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Haunting
Modernity and
the Gothic
Presence
in British
Modernist
Literature
Daniel Darvay
Haunting Modernity and the Gothic Presence in
British Modernist Literature
Daniel Darvay
Haunting Modernity
and the Gothic
Presence in British
Modernist Literature
Daniel Darvay
Colorado State University–Pueblo
Pueblo, Colorado, USA
v
vi PREFACE
NOTES
1. Chris Baldick, and Robert Mighall, “Gothic Criticism,” in A New Companion
to the Gothic, ed. David Punter (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 273.
2. Ibid., 273.
3. Ibid., 278.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
7 Conclusion 187
Bibliography 191
Index 211
xi
CHAPTER 1
By blending the mythological figure of the Amazon with the biblical ref-
erence to the “Parable of the Ten Virgins,” Marvell creates the powerful
image of the vigilant virgin warrior presumably engaged in fighting sin and
temptation in an attempt to maintain chastity. The allure of such an image
would, in Marvell’s view, help inveigle unsuspecting victims like Isabel
Thwaites. Yet the image of the nuns waiting for the great bridegroom and
savior Christ is also self-contradictory and sexually charged in multiple
ways—one of which is that the need for the artificial trimming of the
lamps undermines their natural chastity and subverts the entire metaphor
to suggest obscene self-indulgence rather than abstinence. When William
INTRODUCTION: CATHOLICISM, SACRILEGE, AND THE MODERN GOTHIC 3
To become a genuine house of God, Nun Appleton first has to toss out
the unworthy residents infecting its walls before it can welcome the right-
ful owners, who will restore it to its due glory and prosperity. What might
seem to be stolen property is lawful restitution; what might look like des-
ecration is secular justice; and, finally, what might appear to be heresy is
in fact true Christianity. Thus is the Henrician Dissolution recuperated at
4 D. DARVAY
century, Spelman’s The History and Fate of Sacrilege grew into a com-
prehensive catalog of similar chronicles supported by additional examples
from as early as the time of the Old Testament.
According to Spelman, the particular accidents and misfortunes dog-
ging the numerous families guilty of impropriation should invariably be
ascribed to divine vengeance. In some cases, the repercussions are long
drawn out, such as when entire families are slowly consumed by inter-
nal feud and are eventually driven to bankruptcy, madness, murder, and
extinction. In other cases, however, God shows indulgence by swiftly act-
ing through the brute force of material reality that the wise should take to
be omens of more pervasive tragedies to come. Toxic lead poisons some of
the usurpers; church bells sink the ships that attempt to haul them away;
church steeples topple over onto houses, crushing those within; monas-
tic buildings cast their sacred stones and walls on the defilers. Marvell
and Thomas Fairfax might have been familiar with Spelman’s account of
Edward Paston, who, as the third-generation owner of Bingham Priory,
changed his original plans for building his stately new house “upon or near
the priory,” and instead ended up building it at Appleton (just a few miles
from Nun Appleton House) after “a piece of wall fell upon a workman,
and slew him.”9
The imaginative recuperation of material punishment for sacrilege
exhibited in Marvell’s poem would come to play a prominent role in the
birth of the Gothic novel. Traditionally considered to be the founding text
of Gothic fiction, Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto (1764) puts on
display for an eighteenth-century audience what is essentially a fictitious
story of sacrilege. As some of the unfortunate descendants in Spelman’s
catalog, the protagonist of Walpole’s novel is forced to suffer the devas-
tating consequences in the form of divine retribution of his ancestor’s
usurpation. Manfred, the actual lord of Otranto, is pursued by the curse
of Alfonso the Good, the rightful owner, who had been unlawfully dis-
possessed by Manfred’s grandfather Ricardo. Like those offenders on
Spelman’s list that are sensible enough to atone for their crimes before too
late, Ricardo is quick to make reparations in hopes of appeasing the wrath
of God. However, even though he makes a “vow to St. Nicholas to found
a church and two convents” (CO, 105), the saint can only delay but not
deflect Alfonso’s imprecation that “the Castle and Lordship of Otranto
should pass from the present family whenever the real owner should be
grown too large to inhabit the castle” (CO, 27). It takes more than three
generations for the curse to be fulfilled, and for Ricardo’s descendants to
INTRODUCTION: CATHOLICISM, SACRILEGE, AND THE MODERN GOTHIC 7
Letters were then [i.e., at the time the manuscript was written] in their most
flourishing state in Italy, and contributed to dispel the empire of supersti-
tion, at that time so forcibly attacked by the reformers. It is not unlikely, that
INTRODUCTION: CATHOLICISM, SACRILEGE, AND THE MODERN GOTHIC 9
an artful priest might endeavor to turn their own arms on the innovators;
and might avail himself of his abilities as an author to confirm the populace
in their ancient errors and superstitions. If this was his view, he has certainly
acted with signal address. Such a work as the following would enslave a
hundred vulgar minds, beyond half the books of controversy that have been
written from the days of Luther to the present hour. This solution of the
author’s motives is, however, offered as a mere conjecture. Whatever his
views were, or whatever effects the execution of them might have, his work
can only be laid before the public at present as a matter of entertainment.
(CO, 17)
madness and pushed to the verge of murdering her niece, Elizabeth I. The
representation of Protestantism as the extension of the whims and caprices
of cruel and spiteful sovereigns of the Tudor and Stuart lines is also the
focus of Sophia Lee’s The Recess (1785), which tells the story of how the
secret system of passages under the ruined abbey of St. Vincent serves to
shelter the two Catholic daughters of Mary Stuart from the persecutions
of Queen Elizabeth I and King James I. Such examples complicate our
understanding of the Gothic well beyond the Catholic/Protestant split.
