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International Intervention Sovereignty versus
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Download
Author(s): Michael Keren, Donald A. Sylvan (eds.)
ISBN(s): 9780714651927, 0714651923
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 3.73 MB
Year: 2002
Language: english
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
This page intentionally left blank
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
Sovereignty versus Responsibility
Edited by
MICHAEL KEREN
and
DONALD A. SYLVAN
First Published in 2002 by Frank Cass Publishers
Published 2014 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 USA
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informabusiness
Copyright collection © 2002 Taylor & Francis

Copyright chapters © 2002 contributors
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data:

International intervention: sovereignty versus
responsibility
1. Intervention (International law) 2. Sovereignty
I. Keren, Michael II. Sylvan, Donald A.
327.1'72
ISBN 978-0-714-65192-7 (cloth)

ISBN 978-0-714-68194-8 (paper)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

International intervention: sovereignty versus responsibility / edited by Michael Keren
and Donald A. Sylvan.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7146-5192-3 - ISBN 0-7146-8194-6 (pbk.)
1. Humanitarian intervention. I. Keren, Michael. II. Sylvan, Donald A.
JZ6369 .I58 2002

341.5'84-dc21
2002020817
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the Publisher.
Typeset in 11/13pt Ehrhardt by Vitaset, Paddock Wood, Kent

ISBN 978-1-315-04003-5 (eISBN)
Contents
Notes on Contributors vii

Preface ix
Acknowledgements xiii
TH EO RY AND H U M A N IT A R IA N IN T E R V E N T IO N
1 Theory and Humanitarian Intervention 3

H oward Adelman
C O G N IT IV E AND D O M E S T IC SO U R C E S OF IN T E R V E N T IO N
2 Intellectuals without Borders 27

M ichael K eren
3 When is Intervention Likely? 40
Arie N adler
4 Deciding whether to Intervene 56
D onald A. S ylva n and J o n C. P evehouse
5 The Media and International Intervention 75
Akiba Cohen
C O N S T R A IN T S AND C O N SE Q U E N C E S OF IN T E R V E N T IO N
6 The UN Experience in Modern Intervention 95

R udiger Wolfrum
1 Intervention as a Challenge for the M ilitary 114
Gustav Daniker
8 Canadian Discourse on Peacekeeping 126
B a rry C ooper
9 Multilateral Intervention and the International Community 147
B ruce Cronin
SC H O L A R S A G A IN ST GENO CIDE
10 Scholars against Genocide 169

N eal R iem er
Index 183
Notes on Contributors
Prof. Howard Adelman

Department of Philosophy
York University
Prof. Akiba Cohen

Department of Communication
Tel-Aviv University
Prof. Barry Cooper

Department of Political Science
The University of Calgary
Prof. Bruce Cronin

Univerisity of Wisconsin-Madison
Dr Major General (Ret.) Gustav Daniker

Swiss Army
Prof. Michael Keren

Department of Communication
Tel Aviv University
Prof. Arie Nadler

Department of Psychology
Tel-Aviv University
Jon C. Pevehouse
University of Wisconsin
Vlll International In terven tion
Prof. E m eritus N eal R iem er

Drew University
Prof. D onald A. S ylv an

Ohio State University
Prof. Dr R udiger W olfrum

Director, Max Planck Institut Fur Auslandiches
Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht
Preface
National sovereignty, defined as a nation’s right to exercise its own law and
practice over its territory, is a cherished norm in the modern era, and yet it
raises great legal, political and ethical dilemmas. Should sovereignty be
respected under all conditions or are there instances in which interference
in a state’s internal affairs becomes not only a right but a duty? What
responsibility do striking violations of international norms committed
within a sovereign state pose to the international community? What
constitutes an international ‘community’ in this regard and under what
conditions and restraints could it intervene? What should be the role of
domestic forces and international bodies in defining the need to intervene
and how can justified intervention be distinguished from sheer breech of
sovereignty?
Since the end of the Cold War, these questions have shifted from the realm
of theory to the domain of practice. Policy makers all over the world are
haunted by the sovereignty versus responsibility dilemma which lies at the
core of the emerging international order, and may be expected to become
even more central in the future.
As part of the Bertelsmann International Conferences organized by Tel-
Aviv University, a distinguished group of international lawyers, political
scientists, philosophers, social psychologists, communications experts and
military practitioners from Europe, North America and Israel met in Berlin
in December 1996 to discuss the above dilemma. This book contains selected
articles presented at this unique conference. During the period it took to
prepare the articles for publication, they had to be updated several times, as
atrocities never seem to end and the dilemmas of international intervention
are ever present.
This collection, marked by its interdisciplinary nature, as well as by
a balance between scholarly approaches and humanitarian concerns, is
presented with a sense of urgency enhanced by recent events in Kosovo, East
Timor and elsewhere which brought to bear both the tragedy of inaction and
X International In terven tion
the complexities and difficulties of intervention. As stated by UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in the 54th session of the General Assembly,
The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the con

sequences of inaction can be in the face of mass murder. But this
year’s conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions
about the consequences of action without international
consensus and clear legal authority ... To avoid repeating such
tragedies in the next century, I believe it is essential that the
international community reach consensus - not only on the
principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights
must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on ways of
deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom. The
Kosovo conflict and its outcome have prompted a debate of
worldwide importance. And to each side in this debate difficult
questions can be posed.
This collection joins the debate called for by the Secretary-General. It

begins with an introduction by philosopher Howard Adelman who sets the
parameters of a theory combining a global concern for humanitarian
intervention with the modern emphasis upon national sovereignty. The
articles are then divided into two sections; one on the cognitive factors
playing a part in the decisions by leaders and publics to intervene, as well as
the domestic forces affecting these decisions, and the other on the actual
problems faced by the intervening international and national forces.
The first section begins with an article by political theorist Michael Keren
on the role of intellectuals in sparking a sense of international responsibility.
The author asks why intellectuals participated in the Spanish Civil War
in 1936 but did not show similar willingness to intervene in the former
Yugoslavia in 1996. The difference is attributed to changes in intellectual
traditions, which took place in the 60 years separating the two cases,
especially in the perception of history.
Social psychologist Arie Nadler discusses the cognitive factors affecting
righteous action by individuals. He surveys studies on individuals’
intervention on behalf of other human beings, dealing specifically with the
motives of rescuers of Jews in World War II. He lists a series of material and
normative factors explaining altruistic behavior, such as the costs and
rewards for helping and the empathy and perceived similarity with the
persecuted group, and concludes by discussing the role of leadership in
enhancing altruistic behavior in the international arena.
International relations analysts Don Sylvan and Jon Pevehouse construct
P reface XI
a typology of forms in which problems are presented to foreign-policy

makers. Studying four decisions by US and French leaders to intervene in
Central Africa in light of the typology, the authors conclude that when a
problem is represented as one involving a threshold, representing the
problem as catastrophic, it is more likely to lead to intervention.
Finally, media analyst Akiba Cohen discusses the ways in which the media
affect news about atrocities conducted in other sovereign states. He discusses
the ways in which the modern mass media, especially television, present
social conflicts and - contrary to common belief —stresses the importance
of relevant, reliable and comprehensible information in mobilizing support
for intervention.
The second section begins with legal expert Rudiger Wolfrum who
surveys decisions by the Security Council and demonstrates the difficulty it
faces in defining the thresholds of action and inaction. Maj. Gen. Gustav
Daniker of the Swiss Army discusses the problems faced by modern military
organizations that find themselves in peacekeeping roles, and draws the
parameters of a new model of the soldier participating in such roles. Political
scientist Barry Cooper surveys the Canadian public discourse on
peacekeeping, mainly in the Middle East, within a conceptual framework of
realism versus idealism. He demonstrates the ambiguity surrounding
peacekeeping both as a concept and as reality, and shows the ways in which
both idealists and realists have taken advantage of that ambiguity. And Bruce
Cronin, an international-relations analyst, discusses the challenges posed by
collective security operations to the international community.
In conclusion, political scientist Neal Riemer outlines the role the
scholarly community can play in designing a human rights’ regime in face
of atrocities committed within sovereign states.
We do not expect this book, or for that matter any book, to make an
immediate policy difference, but we do hope it will contribute to the debate
over humanitarian intervention and help clarify the issues involved in the
sovereignty-responsibility dilemma.
Acknowledgements
This book was made possible by a grant given to Tel-Aviv University by the
Bertelsmann Foundation. The editors are indebted to the Foundation for its
generosity and to Professor Yoram Dinstein, former president of Tel-Aviv
University, who initiated and conducted the conference on which this book
is based and without whose endless energy and wisdom this project would
not have been possible. They are also indebted to Professor Christian
Tomuschat of Humboldt University in Berlin who kindly hosted the confer
ence, and to Professor Richard H. Ullman of Princeton University who gave
the keynote address. Special thanks are due to Professor Efraim Karsh
of King’s College for his help and encouragement, and to Gabriela Fisman
for her invaluable assistance. Finally, we would like to thank M r Frank
Cass and everybody at Frank Cass Publishers who worked on the production
of the book, especially Stuart Cass, Managing Director, Sarah Clarke,
Editorial Administrator and Sally Green, Editor.
In October 2001, the sad news reached us that Professor Neal Riemer, a
close friend, a fine scholar and a true humanist, who wrote the concluding
chapter, died of cancer. We would like to devote this book to his memory.
THEORY AND
HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
ONE
—< o > —
Theory and Humanitarian Intervention
HOW ARD A D E LM A N
V IO LE N C E , M O D E R N IT Y , TH E N A T IO N -ST A T E AND
IN T E R V E N T IO N
If modernity is characterized by the rational organization of life, how do we

