep-
resentation of the distinctive intonational
(13) Did Sakina see Emily /or did he see Julie\? contour that characterizes the alternative-
DS: [[𝐶 ? OP] Sakina see Emily] or [[𝐶 ? OP] Sakina see Julie] question reading.
LF: OP 1 [ [ [? 𝑡 1 ] Sakina see Emily] or [ [? 𝑡 1 ] Sakina see Julie] ]
The semantic value of (16) depends on who the students in the evaluation
world are. It is easy to imagine circumstances where it is not common
ground who the students are. So, how should we update the context with
a question like (16)?
Option 1: The world of utterance. We could say that the context gets par- Option 1 would say something like: To
titioned based on the set of propositions denoted by the interrogative rel- ask a question by uttering a sentence 𝜙
in world 𝑤 is to propose that the cur-
ative to the world in which the question is asked. However, this would
rent partitioned context set C be re-
miss the fact that the participants in the conversation do not know which placed by the new partitioned context
∪
world they are in. The context set is precisely meant to model that they set PART(⟦𝜙⟧𝑤 , C).
have some common ground on what world they’re in but no more: there
are always multiple candidates for what the actual world is. Furthermore,
it is presumably inescapable that participants make some false presuppo-
sitions, in which case the actual world in which the utterance occurs isn’t
even part of the context set (even though everyone is acting as if the com-
mon ground contains the actual world).
So, it seems clear that we need to interpret the interrogative with re-
spect to the worlds in the context set and use the resulting set of propo-
sitions to partition the context set. But now we need to face the possi-
bility that the participants in the conversation where (16) is uttered are
uncertain about who the (relevant) students are. To set up a minimal test
scenario, assume that everyone knows that 𝑎 is a student but there’s un-
certainty about whether 𝑏 is. Now, assume that (16) is uttered against that
background. There are worlds in the context set where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the
students, and other worlds where only 𝑎 is a student. Our semantics will
deliver two different sets of propositions as the semantic value of the in-
terrogative for the two different kinds of worlds in the context set: for the
𝑎, 𝑏-worlds, we get the set containing the proposition that 𝑎 called and
the proposition that 𝑏 called; while for the 𝑎-worlds, we get the set that
contains only the proposition that 𝑎 called. How should the interrogative
partition the context set?
160 Q U E S T I O N S
For our minimal test scenario, that means that the context set will be
partitioned by the the set containing the proposition that 𝑎 called and the
proposition that 𝑏 called. By our definition of relevance, this means that
the answer “𝑏 called” will be relevant. But notice that when the context
set is updated by the assertion that 𝑏 called, there will still be worlds left
in the context set where 𝑏 is not a student (while it is now accepted that 𝑏
called). This is incorrect: answering that 𝑏 called when what was asked is
Which students called? surely commits one to 𝑏 being a student.
Option 3: Presupposition of consensus. Stalnaker 1978 in his analysis of
the speech act of assertion formulated three principles that he views as
“essential conditions of rational communication”:
1. A proposition asserted is always true in some but not all of the possi-
ble worlds in the context set.
2. Any assertive utterance should express a proposition, relative to each
possible world in the context set, and that proposition should have a
truth-value in each possible world in the context set.
3. The same proposition is expressed relative to each possible world in
the context set.
What’s relevant for us here is the third principle, which ensures that there
is common ground on which proposition the speaker is proposing to add
to the common ground. We suggest that essentially the same principle
applies to the speech act of asking a question: the same set of propositions
needs to be expressed by the interrogative relative to each possible world
in the context set. This then amounts to the assumption that for each wh-
phrase that is used, the interlocutors agree on a specific set of individuals
as its intended range. This means that in our test scenario, the question
Which students called? is a pragmatic error: asking the question presupposes
that it is common ground who the students are.
Hence, the final version of our definition is as follows:
(21) relies on appropriate assumptions about which phrases have the fea-
ture [WH]. For the time being, assume that certain words such as who,
what, how are marked as [WH] in the lexicon. These then will be the
only phrases that can be located right above ? in well-formed LFs, and
moreover, they cannot be located anywhere else. LF-high for the wh-
question in (19a) complies with (21), as does LF-low for the polar ques-
tion in (20b). LF-low in (19b) is ruled out because it has a phrase marked
[WH] in a location other than spec-of-?, and LF-high in (20a) is prohib-
ited because it has a phrase in spec-of-? which lacks [WH].