Despite certain individual features we find in various kinds of Gothic
literature, however, a focus on the theme of sacrilege can lead to a number
of important conclusions about the persistence and the morphology of
Gothic conventions. The Gothic had been under construction for at least
two centuries before it came to dominate the literary scene at the end of
the eighteenth century. Sacrilege narratives serve as testimony. The fami-
lies who profit from impropriation are also the ones responsible for the
distress suffered by their descendants, whose struggles in turn provide the
aesthetic and cultural material for successive generations of future reader-
ship.16 Gothic conventions are recognized as such in part because they can
be interpreted within a wider literary and cultural tradition, or in Alastair
Fowler’s words, because of the “meaningful departures” that a particular
work makes in relation to already established types.17 Over the course of
several centuries of modern history, the Gothic transformation of sacri-
lege—from a distinctive epiphenomenon of the Reformation to a crucial
element of a broader anti-Catholic discourse to the blueprint for a yet
more pervasive fear of foreign intrusion into the English nation—displays
the operations of a plastic genre at work in multiple structures of meaning
across society.
If there is a certain structural pattern behind the plasticity of the Gothic
genre, it has to do with the perpetuation of the illusion that human sub-
jectivity acquires the liberty to reinvent itself as if out of thin air pre-
cisely while recognizing its defenselessness against and dependence upon
external mechanisms of control. Whatever metaphorical variation on the
impossibility of solitude a particular work may describe, the result turns
out as expected: the terror of the hidden interior of physical spaces is
mirrored in the self-realization following the newly expanded realm of
the imagination. There is no lock secure enough, no chamber without a
trap door, no simple passage without an entire labyrinth, and no personal
boundaries capable of protecting Gothic protagonists from the iniquities
of society or the intrusion of others, and much less from their own evil
12 D. DARVAY
counterparts. Yet all these encumbrances stand for the symbolic rebirth of
subjectivity from within. They create the necessary conditions for Gothic
characters to measure their existence against standards of thinking that
are made to appear distinctively clear, transparent, and private, but only
once these same qualities are called into question by worldly impediments
magnified to hyperbolic dimensions.
We can see this logic launched by the institutional establishment of
Protestant English identity under Elizabeth I and periodically echoed at
key moments in history, when social and political conditions demanded
yet another guise for a nation in need of renewal. The secret interior of
English Protestantism becomes visible in the late sixteenth-century prac-
tice of recusancy, the refusal on the part of English Catholics to attend
established religious services. It finds its emblematic manifestation in the
image of a tonsured monk, ensconced in what has come to be known as a
priest hole, usually an oubliette designed for the express purpose of hiding
a private chaplain employed by recusant families. As in Gothic fiction, the
resourcefulness of those who are in concealment feeds the bewilderment
and the curiosity of those who are exposed. In the late sixteenth century,
the cat-and-mouse play involved the ingenious priest holes made famous
by the carpenter and Jesuit lay brother Nicholas Owen and the tireless
efforts at discovery of the infamous priest-hunter Richard Topcliffe. The
bloody nature of the play is evidenced in the execution of the recusant
poets Chidiock Tichborne and Robert Southwell, both of whom were
hanged, drawn, and quartered—the former for his participation in the
Babington Plot of 1586 aimed at assassinating Queen Elizabeth, and the
latter, captured by Topcliffe, for his involvement in the Jesuit Mission
to England initiated by Edmund Campion and Robert Parsons in 1580.
Educated at the English College in Douai, a major center, along with
Rome and Louvain, of Catholic academic exiles at this time, Southwell
was one of the hundreds of seminary priests who were trained abroad and
smuggled into England in order to consolidate the underground existence
of the Catholic church.18 This small but highly skilled army of undercover
priests fueled the continuing stigmatization of Catholicism, and especially
of the Jesuit Order, as a supranational threat equally capable of blurring
national boundaries and subverting domestic life by overcoming the
two main—geographic and moral—defenses of Englishness: the English
Channel and the Protestant family.
With the invocation of a hyperbolic threat shown explicitly to pervade
all aspects of society, the stage is set for the reinvention of Englishness
INTRODUCTION: CATHOLICISM, SACRILEGE, AND THE MODERN GOTHIC 13
new light was made to look like a work of restoration and recovery rather
than one of mere disapproval and dissent. The hundreds of pages of evi-
dence of Romish abuse were meant to suggest the gradual deterioration of
an institution that had once been intact, and even the present corruption
of which gave nothing but further proof of a righteous Church of England
that fell under the deadly spell of Catholicism. However, with the apparent
triumph over the ruinous past, as so many Gothic characters realize, comes
the painful recognition of the precariousness of the purified present. If
Protestant England lives in fear of a Catholic infiltration, then that fear is
also of itself and of its own permeable nature—a permeability evidenced
in the sneaking suspicion that the noxious influence of alien priest-spies
will somehow still find or create a hotbed of subversive activity on domes-
tic soil. Yet again, Gothic fiction is replete with such fears. What at first
appears to be an external source of danger almost always turns out to have
a hidden interior, which, once disclosed and brought to light, leads back
to the protagonist’s most intimate entourage, usually in the person of a
close friend, family member, or in some cases the imaginary double of our
seemingly innocent protagonist.
