584029

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
GEORGIA
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
26 OCTOBER 2024
ODIHR Election Observation Mission

Final Report
Warsaw
20 December 2024
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 1

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................... 5
III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ........................................................................ 6
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM............................................................ 8
V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................. 9
VI. VOTING TECHNOLOGIES ....................................................................................................... 11
VII. VOTER RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION ................................................................................. 13
VIII. CANDIDATE RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION ....................................................................... 14
IX. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN ......................................................................................................... 15
X. CAMPAIGN FINANCE ................................................................................................................ 18
A. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE .......................................................................................................... 18
B. DISCLOSURE AND OVERSIGHT ...................................................................................................... 19
XI. MEDIA ........................................................................................................................................... 22
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................................... 22
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................................... 22
C. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN ........................................................................................ 24
XII. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES .................................................................. 25
XIII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION ...................................................................................... 26
XIV. ELECTION OBSERVATION ...................................................................................................... 28
XV. ELECTION DAY........................................................................................................................... 29
A. OPENING AND VOTING ................................................................................................................... 29
B. COUNTING AND TABULATION ........................................................................................................ 31
XVI. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................ 32
XVII. RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 35
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 36
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 37
ANNEX I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS ............................................................................................. 39
ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION
MISSION ........................................................................................................................................ 40
ABOUT ODIHR ......................................................................................................................................... 51
GEORGIA
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
26 October 2024
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 1
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Following an invitation from the authorities of Georgia and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Observation
Mission (EOM) to observe the 26 October parliamentary elections. The ODIHR EOM assessed the
compliance of the electoral process with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and
standards for democratic elections, and national legislation. For election day, the ODIHR EOM was
joined by delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to form an
International Election Observation Mission (IEOM).
In its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on 27 October, the IEOM concluded
that while the elections “offered voters a wide choice with 18 candidate lists, they unfolded amid
entrenched polarization in an environment marred by concerns over recently adopted legislation, its
impact on fundamental freedoms and civil society. Contestants could generally campaign freely while
campaign rhetoric and imagery was highly divisive. Reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public
sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign. This, coupled with extensive tracking of voters
on election day, raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of
retribution. The legal framework provides an adequate basis for democratic elections, but recent
frequent amendments marked a step backwards, raising concerns over its potential use for political gain.
Preparations for the elections were well-administered, including extensive voter education on the use
of new voting technologies. A significant imbalance in financial resources and advantage of
incumbency contributed to an already uneven playing field. The polarized media environment and
instrumentalization of private outlets for political propaganda affected impartial news coverage,
hindering voters’ ability to make an informed choice. Effectiveness of campaign finance oversight was
undermined by limited enforcement, and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalization
of the oversight body. The underrepresentation of women on party lists and in the campaign
demonstrates a need for greater commitment to ensure adequate involvement in political life. Election
day was generally procedurally well-organized and administered in an orderly manner but marked by a
tense environment, with frequent compromises in vote secrecy and several procedural inconsistencies,
as well as reports of intimidation and pressure on voters that negatively impacted public trust in the
process.”
Overall, the legal framework provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections. However,
it is overly complex, and retains gaps and inconsistencies. Moreover, since 2020, the framework has
undergone over 20 revisions, several marking a step backwards, including those adopted shortly before
the elections without broad cross-party support. Such frequent and last-minute changes undermined
legal stability and raised concerns about potential misuse for political gain, contrary to OSCE
commitments and international good practice. While earlier amendments addressed several ODIHR and
Venice Commission recommendations and were adopted following public consultations, the most
recent 2024 amendments including those that abolished the gender quota on parliamentary candidate
lists and altered the CEC’s composition and decision-making process to bypass the two-thirds majority
requirement in repeat voting, were introduced without an inclusive consultative process or broad
1
The English version of this report is the only official document. An unofficial translation is available in Georgian.
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Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2024
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report
political consensus. Several longstanding recommendations from ODIHR and the Venice Commission
remained unaddressed, including those related to the impartiality of election administration,
comprehensive regulations to prevent misuse of administrative resources, oversight of campaign and
campaign finance, media, and electoral dispute resolution.
The election administration efficiently managed the technical aspects of the elections. The CEC held
regular live-streamed sessions, promptly published all relevant materials online, and organized
extensive training and voter information campaigns. However, the public perception of its impartiality
was undermined by recent legal amendments that shifted control over the selection and nomination of
its members to the ruling party, abolished the opposition-nominated deputy chairperson position, and
reduced the requirement for political consensus in its work, as well as perceived links between non-
partisan members and the ruling party. Decision-making within election commissions was not always
collegial, with opposition-appointed members raising concerns about limited information sharing and
instances of marginalization, including after election day. Allegations of ruling-party affiliation at all
levels further eroded public trust. Positively, the CEC took numerous steps to improve the accessibility
of the electoral process for persons with disabilities; however, significant issues with accessibility at
many polling stations remain unaddressed.
For the first time, electronic devices were introduced in most polling stations for voter identification,
vote counting, and the transmission of preliminary results. While most stakeholders considered this as
a positive measure to increase trust in the integrity of election day proceedings, however, diverting from
international good practice the CEC did not give key stakeholders full access to the processes and
documentation related to the devices and the respective audit reports were released only after election
day, limiting transparency and fuelling concerns about the devices’ vulnerabilities and potential misuse
to disclose voter identities. Despite considerable efforts by the election administration to inform voters
about the use of new technologies, many voters on election day faced difficulties using electronic
devices and were not properly instructed, leading to frequent instances of compromised vote secrecy.
Citizens declared legally incapacitated by a court decision and placed in institutional care were denied
the right to vote, contrary to international standards. Voters with expired ID documents or without a
registered address, who did not have a valid passport either, were excluded from voter lists, at odds with
international standards. The CEC offered several options for verifying voter registration data and
requesting corrections, both in person and online. While most ODIHR EOM interlocutors did not
express significant concerns about the accuracy or inclusiveness of the voter lists before election day,
some questioned the legitimacy of multiple registrations at the same addresses involving voters
unknown to the actual residents. After election day, the opposition alleged the misuse of voter data,
including that of citizens residing abroad. The election administration denied these allegations but
declined to provide access to the list of voters who participated, citing the lack of legal provisions.