Propose an LF, say how it is derived in the syntax, compute its semantic inter-
pretation, and then compute the partition it imposes. For simplicity, assume in
this last part that the domain of people that who ranges over is just {s, e}, and
that the common ground before the question is totally uninformative, i.e, it is a
partitioned context set whose union is W (the set of all worlds whatsoever). How
many cells does the partition have and what are its cells? Regarding syntax, at-
tend in particular to the satisfaction of the Wh-Licensing Principle.
Exercise 8.2 In written language, a question containing or, such as (23), can be
ambiguous.
I N T E R R O G AT I V E C L A U S E S 163
The questioner may want to know which of the two professors you talked to
(“alternative-question reading”) or just whether you talked to at least one of
them (“polar-question reading”). Perhaps the alternative reading is more salient
out of the blue, but the polar reading can be facilitated by an appropriate context.
(E.g. imagine that your squib is on multiple-wh-constructions, and you have pre-
viously been told that you ought to consult a faculty member who has published
on this topic, namely David or Norvin.)
Your task in the exercise is to analyze the two readings of (23), by proposing
an appropriate LF for each reading and discussing its syntactic derivation as well
as its semantic and pragmatic interpretation. You should assume that English has
only one unambiguous word or, and its semantic type is ⟨𝑡, ⟨𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩. This means
that, for both readings, you must posit some amount of elided material in the
right disjunct, since or can only coordinate constituents of type 𝑡.
Third, there are verbs which take interrogative complements but are
ungrammatical with that-clauses.
(26) a. *Sakina asked/is wondering that Becky called.
b. Sakina asked/is wondering who called.
We will focus at first on the middle group, which Lahiri 2002 dubbed
the class of “responsive” verbs.
its complement is true. For simplicity, we assume here that apart from the
factive presupposition, the meaning of know is the same as the meaning of
believe, and so we can write the lexical entry in (27).
(27) ⟦know⟧𝑤 = 𝜆𝑝𝑠𝑡 : 𝑝 (𝑤) = 1. 𝜆𝑥𝑒 . ∀𝑤 ′ [𝑤 ′ ∈ DOX(𝑥, 𝑤) → 𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1] Here, DOX maps an individual 𝑥 and a
world 𝑤 into the set of worlds compatible
This entry was designed to work for know with a that-clause. What would with what 𝑥 believes in 𝑤.
happen if we tried to interpret an LF with an interrogative clause as the
sister of know? Evidently, we would run into a type-mismatch. On our
current analysis of interrogative clauses, their extensions are of type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩
and their intensions of type ⟨𝑠, ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩. Neither type can compose with the
type of know in (27) by means of any of our semantic rules.
What shall we do? Older literature on question-embedding made verbs
like know lexically ambiguous, with distinct (though not unrelated) lexical
entries for declarative-taking know and interrogative-taking know. More
recent work has pursued the strategy of positing a single unambiguous
verb and readjusting the semantic type of the interrogative complement.
Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982 did this first, and another influential ver-
sion of this approach originates with Dayal 1996. Dayal proposed that
the combination of the verb with the Karttunen-denotation of its com-
plement is mediated by an “answer operator”, which maps sets of propo-
sitions to propositions. We will follow Dayal’s general strategy in these
notes. We will entertain a couple of possible meanings for the answer op-
erator and talk about the empirical considerations that bear on the ques-
tion which meaning is correct.
The rough intuition to be implemented is that “to know who called”
means something like “to know the answer to the question ‘who called?”’.
(Paraphrases of this form work for all the verbs in this group, hence Lahiri’s
term “responsive verbs”.) The answer to a question is a proposition, hence
an object of a suitable semantic type to feed to the meaning of know in
(27). If the LFs of sentences like (25b) contain an operator that maps a
question-denotation to the proposition that’s the answer to that question,
we have a solution to the type-mismatch problem.