These important features of the Gothic are eventually brought to bear
upon a pre-World War I British society that found itself to be the front-
runner in the scramble for imperial expansion yet in constant dread of
cultural regression.22 One can see these conflicting tendencies at work in
what Patrick Brantlinger has called “imperial Gothic,” a genre that mixes
a progressive, Darwinian ideology of imperialism exhibited in the fin-de-
siècle adventure novel with atavistic impulses and occult material handed
down by the Gothic tradition.23 But the Gothic dimensions of imperial-
ism are also visible in Britain’s implication in the growing competition
among European nation-states and the increasing paranoia of a looming
Continental invasion. Defensive nationalism, the inalienable secret inte-
rior of empire, motivates colonial expansion in keeping with John Robert
Seeley’s puckishly entertaining observation that the British Empire was
acquired in a “fit of absence of mind.”24 Forster draws a similar conclu-
sion in “Notes on the English Character” (1926), where he diagnoses the
“underdeveloped” and fundamentally “incomplete” nature of the English
character both as a by-product of the obscure gap at the center of a sprawl-
ing empire and as the impulse behind a possible revitalization of English
society.25 As in Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), whose blood-thirsty vam-
pire brings the imaginary horrors of a mystified Transylvania into the heart
of civilized England, some of the modernist works I discuss in this book
16 D. DARVAY
Westminster. It seemed that by a singular turn of events the old issues and
problems from the time of the Reformation resurfaced to cast a shadow
on the glittering domed glass roof of the Crystal Palace built for the Great
Exhibition of 1851 as a symbol of Britain’s industrial power and imperial
superiority.28
In representative mid-Victorian variations on the Gothic—notably, anti-
Catholic fiction and sensation novels—protagonists must deal with inse-
curities similar to those of Marvell’s Lord Fairfax. They have to face the
disconcerting possibility that the very lives they lead, much like the houses
they live in and the country they love, might not be entirely their own and
could therefore turn against them any moment. This fundamental perme-
ability of Protestant identity finds expression in what these novels depict as
one of the worst possible scenarios of all—that due to a natural susceptibil-
ity to hypnosis or some other form of insidious influence, innocent victims
will fall prey to the charming accoutrements and the elaborate ceremonial
deployed by crafty Jesuit zealots. Endowed with mesmeric powers, the
charismatic General of the Society of Jesus, Antonio Scaviatoli, in Frances
Trollope’s Father Eustace: A Tale of the Jesuits (1847), is one such zealot,
who, in an attempt to capture the fortune of the young heiress Juliana de
Morley, sends forth the handsome Edward Stormont—in truth, Father
Eustace, himself a victim of Scaviatoli’s mind games—to seduce her. For
Eustace, true salvation from the almost superhuman tyranny and surveil-
lance of a supranational organization bent on universal control lies in the
steadfastness with which Julianna is able to resist the Catholic temptation,
which, in a characteristic Gothic fashion, turns out to be a part of her
past she needs to disown, like her penchant for visiting her late Catholic
father’s private chapel hidden deep within the walls of Cuthbert Castle.
Main characters in other works learn to deal with other aspects of the same
problem. In Villette (1853), Charlotte Brontë’s refreshingly original take
on Catholicism, M. Paul slowly unlearns the indoctrination of his bigoted
Jesuit tutor Père Silas, as he gradually yields to Lucy Snowe’s Protestant
ideas, which, in an interesting reversal of roles, are now presented as
symbolically invading a Catholic country together with Lucy, who in the
meantime has relocated as English teacher to Madame Beck’s boarding
school in the small town of Villette. Of course, Lucy is not exempt from
the typical temptations of Catholicism, which come through a series of
emotional appeals—to pity in the “honeyed voice” of Père Silas’s pam-
phlet about orphans; to vanity in the mesmerizing splendor of Rome; and
to fear in the Gothic tale of the undead nun who was buried alive in the
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clear from the first Article of the Treaty that the independence
is not an ordinary independence, but a diplomatic variety
which was perfectly consistent with recurring interventions to
ward off foreign aggression and put down domestic revolt. In
other words, it was a dependent independence, or no
independence at all, and such it remains under the
agreement of February, 1904. That instrument undoubtedly
establishes a Japanese Protectorate over Korea, and the
beauty of Protectorates is their indefiniteness. As Professor
Nye, the great Belgian jurist, says in his recently published
work on Le Droit International: “Le terme ‘protectorat,’
désigne la situation créée par le traité de protection.... Le
protectorat a plus ou moins de développement; rien n’est fixé
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Etats.” These words exactly fit the condition of Korea under
its recent agreement with Japan. Indeed, the description
might be extended to its internal affairs also. Susceptibilities
are soothed, and possibly diplomatic difficulties are turned, by
calling it independent; but in reality it is as much under
Japanese protection as Egypt is under ours; all state-paper
description to the contrary notwithstanding.
The new Treaty of August 22, 1904, shows that this is fully
understood at Tokyo. A financial adviser and a diplomatic adviser are
to be appointed by the Korean Government on the recommendation
of Japan, and nothing important is to be done in their departments
without their advice. No treaties with Foreign Powers are to be
concluded, and no concessions to foreigners granted, without
previous consultation with the Japanese Government.
That the view of this authority as to the significance of the
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clearly demonstrated by the acceptance of its conclusions, in a
practical way, though the official action of foreign governments since
the date of the conventions themselves.
In particular it is to be noted that the Government of the United
States has expressed an opinion touching the effect in international
law upon the status of Korea of the February and August Protocols
which is substantially identical with that of Professor Lawrence.
Before there was any occasion for a formal expression of opinion a
significant indication of the views of the Department of State upon
the subject could be found in the Foreign Relations for 1904. Over
the Protocols as published therein may be found the caption
“Protectorate by Japan over Korea.” (437 f.) Later on, Secretary Root
had occasion expressly to state this opinion. This was when, in
December, 1905, Mr. Min Yung-chan, whilom Korean Minister to
France, came to the United States for the purpose of protesting
against recognition by the United States of the Treaty of November
17th of the same year. In a letter to Mr. Min, explaining the reasons
which made it impossible for the American Government not to
recognize the binding force of that instrument, the Secretary added
that there was another and a conclusive reason against interference
in the matter. This reason, he said, was to be found in the
circumstance that Korea had previously concluded with Japan two
agreements which, in principle and in practice, established a
Japanese Protectorate in Korea, and to the force of which in that
particular the Treaty of November 17 added nothing.
To this view of the virtual significance of these earlier Protocols
there is only to be opposed the demonstrably false assertions of the
now ex-Emperor and the opinions and affirmations—quite
unwarranted as the next chapter will show—of writers like Mr.
Hulbert, Mr. Story, and other so-called “foreign friends” of His
Majesty. These assertions and opinions are certainly not made any
more credible by the willingness of their authors to denounce the
President and Acting Foreign Minister of the United States in Korea,
and, by implication, all the other heads of foreign governments who
neither share their opinion, nor approve of their conduct in support
of the opinion![32]
By the Treaty of Portsmouth the Russian Government not only
definitely relinquished all the political interests she had previously
claimed to possess in Korea, but also recognized in all important
particulars the rights acquired in the same country by Japan through
the Conventions of February and August, 1904. Article Second of the
Treaty stipulates: “The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging
that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and
economical interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with
the measures of guidance, protection and control which the Imperial
Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea.”
