Language and Language Use Noba.

pdf
Salvo no Dropbox • 28 de out de 2019 23:53

"

Browse Content / Language and Language Use

Language and
Language Use
By Yoshihisa Kashima
University of Melbourne

Humans have the capacity to use complex

language, far more than any other species on
Earth. We cooperate with each other to use
language for communication; language is
often used to communicate about and even
construct and maintain our social world.
Language use and human sociality are
inseparable parts of Homo sapiens as a
biological species.

! Share
Tags:
Audience design, Common ground,
Situation model, Social brain hypothesis

Learning Objectives

De!ne basic terms used to describe

language use.

Describe the process by which people can

share new information by using language.

Characterize the typical content of

conversation and its social implications.

Characterize psychological consequences

of language use and give an example.

Introduction

Imagine two men of 30-something age, Adam

and Ben, walking down the corridor. Judging
from their clothing, they are young
businessmen, taking a break from work. They
then have this exchange.

Adam: “You know, Gary bought a

ring.”
Ben: "Oh yeah? For Mary, isn't it?"
(Adam nods.)

If you are watching this scene and hearing

their conversation, what can you guess from
this? First of all, you’d guess that Gary bought
a ring for Mary, whoever Gary and Mary might
be. Perhaps you would infer that Gary is
getting married to Mary. What else can you
guess? Perhaps that Adam and Ben are fairly
close colleagues, and both of them know Gary
and Mary reasonably well. In other words, you
can guess the social relationships
surrounding the people who are engaging in
the conversation and the people whom they
are talking about.
Language is an essential tool that enables us to live
the kind of lives we do. Much of contemporary
human civilization wouldn’t have been possible
without it. [Image: Marc Wathieu,
https://goo.gl/jNSzTC, CC BY-NC 2.0,
https://goo.gl/VnKlK8]

Language is used in our everyday lives. If

psychology is a science of behavior, scienti!c
investigation of language use must be one of
the most central topics—this is because
language use is ubiquitous. Every human
group has a language; human infants (except
those who have unfortunate disabilities) learn
at least one language without being taught
explicitly. Even when children who don’t have
much language to begin with are brought
together, they can begin to develop and use
their own language. There is at least one
known instance where children who had had
little language were brought together and
developed their own language spontaneously
with minimum input from adults. In Nicaragua
in the 1980s, deaf children who were
separately raised in various locations were
brought together to schools for the !rst time.
Teachers tried to teach them Spanish with
little success. However, they began to notice
that the children were using their hands and
gestures, apparently to communicate with
each other. Linguists were brought in to !nd
out what was happening—it turned out the
children had developed their own sign
language by themselves. That was the birth of
a new language, Nicaraguan Sign Language
(Kegl, Senghas, & Coppola, 1999). Language is
ubiquitous, and we humans are born to use it.

How Do We Use Language?

If language is so ubiquitous, how do we

actually use it? To be sure, some of us use it
to write diaries and poetry, but the primary
form of language use is interpersonal. That’s
how we learn language, and that’s how we
use it. Just like Adam and Ben, we exchange
words and utterances to communicate with
each other. Let’s consider the simplest case of
two people, Adam and Ben, talking with each
other. According to Clark (1996), in order for
them to carry out a conversation, they must
keep track of common ground. Common
ground is a set of knowledge that the speaker
and listener share and they think, assume, or
otherwise take for granted that they share.
So, when Adam says, “Gary bought a ring,” he
takes for granted that Ben knows the
meaning of the words he is using, whom Gary
is, and what buying a ring means. When Ben
says, “For Mary, isn’t it?” he takes for granted
that Adam knows the meaning of these
words, who Mary is, and what buying a ring
for someone means. All these are part of their
common ground.