Party and candidate registration was generally inclusive, with the CEC registering 1,184 candidates
across 18 political party lists. However, existing restrictions, such as the in-country residency
requirement, limitations on individuals deprived of candidacy rights or sentenced to imprisonment by
court decision, and the lack of provisions for independent candidacy, are inconsistent with OSCE
commitments, international standards, and good practice. In addition, at odds with previous ODIHR
recommendations, the official campaign period began more than a month before the conclusion of
candidate registration; the overlap of these periods led to disputes over the allocation of free airtime in
the media and discrepancies in financial reporting periods.
Party programmes largely lacked specific messaging for women, and most parties featured few women
in their campaigns. While women constituted a majority in most lower-level election commissions, they
made up only 4 of the 17 CEC members. Despite constitutional provisions requiring the state to take
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special measures to ensure gender equality, legal amendments adopted in 2024 abolished mandatory
gender quotas on parliamentary candidate lists. The repeal of this positive measure, combined with
existing underrepresentation of women in elected positions, as well as entrenched stereotypes, internal
challenges within political parties, and gender-specific threats, had a significant negative impact on
women’s political participation. As a result, only 29 percent of party list candidates were women, with
most of them in non-electable positions, marking a substantial decrease from the 2020 elections. Among
the elected members of parliament, 34 are women, representing a 23 percent of the total.
Contestants were generally able to campaign freely, and 18 candidate lists competed in a subdued
campaign. However, reports of intimidation, coercion, inducement and pressure on voters, especially
public sector employees and the economically vulnerable persisted, raising concerns about the ability
of some voters to freely form their opinions and cast their votes without fear of retribution, at odds with
OSCE commitments and international standards. Campaign rhetoric and imagery were highly divisive,
and both ruling and opposition parties reported isolated incidents of violence, event disruptions, and
damage to campaign materials. Representatives of the ruling party made public statements about their
plans to ban the key opposition parties, including by applying to the Constitutional Court, contrary to
the principle of democratic pluralism. Campaigning by high-level and local officials, financial
incentives for diverse social groups as well as a government amnesty programme, while not against the
law, provided an undue advantage of incumbency, and questioned the government’s genuine
commitment to preventing voter influence through state resources.
The ruling party held a significant financial advantage over its competitors in terms of state funding,
private donations, and campaign spending. The 2023 legal amendments reduced the annual expenditure
cap for political parties and prohibited donations from legal entities, addressing some previous ODIHR
recommendations; however, issues related to third-party campaigning and the absence of the legally
prescribed publication of the oversight body’s conclusions before election day remain unaddressed.
Legislative shortcomings and inconsistent enforcement undermined the transparency and effectiveness
of party and campaign finance oversight, now overseen by the newly established Anti-Corruption
Bureau (ACB) since 2023. The ACB’s application of legal provisions was selective and inconsistent,
particularly in designating certain civil society organizations as entities “with a declared electoral goal”,
subjecting them to the same financial regulations as electoral contestants. These designations were later
withdrawn following a government request, raising concerns about political interference in the ACBs
operations.
The media landscape is diverse yet highly polarized, with much of its funding tied to party-affiliated
individuals, undermining independent news production and contrary to international standards. The
safety of journalists remains a major concern, highlighted by a number of recent assaults, acts of
intimidation, and pressure on them, including on election day. The narrow interpretation of restrictive
campaign provisions by the media regulator and the courts resulted in sanctions against broadcasters
and limited opposition parties’ ability to campaign in the media. The ODIHR EOM media monitoring
revealed clear political bias across all monitored TV stations, with commercial television not
implementing legal obligations for impartial news coverage. The public broadcaster covered all parties
predominantly in a positive or neutral tone but devoted significantly more time to the ruling party in the
news. The instrumentalization of commercial television for political propaganda undermined
independent journalism and amplified divisive political rhetoric. In addition, the absence of impartial
analysis of party programmes and the refusal by key political actors to participate in debates challenged
voters’ ability to make an informed choice.
While the law provides for remedies for election disputes, the effectiveness of dispute resolution
remained limited due to restrictions on voters’ legal standing, procedural shortcomings, ambiguities in
the legislation and inconsistencies in its application. Before election day, more than 200 complaints
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were filed with election commissions regarding the appointment and operation of Precinct Election
Commissions (PECs), alleged misuse of administrative resources, and campaign violations. Most
decisions were made by election commission chairpersons rather than the full commissions,
undermining collegiality and reducing transparency, contrary to prior ODIHR recommendations. Many
complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated, often without adequate investigation of the merits. The
trust in the law enforcement, the election administration, and the judiciary to effectively and impartially
adjudicate politically sensitive matters remained low throughout the electoral period.
The law provides for election observation by citizen and international observers, contributing to a
vibrant observation scene. However, the adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence,
along with the threat of sanctions for non-compliance, although the latter not used before the elections,
had a stigmatizing effect on many organizations. This coupled with reported incidents of attacks and
intimidation, has impacted their ability to operate in an environment free from undue pressure. Further,
some groups faced targeted discrediting efforts by state authorities and ruling party structures, being
labelled as foreign or opposition agents, aimed at undermining their credibility. On election day, several
citizen observer groups reported instances of intimidation against their representatives, obstacles to their
work, and the presence of individuals at polling stations registered as observers who acted on behalf of
contestants, mainly the ruling party.