Thus did the war with Russia, which was fought over the relations
between Japan and Korea as an issue of supreme importance,
terminate the second main period in the history of these relations.
The Chino-Japan war removed forever that foreign influence which
had continued through centuries, not only to prevent the immediate
realization of a true national independence on the part of Korea, but
also to unfit the Korean Government to maintain such independence
when conferred upon it as the gift of another nation. The Russo-
Japanese war terminated the attempt of a more powerful foreign
nation to supersede the controlling influence of Japan in Korea. At
the same time it gave a convincing further demonstration of Korea’s
inherent and hopeless inability to control herself, under any existing
conditions of her government or of her system of civilization. Thus
the provisions for a Japanese Protectorate, which shall secure for
both nations the largest possible measure of good, offered to the
Marquis Ito his difficult problem as Imperial Commissioner to Korea
in November, 1905.
CHAPTER XI
THE COMPACT
It will need no argument for those familiar with the habitual ways
of the Korean Government in dealing with foreign affairs to establish
the necessity that Japan should make more definite, explicit, and
comprehensive, the Protocols of February 23 and August 22, 1904.
Foreign affairs have always been with the Emperor and Court of
Korea a particularly favorable but mischievous sphere for intrigue
and intermeddling. The Foreign Office has never had any real control
over the agents of the government, who have been the tools of the
Emperor in their dealings with foreign Legations. The Korean Foreign
Minister in 1905 was not an efficient and responsible representative
of either the intentions or the transactions of his own government;
instructions were frequently sent direct from the Palace to Ministers
in other countries; foreign Legations had, each one, a separate
cipher to be used for such communications; and there were several
instances of clandestine communication with agents abroad, even
during the Russo-Japanese war. To guard, therefore, against the
repetition of occurrences similar to those which had already cost her
so dearly, Japan’s interests demanded that her control over the
management of Korea’s foreign affairs should be undivided and
unquestioned.
It was not, however, in the interests of Japan alone that the
management of Korea’s foreign affairs was to pass out of her own
hands. It was distinctly, as events are fast proving beyond a
reasonable doubt, for the advantage of Korea herself. In any valid
meaning of the word, Korea had never been “independent” of
foreign influences, dominating over her and corrupting the officials
within her own borders. For centuries these influences came chiefly
from China; for a decade, chiefly from Russia and other Western
nations. The Treaty of 1905 was also, just as distinctly—so, we
believe, the events will ultimately prove—for the advantage of these
Western nations, and of the entire Far East.
It is, therefore, highly desirable, not only as vindicating the honor
of Marquis Ito and of the Japanese Government, but also as
establishing the Protectorate of Japan over Korea upon foundations
of veracity and justice, that the exact and full truth should be known
and placed on record before the world, concerning the Convention of
November, 1905. This is the more desirable because of the gross
and persistent misrepresentations of the facts which have been
repeated over and over again—chiefly by the same persons—down
to the time of the appearance of the so-called Korean Commission at
The Hague Conference of 1907.[33] His Majesty the Emperor (now
ex-Emperor) of Korea has, indeed, publicly proclaimed his intention
not to keep a treaty “made under duress” and through fears of
“personal violence”; he has also made it appear that the signatures
and the Imperial seal upon the document were fraudulently
obtained. Meantime, he has sedulously (and, we believe, with such
sincerity as his nature admits) cultivated and cherished the
friendship of the Japanese Resident-General who negotiated, and
who has administered affairs under, the Treaty. How he lost his
crown, at the hands of his own Ministry, for his last violation of the
most solemn provisions of the same treaty, is now a matter of
universal history.
Marquis Ito arrived at Seoul, as the Representative of the
Japanese Government, to conclude a new Convention with Korea,
during the first week of November, 1905. He was the bearer of a
letter from his own Emperor to the Emperor of Korea, which frankly
explained the object of his mission. What follows is the substance of
His Japanese Majesty’s letter.
“Japan, in self-defence and for the preservation of the peace and
security of the Far East, had been forced to go to war with Russia;
but now, after a struggle of twenty months, hostilities were ended.
During their continuance the Emperor of Korea and his people, no
doubt, shared the anxiety felt by the Emperor and people of Japan.
In the mind of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, the most
absorbing thought and purpose now was to safeguard the future
peace and security of the two Empires, and to augment and
strengthen the friendly relations existing between them.
Unfortunately, however, Korea was not yet in a state of good
defence, nor was the basis for a system of effective self-defence yet
created. Her weakness in these regards was in itself a menace to the
peace of the Far East as well as to her own security. That this was
unhappily the case was a matter of as much regret to His Majesty as
it could be to the Emperor of Korea; and for this reason the safety of
Korea was as much a matter of anxiety to him as was that of his
own country. His Majesty had already commanded his Government
to conclude the Protocols of February and August, 1904, for the
defence of Korea. Now, in order to preserve the peace which had
been secured, and to guard against future dangers arising from the
defenceless condition of Korea, it was necessary that the bonds
which united the two countries should be closer and stronger than
ever before. Having this end in view, His Majesty had commanded
His Government to study the question and to devise means of
attaining this desirable result. The preservation and protection of the
dignity, privileges, and tranquillity of the Imperial House of Korea
would, as a matter of course, be one of the first considerations kept
in view.
“His Majesty felt sure that if the Emperor of Korea would carefully
consider the general situation and its bearing upon the interests and
welfare of his country and people, he would decide to take the
advice now earnestly tendered to him.”
It should be noticed that this address from His Imperial Majesty of
Japan to the Korean Emperor—the sincerity of which cannot be
questioned—is pervaded with the same spirit as that which has
characterized the administration, hitherto, of the Japanese
Residency-General.
Marquis Ito informed the Korean Emperor that he would ask for
another audience in a few days. His Majesty consented, adding that
in the meantime he desired carefully to study the letter from the
Emperor of Japan.[34]
On the 15th of November, Marquis Ito had a private audience
which lasted about four hours, and in which he frankly explained the
object of his mission.... The Emperor began the interview by
complaining of certain injuries done by the Japanese civil and
military authorities during the war. He dwelt at length upon past
events, saying, among other things, that he had not wished to go to
the Russian Legation in 1895, but had been over-persuaded by those
about his person.
