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Gustavo E. Romero

Scientific
Philosophy
Scientific Philosophy
Gustavo E. Romero

Scientific Philosophy

123
Gustavo E. Romero
Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía
Villa Elisa, Buenos Aires, Argentina

ISBN 978-3-319-97630-3 ISBN 978-3-319-97631-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97631-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018954655

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
The machinery of the world is far too
complex for the simplicity of men.
—Jorge Luis Borges
Go as far as you can see; when you get there,
you’ll be able to see further.
—Thomas Carlyle
To Blumina, again.
Foreword

So far as I know, this is the only book titled Scientific Philosophy published since
Reichenbach’s dated and forgotten work of 1961. Moreover, although Romero’s
work belongs in the movement initiated in the 1920s by the Vienna Circle, it departs
radically from the empiricist tradition, if only because it takes metaphysics seriously
to the point of seeking to update it in the light of current science.
This book is controversial, because it criticizes a number of sacred cows, such as
the beliefs that science has no philosophical presuppositions, that space and time are
immaterial, that matter does not matter, and that values are not of this world. But no
one can doubt that the author has strived to offer good reasons for his heterodoxies
and that his prose is crystal clear to anyone who bothers to understand his technical
terms. Surely, the readers of Romero’s sober and calm didactic prose may miss
the ironies of Bertrand Russell’s. But then, the mentor of a group of twenty or so
explorers of white dwarfs, black holes, and cosmic rays and the like finds no time
to waste on a cloud of gnats intent on snuffing out the few candles that illumine the
dark recesses of the long postmodernist cave where we have been abandoned.
The most obvious criticism of this work is that it identifies science with
contemporary physics, whence it neglects some of the classical philosophical
conundrums, such as the nature of mind and the individualist-holism dilemma that
has plagued social science. The said collapse of “science” onto “physics” also leads
to underrating or even ignoring the views that to philosophize is to search for the
good life, that justice is both definable and attainable, that objectivity does not entail
impartiality, and that good philosophy is our only defense against bad science and
evil technology. A different title, such as “The philosophical roots of science,” might
be more faithful, but it might also deter those who fear the intrusion of superstition.
Romero’s search for objectivity and testability endangers the vast edifice of
bayesianism, or the interpretation of probability as degree of belief rather than as the
measure of real possibility. But the enemy of arbitrariness and the reader in search
of intellectual stimulation is likely to welcome such attacks on the philosophical
industries of the day.
In sum, let us read, discuss, and try to outdo this recent vindication and update of
Aristotle’s conception of scientific philosophy, or philosophical science, as both a

vii
viii Foreword

tool and an ideal of those who search for the truth inside or outside the nine-to-five
cage.

Department of Philosophy Mario Bunge, FRSC

McGill University
Montreal, QC, Canada
Preface

This book is the result of my long engagement with philosophy as a research

scientist. During the three decades I have pondered about many of the major
philosophical problems posed by physics, I have sought for reasonable articulations
of the wide worldview implied by our best current scientific theories, I have reflected
upon the nature of the scientific enterprise, and I have despaired of the work of many
professional philosophers. Philosophy has became, at least in most of the English-
speaking world, a sophisticated and highly technical activity. This technicality,
unfortunately, many times serves no major purpose since the topics dealt with
are completely at odds with science. It seems to me that the image of the world
many philosophers adopt is that of the common sense and everyday intuitions. The
physical depiction of the world on which much of the current philosophical debate is
based is more like that of the Greek atomists or that presented in Lucretius’s Rerum
Natura than that of contemporary physics. This is very regrettable since current
science is in desperate need of philosophical work to clarify the ultimate meaning
of its theories and to yield a coherent view of the world. It is not surprising that
many scientists, when they learn that academic philosophers devote long articles,
intricate arguments, and even lengthy treatises to conclude things such as that they
do not exist or that there are no physical objects other than people and atoms, give
up philosophy altogether. And this is regrettable because then some of those very
same scientists feel the need to express some philosophical implications of their
work. . . and end articulating absurdities such as that the universe is a mathematical
structure or that the computer viruses are a form of life. In the meanwhile, the main
loser is our civilization, which depends critically on a science whose deep meaning
is mostly ignored.
This book is a reaction to such a state of affairs. As a working scientist, I know
well the advantages of some philosophical instruction as well as the perils of an
open anti-philosophical stance. Some philosophical insight helps the scientist to
grasp better the full meaning of concepts such as those of “law,” “theory,” “model,”
“truth,” “relevancy,” “property,” “existence,” “space,” “state,” “time,” “chance,”
“probability,” and many others that are used in everyday research. A scientist who
understands what he or she is doing can allegedly do a better work. A scientist, on

ix
x Preface

the other hand, who despises philosophy is at risk of falling inadvertently into some
bad or obsolete philosophy that might hinder further research.
This work presents a clear and straight view of the main philosophical issues that
in my opinion are relevant to scientists. Of course, some philosophers will disagree
with my views. I have tried to stay as close as possible to the standard scientific
image in order to present elucidations of the main concepts of philosophical impor-
tance that appear in the special sciences. The overall approach is epistemologically
realistic and ontologically materialistic (many would prefer the word “naturalistic”).
The text emerged from lectures on scientific philosophy addressed to scientists at
the Universities of La Plata, San Martín, Mexico, Karlsruhe, and Barcelona. The
book can be used as a textbook for a short (one semester) graduate course for either
scientists and philosophers with some background in science. Those general readers
who are concerned with philosophy but are tired of reading incomprehensible jargon
and wild speculations will find here, I hope, some stimulating and direct material.
The first part of the book provides an exposition of the main topics of scientific
philosophy: semantics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. The second
part of the book presents some applications of the scientific method in philosophy.
I focus on three major problems: the nature of mathematics, the interpretation of
quantum mechanics, and the ontology of space-time. Along with several problems
in the neurosciences, I think that these are the more urgent philosophical issues in
current scientific research. Unavoidably, these chapters are more demanding for the
reader. For this reason, I include in them more references and more introductory
material. I hope they will stimulate some readers to pursue further research on such
subjects.

