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United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Ramesh
Chandra Thakur Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Ramesh Chandra Thakur, Albrecht Schnabel
ISBN(s): 9780585434094, 0585434093
Edition: Kindle
File Details: PDF, 1.19 MB
Year: 2001
Language: english
United Nations
peacekeeping operations:
Ad hoc missions,
permanent engagement

Edited by Ramesh Thakur and


Albrecht Schnabel

UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY


PRESS
The United Nations University is an organ of the United Nations estab-
lished by the General Assembly in 1972 to be an international community
of scholars engaged in research, advanced training, and the dissemination
of knowledge related to the pressing global problems of human survi-
val, development, and welfare. Its activities focus mainly on the areas of
peace and governance, environment and sustainable development, and
science and technology in relation to human welfare. The University oper-
ates through a worldwide network of research and postgraduate training
centres, with its planning and coordinating headquarters in Tokyo.
The United Nations University Press, the publishing division of the
UNU, publishes scholarly and policy-oriented books and periodicals in
areas related to the University's research.
United Nations peacekeeping operations
This page intentionally left blank
United Nations peacekeeping
operations: Ad hoc missions,
permanent engagement
Edited by Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel

a United Nations
University Press
TOKYO u NEW YORK u PARIS
( The United Nations University, 2001

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and
do not necessarily re¯ect the views of the United Nations University.

United Nations University Press


The United Nations University, 53-70, Jingumae 5-chome,
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, 150-8925, Japan
Tel: +81-3-3499-2811 Fax: +81-3-3406-7345
E-mail: [email protected]
http://www.unu.edu

United Nations University Of®ce in North America


2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-1462-70, New York, NY 10017, USA
Tel: +1-212-963-6387 Fax: +1-212-371-9454
E-mail: [email protected]

United Nations University Press is the publishing division of the United Nations
University.

Cover design by Joyce C. Weston


Cover photograph by UN/DPI

Printed in the United States of America

UNUP-1067
ISBN 92-808-1067-7
Contents

Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Part I: Challenges of post-Cold War peacekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1 Cascading generations of peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu


line to Kosovo and Timor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel

2 Peacekeeping and the violence in ethnic con¯ict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26


Roger Mac Ginty and Gillian Robinson

3 The role of the UN Secretariat in organizing peacekeeping . . . . 46


Hisako Shimura

4 Policing the peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57


Michael O'Connor

Part II: Regional experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

5 Regional peacekeeping in the CIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77


S. Neil MacFarlane
v
vi CONTENTS

6 Towards more effective peace operations: Learning from the


African ``laboratory''? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Mark Malan

7 Establishing the credibility of a regional peacekeeping


capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Vere Hayes

Part III: Experiences from Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and


East Timor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

8 The politics of UN peacekeeping from Cambodia to


Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Yasushi Akashi

9 The Cambodian experience: A success story still?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155


John Sanderson

10 UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia ± from


UNPROFOR to Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Satish Nambiar

11 Civilian police in UN peace operations: Some lessons from


recent Australian experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
John McFarlane and William Maley

Part IV: A new beginning? The road to Brahimi and beyond . . . . . . 213

12 Peacekeeping and the changing role of the United Nations:


Four dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst

13 From An Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report: Towards a


new era of UN peace operations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
For the peacekeepers who died in the line of duty
They gave their lives for peace
Acknowledgements

The idea for this book was triggered by the United Nations University's
October 1999 UN Day Symposium on Peacekeeping, in which some of
the book contributors participated. The positive response to the sympo-
sium encouraged us to invite our speakers, along with other selected con-
tributors, to join in an examination of the lessons that should be learned
from past peacekeeping practices for future peacekeeping operations. The
contribution of our book to the ongoing debate on the nature, legality, and
practicality of peacekeeping lies in the unique composition of the chapter
contributors ± half of them are academic ``observers'' of peacekeeping,
while the other half are practitioners who have been intimately involved,
in the ®eld and at UN Headquarters, in the planning and execution of
some of the most crucial peacekeeping operations of the past 10 years.
We hope that the combined insights of these contributions will prove
useful to scholars, practitioners, and students of UN peacekeeping.
We are indebted to Yoshie Sawada, our administrative assistant, and
Chifumi Mizutani, the programme's secretary, for their tireless support in
the many administrative aspects of this project.
The publication of this book bene®ted greatly from the support we re-
ceived from UNU Press and its Head, Janet Boileau. We greatly appre-
ciate the careful copyediting work by Cherry Ekins, and the very helpful
comments provided by the anonymous peer reviewers of the draft manu-
script. Finally, we are indebted to our families who have again endured the
many hours we spent on this, our second, co-edited book project.
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix

As the UN's peace and humanitarian assistance activities creep into


increasingly dangerous con¯ict zones, the risks associated for those work-
ing for the United Nations, regional organizations, or NGOs become
ever greater. We dedicate the book to those who have lost their lives as
peacekeepers in the service of a more peaceful and just world.

Ramesh Thakur
Albrecht Schnabel
Tokyo, May 2001
List of acronyms

ACABQ UN Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary


Questions
ACRF African Crisis Response Force
ACRI US African Crisis Response Initiative
AFP Australian Federal Police
AIDS acquired immune de®ciency syndrome
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
BRIMOB Brigade Mobil (Indonesian police mobile brigade)
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence
CAR Central African Republic
CIA US Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC civil/military cooperation
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CISPKF CIS Peacekeeping Force
CNRT Council for the National Resistance of Timor
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAM UN Department of Administration and Management
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DPA UN Department of Political Affairs
DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPMC Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia)
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group (Liberia and Sierra Leone)
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ECPS UN Executive Committe on Peace and Security
EISAS UN ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat

x
LIST OF ACRONYMS xi

EU European Union
FOD UN Field Operations Division
FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful,
and Cooperative Cambodia
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP internally displaced person
IFOR NATO Implementation Force (former Yugoslavia)
IGO intergovernmental organization
IMTF integrated mission task force
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INTERFET International Force in East Timor
IPKF Indian Peacekeeping Force (Sri Lanka)
ISDSC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (Southern Africa)
JCC Joint Control Commission (Moldova/South Ossetia)
JMC Joint Military Commission
KFOR Kosovo Force
KPNLF Khmer People's National Liberation Front (Cambodia)
MFO Multinational Force and Observer Group (Sinai)
MINURCA UN Mission in the Central African Republic
MISAB Inter-African Mission in Monitor the Implementation of the
Bangui Agreements
MLO military liaison of®cer
MNF Multinational Force (Lebanon)
MOG military observer group
MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MRD motor ri¯e division
MVD Ministry of International Affairs (Russia)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO non-governmental organization
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
OCHA UN Of®ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
ONUC UN Operation in Congo
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKO peacekeeping operation
PolRI Indonesian police force
PPS parent police service
PSO peace support operation
RECAMP Renforcement du Capabilite African pour Maintien la Paix
(Reinforcement of African Military Peacekeeping Capacity)
RPTC SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADC Southern African Development Community
SFOR Stabilization Force (former Yugoslavia)
xii LIST OF ACRONYMS

SNC Supreme National Council (Cambodia)


SOFA status of forces agreement
SOP standard operating procedure
SPA UN Of®ce for Special Political Affairs
SRSG special representative of the Secretary-General
TNI Tentara National Indonesia
UNAMET UN Assistance Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone
UNAVEM III UN Angola Veri®cation Mission III
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNEF I First UN Emergency Force
UNFICYP UN Force in Cyprus
UNHCR Of®ce of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDIR UN Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNITAF Uni®ed Task Force (Somalia)
UNMIH UN Mission in Haiti
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOT UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMSIL UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone
UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalia
UNOSOM II Second UN Operation in Somalia
UNPA UN Protected Area
UNPREDEP UN Preventive Deployment (Macedonia)
UNPROFOR UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
UNSAS UN Standby Arrangements System
UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTEA UN Temporary Executive Authority (West Irian)
UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization
UTO United Tajik Opposition
WEU Western European Union
Part I
Challenges of post-Cold War
peacekeeping
This page intentionally left blank
1
Cascading generations of
peacekeeping: Across the
Mogadishu line to Kosovo
and Timor
Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel1

As we step over the threshold from one century to the next, the United
Nations is faced with growing demands for collective intervention along-
side declining con®dence in its effectiveness and ef®ciency, diminishing
®nancial support for its activities by some leading industrialized coun-
tries, and gathering storm clouds in the direction in which it seems to be
headed, propelled by the challenge of humanitarian intervention.2 Serious
doubts have been expressed about the institutional capacity of the UN
system to cope with the multitude of challenges confronting it in the new
millennium. In the meantime, the challenge of peacekeeping shows no
sign of abating. Since UN peacekeeping was launched over 50 years ago
in the Middle East, more than 50 operations have been deployed. Many
have played critical roles in ending or managing con¯icts in Africa, Asia,
Central America, and Europe.
During the Cold War, UN peacekeeping forces were interposed be-
tween warring parties and used to forestall major power confrontations
across global faultlines. The number of peacekeeping operations in-
creased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the UN was placed
centre stage in efforts to resolve outstanding con¯icts. However, the
multiplication of missions was not always accompanied by coherent pol-
icy or integrated military and political responses. When the missions en-
countered problems, the ``crisis of expectations''3 of the late 1980s and
early 1990s in turn gave way to a crisis of con®dence-cum-credibility in

3
4 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

UN peacekeeping in the late 1990s, and member states began to limit


their military, political, and ®nancial exposure.
Yet the need for UN peacekeeping remains and will continue. The
causes of con¯ict are many, but the fact of con¯ict remains a constant
feature of international affairs. More and more con¯icts break out within
borders, not between countries. They still pose major challenges to re-
gional stability. UN peacekeeping may not necessarily be the best instru-
ment for the task at hand in every instance. When should the international
community mandate peacekeeping tasks to the UN? What makes for their
success and failure? When should the UN act in partnership with regional
institutions? What is the relationship between military troops, political
negotiations, and organizational requirements at the UN Secretariat?
How, in the end, can we reconcile ``the temporary nature of speci®c op-
erations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace
operation activities as core functions of the United Nations''?4
This volume explores the evolution of peacekeeping, particularly since
the early 1990s, a period that was characterized by much initial enthusiasm
and hopes for a United Nations that would ®nd a more agreeable interna-
tional environment for more effective and sustained operations to secure
peace where it existed, and to provide peace where it did not. The end of
the Cold War unleashed new possibilities in international cooperation ±
both between the former superpower antagonists and within the UN's
premier organ responsible for the provision of international peace and
security, the Security Council. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali hoped to
unleash and instil a new sense of international responsibility, one which
would allow the world organization to address the many new security
challenges, foremost internal con¯icts, emerging from the long peace of
the Cold War era. Peacekeeping has always been one of the most visible
symbols of the UN role in international peace and security. And it was
the world's disappointment with the performance of UN peacekeeping
operations over the years that followed which became so symbolic of the
UN's failure to emerge from the ashes of the Cold War as a rejuvenated
key player in international and, increasingly, internal peace and security.
This book re¯ects some of the thinking, some of the experiences in the
UN and in the ®eld, some of the frustrations, and some of the hopes of
this past decade. It combines academic analysis, ®eld experience, and re-
¯ection with forward-looking proposals (including the suggestions of, and
responses to, the recent Brahimi Report) for more effective peace oper-
ations designed and deployed by the UN in partnership with regional,
subregional, and local actors. The various chapters in this book con®rm,
among others things, the reality of differences among academics, inter-
national civil servants, and generals in their respective cultures of re¯ec-
tion, introspection, and analysis.
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 5