explain the relativity of values, the rivalries entailed in power politics, and
the recourse to violence despite the advance of reason and civilization? Since
the end of the Cold War and its initial promise of a breakthrough in
establishing greater peace, intra-state crises appear to have mushroomed. We
have witnessed genocides on a scale not seen since World War II, with over
a million being slaughtered in Rwanda alone in less than four months in 1994.
The theory of modernity is based on a rational order and peace. The end of
superpower rivalry with the termination of the Cold War promised the final
arrival of that state. However, there is a gap. On the one side, we have the
promises of theory and the expectations that have followed the major
historical disjunctures of the twentieth century, whether at the end of the
two world wars or the end of the Cold War. On the other side, we encounter
the reality of increased numbers of intra-state wars and the horrendous
atrocities that have accompanied them. We received promises, but, appar
ently, there has been no delivery.
In the political arena, modernity is characterized by the development of
the nation-state. That development achieved its apogee with the division of
the whole globe among territorially based nation-states and the dissolution
of the last empire, the Soviet Union, at the beginning of the last decade of
the twentieth century. In a global nation-state system, there is a compact
among the states that each has exclusive jurisdiction over the land and
peoples within their respective territories. States assume responsibility for
the security and well-being of their own people. But a state only exists as a
4 International In terven tion
fully developed state if there is effective control and power exercised over
the body politic, and if that polity is capable of surviving on its own. As a
body politic, there has to be both centralized coercive control and an
economy in place that will ensure survival.
The compact among states does not make the arrangement into a mech
anical system of billiard balls or atoms, but into a club. For in order to be a
state, the states as a collectivity must recognize the individual state as a
member of the club. State autonomy and recognition together make up the
bookends of the club of states.1The rule of non-intervention arises from this
arrangement.
Since it is a mutual pact, there is by definition no higher authority to
determine who is a member or to police whether a state behaves like a
member. In fact, the club of nation-states emerged in Western Europe
precisely to create a single rather than divided authority in a polity.2This was
done in opposition to Rome, which claimed universal jurisdiction over the
behavior of states, and, in fact, claimed to be the embodiment of universal
values on earth, and, as such, the source of higher authority.3This is why the
arrangements between and among states are said to be anarchic.
The emergence of the nation-state system was originally unique to
Western Europe. Elsewhere, the modern era resulted in the development of
gunpowder empires in India, China, and Turkey. In Europe, this unique and
novel political development was facilitated by the synergy of a number of
diverse factors: the invention and application of the printing press, which
took the monopoly of the control over knowledge away from the church; the
thronging of aristocrats to the universities in the fifteen hundreds where,
housed traditionally in nations, they developed a camaraderie and sense of
community among the fraternity members who spoke the same language and
thereby developed parochial loyalties, in contrast to the universal values
and loyalties to Rome that accounted for the intent of their education; the
diversity of centers controlling mining to make cannons so no monopoly
developed to control the manufacture of armaments; at the same time, larger
entities were needed than city-states to afford the costs of the new arma
ments; the distance of Western Europe from the threat of raids from the
nomads on the eastern steppes, so Western Europeans lived in relative
security; the very long coastline of what was in reality a peninsula of a huge
Asian land mass which (along with the printing press) made this a society
open to discovery and change rather than fixed and permanent landmarks;
in comparison to other areas, the relative immunity to new diseases possessed
by the voyagers from Europe following the Black Death. These and other
factors combined to facilitate the development of the nation-state as a
combination of three classes: merchant capital in the city, the bureaucracy
T heory and H umanitarian Interven tion 5
and legal systems of towns based primarily on contract law, and the military
capacity of the countryside.4
The only class marginalized by this development was the scholars, the
preservers of knowledge and inculcators of values in the university who
opposed the sense of openness and new discovery.5 Though not overtly
intended to do so, the new nation-state freed itself from the moral reins and
the intellectual straightjacket of the scholastics in the university with their
relatively petty quarrels and the equally narrow foundations in either a
skeptical defense of tradition or a skeptical overthrow of tradition for faith.
But capitalism freed men from the fetters of the moralists.6 Thus, Henry
Robinson argued that the denial of the liberty of conscience, not Luther’s
conscience identified with absolute faith, was a restraint upon trade.7
The nation-state arose at the very same time as a scientific conceptual
foundation for reconciling change with stability in a radically new way was
discovered. Such a solution was found in the Newtonian schema where one
could have development and stability at the same time. Aristotle had defined
motion in terms of rest. The circularity of the seasons and of the heavenly
bodies was perfect motion in itself because one always returned to the same
starting point. Rest defined motion. Stasis defined mobility. This was the
perfect rationale for a permanently settled agricultural society. Stability was
inherent, natural, and represented perfection. But Newton defined rest in
terms of motion; a home base is merely a respite from movement; movement,
not stasis, is the norm. Change is prior in both experience and logic. Stasis
is merely an equilibrium point in a dynamic, changing system. A state is
merely a place of equilibrium in an otherwise chaotic globe.
Thus was born the club of nation-states based on municipal property and
contract law8rather than a hierarchical moral law. Each of those states, which
became dedicated to the growth of capitalism, was consolidated as a state by
the ‘nations,’ the fraternity of land-owning aristocrats who borrowed from
the merchants to consolidate the hegemonic rule of a dominant language
group over a territory.9 The identity and boundaries of that people had to
be determined based on historically and culturally inherited patterns of
behavior and national character traits of a dominant ethnic group in relation
to the difficulties of assimilating minorities into the dominant culture, and
in conflicts and wars with proximate rivals. Consolidation of the character
of each state meant conflict from within and from without. It meant inter
vention in each other’s affairs to consolidate one’s own status: the founda
tions for intervention were forged in the multicultural heritage of every
nation-state.10 It also meant indifference to the workings of other states as
long as that other state was not a threat to the security and economic well
being of one’s own.
6 In ternational In terven tion
Thus, ironically, the rules of this club meant that a number of semi-
functioning and even a few non-functioning states remained members of the
club. Why? Because nothing is to be gained from kicking them out of the
club. However, if a state is deemed to misbehave such that it is perceived as
a threat to another powerful state or group of states - that is, to their security
or key economic interests - or to the club as a whole, intervention in the
affairs of that state is justified. Disobey these minimal rules and reprisals
could be expected, including at the very extreme, intervention.
Thus, the Concert of Europe of 1815 was used as an opportunity by the
club to have the revolutionary activities of internal dissidents repressed.11By
the end of World War I 100 years later, the grotian idealists rather than the
realists were in charge. Rather than intervention being justified to put down
revolutionaries, intervention was justified in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919
to protect the rights of national minorities within states. These latter rules
of intervention proved to be totally unworkable.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention may have formalized the legal criteria
for the attainment of sovereign statehood. The three prerequisites to a
sovereign state were land (the existence of a defined territory), people (a
permanent population in that territory), and an effective government for the
state which could demonstrate its capability in enforcing its authority over
the territory and the people. That Convention may have endorsed the
principle of autonomy and non-intervention; each state had the power to
exercise exclusive control over its own domestic affairs, with the right to take
ultimate decisions and actions concerning the lives of its citizens within the
territorial boundaries of the state without interference by other states. But
that rule was always subject to the very important qualifier, that a member
of the club had to be willing to abide by the rules of the club of states.12The
protection given to the Kurds in northern Iraq13determined that large flows
of refugees were threats to peace and security and justified intervention. This
was also true in Haiti, whatever the rationale used. Certainly, Rwanda
demonstrated that states are unwilling to intervene in spite of prior know
ledge, military presence, and the legal right, if there seems to be no threat to
peace and security for the powerful members of the club or the club itself14
G LO B A LIZ A T IO N AND ST A T E S IN C R IS IS
Is this conclusion valid? In fact, are states still the significant players which
determine when and when not to intervene? Has not globalization both
weakened the nation-state as well as provided new opportunities for a global
legal and enforcement order of some kind? Are forces not at work to allow
T heory and H umanitarian Intervention 1
for the resurrection of a new international source of authority higher than