Procedurally, election day was generally orderly administered but marked by a tense atmosphere and
widespread intimidation of voters, as well as of citizen observers. ODIHR observers noted numerous
indications of pressure on voters, reports of many voters feeling pressured, tracking by ruling party
structures and affiliates, and overcrowding at many polling stations. In numerous cases, 24 per cent of
observations, vote secrecy was potentially compromised due to the manner of ballot insertion into ballot
boxes, inadequate polling station layouts, and marks visible on the back of ballots. Additionally, ruling
party representatives frequently video-recorded the voting process, which may have had an intimidating
effect on voters. The counting process revealed procedural omissions, including improper handling of
unused ballots, failure to announce votes aloud, and inconsistencies in determining ballot validity.
Handling of results protocols at District Election Commissions (DECs) was inconsistent. While
preliminary results were promptly published online by the CEC, key data, such as voter turnout per
polling station and the number of invalid votes, were not made available in a user-friendly format.
Following the release of preliminary results, the opposition rejected the outcome, citing irregularities
such as voter intimidation, vote buying, and alleged foreign interference. In the following days, citizen
observer organizations and the opposition claimed that these irregularities pointed to coordinated
manipulation, while the government, the ruling party, and the CEC denied these claims. Over 1,200
complaints were filed by parties and observer organizations, but most were dismissed by DECs after
limited investigation, with courts upholding the majority of these decisions following minimal scrutiny
of the cases. Appeals against electoral results submitted to the CEC, courts, and the Constitutional Court
were dismissed. Overall, the handling of post-election day complaints by election commissions and
courts undermined the right to due process, failed to provide an effective remedy, and did not
comprehensively address widespread concerns about the integrity of election results. All elected
opposition members of the parliament relinquished their seats or boycotted the opening session. Further,
of serious concern, starting in late November, demonstrations against a government decision to
postpone EU negotiation talks led to violent clashes with law enforcement and mass-arrests, challenging
protesters’ rights to freedom of assembly and deepening the political crisis. On 14 December, a GD-
dominated electoral college elected Mikheil Kavelashvili as president amid ongoing protests, with
President Zourabichvili, the opposition, and civil society rejecting the legitimacy of the process.
This report offers a number of recommendations to support efforts to bring elections in Georgia closer
in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic
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elections. Priority recommendations include preventing voter intimidation, pressure on public

employees, vote buying, and electoral violence; undertaking a comprehensive legislative review to align
the legal framework with international standards; revising the appointment process for election
commission members to prevent dominance by any single political party and fully ensure efficiency;
developing clear regulations for political finance oversight; introducing measures to ensure the
independence of the media regulatory body; ensuring efficiency and transparency in election dispute
resolution; allowing for citizen observers to operate without pressure or intimidation; and guaranteeing
vote secrecy through procedural safeguards. ODIHR stands ready to assist in addressing immediate
post-election concerns and working to improve future elections by addressing the recommendations
contained in this and previous reports, including through a comprehensive review of the electoral
legislation.
II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Following an invitation from the authorities of Georgia to observe the 26 October 2024 parliamentary
elections and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 11 September. The mission,
led by Mr. Eoghan Murphy, consisted of a 12-member core team based in Tbilisi and 30 long-term
observers (LTOs) deployed on 19 September to 13 locations around the country. The ODIHR EOM
members remained in the country until 10 November to follow post-election-day developments.
For election day, the ODIHR EOM was joined by delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament
(EP), and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) to form an International Election
Observation Mission (IEOM). Mr. Pascal Allizard was appointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office
as Special Co-ordinator and Leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission. Ms. Pia Kauma headed
the OSCE PA delegation, Mr. Iulian Bulai headed the PACE delegation, Mr. Antonio López-Istúriz
White headed the EP delegation, and Mr. Faik Öztrak headed the NATO PA delegation. The IEOM
deployed 530 observers from 42 OSCE participating States on election day, including 362 long-term
and short-term observers by ODIHR, a 60-member delegation from the OSCE PA, a 39-member
delegation from PACE, a 12-member delegation from the EP and a 38-member delegation from the
NATO PA; 47 per cent of the IEOM observers were women. Opening was observed in 223 polling
stations and voting was observed in 1,924 polling stations across the country. Counting was observed
in 193 polling stations, and the intake of results protocols in 73 District Election Commissions (DECs).
The ODIHR EOM assessed compliance of the election process with OSCE commitments and other
international obligations and standards for democratic elections and domestic legislation. This final
report follows a Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions that was released at a press
conference on 27 October. 2
The ODIHR EOM wishes to thank the authorities of Georgia for their invitation to observe the elections,
and the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their assistance. It
also expresses appreciation to other state institutions, the judiciary, political parties, media, civil society
organizations, international community representatives, and other interlocutors for their co-operation
and for sharing their views.
2
See previous ODIHR election reports on Georgia.
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III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
On 27 August, in line with the Constitution, the president called parliamentary elections for 26 October.
These were the first elections since Georgia had been granted European Union (EU) candidacy status
in December 2023, though the accession process was de facto halted by the EU in June 2024, citing
concerns over democratic backsliding. 3
The political landscape has been dominated by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD), in power since 2012,
which maintains a strong influence across political and public life, and has exercised extensive control
over state institutions. In the 2020 parliamentary elections, 9 political parties and coalitions secured
mandates, with GD winning 90 of 150 seats. The United National Movement (UNM)-led coalition
became the largest opposition faction with 36 mandates. 4 In the following years, the opposition
landscape became fragmented due to intra-party instabilities. For these elections, most opposition
parties united into three coalitions: the “Coalition for Change” (Ahali, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa!,
and Republican Party), “Strong Georgia” (“Strong Georgia – Lelo”, For the People, Freedom Square,
and Citizens), and “Unity – to Save Georgia” (UNM, European Georgia [EG] and Strategy
Aghmashenebeli [SA]). 5
The elections took place amidst entrenched political polarization, marked by deep antagonism between
the ruling party and the government on one side and most opposition parties and the president on the
other. 6 This divide was amplified by broad social discontent due to the adoption of various legislation.