Sitges, Catalonia, Spain Gustavo E. Romero

11 January 2018
Acknowledgments

I am most grateful to Mario Bunge for inspiration, guidance, and critical reviews of
my work along many years. His friendship has been one of the joys of my life. I have
no doubt that he would disapprove many of my claims in this book. Nevertheless, at
the same time, I am sure that he would be satisfied of the overall scientific-oriented
spirit of the book.
I want to thank the many students who have taken my courses on philosophical
topics over the years at the universities of La Plata, San Martín, UNAM-Morelia,
Karlsruhe (KIT), and Barcelona. Their questions and interest have shaped the
material of this book. I am also grateful to my enthusiastic PhD students Luciano
Combi and Federico López Armengol for many discussions on foundational issues. I
have learned many things from conversations on the topics of this book with friends
and colleagues. I want to mention Santiago Perez-Bergliaffa, Valenti Bosch-Ramon,
Pablo Jacovkis, Janou Glaeser, Gerardo Primero, Nicolás Pérez, Matías Castro,
Federico Aisenberg, Federico Langer, Carlos Romero, Silvio Sánchez Mújica,
Héctor Vucetich, Sergio Riva de Neyra, Nelson Pinto-Neto, Felipe Tovar Falciano,
Rafael González del Solar, and Javier López de Casenave. I also benefited from
many correspondents through the Internet. Gerardo Primero, Nicolás Pérez, Pablo
Jacovkis, and Sergio Riva de Neyra made valuable remarks on early drafts of this
book. I sincerely thank their comments.
Special thanks go to Daniela Pérez and my daughter Blumina Romero, for
support, encouragement, and critical observations.
I also remain grateful to Paula Benaglia for many years of support, comprehen-
sion, and help. Thank you Paula, for everything.
Some material presented in this book has been adapted from the articles listed
below. I am very thankful to the editors of the journals for permission to use this
stuff.
• Perez-Bergliaffa, S.E., Romero, G.E., and Vucetich, H. 1993, Axiomatic founda-
tions of nonrelativistic Quantum Mechanics: A realistic approach, Int. J. Theor.
Phys., 32, 1507–1522.

xi
xii Acknowledgments

• Perez-Bergliaffa, S.E., Romero, G.E., and Vucetich, H. 1996, Axiomatic founda-

tions of quantum mechanics revisited: The case for systems, Int. J. Theor. Phys.,
35, 1805–1819.
• Perez-Bergliaffa, S.E., Romero, G.E., and Vucetich, H. 1998, Toward an
axiomatic pregeometry of space-time, Int. J. Theor. Phys., 37, 2281–2298.
• Romero, G.E. and Pérez, D. 2012, New remarks in the Cosmological Argument,
Int. J. Philos. Relig., 72, 103–113.
• Romero, G.E. 2012, Parmenides reloaded, Foundations of Science, 17, 291–299.
• Romero, G.E. 2013, From change to spacetime: an Eleatic journey, Foundations
of Science, 18, 139–148.
• Romero, G.E. 2013, Adversus singularitates: The ontology of space- time
singularities, Foundations of Science, 18, 297–306.
• Romero, G.E. 2014, The collapse of supertasks, Foundations of Science, 19, 209–
216.
• Romero, G.E. 2015, Present time, Foundations of Science, 20, 135–145.
• Romero, G.E. 2016, Sufficient reason and reason enough, Foundations of
Science, 21, 455–460.
• Romero, G.E. 2016, A formal ontological theory based on timeless events,
Philosophia, 44, 607–622.
• Romero, G.E. 2017, On the ontology of spacetime: Substantivalism, relationism,
eternalism, and emergence, Foundations of Science, 22, 141–159.
• Romero, G.E. 2017, Truth and relevancy, Metatheoria, 7, 25–30.
• Romero, G.E. 2018, Outline of a theory of scientific aesthetics, Foundations of
Science, in press.
This work was supported, in part, by a research grant from CONICET (PIP 2014-
0338). Parts of the text were prepared while I visited the University of Barcelona
in the winter of 2018. I remain grateful to Josep M. Paredes and the staff of the
Institute of Cosmos Sciences (ICCUB) for their kind hospitality.
Contents

Part I Basic Scientific Philosophy

1 Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Philosophical Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Introduction: Formal Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Denotation and Designation .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Reference .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Intension and Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6 Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7 Vagueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8 Theory of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.8.1 A Short Overview of Some Theories of Truth .. . . . . . . . . . 19
2.8.2 Formal Truth.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8.3 Factual Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.8.4 Relevancy .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8.5 Truth Bearers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8.6 Analytic/Synthetic Distinction of Propositions .. . . . . . . . . 27
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Things and Composition.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Properties and Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Levels, Systems, Structure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.6 Chance and Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.7 Space, Time, and Spacetime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.8 Matter.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.9 Mind .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

xiii
xiv Contents

3.10 Materialism.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.11 Information .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.12 Biological Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.13 Social Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Epistemology .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1 Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Understanding .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 Explanation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Sufficient Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 Model .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.6 Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.7 Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.8 The Limits of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.9 Technology .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.10 Pseudoscience and Pseudotechnology . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.11 Scientific Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5 Ethics. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1 Values.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2 Axiology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3 Free Will. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.4 The Ontological Status of Goods, Values, and Morals .. . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.5 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.6 Metaethics .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.7 Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6 Aesthetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.1 Aesthetic Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.2 Beauty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.3 Art and Artworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.4 The Ontology of Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Part II Specific Topics

7 Mathematical Fictionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.1 The Nature of Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.2 Mathematical Objects as Conceptual Artifacts .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.3 Why Mathematics Can Be Applied to Reality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Contents xv

8 Philosophical Problems of Quantum Mechanics . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8.2 Outline of QM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.3 Axiomatization of QM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.3.1 Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
8.3.2 Formal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
8.3.3 Material Background .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
8.3.4 Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
8.3.5 Generating Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
8.3.6 Definitions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8.3.7 Axiomatic Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8.3.8 Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8.3.9 Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.3.10 Definitions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.3.11 Some Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
8.3.12 Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.4 Philosophical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
8.5 Extension to Systems of Many Components . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.6 EPR and Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8.7 Entanglement.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
9 Quantum Objects .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
9.2 Identity and the Quantum World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
9.3 Ontic Vagueness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
9.4 Realistic Quantum Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
10 Ontological Problems of Spacetime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
10.2 The Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
10.3 Against Presentism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
10.4 When Is ‘Now’?.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
10.5 Defining the Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
10.6 Some Further Objections Against Presentism .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
10.7 Event Substantivalism and the Emergence of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
10.8 Defending Eternalism.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
10.9 Relationism Before Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
10.10 An Ontology Cozy for Science .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
10.11 Closing Remarks .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
xvi Contents

A Event Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

A.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
A.2 A Theory of Basic Events and Processes . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
A.3 Causation .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
A.4 Spacetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
A.5 Discrete Spacetime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
References .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

B Boolean Algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

C Probabilities .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

D Suggested Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Index . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
List of Special Symbols

The next list describes several special symbols that will be later used in the book.