The contributions to this volume are grouped in four parts. The ®rst
part outlines the challenges of post-Cold War peacekeeping; the second
part sheds light on regional experiences of peacekeeping missions, with
an emphasis on the post-Soviet region and Africa. In the third part practi-
tioners with extensive ®eld experience in peacekeeping share their speci®c
experiences in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and East Timor. Finally, the
fourth part takes stock of the recent record of UN peacekeeping, and of
the UN's own attempt to analyse, evaluate, and reform its performance in
peace operations.
This introductory chapter is designed to provide the basic background
for the chapters to follow. It does this by ®rst outlining the succeeding
generations of peacekeeping operations that have been established since
the early years of the United Nations after the Second World War. It
then analyses some of the critical issues that have arisen for international
peacekeeping missions in the types of inter-group ®ghting that comprise
today's ``normal'' con¯ict.
In Chapter 2, Roger Mac Ginty and Gillian Robinson examine the in-
tricacies of ethnic con¯ict, and the challenges they pose for UN peace
operations. They argue that in these situations traditional peacekeeping
is ill-placed, and peace enforcement is often neither doable nor desirable.
Instead, smaller-scale interventions, mostly of a preventive nature and in
close collaboration with local actors, hold greater promise to be effective
in the long run (see also the concluding chapter by Schnabel and Thakur).
Hisako Shimura, a former UN of®cial working for the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and recently a member of the Brahimi
Panel, examines the role of the UN Secretariat in organizing peacekeeping
in Chapter 3. She shows that the Secretary-General and the UN Secre-
tariat at large have played unusually dominant roles in the organization
and management of peacekeeping operations. While she does not criti-
cize this prominence, she points to the fact that it is those powerful actors
who need to be placed in a better position to recognize potential problems
at an early stage and to respond swiftly and competently. They must do
so with the professionalism that would be expected from the United
Nations, and in particular from the DPKO, but is not forthcoming in the
face of inadequate resources and personnel to meet these ever-increasing
challenges.
In Chapter 4, Michael O'Connor looks at effectiveness in peacekeeping
from a different perspective ± that of the mission on the ground. He argues
that peace agreements have to be policed actively and forcefully. This is
only possible if peacekeeping missions can rely on well-trained military
personnel on the ground and on sound military advice from UN Head-
quarters.
In Chapter 5, Neil MacFarlane examines the virtue and utility of
6 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

subcontracting peacekeeping tasks to regional organizations. While sub-


contracting ± usually to regional and subregional organizations in the
South ± takes the pressure off the North to become involved in con-
¯icts throughout the developing world, there are also clear advantages for
the South; those regions that would not normally see external involvement
must improve their own capacity to address war and suffering. Indeed,
regional approaches may be the ticket to long-term sustainability of peace
operations in protracted con¯icts. MacFarlane examines regional peace-
keeping in the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States. While
CIS- and Russian-dominated peacekeeping has been less than ideal, in
the absence of any other takers (including the United Nations), growing
signs of more con¯ict throughout the region, and less willingness by
Russia to bear the cost of regional security provision, we may soon ``look
back with slight nostalgia on the days when Russia could and would police
the region''.
In Chapter 6, Mark Malan studies the peacekeeping capacity of African
countries, both as participants in UN peacekeeping missions abroad and
in organizing their own missions on the continent. Focusing on the recent
UN mission in Sierra Leone, Malan questions the application of ``lean
peacekeeping'' as a way to offer African solutions to African problems.
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone was a very public failure in peacekeeping on
a continent where few lessons have been learned from past failures, and
where no military doctrine for peacekeeping and, more so today, peace
enforcement has developed. Malan presents the concept of ``con¯ict
termination operations'' through an indigenous but externally funded
``African Legion'', a force which could quickly bring con¯icts to a halt,
allowing traditional peacekeepers to deploy in situations in which there
actually is a peace to be kept. Only such an eÂlite legion, or so argues
Malan, would be capable of preventing another Rwanda from happening.
In Chapter 7, Vere Hayes argues that more peacekeepers on the ground
or tougher mandates will not bring much improvement to weak and in-
ef®cient peace operations unless arms, training, and command and control
are also upgraded. Unless forces have credible combat power, supported
both by the political will to employ such power and the professional skills
of the individual soldier to use it, peace support missions will become
pawns in the hands of con¯icting parties, and not the guardians of peace
and stability they are supposed to be. Drawing on the African context,
Hayes argues that peacekeepers must be well trained as combat soldiers,
and that the political will has to exist to use peacekeepers in robust de-
fence of a mission's mandate against spoilers. Hayes proposes regionwide
training exercises that would produce a large pool of adequately trained
peacekeepers across all ranks who could and should participate in col-
laborative regional missions.
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 7

Many of the issues so far discussed are then ¯eshed out in the context
of very speci®c ®rst-hand experiences of peacekeepers in Cambodia, for-
mer Yugoslavia, and East Timor. In Chapter 8, Yasushi Akashi discusses
the politics of UN peacekeeping from Cambodia to Yugoslavia. Drawing
on his experience as special representative of the Secretary-General
in both theatres, Akashi comments on the role of the Security Council,
the relations between the ®eld and UN Headquarters, the necessity for
post-con¯ict peace-building commitments, the lack of unity of the per-
manent ®ve in the Security Council, and the absolute requirement of
sustained diplomatic effort, without which mission creep and fatigue are
unavoidable. Akashi supports recent efforts to take a pragmatic approach
to peacekeeping ± one that allows the international community to be
more assertive as long as a mission is well funded, well organized, and
required to avert humanitarian disasters.
In Chapter 9, John Sanderson re¯ects on his experience in Cambodia,
and on developments there since UNTAC was concluded in 1993. He
expresses his frustration over what has been a slow and shaky recovery
process after the war. He attributes the failure to win the peace on the
UN's inexperience with post-con¯ict peace-building, and its failure to
``rapidly deploy forces to ®eld high-quality administrators in suf®cient
numbers to provide effective supervision and governance in disrupted
states''. While more ®eld experience exists today to avoid such problems,
the capacity is still lacking to occupy and run countries emerging from
war. Sanderson argues that only such a capacity will allow the United
Nations to generate lasting improvement.
Satish Nambiar, in his contribution in Chapter 10, reminds us that there
is an important difference between non-coercive peacekeeping and puni-
tive peace enforcement. In contrast to other contributors to this volume,
General Nambiar maintains that force must be used only if it is well con-
ceived and the consequences are well understood. Above all, the pursuit of
political solutions and concurrent peace-building activities have to exploit
the space created by peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations ±
the failure to do so leads only to further disarray, and it is the peace-
keepers who tend to be blamed. Nambiar draws on his experience in
former Yugoslavia and re¯ects on the damage done to the United Nations
through its failure to address Kosovo's problem at an early stage and
through NATO bypassing the Security Council to launch its air war over
Kosovo. While humanitarian law may well deserve to be enforced with
military might, this might must come from the United Nations, and not
some dominant country or regional alliance.
John McFarlane and Willliam Maley round off this section with a dis-
cussion of civilian police in UN peace operations in Chapter 11. Frag-
mented war-torn states with a serious inability to perform the normal
8 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

functions of a sovereign state, delegitimized over years of war and chaos,


disorder, and lawlessness on the streets, have little capacity to deal with
further fragmentation and subsequent violence. In such a context indige-
nous police and military forces are often more destructive than construc-
tive. It is the external military and police forces that need to step into this
power vacuum and facilitate the creation of a minimum acceptable secu-
rity environment. McFarlane and Maley note that the role of the civilian
police is frequently undervalued in comparison to the role of military
forces. It is the police of®cer who often gains the respect of the local pop-
ulation, contributes most directly to the reconstitution of local security and
order, and, after military peacekeepers have withdrawn, continues to assist
the population to recreate a semblance of orderly and stable social life.
Drawing on the experience of the Australian Federal Police component
of UNTAET in East Timor, McFarlane and Maley assess the gap that still
exists between the crucial role played by civilian police in peacekeeping
and peace-building missions (which are, after all, not merely military op-
erations) and the little recognition they receive from the United Nations
and other key players in the organization and implementation of peace
operations.
The ®nal section of the volume begins with Margaret Karns and Karen
Mingst's discussion of four dilemmas confronting peacekeeping amid the
changing role of the United Nations in Chapter 12. They argue that UN
peace operations are plagued basically by four main problems: the shift
from interstate to intrastate con¯ict and the related challenges of when,
how, and by whom intervention in civil con¯ict may be justi®ed; the
changing international expectations and interpretations of the interna-
tional community's responsibility to respond to gross humanitarian vio-
lations; the changing, rising number, and diversity of non-state, interstate,
and suprastate actors involved in peace operations; and the question
of leadership in future peace operations within and outside the United
Nations. In the years to come the United Nations will likely be torn and
constrained by the contest between new and old norms of sovereignty
and intervention; the emerging role of regional organizations and ad hoc
coalitions of states, some of which will not seek UN approval for missions
that they ®nd desirable and necessary; and the role and demeanour of the
USA. It will not be easy for the United Nations to carve out a role that
allows for leadership, legitimacy, and the record to go with it.
Finally, in Chapter 13, Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur discuss
the recently published Brahimi Report, commissioned by the Secretary-
General to seek creative solutions to the chronic peacekeeping failures of
the 1990s. They argue that, despite the fact that the Brahimi Report makes
far-reaching demands on the United Nations and its member states, it
nevertheless constitutes only the minimum required reform agenda that
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 9

would need to be followed and implemented to bring lasting legitimacy to


UN peace operations. The chapter further assesses a neglected yet im-
portant part of the Brahimi Report ± the importance of both effective and
early prevention of violence, as well as the need for unquali®ed, effective,
and concerted intervention when human rights are violated on a mass
scale. The discussion emanating from the Brahimi Report and the con-
sistency with which its main ®ndings and recommendations have echoed
through the writings of practitioners and academics alike (in this volume
as well as in other contributions to this ongoing debate) are testimony to
the commonsensical nature of most of its suggestions.

The six generations of peacekeeping

Terms like ``peacekeeping'', ``peace support operations'', and ``peace


operations'' are used generically to refer to missions and operations that
fall short of military combat between clearly recognizable enemies. Dif-
ferent analysts use different typologies to classify the many operations
that have been mounted in ®ve decades of UN experience. The early
distinctions were between observer and peacekeeping missions. But the
latter developed too many variations for the one term to retain concep-
tual clarity. It is possible, for example, to classify them by type of actor.
Thus Henry Wiseman divides peacekeeping operations ®rstly into UN,
regional, and independent ad hoc missions. Alternatively, they may be
grouped chronologically. Thus Wiseman divides UN operations into the
nascent period (1946±1956), the assertive period (1956±1967), the dor-
mant period (1967±1973), and the resurgent period (1973±1978).5 The
last period's nomenclature was clearly premature: the real resurgence
came after the end of the Cold War. Or they may be classi®ed by func-
tions and tasks, as done by Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall
± observation, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, preventive
deployment, interposition, paci®cation, collective enforcement, etc.6 The
trouble with this is that many different functions can be carried out by any
one operation, and functions of the same operation can change over time.
The present authors prefer to classify in a way which allows one to distin-
guish between peacekeeping missions overall.

First generation: Traditional peacekeeping ± pending peace

Article 1(1) of the UN Charter declares the primary purpose of the or-
ganization to be the maintenance of international peace and security. The
world failed to realize a collective security system centred on the United
Nations during the Cold War, and appears no nearer to the goal today.
10 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

With a reliable system of collective security proving unattainable, states


moved to guarantee national security by means of collective defence ± that
is, alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the Warsaw Pact ± and the international community groped towards
damage-limitation techniques to avoid and contain con¯icts. Peacekeeping
evolved in the grey zone between paci®c settlement (Chapter VI of the UN
Charter) and military enforcement (Chapter VII). Its primary purpose was
to supervise and monitor a cease-®re. Peacekeeping operations had no
military objectives, were barred from active combat, were located between
rather than in opposition to hostile elements, and were required to nego-
tiate rather than ®ght.
The cardinal distinction between collective security and ®rst-generation
peacekeeping lay in their reliance upon force and consent respectively.

..
Traditional peacekeeping had several distinguishing characteristics:
consent and cooperation of parties to the con¯ict;

..international backing, especially in the UN Security Council;


UN command and control;

..
multinational composition;
no use of force;

.
military neutrality between the rival armies;
political impartiality between the rival countries.

Second generation: Non-UN peacekeeping

Traditional peacekeeping was thus under UN auspices and command and


control. There was a reaction against UN peacekeeping because of wide-
spread, although not always accurate, perceptions that UN operations led
to diplomatic ennui and could not be freed of the Cold War rivalry and
other highly politicized antagonisms that had infected large parts of the
UN system. The term ``second generation'' was appropriated in the 1990s
by analysts who came late to the study of this novel institution, not by
those who had devoted themselves to the subject during the years when
peacekeeping was less fashionable.7
It makes more sense to use the term to refer to a spate of peacekeep-
ing operations that were mounted either unilaterally or multilaterally, but
in any case outside the UN system. These include the Commonwealth
peacekeeping operation for overseeing the conversion of Rhodesia into
Zimbabwe,8 the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Group in the
Sinai,9 the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut,10 and the Indian
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka. The precursor to this sort of
extra-UN peacekeeping operations might well be said to have been the
international control commissions in Indochina set up pursuant to the
Geneva Agreements of 1954.11
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 11

Some of these efforts were successful, including the Commonwealth


operation in Zimbabwe and the MFO in Sinai. Others were largely fail-
ures, for example the MNF in Beirut and the IPKF in Sri Lanka. The
reason why it makes sense to identify this phase of peacekeeping as sec-
ond generation is the intergenerational structural continuity implied by
the metaphor. There is a direct lineage from traditional UN peace-
keeping to the expanded peacekeeping of the third generation onwards
in the 1990s. On the one hand, the non-UN operations adopted most of
the principles of third-party military interposition and buffering from tra-
ditional UN peacekeeping. The MFO, for example, is virtually the classic
UN model of a peacekeeping force, and has often had force commanders
with direct UN experience. On the other hand, they expanded the range of
tasks and functions that were required beyond just military interposition,
as in Indochina in the 1950s and Zimbabwe in the 1970s. Both the MNF
in Beirut and the IPKF in Sri Lanka in the 1980s foreshadowed the con-
ceptual and operational challenges that were to confront and destroy the
UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in the 1990s when enforcement
was forced into a shotgun marriage with peacekeeping.

