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Mareike Jenner
First of all, I would like to thank Lina Aboujieb, the editor of this book
and her assistant Ellie Freedman, for their support throughout the
development of this book. I am also indebted to the peer reviewers for
their insightful comments to help develop this project.
This research would not have been possible without the consistent
support of friends and colleagues, such as Matt Hills, Tanya Horeck,
Glen Creeber, Stephanie Jones, Lisa Richards and others.
I would also like to thank my family for their ongoing support as well
as Sandra, Christina, Judith and Laura, without whom none of this is
possible.
v
Contents
vii
viii Contents
Part IV Conclusion
14 Conclusion 263
Bibliography 271
Index 293
CHAPTER 1
At the 2009 Emmy awards, host Neil Patrick Harris reprised his role as
Dr. Horrible from the three-part-musical Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along-Blog
(iTunes, 2008). This had been written and directed by Joss Whedon dur-
ing the 2007–2008 Hollywood writer’s strike and distributed via iTunes
as a webseries, bypassing traditional broadcasting systems. In the Emmy
sketch, Dr. Horrible threatens that online series will take over television,
effectively replacing the industry present at the event. Dr. Horrible’s
nemesis Captain Hammer (Nathan Fillion), however, states: “Don’t
worry, America. I’ve mastered this internet and I’m here to tell you:
it’s nothing but a fad! TV is here to stay! […] People will always need
big, glossy, shiny, gloss-covered entertainment. And Hollywood will be
there to provide it. Like the Ottoman empire, the music industry and
Zima, we’re here to stay. Musical villains, piano-playing cats, they’re a
flash in the pan!”. Much like Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog itself can be
read as a deliberate protest against the television industry in times of bit-
ter conflict, the sketch points to the threats online video services pose to
traditional industry structures. Even though it pokes fun at online vid-
eo’s frequent need for buffering, Captain Hammer’s short-sighted view
of the internet is a jibe against the television industry’s unpreparedness
for the competition through online streaming services. Only four years
later, the Emmy awards included three nominations for House of Cards
(Netflix, 2013–) and one nomination for the Netflix-produced season 4
of Arrested Development (Fox, 2003–6; Netflix, 2013–).
2007, the year before Dr. Horrible’s Sing-Along Blog was released
on iTunes, was the year the BBC iPlayer was launched in the UK, a
major signal that television would soon move online. It is also the point
Michael Curtin pinpoints as a moment when some of the enormous
shifts that currently dominate television first occurred: In the United
States, Nielsen introduced ratings for advertisements in light of wide-
spread DVR use. There was also growing competition from the video
game industry, culminating in the 2007–2008 Hollywood writer’s strike,
which compromised US television schedules significantly:
or, more accurately, DVD publishing (see Lotz 2014, 2017). DVD
box sets of TV series, after all, were a key technology to allow not just
time-shifting, but self-scheduling independent from television schedules.
These distinctions are more than just semantics, as broadcasting sug-
gests a linear, synchronised (and communal) experience, whereas with
publishing, commodities can be consumed as scheduled by users. Binge-
watching as viewing practice prefigures OTT, particularly with the ris-
ing popularity of DVD box sets in the early 2000s (Lotz 2014, location
1780). Nevertheless, Netflix’ active promotion of the term and its signif-
icance to Netflix suggests its centrality to the brand. Overturning these
significant, even central, aspects, might position Netflix as an alternative
to television (like DVDs), but not as the medium itself.
And yet, in popular and academic discourse, Netflix is often perceived
as television. First and foremost, this is linked to the way Netflix defines,
and consequently markets, itself: In a GQ profile of Netflix founder
and CEO Reed Hastings in January 2013, he states that the goal “is to
become HBO faster than HBO can become us” (Hass 2013). This needs
to be read as an explicit challenge to HBO, leader of the so-called ‘qual-
ity revolution’ of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Much like HBO, sev-
eral US cable channels (such as AMC, Showtime, FX) have built their
brand identity around high-quality original drama. HBO remains central
to contemporary ideas of ‘quality’ TV. Netflix’ House of Cards, with its
first episode directed by David Fincher, starring Academy Award winner
Kevin Spacey and Robin Wright, an adaptation of the BBC series of the
same title, was a highly ambitious project that imitated HBO’s brand-
ing strategy (see Johnson 2012, 37–59). By positioning itself as compet-
itor to HBO, Netflix implicitly defined itself as television, rather than an
online broadcaster like YouTube. There lies some irony in the fact that
Netflix challenged HBO, a channel that marketed itself for years as being
‘not TV’. HBO is received via cable broadcasting systems and submits
to the ‘rules’ of the television schedule where one episode is aired every
week. Despite its marketing, which aimed to highlight the difference of
its output from other television content, HBO is TV. Second, Netflix
positioned itself as television through its productions: Its first ‘Netflix
Original’, Lilyhammer was first licensed and later co-produced with
Norwegian Public Service Broadcaster NRK.1 An early original series was
1 Most aspects of the production of Lilyhammer are Norwegian, including most of the
cast, only part of the financing comes from Netflix and the main character is played by
6 M. JENNER
In the run-up to its launch in Britain, Netflix joined major British broad-
casters Sky, the BBC, and Channel 4 at Los Angeles Screenings, where
deals for the international distribution of American content are negotiated.