def
= Stipulative definition
∅ Empty set
 “Is a theorem” or “is entailed”
D Designation
R Reference
=ˆ Representation
I Intension
M Meaning
V Truth value
T Theory
+̇ Juxtaposition
×˙ Superposition
◦ Composition
 Null thing
xy x is separated from y
Comp(x) Composition of x
U Universe
 Set of basic things
 Set of all things
P Property
SL (X) Lawful space state of X
XY X acts upon Y
X  Y X interacts with Y
h(X) History of X
h(X/Y ) History of X in presence of Y

xvii
xviii List of Special Symbols

EL (X) Event space of X

Emode i Existence predicate
e0 Null event
W The World (composition of all events)
List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Language: ordinary and formal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Fig. 2.2 Semantic relations of designation, denotation, and reference . . . . . . 11
Fig. 2.3 Meaning as a two-dimensional concept . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Fig. 2.4 Different semantic relations (reference R, sense S, and
meaning M) between constructs and objects . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Fig. 2.5 Kinds of truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Fig. 2.6 Traditional criteria for truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Fig. 10.1 A ‘presentist-friendly’ spacetime: evolving 3-dimensional
space-like surfaces in a spacetime with a preferred
time-direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Fig. A.1 Graphic representation of discrete event generation and
transition to spacetime. The circles around each event
represent energy, defined as the capacity to generate new
events. See main text for details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

xix
 Part I
Basic Scientific Philosophy
Chapter 1
Introduction

Science needs philosophy. Without semantics it is not possible to interpret formal

systems and theories. Without ontology such basic concepts as those of law, cause,
chance, space, and time remain vague. Without epistemology there is no good
methodology of adequate control of observation and experiment, no understanding
of knowledge nor of the difference between science and charlatanism. Without
ethics there is no regulation of the scientific enterprise or values to guide the use
of technology. These are just a few examples that support the general statement that
without philosophy there is no science. Science is based on general philosophical
assumptions, and in turn science informs philosophy, in a virtuous cycle. From this
mutual support results the advancement of knowledge. If philosophy fails, science
is hindered. And without science, philosophy quickly degrades to domesticated
speculation based on common sense. . . at best.
Some examples of the usefulness of philosophy for science are in order. The lack
of an adequate interpretation of quantum mechanics, for instance, has obstructed
the formulation of a consistent theory of quantum gravity. Failure at evaluating
the testability of scientific programs has resulted in a waste of valuable resources
in many occasions. Dogmatic acceptance of dualistic ontologies has fostered the
development of pseudosciences of the mind producing unnecessary suffering to
psychiatric patients. Abandonment of realism led to the collapse of social sciences
under postmodern constructivism and its unbearable verbiage.
A philosophically illustrated scientist will be in better conditions to address
specific scientific problems with clarity and lucidity. But philosophy has not always
been well informed by science. Rather the contrary. Anti-scientific philosophies
such as existentialism, postmodernism, and modern skepticism have seriously dam-
aged the image of the philosophical enterprise among research scientists. Although
extreme forms of relativism are still popular in some sectors of the humanities, a
significant part of the academic philosophy nowadays is again mainly scientifically
oriented, especially in connection with problems of physics, neuroscience, and
technology. Unfortunately, another part seems to be lost in the search of witticisms
and poor attempts to dazzle with logical tricks (see, for example, the diagnosis

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G. E. Romero, Scientific Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97631-0_1
4 1 Introduction

presented by Ladyman and Ross 2007 in their Chapter 1). For the latter group a
good prescription is to reinforce their contact with current science.
This book provides an introduction to the main branches of what can be called
scientific philosophy, i.e. philosophy informed by science and concerned with the
philosophical aspects of scientific problems. Scientific philosophy proceeds like
science, proposing theories that can be put to the test, and uses as many exact tools as
possible. The main way to test a philosophical theory is by its interactions with more
specific theories of science. A philosophical theory that remains alien to science,
that is of no use for improving our understanding of the general topics underlying
diverse scientific theories, that does not stimulate further research, or that does not
change with the advancement of science, such a theory, I maintain, must fall.
According to Russell (1917):
[. . . ] there are two different ways in which a philosophy may seek to base itself upon
science. It may emphasise the most general results of science, and seek to give even greater
generality and unity to these results. Or it may study the methods of science, and seek to
apply these methods, with the necessary adaptations, to its own peculiar province.

In this book I try to follow both paths.

The main branches of scientific philosophy are philosophical logic, semantics,
ontology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. The approach I come up with is
based on the analysis and discussion of specific topics and problems and not on
the exposition of alternative doctrines. Neither I provide an historic overview. My
basic goal is to offer the reader the tools to explore by him or herself a wide variety
of philosophical problems and to present my specific views on some of them. In
issues of ethics and aesthetics I do not present specific normative proposals. I restrict
myself to the elucidation of the basic concepts, offering the tools for the construction
of normative systems. Every specific system is strongly dependent on the particular
cultural, economic, and social context of its formulation. I cannot develop such
proposals here without loss of generality and focus on my primary goal that is to
present the basics of a scientific way of doing philosophy. Such an important task is
left for a future work.
The scientific way of doing philosophy can be traced to pre-Socratic thinkers
such as Anaximander, Parmenides, and the atomists. From them, it follows a thread
that goes through such illustrious names as Grosseteste, Bacon, Galileo Galilei,
D’Holbach, Helvétius, Frege, Peirce, Boltzmann, Russell, the logical empiricists,
and current thinkers as Nicholas Rescher, Adolf Grünbaum, Mario Bunge, and many
others.
Perhaps the most comprehensive work of scientific philosophy is the monumental
Treatise on Basic Philosophy, in 8 volumes, by Bunge (1974–1989). In what follows
I shall adopt Bunge’s classification of philosophy, and often, but not always, his
views. The resulting philosophy can be characterized as naturalistic.
In Chap. 2 I present the basics of philosophical semantics, the investigation of the
structure and contents of our languages and their relation to the world. I introduce
a two-dimensional theory of meaning based on set theory and inspired by the work
of Frege and developed by Bunge. Then I discuss the concept of truth, which is of
paramount importance in science.
References 5