In 2023 and 2024, large-scale protests emerged against the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence,
initially withdrawn in 2023, but eventually adopted in May 2024. 7 Many ODIHR EOM interlocutors
reported violence and intimidation against the protesters, civil society, and journalists during and
immediately following the protests. 8 On 17 September, the parliament adopted the Law on Protection
3
Georgia applied for EU membership in March 2022 and received candidate status in December 2023, contingent
on taking the steps outlined in the European Commission’s (EC) recommendations. The June 2024 conclusions of
the European Council stated that the adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence represents
backsliding on these steps, de facto leading to a halt of the process. In its October 2024 Enlargement Report, the
EC stated that it is “not in a position to consider recommending” opening EU accession negotiations with Georgia.
4
Other parties were: European Georgia (EG) with 5 seats; “Strong Georgia – Lelo” with 4; Strategy Aghmashenebeli
(SA) with 4; Alliance of Patriots (AoP) with 4; Girchi with 4; Citizens with 2; and the Labour Party (LP) with 1.
5
Pre-electoral blocs are not envisioned by the law; blocs registered candidates on the lists of their leading parties.
6
Following the 2017 constitutional amendments, which concluded the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary
system initiated in 2010, the outgoing President, Salome Zourabichvili was the last directly elected president.
Although endorsed by GD as the presidential candidate, Salome Zourabichvili grew increasingly alienated from the
party following the 2020 parliamentary elections. In October 2023, GD made an unsuccessful attempt to impeach
her for unauthorized foreign visits. However, the party lacked the necessary 100 parliamentary votes to proceed
with impeachment.
7
The law introduced new registration, reporting, and public disclosure requirements for civil society organizations
(CSOs) and media with more than 20 per cent of their non-commercial revenue from foreign sources, labelling
them as “organizations pursuing the interests of a foreign power”. Various CSOs and media announced that they
would not register, arguing that the law is unconstitutional and constitutes stigmatization. More than 100 CSOs
announced that they would halt cooperation with the government in all formats. Of the 476 CSOs that had applied
for the status of “organization pursuing the interests of a foreign power” by the legal deadline of 2 September, 382
were officially registered as such by the National Agency of Public Registry of the Ministry of Justice as of
beginning of December.
8
See critical assessments of the law in the opinion by ODIHR, the opinion by the Council of Europe’s Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), a statement by the OSCE PA, a statement by the High
Representative with the European Commission, a declaration by the NATO PA, as well as a statement by the
director of ODIHR. In July, the president, along with 38 MPs and over 120 civil society and media organizations,
challenged the law at the Constitutional Court and requested provisional measures to suspend its enforcement. On
9 October, the Court ruled the case admissible but did not suspend applicability. On 17 October, 16 media
organizations, 120 civil society organizations, and four individuals filed a joint complaint with the European Court
of Human Rights, alleging non-compliance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.
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of Family Values and Minors, which introduced measures that discriminate against the LGBTI
community. The adoption of these laws has had a negative impact on the public perception of civil
society organizations and independent media, as well as LGBTI community and limit freedom of
association, assembly and expression, contrary to Georgia’s international obligations and OSCE
commitments. 9
Legislation that imposes limitations on the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedoms of

assembly and expression should be repealed. Any restrictions on such fundamental freedoms must be
exceptional, strictly proportionate to a legitimate aim, and imposed only to the extent necessary in a
democratic society.
Women’s representation in elected positions remains low, and recent reforms represent a step back and
negatively impact gender representation in politics. Despite constitutional provisions requiring the state
to take special measures to ensure gender equality, in May 2024, the parliament abolished mandatory
gender quotas and other temporary measures aimed at increasing women’s political participation,
leading to a significant decline in the number of women candidates in these elections. 10 Women held
19 per cent of seats in the outgoing parliament, 3 out of 64 mayoral positions, and only 2 out of 12
ministerial posts. 11 While some political parties pledged to adhere to voluntary internal gender quotas,
only 341 of the 1,184 parliamentary candidates (29 per cent) were women. This marks a significant
decrease from the 44 per cent observed in the 2020 parliamentary elections when the gender quota
requirement was in place. Women led only 3 out of 18 lists and constituted 22 per cent of candidates in
the top 10 positions.12 This systemic underrepresentation, along with the repeal of positive legislative
measures and the persistent obstacles faced by women politicians, including gender-specific threats,
continues to hinder women’s participation in political and public life. 13 Of the 150 elected candidates,
only 34 are women (23 percent), marking a slight increase from the previous composition, which was
initially 21 percent and decreased to 19 percent over the term.
In line with international standards and OSCE commitments, authorities should put in place effective
temporary special measures to eliminate discrimination against women in public and political life.
Given their proven effectiveness, the authorities should give particular consideration to re-introducing
the mandatory electoral gender quotas as well as the requirement that a woman withdrawing from her
mandate as Member of Parliament be replaced by the next woman candidate on the same party list.
9
The law bans gender reassignment, adoption by non-heterosexual individuals and gatherings or the dissemination
of information in schools that “aim to popularize” non-heterosexual relationships. The Venice Commission, the
European Union External Action Service, and the UN Human Rights Office spokesperson criticized the law.
10
Girchi MPs, who initiated the amendments, secured the ruling party’s support in exchange for their votes for the
candidate supported by GD for the CEC chairperson. Representatives of the ruling party argued that gender quotas
are a form of positive discrimination that have already achieved their main task. See the ODIHR opinion which
states that “Without introducing alternative forms of temporary special measures or other recognized mechanisms
to accelerate women’s political representation in Georgia, this represents a setback for the advancement of gender
equality in Georgia, not in line with international human rights standards and OSCE commitments which mandate
the elimination of discrimination against women in political and public life.” See also the Venice Commission
opinion, which argued against the abolition of gender quotas.
11
The percentage of women in the parliament remains below the average for OSCE participating states (32 per cent
as of October 2024), and below the global average of 27 per cent.