the nation-state so that minimalist moral criteria can be imposed on heinous
crimes globally recognized as illegal? Has globalization brought into exis
tence a world civilization?15 Some would impose stiff criteria on member
ship in the nation-state club.16 These, and other reformist formulations
aiming towards global governance or a higher legal authority than the nation
state, are the dreams of grotians and idealists. They want to eliminate the
basic premise of the Westphalian system - that such tests would be minimal.
The only test would be whether a state’s behavior, or even the internal
conflicts within that state, are deemed by the other states to threaten the
preservation of the state system itself and the security and peace in the
relations between states.
But isn’t globalization changing the rules of the game? Look at the radical
changes that have taken place in the last century as modernistic globalization
seems to be on the verge of completing its task with the internationalization
of the economy. Internationalized capital17makes the international economy
volatile as states are subjected to the whims of the market because of the high
proportion of debt held by foreigners. Internationalized production makes
states compete for jobs. Radical changes in transportation, communication,
and an international culture of consumerism have facilitated this process of
internationalizing the economy. New forms of collective decision-making
have emerged with transnational pressure groups and environmental
challenges that defy national solutions.18Enormous refugee movements have
been a by-product of this increasingly internationalized economy.19 An
agriculturally based society has been transformed into an urban one. The
human population has grown from one billion at the beginning of the
twentieth century and is now approaching six billion in spite of the large die
offs from wars, politically induced famine, and genocidal slaughter.
As a result of these and other changes, many20argue that both centripetal
and centrifugal forces are seriously undermining the strength and autonomy
of the nation-state.21 Some even contend that the state is an obsolete insti
tution.22 Modernity set out to establish a single source of impersonal
authority rooted in the market which was congruous with units which were
varied but with the same common elements - a legal polity, a territorial base
and a population of producers and consumers that viewed themselves as a
single economic unit. Now there is a lack of congruity between the territorial
organization of political authority and the subterritorial and transterritorial
mobilization of social forces.23 Neoliberalism aims for greater and greater
integration within a global economy. States are then less able to control trade
and monetary policy. As the market expands, the state as the primary political
unit becomes weaker.24
These globalization forces affect the ability of developed states to respond

to crises and exacerbate the problems of nation-state consolidation in
developing situations.25 With rapid urbanization in the developed world,
there is a loss of identity for new arrivals and also a sense of invisibility and
freedom from traditional norms which previously boundaried the actions of
the individual. One of the by-products is a decline in the sense of common
purpose.
Yet developed states are still involved in providing assistance to Third
World states but at declining levels in terms of both the size of their own
economies and the multiplication of needs elsewhere. Further, an increasing
proportion of development aid has shifted to dealing with complex emer
gencies.26 Developed states are economically as well as socially less commit
ted to providing overseas assistance. At the same time, multinationals grow
in strength and power, but 70 per cent of international trade is intracompany
trade, and states are less able to tax global companies since the way they earn
their profits are less and less under the control of states.27Global corporations
contribute a declining proportion of national income to state coffers, and
significantly less when measured against their wealth and power in the
economy. The ability of any single state to tax them in relationship to their
real earnings further weakens under the pressure of international com
petition to attract multinationals to different countries and locales. The
combination of political, social, and economic weakness of developed states
means that they are less able to play a role as providers of development aid,
especially given the greater need. The result is a weakening of international
law and the tools for its enforcement in all but the commercial field, at the
same time as those laws themselves and the areas of international concern
are multiplying.
In such a context, it is not surprising that the idea of a global consensus
for acting in response to complex emergencies is more myth than reality. The
situation is not helped when the sources of threat to developed states
themselves have shifted away from other states. On the one hand, there are
internal dissident and desperate factions and cults. On the other hand,
externally there are emerging real and imagined imported medical threats,
illegal migration, the globalization of crime and the age-old threat that has
always haunted nation-states, revolutionaries and terrorists who believe they
are dedicated and sacrificing their lives for a higher moral purpose. Add
environmental problems (global warming, ozone depletion, etc.), large
population increases exacerbating already high migratory flows, the possible
end of the agricultural revolution wherein population increases will again
increase at a faster rate than the ability of the world to feed itself. In light of
the combination of these factors, the ability of the Westphalian state system
to handle these pressures seems questionable. As fish stocks are depleted, as

forests are cut down, as fresh water becomes scarce in most countries, won’t
these problems produce greater social and political instability with no
governmental institutions able to deal with them? States are forced to be
more competitive than ever with less ability to meet the needs of their own
citizens.28
What about the Third World? Look at Africa. In the 1990s we witnessed
the famine and aborted humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, the genocide
in Rwanda, the resumption of the civil war in Angola, the civil war between
the Christians in the south and the Muslims in the north in the Sudan, the
enormous bloodletting in Liberia, the chronic massacres in Burundi, the
collapse in Sierra Leone, and the current crisis in Zaire/Congo. Given the
earlier legacies of Uganda, Mozambique, South Africa, and Chad, and the
immanent disasters to which large African states such as Kenya and Nigeria
are now prone, Africa accounts for a very disproportionate share of geno
cides, famines, coups d’etats, civil wars, and plagues. Almost half of the civil
wars being waged in the world today (16 of 35) with battle deaths exceeding
1,000 per year, and, therefore, half the complex emergencies, are to be found
in Africa. In addition to the Congo and Rwanda, the UN Security Council
has on its current agenda at least eight other African states - Angola, Somalia,
Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Western Sahara, and Rwanda’s
fraternal twin to the south, Burundi.29
These states are largely dependent on the exports of commodities.
Commodity prices are subject to sizable market fluctuations with disastrous
consequences when prices decline. Political leaders and the civil society are
disproportionately dependent on overseas aid. In such circumstances, the
control of the political levers of power is critical for economic success. For
Peter U vin30this results in structural violence. This situation is exacerbated
when most countries are segmented and fractured by different ethnic groups,
clans, tribes, and even religions, often with one group on both sides of a
border. With violence becoming endemic in many countries as a mode of
dealing with conflict, the risk of any of these countries collapsing into civil
war is significant.
The key root causes are present in most African countries: economies
subject to sudden acute pressure because of the collapse of commodity
prices, a weakened state sector (particularly as pressures for democratization
and human rights protection grow), ethnic segmentation, and a culture of
violence that is on the increase.31
All of the above are but indicators of the weakening role of the individual
nation-states to handle crises in the Third World. Is global governance the
solution?
G LO B A L GO VERN AN CE
Given the enormity of the problems and the increasing weakness of states to
play a positive role, is the time not ripe for the UN to evolve into a true form
of global governance? Many leaders of the UN see the role of the UN going
beyond this goal of creating a legal global authority with coercive clout
to make the inter-state system more effective. They are not just grotians;
they are Utopians. They envision the UN as a moral leader, imparting and
upholding universal moral values. Javier Perez de Cuellar in April of 1991
claimed that there was a shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the
defense of the oppressed in the name of morality ‘should prevail over
frontiers and legal documents’.32 Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that the
UN’s coercive role was intended ‘to address the deepest causes of conflict:
economic despair, social injustice and political oppression’. Boutros-Ghali’s
key document continued: ‘It is possible to discern an increasingly common
moral perception that spans the world’s nations and peoples, and which is
finding expression in international laws, many owing to the work of this
Organization.’ 33
In other words, the UN was not simply hoping to be a grotian legal system
but claiming to be a moral teacher. International law merely reflected that
morality. But unlike the Pope in the sixteenth century, the source of authentic
authority did not come from God, but from a shared set of values held by
the people in the world. The UN was, in fact, a modernist institution that
obtained its claimed quasi-sovereign authority from the will of the masses.
This suggests that the real source of reform is to be found in the
consciousness and values of people themselves and their assumption of
responsibility. ‘[Development in international norms and practice appear
to be shifting the focus of sovereignty from the government to the people of
a state, from the Westphalian precepts to popular sovereignty.’ 34The people,
acting directly through NGOs (Non-Government Organizations) and new
transnational organizations that bypass governments, will bring about the
new world order.
But these organizations lack both economic clout and coercive power.
Each special group represents a small segment of humanity and a very
particular pressure group. In the global scheme, it appears as if an army of
ants is being sent to do the job of an elephant. But the metaphor is totally
misleading. The multiplicity of groups does not constitute an army. There
is no central direction or sense of common purpose. And there is absolutely
no evidence for a global system of values being in place as claimed by the last
two Secretary-Generals of the UN. In Hobbes’ phrase, empty rhetoric has
replaced objective analysis. And if there is no global consciousness, the claims
of the UN to have a public constituency is simply self-advertisement.