(2016, 226)
Ward argues that, with this appearance, Netflix positioned itself as televi-
sion channel and exporter of American content to other territories, join-
ing other industry figures at important sales events. In his rather polemic
book Television is the New Television, journalist Michael Wolff argues:
American actor Steven Van Zandt, known from The Sopranos (HBO 1999–2007) (see
Mikos and Gamula 2014, 90–4).
2 In its illegal version, DVD box sets were frequently ripped and put online for the pur-
poses of illegal downloads. This also enabled binge-watching via PCs or laptops if viewers
did not wish to go through the extra effort (and expense) of burning DVDs.
1 INTRODUCTION: NETFLIX AND THE RE-INVENTION OF TELEVISION 7
and the concept of television is permeable. This leads back to the first
point on this list: By stating that Netflix is television, Netflix can become
television.
Television has never been a stable object easily defined, but discur-
sively constructed via social practices, spaces, content, industry, or tech-
nological discourses. Often, the shifts in how we understand or interact
with television feel less radical than they actually are, which is why a dis-
cursive construction of television can accommodate shifts in technology
and habits. As Lisa Gitelman explains:
Much of this can be explained via existing and changing media habits.
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun argues:
Not all content labelled Netflix Originals can be separated into a binary
of in-house production and Netflix Originals. Lilyhammer was produced
by Norwegian channel NRK first, but Netflix bought it after only its
pilot was produced and is sharing in its production costs. In its dealings
with Marvel Studios, both production companies are heavily invested.
Yet, it is considered important, here, to acknowledge that much of the
content branded ‘Netflix Original’ is only considered original due to the
companies’ rather liberal usage of the word. Looking at Netflix as global
company, it is only prudent to acknowledge that different content can be
featured under this term.
There are two main themes to this book: the first one is to consider
how Netflix changes ideas of what television is. The second theme that
runs through this book is a consideration of the nexus of concepts of
control and choice, and their relationship with power and subversion.
Netflix builds on the marketing language of previous ancillary technol-
ogy of television by emphasising that it offers both, more control and
more choice, to viewers. Yet, much as with previous technologies, as
outlined in Part I, this control does not translate to substantial shifts in
power. Though Netflix disrupts the way media systems are organised,
particularly in the United States, it hardly offers a subversion that leads
to sustainable changes to the organisation of power—at least not in the
relationship between audiences and industry. Yet, control can be exer-
cised by many actors and means something different in each context.
Different ancillary technologies allow for different kinds of control, but
national media systems in a globalised world, also offer different forms
of control to broadcasters. Overall, the central argument is that, even
though Netflix changes conceptions of television, it does not substan-
tially overturn relations of power between audience, industry and the
nation state within neoliberal capitalist systems. Nevertheless, it impacts
on these regimes of control and power by restructuring how they are
organised.