12
The Party of Georgian Unity and Development and “Change Georgia” had the highest representation of women
candidates, at 52 and 51 per cent, respectively. “For Georgia” had 45 per cent women candidates. In the “Strong
Georgia” coalition, women made up 30 per cent, while on the “Coalition for Change” list, women constituted 26
per cent. In the “Unity – to Save Georgia” coalition, the figure was 23 per cent. On the GD list, 16 per cent of
the candidates were women, with only two in the top 10 and none between positions 21 and 51.
13
According to the 2022 UN Report on Violence Against Women in Politics in Georgia, “[m]ore than half of the
[women] respondents (54 per cent) have experienced some form of harassment or violence during their tenure as
an appointed official or during their campaign work. […] The most common forms of violence against women in
politics are psychological violence and violence on social media.”
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IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Georgia is a party to international and regional instruments related to the holding of democratic
elections. 14 Parliamentary elections are governed by the 1995 Constitution, the 2011 Election Code, the
1997 Law on Political Unions of Citizens (LPU), and regulations of the Central Election Commission
(CEC). 15 The Election Code has been amended over 20 times since the last parliamentary elections,
most recently in June 2024. Despite the frequent changes, the amendments did not address a long-
standing ODIHR recommendations to provide a comprehensive legal reform.
The 2022 amendments, adopted through consultations and cross-party support, introduced the
widespread use of electronic technologies, addressed some previous ODIHR and Council of Europe’s
Venice Commission recommendations related to the impartiality of lower-level election bodies and
citizen observers, established additional grounds for automatic recounts of polling station results,
extended some election dispute resolution deadlines, and added further regulations on campaign finance
reporting and accountability. Amendments adopted in 2023, which extended the application of the
gender quotas on candidate lists until 2032, received support across party lines. In contrast, amendments
that banned donations from legal entities to political parties, lowered the annual expenditure cap, and
removed the need for broader consensus in the nomination and appointment of non-partisan CEC
members and the chairperson were solely supported by the ruling party and its affiliates. 16
Amendments adopted in 2024 were enacted without an inclusive consultative process or broad political
support. These abolished gender quotas on parliamentary candidate lists, modified the decision-making
process within the election administration by allowing the CEC to bypass the two-thirds majority
requirement in repeat voting, eliminated the position of the opposition-nominated deputy chairperson
of the CEC, further revised the procedure for appointing CEC members, and expanded the powers of
the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). 17 Furthermore, these amendments disregarded concerns raised by
key stakeholders as well as ODIHR and the Venice Commission, and reversed provisions previously
implemented in line with recommendations from these organizations, such as the application of gender
quotas, the consensus-based appointment of CEC members, and safeguards for the decision-making
process within the CEC. 18
Overall, the legal framework provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections. However,
frequent revisions to the legal framework, some made shortly before the elections and without broad
cross-party support, undermined its stability and raised concerns about the potential for political
14
Georgia is a party to the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, and the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
15
Other relevant laws include the 1984 Administrative Offences Code, the 1999 Criminal Code, the 1999 Code of
Administrative Procedure, the 1999 General Administrative Code, and the 2004 Law on Broadcasting.
16
Following an EU-brokered April 2021 agreement between GD and several opposition parties, the 2021 amendments
introduced a consensus-seeking procedure for the election of the CEC non-partisan members and the chairperson,
based on nominations by the president. The 2023 amendments were vetoed by the president; the veto was
subsequently overridden by the parliament. See the 2023 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Opinion.
17
Paragraph 5.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that the legislation should be adopted at the end of
a public procedure. The president vetoed the 2024 amendments, except for those related to powers of the ACB, but
the veto was then overridden by parliament. Only one amendment package, which included the removal of the
gender quota, was supported by one opposition party, while all other opposition parties boycotted the voting.
18
See the 2023 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Opinion and the 2024 Follow-up Opinion, which stated that
“amendments are clearly insufficient to ensure a consensus-based political process crucial for the independence and
impartiality of the CEC and for public trust in this institution”.
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manipulation, contrary to OSCE commitments and international good practice. 19 Moreover, the law is
overly complex, lacks clarity in some areas, and retains gaps and inconsistencies, which at times led to
diverging implementations by stakeholders. 20 Further, several longstanding ODIHR and Venice
Commission recommendations remain unaddressed. These relate to the nomination and appointment of
election commission members, voter and candidate eligibility, comprehensive regulations to prevent
the misuse of administrative resources and pressure on voters, strengthening regulations on campaign
finance and campaigning in the media, and reinforcing the framework for electoral dispute resolution.
A comprehensive legislative reform should be undertaken to implement outstanding ODIHR

recommendations and further align the legal framework with OSCE commitments, international
standards, and good practice. This review should be completed well in advance of the next election and
through an inclusive and transparent consultative process.
Pursuant to the 2017 constitutional amendments, these were the first parliamentary elections conducted
under a fully proportional electoral system. The 150-member unicameral parliament is directly elected
for a four-year term within a single nationwide constituency with closed candidate lists. Political parties
must surpass a five per cent threshold to qualify for seat allocation. Legal amendments in 2024 reduced
the minimum required number of candidates on party lists from 60 to 30, and permitted political parties
to indicate certain candidates as delegates representing voters from one of 30 designated districts. 21
V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
The elections were administered by the CEC, 73 District Election Commissions (DECs), and 3,111
Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). 22 All commissions are composed of eight non-partisan
members and up to nine members nominated by parties represented in parliament. The CEC and DECs
are permanent bodies, while PECs are temporary bodies formed ahead of each election. By law, non-
partisan members have to meet requirements aimed to ensure their impartiality, and be certified for their
19
Section II.2.b of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission 2002 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
(Code of Good Practice) states that “fundamental elements of electoral law, in particular the electoral system proper,
membership of electoral commissions […] should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election”,
while paragraph 64 of its explanatory report stresses that “care must be taken to avoid […] even the mere semblance
of manipulation”. The 2024 Venice Commission Revised Interpretative Declaration suggests that amendments
within a year to elections are permissible if they are in accordance with international electoral standards and based
“on consensus between government and opposition and on broad public consultations”.