Further, it is false advertising. Given the UN performance in Rwanda, these
words sound not merely empty, but hypocritical.
Gramscians also believe that there has been a change in consciousness
among the people of the world that will demand a system of global
governance.35 But the evidence is weak. Certainly, with television coverage,
there has been a dramatic increase in the politics of sentiment, the CNN
effect, in which bleeding hearts are induced to pour out dollars and, more
importantly, put pressures on their governments to act when humanitarian
disasters are portrayed. This occurred even in Goma in both 1994 and 1996
when large numbers of those fleeing Rwanda, or already ensconced in refugee
camps in Zaire as ‘refugees’, were the genocidal killers.
The politics of sentiment does exist. However, offsetting the unthinking
‘bleeding hearts’ are the fearful guts of all the polities in the world. Virtually
no developed country is willing to place its citizens at significant risk for the
purpose of a cause, even one as lofty as preventing the genocide of civilians,
even when the task is relatively easy, far less expensive than the clean-up
costs, and the risks are relatively minimal. There is indeed a global con
sciousness that has developed, but insofar as it has been developed by the
visual media, it simply means we are ready to cry and reach deep into our
pockets as each successive disaster of the week is portrayed. But the
diachronic, unconscious lessons of the Cold War and the MAD (Mutually
Assured Destruction) doctrine of deterrence have gone much deeper. We
have been conditioned to be risk averse.
Neither a global consciousness, nor the UN, nor a new global agency
expressing that consciousness rather than the will of the weakened states that
constitute the membership of the UN, can be relied on to guide us in these
hazardous times. The state continues to be the major political institution
mediating between local cultures and the emerging global civilization,
between past and future. The state may indeed be weaker, but there is no
other real game in town.36
C O N F L IC T D Y N A M IC S: B IF U R C A T IO N V E R S U S T U R N IN G P O IN T S
Let us turn to the crises themselves, not to their turning points. ‘Turning
point’ is part of the rhetoric of progress and optimism. The end of the Cold
War was one of these recurring illusionary turning points within theories of
progress - stages of development, or stages of a crisis - as if there were
inevitable set patterns all conflicts went through. I prefer the more neutral
language of bifurcation points.
A bifurcation point is the position that is most distant from a state of

relative equilibrium where there is maximum chaos in a system, but also
where there are the greatest opportunities for innovation and change. Such
points of chaos are subject to very unpredictable patterns. In these situations,
what often counts most is not the underlying or root causes or even
intervening variables, but the triggers themselves. It takes very little to shift
a situation in one direction rather than another.
At bifurcation points, what is most needed is a knowledge of triggers more
than root or underlying causes. To neutralize the effects of specific leaders,
knowledge is needed which goes beyond general causes to identify what
Alexander George ’7 calls actor-centered and situational analysis. This is
because different nations and groups have different propensities. Further,
an analysis of endogenous factors is insufficient. Even if the primary causes
of violence are internal, exogenous factors are critical. At the very least, they
play a permissive role. They cannot be left out of any analysis. It is as
important to understand the conceptual and practical constraints of outside
actors - and the conditions, capacities, and motivations which can propel
them to act effectively - as it is to understand the internal dynamics within
a state and within the region in which that state exists. For, as the Rwanda
study makes clear, the role of neighboring states is critical to understanding
the conflict as well as grasping the best mechanisms for helping to minimize
the violence. Understanding the role of permissive conditions and outside
actions and their interaction with the triggers which exacerbate the proxi
mate causes of violence is essential to any analysis.
This does not mean that the focus shifts from ‘discrete (ontologically
distinct) unities (that is, states like Rwanda) to the dynamics of social
development within the international system as a whole’.38 Some, wedded to
a mechanistic Newtonian model of science, would stress general patterns and
laws. It could be a general cause, such as the inherent dialectic of capitalism
for the revolutionary Utopians. Or the missing ingredient could be the
absence of developed and effective global political regimes of authority for
most liberal internationalists. From the opposite ideological perspective, the
inherent conflict between sovereign states, or, in more globalist terms, the
clash of civilizations or the clash between civilization itself and nature and
hence the focus on environmental scarcity, all could be emphasized. This
paper does not concentrate on reconciling the various models of general
causes that have been offered. Rather than such powerful mechanisms, I note
that relatively minor events can start a chain reaction.39 In the center of any
system where there is relative stability, one may find a degree of predictability.
However, at the outer edges of the system, a small change can not only have
a large impact in that arena, but can profoundly affect the system as a whole.40
In conventional international studies, large-scale elements - environ

mental scarcity and the consequences on satisfying needs, population
explosions, and illicit economic engagements, for example - are isolated and
studied as they are found in various cases. But the world cannot be reduced
to a simple mechanical model. It is a complex, inter-active system charac
terized by ‘chaos’ 41 at key points of perturbation.42
The stress should not be on root causes or prevailing intervening factors,
but on triggers at critical bifurcation points, the very elements that
mechanical modellers of both the realist and idealist schools tend to dismiss
as minor contingent variables which are unpredictable and uncontrollable.
The key point is the trigger, a bifurcation point where a combination of
elements comes together. At that critical juncture, choices can be made and
actions can be taken, without which the system will spin into disorder.
In addition to an immediate opportunity for creative action, bifurcation
points bring to the fore the contradictions in international regimes, such
as the refugee regime. Thus, in addition to allowing us to grasp what is
happening and providing opportunities for innovative intervention, such
innovations can have the greatest impact on the system as a whole. Order
emerges out of disordered systems, not via a central control or via governing
laws, natural or man-made. In fact, a lack of central control makes the system
more adaptive because of the use of the principle of self-organization.
Bifurcation points allow a system to reach a higher level of organization, not
by controlling the chaos, but, as part of the system, by innovating at the point
of chaos to increase the organization and, hence, equilibrium of the system
as a whole.43
T H E D Y N A M IC S OF T H IR D -P A R T Y IN T E R V E N T IO N S
An emphasis on bifurcation points has enormous implications for both

analysis and understanding. In the analytical arena, the stress has been on
demarcating the constant stages that any crisis goes through in order to
predict its progress and anticipate results. This is but the correlate of the
emphasis on root causes. But what has been suggested above is that whatever
the predictability factors, the most significant point of intervention is at a
bifurcation point. There the unpredictability is greatest. Most important,
the contingent variables have their most significant impact. Whether or not
there is a dynamic pattern to conflict in which certain interventionist
strategies can be correlated with different points in the crisis dynamic, the
contingent knowledge is much more important.
In any case, the chaos among theoreticians is even greater than the chaos
in the nation-state organization of the world itself There are conflicts

between realists and idealists, between structural neo-realists, liberal realists,
classical realists, and neo-liberal institutionalists; and built into world
systems theory is an inherent struggle between states, the focus of the
realists, and the globally oriented economy, the focus of the liberal realist.
There are also conflicts between grotians and Utopians, between Utopians
and realists versus gramscian utopian realism, between neo-liberal
internationalists and grotian internationalists.
The Rwanda report44 recommended that one of the greatest problems
in intervention was the lack of coherence in policy. Policy formulation tends
to mimic the divisions among the theorists. To add to the dilemma, there
is a gap between theory and practice. George45 documented the character of
that gap very incisively. Between the university and society, the largest chasm
probably exists between theory as practiced in the university and actual
foreign policy.
Part of the reason is the standard one applied to any need to connect theory
and practice - the abstraction of one and the immersion in the concrete of
the other. In the latter, there is the need for decisions when there is imperfect
information and no time to gather more. But the foreign policy field has
special problems. First, in the dominant realist theory, relations between
states are dominated by the pursuit of rational self-interest combined with
the preservation and extension of the power of the state to facilitate such
pursuits by its members. In Wallerstein’s world systems theory, the economy
is globalized while the realization of positions of power is confined largely
within state boundaries. In such a context, the study of power becomes the
study of domestic politics, while foreign policy becomes a sub-study of
economics - how to promote a country’s self-interest within a global
economy. This is particularly true when the study of the strategic uses of
power outside the country becomes primarily a study of the best use of
coercive power in the effort to advance national self-interest.46 In that case,
the military strategists replace the political scientists per se as the leaders in
this area.
One of the results is the relative neglect of whole fields of study which
have least relevance to either economic or strategy issues. African Studies is
a case in point.47Secondly, in the policy area, the Rwanda study demonstrates
how policy was largely dictated, not by knowledge and analysis, but by
ignorance, misleading perceptions carried in the media, and sentiment.
When experience was ostensibly used - such as the reference to Somalia -
it was based both on a misreading of that experience and an ill-fitting
application to Rwanda. And when experience was relevant - such as that from
Zaire - it was not utilized.
As an example, from the theoretical side, those in the United States with
knowledge of Rwanda were largely anthropologists and historians, not
political scientists let alone foreign-policy specialists. There was a simple
reason. Rwanda had not heretofore been a primary foreign-policy interest of
the United States. It is difficult to undertake empirical studies on foreign-
policy areas where one’s own country has little engagement. And while there
were many studies of Zaire because of the American involvement, they were
overwhelmingly critical - analyses of covert and hegemonic exercises in
power politics to advance American interests and engage in cold-war politics
through proxy wars. If intellectuals cannot be the moral guides of a state,
they will almost inevitably play the role of its superego.
This role has been a recurring theme endemic to the role of universities
in the modern world. As the university developed, again and again it would
create groups of intellectuals concerned with the moral marginality of the
university and its failure to resurrect its original medieval mission to create
and set universal moral standards for society.
There is an additional problem. It is difficult to generalize from historical
studies of the agents and issues in a particular setting. The gap between
politics as history and politics as social science continues to plague academia.
Theory based on scientific abstractions lacks enough historical specificity to
be relevant, while the historical details of the events in Rwanda lack a
comparative context or enough generalization to fit current practices within
a larger context.
In the Rwanda case, the Adelman/Suhrke report48pointed to the absence
of any detailed diagnosis of what was occurring at the decision-m ak ing levels.
There were analyses. In the United States, the State Department had
scenario studies. The CIA had undertaken strategic studies, as had Pentagon
advisers.49The UN had a plethora of information and reports, none of which
had been subjected to systematic analyses. In France, where the best studies
were done, they influenced a shift in French policy from unqualified support
for Habyarimana to support for the peace process; the ambivalence of the
shift suffered from both a time lag and the conflicts over policy. More
important than all these gaps in substantive knowledge or the application of
substantive knowledge even when it was available, was the absence of a
coherent process for obtaining the knowledge and utilizing it.
But there are deeper problems. The conflicts between various inclinations
in foreign policy are but correlates to the disputes between different
theoretical schools. As long as there is such confusion in conceptualizing the
general problem, it is difficult for policymakers to take scholars seriously,
other than to use them as rationales for their own propensities.50
Over the past decades, George has demonstrated the greatest concern
with the problem of the gap between theory and practice. He eschews
confining himself to concerns with instrumental (he calls it technical) ration
ality and is concerned with the broader realm of normative considerations
in what he terms ‘value rationality’. Nevertheless, George is still a realist.
He begins with the assumption that the essential task of statecraft ‘is to
develop and manage relationships with other states in ways that will protect
and enhance one’s own security and welfare’.51Thus, policymakers have to
clearly enunciate a state’s interests, prioritize them, and assess costs and risks
in pursuing them.
Though George’s framework was far broader than most realists and
included America’s normative as well as material interests and the role of
knowledge as well as power and interest in explicating and guiding political
actions,52 there remained two problems. The material and power interests
were given priority. Secondly, the key normative interest, the prevention or
mitigation of genocide, arose late in the game. Prior to that stage, the priority
of material and power interests meant that the intelligence analysis had not
been done or, when undertaken, had not risen to the top of the pile.
Committed in one direction, in good part propelled by domestic reactions
to perceptions of the Somalia involvement, it then became very difficult to
reverse course, especially when neither the government nor the public was
well informed on the issue.
JU S T IF Y I N G H U M A N IT A R IA N IN T E R V E N T IO N -
TH E C A SE OF ZAIRE
States largely avoided the universal predictions of disaster in Zaire. If the