Since our syntax for interrogative clauses already happens to posit a
silent operator at the top edge of the clause (albeit one that we have so far
treated as semantically vacuous) we need not actually make the structure
more complex. Instead we can assume (following a suggestion by Danny
Fox) that our new answer operator appears instead of the previous vac-
uous one. This means that we base-generate it inside C as the sister of ?
and move it up for interpretability, leaving a type-⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩ trace as before.
Our LF-structure for a sentence with know and an interrogative comple-
ment then looks as in (28b).
I N T E R R O G AT I V E C L A U S E S 165
We will now focus on the task of proposing a meaning for ANS which
not only fixes the type-mismatch, but also yields reasonable truth condi-
tions for the know-sentence.
Let’s put this entry to work in a computation for the example sentence.
(30) a. computation of presupposition:
Let 𝑤 be a world. Then
⟦Sakina knows who called⟧𝑤 is defined
iff (by FA twice) Observe that the mother node of know
⟦know⟧𝑤 (⟦ANS 1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 )(𝑠) is defined is interpreted by plain Functional Ap-
plication (not by Intensional Functional
iff (by entry for know)
Application, which would have applied if
⟦ANS 1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 (𝑤) = 1 know were taking a declarative comple-
iff (by FA) ment). This is because the extension of the
( ) constituent headed by ANS is of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡 ⟩.
⟦ANS⟧𝑤 ⟦1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 (𝑤) = 1
iff by entry for ANS
∀𝑝 [⟦1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 (𝑝) = 1 &𝑝 (𝑤) = 1 → 𝑝 (𝑤) = 1]
This is a tautology, so we know that ⟦Sakina knows who called⟧𝑤
is defined for all 𝑤.
b. computation of truth condition:
Let 𝑤 be a world. Then
⟦Sakina knows who called⟧𝑤 = 1
iff (by FA twice)
⟦know⟧𝑤 (⟦ANS 1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 )(𝑠) = 1
iff (by entry for know and truth of presupposition)
∀𝑤 ′ [𝑤 ′ ∈ DOX(𝑠, 𝑤) → ⟦ANS 1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1]
c. We interrupt for an embedded computation:
⟦ANS 1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1
small iff (by entry for ANS)
∀𝑝 [⟦1 who 2 ?-𝑡 1 𝑡 2 called⟧𝑤 (𝑝) = 1 & 𝑝 (𝑤) = 1 → 𝑝 (𝑤 ′ ) = 1]
166 Q U E S T I O N S
In other words, the sentence Sakina knows who called is true in 𝑤 if and
only if, for every person who in fact called in 𝑤, Sakina believes (in 𝑤)
that this person called.
Recall that our denotation for a polar question is a singleton set. The sister
of ANS in (31b) denotes the set whose only member is the proposition that
Emily called. If we complete the calculation, we get the following truth
condition.
(32) presupposition of (31b): tautological
⟦(31b)⟧𝑤 = 1 iff
Emily called in 𝑤 → ∀𝑤 ′ [𝑤 ′ ∈ DOX(𝑠, 𝑤) → Emily called in 𝑤 ′ ]
I N T E R R O G AT I V E C L A U S E S 167
This says that the sentence (31a) is true in 𝑤 if either one of the following
two conditions is met: either (i) Emily did not call in 𝑤, or else (ii) she did
call in w and Sakina believes in w that she did. This is not satisfactory.
What it gets right is that, if Emily called but Sakina is unaware of this,
then the sentence is false. But it also predicts that, if Emily didn’t call, then
the sentence is true no matter what Sakina believes — even if she wrongly
believes that she did call.
A gut reaction to this problem is that the culprit is our semantics for
polar questions, not our ANS operator. This is what Karttunen would have
said. Indeed, he gave a different semantics for polar questions and did not
have this problem. In our variant of his theory, if we minimally changed How might we do that? Perhaps by giving
the semantics of polar questions so that the sister of ANS were to denote a meaning to whether, letting it denote a
function that maps a singleton set {𝑝 } to
the 2-membered set {that Emily called, that Emily didn’t call}, the truth
the set {𝑝, ¬𝑝 }.
conditions would come out correct without any revision to our entry
for ANS. (Exercise: Convince yourself of this.) This looks like a good way
out — at least at first. But when we look at further problem cases, we will
come to see it is a move that is neither sufficient nor necessary.