Chapter 3 is devoted to ontology, i.e. the broadest theory about the world that
emerges from our particular sciences. I characterize in this chapter concepts that
permeate our entire scientific views, including those of thing, property, law, system,
structure, causality, chance, matter, emergence, energy, and more. The approach is
based on the idea that there are some kind of permanent individuals or things, but I
admit that this ontology might result not fully appropriate at some specific level of
analysis of reality. I offer in an appendix an alternative approach based on ‘events’.
Chapter 4 is devoted to epistemology. Such important concepts for science as
those of knowledge, understanding, explanation, model, and theory are elucidated
there. The definitions I propose should be tested by the working scientist against
the daily experience of actual scientific research. Surely they can be refined and
expanded to accommodate features that I have missed. Altogether, however, I hope
they can provide a good starting point.
Ethics is the topic of Chap. 5. I am both naturalistic and fictionalist about good
and bad: I think that these concepts are fictions we have created to guide our actions
in our social interactions. My debt with the thought of Vaihinger (1923) is great
here, as in Chap. 6, devoted to aesthetics. My methods, instead, come from Bunge
(1974–1989), Beth (1964), and Martin (1958).
Fictionalist is also my interpretation of mathematics (Chap. 7). This chapter
starts the more specific and controversial part of the book. The next two Chaps. 8
and 9, deal with the interpretation of quantum mechanics and some of its problems.
These chapters are more technical and demand some knowledge of the subject by
the reader. My interpretation of quantum mechanics is realist and literal. It might
be dubbed the “minimalist interpretation”. I do not find in quantum mechanics
reasons to support the existence of many worlds, many minds, or many observers. I
acknowledge that Bohm’s theory is an interesting alternative to the standard theory,
but I think that so far we do not need an ontology populated by particles and pilot
waves. The world, in my view, is just a world of quantum fields and spacetime. At
least as far as our current scientific knowledge informs us.
Spacetime is the subject of Chap. 10. I critically discuss presentism, the doctrine
that only the present exists, and defend a kind of emergent substantivalism that I
think is imposed by a correct reading of general relativity. Such discussions close
the book.

References

Beth, E. W. (1964). The foundations of mathematics. New York: Harper and Row.
Bunge, M. (1974–1989). Treatise on basic philosophy, 8 Vols. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Everything must go. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martin, R. M. (1958). Truth and denotation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Russell, B. (1917). Mysticism and logic and other essays. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Vaihinger, H. (1911). Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard.
Published in English as The Philosophy of ‘As If’, translated by C.K. Ogden, London: Kegan
Paul, 1923.
Chapter 2
Philosophical Semantics

2.1 Introduction: Formal Languages

The most basic assumption of science is that there is a reality to be known. Without
the postulate of the independent existence of a real world the scientific effort would
be in vain. I do not discuss this basic assumption here. I shall come back to this issue
in the next chapter, devoted to ontology. Now I want to focus on how we represent
the world in our attempts to understand it.1
In order to represent some features of the world we use conceptual systems called
languages. In our daily life natural languages such as English, German, or Spanish
are, or seem to be, enough for most purposes. Unfortunately, natural languages are
plagued by vagueness, lack of precision, and ambiguity. If we want to penetrate
deeper into the structure of reality we should adopt formal languages as those
provided by logic and mathematics (Fig. 2.1).
A formal language is a conceptual system equipped with a set of specific rules to
generate valid combinations of symbols. A symbol is an artificial sign. A sign is any
object that “stands for” another object. Natural signs are usually called indicators,
as when we say that dark clouds indicate a forthcoming storm.
More precisely, we define a formal language L as the triplet

L = , R, O , (2.1)

where:
•  is the set of primitive terms of the language.
• R is the set of rules that provide explicit instructions about how to form valid
combinations of the elements of .

1 By “the world” I mean the totally of existents, whatever they are.

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8 2 Philosophical Semantics

Fig. 2.1 Language: ordinary Natural (vague)

and formal

Languages
(conceptual systems
for communication
and representation)

Formal (exact)

• O is a set of extra-linguistic objects that are denoted and represented by the

elements of the language L.
The set R can contain three disjoint subsets:

R = Sy ∪ Se ∪ Pr , (2.2)

where
def
• Sy = set of syntactic rules,
def
• Se = set of semantic rules,
def
• Pr = set of pragmatic rules.
If Se = Pr = O = ∅ ⇒ L is called a logistic system or calculus.
The rules Sy determine how to construct valid combinations of symbols called
formulas.
The simplest form of a powerful logistic system is called first order logic. I shall
call this system L1 . The rules of a language L1 are expressed in a second language
L2 , called metalanguage. This avoids the emergence of certain paradoxes such as
the Russell paradox2 and the many paradoxes of self-reference3 (see Sainsbury
2009). The metalanguage can be formed with elements of L1 and natural languages.
The primitive symbols of L1 are:
1. A series (finite or infinite) of predicate signs: ‘p1 ’, ‘p2 ’, etc.
2. The equal symbol ‘=’.
3. The negative symbol ‘¬’.
4. A series (finite or infinite) of constants: ‘a’, ‘b’, etc.

2 The Russell paradox: consider the class of all classes that are not members of themselves. Let us

call this class A. Then if A ∈ A → A ∈ / A and if A ∈ / A → A ∈ A.

3 Paradoxes of self-reference are like the Liar’s paradox: consider the statement “I lie”. If I lie,

then what I say is false. Then “I lie” is false, and I say the truth. Then I do not lie, contrary to the
hypothesis.
2.1 Introduction: Formal Languages 9

5. A series (finite or infinite) of variables: ‘x1 ’, ‘x2 ’, etc.4

6. The basic connective ‘∧’.
7. The existential symbol ‘∃’.
8. The parentheses ‘(’ and ‘)’.
9. The comma ‘,’.
In this list all symbols between quotation marks ‘. . . ’ belong to the language
vocabulary L1 , whereas the sentences are formulated in the metalanguage. We call
term of L1 to any constant, variable, or valued predicate such as ‘p(a, b, c, . . .)’.
Valid combinations of symbols are called formulas.
The syntactic rules (elements of R = Sy ) are:
• Sy1 : If ‘p’ is a predicate and ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, etc., are terms, then ‘p(a, b, c, . . .)’ is
a formula.
• Sy2 : If ‘ϕ’ and ‘ξ ’ are formulas, then ‘ϕ ∧ ξ ’ is a formula.
• Sy3 : If ‘ϕ’ is a formula, then ‘¬ϕ’ is a formula.
• Sy4 : If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are terms, then ‘a = b’ is a formula.
• Sy5 : If ‘ϕ’ is a formula and ‘x’ a variable, then ‘(∃x ϕx)’ is a formula.
• Sy6 : There is not any further sequence of primitive symbols that is a formula.
We can introduce now a number of useful definitions.5
• D1 : (A ∨ B) = (¬ (¬A ∧ ¬B)).
• D2 : (A → B) = (¬A ∨ B).
• D3 : (A ≡ B) = (A → B) ∧ (B → A).
• D4 : (∀x ϕx) = (¬∃x (¬ϕx)).
In the formula ‘∃x ϕx’, ‘x’ is called a bound variable. The symbol ‘∃’ is called a
quantifier. The symbols ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, and ‘≡’ are called conjunction, disjunction,
implication, and identity, respectively.
This formulation of L1 is not unique. For instance, we might have adopted
‘∀’ as primitive quantifier. From definition D4 is clear that the quantifiers are not
independent and it is matter of convention which one is adopted as a primitive
operator.
The operation of deduction allows to obtain valid formulas from axioms (i.e.
primitive rules) or other valid formulas. Deduction is simply the successive applica-
tion of the syntactic rules. A formula is valid if it is constructed in conformity with
the syntactic rules. Formulas obtained through deduction are called theorems, and
preceded by the symbol ‘’ in any formal presentation of the system.
Deducibility () should not be confused with implication (→). In general A  B
is stronger than A → B. Actually if A  B then A → B but the converse is not
valid.