situation of the refugee warriors from the interahamwe and ex-FAR (Forces
Armees de Rwanda) army, who indoctrinated and intimidated the refugees
against returning to Rwanda, were not attended to an explosion could be
expected. The eruption began when the interahamwe and ex-FAR combined
with Zairian army units to undertake ethnic cleansing of the Banyawalenge
in the Masisi region of Zaire in the spring of 1996. But by the time those
efforts were extended to the Bukavu and Uvira areas in the south, the
Banyawalenge, whose citizenship had been taken away by the Zairian govern
ment in 1981, had allies and ‘volunteers’ from Rwanda. They defeated the
militant Hutu attacks and began the violent overthrow of the Zairian regime.
Though Brian Atkins from USAID (United States Assistance for Inter
national Development) tried to make intervention a central goal of US policy
in the June 1996 Rwanda Roundtable in Geneva, his initiative was under
mined from three sources. There was a lack of ardent support by other states.
Professional analysts pointed out all the hazards, difficulties, and risks of
intervention. Most importantly, he was not supported by his own ‘realist’
colleagues, especially from the State and Defense Departments.
However, as usual, sentiment overruled the various instrumental ration
alists as the media covered the plight of the refugees extensively and in detail.
International intervention was proposed and adopted. But beneath the unity
of purpose, the supporters of an interventionist initiative were in conflict.
Taken together, they were also at odds with the parameters set out by the
African states in the Nairobi summit of 5 November, in particular the
obligation to free the refugee camps from the control of the militants and
allow the refugees to return to Rwanda. As a result of this incoherence among
states, the rebels initiated a preemptive attack against the interahamwe and
ex-FAR, and suddenly over 600,000 refugees were moving back to Rwanda.
Paradoxically, when the interventionists were determined to be strictly
humanitarian, key African states believed that the inclusion of France meant
that the intervention was certain to be political and one-sided. The camps
would be reinforced and the interahamwe strengthened.
With the dramatic decline in the sentiment for intervention and with the
political obstacles arising against intervention, the rationale dissolved even
though there were still 750,000 internally displaced Zairians and the plight
of allegedly 500,000 Rwandese and Burundian refugees had still not been
resolved.53 Whether the humanitarian intervention melted into air or was
transformed into something radically other, the opportunity for basing
intervention on norms and rules and for using the crisis to articulate a
consistent rationale was lost.
Without effective rules of the club of nation-states (excluding those rules
which are in the books but are not enforced), a government can slaughter
thousands, tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands and millions of
its own citizens without any intervention or with belated interference by
outside powers. States are unwilling to intervene in spite of prior knowledge
of a genocide (such as in Rwanda), military presence and the legal right to
intervene, if there seems to be no threat to peace and security for the powerful
members of the club or the club itself.54Alternatively, sentiment can arouse
the passion for humanitarian intervention, but one which must be strictly
humanitarian and not get at the root of the problem or involve any significant
risk to the intervenors.
Does this mean that the club of states lacks any abiding legal rules or moral
guides? Not at all. The rules of state security are clear. Even the rules of
economic interests are clear. Only those rules which ignore security and
economic interests and attempt to found rules of intervention on a universal
moral order are ignored, except as a moral whipping tool.
Does this mean states are able to abuse their own citizens with impunity?
Not at all. Because abuse always has consequences for the other members —
the most obvious one being the flow of refugees into those countries. The
legal norms and the ethical guidelines do exist, but they remain vague,
unarticulated, and are not adequately embodied in international law because
the universalists have fought a rearguard battle on the only turf which they
predominated as they were successfully beaten back with the rise of
modernity.
It is time for the rules of the club of nation-states justifying intervention
to be articulated. When and under what conditions is the abuse by a state of
its own citizens, or the tolerance by state authorities of abuse perpetrated by
others, to be considered unacceptable to the other members of the club? Will
such rules be founded on the basis that such abuse threatens the security and
economic well-being of those other members as well as the continuity of the
club in general? In sum, binding both failing states and states which attempt
to prevent such failures (and the consequences thereof) is the common
membership of both in the same club. They are bound together by a set of
articulated and unarticulated rules governing intervention by one state in the
affairs of the other.
The timing for clarifying the rules of membership and the definition of
threats to peace and security is propitious. The currents of globalization are
undermining the strength of the individual member states as well as the
illusion of the absolute autonomy of each. But, as indicated above, these
historical factors are being used as a rallying cry for the universalist forces
to reimpose a set of universal moral rules. An articulation of rules which
integrate interests and norms is needed. So are readily available instruments
of intervention and the logistics for delivering them. What is not needed is
policy determined to be ineffectual by the unreason of realism, or an activist
policy determined in an ad hoc manner by sentimentalism.
To realize such a policy, it will be necessary to reward risks with honour
and glory for the sacrifice. On the other hand, such a rationale must not
become an apologetic for a new imperialism on the premise of Machiavelli
that a state must be constantly either preparing for war or fighting wars lest
the state implode with the domestic turmoil that always arises in times of
peace.55 Humanitarian intervention must be founded on both interests and
norms lest it become the excuse for a messianic complex of sacrifice,
salvation, and redemption in what the military call low intensity conflicts and
what the humanitarians call complex emergencies. This is the only meaning
ful route to escape the negligence and impotence of 1991-92, a period which
set the stage for the radical shifts between indifference and sentiment
towards the Third World that followed.
N O TE S
1. David Held, D em ocracy and the G lobal O rder: From the M odern S tate to Cosmopolitan
G overnance (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.36; Stephen D. Krasner
(ed.), In tern ation al R egim es (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 18; and
Cynthia Weber, S im ulating S o v ereign ty : In terven tion , the S tate and S ym bolic Exchange
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
2. Jean Bodin saw the singularity of the nation-state as the only answer to divided authority
between the local polity and Rome because the ‘medieval confusion of un-coordinated
independent authorities with residual ties to a distant Pope or Emperor was a recipe for
chaos and bloodshed’. Jean Bodin (1576) De Republica - Six Books o f the C om m onwealth
(tr. M.J. Tooley) (Oxford: Blackwell). As Bodin wrote, ‘what was required in each state
was a single and ultimate source with “the power to give the law to all citizens” ’(p.78).
3. Machiavelli was one of the first political thinkers to oppose the idea of a centrally directed
religious political authority; he was in favor of political power being transferred to
the merchant-led city-state as opposed to a third option, a secular imperial center.
Machiavelli believed that a replication of the pagan Rome of antiquity as the alternative
to medieval Rome would be too large and cumbersome to manage human political
ambitions just as classical Rome had been. Vickie B. Sullivan, M achiavelli's Three R om es:
R eligion , Human L iberty and Politics R eform ed (Dekalb IL: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1996).
4. John Gledhill, P ow er and its D isguises: A nthropological P erspectives on P olitics (London:
Pluto Press, 1994).
5. Think of the debate that was at the intellectual foundations of modernity - finding a solid
foundation for knowledge in the face of the attack by pyrrhonistic skepticism. Note the
recognition that the quest for knowledge could have no certain and fixed foundations. It
was only with the latter recognition that we would get the divide between pure fideism
- the path of faith - and mitigated or constructive skepticism, basing knowledge on
reasonableness. (Richard H. Popkin, The H istory o f S cepticism fr o m Erasmus to D escartes
(N.V. Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp., 1960), p. 15.) But at the intellectual
foundations of modernity, the choice was between truth authorized by Church tradition
- the status of which required the skepticism of Erasmus to defend - or the insistence
on founding faith on Truth, as in M artin Luther’s 1520 volumes, The A ppeal to the
German N obility and The B abylonian C aptivity o f the Church. In those attacks, he
established an alternative foundation for certainty - scripture and faith. Truth and the
source of faith were to be found in scripture, and in order to read scripture truthfully,
one had to have faith. And because it was a foundation in personal conscience and in
using reason to attack tradition to provide a foundation in faith, the traditional order was
undermined. But the insistence remained that truth be built on some solid foundation.
There was either faith or a skepticism that reinforced traditional institutions. Alterna
tively, the Rabelasian path undermined any basis of knowledge whatsoever.
6. For an analysis of the development of sixteenth-century capitalist agriculture (Immanuel
Wallerstein, The M odern World S tate (N ew York: Academic Press, 1974)). For a discussion
of its union with mercantilism to develop capitalist expansion in the seventeenth century
(Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist W orld-economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979)).
7. Henry Robinson, A S h ort A nswer to A.S. (1645): ‘nations denying the right to worship
could not properly send their agents to other nations so discriminated against’. R.L.
Colie, Light and the E nlightenm ent: A S tudy o f the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch
Arminians (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1957), p.45. Henry More
would transform this practical rationale into a matter of principle and human justice.
8. Ronen P. Palan, ‘State and Society in International Relations’, in Ronen P. Palan and
Barry Gills (eds), Transcending the S tate—G lobal D ivide: a N eostructuralist Agenda in
Intern ation al R elations (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp.45-62.
William H. McNeill, The G lobal C ondition: C onquerors, Catastrophes and C om m unity
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
9. In this interpretation, the development of the state p reced es the development of a
commercial empire and a global economy. Wallerstein argued that the state originated as
a by-product of capitalist development. For support for my claim that the state system
is created prior to, but facilitated by, the development of a consolidated capitalist system
(Aristide Zolberg, ‘Origins of the Modern World State: A Missing Link’, World P olitics,
33:2, January 1981, pp.253-81).
10. Weber, S im ulating S ov ereig n ty , p.20.
11. As Australian Chancellor Meternich stated, ‘States belonging to the European alliance,
which have undergone in their internal structure an alteration brought about by revolt,
whose consequences may be dangerous to other states, cease automatically to be members
of the alliance. [If such states] cause neighbouring states to feel an immediate danger, and
if action by the Great Powers can be effective and beneficial, the Great Powers will take
steps to bring the disturbed area back into the European system, first of all by friendly
representations, and secondly by force if force becomes necessary to this end.’ (R.R.
Palmer and J. Colton, A H istory o f the M odern World, 4th edn (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1971)0
12. ‘As enforcement operations always overlook the principle of consent, they are essentially
interventionist forces, where intervention is defined as an attempt to get involved, or
deploy military force, in a conflict without the approval of all the parties to the conflict.
These interventions (Haiti, northern Iraq, Somalia) appear to have set important legal
precedents.’ (Samuel M. Makinda, ‘Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges
for the United Nations’, G lobal G overn ance: A R eview o f M ultilateralism and In ter
national O rganizations, 2:2, M ay-Aug. 1996, pp. 149-68.)
13. The intervention in northern Iraq was not undertaken ‘to protect Kurds from dictatorial
rule’ (Makinda, ibid., pp. 157-8), though that may have been the effect. (Howard
Adelman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds’, In tern ation al J o u rn a l o f
R efu gee L aw, 4:1, 1992, pp.4—38; Howard Adelman, ‘The Ethics of Humanitarian
Intervention: The Case of the Kurdish Refugees’, Public A ffairs Q u a rterly, ‘Special Issue
on Refugees’, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 1992, pp.61-88; and the commentary of Laberge in Ethics
and In ternational A ffairs, 1995.) Contrary to the wishful thinking of many grotians and
Utopians, there is no indication that ‘the UN is probably ready to implement a broader
concept of security that, among other things, includes economic development, societal
institutions, and good governance’ . (Makinda, ‘Sovereignty and International Security’,
G lobal G overnance, 2:2, M ay-Aug. 1996, p. 164.)
14. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, ‘Early Warning and Conflict Management: Genocide
in Rwanda’ constituting Study II of the E valuation o f E m ergency A ssistance to R wanda
(Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996).
15. ‘(T)oday and for the foreseeable future, the only international civilization worthy of the
name is the governing economic culture of the world market. Despite the view of some
contemporary observers, the forces of globalization have successfully resisted partition
into cultural camps.’ (Richard Rosecrance, ‘The Rise of the Virtual State’, Foreign Affairs,
July-Aug. 1996, pp.45-61.)
16. Luigi Bonante, Ethics and Intern ation al P olitics (Colombia SC: University of South
Carolina Press, 1995), p.30.
17. ‘Economic globalization has placed constraints upon the autonomy of states. More and
more, national debts are foreign debts so that states have to be attentive to external bond
markets and to externally influenced interest rates in determining their own economic
policies. The level of national economic activity also depends upon access to foreign
markets. Participation in various international “regimes” channels the activities of states
in developed capitalist countries into conformity with global economy processes, tending
toward a stabilization of the world capitalist economy.’ (Robert W. Cox, ‘Structural issues
of global governance: Implications for Europe’, in Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, H istorical
M ateralism and In tern ation al R elations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).)