Let’s return to the case of the embedded constituent question in (28) The problem we’re discussing here was
and scrutinize the truth conditions we derived in (30) a bit more care- noticed by Karttunen 1977 in a footnote,
and he fixed it by complicating his lexi-
fully. Suppose that w is a world in which nobody called. Then the univer-
cal entry for interrogative-taking know.
sal quantification we computed in (30b) is trivially true: Whatever Sak- He ended up stating the truth condi-
ina’s beliefs in 𝑤 may be, the material conditional ‘[𝑥 called in 𝑤 → Sakina tion in the form of a disjunction, with
believes in 𝑤 that 𝑥 called]’ is true for every 𝑥 (since the antecedent is al- a special clause for the case where the
question-denotation only contains false
ways false). So the sentence (28) is predicted to be true, for example, in propositions. Heim 1994 showed how to
a world where nobody called but Sakina falsely believes that Emily and generalize Karttunen’s special clause to a
Julie called. This does not conform to our intuitions. general solution for all the problem cases
we consider in this section. The solution
Finally, as Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982 forcefully pointed out, even if
we will present in these lecture notes is
we only consider worlds in which some people did in fact call, the truth not quite the same as Heim’s. See papers
conditions imposed by our current (and Karttunen’s) semantics are too by Rullmann & Beck 1998, Beck & Rull-
lax. Suppose that only Emily called, but Sakina thinks that Emily, Julie, mann 1999, Sharvit 2002, and Sharvit &
Guerzoni 2003 for discussion and compar-
and Delphine all called. Would we say that Sakina knows who called?
ison.
We’d be reluctant to. But our semantics deems the sentence Sakina knows
who called to be true in this scenario. After all, Sakina does believe of ev-
ery person who in fact called (namely, of Emily), that that person called.
This is all that our predicted truth conditions require. If our analysis
were right, it simply shouldn’t matter how many false beliefs Sakina has
about people calling who did not in fact call.
Groenendijk & Stokhof argued that the correct semantics for Sakina
knows who called is what they dubbed “strongly exhaustive” — i.e., the
know-sentence is true only when Sakina is fully informed about who
called and who didn’t. She believes that they called of all the people who
did in fact call, and she believes that they didn’t call of all the ones who
didn’t. Can we revise our entry for the answer operator so that it delivers
this more stringent truth condition? Yes, here is how.
168 Q U E S T I O N S
Definition 8 (Update by question, draft revision) To ask a question Note that the relevant sentences 𝜙 are
by uttering a sentence 𝜙 is to propose that the current partitioned context of the form “ANS 𝑄” and relative to any
world 𝑤 denote the proposition that is
set C be replaced by the new partitioned context set
true of any world that agrees with 𝑤 on
∪ ∪ all the propositions in the set denoted by
{𝑝 : ∃𝑤 ∈ C. 𝑝 = ⟦𝜙⟧𝑤 ∩ C}. 𝑄 relative to 𝑤.
I N T E R R O G AT I V E C L A U S E S 169
We take each world 𝑤 in the prior context set in turn. We evaluate the
matrix question 𝜙 (= ANS 𝑄) in 𝑤 and intersect the resulting proposi-
tion with the context set, thus finding those worlds in the context set that
agree with 𝑤 on all the propositions in ⟦𝑄⟧𝑤 . We collect the resulting set
of sets of worlds to serve as the new partitioned context set.
There is a tricky issue here, which is a reprise of what we discussed on
page 159ff. Take again a test scenario where everyone knows that 𝑎 is a
student but there’s uncertainty about whether 𝑏 is. And there’s maximal
uncertainty about who called. Now, assume that (34) is uttered against
that background:
(34) Which students called?
There are worlds in the context set where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the students, and
other worlds where only 𝑎 is a student. We saw earlier that in such a con-
text, it is best to rule (34) out as pragmatically infelicitous because the set
of propositions denoted by the interrogative varies among the worlds in
the context set. This was easy enough to do in the system we were work-
ing with at that point. Now, however, we are considering the possibil-
ity that what is being uttered is really “ANS which students called”. That
structure has different semantic values across the worlds in the context set
simply because there are different true answers in those worlds (otherwise
why ask the question?). So, we can’t enforce a presupposition that the in- In an earlier version of these lecture notes,
terrogative have the same value (the same strong true answer) across the it was erroneously claimed that we could
evade the problem this way.
context set.