4 If
the variables are few, it is usual to adopt ‘x’, ‘y’, etc.
5 These are stipulative definitions. For a discussion of the different kinds of definitions see Gupta
(2015).
10 2 Philosophical Semantics

• D5 :  = “is a theorem” or “is entailed”.

Another important definition is that of consistency.
• D6 : A set of formulas  is said consistent if ¬ ( → ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) for any ϕ ∈ .
• D7 : A set  of formulas is inconsistent or incoherent if  → ¬ϕ ∧ ϕ for some
ϕ ∈ .
• D8 : ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is called a contradiction.
If we want to apply a formal language to the world, we need to add another set
of rules in order to relate symbols and formulas with extra-linguistic objects. Let O
be a set of extra-linguistic objects. An interpreted formal language LI 1 is given by:

LI 1 = , R, O , (2.3)

where R = Sy ∪ Se and O = ∅.
The rules in Se relate the elements of  and valid formulas obtained from
them through the syntactic rules with objects in O. There are three basic semantic
relations: denotation, reference, and representation. Once these relations have been
introduced we can define the derivative concepts of sense, meaning, and truth. When
all these relations and concepts are made explicit for a given language, we say that
there is an interpretation or a model for the language.
The semantic rules are formulated, as the syntactic ones, in the metalanguage L2 .
In what follows I shall define and discuss the semantic relations of denotation,
reference, and representation, as well as the concepts of sense, meaning, and truth.
Pragmatic rules will not be considered here since they concern to the relations
between language and users, and are more relevant for the semiotics of natural
languages than for philosophy.

2.2 Denotation and Designation

Denotation is a relation that assigns symbols to objects of the universe of discourse

of a language:

D :  → O. (2.4)

For instance, a proper name denotes a specific person: “Gustavo Esteban Romero”
denotes the author of this book. In general, the constants a, b, . . . . etc. of  denote
some specific objects belonging to O.
The relation of denotation should not be confused with that of designation.
Designation (D) relates symbols to concepts:

D :  → C, (2.5)
2.3 Reference 11

where C is a set of constructs, i.e. conceptual entities constructed by abstraction.

Abstraction usually proceeds by imposing an equivalence relation to a set, an
operation that results in the partition of the set into disjoint subsets. Each subset
is identified with a construct or concept.

2.3 Reference

Reference is a relation between constructs and objects of any kind, either factual
items of the world or formal constructs:

R : C → ;  = O ∪ C. (2.6)

If  = O we say that the reference is factual. If  = C we say that the reference is

formal.
Given a construct c ∈ C, the class of reference of c is the set of all objects x
referred by c:

[c]R = {x ∈  : R(cx)} . (2.7)

The relations among symbols (), constructs (C), and objects ( = O ∪ C) are
schematically represented in Fig. 2.2.
The relation of reference can be specified to become a function in the case of
predicates and statements.
A predicate is a function from some multiple domain of objects A1 ×A2 ×. . .×An
to statements (S):

P : A1 × A2 × . . . × An → S. (2.8)

The value of P at a1 , a2 . . . , an ∈ A1 × A2 × . . . × An is the atomic statement

Pa1 a2 ..an .
The reference class of a predicate is the collection of its arguments:


n
R(P ) = Ai , (2.9)
i=1

Fig. 2.2 Semantic relations

of designation, denotation,
and reference
12 2 Philosophical Semantics

and the reference class of a statement s ∈ S is:

R(Pa1 a2 ,..., an ) = {a1 , a2 , . . . , an }, (2.10)

i.e. the set of its arguments.

In the case of a complex statement W = W (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ), with s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ∈
S, the reference class is the union of all sets of arguments:


n
R (W (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn )) = R(si ). (2.11)
i=1

If the predicate is quantified, then the reference class is the reference class of the
predicate. The quantification does not have referential import.
Notice that individuals do not refer, even if they are constructs; they are referred
by statements and predicates.
Let us define, at this point, a theory as a set T of statements S, that is closed under
the operation of entailment (): any s ∈ T is either an axiom (a basic statement) or
a consequence of the set of axioms (A = {Ai ; i = 1, . . . , n}).6 Symbolically:

T = {s : A  s} . (2.12)

Then, the reference class of the theory is:


n
R(T ) = R(Ai ), (2.13)
i=1

where n is the number of axioms Ai ∈ A. This means that the reference class of
any theory can be determined from the references of its axioms. In other words:
reference is conserved under the operation of deduction. This is an important
property: if we can correctly axiomatize a given theory, then the semantic analysis
of the axioms will completely determine the reference class of the whole theory.
When theories are presented only in a heuristic fashion, it is not uncommon that
some supposed referents result illegitimately introduced at the level of theorems or
even through ad-hoc statements.
Finally, let us notice that reference is different from extension. The latter concept
involves in turn the concept of truth (see below). The extension of a predicate is
formed by those objects that make the predicate a true statement. The extension
of (∀x) (P x ∨ ¬P x) is everything. The extension of (∀x) (P x ∧ ¬P x), instead,
is nothing. These abstract formulas have no reference. Contrarily, the statement
‘Prague is the most beautiful city in the world and Prague is not the most beautiful
city in the world’ has no extension but its reference class is {Prague}, and the
statement refers to the city of Prague.

6 Notice that the axioms are also trivially entailed by the axiomatic basis: Ai  Ai .
2.4 Representation 13

Pure logistic systems do not refer since they are not interpreted. Logic does not
have any reference class. Mathematics, instead, has purely formal reference classes:
it refers only to constructs. Factual science refers to the objects that populate the
world.