The "common ground" in a conversation helps

people coordinate their language use. And as
conversations progress common ground shifts and
changes as the participants add new information
and cooperate to help one another understand.
[Image: Converse College, https://goo.gl/UhbMQH,
CC BY-NC 2.0, https://goo.gl/VnKlK8]

Note that, when Adam presents the

information about Gary’s purchase of a ring,
Ben responds by presenting his inference
about who the recipient of the ring might be,
namely, Mary. In conversational terms, Ben’s
utterance acts as evidence for his
comprehension of Adam’s utterance—“Yes, I
understood that Gary bought a ring”—and
Adam’s nod acts as evidence that he now has
understood what Ben has said too—“Yes, I
understood that you understood that Gary
has bought a ring for Mary.” This new
information is now added to the initial
common ground. Thus, the pair of utterances
by Adam and Ben (called an adjacency pair)
together with Adam’s a"rmative nod jointly
completes one proposition, “Gary bought a
ring for Mary,” and adds this information to
their common ground. This way, common
ground changes as we talk, gathering new
information that we agree on and have
evidence that we share. It evolves as people
take turns to assume the roles of speaker and
listener, and actively engage in the exchange
of meaning.

Common ground helps people coordinate

their language use. For instance, when a
speaker says something to a listener, he or
she takes into account their common ground,
that is, what the speaker thinks the listener
knows. Adam said what he did because he
knew Ben would know who Gary was. He’d
have said, “A friend of mine is getting
married,” to another colleague who wouldn’t
know Gary. This is called audience design
(Fussell & Krauss, 1992); speakers design their
utterances for their audiences by taking into
account the audiences’ knowledge. If their
audiences are seen to be knowledgeable
about an object (such as Ben about Gary),
they tend to use a brief label of the object (i.e.,
Gary); for a less knowledgeable audience, they
use more descriptive words (e.g., “a friend of
mine”) to help the audience understand their
utterances (Box 1).
So, language use is a cooperative activity, but
how do we coordinate our language use in a
conversational setting? To be sure, we have a
conversation in small groups. The number of
people engaging in a conversation at a time is
rarely more than four. By some counts (e.g.,
Dunbar, Duncan, & Nettle, 1995; James, 1953),
more than 90 percent of conversations
happen in a group of four individuals or less.
Certainly, coordinating conversation among
four is not as di"cult as coordinating
conversation among 10. But, even among
only four people, if you think about it,
everyday conversation is an almost
miraculous achievement. We typically have a
conversation by rapidly exchanging words
and utterances in real time in a noisy
environment. Think about your conversation
at home in the morning, at a bus stop, in a
shopping mall. How can we keep track of our
common ground under such circumstances?

Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue that we

achieve our conversational coordination by
virtue of our ability to interactively align each
other’s actions at di#erent levels of language
use: lexicon (i.e., words and expressions),
syntax (i.e., grammatical rules for arranging
words and expressions together), as well as
speech rate and accent. For instance, when
one person uses a certain expression to refer
to an object in a conversation, others tend to
use the same expression (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986). Furthermore, if someone says
“the cowboy o#ered a banana to the robber,”
rather than “the cowboy o#ered the robber a
banana,” others are more likely to use the
same syntactic structure (e.g., “the girl gave a
book to the boy” rather than “the girl gave the
boy a book”) even if di#erent words are
involved (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland,
2000). Finally, people in conversation tend to
exhibit similar accents and rates of speech,
and they are often associated with people’s
social identity (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland,
1991). So, if you have lived in di#erent places
where people have somewhat di#erent
accents (e.g., United States and United
Kingdom), you might have noticed that you
speak with Americans with an American
accent, but speak with Britons with a British
accent.

Pickering and Garrod (2004) suggest that

these interpersonal alignments at di#erent
levels of language use can activate similar
situation models in the minds of those who
are engaged in a conversation. Situation
models are representations about the topic of
a conversation. So, if you are talking about
Gary and Mary with your friends, you might
have a situation model of Gary giving Mary a
ring in your mind. Pickering and Garrod’s
theory is that as you describe this situation
using language, others in the conversation
begin to use similar words and grammar, and
many other aspects of language use
converge. As you all do so, similar situation
models begin to be built in everyone’s mind
through the mechanism known as priming.
Priming occurs when your thinking about one
concept (e.g., “ring”) reminds you about other
related concepts (e.g., “marriage”, “wedding
ceremony”). So, if everyone in the
conversation knows about Gary, Mary, and
the usual course of events associated with a
ring—engagement, wedding, marriage, etc.—
everyone is likely to construct a shared
situation model about Gary and Mary. Thus,
making use of our highly developed
interpersonal ability to imitate (i.e., executing
the same action as another person) and
cognitive ability to infer (i.e., one idea leading
to other ideas), we humans coordinate our
common ground, share situation models, and
communicate with each other.
What Do We Talk About?