Marquis Ito replied that as he would remain in Korea for some
time, there would be ample opportunity for a full exchange of views
regarding the matters to which His Majesty referred. At the present
moment he felt it to be his imperative duty to beg His Majesty to
hear the particulars of the mission with which he had been charged
by his Imperial Master. From 1885 onward, he went on to say, Japan
had earnestly endeavored to maintain the independence of Korea.
Unfortunately, Korea herself had rendered but little aid in the
struggle which Japan had maintained in her behalf. Nevertheless,
these efforts had preserved His Majesty’s Empire, and, although
there might have been causes of complaint, such as those to which
His Majesty had just referred, in justice to Japan it should not be
forgotten that in the midst of the great struggle in which she had
been engaged, it was unhappily not possible wholly to avoid such
occurrences. If His Majesty would consider all the circumstances, he
would undoubtedly realize that in the midst of the absorbing anxiety
of that momentous contest and of the heavy burdens it imposed
upon Japan, whatever fault might attach to her as regarded the
matters of which His Majesty had spoken was at least excusable.
Korea, on the other hand, had borne but a small portion of the
burden created by the necessity of defending and maintaining a
principle in which she was as deeply interested as Japan—namely,
the peace and security of the Far East. Turning to the future,
however, it could be clearly perceived that in order effectively to
ensure the future peace and security of the Far East, it was
imperatively necessary that the bonds uniting the two countries
should be drawn closer. For that purpose, and with that object in
view, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan had graciously entrusted
him with the task of explaining the means which, after mature and
careful deliberation, it had been concluded should be adopted.
The substance of the plan which had been thus formulated might
be summed up as follows: ... The Japanese Government, with the
consent of the Government of Korea, to have the right to control and
direct the foreign affairs of Korea, while the internal autonomy of the
Empire would be maintained; and, of course, His Majesty’s
Government, under His Majesty’s direction, would continue as at the
present time.
Explaining the objects of the Agreement thus outlined, the
Marquis pointed out that it would effectively safeguard the security
and prestige of the Imperial House of Korea, while affording the
surest means of augmenting the happiness and prosperity of the
people. For the reasons stated, and for these alone, the Marquis
went on to say, he strongly advised the Emperor to accept this plan;
and, taking into account the general situation, and the condition of
Korea in particular, he earnestly hoped that His Majesty would
consent. The Japanese Minister was authorized to discuss the details
with His Majesty’s Ministers.
The Emperor in reply expressed his appreciation of the
manifestation of sincere good-will on the part of the Emperor of
Japan, and his thanks. Although he would not absolutely reject the
proposal, it was his earnest desire to retain some outward form of
control over the external affairs of Korea. As to the actual exercise of
such control by Japan, and in what manner it should be exercised,
he had no objections to urge.
Marquis Ito enquired what was meant by “outward form.”
The Emperor replied, “the right to maintain Legations abroad.”
The Marquis then stated that, in accordance with diplomatic rules
and usage, there was in that case no difference between the form
and the substance of control. Therefore he could not accept the
suggestion. If Korea were to continue to have Legations abroad, she
would in fact retain control of the external relations of the Empire.
The status quo would be perpetuated; there would be constant
danger of the renewal of past difficulties; and again the peace of the
East would be threatened. It was absolutely necessary that Japan
should control and direct the external relations of Korea. This
decision was the result of most careful investigations and
deliberations; it could not be changed. Marquis Ito further stated
that he had brought a memorandum of the agreement which it was
desired to conclude; and this he then handed to the Emperor.
The Emperor, having read it, expressed his implicit trust in Marquis
Ito, saying that he placed more reliance upon what he said than
upon the representations of his own subjects. [It may seem a
strange comment upon the working of His Majesty’s mind, but all my
observations and experiences, while in Korea, lead me to believe in
the veracity of this declaration. To the last, the Emperor trusted the
word of the Marquis Ito.]... If, however, he accepted the agreement
and retained no outward form of control over Korean foreign affairs,
the relations of Japan and Korea would be like those of Austria and
Hungary; or Korea’s condition would be like that of one of the
African tribes.
Marquis Ito begged leave to dissent. Austria and Hungary were
ruled by one monarch; whereas in this case His Majesty would still
be Emperor of Korea, and would continue as before to exercise his
Imperial prerogatives. As for the presumed resemblance to an
African tribe, that could hardly be considered in point; since Korea
had a Government established for centuries and therefore a national
organization and forms of administration such as no savage tribe
possessed.
The Emperor expressed appreciation of what the Marquis said, but
repeated that he did not care for the substance, and only wished to
retain some external form of control over Korea’s foreign affairs. He
therefore hoped that the Marquis would inform his Emperor and the
Japanese Government of this wish and would induce them to change
the plan proposed; this wish he reiterated a number of times. [There
were undoubtedly two reasons, entirely valid from his point of view,
for the endeavor to secure this change. The first was the very
natural desire to “save his face”; and the second was the—with him
—scarcely less natural desire to leave room for intrigue to contest
the scope of the terms agreed upon while claiming to be faithful to
their substance.]
The Marquis stated that he could not comply with the request of
His Majesty. The draft was the definitive expression of the views of
the Japanese Government after most careful consideration, and
could not be changed as His Majesty desired. He then quoted the
Article in the Portsmouth Treaty wherein Russia recognizes the
paramount political, commercial, and economic interests of Japan in
Korea. There was only one alternative, he added: either to accept or
to refuse. He could not predict what the result would be if His
Majesty refused, but he feared that it might be less acceptable than
what he now proposed. If His Majesty refused, he must clearly
understand this.
The Emperor replied that he did not hesitate because he was
ignorant of this fact, but because he could not himself decide at that
moment. He must consult his Ministers and ascertain also “the
intention of the people at large.”
The Marquis replied that His Majesty was, of course, quite right in
desiring to consult his Ministers, but he could not understand what
was meant by consulting “the intention of the people.” Inasmuch as
Korea did not have a constitutional form of government, and
consequently no Diet, it seemed rather a strange proceeding to
consult “the intention of the people.” If such action should lead to
popular ferment and excitement and possibly public disturbances, he
must respectfully point out that the responsibility would rest with His
Majesty.