Third generation: Expanded peacekeeping ± peace reinforcement

Traditional peacekeeping therefore aimed to contain and stabilize volatile


regions and interstate con¯icts until such time as negotiations produced
lasting peace agreements. By contrast, the third generation of peace-
keeping saw missions being mounted as part of package deals of peace
agreements, for example in Namibia and Cambodia. The peacekeeping
mission was an integral component of the peace agreement and was
meant to complete the peace settlement by providing third-party inter-
national military reinforcement for the peace process.
The pace of peacekeeping accelerated under the impact of the end of
the Cold War. In the early 1990s, Cold War acrimony between the super-
powers gave way to a new world order harmony. With unprecedented co-
operation among the ®ve permanent members, the UN Security Council
was relieved of the disability of great-power disagreement. The prolifer-
ation of peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s was testimony to the
enhanced expectations of the United Nations in the new order. When the
Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeeping in 1988, just over
10,000 persons from 35 countries were serving with seven operations, at
an annual cost of US$230m. At their peak around mid-1994, there were
17 UN peacekeeping operations at an annual cost of almost US$4bn em-
ploying a total of more than 87,000 troops, police, and civilian of®cers.
Re¯ecting the changing nature of modern armed con¯ict, UN oper-
ations expanded not just in numbers but also in the nature and scope of
12 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

their missions. The ``simple emergencies'' of yesteryear required the


United Nations to cope with organized violence between states ®ghting
across an international border. By contrast, ``complex emergencies'' pro-
duce multiple crises all at once:12 collapsed state structures; humanitarian
tragedies caused by starvation, disease, or genocide; large-scale ®ghting
and slaughter between rival ethnic or bandit groups; horri®c human rights
atrocities; and the intermingling of criminal elements and child soldiers
with irregular forces. Re¯ecting this, third-generation operations ± of
which Cambodia, in which both Yasushi Akashi and John Sanderson
were involved, was a particularly good example13 ± had to undertake the

..
following types of tasks:
military disengagement, demobilization, and cantonment;

..policing;
human rights monitoring and enforcement;

..
information dissemination;
observation, organization, and conduct of elections;

..
rehabilitation;
repatriation;

.
administration;
working with or overseeing the operations of regional or non-UN
peacekeeping operations.

Fourth generation: Peace enforcement

The efforts of the United Nations and member states did not always meet
demand. On the basis of its actions and inaction in Somalia, Bosnia, and
Rwanda, wrote a critic, ``the UN has become not a friend of world stability
but a menace. Wherever it intervenes, peace is neither made nor kept but
postponed.''14 The UN's credibility was seen to have been lost, in partic-
ular, in the tide of refugees swarming on the highways and byways of
former Yugoslavia: a veritable symbol of human misery. A columnist
with The Economist mentioned the following as Bosnia's contribution to
doublespeak: ``safe area'' means a deadly dangerous place; a ``rapid re-
action'' will occur next month, maybe; and a ``protection force'' is one
that offers neither.15 While the cynics might conclude that Bosnia was the
UN's Viet Nam, the romantics might respond that it is better explained as
the UN's Munich: a failure of collective nerve and will. A peacekeeping
operation in a theatre where there was no peace to keep, the UN Pro-
tection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia offered neither safety
to the local people, solace to the displaced and dispossessed, nor even the
consolation to the international community of having done the job to the
best of their ability. Its failure to prevent the horrors of Srebrenica in
1995 remains a stain on the world conscience for passivity in the face of
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 13

the calculated return of ``evil'' to Europe and a tragedy that, in the words
of the of®cial UN report, ``will haunt our history forever''.16
The pace of developments raced ahead even of third-generation oper-
ations. In Somalia and elsewhere the United Nations attempted ``peace
enforcement'', with results that were anything but encouraging17 ± hence
General Sir Michael Rose's metaphor, used in the title of this chapter, of
``the Mogadishu line'' that peacekeeping forces dare cross only at their
peril.18 While the conceptual issues associated with peace enforcement
will be discussed below, Somalia most clearly represented the birth (and
death) of the fourth generation of UN peacekeeping.

Fifth generation: Peace restoration by partnership

Partly as a consequence of the disastrous venture into peace enforcement,


in Bosnia and Haiti UN peacekeeping underwent a further metamorphosis
into the ®fth generation of enforcement operations ± authorized by the
UN Security Council, but undertaken by a single power or ad hoc multi-
lateral coalitions. The United Nations itself took back responsibility for a
traditional-type consensual peacekeeping once the situation had stabi-
lized,19 but with the tasks of third-generation expanded peacekeeping.
(Although UNOSOM had been preceded by the US-led Uni®ed Task
Force, UNITAF, the latter did not engage in enforcement.) Modifying
the Gulf War precedent somewhat, this was the pattern that emerged of
UN-authorized military action by the USA in Haiti, France in Rwanda,
Russia in Georgia, and NATO in Bosnia. Neil MacFarlane in Chapter 5
and Mark Malan in Chapter 6 note the many challenges of regional
peacekeeping in the CIS and Africa, respectively. The danger is real,
nevertheless, that major powers take military action only when and where
their national interests are engaged. The United Nations by contrast is the
political embodiment of the international community and the custodian
of the international interest.

Sixth generation: Multinational peace restoration, UN state creation

East Timor represents the evolution into the most recent, sixth genera-
tion of peacekeeping. A UN-authorized multinational force is prepared
for combat action if necessary, and is given the mandate, troops, equip-
ment, and robust rules of engagement that are required for such a mis-
sion. However, the military operation is but the prelude to a de facto UN
administration that engages in state-making for a transitional period.
That is, a ``nation'' is granted independence as a result of UN-organized
elections. But the nation concerned has no structures of ``state'' to speak
of. It is not even, like Somalia, a case of a failed state; in East Timor a
14 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

state has had to be created from scratch. The United Nations has ®nally
confronted and addressed, in East Timor, the dilemma that haunted it in
the Congo in the 1960s and Somalia in the 1990s, namely that peace res-
toration is not possible without the establishment of law and order. But in
a country where the writ of government has either collapsed or is non-
existent, the law that is made and enforced so as to provide order can only
be that of the United Nations or of another foreign power (or coalition).

Crossing the Mogadishu line

A signi®cant cost of the cascade of generations of peacekeeping within a


highly compressed time-frame is that most of the major operations today
have little real precedent to go by; each has to make and learn from its
own mistakes. The lessons-learned unit of the UN Department of Peace-
keeping Operations must feel like Alice in Wonderland: running harder
and harder just to stay in one place. There are three sets of reasons for
the cascade of many generations of peacekeeping under the accelerated
pace of developments over the last decade or so. The ®rst concerns the
dif®culty of reconciling the tension between the primary unit of formal
world order and UN membership being the sovereign state, on the one
hand, and the declining salience of interstate violence on the other hand.
The second concerns the dif®cult and painful learning curve with regard
to the proper balance between consensual and muscular operations in
contemporary armed con¯icts within the borders of UN member states.
The ``Mogadishu line'' is a shorthand metaphor for capturing both sets of
problems. The third and ®nal set concerns the shifting relative balance
away from state rights to human rights in contemporary world affairs, and
the resulting pressures on the international community to countenance
armed intervention for humanitarian reasons.

Peacekeeping in civil wars

East Timor represents one type of intrastate con¯ict that was fought over
the formation of a new state. Another type of internal con¯ict concerns
cases where there is no challenge to the territorial status quo, only to the
political: that is, different factions compete and ®ght to be recognized as
the sole legitimate government of a country whose territorial boundaries
remain uncontested. Cambodia was one such example. Others include
Afghanistan and Angola, ``orphans of the Cold War'' in Dame Margaret
Anstee's evocative metaphor.20 The end of the Cold War did not mean
an end of history, nor even the end of all war.
The United Nations was designed to keep world peace, if necessary by
going to war against aggressors. The transient Cold War hostility and the
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 15

more enduring structural realities of diverging major power interests put


paid to the rhetoric of indivisible peace. As the system of collective secu-
rity proved elusive but con¯icts did not abate, creative solutions were
found to inject a stabilizing UN presence through unarmed and impartial
UN peacekeepers who conducted holding rather than military operations.
Internal ethno-national con¯icts, discussed by Roger Mac Ginty and Gil-
lian Robinson in Chapter 2, re¯ect weaknesses in state capacity. Complex
humanitarian operations are at the cutting edge of the UN's core function
in the new world disorder. Their well-publicized failures in the Balkans,
Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and Sierra Leone have damaged the core
credibility of the organization.
UN intervention in internal con¯icts raises the impossible political
question of how the world body, committed to maintaining the territorial
integrity of member states, will decide when to support and when to op-
pose the ``legitimate'' government against attempts at secession. The re-
fusal to talk to one party in a civil war, because it is considered to be
``illegitimate'', reduces the chances of ending it. To be effective, the United
Nations must negotiate with all signi®cant sectarian leaders. But in doing
so, the United Nations endows them with a degree of legitimacy. In return,
however, leaders of ill-disciplined and uncoordinated guerrilla groups may
be unable or unwilling to honour the agreements made with the United
Nations. Does the writ of the rebels and secessionists run deep and wide
enough for the leaders who have signed the agreements to be able to
deliver a cease-®re that will hold? The safety measure for guerrilla groups
is that they do not have strict chains of command; they exist in isolation,
operating from self-contained cells. Units at the end of such a loose chain
of command may not receive or accept directives from above.
If there is no effective government in power, then attempts by the
United Nations to impose its own law and order can provoke ®erce
backlash from armed bandit groups. This is what happened to the human-
itarian peacekeeping mission in Somalia. There was a blurring of the line
between combatants and civilians because irregular forces merged, like
®sh in the ocean, with the local population.
Civil wars scatter UN troops thinly over a wide geographical area under
a tenuous cease-®re. These troops are more vulnerable to attacks when not
deployed at ®xed positions in a neutral area. The result can be that the
United Nations has to devote more time, resources, and personnel to
protecting its mission than to accomplishing its goals ± or risk having its
soldiers taken hostage.

Robust peacekeeping

Should the United Nations use force against those who would challenge
its authority, as in Bosnia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone? The crisis that
16 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

confronted the UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in May 2000


was a sad commentary on lessons learnt, not learnt, and forgotten over
®ve decades of peacekeeping. Dag HammarskjoÈd created the ®rst UN
peacekeeping force in 1956 in the Suez. He restricted the use of force to
self-defence, de®ned as the protection of the lives of UN soldiers and of
the positions held by them under a UN mandate. In An Agenda for Peace,
the new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali implied that future
peacekeeping operations could be organized without the consent of all
the parties.21 This did not happen.
In late 1999, the United Nations issued a remarkably frank, self-critical
report on its role in events leading to the death of thousands of civilians
under its protection in Srebrenica in 1995. The grim yet poignant text
chronicled a tragedy of mostly avoidable errors. Secretary-General Ko®
Annan assumed full responsibility for these mistakes by the United
Nations, which had occurred during his watch as Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping. A month after the Srebrenica report, an international
panel convened by Annan tabled a similarly sobering report on the UN's
failure to prevent the genocide of half a million Rwandans in 1994.22
Another panel, convened by the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
was not shy in pointing the ®nger of almost criminal blame at some of the
permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as UN staff:

As to the UN Secretariat, a directive was sent from headquarters in New York


to General Dallaire indicating that the UN forces could, if absolutely necessary,
exceed their mandate in one solitary circumstance: the evacuation of foreign
nationals. We, the panel, viewed the directive with incredulity. It was a shocking
double standard. No such directive was ever issued on behalf of the rescue of
Rwandans.23

In all these cases, the predicament of peacekeeping soldiers on the ground


was that they were unable to move forward into an unwinnable battle,
unable to stay put taking casualties for no purpose, and unable to with-
draw without damaging national and UN credibility.
Turning a peacekeeping mission into a ®ghting force creates two prob-
lems. First, it calls for a long commitment. Foreign armies, including those
®ghting under the UN blue ¯ag, cannot impose peace on civil wars without
also imposing foreign rule: this was the logic of colonialism. Second, they
cannot join the fray without taking sides in the civil war. But to take sides
is to become aligned to one and therefore the enemy of the other. If the
faction against which the United Nations takes up arms were genteel and
law-abiding, then the United Nations would not need to resort to such
action in the ®rst place. Yet when UN personnel come under attack, the
organization does not have the means to defend them. If it calls on
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 17

mainly Western armies for protection, it will be seen even more as a tool
of the West.
In other words, ground realities since the end of the Cold War have
highlighted the large gap between the two familiar poles of traditional
peacekeeping and Chapter VII enforcement. There is a need for a con-
ceptual and policy bridge for a transition from Chapter VI to Chapter VII.
At present there is no continuum from consensual peacekeeping to col-
lective enforcement. Because the mechanism for setting up a collective
security force under Chapter VII does not exist, the United Nations has
resorted to subcontracting enforcement operations. Yet the belief persists
in many modern military forces that peacekeeping is for wimps, not for
real soldiers, even though the most common form of insecurity today ±
wars within state borders ± calls for complex peacekeeping operations as
the tool of choice by the international community. Those with the military
capacity lack the political will to take part in robust UN peacekeeping;
those with the will lack the means.