Netflix as TV IV
Derek Kompare notes in Rerun Nation (2005) that the different tech-
nological innovations to television need to be understood not merely
as technological innovation, but “reconceptions, profoundly altering
our relationship with dominant media institutions, and with media cul-
ture in general” (2005, 199, italics in the original). Each phase or stage
10 M. JENNER
In the United States, TVI, dating from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s,
is the era of channel scarcity, the mass audience, and three-network hegem-
ony. TVII, dating from roughly the early 1980s to the late 1990s, is the
era of channel/network expansion, quality television, and network brand-
ing strategies. TVIII, dating from the late 1990s to the present, is the era
of proliferating digital distribution platforms, further audience fragmen-
tation, and, as Rogers, Epstein and Reeves [2002] suggest, a shift from
second-order to first-order commodity relations. (Pearson 2011, location
1262–6)
The first era is characterized by a few channels broadcasting for part of the
day only. It was the era of scarcity, which lasted for most countries until
the late 1970s or early 1980s. As broadcasting developed, the era of scar-
city gradually gave way to an era of availability, where several channels
continuously jostled for attention, often with more competition from
cable and satellite services. The third era, the era of plenty, is confidently
predicted by the television industry itself. It is foreseen as an era in which
television programmes (or, as they will be known, ‘content’ or ‘product’)
will be accessible through a variety of technologies, the sum of which will
give consumers the new phenomenon of ‘television on demand’ as well as
‘interactive television’. The era of plenty is predicted even as most nations
and individuals are still coming to terms with the transition to the era of
availability. (2000, 39)
Ellis’ division into eras and the model of TV I, II, and III overlap in
many respects. But though these ‘periods’ of television work well as a
broad—if simplified—conceptualisation of television history, it is not
the only way to look at it. In Video Revolutions (2014), Newman maps
12 M. JENNER
different meanings of the term video. He divides the history of the term
into three different phases:
The first phase covers television’s early years (at least in the United
States) and, thus, was often associated with television’s ‘liveness’. The
second phase covers the use of magnetic tape, which enabled American
broadcasters to account for the USA’s different time zones by time-de-
laying broadcasts recorded in New York for West Coast audiences. As
Newman points out, film and video were viewed as distinct media, with
video functioning more as an extension of live broadcasting. This prop-
erty also speaks to video’s later conceptualisation as time-shifting tech-
nology in the form of Betamax in the 1970s. Covering the term and
cultural use of video rather than focussing on Betamax or VCR technol-
ogies, Newman also points to video’s use in art, where video was used
to formulate ideas that run counter to mass communication’s ideolog-
ical outlook(s). The third era sees the meaning of the term widened to
essentially mean recorded moving images. These three phases can also
be viewed as phases that determine the technologies television is associ-
ated with. In the first stage, when video and television are virtually inter-
changeable, the medium is defined through ‘liveness’ and towards the
end of the phase, a degree of viewer independence is introduced through
the remote control. The second phase could be termed the age of the
VCR and cable, offering vast amounts of choice, the ability to time-
shift and autonomously schedule (predominantly films). The third stage
describes the shift towards the digital.
1 INTRODUCTION: NETFLIX AND THE RE-INVENTION OF TELEVISION 13
All these ‘phases’, ‘stages’ or eras seem to refer to the same phenom-
ena. Although all are simplifications of complex, nationally specific dis-
courses—always determined and necessitated by the approaches taken to
analyse them—what cannot be denied is that they are led by and linked
to technological shifts. TV I is marked by the (increasingly) affordable
television set itself, TV II by more affordable and accurate remote con-
trols, cable and satellite technology as well as the VCR, and TV III by
DVD and the DVR and digital broadcasting technologies. While each
period is marked by its own technological innovations, this is linked with
industrial shifts, changes in content (particularly aesthetics and narrative
forms), associated viewing habits and shifts in the social connotations of
television. However, these eras are not neatly contained phases or stages.
Key aspects may be the same (technology, industry, content), but his-
torical moments can never be directly pinpointed. Partly, this may be
an issue of perspective (national context, focus on specific aspects of a
discourse), but these developments are also relatively slow-moving. For
each successful technology, a range of other technologies fail. Some
industry practices may have been developed outside of the TV industry
or outside of the industrial structures of conglomeration. Thus, these
‘phases’ need to be viewed as rough conceptualisations with messy, often
blurry, outlines. Newman starts Video Revolutions by stating:
At different times video has been different things for different people,
and its history is more than just a progression of material formats: cam-
eras, transmitters and receivers, tapes and discs, decks that record and play
them, digital files, apps and interfaces. It is also a history of ideas about
technology and culture, and relations and distinctions among various types
of media and the and the social needs giving rise to their uses. (2014, 1)
But it remains true that, after a great deal of intensive research and devel-
opment, the domestic television set is in a number of ways an inefficient
medium of visual broadcasting. Its visual inefficiency by comparison with
the cinema is especially striking, whereas in the case of radio there was by
the 1930s a highly efficient sound broadcasting receiver, without any real
competitors in its own line. Within the limits of the television home-set
emphasis it has so far not been possible to make more than minor qualita-
tive improvements. Higher-definition systems, and colour, have still only
brought the domestic television set, as a machine, to the standard of a very
1 INTRODUCTION: NETFLIX AND THE RE-INVENTION OF TELEVISION 15
inferior kind of cinema. Yet most people have adapted to this inferior visual
medium, in an unusual kind of preference for an inferior immediate tech-
nology, because of the social complex – and especially that of the privatised
home – within which broadcasting, as a system, is operative. (Williams
1974, 28)
3 At the time of Williams’ writing, TV I was on the cusp of TV II, though many technol-
4 Yet, Spielberg’s involvement with Columbo pre-dates his film debut Jaws (Spielberg
1975).