The set of sets of worlds we would get from Definition 8 in our test
scenario would not in fact be a partition of the context set:
(i) a world 𝑤 where 𝑎 called and 𝑏 is not a student will be lumped with
any world where 𝑎 called and 𝑏 is a student, no matter whether 𝑏
called (since the proposition that 𝑏 called is not in the denotation in
𝑤 of the underlying interrogative);
(ii) a world 𝑤 ′ where 𝑎 called and 𝑏 is a student who called will be
lumped only with other worlds where 𝑎 called and 𝑏 is a student
who called;
(iii) the two sets generated by 𝑤 and 𝑤 ′ are not disjoint, since they both
contain worlds where 𝑎 called and 𝑏 is a student who called.
The only way we can see to prevent this situation is to state directly in
the “update by question” rule that the update is only felicitous if it results
in a partition:
∪
If the resulting set of sets of worlds is not a partition of C, the utter-
ance is infelicitous.
We conclude this subsection by noting that we have now encountered In particular, note that we have derived a
a kind of presupposition that is not grounded in the denotational seman- condition on any wide-scope restriction
on wh-phrases that requires the set char-
tics of the sentences uttered but emerges from the rules and principles of
acterized by that restriction to be “settled”
pragmatics. in the prior context set. It would be inter-
esting to compare this result to ideas about
“d-linking” that are found in the literature
8.3.5 Embedding under rogative verbs on questions.
Exercise 8.4 Convince yourself that, given entry (35), the predicted truth con-
dition for Sakina wonders who called matches the informal paraphrase that we
gave in the text.
The basic idea in most current semantic treatments of plural DPs is that
plural definites and pronouns denote entities in 𝐷𝑒 , just like singular defi-
nites, pronouns, and proper names. The only difference is that the entities
denoted by plurals are more complex (and typically spatially discontin-
uous). A distinction is made within the domain 𝐷𝑒 , between so-called
“atoms” or “atomic individuals” (the referents of singular DPs) and “plu-
ralities” or “non-atomic individuals” (the referents of plural DPs). Non-
atomic individuals contain atomic individuals as (proper) parts; e.g., if
Lucy is one of the players, then ⟦Lucy⟧ (i.e., Lucy) is an atomic part of
⟦the players⟧. An atomic individual, on the other hand, has no atomic
parts other than itself. (An atom counts as an atomic part of itself.)
Given that 𝐷𝑒 contains pluralities along with atoms, predicate exten-
sions of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡⟩ are functions that apply to both atoms and pluralities.
In the case of common nouns, English has a morphological number dis-
tinction which seems to have semantic import:
(36) a. ⟦cat⟧𝑤 = 𝜆𝑥 . is a cat in 𝑤
b. ⟦cats⟧𝑤 = 𝜆𝑥 . every atomic part of 𝑥 is a cat in 𝑤
Being a cat entails being an atomic individual (this is how we agree to Notice that an entity that ⟦cats⟧𝑤 maps
understand our metalanguage). Therefore, the denotation of the singular to 1 is not necessarily a plurality. As in-
terpreted in (36b), the plural noun cats is
noun as defined in (36a) maps every plurality to 0. The pluralized noun
also true of a single cat, because of the fact
in (36b), on the other hand, maps to 1 those pluralities whose atomic parts that an atom is an atomic part of itself. It
are all cats. would be possible to revise (36b) so that
Verbs can show morphological number too, but we assume that this it requires 𝑥 to be non-atomic. But as we
will see below, the current formulation
is always due to morphological agreement with a number-marked sub- actually works better. The reason is, in a
ject, and that the number morphology on the verb is not interpreted it- nutshell, that “One.” is a perfectly good
self. As far as semantics is concerned, verbs are “number neutral” and typ- answer to a how-many question.
ically can be true indiscriminately of both atoms and pluralities. This is
reflected, for example, in a lexical entry like (37).