``Humanitarian'' intervention

Reading the UN Charter, there is little doubt that a basic premise under-
pinning the organization is the notion of inalienable human rights that
are universally valid. Many governments argue in favour of a relativist
interpretation of human rights. Yet there is no society in which indi-
viduals do not want adequate food and shelter, the ability to be able to
speak freely, to practise their own religion, and to avoid torture and im-
prisonment by the state without ®rst being charged and subjected to a fair
trial. None of this is culture-speci®c.
A steady loss of government control over transborder exchanges has
been accompanied by increased demands and expectations of the United
Nations from the peoples of the world. In the case of human rights, this
takes the form of people seeking the protection of the international or-
ganization from abuses by their own governments. Governments, how-
ever, continue to be suspicious of claims by international bodies of a
quali®ed right to intervene.
In practice, the legitimacy of intervention turns upon the answer to
questions about the four main elements involved in any act of intervention:
actor, act, target, and purpose. The most immediately acceptable justi®ca-
tion for intervention is the collectivist principle: not why intervention was
undertaken, but who took the decision to intervene. Since 1945, the most
widely accepted legitimator of international action has been the United
Nations. The International Bill of Rights after all comprises three seminal
UN accomplishments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948, and the two covenants on civil-political and socio-economic-cultural
18 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

rights of 1966. The Universal Declaration is the embodiment and procla-


mation of the human rights norm. The covenants added force and specif-
icity, af®rming both civil-political and social-economic-cultural rights,
without privileging either set. Together they embody the moral code,
political consensus, and legal synthesis of human rights.24
The international community has been confronted with the dilemma of
the tension between respect for national sovereignty and the concomitant
principle of non-interference, and the rising chorus of international con-
cern at gross human rights atrocities. The United Nations faced fresh
charges of dereliction of duty after the referendum on autonomy or in-
dependence held in East Timor in 1999. On the one hand, some argued
that the United Nations had ful®lled its part of the bargain brilliantly,
with a 98 per cent voter turnout and a decisive electoral verdict. The In-
donesian military had failed to live up to their side of the bargain in en-
suring adequate security. On the other hand, however, others argued that
the Indonesian military's failure was predictable and should have been
anticipated. The United Nations therefore had a responsibility to ensure
the safety and security of the people who had reposed their trust in the
international community but were betrayed ± the very point that General
Sanderson makes about Cambodia.
The search for standby arrangements that will provide rapid reaction
capability to the United Nations when confronted with humanitarian crises
of horri®c proportions is an effort to lessen the reliance on major powers
whose national interests may diverge in important ways from the interna-
tional interest vested in the world organization. Conversely, if the national
interests of the major powers are not at stake, then it is correspondingly
more dif®cult to secure their substantial involvement on purely humani-
tarian considerations.
Complex emergencies may require comprehensive and integrated re-
sponses from several actors. There is scope for a partnership between UN
peacekeeping, peace-restoring and peacemaking operations; and between
UN operations and the activities of regional and non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs). We are already witnessing divisions of labour be-
tween the various regional and international actors based on their com-
parative advantages. We should, however, be sensitive to the dangers of
the tribalization of peacekeeping if regional bodies begin to claim own-
ership of con¯icts within their areas of geographic coverage. Wider in-
ternational participation is necessary for reasons of legitimacy, solidarity,
and capacity.25
Another note of caution is that a peacekeeping mission can be largely
successful, yet the eventual outcome may not be fully satisfactory. Quick-
®x solutions and instant democracy are insuf®cient unto themselves.
Peacekeeping is but a point on the continuum from pre-con¯ict peace-
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 19

building to post-con¯ict peace reconstruction. It must be integrated with


the search for a political solution. A peace agreement is no solution if it
does not last the distance. Sometimes the desire to bring an interminable
con¯ict to a quick end, and the use of peacekeeping troops for this pur-
pose, can override the need to ensure that the terms of the settlement are
honourable, just, and likely to endure. The requirements for sustainable
peace are different from those of Band-Aid or ®re-®ghting responses.
This is shown up only too starkly in Cambodia. General Sanderson notes
in Chapter 9 that his heart weeps for the Cambodian people. The UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was a success, in that it
ful®lled its mandate in time and under budget. But, re¯ecting de®ciencies
and shortcomings of the UN system as a whole rather than of the peace-
keeping operation per se, UNTAC lost focus on the principal objective of
its mandate, which was to leave Cambodia with effective democratic
government. Instead, it acquiesced in decisions that paved the way for a
political system of underlying criminality.

Review and reform of UN peacekeeping

Ko® Annan appointed a high-level international panel, led by Lakhdar


Brahimi, a former special representative of the Secretary-General, and
including Hisako Shimura, who writes of the Secretariat perspective on
peacekeeping in Chapter 3, to make recommendations for changes in UN
peacekeeping. It reported its ®ndings in August 2000.26 The general
thrust of its recommendations is that the United Nations should de®ne
the peacekeeping mission, bring the force needed for the purpose, and do
what is required to get the job done.
Peacekeeping shortcomings and reforms can be addressed at three
levels: policy, managerial, and operational.27
Policy responsibility vests mainly in the member states, in particular
those who are on the UN Security Council and especially the ®ve perma-
nent members (P5). The Brahimi Report reaf®rms the need for the United
Nations to get serious about con¯ict prevention. Annan's efforts to address
the root causes of con¯ict in many regions and countries ± including abu-
sive governments, the absence of democracy, gross violations of human
rights, predatory economic policies, and the still-booming international
sale of weaponry ± deserve more support from member states. The Secu-
rity Council must move beyond its current pattern of reaction and address
potential crises holistically and at root before violence breaks out. As
necessary and logical this may seem, however, taking effective preventive
action remains a daunting task, as Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur
note in Chapter 13.
20 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

The need for clear mandates and goals, matching military and ®nan-
cial resources, performance benchmarks, etc., has long been recognized
but rarely followed. Disagreement among Security Council members is
papered over by ambiguous language, the price for which is paid by peace-
keepers in the ®eld. Another well-known lesson is that peacekeepers
cannot function where there is no peace to keep. Missions keep being
mounted in the Micawberesque belief that everything that can go right
will go right. The Brahimi panel comments on the UN tendency to base
decisions on best-case planning assumptions in situations with a history of
worst-case behaviour. Yet a third lesson, learnt at great cost and human
suffering in the 1990s, is that the need for impartial peacekeeping should
not automatically translate into moral equivalence among the con¯ict
parties on the ground.
The Brahimi Report criticizes the Security Council's record of decisions
unsupported by the necessary resources to implement them. It recom-
mends that no Council decision be taken to create a peacekeeping opera-
tion (or substantially change its mandate) until the Secretary-General can
certify that the necessary personnel and equipment have been offered.
This recommendation, if adopted, should cut down on the number of un-
realistic resolutions that have been debasing the Council's currency in
recent years.
More open and democratic decision-making procedures by the Security
Council would also help to promote a culture of accountability: member
states should be held responsible for disasters ¯owing from ¯awed policy.
So should UN of®cials. Policy failures are compounded by managerial
mistakes made by the Secretariat. As US Permanent Representative
Richard Holbrooke and others have noted, the DPKO is effectively the
UN's ministry of defence, except that it is on a more or less permanent
war footing. Its human, technical, logistical, and ®nancial capacity to en-
gage in this mammoth, worldwide, round-the-clock task is underwhelming.
Many former force commanders, including Generals John Sanderson and
Satish Nambiar, have commented on the strategic disconnect between
their needs in the ®eld and the calibre and professionalism of military
advice available to the Secretary-General in New York. In Chapter 4
Michael O'Connor considers a revised Military Staff Council and solid
military expertise in the DPKO as one of the most crucial, but hitherto
neglected, components of successful peace operations.
The United Nations needs to develop the professional civil service
culture of providing advice that is sound, based on a thorough assessment
of options, independent of what might be politically popular or ®t the
preconceptions of the decision-makers, and free from fear of consequences
for politically neutral of®cials. Where clearly unimplementable missions
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 21

have been approved because of confused, unclear, or severely under-


resourced mandates, the United Nations has to learn to say ``No''. The
Brahimi panel advised the United Nations to reject contributions if they
do not measure up with respect to the training and equipment needed for
the job. The Secretariat is advised to tell the Security Council what it
needs to hear, not what it wants to hear. This recommendation seems to
target the cosy relationship that has grown up between the Secretariat
and the P5, which often get to vet the Secretariat's advice before it is
proffered to the full Council. The practice has been much criticized, for it
has resulted in bad recommendations from successive Secretaries-General
to the Council shaped by the P5 on the basis of what their governments
were prepared to support rather than on what the situation required.
Timidity masquerading as political neutrality has also led to the oper-
ational failure to confront openly those who challenge peacekeeping mis-
sions in the ®eld. The United Nations, while striving to remain impartial,
should suspend its long-standing attachment to neutrality between bellig-
erents if one or several pursue morally reprehensible goals in repugnant
ways. That is, the United Nations should no longer extend, directly or in-
directly, a seal of moral equivalency in its relations with combatants. Im-
partiality should not translate into complicity with evil. The UN Charter
sets out the principles that the organization must defend and the values
that it must uphold. The reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor
implies a degree of moral equivalency between the two and damages the
institution of UN peacekeeping.
In order to arrest and reverse the sense of drift, UN approaches to
peacekeeping need to re¯ect the multifaceted nature of UN action in
countries af¯icted by mostly civil wars. This means promoting the rule of law
and economic recovery by integrating the military, policing, institution-
building, reconstruction, and civil administration functions of peace-
keeping operations to a much greater degree than in the past. This is
particularly true where the United Nations substitutes for collapsed local
governments, as in Kosovo and East Timor. Experience has shown that
reconstructing state institutions responsible for establishing the rule of
law is considerably more challenging than merely keeping the peace. The
United Nations is encouraged by the Brahimi panel to develop a generic
legal framework generally applicable where state institutions collapse (as
in Kosovo and East Timor). International legal personnel (judges, pros-
ecutors, investigators) could then operate, albeit with sensitivity to local
traditions, to restore law and order in the absence of local political
authority.
Countries with large ®nancial and military resources are reluctant to
deploy either to address African con¯icts.28 This also will have to change
22 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

if UN credibility on peacekeeping is to be restored. In order to reoccupy


its niche as a major actor in international security, the United Nations
requires consistency of purpose, the resources to give it substance, and a
convincing attention span. The importance of credibility for regional
peacekeeping in Africa is further underlined by Brigadier Hayes in
Chapter 7.