18. David Held, D em ocracy and the G lobal O rder, p.viii; Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas,
‘Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance’, in G lobal G overn ance, 1:3,
Sept.-Dee. 1995, pp.255-84.
19. Howard Adelman, ‘Ethnicity and Refugees’, in World R efu gee S u rv ey (Washington DC:
U S Committee for Refugees, 1992), pp.6-11.
20. Admittedly, many modern realists such as Schweller have argued that this observation is
inaccurate.
21. ‘We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends.
Regional and continental associations of states are evolving ways to deepen cooperation
and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries.
National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and
by decisions of states to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political
associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and
sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of states is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious,
social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new
assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking
to undermine evolution and change through democratic means.’ (Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, An Agenda f o r P eace 1995, 2nd edn (New York: United Nations, 1995), para. II,
pp.41-2.) (The first 1992 edition is included.)
22. Paul Kennedy, P reparing f o r the T w enty-first C entury (New York: Random House, 1993),
p.131.
23. ‘Globalization is generating a more complex multi-level world political system, which
implicitly challenges the old Westphalian assumption that a state is a state is a state.
Structures of authority comprise not one but at least three levels: the macro-regional
level, the old state (or Westphalian) level, and the micro-regional level. All three levels
are limited in their possibilities by a global economy which has means of exerting its
pressures without formally authoritative political structures.’ (Cox, ‘Structural issues of
global governance’, p.263.)
24. James H. M ittelman, ‘Rethinking the “New Regionalism” in the Context of Global
ization’, in G lobal G overn ance, 2:2, M ay-Aug. 1996, pp. 189-214.
25. ‘The rapid growth and maturation of the multicentric world can in good part be traced
to the extraordinary dynamism and expansion of the global economy. And so can the
weakening of the state, which is no longer the manager of the national economy and has
become, instead, an instrument for adjusting the national economy to the exigencies of
an expanding world economy.’ (James N. Rosenau, The U nited N ations in a Turbulent
World (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).)
26. At the time of the Rwanda genocide, 45 per cent of UN assistance was devoted to
humanitarian rather than development purposes. (Cf. ‘Emergencies Consuming Nearly
H alf of UN Assistance’, A frica R eco v ery , 8:1-2, (UNDP, 1994).)
27. ‘Restructuring is depriving the state of its ability to regulate economic life, furthering
the outflow and internal concentration of wealth.’ (Mittelman, ‘Rethinking the “New
Regionalism” in the Context of Globalization’, G lobal G overn ance, p.209.)
28. ‘As economic interests expand and the domestic economy becomes a derivative of the
global economy, the nation-state is placed in a difficult and contradictory position. It
must in neoliberal societies ... promote the efficiency of global resource exploitation and
at the same time meet an expanding array of domestic responsibilities.’ (Warren Mason,
‘What is New in Neostructuralism?’ in Palan and Gills (eds), Transcending the S ta te -
G lobal D ivide, p. 17.) The global market on its own seems merely to exacerbate the
problems we apparently face as no substitute appears able to take over the role of the state,
and the state’s ability to control even its own monetary and fiscal policies is eroded.
29. The first is a point Edmond J. Keller makes in his introduction (p. 11) and Donald
Rothchild makes in his conclusion (p. 228) of their edited volume, A frica in the N ew
Intern ation al Order: R ethinking S tate S ov ereign ty and R egional S ecu rity (Boulder CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). Ibrahim A. Gambari makes the latter point in his article
‘The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing Africa’s Security Issues’,
in that volume (p.29).
30. Peter Uvin, A iding Violence: The D evelopm ent Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford CT:
Kumarian Press, 1998).
31. M ichael E. Brown, The In tern ation al Dimensions o f In tern a l C onflict (Cambridge, MA:
The M IT Press, 1996), p.573, for example, identifies four main clusters of factors which
somewhat compare to and have a large overlap with the four underlying causes I identify:
an economic crisis, weak institutions, social segmentation, and proneness to violence. He
identifies ‘structural factors such as weak states, security concerns, and ethnic geography;
political factors such as discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national
ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics; economic/social factors such as
widespread economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic
development and modernization; and cultural/perceptual factors such as patterns of
cultural discrimination and problematic group histories’. Proximate causes are but the
acceleration of the underlying causes as can be seen in the comparative chart. (Ibid.,
p.577, Table 17.1.)
32. UN Press Release, SG/SM /4560, 24 April 1991.
33. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda f o r P eace.
34. Makinda, ‘Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations’,
in G lobal G overnance, 2:2, M ay-Aug. 1996, pp. 149-68.
35. ‘(W)e now live in a world which is characterized by the growing global integration of
production and financial structures, complex communications grids, the rapid innovation
and diffusion of technology and the possible em ergen ce o f associated form s o f consciousness
(my italics), as well as changes in security structures and strategic alignments.’ (Gill,
Gramsci, H istorical M aterialism and In tern ation al R elations, p.7.)
36. ‘In a context of a globalized world economy, the territoriality of the state is significant
not as the source of quasi-ontological needs and desires but because the state is the
primary political organizational mechanism of social order and transformation.’ (Palan,
‘State and Society in Global Relations’, Transcending the S tate-G lob a l D ivide, p.46.)
37. Alexander L. George, B ridging the Gap: T heory and P ractice in Foreign P olicy (Washington
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
38. Gills and Palan, ‘The Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations’ in Ronen P.
Palan and Barry Gills (eds), Transcending the S ta te-G lob a l D ivide, pp. 1-14.
39. Very few international theorists pay attention to what is generally known as ‘chaos’ theory,
even though they are preoccupied with crises. One exception is M ichael Nicholson,
Causes and C onsequences in Intern ation al R elations: A C onceptual S tudy (New York: Pinter,
1996), pp.37-43. ‘Small changes in the area around the bifurcation point lead to major
changes in the system’s behavior.’ (P.39.)
40. This is often referred to as the bu tterfly effect. ‘If a butterfly flies from one buttercup to
another in June in England instead of staying put, the minute change in the climate
“causes” a hurricane in the Caribbean in the following year.’ Ibid., p.43.
41. For the best introduction to the chaos theory of the Brussels school, see Ilya Prigogine
and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out o f Chaos: M a n s N ew D ialogue with N ature (New York:
Bantam, 1984), or Prigogine’s earlier more mathematical version, From B ein g to
B ecom in g: Time and Com plexity in the P h ysica l S cien ces (San Francisco CA: W.H. Freeman
and Company). For a model on how these systems produce greater order instead of chaos,
see the combined work of the Danish scientist, Per Bak, and his Chinese colleague, Kan
Chen, and their theory o f ‘self-organized criticality’. (Cf. their article by that same name
in S cien tific A merican, January 1991, pp.46-53, or their earlier short version with Michael
Creutz, ‘Self-Organized Criticality in the “Game of Life’”, in N ature, 342:6251, 14
December 1989, pp.780-2,. Whereas environmental realists stress the mechanical sub
state (Homer-Dixon), inter-state (classical realists), and larger macro-civilizational
factors that need to be kept in equilibrium, and idealists and liberal internationalists stress
the values and institutions that ought to be put in place to prevent the system from
spinning out of control, this theory essentially argues that the factors for producing a
higher level of order are to be found within the complex system itself. What is most
important is detecting the critical point at which a system can go from relative stability
to catastrophe.
42. Though ‘chaos’ is used here analogically, it also tries to use the analogy accurately in
reference to the key elements of chaos theory. Thus, though on the one hand, language
is being used metaphorically, hopefully it is not obscurantist and confusing. For a satire
on the misuse of chaos theory to posit a relativist world in which reflection is merely an
exercise in subjective projection, see the article by Alan D. Sokal, ‘Transgressing the
Boundaries - Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity’, S ocia l Text,
Spring/Summer 1996, pp.217—52, and the commentary by Steven Weinberg, ‘Sokal’s
Hoax’, N ew York R eview o f Books, XLIIL13, 8 August, pp. 11-15.
43. John H. Holland, H idden O rder: H ow A daptation Builds C om plexity (Reading: Addison-
Wesley, 1995).
44. Adelman and Suhrke, ‘Early Warning and Conflict Management’.
45. George, B ridging the Gap.
46. In George (ibid.), the primary gap between theory and practice is between realist theorists
and realist practitioners. ‘(P)ractitioners find it difficult to make much use of academic
approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state
actors are alike and can be expected to behave the same way in given situations, and which
rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational
unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with actor-
specific models ... that grasp the different internal structures and behaviorial patterns
of each state and leader with which they must deal.’ (P.9.) On the other hand, for George,
what the practitioners need is statecraft since, ‘[T]he essential task of foreign policy is to
develop and manage relationships with other states that will protect and enhance one’s
own security and welfare. This objective requires that policymakers clearly define their
own state’s interests, differentiate these interests in terms of relative importance, and
make prudent judgments as to acceptable costs and risks of pursuing them.’ (P.xxiv.) In
other words, practitioners (American ones at least) practice realism, but theory based on
realism is of no help. What is of help is a model that is actor specific, instead of assuming
one set of motives, and which is relative to the structure and situation within which the
actor operates.
47. This also applies to media coverage. On non-reporting on Africa, see M ary Anne
Fitzgerald, ‘The News Hole: Reporting Africa’, A frica R eport (Ju ly- Aug. 1989), pp.52-4.
49. Part of the reason these studies were not utilized in influencing policy is the very familiar
one where the academic gained access to prescient lower level analyses which were never
used and, in retrospect, embarrassed the government.
50. Howard Adelman, ‘Poetics and History’, a review essay on Gerard Prunier’s The
R wandese Crisis: H istory o f a G enocide, for Intern ation al M igration R eview , Fall, 1996,
Vol. 30.
51. George, B ridging the Gap, p.xxiv.
52. For a challenge to realist convictions that knowledge and historical experience are
irrelevant compared to power and interest in explaining state actions, see Dan Reiter,
Crucibles o f B eliefs: L earning, A lliances, and World Wars (Ithaca NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996). The book is particularly relevant because it explains the different behavior
of Norway and Sweden following World War II.
53. I say ‘alleged’ because the original numbers were exaggerated and the numbers of
‘missing’ refugees were greatly exaggerated.
55. Sullivan, M a ch ia velli’s Three R om es: R eligion, H uman L iberty and P olitics R eform ed,
p. 177; and Michael T. Klare, The N ew Pas A m ericana: US In terven tion in the Post C old-
War Era (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1992), pp.37-54.
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Richard II., 23
Richard, Lewis, 10n
Richardes, Lewis, 40n
Richardson, C. J., 63
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Richardson, W. Westbrook, 83
Richold, —, 83
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Rivers, Margaret, Lady (formerly Tryon), 69
Rivers, Mary, Countess Dowager, 68n
Rivers, Penelope, Lady, 69
Rivers, Richard, 4th Earl (“Tyburn Dick”), 69, 70
Rivers, Thomas Darcy, Baron Darcy of Chich (afterwards Earl), 67
Rivers, Thomas Savage, 3rd Earl, 68, 69
Rivers House, Great Queen Street, 59, 63, 67
Roberts, Thomas, 13, 14
Robins, Richard, 107
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Rochford, Frederick Nassau de Zuylestein, 3rd Earl of, 70
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Rowland, Percival, 122n
Rowlandson, William, 139
Rowley, —, 90
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Rudd, Thos., 92
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Sadler, Ric., 89
Sadler (alias Clarke), Thomas, 80
St. Albans, Earl of (Marquess of Clanricarde), 46, 47, 50, 59
St. Amond, Jas., 65n
St. Andrew Street, 113
St. Giles, Cripplegate, Charity Schools, 112
St. Giles-in-the-Fields Church, 127–140
St. Giles-in-the-Fields, Hospital of, 20, 23, 34, 107, 109, 111, 117–126,
186
St. Giles-in-the-Fields, Rectors of, 87, 139
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St. Giles’ Wood, Edmonton, 125
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137
St. John of Jerusalem, Priory of, 3, 7
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St. Thomas’s Street (now Shelton Street), 27, 31
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Salisbury, Robert Cecil, Earl of, 36
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Salvadore, —, 66
Sandby, Thomas, 61, 62, 63
Sanders (Saunders), Mary, 96
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Savage, —, 84
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Savage, Elizabeth (afterwards Lady Thimbleby), 90
Savage, Elizabeth (née Darcy), Countess Rivers, 59, 67, 68, 73n, 90
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Savage, Lady Mary, 68
Savage, Sir Thomas (afterwards Viscount Savage), 67, 90
Savage, Thomas, 3rd Earl Rivers, 68, 69
Savill, Miss, 71
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Schmidt, Bernard (Father Smith), 132
Scott, —, 172
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Scott, John (Rector), 139
Scott, William, 150
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Stephenson, Mrs., 165
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Stewart, G., 92
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Stuart, George Seigneur D’Aubigny, 60, 72
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Stydolph, Thomas, 112
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Taylor, Ed., 56
Taylor, Dr. John, 89
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Thomson, Mrs. Anne, 11
Thomson, William, 11
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Twisden, Sir Thomas, 11
Twisden, Sir William, 11
Twyford Buildings, Gate Street, 12
“Tyburn Dick”, 69
Tyburn Gallows, 144
Tye, Dr., 162
Tyler, Rev. James Endell, 105
Tyler, William, 61, 62
Umfreville, Chas., 103n