(37) ⟦meow⟧𝑤 = 𝜆𝑥 . every atomic part of 𝑥 meows in 𝑤
The condition in (37) can be met by both pluralities and atoms. A plu-
rality is mapped to 1 iff all its atomic parts meow, and an atom is mapped
to 1 if it itself meows. (Recall that every atom counts as an atomic part of
itself.)
We can count the atomic parts of a plural individual. For example, the
plural individual composed of Lucy, Kathellen, and Shanice has 3 atomic
parts. Let’s have a concise notation for this.
172 Q U E S T I O N S
With this little bit of plural semantics in place, we can now introduce Actually, Hackl assumes (with most of the
Hackl 2001’s semantics for many and an appropriate semantics for inter- literature on adjectives and gradability)
that there is an additional basic type 𝑑
rogative how that will go with it. Hackl proposes that many is not by itself
(for “degrees”) separate from type 𝑒. The
a quantificational determiner of type ⟨𝑒𝑡, ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩. Rather it is looking for number argument of many is a special case
an argument which denotes a number, and only after it has been saturated of a degree argument, and the type for
with such an argument, the resulting phrase is a quantificational deter- many is then ⟨𝑑, ⟨𝑒𝑡, ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡 ⟩⟩ ⟩.
miner. So the type of many is type ⟨𝑒, ⟨𝑒𝑡, ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡⟩⟩⟩ — assuming that num- Hackl’s analysis implies that the superfi-
bers are abstract individuals of some kind, hence members of 𝐷𝑒 — and its cially simplest uses of many, as in Many
entry is as in (39). cats meowed, are actually more complex
at LF: the argument position of many is
(39) ⟦many⟧ = 𝜆𝑛 : 𝑛 is a number. 𝜆𝑓𝑒𝑡 .𝜆𝑔𝑒𝑡 . ∃𝑥 [#(𝑥) = 𝑛 & 𝑓 (𝑥) = bound by a covert POS (“positive opera-
1 & 𝑔(𝑥) = 1] tor”), which is a quantifier over numbers
(degrees) and means something like ‘a
When building a sentence with many, in the simplest case we would fill number (degree) above the contextually
the first argument slot of many with a word that refers to a number. This specified threshold’.
Now we use our entries for cats and meow, and this becomes (42).
(42) ∃𝑥 [#(𝑥) = 3
& every atomic part of 𝑥 is a cat in @
& every atomic part of 𝑥 meows in @ ]
In a how-many question, the argument slot that was saturated by that or The main source for the argument in this
three in (40) is instead occupied by the wh-word how. In Karttunen’s the- section is Arnim von Stechow’s paper
“Against LF pied-piping” (von Stechow
ory, this will be an existential quantifier, equivalent to some number.
1996).
(43) ⟦how⟧ = 𝜆𝑓𝑒𝑡 . ∃𝑛[𝑛 is a number & 𝑓 (𝑛) = 1]
(type ⟨𝑒𝑡, 𝑡⟩, a generalized quantifier) For Hackl, it would be type ⟨𝑑𝑡, 𝑡 ⟩, a
generalized quantifier over degrees.
This semantic type is not interpretable in situ as the sister of many, and
must undergo (covert) movement for interpretability. With this in mind,
let’s attempt a syntactic derivation for the question How many cats did you
adopt?
(44) a. [𝐶 ? OP] [you adopted how many cats]
b. OP 5 [ [? 𝑡 5 ] [you adopted how many cats] ]
c. OP 5[how many cats 1 [[? 𝑡 5 ] you adopted 𝑡 1 ]
d. OP 5[how 2[𝑡 2 many cats 1[[? 𝑡 5 ] you adopted 𝑡 1 ] ] ]
We have three movements that derive the LF from the base generated
structure in (44a): the movement of the empty OP in (44b), the wh-
movement of the wh-phrase how many cats in (44c), and the QR of the
quantifier how in (44d).
We can check the semantic types to confirm that we have derived an
interpretable structure (do this as an exercise). Let’s compute what (44d)
means. (The details are left as an exercise. Here we conflate sets of propo-
sitions with their characteristic functions.)