Conclusion

International organizations touch our daily lives in myriad ways. They are
an important means of arranging the functioning of the state-based in-
ternational system more satisfactorily than had proven to be the case in
conditions of international anarchy. The United Nations lies at their leg-
islative and normative centre. If it did not exist, we would surely have to
invent it. Considering the ill-fated history of the League of Nations, the
UN founders would have felt pride and satisfaction that their creation is
still intact at the dawn of the new millennium, embracing virtually the
entire international community. Yet their vision of a world community
equal in rights and united in action is still to be realized.
Like the League of Nations in the inter-war period, the United Nations
embodies the idea that aggressive war is a crime against humanity, with
every state having the interest, right, and duty to collaborate in preventing
it. The innovation of peacekeeping notwithstanding, the United Nations
has not lived up to expectations in securing a disarmed and peaceful world.
For the United Nations to succeed, the world community must match the
demands made on the organization by the means given to it. The UN's
®nancial dif®culties are compounded by perceptions, not always justi®ed,
of bureaucratic inef®ciency. Based on human solidarity and transcending
national perspectives, the United Nations provides and manages the
framework for bringing together the world's leaders to tackle the pressing
problems of the day for the survival, development, and welfare of all
human beings everywhere.
Peacekeeping evolved as partial compensation for the gap between the
Charter rhetoric and the Cold War reality of collective security. As Ya-
sushi Akashi notes in Chapter 8, many of the lessons learnt are restate-
ments of long-held convictions by the peacekeeping community: the lack
of unity among the major powers; the imprecision, ambiguity, prolifera-
tion, and inconsistencies of the mandates approved by the UN Security
Council; the lack of coordination between the legislative bodies at UN
Headquarters in New York and the peacekeeping operations in the ®eld;
the unwillingness of the parties to the con¯ict to trust UN diplomacy
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 23

rather than their own arms; and the incongruence between the mandate
and resources given to the peacekeeping missions.
In the past, the United Nations has emphasized abortion to the neglect
of prophylaxis. It needs to sharpen its skills at identifying potential con-
¯icts before the fact so that parties to disputes can be brought together
during the period of infancy. The United Nations also needs to become
involved in post-con¯ict peace-building by identifying, supporting, and
deepening the structures that will consolidate peace and enhance people's
sense of con®dence and well-being.29 Peacekeeping is a circuit breaker in
a spiralling cycle of violence. The problem with traditional peacekeeping
was that it could at best localize the impact of con¯icts and then freeze
them. Rarely did the United Nations prevent con¯icts from breaking out
or resolve them after they did. The sixth-generation model for East
Timor has ®nally come to terms with this requirement. It remains to be
seen how successful it will be, and whether it can be replicated elsewhere.
In the midst of the swirling tides of change, the United Nations must
strive for a balance between the desirable and the possible. Its dilemma is
that it must avoid deploying forces into situations where the risk of failure
is high, but not be so timid as to transform every dif®culty into an alibi for
inaction. The Charter was a triumph of hope and idealism over the ex-
perience of two world wars. The ¯ame ¯ickered in the chill winds of the
Cold War, but has not yet died out. The organization's greatest strength
as the only universal forum for cooperation and management is its mobi-
lizing and convening potential. The global public goods of peace, pros-
perity, sustainable development, and good governance cannot be achieved
by any country acting on its own. The United Nations is still the symbol of
our hopes and dreams for a better world, where weakness can be com-
pensated by justice and fairness, and the law of the jungle replaced by the
rule of law.
The United Nations has to strike a balance between realism and ideal-
ism. It will be incapacitated if it alienates its most important members, in
particular the USA. Its decisions must re¯ect current realities of military
and economic power. Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst note in Chapter
12 that the United Nations faces the dilemma of reducing dependence on
the USA, yet creating and sustaining US diplomatic, material, and ®nan-
cial support in order to meet the demands and expectations from differ-
ent pockets of crises around the world for peacekeeping operations in the
future. But the United Nations will also lose credibility if it compromises
core values. It is the repository of international idealism, and utopia is
fundamental to its identity. Even the sense of disenchantment and dis-
illusionment on the part of some cannot be understood other than in this
context.
24 THAKUR AND SCHNABEL

Notes
1. The views expressed in this chapter are the personal opinion of the authors. They do not
necessarily re¯ect the views of the United Nations University.
2. See Ko® Annan, Facing the Humanitarian Challenge: Towards a Culture of Prevention,
New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1999.
3. The phrase is taken from Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds), A Crisis of Ex-
pectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, Boulder: Westview, 1995.
4. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, New
York: UN General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August 2000, p. xiii.
5. Henry Wiseman, ``The United Nations and international peacekeeping: A comparative
analysis'', in UN Institute for Training and Research, The United Nations and the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987,
pp. 263±333.
6. Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, ``International peacekeeping and
con¯ict resolution: A taxonomic analysis with implications'', Journal of Con¯ict Resolu-
tion, Vol. 42, No. 1, February 1998, pp. 33±55.
7. The two most prominent analysts, at least in English, were Professor Alan James and
veteran UN peacekeeper Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye. General Rikhye was also the
founding president of the International Peace Academy in New York. See in particular
Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping, New York: Praeger, 1969; Alan James, Peace-
keeping in International Politics, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990; Indar Jit Rikhye,
Michael Harbottle and Bjùrn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and
Its Future, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974; and Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory
and Practice of Peacekeeping, London: C. Hurst, 1984. See also Paul F. Diehl, Interna-
tional Peacekeeping, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; and Henry
Wiseman (ed.), Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, New York: Pergamon, 1983.
Representative works from more recent times include William J. Durch, The Evolution
of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, New York: St Martin's
Press, 1993; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, ``Second-generation multinational oper-
ations'', Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, 1992, pp. 113±134; and Steven R. Ratner, The
New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Con¯ict after the Cold War, New
York: St Martin's Press, 1996. The United Nations itself has published straightforward
and authoritative accounts in The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-
keeping, 3rd edn, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996.
8. See Henry Wiseman and Alastair Taylor, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, New York:
Pergamon Press for the International Peace Academy, 1981.
9. See Mala Tabory, The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, Boulder: West-
view, 1986.
10. See Ramesh Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority
and Multinational Force, Boulder: Westview, 1987.
11. See Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the Interna-
tional Commission, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984.
12. The Congo crisis of the 1960s, and the UN operation there from 1960 to 1964, could be
said to have been precursors to the complex emergencies and third-generation missions.
13. See Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate,
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995; Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of
UNTAC, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1995.
14. Simon Jenkins, ``Fanning the ¯ames of war'', The Times (London), 9 November 1994.
15. Johnson, ``The injuries of war'', The Economist (London), 29 July 1995, p. 72.
CASCADING GENERATIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 25

16. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998),
New York: UN Secretariat, November 1999, paragraph 503.
17. See Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in
Somalia, New York: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy, 1993; and
Ramesh Thakur, ``From peacekeeping to peace enforcement: The UN Operation in
Somalia'', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, September 1994, pp. 387±410.
18. Michael Rose, ``The Bosnia experience'', in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), Past Imperfect, Fu-
ture UNcertain: The United Nations at Fifty, London/New York: Macmillan/St Martin's
Press, 1998, p. 139.
19. For an excellent analysis of the issues surrounding such a division of labour, see David
Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990±1997,
Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.
20. Margaret Joan Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the
Angolan Peace Process, 1992±93, New York: St Martin's Press, 1996. On Afghanistan
see William Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, New
York: New York University Press, 1998.
21. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1992, paragraph 20.
22. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, New York: United Nations, 15 December 1999.
23. Stephen Lewis, ``After Rwanda, the world doesn't look the same'', International Herald
Tribune, 10 July 2000. Lewis was one of the members of the OAU panel. General Ro-
mero Dallaire was commander of the UN force in Rwanda at the time of the genocide.
24. Ramesh Thakur, ``Teaming up to make human rights a universal fact'', International
Herald Tribune, 10 December 1998.
25. Olara A. Otunnu, ``Promoting peacemaking and peacekeeping: The role and perspec-
tive of the International Peace Academy'', in Thakur, note 18, pp. 213±214.
26. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, note 4.
27. This section is drawn mainly from David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, ``UN peace-
keeping: Lessons learned?'' Global Governance, Vol. 7, No. 1, January±March 2001,
pp. 11±17.
28. For a recent collection of essays examining the peacekeeping requirements for Africa,
see Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies:
Peace Support Missions in Africa, Johannesburg and Pretoria: South African Institute of
International Affairs and Institute for Security Studies, 1999.
29. This was recognised by Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace, note 21, paragraphs 55±
59.
2
Peacekeeping and the violence
in ethnic con¯ict
Roger Mac Ginty and Gillian Robinson

There is an immense literature on peacekeeping, much of it concentrating


on reconceptualisations of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War,
the need for structural reform of the UN system, and case studies of
particular peacekeeping operations. On the whole, however, the litera-
ture fails to give due attention to the nature of the con¯ict and violence to
which peacekeeping and its successor types of intervention have been
applied. To be effective, techniques used to manage and ameliorate the
effects of ethnic con¯ict require a sophisticated understanding of the
nature of the con¯ict and violence involved. This chapter will explore the
nature of ethnic con¯ict and the violence often associated with it, and will
also examine some of the main problems which ethnic con¯ict presents to
peacekeeping. It is argued that peacekeeping, in its traditional form, is
often an inappropriate form of intervention in cases of ethnic con¯ict. This
is not necessarily an argument in favour of second- or third-generation UN
peace operations. Instead, it is developed into an argument that smaller-
scale, often multiple, interventions, such as human rights monitoring and
the introduction of con®dence-building measures, hold a greater possibil-
ity for success. The United Nations has an enormous capacity to contribute
to these forms of intervention.
Given the increased prominence of ethnic con¯ict in recent years, it is
reasonable to expect that the international organization charged with the
maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations,
would intervene to facilitate the settlement and resolution of con¯icts.

26
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Non conviene che tu vada sola, specialmente dopo quella tua
bambinata che diede da discorrere oltre al bisogno. T’accompagnerò
io al primo momento di libertà. — Ed ella replicò con inusata
mansuetudine: — Come vuoi. — Per disgrazia il conte era
occupatissimo a cercare una nuova pariglia pel suo landau e non
aveva in quei giorni un minuto disponibile. Anche la contessa era
tanto tanto occupata.... a riposarsi dalle fatiche del carnovale e a
prepararsi alle penitenze della quaresima.... Però ell’aveva dato
ordine espresso a uno dei servi di passare ogni mattina dal
professore, e, quel che più importa, quando il servo tornava dalla
sua spedizione, ell’aveva l’abitudine non troppo comune di star a
sentire ciò ch’egli le riferiva. Anzi un paio di volte ella esclamò: —
Povero Teofoli! Quanto mi dispiace!
Il bello si è che pel solo dubbio d’incontrar la Serlati non si recava da
Teofoli nemmeno la Ermansi, la quale avrebbe pur voluto portare il
suo perdono in extremis all’amico che l’aveva offesa, ferita nel suo
amor proprio, posposta ad una civetta. Le due donne erano ormai
nemiche mortali, e la Ermansi parlando della Giorgina, diceva: — In
società devo subirla; se la trovassi in casa del professore temo che
mi dimenticherei d’essere una dama. — Ora, a essere una dama la
contessa ci teneva troppo per non sfuggir tutte le occasioni che
potevano farla discendere al grado di pedina. Rinunciò quindi al suo
magnanimo proposito affidando al conte marito l’ufficio di sostituirla.
In luogo della Serlati e della Ermansi, all’ultimo momento e quando
l’infermo aveva già perduto i sensi e non ravvisava nessuno, giunse
la sorella Teofoli da Roma. Era una signora magra, stecchita, dalla
fisonomia impassibile, d’un’età che non si sarebbe potuta
determinare a prima vista. In realtà aveva dieci o dodici anni meno
del fratello che studiava all’estero mentr’ella era fanciulla, che, per le
necessità della sua carriera, era rimasto lontano anche dopo, e col
quale ella non aveva nè analogia di gusti, nè consuetudine di vita, nè
frequenza di relazioni epistolari. L’imminente catastrofe la lasciava
fredda; mostrava appena quel tanto di dolore ch’era voluto dalle
convenienze; aveva piuttosto l’aria dell’erede che volgendo in giro lo
sguardo valuta, così a un dipresso, gli oggetti destinati a divenire in
breve sua proprietà. In fondo, di tutte le persone che in quell’ora
suprema s’affollavano nella casa, ell’era la meno afflitta, la meno
commossa; e verso quelle persone ella provava un sentimento
difficile a definirsi, un misto di stizza e di soggezione; le parevano
intrusi, e nel medesimo tempo una voce le diceva che l’intrusa era
lei, lei che del fratello non aveva curato la gloria, lei che ne ignorava i
trionfi e le debolezze. Pure, intrusa o no, poichè la parentela le dava
una larva di padronanza, ella si affrettò a far prevalere la sua volontà
in un soggetto delicatissimo. Tepida credente, ma ligia alle forme,
ma convinta della santità d’una massima che il suo consorte,
impiegato superiore al Demanio, amava spesso ripetere: bisogna far
sempre quello che fa la maggioranza; ella si scandalizzò altamente
che Teofoli si fosse ridotto a quel punto senz’adempiere alle pratiche
di buon cattolico. Che poi egli fosse vissuto sempre fuori d’ogni
religione positiva, che avesse ne’ suoi scritti e ne’ suoi discorsi
sostenuto dottrine razionaliste erano piccolezze che alla brava
signora non importavano affatto; le importava soltanto ch’egli
uscisse dal mondo, per dir così, con le sue carte in regola. Mandò
quindi lì per lì a chiamare un prete. Costui, un po’ per sincero zelo
religioso, un po’ per il vanto di ricondurre in grembo alla Chiesa
l’illustre professore Teofoli, accorse subito, e non fu colpa sua se
mentr’egli saliva le scale l’illustre professore Teofoli esalava
l’estremo sospiro. Però la Curia fu di manica larga, tenne conto al
morto del buon volere manifestato da chi rappresentava la famiglia e
si mostrò ben lieta di accompagnarlo con le sue preghiere e di
avvolgerlo nello sue pompe. Alcuni arricciavano il naso,
protestavano contro questa specie di violenza postuma usata ad un
uomo di cui erano notissime le opinioni, e Dalla Volpe in particolare
schizzava veleno pensando che la cosa avrebbe fatto piacere a sua
moglie. Ma già conveniva piegare il capo, perchè in mancanza di
qualsiasi disposizione del defunto non c’era chi avesse diritto di
opporsi all’autorità della sorella. Del resto, anche molti indifferenti,
molti scettici davano ragione a lei; dicevano ch’ell’aveva fatto
benissimo, che non c’è il prezzo dell’opera a singolarizzarsi per
questioni di forma, e che i funerali religiosi sono più belli dei funerali
civili.
XVIII.