20
The legislation includes references to provisions that no longer exist or are not applicable. For instance, Articles 51
and 186 of the Election Code refer to an abrogated article of the LPU to determine which electoral subjects are
eligible for free airtime. The law also contains numerous provisional norms adopted for specific elections, many of
which are now obsolete. The two-week deadline provided in Article 125(17) of the Election Code for repeat
elections does not allow sufficient time to organize elections if results are invalidated due to complaints. Article
45(3.1) imposes a ban on campaigning by law-enforcement personnel but not on personnel of the Special
Investigation Service. Certain concepts are ambiguous, such as ‘campaigning to serve the goals of another electoral
subject’, ‘donations to refrain from supporting another electoral subject’, and ‘persons with declared electoral
goals’. Eligibility rules for free airtime are also insufficiently defined for situations where electoral blocs are not
permitted. These have at times led to broad discretionary interpretations by enforcement bodies and courts, resulting
in disputes and sanctions (see Media, Campaign Finance, and Election Dispute Resolution).
21
Contesting parties may designate a candidate as a ‘delegate’ from specified districts. If elected, such a member of
parliament will represent the inhabitants of that district, provided the designating party received the highest number
of valid votes in that district. For the 2024 elections, only Georgian Dream (GD) made use of this opportunity.
22
Including 67 polling stations in 42 countries where out-of-country voting was organized. Additional in-country
PECs were formed in 13 electoral precincts established in penal institutions and an in-patient facility. Elections
were not held in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, territories currently not under the control of the government. See the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 2024 judgement in case of Georgia v. Russia.
Georgia Page: 10
position, which, for the first time, was also required at the PEC level. 23 Women constituted the majority
in most of the lower-level commissions; however, only 4 of the 17 CEC members were women. 24
Most DECs and PECs were established within the legal deadlines, despite the short time for processing
applications, but the pool of candidates was limited, with only one per cent surplus at the PEC level,
resulting in minimal competition for most vacant posts. 25 Several political parties reported difficulties
in recruiting PEC members, and many DECs and PECs experienced significant turnover in membership,
often after training was completed. DECs attributed this to low remuneration, insufficient understanding
of PEC members’ roles, and, in some cases, reluctance to represent political parties. Political parties
also cited fear of pressure from local authorities and supporters of other parties as reasons for
withdrawals. 26 Non-partisan PEC members can withdraw or be replaced any time, which resulted in
insufficient training for many replacements, negatively affecting their performance on election day,
contrary to international good practice. 27
To ensure stability and professional capacity of the election administration, the possibility to replace
members of District Election Commission and Precinct Election Commission should be limited within
a reasonable period of time prior to election day to allow for all members to undergo training.
The election administration managed technical preparations in a timely and efficient manner.
Contributing to transparency, the CEC held regular live-streamed sessions and promptly published its
decisions and other relevant materials online. However, its decision-making at times lacked collegiality,
with opposition members reporting insufficient information sharing and marginalization. As a result,
they frequently abstained from voting on contentious issues, allowing decisions to pass by a simple
majority. 28 Party-appointed members had minimal involvement in the DEC and PEC work before
election day, and the high number of party-appointed PEC members led to overcrowding at polling
stations, which did not enhance efficiency of their work. While most ODIHR EOM interlocutors had
confidence in the election administration’s technical and organizational capacities, many raised
concerns over their impartiality due to recent amendments which vested control over the selection and
nomination process of CEC members to the ruling party, removed the need for consensus in its decision-
23
Non-partisan members cannot be election contestants, their representatives, observers, media representatives, or if,
in the last two general elections, they were appointed by a party as a commission member or representative, were
contestants, or have been political party donors since the last general elections.
24
Women constituted 67 per cent of DEC members and 73 per cent of PEC members, holding 55 per cent of leadership
positions in DECs and 78 per cent of PECs.
25
For the election period, the five permanent members at each DEC were joined by three temporary non-partisan and
up to nine party-nominated members. The CEC received 263 applications for 219 vacant positions of temporary
non-partisan DEC members. In 56 per cent of DECs, the CEC received the exact number of applications as
vacancies. Within a four-day period, DECs selected 24,047 non-partisan PEC members from 24,425 applicants.
For the 9,090 PEC leadership positions, DECs received 9,111 applications. The competitions for numerous
vacancies were relaunched due to the insufficient number of candidacies and resignations.
26
The ODIHR EOM noted that some party-appointed members in the districts of Ambrolauri, Bolnisi, Mtatsminda
(Tbilisi) and Sagarejo were unaware of their appointments or who nominated them.
27
See paragraph II.3.1.g of the Code of Good Practice which states that “[m]embers of electoral commissions must
receive standard training”.
28
The 2024 amendments changed the requirement for CEC decision-making, to allow for re-voting on issues with
a simple majority at the same session, if support of at least two-thirds of the full membership cannot be reached.
Several CEC regulations were controversial, with some appealed to the court (see Election Dispute Resolution).
For example, the CEC moved the deadline for assigning PEC responsibilities to seven days before election day,
citing the need for “timely and uniform” implementation of procedures. However, the opposition raised concerns
that earlier assignments could expose PEC members in key roles to pressure from the ruling party. The CEC’s
implementation of provisions on out-of-country voting, opening polling stations at diplomatic missions, also drew
criticism for restricting access to voting abroad. After election day, opposition CEC members contested some
procurement decisions, citing the poor quality of ballot papers. Many stakeholders also criticized the lack of
transparency in CEC decisions on auditing electronic devices.
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making process, as well as perceived links between non-partisan members and the ruling party at all
levels. 29
To strengthen impartiality of election administration, the appointment process for election commission
members at all levels should be revised to prevent dominance by any single political party. To enhance
operational efficiency and prevent overcrowding, the number of commissioners, particularly at the
Precinct Election Commission level, should be adjusted to the actual needs.