Finally, after some further discussion, the Emperor requested
Marquis Ito to have Minister Hayashi (who held the power to
negotiate the proposed agreement) consult with his own Minister for
Foreign Affairs. The result could be submitted to the Cabinet; and
when that body had reached a decision His Majesty’s approval could
be asked.
Marquis Ito said that prompt action was necessary, and requested
His Majesty to summon the Minister for Foreign Affairs at once, and
to instruct him to negotiate and sign the agreement. The Emperor
replied that he would give instructions to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs to that effect. Marquis Ito stated that he would remain
awaiting the conclusion of that agreement, and would again request
His Majesty to grant him an audience.
Before this first audience ended the Emperor again asked Marquis
Ito to persuade His Majesty of Japan to consent that Korea should
retain some outward form of control over her foreign affairs; but
again Marquis Ito refused. This repeated refusal of Japan’s
Representative to concede anything whatever as an abatement of
his country’s control in the future over Korea’s relations to foreign
countries distinctly reveals the nature of the only treaty that could
then possibly have been concluded between the two Powers. On the
following day, the 16th of November, Marquis Ito had a conference
with all of the Cabinet Ministers, except the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who on the same day began negotiations with Minister
Hayashi. Marquis Ito explained fully to the Korean Ministers the
object of his mission and the views of his Government.
On the 17th of November, at 11 a. m., all of the Korean Ministers
went to the Japanese Legation, lunched there, and conferred with
Mr. Hayashi until 3 o’clock, when they adjourned to the Palace and
held a meeting in the Emperor’s presence. Their decision was, finally,
to refuse to agree to the Treaty in the form in which it had been
proposed. Marquis Ito was taking dinner with General Hasegawa,
when, at 7.30, he received a message from Mr. Hayashi conveying
this intelligence and a request to come to the Palace.[35]
Accordingly, at 8 o’clock, he went to the Palace in company with
General Hasegawa, the latter’s aide, and the three or four mounted
gendarmes, who accompanied Marquis Ito wherever he went. There
were no other Japanese guards or soldiers in attendance, and none
in the immediate vicinity of the Palace. The gendarmes who
accompanied the Marquis did not enter the Palace precincts, and all
the gates and entrances were guarded as usual by Korean soldiers,
Korean gendarmes and Korean policemen. Precautions had indeed
been taken to preserve order in the city, as some outburst of mob
violence was possible. The necessity of this precaution was shown
later in the night when an attempt was made to set fire to the house
of Mr. Yi Wan-yong, Minister of Education (now Prime Minister). It
was only when the conference was ended that, at the express
request of the Korean Ministers, a small number of gendarmes was
summoned to accompany them to their homes. [This precaution will
not seem excessive, or threatening of violence to others, in the eyes
of one who, like myself, has spent a period of two months in Korea,
characterized by repeated attempts to assassinate the Ministers, who
always went guarded by Korean and Japanese gendarmes. See pp.
66 ff.]
Upon arriving at the Palace, Marquis Ito was informed by Mr.
Hayashi that, although His Majesty had ordered the Cabinet to come
to an agreement which would establish a cordial entente with Japan,
and although the majority of the Cabinet Ministers were ready to
obey His Majesty’s commands, Mr. Han, the Prime Minister,
persistently refused to obey. Marquis Ito thereupon, through the
Minister of the Household, requested a private audience with His
Majesty.
It should be explained here that during all of the proceedings,
which took place in the rooms on the lower floor of the “Library,” the
Emperor was in his rooms in the upper story, and was never
personally approached by any one except, as hereafter stated, by his
own Ministers. It may also be added, in explanation of the time of
the conference, that it had been His Majesty’s invariable practice for
years to transact important public business at night. He turned night
into day in that regard and the Cabinet Ministers had customarily
been obliged to attend in turn at the Palace and remain there all
night long.
To the request for a private audience the Emperor replied that
although he would be pleased to grant an audience at once, he was
very tired and was suffering from sore throat—the plea of
indisposition being one to which he is accustomed to resort for
avoiding audiences. Therefore he preferred that Marquis Ito should
consult with his Ministers whom he would instruct to negotiate and
conclude an agreement establishing a cordial entente between Korea
and Japan. At the same time that the Emperor requested the
Marquis to consult with the Cabinet for that purpose, the Minister of
the Household informed the Cabinet Ministers that His Majesty
commanded them to negotiate with Marquis Ito.
Marquis Ito then turned to the Prime Minister, and, repeating what
Mr. Hayashi had told him, enquired whether the statement correctly
represented his attitude. The Prime Minister replied that it was
correct. His Majesty had often commanded him to come to an
understanding with the Japanese Minister, but he had refused. Then
the other Ministers had accused him of disloyalty in disobeying His
Majesty’s commands. He himself could not but feel that the
accusation was well founded and, on that account, he wished
immediately to resign his office and to await the Imperial
punishment for his disobedience. As he had informed Marquis Ito the
day before, although he was perfectly well aware that Korea could
not maintain her independence by her own unaided efforts, he still
wished to retain the outward semblance of control over the Nation’s
foreign relations.
Thereupon Marquis Ito said that the last thought in his mind
would be to try to force the Prime Minister to do any thing which
would destroy his country. The Minister had said, however, that he
wished to resign because he had been disloyal in disobeying the
Emperor’s commands. It did not seem to him, the Marquis, that this
was either a dignified, or a sensible course for a Minister of State to
adopt. The management of public affairs required decision. If the
Prime Minister could not come to some understanding with Japan’s
representatives, as his own Majesty the Emperor had commanded
him to do, he was seriously jeopardizing his country’s interests. The
Marquis could not believe that this was genuine loyalty. There was
only one alternative before the Prime Minister, either to obey the
Imperial order, or, carefully considering the gravity of the situation,
to do what he could to change the Imperial opinion. He then asked
the Prime Minister to request the other Ministers, in accordance with
the Emperor’s command, conveyed through the Minister of the
Household, to give their views regarding the proposed agreement.