Un pallido sole d’inverno illumina lo studio del professore Teofoli, ove


s’affollano, in quella fredda mattina di febbraio, i colleghi, gli amici, i
discepoli, tutti vestiti a bruno, tutti tristi e compunti, alcuni con le
lacrime agli occhi. Gl’intimissimi, quelli che si sentono abbastanza
sicuri de’ propri nervi, entrano un istante nella camera attigua, danno
un silenzioso saluto al defunto, composto nella bara non ancora
chiusa, irrigidito, non sformato però dalla morte, anzi con
un’espressione calma, serena, tranquillamente meditativa che la sua
fisonomia aveva perduto già da gran tempo. Forse egli aveva finito
col vincere la sua battaglia, con lo scacciar da sè le immagini
lusinghiere, le illusioni fallaci, forse, com’egli voleva, il vecchio uomo
era risorto.... Ma non c’era risorto che per morire.
Nello studio regna il disordine pieno di vita delle stanze abitate fino a
ieri; libri dappertutto; negli scaffali, sulla tavola, sulle sedie; giornali
sparsi qua e là alla rinfusa; quaderni ammonticchiati; fogli manoscritti
interrotti a metà di una linea, a metà di una parola come per una
chiamata urgente, improvvisa. E il tagliacarte d’avorio fra una pagina
e l’altra d’un nuovo volume, e il calamaio aperto con gli orli ancora
gocciolanti d’inchiostro, e la penna gettata negligentemente sul
calamaio e aspettante d’esser ripresa dalla mano che l’ha deposta.
Pendono dalla parete le solite fotografie di celebri italiani e stranieri.
Pendono e guardano. Videro per anni e anni, dall’alba a notte
inoltrata, il professore Teofoli intento nei suoi lavori, ora esaltato
dalla febbre della creazione, ora assorto nelle minuzie dell’indagine,
ora lieto, ora mesto, di quella gioia vereconda, di quella mestizia
pacata ch’è propria di chi ha un unico amore, la scienza. E per anni
e anni videro, soltanto in nome della scienza, aprirsi le porte del
santuario, e udirono suonar solo di dispute scientifiche il luogo quieto
e raccolto. Ma videro anche più tardi sulla fronte pensosa del filosofo
scender l’ombra di una cura nuova e diversa, lo videro meno assiduo
all’opera, meno paziente nella ricerca, meno sollecito verso coloro
che venivano ad attingere alla ricca fonte della sua dottrina. Sin che
un giorno, in quel fido asilo di studi, irruppe un gaio folletto in
cappellino color marrone, pelliccia e manicotto, scompigliò i libri e le
carte, spargendo intorno a sè profumi acuti e sorrisi inebbrianti e
promesse inadempiute di arcane dolcezze. Sorrisero forse anch’essi
gli illustri uomini pendenti in effigie dalla parete, ma il professore
Teofoli non sorrise più, non trovò più conforto, non ebbe più pace. E
adesso gl’illustri uomini guardano s’egli esca dalla sua camera
ov’entrò una mattina livido e sfatto, se riprenda con animo sereno le
sue occupazioni.
Sì certo ch’egli escirà dalla sua camera. N’esce chiuso fra
quattr’assi, sulle spalle di otto giovani della facoltà di lettere che non
vollero cedere a mani mercenarie l’onore di portare almeno fino alla
chiesa il loro diletto maestro. Attraversa un’ultima volta lo studio,
attraversa l’andito ove la signora Pasqua si stempera in pianto, fa
una breve sosta giù nel vestibolo terreno per lasciare che si formi il
corteo. A un dato segnale, la musica cittadina apre la marcia
intuonando funebri salmodie; subito dopo, la scolaresca coi bidelli in
gran tenuta e il gonfalone dell’Università velato a bruno, e varie
Associazioni con le rispettive bandiere. Poi viene il clero della
parrocchia, poi il feretro ch’è coperto di ghirlande e i cui cordoni sono
tenuti dal rettore dell’Università, dal sindaco, dal consigliere delegato
di Prefettura, dal presidente dell’Istituto di scienze e da quattro
professori tra i quali Frusti e Dalla Volpe. Seguono in massa gli altri
colleghi del corpo insegnante, compresi quelli che non costumano di
far lezione, e dietro a loro rappresentanze d’ogni specie e cittadini
d’ogni ordine, senza contare i semplici curiosi, senza contare lo
stuolo delle vanità che assistono ai funerali nella speranza di veder
citati i loro nomi dai fogli. Il corteggio passa in mezzo a una doppia
fila di popolo rispettoso; si parla del morto, se ne ricordano le
abitudini semplici, se ne lodano i modi gentili. — Un così brav’uomo,
e così privo di boria, — dice qualcuno. Indi corre per le bocche la
leggenda della contessa. — Era vero che una donna, una contessa
gli aveva fatto girar la testa? Era vero che per seguirla di qua e di là
egli s’era rovinato la salute? — Ma sì, ma sì, era vero, verissimo. E
la contessa era quella Serlati ch’era venuta ad abitar la città
nell’inverno, e che si vedeva dappertutto. — Una bellezza! —
Questo sì.... Ma che civetta! — E poi così giovine!... Come mai il
professore Teofoli non ha capito che quello non era pane per i suoi
denti?
In chiesa c’è già una cinquantina di persone, nomini e signore, che
aspettano. Fra gli uomini il marchese di Montalto, mister Gilbert che
s’è fatto male a un piede e cammina a fatica, Monsieur de la Rue
Blanche ch’è appena tornato da una gita a Firenze; fra le signore,
oltre a parecchie mogli di professori, la Ermansi, la Roncagli, le due
Gilbert, zia e nipote, la tanto nominata Serlati. La Ermansi,
sinceramente afflitta per la perdita dell’antico frequentatore del suo
salotto, slancia occhiate velenose alla Serlati alla quale ella
attribuisce la colpa della catastrofe; dal canto suo, la bella Giorgina,
le mille miglia lontana dal sentirsi rea del delitto di cui la si accusa,
rimane impassibile sotto i fulmini della matura contessa ed esamina
attentamente miss Gilbert, la sola donna che potrebbe rivaleggiare
con lei. Ella conchiude però di non aver nulla da temere nemmeno
da miss Gilbert, ch’è troppo magra e non sa vestirsi, mentr’ella, la
Serlati, ha anche oggi una toilette da lutto che le sta a pennello.
Queste considerazioni sono interrotte dall’arrivo del funerale. E
durante tutta la cerimonia il contegno della Serlati è ammirabile. Ella
non sbadiglia, non chiacchiera con le vicine, non consulta troppo
spesso l’orologio; bensì, a un certo punto, non potendone più dal
caldo prodotto dalla gente e dai lumi, alza il velo che le nascondeva
la faccia. Nessuno ha l’obbligo di morir soffocato. Allora, non c’è che
dire, quegli uomini, giovani e vecchi, si turbano, si distraggono; una
fiamma passa nei loro occhi, un fremito agita le loro membra, una
parola si forma loro sulle labbra, una parola non pronunziata ma che
la Giorgina sente lo stesso: — Bella, bella! — Soltanto Frusti e Volpe
conservano un atteggiamento di fiera protesta. E quando il feretro è
portato fuori di chiesa, issato sul carro funebre che lo condurrà al
cimitero, passando per l’Università ove si pronunzieranno i discorsi,
Frusti arringa con piglio iracondo un gruppo di scolari intenti a
guardare estatici la Serlati che monta in carrozza. — Non vi curate
delle femmine, disgraziati che siete. La migliore di esse, e quella lì è
una delle peggio, non merita da noi il sacrifizio d’un’ora, d’un
pensiero.... Ogni minuto che diamo alla donna è tolto alla nostra
pace, alla nostra salute, a quelle pure e schiette gioie intellettuali che
valgono più di tutti i baci d’una sirena.
Mediocremente persuasi di questa sentenza, gli studenti sorridono
sotto i baffi.
Ma il Rettore, ch’è un uomo di molto buon senso, posa la mano sulla
spalla del focoso collega. — Via, via, Frusti, lasciate che i giovani
sian giovani.... In certe materie, credetelo, gli studenti hanno
maggior competenza dei professori....
— Bravo, — replica ironico lo storico di Carlo V e Francesco I, —
difendete anche voi il cosidetto sesso debole.... Mi sembra che
l’esempio del povero Teofoli....
— L’esempio del povero Teofoli non calza, — interrompe il Rettore.
— Teofoli ha avuto il torto, o la disgrazia, d’innamorarsi a
cinquant’anni passati; e d’innamorarsi d’una persona che non gli
conveniva sotto nessun rapporto. Era una cosa fatta fuori di tempo e
fuori di posto, e le cose fatte fuori di tempo e fuori di posto non
possono andare che male.
Forse queste semplici e savie parole riassumono tutta la filosofia del
nostro racconto.
IL SALOTTINO GIAPPONESE.

Giorgio Ceriani, capo della ricchissima ditta G. Ceriani e C.º, era in


gondola scoperta, insieme con due amici forestieri ch’egli conduceva
a desinare al Lido, sulla terrazza dello Stabilimento dei Bagni.
Nell’ultimo tratto del Canal Grande, quello che va dal Ponte
dell’Accademia fino al Molo, egli alzò gli occhi verso la finestra
d’angolo d’un palazzo gotico, e salutò qualcheduno che gli rese il
saluto.
— Che palazzo è? — chiese uno dei forestieri.
Giorgio Ceriani disse un nome patrizio e soggiunse: — Questi erano
gli antichi proprietari. Adesso però il palazzo appartiene al cavaliere
Roberto Prosperi, che fu già mio principale ed è ora mio socio
accomandante.
— Ha liquidato la sua casa?
— Oh, da un pezzo.
— Era vecchio?
— Tutt’altro.... Ma non aveva figliuoli.... E poi.... la condizione di sua
moglie.... Sarebbe una storia lunga....
Gli amici insistettero perch’egli la raccontasse.
— Più tardi, — egli rispose. — Dopo pranzo se non avremo di
meglio.
Indi ripigliò: — La persona che ho salutata era appunto la signora
Prosperi, la bella Agnese Prosperi.... Povera donna! Ogni giorno, e
quasi a tutte le ore del giorno, si è certi di vederla a quel posto.
— Non si può muovere?
— Peggio. Non si vuol muovere.... Dice di non trovare un po’ di pace
che lì, in quello che lei chiama il suo salottino giapponese.
— È veramente un salotto alla giapponese?
— Avrebbe dovuto essere.... Invece non ne ha che il nome.
— Eh, si capisce che quella signora non ha il cervello a segno.
— Pur troppo.... Senza esser pazza.... ha un’idea fissa,
un’impressione, un ricordo incancellabile.
La curiosità dei due amici era stuzzicata. Ma Giorgio Ceriani tenne
fermo a non volerla appagare sin dopo il pranzo. Allora avvicinando
la sedia al parapetto della terrazza verso il mare, ove gli ultimi raggi
del sole coloravano le vele delle barche peschereccie, principiò il
suo racconto che noi riproduciamo qui quasi testualmente.

I.