2.4 Representation

Some constructs not only refer, but also represent things, their properties, and
changes. In particular, any statement represents a fact of its referents. The same
construct can refer to a thing and represent some of its properties. We designate the
relation of representation by:

=
ˆ : C → F, (2.14)

where C is a set of constructs and F a set of facts, understood as states or changes

of states of a thing (a factual object).
The basic rules that govern this relation are:
• Repr1 : Properties of real things are represented by predicates (in particular,
functions).
• Repr2 : Real things are represented by sets equipped with relations, functions, or
operators.
• Repr3 : Events (changes) in things are represented by sets of statements (either
singular or existential).
• Repr4 : Laws (regular patterns of events) are represented by sets of universal
statements.
The representation relation is not symmetric (facts do not represent constructs),
reflexive (constructs do not represent themselves), nor transitive (facts do not
represent anything at all).
If a construct is a theory T about entities of some kind K, we say that T =K ˆ if
there is a function = ˆ : S → 2T from the set of states of the elements of K to the
set of all subsets of statements of T . If a subset of statements t represents a specific
fact s we write ‘t =s’.
ˆ
I remark that representations are not necessarily unique. The same feature of
reality can be represented in different ways. We can introduce the following criterion
of equivalence for different representations of the same facts:
Criterion If c and c are two constructs and T a factual theory, then c and c are
equivalent representations of the same factual item if and only if (hereafter, iff) they
are interchangeable in all law statements of T .
This means that the law statements of a theory must be invariant under the
replacement of c and c if c and c are equivalent representations.
We can extend the concept of equivalent representations to the whole theories:
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Title: Quo Vadimus?

Some Glimpses of the Future

Author: E. E. Fournier d'Albe

Release date: May 1, 2024 [eBook #73514]

Language: English

Original publication: New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1925

Credits: Produced by Tim Lindell, Donald Cummings and the Online

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK QUO

VADIMUS? ***
QUO VADIMUS?
 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW SERIES

DÆDALUS, or Science and the Future

By J. B. S. Haldane

ICARUS, or The Future of Science

By the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.

THE MONGOL IN OUR MIDST

By F. G. Crookshank, M.D. Fully Illustrated

WIRELESS POSSIBILITIES
By Prof. A. M. Low. With four Diagrams

NARCISSUS, or An Anatomy of Clothes

By Gerald Heard. Illustrated

TANTALUS, or The Future of Man

By Dr. F. C. S. Schiller

THE PASSING OF THE PHANTOMS

By Prof. C. J. Patten, M.A., M.D., Sc.D., F.R.A.I.

CALLINICUS, A Defence of Chemical Warfare

By J. B. S. Haldane

QUO VADIMUS? Some Glimpses of the Future

By E. E. Fournier d’Albe, D.Sc., F.Inst.P.

THE CONQUEST OF CANCER

By H. W. S. Wright, M.S., F.R.C.S.

HYPATIA, or Woman and Knowledge

By Dora Russell (Hon. Mrs. Bertrand Russell)

LYSISTRATA, or Woman’s Future and Future Woman

By A. M. Ludovici
WHAT I BELIEVE
By the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.

In Preparation

PERSEUS, of Dragons
By H. F. Scott Stokes, M.A.

THE FUTURE OF SEX

By Rebecca West

THE EVOCATION OF GENIUS

By Alan Porter

AESCULAPIUS, or Disease and The Man

By F. G. Crookshank, M.D.

Other Volumes in Preparation

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

 QUO VADIMUS?
SOME GLIMPSES OF THE
FUTURE

BY

E. E. FOURNIER d’ALBE
D.Sc., F.Inst.P.
Author of The Life of Sir William Crookes, The
Electron Theory, The Moon-Element, etc.

NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
681 Fifth Avenue
 Copyright 1925
By E. P. Dutton & Company

All Rights Reserved

Printed in the United

States of America
 QUO VADIMUS?
Sitting at my desk by a cosy and up-to-date gas fire on a foggy
day, with tufts of mist steadily rolling up from the swollen waters of
the wise old Thames, I try to realize that I am travelling through
space at a rate of over a thousand miles a minute, on board a minor
planet in forced revolution round a vast white-hot globe nearly a
hundred million miles away.
Somebody has called astronomy the Futile Science, and I am not
at all sure that the epithet is wholly undeserved. What do the stars
matter to us? There was a time when they were believed to have an
influence on human affairs, particularly those of kings and emperors.
To-day they are insignificant specks at an immense distance from us,
a distance so great that if they all were utterly annihilated neither we
nor our remotest descendants should experience the smallest
material effect.
The only assignable value of the stars to us, beyond the general
enlargement of our mental horizon, is that they serve as an accurate
measure of time. But even that use is now almost superfluous, since
other absolute standards of time have become available, such as the
rates of disintegration of the radio-active elements.
How, then, can I account for the fact that there is a perpetual
fascination about “the heavens,” that books are constantly being
written about them, societies founded to study them, and vast
observatories built to watch them?
It cannot be simply the thirst for knowledge. Knowledge in the
abstract has but few devotees. For every one person who wants the
Truth at all costs there are a thousand who want an Illusion at all
costs, even at the cost of mental balance. Let a man go about
proclaiming truths ascertained by research and experiment, and he
will be considered a bore by all except a few specialists. But let him
boldly assert an absurdity or a paradox, and he will obtain millions of
adherents, all animated by the Will to Believe. And the more absurd
his assertions, the more self-assured and fanatical will be his
followers.
No, the popular interest in astronomy is not due to a thirst for
accurate information. It is due to a vestige of the old astrological
belief in the significance of the constellations. We still try to “read our
fate in the stars.” They are of interest to us for what they can tell us
of the future, proximate or remote. We search the heavens for an
answer to the question “Whither?”—Quo vadimus?
In trying to predict the fate of the human race we must begin by
gauging the chances of permanence possessed by our habitable
globe. Its probable age has been put at a hundred million years.
Predictions as to when it will cease to be habitable vary enormously,
but the latest figures go into many millions of years, and the
discovery of radio-activity has had the effect of greatly postponing
the general freezing up of our planet.
Our earthly habitation, then, seems assured for many millions of
years. But millions of years are, after all, but relative, and they vanish
before the vast age of the stellar universe[1] and the enormous vistas
of time yet to come.
[1] Dr. Jeans, on very modern data, puts this age at seven million
million years.