This the Prime Minister proceeded to do.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pak Chi-sun (afterwards Acting
Prime Minister) stated that, as he had informed the Japanese
Minister, he was opposed to the treaty and did not wish to negotiate
it; but if he was ordered to do so, he would comply. The Marquis
asked what he meant by “ordered”; did he mean an Imperial order?
Mr. Pak assented.
The Minister of Finance, Mr. Min Yong-ki, said that he was opposed
to the treaty. (He remained in office for a year and a half after the
conclusion of the treaty, considering, no doubt, that the Imperial
command absolved him from responsibility.)
The Minister of Education, Mr. Yi Wan-yong (now Prime Minister),
replied that he had already expressed his opinion fully in His
Majesty’s presence. The request of Japan was the logical result of
existing conditions in the East. The diplomacy of Korea, always
changing, had forced Japan into a great war which had entailed on
her heavy sacrifices, and in which, finally, she had been victorious.
Korea must accept the result and aid in maintaining the future peace
of the East by loyally co-operating with Japan.
The Minister of Justice, Mr. Yi Ha-yung (who had been Minister for
Foreign Affairs during the war), stated that, in his opinion, the
Protocols of February 23 and August 22, 1904, already gave Japan
practically all that she now asked. Consequently he did not think that
the new Treaty was necessary.
Marquis Ito then said to him that the opinion he had expressed at
the conference of the previous day was somewhat different, and
that he had appeared at that time to be in favor of the Treaty. The
Minister assented, but added that then, as now, he thought that the
Protocols would have been amply sufficient if Korea herself had
faithfully observed the obligations they imposed upon her.
The Minister of War, Mr. Yi Kun-tak, stated that in His Majesty’s
presence he had supported the Minister of Education in the position
described by the latter. Finally, however, he had cast his vote in favor
of the Prime Minister’s proposal that they should insist upon a Treaty
which retained to Korea the outward form of control over her foreign
relations. He would now agree to the proposed treaty, however.
The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Yi Chi-yung, said that having
negotiated and signed the Protocol of February 23, 1904, he had
naturally associated himself with the Minister of Education in His
Majesty’s presence, and he now did the same.
The Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Mr. Kwon
Chong-hiun, said that he had seconded the proposal of the Minister
of Education and was of course in favor of the Treaty. He desired,
however, to suggest several amendments.
After some further consultation, Marquis Ito turned to the Prime
Minister, and said that there were but two of the Ministers opposed
to the Treaty. The recognized method of deciding such questions
was by a majority vote, and, as the Prime Minister had seen, the
majority of the Cabinet were in favor of negotiating and concluding
the Treaty. It was the duty of the Prime Minister accordingly, bearing
in mind the Imperial command, to proceed to accomplish this result
in due form. Thereupon the Prime Minister, saying something about
disloyalty, burst into tears and went hastily into the next room. After
a few moments Marquis Ito followed him, and found him still greatly
agitated. The Marquis spoke to him gently, and, repeating his former
arguments, tried to persuade him that it was his duty as a loyal
servant to obey the Imperial command by assisting in the
negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty. Finding, however, that his
efforts were fruitless, Marquis Ito returned to the other room,
leaving Mr. Han alone.[36]
After Mr. Han’s disappearance from the scene, and upon the
Marquis’ return to the room, the latter addressed the Minister of the
Household, stating that, as he had seen, the Cabinet Ministers, with
two exceptions, had expressed their willingness to accept the Treaty
in principle; and of the two dissenting Ministers one, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, had said that he would sign the Treaty if he received
the Imperial command to do so. Turning then to the Ministers, he
enquired whether they were willing to proceed as commanded by
His Majesty, with the consideration of the Treaty, and of the
amendments, which several of their number had expressed a desire
to present. The Ministers replied that they were ready to do so, but
wished the Minister of the Household to be present. Accordingly the
deliberations were conducted in the presence of that official.
The Treaty was then considered in detail. The Minister of
Education proposed an amendment, stipulating that the functions of
control to be exercised by Japan should be confined exclusively to
administration of the foreign relations of Korea. Marquis Ito replied
that he could not accept this amendment, but after some discussion
proposed the insertion of the word “primarily” in the Article.[37]
The Minister of Justice proposed an amendment stipulating that
Japan would guarantee to maintain the peace, security and prestige
of the Imperial Household. This Marquis Ito accepted and wrote the
amendment with his own hand.
After some further deliberation the treaty in its amended form was
agreed to. The Minister of the Household, accompanied by Mr. Yi
Chi-yung, Minister of Home Affairs, then took the document to the
Emperor. After a time they returned, saying that His Majesty was
satisfied with the instrument as amended and gave it his sanction.
He instructed them to say, however, that he desired to add one more
amendment. It was to insert in the preamble a stipulation to the
effect that when Korea became able again to exercise the functions
surrendered to Japan by the Treaty, she would be entitled to resume
the control of her foreign relations. To this proposal Marquis Ito
assented, and again wrote the amendment with his own hand. The
two Ministers took the completed instrument to His Majesty, and in a
short time returned saying His Majesty was “quite satisfied and
approved the Treaty.”
The copyists then began preparing the copies for signature, and
the Minister of Foreign Affairs went to the telephone and ordered the
clerk in charge to bring the seal of the Foreign Office to the Palace.
The Minister of the Household, who had again repaired to the
Imperial presence, returned while this was going on with the
following message from the Emperor to Marquis Ito, which is here
repeated verbatim:—“Now that this new Agreement has been
concluded our countries should mutually congratulate each other. We
feel tired, as we are not well, and shall retire. You, who have
reached an advanced age and have remained awake until this late
hour, must also be greatly fatigued. Please, therefore, return to your
home and sleep well.”
Marquis Ito returned thanks for this gracious message, but
remained until the Treaty had been copied and duly signed by Mr.