Non sono che dieci anni. Ero nel banco Prosperi da qualche tempo,
addetto alla corrispondenza in lingue straniere.
Quantunque il più giovine e l’ultimo arrivato dei commessi, ero
trattato con distinzione speciale; forse conferiva al mio credito la
conoscenza delle lingue, forse s’era scoperta in me qualche
attitudine per gli affari, forse il mio carattere inspirava fiducia. Fatto si
è che non mi si nascondeva nulla, e che nelle operazioni importanti il
principale chiedeva spesso il mio parere. Ero stato anche due o tre
volte a pranzo su in casa, e la signora Agnese s’era mostrata
gentilissima meco. Ma la sua era una gentilezza fredda, un po’
altera, ben diversa da quella del marito. I miei colleghi non
l’amavano; dicevano ch’ella non era donna adatta pel signor
Roberto, ch’ella aveva gusti troppo raffinati, troppo aristocratici, e
che a lui sarebbe convenuto di prender per moglie una figliuola di
negozianti con mezzo milione di dote, invece di questa che gli aveva
portato pochissimo e che senza esser nobile aveva tutti i fumi della
nobiltà. Però quelli che si ricordavano del matrimonio (e non ci
voleva molto a ricordarsene perchè il matrimonio datava solo da sei
anni) dovevano riconoscere che il signor Roberto e la signora
Agnese s’erano sposati per inclinazione e che difficilmente si poteva
vedere una coppia più bella e più innamorata. Adesso l’amore
durava in uno solo dei coniugi, nel signor Roberto, ed era un amore
ardente, appassionato, un amore a cui non sarebbe parso grave
alcun sacrifizio pur di riconquistare quel cuore che gli sfuggiva. Del
resto, nessun’altra accusa seria, tranne quella di ricambiare con un
riserbo gelato tanta tenerezza, si faceva alla signora Agnese. Non
era nè vana, nè civetta, nè esigente; se non trovava la felicità nella
sua casa non la cercava di fuori. — Ah se avesse avuto figliuoli! —
esclamava qualcheduno. E l’esclamazione coglieva nel segno.
Ho detto che non era esigente. Guai se fosse stata! Ogni desiderio
di lei era una legge pel marito; e non soltanto i desideri espressi
palesemente, ma anche quelli appena adombrati, ma anche quelli
supposti. Uomo savio com’era, il signor Roberto, per compiacerla,
avrebbe dato fondo al suo patrimonio.
Fu appunto per soddisfare uno di questi desideri sfuggitole dal
labbro ch’egli mi consegnò una mattina una lunga nota tutta di suo
pugno pregandomi di tradurla in inglese e d’inserirla nella lettera
ch’io dovevo scrivere il giorno stesso ai nostri corrispondenti di
Hiogo nel Giappone, i signori James Holiday e C.º. Noi avevamo in
corso coi signori Holiday un grossissimo affare; un’importazione di
60 mila sacchi di riso da loro acquistati per nostro conto e ch’essi
dovevano caricare appena arrivasse a Hiogo il vapore inglese King
Arthur, capitano George Atkinson, che in quel momento si trovava a
Venezia e che avevamo noleggiato apposta. Ma la nota
consegnatami dal principale si riferiva a cosa affatto diversa. Essa
conteneva la preghiera, rivolta in particolare a M.r James Holiday,
che i Prosperi avevano conosciuto due anni addietro in un suo
viaggio in Europa, di comperare e spedire per mezzo del King Arthur
tutto l’occorrente per arredare alla giapponese un salottino di cui
s’indicavano le dimensioni e si univa la pianta. Si fidava nel buon
gusto di M.r Holiday lasciandogli mano libera per la scelta degli
oggetti, e dandogli per la spesa il limite approssimativo di mille a
milleduecento sterline. Questo importo doveva essere aggiunto a
quello del riso e compreso nelle tratte con cui i signori Holiday si
sarebbero rimborsati del loro avere sui banchieri di Londra Eliot,
Green e Cº.
Naturalmente, io dissi che mi sarei accinto subito al lavoro.
— Procuri di aver spicciato la posta per le due — ripigliò il signor
Roberto. — Vorrei che mi accompagnasse a bordo del King Arthur.
Devo parlare col capitano, ed ella sa che l’inglese non è il mio forte e
che mi è sempre utile di avere un interprete.... A proposito, — egli
soggiunse dopo una breve pausa, — verrà con noi anche mia moglie
che non ha mai visitato un gran vapore mercantile.
Alle due in punto la signora Agnese era in banco in cappellino e
mantiglia, col ventaglio appeso alla cintura e con un ombrellino di
seta rossa in mano.
Il principale mi chiamò: — Ha scritto quella lettera a Hiogo?
Io feci col capo un segno affermativo.
— Abbia la cortesia di portarla qui — seguitò Prosperi — e di
leggere a mia moglie la parte che concerne il salottino giapponese.
Andai a prendere il foglio e cominciai la mia lettura traducendo
dall’inglese in italiano.
La signora Agnese sorrise. — Legga pure nell’originale. Capisco
abbastanza.
Dovetti compiacerla, benchè mi seccasse questa specie di esame di
pronuncia. Ella mi porse un’attenzione benevola, e quand’ebbi finito
mi indirizzò qualche frase gentile circa alla mia facilità di scrivere e
parlare le lingue straniere. Però (e si rivolse a suo marito) aveva
delle obbiezioni di massima. È vero, ell’aveva detto, che rimettendo
a nuovo alcune stanze del palazzo si sarebbe potuto fornire di
ninnoli giapponesi il salottino d’angolo, ma l’aveva detto così di volo,
non sognandosi nemmeno che si trattasse d’una spesa grave.
Venticinquemila lire e più per un salottino!... Era una pazzia.... No,
no, ella ne avrebbe rimorso per tutta la vita.
Il signor Roberto che s’era levato da sedere le mise una mano sulla
bocca pregandola di non insistere. La pazzia, s’era tale, la faceva lui;
ella non aveva fatto che dar forma a un’idea ch’egli ruminava già da
due anni, da quando M.r Holiday era stato a Venezia. Non si
sgomentasse della spesa; l’ultimo bilancio s’era chiuso con un utile
di oltre mezzo milione, e permetteva di levarsi qualche capriccio.
Come conclusione di questo discorso il signor Roberto mi tolse di
mano la lettera, la firmò, e mi ordinò di portarla nella stanza vicina
perchè la copiassero e la mandassero immediatamente alla posta.
— Cosa fatta, capo ha, — egli disse. — E adesso non perdiamo
tempo. Ceriani, è pronto?
Di lì a poco scendevamo tutti e tre la scaletta che dal banco metteva
nell’entratura, una lunga entratura di palazzo veneziano, con la riva
da una parte e un ampio cortile dall’altra.
Io guardavo con maggior attenzione dell’usato la giovine coppia che
mi stava dinanzi; due belle persone, ma due tipi affatto diversi. Egli
alto, largo di spalle e di torace, ben piantato sulle gambe nervose,
bruno d’occhi, di capelli e di barba, di carnagione rosea che si
coloriva forse un po’ troppo intensamente dopo il pasto, dopo una
passeggiata, nel calore d’una discussione; insomma un
temperamento sanguigno esuberante di forza e di vitalità. Ella,
pallida, bionda, magra: un profilo di cammeo sopra un corpo di
silfide; capelli lisci e finissimi spartiti regolarmente sulle tempie e
avvolti in treccia dietro alla nuca, grandi occhi azzurri dalla
guardatura un po’ incerta e fantastica, piedi e mani che uno scultore
avrebbe preso volentieri a modello; nel complesso un impasto di
correttezza classica e d’idealità romantica.
Si montò in gondola. Quantunque non fossimo che alla metà di
marzo era una temperatura da primavera inoltrata, e la gondola
aveva, anzichè il felze nero e opprimente, una elegante tenda di
raso a frangie. Arrivammo in dieci minuti nel Canale della Giudecca,
forse meno gaio, meno artistico di quello di San Marco, senza lo
sfondo superbo del Palazzo dei Dogi e della Piazzetta; non meno
bello però nè meno pittoresco nella doppia linea delle Zattere e della
Giudecca, quelle rivolte al mezzogiorno, questa un po’ in ombra, un
po’ severa, un po’ triste, se non fossero i rii che la traversano e che
lasciano vedere da lontano sotto gli archi dei ponti i muricciuoli degli
orti incoronati d’allegra verdura, e di là dall’Isola un altro e più ampio
tratto di laguna anch’esso riscintillante ai raggi del sole. E in questo
Canale, più assai che nel bacino di San Marco, s’agita e ferve,
piccolo o grande che sia, il commercio marittimo di Venezia, e a tutte
l’ore si vedono bastimenti a vela e piroscafi andare, venire, o cullarsi
indolentemente sull’onda come se posassero dalle fatiche del
viaggio.
Il giorno della nostra visita al King Arthur c’era un insolito
movimento. Mi ricordo che passò a poca distanza da noi, mandando
un urlo rauco e prolungato come un gemito di belva ferita, un vapore
inglese, vuoto, enorme e mostruoso, con quasi tutto lo scafo fuori
dell’acqua; intorno a un altro della Navigazione italiana arrivato
appena s’affollava uno sciame di barche e battelli; da un terzo,
ancorato in mezzo al Canale, si scaricava il carbone facendolo
scendere nelle peate per un piano inclinato e sollevando un nembo
di polvere scura o densa; uno dei grossi navigli della Peninsulare, di
quelli che si spingono direttamente a Bombay e Calcutta, pronto a
salpare prima di notte, levava già le ancore e fumava dalla
caminiera. E quanto più ci avvicinavamo alla Giudecca, ov’era
ormeggiato il King Arthur, tanto più spesseggiavano i legni e tanto
più cauta doveva proceder la gondola per non urtar nelle catene e
nei gavitelli.
Durante il tragitto il signor Roberto parlò quasi solo. Parlò di
quest’importazione di riso giapponese, la prima che si facesse in
Italia, e del profitto e dell’onore ch’egli sperava trarne. Disse dei gran
passi che s’eran fatti a Venezia, dopo il 1866, a dispetto dei
pessimisti e dei denigratori di professione, e rammentò i tempi
quando, per ogni prodotto di regioni lontane, si doveva ricorrere al
mercato di Londra. Se ci fossero altri dieci negozianti che avessero il
suo spirito d’iniziativa, — egli soggiunse con legittimo orgoglio, —
Venezia sarebbe la prima piazza d’Italia.
Nelle pause del suo discorso lo sguardo del signor Roberto cercava
quello di sua moglie, e più d’una volta la sua mano si posò sulla
mano di lei. Io notai a due riprese ch’ella, quand’era possibile,
sfuggiva il contatto, e questa mal celata ripugnanza per un uomo di
cui ell’era l’idolo offendeva in me il sentimento della giustizia e
dell’equità. Andavo persuadendomi che la scarsa simpatia dei miei
colleghi per la signora Agnese non era infondata.
La scala si fermò ai piedi della scaletta del King Arthur, in cima alla
quale il capitano Atkinson stava ad aspettarci. Era un uomo di
mezza età, di tinta olivastra, di statura giusta e lineamenti regolari,
con un’espressione di malinconia nei grandi occhi grigi. Tutto
sommato, un bell’uomo, dall’aria distinta e signorile, ma uno di quelli
che a guardarli non mettono di buon umore. Del rimanente, la sua
tristezza si spiegava col fatto che gli era morta alcuni mesi addietro a
Londra, mentr’egli viaggiava nei mari dell’India, una moglie giovine e
adorata. Egli ne portava il lutto e ne’ suoi abiti neri pareva un
policeman, o un impiegato delle pompe funebri.
Taciturno per indole e ancor più taciturno dopo la disgrazia che
l’aveva colpito, quel giorno però il capitano Atkinson si sforzava di
esser loquace e faceva con perfetta cortesia gli onori del suo
bastimento, conducendoci a visitarne tutte le parti, dal ponte del
comando alla stiva, dalla cucina alle macchine, prendendo per mano
la signora Agnese nei punti difficili e rispondendo con molta
chiarezza alle sue domande sul meccanismo dell’elica, sull’orario di
bordo, sui segnali, sul carico e lo scarico delle merci. M’accorsi ben
presto che la signora Prosperi non solo capiva l’inglese, ma lo
parlava speditamente, con un fraseggiare elegante, con una
pronuncia corretta. Ell’avrebbe potuto quanto me e meglio di me
servire d’interprete a suo marito. Compiuto il giro del naviglio, il
capitano Atkinson ci fece entrare in un salottino addobbato con
molto decoro ch’era attiguo alla sua cabina e ove erano preparati
abbondanti rinfreschi. Io approfittai di questo momento per
comunicare al capitano certi desideri del mio principale circa a
qualche piccola modificazione da introdursi nei ventilatori, e stavo
scrivendo una noterella in proposito da lasciare a bordo, quando
s’intese un lieve rumore nella cabina. Master Atkinson si alzò,
aperse adagio l’uscio e diede un’occhiata attraverso lo spiraglio. Poi
tornò indietro con un sorriso sul labbro, un sorriso che faceva uno
strano effetto in quel viso triste, e disse: — C’è la mia bimba di là....
Dorme come un angelo e Tom la veglia.... il mio cane di Terranuova.
Era lui che aveva urtato un mobile.... Quando c’è lui è come se ci
fossi io.
— Ha una bimba con sè? — esclamò la signora Agnese. E nel far
questa semplice interrogazione un vivo incarnato le si diffuse sulle
guancie.
Egli chinò il capo affermativamente. — La mia unica figliuola.... L’ho
presa a bordo poche settimane fa, quando partii da Londra.... È
orfana di madre.... Con chi starebbe?... Di qui a qualche tempo forse
la metterò in un collegio.... Adesso è troppo piccina.... Ha cinque
anni.
Il capitano Atkinson, commosso, levò gli occhi verso la parete da cui
pendevano due fotografie; quella del King Artur, e un’altra più
piccola, difesa da un vetro e inquadrata in una cornice di legno,
d’una donna giovine, bionda, dall’aria gracile, una di quelle fisonomie
dolci che si raccomandano.
— Oh me la faccia conoscere la sua bambina, — supplicò la signora
Agnese.
— Anche subito, se si contenta di vederla addormentata.
— Si figuri.... Pur di non svegliarla.
— Oh per questo non si dia pensiero.... Finchè non abbia dormito le
sue due ore di fila, non la sveglierebbero le cannonate.
— In tal caso.... — replicò la signora.
— E se invece pregassimo il capitano di condurcela domattina,
quando deve venire in banco alle undici? — propose il signor
Roberto. — Farebbe colazione con noi.
— Magari! — soggiunse la signora Agnese. E non si quetò fin che
Master Atkinson non ebbe accettato l’invito. Ma questa non le parve
una buona ragione per non veder subito la piccina.... Le bastava
vederla di lontano.... per un momento.
Il capitano volle compiacerla. — Mi lasci passare avanti allora, —
egli disse. — Tom non le permetterebbe neppure di affacciarsi alla
soglia se non ci fossi io.
In fatti, quando il capitano aperse l’uscio della cabina, la prima cosa
che si vide fu il cane di Terranuova che seduto sulle due zampe
posteriori custodiva l’ingresso. A un cenno imperioso del padrone
egli si tirò in un angolo manifestando con un lieve brontolìo la sua
disapprovazione.
Per una curiosità forse indiscreta m’ero avvicinato anch’io e stavo
dietro alla signora Agnese. Il signor Roberto era rimasto seduto e
sfogliava un atlante.
La bimba dormiva profondamente nella sua cuccetta, posata su un
fianco, con la faccia rivolta verso l’uscio, tantochè la si vedeva
benissimo senza entrare nella cabina. Somigliava alla fotografia
appesa al salotto, ma era molto più bella, un vero angioletto dalla
capigliatura bionda che formava una specie d’aureola intorno al
visino di latte e di rosa.
— Oh che amore! — disse la signora Agnese smorzando la voce e
giungendo le palme in atto di adorazione. — E che nome ha?
— Ofelia, — rispose Master Atkinson.
— Strano nome! — pensai, evocando la dolce figura della
infelicissima innamorata di Amleto.
— Venga, venga avanti, — riprese il capitano lusingato nel suo
orgoglio di padre.
La signora Agnese non se lo fece dire due volte, e accostatasi in
punta di piedi alla cuccetta si chinò sulla bimba e le sfiorò con un
bacio la bocca.
Tom inquieto si mosse dal suo angolo, interrogando con gli occhi il
capitano. — Che novità sono queste? Perchè la disturbate?
No, non la disturbavano, ed ella seguitava a dormire sorridendo nel
sonno.
Resistendo alla tentazione di baciarla una seconda volta, la signora
Agnese s’avviò per uscire. Il cane, ormai rassicurato, le si fregò
amorevolmente intorno alle vesti; ella gli fece una carezza e rientrò
nel salottino ove suo marito l’aspettava. A me disse passando: —
Com’è bella, non è vero? — E subito dopo si rivolse al signor
Roberto con un mite rimprovero: — Perchè non hai voluto vederla?
Egli chiuse l’atlante. — La vedrò domani.
— È così bella! — ella ripetè.
Il signor Roberto abbozzò un triste sorriso; uno di quei sorrisi che
sono tanto vicini alle lacrime.
Ricordata al capitano Atkinson la promessa di venir a colazione la
mattina dopo con l’Ofelia, lasciammo il bastimento. Nel ritorno le
parti erano invertite. Prosperi taceva, la signora Agnese, trasfigurata
d’aspetto, spiegava un’insolita facondia. Ma non parlava che d’una
cosa, la sola che le fosse rimasta impressa tra le molte vedute;
parlava di quell’orfanella vegliata amorosamente da quel cane di
Terranuova.
Nello smontar dalla gondola ella mi disse: — Badi che aspetto anche
lei domattina a colazione.