(45) ⟦(44d)⟧@ =
…
= {𝑝 : ∃𝑛 [𝑛 is a number & ∃𝑥 [#(𝑥) = 𝑛 & ⟦cats⟧@ (𝑥) = 1] &
𝑝 = 𝜆𝑤 .⟦adopt⟧𝑤 (𝑥)(you)]}
With a little bit of Predicate Logic reasoning, we can rewrite this equiva- We are exploiting the equivalence of vari-
lently as follows: ous scopal arrangements in a formula with
existential quantifiers and conjunctions.
(46) {𝑝 : ∃𝑥 [ ∃𝑛[𝑛 is a number & #(𝑥) = 𝑛] & ⟦cats⟧@ (𝑥) = 1 & The following four are all equivalent.
𝑝 = 𝜆𝑤 .⟦adopt⟧𝑤 (𝑥) (you)]} ∃𝑥 [𝐹𝑥 & ∃𝑦 [𝑅𝑥 𝑦 & 𝐺 𝑦 ] ]
∃𝑥 ∃𝑦 [𝐹𝑥 & 𝑅𝑥 𝑦 & 𝐺 𝑦 ]
We can now contemplate the underlined part and convince ourselves that ∃𝑦∃𝑥 [𝐹𝑥 & 𝑅𝑥 𝑦 & 𝐺 𝑦 ]
∃𝑦 [∃𝑥 [𝐹𝑥 & 𝑅𝑥 𝑦 ] & 𝐺 𝑦 ]
this part is a tautology. It just says that 𝑥 has some number or other of
atomic parts, which cannot fail to be true. So we might as well drop this
conjunct and rewrite (46) as (47).
(47) {𝑝 : ∃𝑥 [⟦cats⟧@ (𝑥) = 1 & 𝑝 = 𝜆𝑤 .⟦adopt⟧𝑤 (𝑥) (you)]}
question is synonymous with (or at least shares a reading with) the which-
question Which cats did you adopt? This would be unfortunate for our the-
ory.
Upon closer inspection of (44d), however, it turns out that our theory
does not actually generate this LF. We have neglected to check whether
(44d) conforms to the Wh-Licensing Principle, repeated here.
(48) At LF, a phrase 𝛼 occupies a specifier position of ? if and only if 𝛼
has the feature [WH].
In (44d), we have two phrases that are scoped above ?, namely how and 𝑡 2
many cats. Let’s say that the positions they occupy both count as specifier
positions of ? (similar to what one has to say for multiple questions like
who ate what? — see Exercise 8.1). Then (48) would require that both of
these phrases have the feature [WH]. But only how actually does, at least
on our current assumption that [WH] is a lexical property possessed by
only a small set of words. The other phrase that is scoped above ? in (44d)
is 𝑡 2 many cats, which does not carry the feature [WH]. So the structure
(44d) is filtered out by the Wh-Licensing principle as syntactically ill-
formed. And this is a good thing, because it means we don’t generate the
unwelcome reading in (47).
We still have to worry, however, about how we generate the read-
ing that our example actually does have. Is there a second, well-formed,
LF for our example? The answer is yes if our syntax allows for “recon-
struction”, i.e. some mechanism by which overtly moved phrases can be
restored to (one of ) their pre-moved positions at LF. In order to satisfy
the Wh-Licensing Principle, reconstruction must apply to the phrase 𝑡 2
many cats (though not, of course, to how). Where can this phrase be re-
constructed to? Well, if we restored it all the way down to its original base
position as the object of adopt, it wouldn’t be interpretable there, because
quantifiers are not interpretable in object positions. But if we can assume
that wh-movement proceeds (or at least is allowed to proceed) successive
cyclically, and that an object wh-phrase can stop over e.g. at the edge of
VP before it moves on to Spec-CP, we can target this intermediate land-
ing site for reconstruction. (Assuming the VP-internal subject hypothe-
sis, VPs are semantically of type 𝑡 and hence quantifiers are interpretable
at their edges.) By means of reconstruction, we can thus obtain another
LF that is both interpretable and in compliance with the WH-Licensing
principle.
(49) OP 5[how 2[[? 𝑡 5 ] 𝑡 2 many cats 1[you adopted 𝑡 1 ] ] ]
This set contains one proposition per number. It contains the proposi-
tion that you adopted 1 cat, the proposition that you adopted 2 cats, the
proposition that you adopted 3 cats, etc. This prediction accords well with
what we feel are expected answers to the question how many cats did you
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