1 INTRODUCTION: NETFLIX AND THE RE-INVENTION OF TELEVISION 17
[Television] is both a thing and a conduit for electronic signals, both a fur-
niture in a room and a window to an imaged elsewhere, both a commodity
and a way of looking at commodities. (2001, 93)
Thus, the complexity of the medium means that no one approach can
grasp it and any attempts to define what television is in its entirety will
inevitably be limited. Thus, this book cannot hope to grasp the medium
in its full complexity. It highlights some important discourses that consti-
tute what television is and what it has been in the past. In this, it draws
attention to the discursive nature of the medium without claiming to be
able to do justice to the ‘whole’ of the medium. Because of this, it uses
Netflix as a spectre to theorise a range of shifts in the discursive construc-
tion of television.
This book thinks about Netflix as part of a reconception of television
that is still ongoing. This reconception is a process that unites a variety of
discourses, of which Netflix is only one. As Johnson outlines in the intro-
duction of his edited collection From Networks to Netflix:
The problem about studying the present— or even the recent past— is
that it is never over, and one is very much entangled and enmeshed within
the discourse of the day. Critical distance, that much-lauded academic
quality that allows one to understand the social, economic, historically
inflected context of a cultural production, is elusive when that medium and
its attendant technologies are right there in front of us, part of our regu-
larly self-scheduled programs and processes. (2011, 12)
While writing this book, Netflix has not only introduced a vast array
of new programmes and translation languages, it has also performed
updates to its interface, some to comply with regulations that are often
exclusive to the EU. Discourses about the ‘threat’ Netflix poses to
American or other national media systems have become less frenzied over
the past few years. Yet, the initial social discourses of cultural legitima-
tion via ‘quality’ TV, though still persistent, have also been countered
by moral outrage, even moral panic, over depictions of teen suicide in
13 Reasons Why (2017–) or representations of anorexia in To the Bone
1 INTRODUCTION: NETFLIX AND THE RE-INVENTION OF TELEVISION 19
(Noxon 2017) (see, e.g., Allem 2017; Proctor 2017). The pace with
which Netflix has managed to establish itself in the United States and
in transnational markets is remarkable, but the discourse surrounding it
tends to shift with it. New critical perspectives are also bound to emerge.
This book is written with these problems in mind and, partly because of
this, there is an effort to tie Netflix to television history throughout this
book. Grounding Netflix in the history of a medium makes it a less ‘slip-
pery’ object of analysis.
Gitelman (2006) warns of treating media as a singular entity with
agency, or, on the other side of the spectrum, valorising the individual
inventor. This book frequently uses phrases along the lines of ‘Netflix
does…’. Netflix is understood here as a company and its language and
marketing tie it to the medium (and industry) of television. Netflix as a
company consists of complex hierarchies and its achievements and fail-
ures are the result of complicated collective processes. Though CEO
Reed Hastings and Chief Content Officer Ted Sarandos have emerged
as public faces and spokespersons for Netflix, their main function is to
explain and, ideally, sell Netflix to customers and investors. As such, they
develop narratives that suggest a consistency of processes within the
company and the discourse of television that rarely exists. Things become
even more complicated when discussing the medium of television itself.
The technology itself is about transmitting and receiving broadcasting
signals, while those who broadcast those signals (whether through tra-
ditional TV signals, cable, satellite, or Wi-Fi) abide a specific set of rules
and norms. Yet, these might differ significantly depending on the broad-
cast technology used: In the United States, regulation of cable television
is significantly different from regulations for free-to-air television (see,
e.g., Santo 2008). The EU laws governing streaming are different than
those regulating ‘traditional’ broadcasting. The technology of the tele-
vision set mediates some of these norms, but the narrative and aesthetic
norms of television also contain much of what television is. This book
tries to pin down some of the constantly shifting discourses regarding
television. In cases where the medium is invested with agency, this needs
to be understood as a complicated, constantly shifting, socially con-
structed network of meaning.
TV IV is understood here as a process. This process brings together
discourses of technology, audience behaviour, industry, policy, national
media systems, etc. Netflix is currently an important part of TV IV, but
it is hardly the only one. Nevertheless, Netflix’ usage of binge-watching
20 M. JENNER
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