Studies show that people love to gossip. By

gossiping, humans can communicate and share their
representations about their social world—who their
friends and enemies are, what the right thing to do
is under what circumstances, and so on. [Image:
aqua.mech, https://goo.gl/Q7Ap4b, CC BY 2.0,
https://goo.gl/T4qgSp]
What are humans doing when we are talking?
Surely, we can communicate about mundane
things such as what to have for dinner, but
also more complex and abstract things such
as the meaning of life and death, liberty,
equality, and fraternity, and many other
philosophical thoughts. Well, when naturally
occurring conversations were actually
observed (Dunbar, Marriott, & Duncan, 1997),
a staggering 60%–70% of everyday
conversation, for both men and women,
turned out to be gossip—people talk about
themselves and others whom they know. Just
like Adam and Ben, more often than not,
people use language to communicate about
their social world.

Gossip may sound trivial and seem to belittle

our noble ability for language—surely one of
the most remarkable human abilities of all
that distinguish us from other animals. Au
contraire, some have argued that gossip—
activities to think and communicate about our
social world—is one of the most critical uses
to which language has been put. Dunbar
(1996) conjectured that gossiping is the
human equivalent of grooming, monkeys and
primates attending and tending to each other
by cleaning each other’s fur. He argues that it
is an act of socializing, signaling the
importance of one’s partner. Furthermore, by
gossiping, humans can communicate and
share their representations about their social
world—who their friends and enemies are,
what the right thing to do is under what
circumstances, and so on. In so doing, they
can regulate their social world—making more
friends and enlarging one’s own group (often
called the ingroup, the group to which one
belongs) against other groups (outgroups)
that are more likely to be one’s enemies.
Dunbar has argued that it is these social
e#ects that have given humans an
evolutionary advantage and larger brains,
which, in turn, help humans to think more
complex and abstract thoughts and, more
important, maintain larger ingroups. Dunbar
(1993) estimated an equation that predicts
average group size of nonhuman primate
genera from their average neocortex size (the
part of the brain that supports higher order
cognition). In line with his social brain
hypothesis, Dunbar showed that those
primate genera that have larger brains tend
to live in larger groups. Furthermore, using
the same equation, he was able to estimate
the group size that human brains can
support, which turned out to be about 150—
approximately the size of modern hunter-
gatherer communities. Dunbar’s argument is
that language, brain, and human group living
have co-evolved—language and human
sociality are inseparable.

Dunbar’s hypothesis is controversial.

Nonetheless, whether or not he is right, our
everyday language use often ends up
maintaining the existing structure of
intergroup relationships. Language use can
have implications for how we construe our
social world. For one thing, there are subtle
cues that people use to convey the extent to
which someone’s action is just a special case
in a particular context or a pattern that occurs
across many contexts and more like a
character trait of the person. According to
Semin and Fiedler (1988), someone’s action
can be described by an action verb that
describes a concrete action (e.g., he runs), a
state verb that describes the actor’s
psychological state (e.g., he likes running), an
adjective that describes the actor’s personality
(e.g., he is athletic), or a noun that describes
the actor’s role (e.g., he is an athlete).
Depending on whether a verb or an adjective
(or noun) is used, speakers can convey the
permanency and stability of an actor’s
tendency to act in a certain way—verbs
convey particularity, whereas adjectives
convey permanency. Intriguingly, people tend
to describe positive actions of their ingroup
members using adjectives (e.g., he is
generous) rather than verbs (e.g., he gave a
blind man some change), and negative actions
of outgroup members using adjectives (e.g.,
he is cruel) rather than verbs (e.g., he kicked a
dog). Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989)
called this a linguistic intergroup bias, which
can produce and reproduce the
representation of intergroup relationships by
painting a picture favoring the ingroup. That
is, ingroup members are typically good, and if
they do anything bad, that’s more an
exception in special circumstances; in
contrast, outgroup members are typically bad,
and if they do anything good, that’s more an
exception.