Umfreville, Gilbert, 103n
Unicorn Inn, High Holborn, 8, 9
Unicorn Yard, High Holborn, 8
Vanblew, —, 76, 77n
Van Helmont, —, 78
Varney, Frances, 120
Vaughan, Elinor, 18
Vaughan, Thomas, 18
Vaughan, Thomas (“Dapper”), 71
Vaune, Mr., 90
Vavasour, Anne, 20
Vavasour, John, 20, 101, 107, 108, 110, 144
Vavasour, Nicholas, 144
Vere, Lady, 31
Vere, Sir Horace, 51
Verney, Edmund, 121
Verney, Sir R., 120n
Vernon, Mr., 77
Verrinder, Dr. G. C., 132
Vertue, —, 44
Vestry of St. Giles, 26
Villiers, George, 1st Duke of Buckingham, 91n
Villiers, George, 2nd Duke of Buckingham, 91n
Villiers House, 53n
Vine, The, High Holborn, 123, 124
Vine Street (now Grape Street), 124
Violetti, Eva Maria, 90n
Vuidele, Anthony, 119
Waldron, John, 6
Wales, George, Prince of (afterwards George IV.), 78
Walgrave, John, 28, 107
Walker, Dr. Jas., 11
Walker, John, 13, 14
Walker, Richard, 163
Walker, Thomas, 29n, 31n
Walpole, Horace, 44, 46, 56n, 71
Walter, Peter, 105
Walton, Brian, 139
Ward, James, 92
Wardrobe, Great Queen Street, 45n, 66
Warner, Henry, 34n
Warwick, Charles, Earl of, 88
Warwick, Robert, Earl of, 88
Watson, Mrs., 96
Watson, Henry, 149
Watson, Mary, 96
Watson, Rowland, 5, 6
Watson, William, 5
Watson, Sir William, 133
Wayte, Edward, 79
Webb, Barbara (afterwards Viscountess Montagu), 65
Webb, Lady Barbara, 65, 136
Webb, Sir John, 47n, 65n, 136
Webb, John, Architect, 44
Webb, Philip Carteret, 73n, 74
Webb, Rhoda (afterwards Beavor), 75
Webb, Richard, 38
Webb, Thos., 71
Wedderburn, Alexander, Lord Loughborough (afterwards Earl of
Rosslyn), 155
Weedon, Thomas, 96
Weld, Lady Frances, 94, 95n
Weld (Wild, Wield), Humfrey, 59, 60, 94, 95n, 96, 97n, 100
Weld House, 93–97, 99
Weld Street. (See Wild Street.)
Wesley, John, 115, 116
Wesleyan Chapel, Great Queen Street, 86–92
West London Mission, 88, 115
West Street, 112n, 115
West Street Chapel, Seven Dials, 87
Western, Thomas, 11
Weston (Whetstone), John, 5n
Westone, William, 109n
Wetherell, Philip, 21n
Wharton, Philip, 4th Lord, 79, 120
Whetstone, William, 6–7
Whetstone Park, 4, 8
White, James, 28, 112
White Hart, 14, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29n, 30n, 123
White Hart Feilde, 6
—(See also Pursefield.)
White Hart Yard, 26
White Horse in Drury Lane, 35
White House, St. Giles’s Precinct, 121
White Lion Street, 113n, 114
Whitesaunder, Thomas, 119
White Swan in Queen Street, 37n
Whitfield, Henry Fotherley, 31n
Whitfield, Thomas, 110n, 111n
Wigg, William, 110n, 111n
Wild. (See Weld.)
Wild Boare Alley, 18
Wild Court, Nos. 6 and 7, 98
Wild Street (Weld Street), 34, 93–97
—(See also Little Wild Street.)
Wilkes, John, 74–75
Wilkinson, William, 125
Wilkinson’s Close, 125n, 187
Williams, Jas., 165
Williams, John, 84
Williams, Paul, 40n
Williamson, Sir Joseph, 69
Williamsfeild (alias Church Close), 145
Willoughby, Philip, 60n
Willson, Thomas, 138
Wilson, Benjamin, 56, 57, 66, 67n
Wilson, Jas., 56
Wilson, Major, 57
Wilton House, Picture of Lincoln’s Inn Fields, 46
Wiltshire, Charles Powlett, Earl of (afterwards Duke of Bolton), 65
Winchester, John, Marquiss of, 95, 96, 137
Windell, Richard, 109n
Windham, W., 67
Winstanley, J., 11
Wise (Wyse), Joan (afterwards Briscowe), 107, 119
Wise, John, 107n
Wise, Robert, 20
Wither, Thomas, 60n
Withers (Wither, Wyther), Anthony, 51, 60, 73n
Withers, William, 74
Wolcot, Dr. (Peter Pindar), 83
Wolstenholme, John, 96
Wood, Anthony, 80
Woodville, Thomas, 130
Woodward, William, 14
Worcester, Edward (1st Marquess of), 73
Worliche, Mary, 9n
Worlidge, Mrs., 77
Worlidge, Thomas 58, 67n, 76, 77
Worsley, John, 96
Wortley, Sir Francis, 89
Wray, Sir John, 95n
Wren, Sir Christopher, 123, 147
Wren, Stephen, 147
Wright, —, 96n
Wright, Martin, 89
Wriothesley, Lord, 124
Wylson, —, 119
Wynter, Master, 119
Wyse. (See Wise.)
Yarmouth, 1st Earl of, 52