How far can our gaze penetrate the fog which obscures our
future? Can we build for eternity? Must we prepare for a catastrophe
or an inevitable decay? Can we assure to our descendants an
indefinitely prolonged future of perpetual progress and ever-
increasing happiness?
The answer to these questions is ultimately based upon
psychological factors. Human life requires certain physical conditions
for its maintenance. It also requires the passive assistance of many
forms of animal life and plant life. But Man is, without exception, the
most adaptable inhabitant of this globe, and there is little fear of any
physical or biological factors bringing about his extinction, provided
they change sufficiently gradually. If life is adaptation to
surroundings, then Man has more chance of surviving changing
conditions than any other form of terrestrial life. What other species
can thrive equally in the Arctic and under the Equator? The dog is
man’s only rival in that respect, and is but second best.
We need, therefore, not be anxious lest a change in general
physical environment bring our race to an end. The end of the
human race, if ever it comes, will be due to the human race itself. If
the race dies, it will die by suicide. And suicide is a matter of
psychology.
Let us examine the possibility of a voluntary euthanasia of the
human race. It seems the only sort of suicide that is at all
conceivable. Can we imagine a state of things arising in which the
leaders will say: “We have lived long enough. Our race has had a
glorious history, let it have a glorious end. We cannot and will not
bow to the new conditions imposed by Nature. We would rather die
and end it all. Let us all perish together.”
Such an attitude would indeed be a new phenomenon. People
have died rather than surrender, but it was with the thought of the
approval of their fellows and the perpetual honour of their names. In
the case contemplated there would be no such inducement to
heroism. The surrender would be unchronicled and unsung.
A refusal to adapt itself to new conditions is not unknown among
savage races, nor among classes of civilized society. Tribes have
perished off the face of the earth, owing to a voluntary refusal or to
inability to adapt themselves to new conditions of life. But, so far as
we know, this has always taken place in the presence of races of
superior adaptability.
Civilizations have perished. We do not know, of course, how many
civilizations have disappeared without leaving a trace. But we do
know that races have existed, even in our own islands, who were
capable of transporting and building up great pieces of rock, and of
arranging them in an astronomically significant manner. Did these
races perish under the attacks of an enemy? Or did they die off
owing to the exhaustion of their own vitality? We may suppose that it
was the former rather than the latter alternative. For in view of the
great and increasing power of the human race we hardly need fear
any enemies from without. Our destruction, if ever it comes, will
come from within. It will come if and when we develop a Will to Die.
Such a Will to Die has been observed on a small scale in the wave
of suicide sweeping over Central Europe after the Great War. But it
was only a symptom of readjustment. It was partial, and practically
confined to the class bound up with social and governmental
stability, and incapable of adaptation to radically changed conditions.
A more ominous phenomenon is the fall in the birth-rate of most of
the insular tribes of the Pacific, which in some cases has led to their
total extinction. The causes of this fall have never been fully cleared
up. If it is due to the introduction of diseases by Indo-European germ
carriers, or the adoption of modern clothing, or the destruction of
native standards of morality by the introduction of Asiatic religions,
there is no cause for alarm concerning the future of the human race
as a whole. But if the mere discouragement of the tribe when faced
with new conditions can act directly upon the instinct of procreation,
and affect, so to speak, the élan vital of the germ-plasm, then we are
faced with the gravest danger to which the human race can be
exposed.
For such an effect would be too insidious to be dealt with by public
measures. It would be a psychological disease of the most fatal and
virulent kind. It might affect the whole human race during some crisis
in its fortunes, and might bring about its destruction by the failure of
the sex instinct.
Although such a failure must always be a menacing possibility, it is
a remote one, and at no time has it threatened the human race as a
whole. Hunger and Love have kept our race going up to now, and,
barring unforeseen developments, they will do so in sœcula
sœculorum.
But there are other dangers. A new germ might be evolved which,
like the gonococcus, might attack the germ plasm, and produce
general sterility. This is one of the dangers that can be fought by
hygienic and sanitary measures, and the wiles and intricacies of
bacteriological novelties may be safely left to the ever-increasing
resources of bacteriology itself.
 Again, there is the danger of new “rays.” It is now a well-known
fact that X-rays produce sterility when penetrating the human body in
considerable strength or for any length of time. The effect can be
guarded against by an armour of lead screens. X-rays are cut off by
a thin sheet of lead. There are other rays, known as gamma-rays,
which can penetrate several inches of lead. And higher up in the
atmosphere, about seven miles up, another kind of radiation is found
from which even a plate of lead five feet thick would be no
protection. If the sun, entering an unknown part of space filled with
denser matter, were to develop a form of radiation leading to a
considerable increase in the penetrating atmospheric rays, the
persistent action of these rays upon the human germ plasm might
bring about the total destruction of the human race by reducing its
birth-rate to zero. The effect might not even be discovered until it
was too late to remedy it. And even if it were discovered in time, the
action of the rays upon all life on the earth’s surface might have
produced havoc enough to stop all food-supplies and produce
universal starvation.
It is difficult to see how even the greatest resources of science
could meet such an emergency as that. But, short of such a new
danger, there is little doubt that the resources of humanity will be
able to meet all conceivable situations which may threaten it with
destruction.
In order to ensure the indefinite continuance of the human race on
earth, it is necessary
(1) to maintain adequate food supplies and (2) to conserve the
procreative impulse.
The latter condition might, indeed, be put first on the list.
These are the conditions of bare existence. Progress and
happiness are, as they always have been, secondary considerations.
Many minds have regarded one or both of them as unessential.
Thus, it is not at all necessary to contemplate an increasing
population of the globe. The leadership of the human race can much
more effectively be maintained by educating individuals than by
increasing their numbers. And as regards happiness, that can safely
be left to take care of itself. All progress is progress towards greater
happiness. Even mere existence can be a source of supreme
happiness, as when a great danger has been successfully averted.