The election administration prepared a comprehensive training programme for electoral personnel,
contestants, media representatives, and civil society organizations (CSOs). While the training was
mandatory, participation among party-appointed PEC members was low. 30 Sessions observed by the
ODIHR EOM were informative and interactive, but did not sufficiently cover all pre-election
responsibilities of PECs, leading to inconsistencies in the implementation of certain procedures. 31 The
CEC organized extensive voter information and education campaigns, featuring in-person meetings,
audio-visual materials in the media and online, as well as mock election days, focusing on the
verification of voter registration data, voting procedures with electronic devices, and ballot validity.
The CEC made numerous steps to improve the accessibility of the electoral process for persons with
various types of disabilities, including through making adjustments to its website, providing voter
information materials in accessible formats, and offering assistive tools in polling stations. Voter
education materials included sign-language interpretation and videos for citizens with hearing
impairments. Despite these efforts, long-standing deficiencies in the physical accessibility of electoral
premises, including DEC offices and polling stations, persisted (see Election Day).
In a coordinated effort, state and local authorities, along with all other relevant stakeholders, should
undertake necessary measures to ensure independent access for persons with various disabilities
throughout the entire election process, including the allocation of adequate premises for election
commissions and polling stations.
VI. VOTING TECHNOLOGIES
Pursuant to the 2022 legal amendments that introduced the widespread use of electronic technologies
at polling stations, the private vendor Smartmatic was selected in August 2023 to supply voter
identification devices (VIDs), optical vote-counting devices (VCDs), and technical support for their
configuration. For these elections, 2,263 polling stations (75 per cent) were equipped with VCDs and
VIDs, covering approximately 90 per cent of the electorate, while all other polling stations used
29
Recent legal amendments shifted the responsibility for the nomination of non-partisan CEC members, including
the chairperson, from the president to the speaker of parliament, and abolished the position of the opposition-
nominated deputy chairperson, vesting full control over the selection and nomination process of the CEC in the
ruling party. Eight non-partisan CEC members, including the chairperson, are selected by the parliament from
candidates nominated by the speaker through an open competition. They are elected by a three-fifths majority of
all MPs, or by a simple majority if no agreement is reached in the first vote. Paragraph II.3.1 of the Code of Good
Practice underlines that “an impartial body must be in charge of applying electoral law”.
30
The CEC reported that only by 37 per cent of PEC party-nominated members from ‘traditional’ polling stations and
46 per cent of those from polling stations equipped with technologies attended initial training sessions aimed at the
full PEC composition, dropping to 32 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively, at the third stage of the training
programme. Additional training after the second stage saw attendance of only 20 per cent and 24 per cent of the
relevant partisan PEC members.
31
Various PECs visited by ODIHR EOM Long-term Observers (LTOs) showed a lack of understanding of procedures
related to handling applications for changes in voter lists or voting with mobile ballot box.
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traditional voter identification and voting methods. 32 The CEC provided tablets at all polling stations
nationwide to transmit preliminary results. By law, results from the VCDs were considered preliminary,
with only the results of mandatory manual counts included in the official results protocols. 33 To
familiarize voters with the new technologies, the CEC conducted extensive voter education efforts, and
reported that pilot projects and information campaigns reached some 600,000 voters. 34 These pre-
election day demonstrations demonstrated potential compromises to vote secrecy which were not
rectified prior to election day. According to some citizen observers, these pre-election day pilots
demonstrated potential compromises to vote secrecy, which were not rectified prior to election day (see
Election Day).
The law does not mandate independent verification and certification of electronic technologies, which
is considered international good practice. 35 In October 2023, the CEC commissioned a private company
to conduct an audit, which confirmed that the devices complied with international standards and national
legal requirements. 36 A follow-up audit by the same company in October 2024 found that system and
functional updates made by the CEC to the software had not compromised the integrity, reliability, or
security of the voting process. 37 However, reports about this second audit were published only after
election day; the late publication prevented stakeholders from reviewing its findings in due time. 38
Most ODIHR EOM interlocutors supported the introduction of election technologies. Nevertheless,
some raised concerns about the limited information disclosed regarding the external providers involved
in implementing and auditing the devices, their activities, and terms of their contracts. 39 Furthermore,
stakeholders did not have full access to oversee all stages of the implementation of electronic
technology, review detailed documentation, and examine audits, at odds with international good
practice. 40 While the election administration made additional efforts to tackle widespread
misconceptions about the potential for the devices to disclose voter identity, the limited transparency
32
VIDs and VCDs were used in polling stations with at least 300 registered voters that were located in municipal
centres or within a 20 km radius.
33
Each precinct had one VID per 700 registered voters, with up to five interconnected VIDs in larger precincts. The
devices scanned the machine-readable zone of the voter’s electronic ID card but did not process any biometric data.
Only the voter lists specific to each precinct were loaded in the respective VIDs. Each polling station was equipped
with at least two ballot boxes with mounted and interconnected VCDs, with an additional one provided in precincts
of over 2,700 registered voters or turnout over 1,200 voters in the previous elections. Preliminary results were
transmitted to the CEC via a secure virtual private network (VPN).
34
The CEC tested voting technologies in 8 by-elections since 2018 and in a nationwide mock election on 11
September in 598 electoral precincts, allowing 122,864 voters to experience the technology.
35
See paragraph 8 of the 2022 Council of Europe Guidelines on the use of information and communication technology
(ICT) in the electoral processes (Guidelines), which requires evaluation of the ICT systems by independent experts
prior to implementation. Paragraph 33 of the 2017 CoE Recommendation on standards for e-voting states: “The
components of the e-voting system shall be disclosed for verification and certification purposes.”
36
See the 2023 report of the audit conducted by the US-based company “Pro V&V”.
37
See the 2024 audit reports. Conducted in three stages, the audit found that the establishment complied with the
prescribed security measures, such as no internet connectivity for the VCD, only precinct-specific voter lists used
by the VID, and secure transmission of results by the tablets, without the possibility of altering data. The audit’s
scope was limited to evaluating specific features and software modifications made since the last audit.