In addition, when people exchange their

gossip, it can spread through broader social
networks. If gossip is transmitted from one
person to another, the second person can
transmit it to a third person, who then in turn
transmits it to a fourth, and so on through a
chain of communication. This often happens
for emotive stories (Box 2). If gossip is
repeatedly transmitted and spread, it can
reach a large number of people. When stories
travel through communication chains, they
tend to become conventionalized (Bartlett,
1932). A Native American tale of the “War of
the Ghosts” recounts a warrior’s encounter
with ghosts traveling in canoes and his
involvement with their ghostly battle. He is
shot by an arrow but doesn’t die, returning
home to tell the tale. After his narration,
however, he becomes still, a black thing
comes out of his mouth, and he eventually
dies. When it was told to a student in England
in the 1920s and retold from memory to
another person, who, in turn, retold it to
another and so on in a communication chain,
the mythic tale became a story of a young
warrior going to a battle!eld, in which canoes
became boats, and the black thing that came
out of his mouth became simply his spirit
(Bartlett, 1932). In other words, information
transmitted multiple times was transformed
to something that was easily understood by
many, that is, information was assimilated
into the common ground shared by most
people in the linguistic community. More
recently, Kashima (2000) conducted a similar
experiment using a story that contained
a sequence of events that described a young
couple’s interaction that included both
stereotypical and counter-stereotypical
actions (e.g., a man watching sports on TV on
Sunday vs. a man vacuuming the house). After
the retelling of this story, much of the
counter-stereotypical information was
dropped, and stereotypical information was
more likely to be retained. Because
stereotypes are part of the common ground
shared by the community, this !nding too
suggests that conversational retellings are
likely to reproduce conventional content.

Psychological Consequences
of Language Use

What are the psychological consequences of

language use? When people use language to
describe an experience, their thoughts and
feelings are profoundly shaped by the
linguistic representation that they have
produced rather than the original experience
per se (Holtgraves & Kashima, 2008). For
example, Halberstadt (2003) showed a picture
of a person displaying an ambiguous emotion
and examined how people evaluated the
displayed emotion. When people verbally
explained why the target person was
expressing a particular emotion, they tended
to remember the person as feeling that
emotion more intensely than when they
simply labeled the emotion.