Pak, the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Mr. Hayashi, the
Japanese Minister. He then returned to his hotel. In a short time the
seal of the Foreign Office was brought to the Palace, and Mr. Pak,
with his own hand, affixed it to the four copies of the instrument
which had been made.[38]
The conclusion of the Treaty was not followed by any noticeably
great public excitement in Seoul. Crowds collected in the streets,
and there were one or two trifling brawls, but nothing of great
consequence. The policing of the streets was entirely in the hands of
the Korean gendarmes and the mixed force of Korean and Japanese
police under the direction of Mr. Maruyama, Police Adviser to the
Korean Government. Nor, in order to preserve the public peace, was
there at any time necessary any exhibition of a large force, either of
police or of gendarmes in any one locality. They went about singly or
in twos or threes, and the crowds were, as a rule, orderly.
The Convention thus concluded on November 17, 1905, with the
object of strengthening the principle of solidarity which unites the
two Empires, provides that the complete control and direction of
Korean affairs shall hereafter rest with the Japanese Government,
and that a Resident-General shall reside in Seoul, “primarily for the
purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to
diplomatic affairs.” It also provides for the appointment of Residents,
subordinate to the Resident-General, who shall occupy the open
ports and such other places in Korea as the Japanese Government
may deem necessary. Article IV stipulates that all treaties and
agreements subsisting between Japan and Korea, not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Convention itself, shall continue in force.
Furthermore, Japan engages to maintain the welfare and dignity of
the Imperial House of Korea.
This is the substance of the Convention of 1905. Its effect was to
substitute Japan for Korea in all official relations with foreign Powers,
past as well as future. In other words, foreign nations must
hereafter deal directly and exclusively with Japan in everything
affecting their diplomatic relations with Korea. Japan, on her part, is
equally bound to respect and maintain all treaty rights and all treaty
engagements granted by Korea in the past. The “principle of
solidarity which unites the two Empires” implies, and in fact actually
includes, even more than this. While the functions of Japan’s direct
and exclusive control were primarily confined to matters connected
with the direction of foreign affairs, some measure of control over
Korea’s domestic affairs also is necessarily implied. It is not to be
supposed, for example, that Japan could permit internal disorders,
or the perpetuation of domestic abuses, or, in brief, any of those
disturbing conditions which had hitherto prevented Korean progress
and development. International control, dissociated from an orderly
and progressive domestic policy, is not practicable; it is not even
conceivable. The complications and embarrassments which would
inevitably arise from such a complete dissociation of the two
functions of government would far outweigh the advantages. One of
the most fruitful sources of international difficulties in Korea has
always been found in domestic misgovernment. Having assumed the
responsibility and the obligations incident to the direction of foreign
affairs, Japan has the right to ask, and, if need be, to insist, that her
task shall not be made heavier by Korea herself. This did not,
indeed, imply, that Japan should assume charge of the
administrative machinery of the Korean Government, but that she
should enjoy the right to have recourse to those measures of
guidance which naturally and properly fall within the sphere of the
duties she had assumed. Fortunately, however, any discussion
relating to this question must of necessity be purely academic; since
not only the Convention of November 17th, but also the Protocols
and other Agreements concluded before that time give ample
warrant for everything Japan has attempted or accomplished in this
regard.
If corroborative evidence is needed for the account just given of
the negotiations which ended in the Convention of November, 1905,
and upon the basis of which Marquis Ito, as the Representative of
the Japanese Government, had been conducting his administration
in Korea up to the time of the new Convention of July, 1907, it is
afforded in fullest measure in the following manner. A notable
“Memorial” regarding the circumstances under which the earlier
agreement was formed was presented to the Korean Emperor on the
fifteenth of December of the same year; this document lends the
authority of all the other chief actors in this event to every important
detail of the account as already given.[39]
The memorialists were Pak Chi-sun, former Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Yi Wan-yong, Minister of Education; Kwan Chung-hiun,
Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry; Yi Chi-yung,
Minister of Home Affairs; and Yi Kun-tak, Minister of War. The
occasion of the memorial was the agitation against the Treaty which
was then at its height, and on account of which these five Ministers
were being denounced in petitions to the Throne, and in the public
press, as traitors to their country. The purpose of the memorial was
to show that the actual responsibility for the conclusion of the Treaty
rested with the Emperor himself. By relating all the circumstances in
detail (in particular the occurrences at the conference on the
evening of November 17th) the memorialists brought this fact out
into the boldest prominence. Their memorial was, in effect, both a
charge which fixed the responsibility for the Treaty on the Emperor,
and a challenge to the Emperor to deny that the Treaty was
concluded in accordance with his own orders. It was a challenge
which His Majesty did not accept; on the contrary, by approving the
memorial, as he did formally, he acknowledged the truth of the
statements it contained. It was, indeed, officially published at the
time, as approved by the Emperor.[40] Moreover, this memorial was
prepared by its authors and presented to the Throne without the
previous knowledge of the Japanese authorities. In fact, it contained
certain interesting and important details of which they then learned
for the first time.
The memorialists began with the statement that, by reason of His
Majesty’s generosity, they are entrusted with the responsibilities of
Ministers of State, although they do not merit such distinction. They
have seen the petitions denouncing them to the Emperor as traitors.
Those petitions affirm that the state has been destroyed; that the
people have become slaves; and that Korean territory is now the
property of another state. These opinions are indeed almost too
absurd to be noticed; but since they affect the independence and
dignity of the nation, the memorialists cannot permit them to pass
without protest. The new Treaty with Japan does not change the
title of the Empire or affect its real independence. The prestige of
the Imperial House remains as before; the social fabric of the Empire
is unaffected; and the country is in a peaceful condition. The only
change is that the management of the foreign affairs of the country
has been placed under the control of a neighboring state. Besides,
the Treaty which brings about this result is by no means a new
arrangement. It is the direct result of the Protocols concluded in
1904, and does not differ from them in object or in principle. If these
persons who now so loudly proclaim their patriotism are really
sincere and courageous men, why did they not denounce those
Protocols when they were made and maintain their opposition with
their lives? None of them did that then; yet now they clamor for the
abolition of all these arrangements and for the restoration of the old
order of things. It is impossible to agree with them.
We desire, the memorialists go on to say, now to state the actual
facts of the conclusion of the new Treaty:
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