York, Frederica, Duchess of, 114
York, Sir William Dawes, Archbishop of, 110n
Young, Thomas, 110
Zucchi, Antonio, 151, 153, 163, 176

Zuylestein, Frederick Nassau de, 3rd Earl of Rochford, 70
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International Criminal Law Practitioner Library Vol 1

Sovereignty versus Responsibility

Published 2014 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informabusiness

Copyright collection © 2002 Taylor & Francis

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data:

ISBN 978-0-714-65192-7 (cloth)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

JZ6369 .I58 2002

Typeset in 11/13pt Ehrhardt by Vitaset, Paddock Wood, Kent

Notes on Contributors vii

1 Theory and Humanitarian Intervention 3

2 Intellectuals without Borders 27

6 The UN Experience in Modern Intervention 95

10 Scholars against Genocide 169

Prof. Howard Adelman

Prof. Akiba Cohen

Prof. Barry Cooper

Prof. Bruce Cronin

Dr Major General (Ret.) Gustav Daniker

Prof. Michael Keren

Prof. Arie Nadler

Prof. E m eritus N eal R iem er

Prof. D onald A. S ylv an

Prof. Dr R udiger W olfrum

The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the con­

This collection joins the debate called for by the Secretary-General. It

a typology of forms in which problems are presented to foreign-policy

Theory and Humanitarian Intervention

If modernity is characterized by the rational organization of life, how do we

for the resurrection of a new international source of authority higher than

These globalization forces affect the ability of developed states to respond

to handle these pressures seems questionable. As fish stocks are depleted, as

of the UN to have a public constituency is simply self-advertisement.

A bifurcation point is the position that is most distant from a state of

In conventional international studies, large-scale elements - environ­

An emphasis on bifurcation points has enormous implications for both

in the nation-state organization of the world itself There are conflicts

States largely avoided the universal predictions of disaster in Zaire. If the

Queen Anne Street West, 58

Tahairdin, Peter, 67n

Umfreville, Chas., 103n

Yarmouth, 1st Earl of, 52

Zucchi, Antonio, 151, 153, 163, 176

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