II.

L’indomani il capitano Atkinson portò a casa Prosperi un


commensale non invitato, il cane Tom, dal quale l’Ofelia non s’era
voluto staccare a nessun costo. Il capitano riconosceva francamente
di non aver preveduto questa difficoltà; all’ultimo momento, piuttosto
di lasciar la figliuola a bordo o di trascinarsela dietro per forza tutta
ingrugnata o piagnucolosa, egli s’era preso la licenza di
accompagnare l’animale della cui condotta osava farsi mallevadore.
Infatti Tom si conduceva assai meglio della sua padroncina che sulle
prime rifiutava il cibo e si nascondeva ostinatamente il viso fra le
mani dichiarando di voler andar via. Tom invece, seduto come il
solito sulle gambe posteriori, assisteva alla scena con la gravità d’un
filosofo nemico d’ogni escandescenza, ma disposto a perdonar
molto all’infanzia.
Questi capriccetti dell’Ofelia empivano di confusione Master
Atkinson che si sentiva impotente di fronte alla sua piccola tiranna.
Ah, se avesse supposto una cosa simile non avrebbe certo accettato
l’invito.
La signora Agnese, gaia, serena come non l’avevo mai vista, gli
ripeteva per confortarlo: — Lasci fare a me.
E con lo moine, con le carezze, con le rampogne scherzevoli, con
tutte quelle arti gentili di cui effettivamente gli uomini non hanno
neppure l’idea, ella riuscì a poco a poco a quetar la bambina. A
colazione finita, l’Ofelia era già divenuta amica della bella signora
che le parlava così bene nella sua lingua, con una voce così dolce,
con modi così persuasivi. Tantochè, quando la signora Agnese le
domandò se voleva andar con lei sola nel giardino, ella rispose tosto
di sì...: facendo però una riserva mentale relativamente a Tom. Di
questa riserva la signora Agnese s’accorse per un certo sguardo che
la fanciulla rivolse all’animale, e disse pronta: — Ah, Tom può
venire.... Voi altri ci raggiungerete più tardi, — ella soggiunse,
indirizzandosi a noi.
— Che buona mamma sarebbe stata l’Agnese! — sospirò il signor
Roberto appena sua moglie fu uscita dal salotto. Poi cambiò
argomento e ci offerse dei sigari e del cognac.
Parlammo di viaggi. In Giappone il capitano Atkinson non c’era mai
stato; era stato un paio di volte a Singapore e credeva di dovervi
tornare nell’autunno a farvi un carico di pepe per l’Inghilterra. Già
egli calcolava di esser a Venezia col riso entro il mese d’agosto,
onde nella prima metà di settembre avrebbe potuto rimettersi in
cammino. Il King Arthur era uno dei vapori più rapidi della marina
mercantile inglese.
Ripensandoci molto tempo dopo, notai che Master Atkinson
discorreva volentieri del periodo più recente della sua carriera, ma
schivava ogni allusione ad un passato lontano.
Di lì a mezz’ora, scendemmo anche noi in giardino. Il nome era
pomposo: in realtà, non si trattava che d’un piccolo appezzamento di
terra chiuso per tre parti da muri, con una pergola che in quella
stagione dell’anno era senza foglie e con qualche aiuola ch’era
senza fiori. Comunque sia, quel po’ d’aria libera aveva servito a
dissipar l’ultime nubi dalla fronte dell’Ofelia, e prima ancora di
vederla noi fummo gradevolmente sorpresi dal suono delle sue
risate argentine. Tenuta a mano dalla signora Agnese, ella sedeva
sul dorso di Tom e battendo i piedini sul fianco del paziente
quadrupede e gridando hop, hop, si faceva condurre in giro per i
sentieri che serpeggiavano intorno alle aiuole. A ogni svolta ella
rischiava di perder l’equilibrio e s’aggrappava più forte alla sua guida
e abbandonava la sua testina bionda sul testone nero del cane
fedele. Quelli erano i momenti della massima ilarità. I riccioli d’oro le
svolazzavano sulle tempie, un bel colore di rosa le tingeva le
guancie, e balenava ne’ suoi occhi sereni e vibrava da tutte le sue
tenere membra la voluttà della vita. Hop, hop! Ell’avrebbe continuato
la sua cavalcata chi sa fino a quando, tanto più che Tom non si
stancava di portarla, nè la signora Agnese si stancava di reggerla.
Cosicchè suo padre che veniva a troncare il suo divertimento non
ebbe a rallegrarsi di troppo lusinghiere accoglienze. Se prima aveva
voluto andarsene, adesso voleva restare.... voleva restare con Tom
e con aunt Agnes. La chiamava aunt, zia. La zia Agnese (per darle il
titolo che le dava la bimba) intercedette anch’ella in suo favore.
Perchè l’Ofelia non poteva rimaner fino a sera? Già il capitano aveva
le sue faccende; che gusto ci trovava a condur la figliuola in giro dai
negozianti o dai sensali di noleggio? Venisse a prenderla sul tardi,
seppur non preferiva che la gli si riaccompagnasse a bordo. O che
non si fidava?
Durante quest’ultima parte della discussione l’Ofelia s’era
ammutolita. Seduta ai piedi della signora Agnese, ell’aveva posato il
capo sulle ginocchia di lei e vinta dalla stanchezza aveva chiusi gli
occhi.
— Vede, — disse Master Atkinson, — a quest’ora mia figlia
dovrebbe già fare il suo sonnellino d’ogni giorno.... Sta per
addormentarsi.
— Ma è bell’e addormentata, — esclamò con qualche maraviglia la
signora Agnese chinandosi sulla piccina. — Come si fa presto a
quell’età!... Non son due minuti che rideva, scherzava.... e adesso è
con gli angeli.... Adesso poi non gliela do neanche per idea, — ella
ripigliò in tono deciso. — Si figuri.... romperle il sonno.... costringerla
a tenersi ritta, a camminare.... No, no, la metterò a letto io stessa.
E nel dir questo se la prese in collo delicatamente senza svegliarla.
Il capitano era titubante. Gli dispiaceva recare un così gran disturbo;
inoltre non sapeva che impressione potesse fare all’Ofelia, nell’aprir
gli occhi, il trovarsi fuori della sua cabina, il non vedere il suo
babbo....
— Forse Master Atkinson ha ragione, — notò il signor Roberto che
fino allora non aveva pronunziato una parola sull’argomento. — I
fanciulli sono nervosi....
— E gli uomini non intendono nulla di certe cose, — replicò la
signora Agnese con una vivacità un po’ acre. — M’impegno io a
calmar l’Ofelia allorchè si desti.... Tutt’al più, per maggior
precauzione, potrebbe restare anche Tom.
A forza d’insistenza la signora Agnese ebbe causa vinta, e uscì
trionfante portandosi in camera sua la bambina che dormiva d’un
sonno tranquillo e profondo. Tom era rimasto alquanto perplesso,
malcontento di queste novità, desideroso di tornare sul suo
bastimento, ma poco disposto a tornarvi senza la sua inseparabile
compagna. Alla fine ubbidì agli ordini perentori del capitano, e col
muso basso e la coda fra le gambe seguì la sua padroncina.
Tutta questa scena aveva visibilmente conturbato il signor Roberto,
ed egli non me ne fece mistero. Non avrebbe condotta sua moglie a
visitare il King Arthur, mi disse, se avesse supposto di trovare a
bordo l’interessante orfanella. In fatto di bimbi, l’Agnese, che aveva
pure un sano criterio, andava soggetta a degl’impeti irriflessivi. Ora li
sfuggiva con affettazione, ora se ne appassionava fuor di misura. E il
peggio era appunto quando se ne appassionava. Se si fosse limitata
ad accoglierli con piacere, a voler averne spesso qualcheduno
intorno a sè, poichè il ciclo, fino allora almeno, gliene aveva negati
de’ suoi, sarebbe stata una vera fortuna. Ed egli l’avrebbe
assecondata di tutto cuore. Era tanto lieto di vederla lieta. Ma le
esagerazioni lo sgomentavano. È sempre fatale il dimenticare la
realtà delle cose. È inutile; dei figli altrui non si poteva disporre come
se fossero propri; poteva accadere che dovessero allontanarsi
temporaneamente, che dovessero cambiar domicilio, ed egli sapeva
per esperienza quante lacrime e quanti singhiozzi costasse a sua
moglie il rinunziare a ognuno di questi sogni di maternità. Adesso
quell’infatuazione per l’inglesina sarebbe finita con una delle solite
crisi. Di lì a un paio di settimane, alla partenza del King Arthur,
l’Agnese avrebbe sentito più che mai il vuoto della casa, sarebbe
ripiombata nella tristezza e nello scoraggiamento.
In mezzo a queste savie riflessioni si capiva però che al signor
Roberto non bastava l’animo di opporsi in modo risoluto alle fantasie
della donna ch’egli adorava. E io che in principio lo tacciavo di
debolezza non tardai a spiegarmi la sua condotta. Ho anzi un
rimorso; di non aver contribuito a renderlo più pieghevole in un
momento decisivo e solenne.
Senza volerlo e senz’avvedermene io entravo nell’intimità della
famiglia. Nei dì successivi a quello in cui il principale m’aveva
rivelato le sue apprensioni, ebbi a trovarmi parecchie volte con la
signora Agnese che aveva persuaso il capitano Atkinson a lasciarle
ogni giorno per qualche ora l’Ofelia e che affidava a me l’incarico di
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