By verbalizing our own emotional experiences - such

as in a conversation with a close friend - we can
improve our psychological well-being. [Image: Drew
Herron, https://goo.gl/lKMAv1, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0,
https://goo.gl/Toc0ZF]
Thus, constructing a linguistic representation
of another person’s emotion apparently
biased the speaker’s memory of that person’s
emotion. Furthermore, linguistically labeling
one’s own emotional experience appears to
alter the speaker’s neural processes. When
people linguistically labeled negative images,
the amygdala—a brain structure that is
critically involved in the processing of negative
emotions such as fear—was activated less
than when they were not given a chance to
label them (Lieberman et al., 2007). Potentially
because of these e#ects of verbalizing
emotional experiences, linguistic
reconstructions of negative life events can
have some therapeutic e#ects on those who
su#er from the traumatic experiences
(Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). Lyubomirsky,
Sousa, and Dickerhoof (2006) found that
writing and talking about negative past life
events improved people’s psychological well-
being, but just thinking about them worsened
it. There are many other examples of e#ects
of language use on memory and decision
making (Holtgraves & Kashima, 2008).
Furthermore, if a certain type of language use
(linguistic practice) (Holtgraves & Kashima,
2008) is repeated by a large number of people
in a community, it can potentially have a
signi!cant e#ect on their thoughts and action.
This notion is often called Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis (Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956; Box 3).
For instance, if you are given a description of
a man, Steven, as having greater than average
experience of the world (e.g., well-traveled,
varied job experience), a strong family
orientation, and well-developed social skills,
how do you describe Steven? Do you think
you can remember Steven’s personality !ve
days later? It will probably be di"cult. But if
you know Chinese and are reading about
Steven in Chinese, as Ho#man, Lau, and
Johnson (1986) showed, the chances are that
you can remember him well. This is because
English does not have a word to describe this
kind of personality, whereas Chinese does (shì
gù). This way, the language you use can
in$uence your cognition. In its strong form, it
has been argued that language determines
thought, but this is probably wrong. Language
does not completely determine our thoughts
—our thoughts are far too $exible for that—
but habitual uses of language can in$uence
our habit of thought and action. For instance,
some linguistic practice seems to be
associated even with cultural values and
social institution. Pronoun drop is the case in
point. Pronouns such as “I” and “you” are used
to represent the speaker and listener of a
speech in English. In an English sentence,
these pronouns cannot be dropped if they are
used as the subject of a sentence. So, for
instance, “I went to the movie last night” is
!ne, but “Went to the movie last night” is not
in standard English. However, in other
languages such as Japanese, pronouns can be,
and in fact often are, dropped from
sentences. It turned out that people living in
those countries where pronoun drop
languages are spoken tend to have more
collectivistic values (e.g., employees having
greater loyalty toward their employers) than
those who use non–pronoun drop languages
such as English (Kashima & Kashima, 1998). It
was argued that the explicit reference to “you”
and “I” may remind speakers the distinction
between the self and other, and the
di#erentiation between individuals. Such a
linguistic practice may act as a constant
reminder of the cultural value, which, in turn,
may encourage people to perform the
linguistic practice.

Conclusion

Language and language use constitute a

central ingredient of human psychology.
Language is an essential tool that enables us
to live the kind of life we do. Can you imagine
a world in which machines are built, farms are
cultivated, and goods and services are
transported to our household without
language? Is it possible for us to make laws
and regulations, negotiate contracts, and
enforce agreements and settle disputes
without talking? Much of contemporary
human civilization wouldn’t have been
possible without the human ability to develop
and use language. Like the Tower of Babel,
language can divide humanity, and yet, the
core of humanity includes the innate ability
for language use. Whether we can use it
wisely is a task before us in this globalized
world.

Discussion Questions

1. In what sense is language use innate and

learned?

2. Is language a tool for thought or a tool for

communication?

3. What sorts of unintended consequences

can language use bring to your
psychological processes?

Vocabulary
Audience design
Constructing utterances to suit the audience’s
knowledge.

Common ground
Information that is shared by people who
engage in a conversation.

Ingroup
Group to which a person belongs.

Lexicon
Words and expressions.

Linguistic intergroup bias

A tendency for people to characterize positive
things about their ingroup using more
abstract expressions, but negative things
about their outgroups using more abstract
expressions.

Outgroup
Group to which a person does not belong.
Priming
A stimulus presented to a person reminds
him or her about other ideas associated with
the stimulus.

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
The hypothesis that the language that people
use determines their thoughts.

Situation model
A mental representation of an event, object,
or situation constructed at the time of
comprehending a linguistic description.

Social brain hypothesis

The hypothesis that the human brain has
evolved, so that humans can maintain larger
ingroups.

Social networks
Networks of social relationships among
individuals through which information can
travel.

Syntax
Rules by which words are strung together to
form sentences.
References

Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study

in experimental and social psychology.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.

Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., & Cleland,

A. A. (2000). Syntactic co-ordination in
dialogue. Cognition, 75, B13–25.

Clark, H. H. (1996). Using language.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.

Clark, H. H., & Wilkes-Gibbs, D. (1986).

Referring as a collaborative process.
Cognition, 22, 1–39.

Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and

the evolution of language. Boston, MA:
Harvard University Press.

Dunbar, R. I. M. (1993). Coevolution of

neorcortical size, group size and
language in humans. Behavioral and
 Brain Sciences, 16, 681–735.