Once we are sure that the human race has a reasonable chance
of indefinite survival, we can proceed to contemplate the changes, if
any, which are likely to take place as the centuries and millennia roll
on.
Anthropologists put the age of the human race roughly at half a
million years. In that comparatively long period—long as compared
with history, but short as reckoned by geology—man has evolved
from an ape-like, tree-dwelling nut-eater into a plodding, illiterate,
monosyllabic tiller of the soil, (I take the majority of mankind as
representative of its state of progress rather than the élite). The 500
millennia of human evolution have had but little effect on the human
form and the average human character. The brain is somewhat
larger generally and the mouth rather less protruding. The mental
equipment of the representative man—the man representing the
majority—is in many ways inferior to that of the dog or the ant. He is
full of greeds and lusts and superstitions which place him on a level
with the higher animal life, or even below it.
It is in his possibilities rather than in his actual state of
development that man is a superior being. Those possibilities have
to some extent been realized in the educated few. When we speak of
civilization, of modern life and scientific advance, we fix our attention
exclusively on the educated élite. In asserting, for instance, that
nowadays nobody doubts that the earth is round, we are referring to
a very small minority of the human race, composed of perhaps half
the adults of Europe and America and Australia, with a small
sprinkling of Africans and Asiatics, in all perhaps 10 per cent. of the
total population. If a vote were taken of every man, woman, and child
in the world to decide whether the earth is flat or round, there would
be a majority of perhaps 9 to 1 in favour of a flat earth.
Again, “everybody” is supposed to know that a whale is not a fish,
that it does not spawn or lay eggs, but that it suckles its young like
any other mammalian. What proportion of the human race actually
does know that simple fact? How many human beings even know
that the sun is larger than the moon? A great many, no doubt, but
how many out of the whole race?
Scientific knowledge is the birthright of every human child. But on
that very account, perhaps, it is neither prized nor cherished. In the
markets where thoughts are bought and sold, an ounce of illusion is
worth a ton of fact.
The enormous disproportion between the amount of knowledge
accumulated by the human intelligentsia and the general level of
knowledge is productive of many evils and anomalies. It necessarily
breeds an attitude of contemptuous superiority towards the
uninformed masses, and supplies a temptation to profit by that
superiority in order to dominate and oppress the majority. Many
wars, strikes, revolutions, and other social crises are the outcome of
this anomalous condition. On the other hand, the very existence of
empires requires the presence of a great substratum of the half-
educated or uncultivated to follow the lead and obey the behests of
the Imperial few.
The British Empire derives its strength from the numerical strength
of its élite. The Russian Empire and its direct heir, the present
Oligarchy, have had a small élite raised above an enormous mass of
what is probably the least-educated population in the world, outside
Africa. The French African Empire disguises the hegemony of Paris
under the liberal concession of a nominal French citizenship to its
subject tribes. The French élite is broader than the British, as wealth
in France is more evenly distributed. In Germany, on the other hand,
and in certain smaller countries, like Denmark and Finland, it is
education rather than wealth which is more or less impartially
distributed. This also tends to broaden the élite and make the nation
(as distinguished from the empire) more intrinsically powerful.
We thus get an élite among nations as well as individuals. This
élite is, however, based upon force rather than intellectual
leadership, owing to the fact that a nation regarded as an organism
is in a much more primitive stage of evolution than is a civilized
individual. Nations have no morality, no curbs upon their greed, their
hatred, their jealousy and vindictiveness.
The rivalry among nations makes for progress, but its most active
manifestations may produce a serious set-back of long duration,
involving irreparable loss.
So long as peace and goodwill do not prevail among individual
men it is absurd to expect them to prevail among a collection of
beasts of prey such as we have in the nations of the world. Yet it is
obviously desirable that the human population of the globe should
advance as one man. There is one thing, and one thing only, which
can unite humanity into one closely-knit organism, and that is an
external enemy.
If Mr. H. G. Wells’s War of the Worlds were to come true, and an
expeditionary force of Martians were to land on the earth with a view
to its annexation, then the human race might instantly unite to repel
the invader. It would be an inspiring sight to see Japanese and
Turks, Abyssinians and Zulus, Eskimos and Swiss, Brazilians and
Mexicans and Doughboys, Tahitians and Britishers and Russians,
Irish and Egyptians, Persians and Chinese, all vying with each other
in devotion and bravery, fighting for their native planet against a
ruthless and merciless invader.
Without such a danger from without, the close federation of the
nations of the world is almost unthinkable. Take the case of Ireland.
There we have two nationalities in one island, as opposed to each
other as any two nations in the same continent. In the North, a hardy,
stern, rough and unbending type of Scottish origin, who despises the
“natives” of Ireland as an inferior race, and makes good by
converting a large slice of the “distressful country” into a garden of
prosperity. In the South, a graceful and indolent peasant race, with
all the mingled diffidence and bravado of a conquered people largely
pervaded by the blood of its conquerors, and imbued with the idea of
martyrdom for the twin ideas of religion and nationality (in this case,
as it happens, quite incompatible). How can anyone expect peace
under such conditions? The situation is the very stuff that ruthless
wars are made of. The Ulsterman will not “go under” a Dublin
parliament run by what he considers to be ignorant cornerboys. The
Munsterman looks upon the “blaack Praatestant” of the North as dirt,
which Ireland must disgorge before she can rise to the height of her
destiny. England, with her good-natured religious and ethnical
tolerance, is despised by both parties, though the Ulsterman clings
passionately to the empire, which he provides with the largest ships
afloat.
That sort of thing makes international tribunals and Leagues of
Nations look ridiculous. Here are two populations in a small island,
ready to rend each other limb from limb on the slightest excuse
because the country is not large enough to hold both.
On the other hand, it is an undoubted fact that international trade,
finance, and intercourse has increased enormously with improved
means of transport. The Postal Union is a fine achievement towards
the unification of the whole human family. Its successful working
shows that enterprises covering the entire civilized population of the
globe can now be undertaken and carried through. It so happens
that the two greatest States of the world, the British Empire and the
United States of America, are also the States whose home countries
are freest from national intolerance and race prejudice, both
consisting of a mixture of many nationalities. It is to them, as well as
France, that we must look for the greatest advances towards the
ideal of a world federation. Germany before the War cherished
dreams of World Supremacy, but lacked the schooling which might
have led to success.
The two great Empires—British and Japanese—and the two great
Republics—France and U.S.A.—will, if they can agree, form a good
nucleus for a federation of the world. The world, in its present state,
requires leadership, and if the leaders are a representative and
benevolent oligarchy, it is about the best we can hope for.

Given a reasonable degree of stability, guaranteed by a

combination of the best instruments of government yet devised, we
may expect a very rapid progress. What direction will this progress
take, and what will be the fruits of it?
 Do not listen to those futile people who say there is no progress,
and that there is “nothing new under the sun”! So far from
maintaining that what is has been and ever shall be I should assert
that nothing that is has ever been before, that there are new things
evolved every day, and that every child born is a unique personality,
unprecedented in the annals of creation.
And not only are things new, but the new things are, on the
general average, a bit more advanced than the last. Advanced
towards what? Towards perfection, towards greater happiness, a
fuller and more enduring life.
Who will dare deny that life in England—to take the nearest
example—is happier now than it was even fifty years ago? Some
people will sigh for the good old times of the Victorian reign, when
money and employment were plentiful, when there was ample
leisure for the rich, with pleasant ways of spending it, when masters
were masters indeed and servants were loyal, respectful, and dutiful.
But in recent times, apart from the tragedy of the Great War, there
has been an immense improvement in the life of the average
Englishman and his dependents. The general level of education has
risen, infectious diseases have been successfully fought, schooling
has become brighter and more effective, clothing has become more
rational. There is more fresh air and less drudgery. The workman
draws a larger share of the product of his effort, and often drives his
motor car while his employer goes by train. The workman draws his
bloated wage under the protection of his trade union, while the
employer lies awake at night wondering how best to keep the works
running and find new markets for old. That is nearly all to the good,
since there are many more workmen than employers, and the
general level of contentment is raised.
Even the aged, instead of being thrown on the scrap heap, are
guarded from destitution by pensions honourably drawn from a wise
government.
It will, I hope, be put to my credit that I have not carolled the
blessings of the cinema theatre or even of wireless broadcasting.
The optimist who emphasizes these is usually met with the reply that
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