Dunbar, R. I. M., Duncan, N. D. C., &

Nettle, D. (1995). Size and structure of
freely forming conversational groups.
Human Nature, 6, 67–78.

Dunbar, R. I. M., Marriott, A., & Duncan, N.

D. C. (1997). Human conversational
behaviour. Human Nature, 8, 231–246.

Fussell, S. R., & Krauss, R. M. (1992).

Coordination of knowledge in
communication: E#ects of speakers’
assumptions about what others
know. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 62, 378–391.

Giles, H., Coupland, N., & Coupland, J.

(1991) Accommodation theory:
Communication, context, and
consequence. In H. Giles, J. Coupland,
& N. Coupland (Eds.), Contexts of
accommodation: Developments in
applied sociolinguistics (pp. 1–68).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Halberstadt, J. (2003). The paradox of
emotion attribution: Explanation
biases perceptual memory for
emotional expressions. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 12,
197–201.

Ho#man, C., Lau, I., & Johnson, D. R.

(1986). The linguistic relativity of
person cognition: An English-Chinese
comparison. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 51, 1097–1105.

Holtgraves, T. M., & Kashima, Y. (2008).

Language, meaning, and social
cognition. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 12, 73–94.

James, J. (1953). The distribution of free-

forming small group size. American
Sociological Review, 18, 569–570.

Kashima, E., & Kashima, Y. (1998). Culture

and language: The case of cultural
dimensions and personal pronoun
use. Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology, 29, 461–486.
Kashima, Y. (2000). Maintaining cultural
stereotypes in the serial reproduction
of narratives. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 26, 594–604.

Kegl, J., Senghas, A., & Coppola, M. (1999).

Creation through contact: Sign
language emergence and sign
language change in Nicaragua. In M.
DeGra# (Ed.), Language creation and
language change Creolization,
diachrony, and development (pp. 179–
237). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Lieberman, M., Eisenberger, N. I.,

Crockett, M. J., Tom, S. M., Pfeifer, J.
H., & Way, B. W. (2007). Putting
feelings into words. Psychological
Science, 18, 421–428.

Lyubomirsky, S., Sousa, L., & Dickerhoof,

R. (2006). The costs and bene!ts of
writing, talking, and thinking about
life’s triumphs and defeats. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90,
692–708.

Maass, A., Salvi, D., Arcuri, L., & Semin, G.

 (1989). Language use in intergroup
contexts: The linguistic intergroup
bias. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 57, 981–993.

Pennebaker, J. W., & Seagal, J. (1999).

Forming a story: The health bene!ts
of narrative. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 55, 1243–1254.

Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2004).

Toward a mechanistic psychology of
dialogue. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 27, 169–226.

Sapir, E. (1921). Language: An introduction

to the study of speech. New York, NY:
Harcourt Brace.

Semin, G., & Fiedler, K. (1988). The

cognitive functions of linguistic
categories in describing persons:
Social cognition and language. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,
558–568.

Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and

reality (J. B. Carroll, Ed.). Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Authors

Yoshihisa Kashima
Born in Japan,
receiving PhD in the
United States, and
living and teaching in
Australia, Yoshi
Kashima conducts
research on cultural
dynamics – the
formation,
maintenance, and
transformation of
culture over time.
Believing that
language is a critical
mechanism of
cultural transmission,
language use is one
of his main interests.
Creative Commons License

Language and Language Use by Yoshihisa Kashima

is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
License. Permissions beyond the scope of this
license may be available in our Licensing Agreement.

How to cite this Noba module

using APA Style

Kashima, Y. (2019). Language and language

use. In R. Biswas-Diener & E. Diener (Eds),
Noba textbook series: Psychology. Champaign,
IL: DEF publishers. Retrieved from
http://noba.to/gq62cpam

SECTIONS

Abstract
 Learning Objectives

Introduction

How Do We Use Language?

What Do We Talk About?

Psychological Consequences of Language …

Conclusion

Discussion Questions

Vocabulary

References

Authors

Creative Commons License

About Privacy Terms Licensing Contact

© 2019 Diener Education Fund