38
All three stages of the report were published afterward even though two stages of the audit were completed before
election day.
39
Paragraph 7 of the 2022 Council of Europe Guidelines stipulate that “[t]ransparency requirements should aim at
enabling public scrutiny. Appropriate processes should be in place for receiving, answering or discussing feedback
from the public and for processing the conclusions”.
40
See paragraphs 31-33 of the 2017 Guidelines on the implementation of the provisions of Recommendation
CM/Rec(2017)5 on standards for e-voting, which specify transparency measures, including that “[p]ublic access to
the components of the e-voting system and information thereon, in particular documentation, source code and non-
disclosure agreements, should be disclosed to the stakeholders and the public at large, well in advance of the election
period”.
Georgia Page: 13
around the newly introduced technologies contributed to speculation about the potential misuse and
vulnerabilities of VCDs (see Election Day).
To strengthen confidence in the use of election technologies, the law should explicitly provide for
independent third-party verification and certification of voter identification and vote-counting devices.
Relevant stakeholders should be granted meaningful opportunities to scrutinize all aspects of the
implementation process, including access to technical documentation, source code review, device
configuration, and auditing procedures.
VII. VOTER RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION
The right to vote is granted to citizens aged 18 or older on election day, except those serving a prison
sentence for particularly grave crimes. Contrary to international standards and despite previous ODIHR
recommendations, citizens declared legally incapacitated by a court decision and placed in institutional
care are disenfranchised. 41
Persons who are recognized by a court to lack legal capacity on the grounds of intellectual or
psychosocial disability and those who require inpatient care should be allowed to vote, in line with
international standards.
Voter registration is passive and continuous. The CEC is responsible for maintaining the unified voter
list (UVL), based on data managed by the Public Service Development Agency (PSDA) and other state
institutions.42 Voters with valid identification documents are automatically included in the UVL, based
on their current or previous domicile or actual address. 43 However, by law, citizens with expired
documents are excluded from the UVL. To restore their registration, affected citizens were required to
renew their documents and submit a request for re-inclusion by 8 October. 44 The law permits voters
without a registered address to remain in the UVL based on their last place of registration; this provision
is temporary and set to expire in 2026. 45 Exclusion from voter lists due to expired ID documents or a
lack of registered address is not in line with international standards, as it places an undue burden on
citizens to restore their registration and may lead to their disenfranchisement. 46
41
Articles 12 and 29 of the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) oblige states to
“recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others”. See also the CRPD
Committee’s General Comment no. 1, which states that a “person’s decision-making ability cannot be a justification
for any exclusion of persons with disabilities from exercising their political rights”.
42
Special voter lists were compiled, among others, for election officials on duty, voters in hospitals, in-patient
facilities, penal institutions, or staying abroad, as well as for homebound voters. Voters abroad registered with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were automatically included in special voter lists; others could apply for registration
until 7 October. In total, 95,910 voters were entitled to vote abroad. Mobile voting was made available for those
unable to attend polling stations due to health issues, as well as for voters in penal institutions, administrative
detention, hospitals, hard-to-reach areas, as well as military and security personnel on duty.
43
Voters with internally displaced status are registered under their current place of residence. In absence of a
registered address, voters had the opportunity to inform the PSDA of their actual address until 5 October.
44
Following the 2023 amendments, ID cards issued prior to July 2011 with no expiration date ceased to be valid in
July 2024. To ensure timely renewal of documents, the PSDA launched a large-scale campaign to issue new ID
cards free of charge. According to the PSDA, 195,016 of some 260,000 affected citizens replaced their IDs by 14
October, after which the UVL closed for changes. Of the remaining citizens with expired ID cards, 25,733 held
valid passports, allowing them to vote.
45
According to the PSDA, between 12 September and 8 October, some 1,400 citizens, previously without valid
documents or registered address, were included in the UVL. Between 8 and 14 October, any amendments to the
UVL could be made only upon a court decision.
46
Paragraph 11 of the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 25 requires that “States must take
effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right. Where registration of
voters is required, it should be facilitated”.
Georgia Page: 14
To ensure effective exercise of active suffrage by all eligible voters, the authorities should implement
appropriate legislative and administrative measures to ensure that all voters, including those lacking
valid identification documents or a registered address, are included in the voter lists.
The final UVL contained 3,508,294 voters. The PSDA made continued efforts to improve the quality
of voter registration data. 47 Voters had a range of opportunities to verify their information online, at
government service centres, and PSDA offices, and request corrections. Preliminary voter lists were
available for public scrutiny at polling stations one month before elections. According to the CEC, four
political parties and two observer organizations requested copies of the UVL, but none submitted
correction requests based on their verification.
While most ODIHR EOM interlocutors did not express significant concerns about the accuracy or
inclusiveness of the voter lists before election day, some questioned the legitimacy of certain
registrations, citing cases where multiple voters were registered at a single address but were unknown
to the actual residents. 48 After the elections, the opposition alleged misuse of data from certain voters,
including those residing abroad, on election day and requested access to the list of voters who cast their
ballots. The election administration dismissed the allegations and denied the request, citing data
protection regulations and the lack of legal grounds for providing such access.
VIII. CANDIDATE RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION
Citizens eligible to vote, who are aged 25 or older on election day and have resided in Georgia for at
least 10 years, may stand for parliament. Candidate lists may only be submitted by political parties, and
candidates cannot hold membership of another party. 49 The residency requirement, the restrictions for
individuals deprived of candidacy rights or sentenced to imprisonment by a court decision, irrespective
of the gravity of the crime, and the absence of provisions for independent candidacies are at odds with
international standards, good practice, and prior ODIHR recommendations. 50
Party and candidate registration was inclusive. Parties not represented in parliament, which are required
to collect at least 25,000 supporting signatures from voters, could apply to the CEC by 15 July and
submit signatures by 1 August. Of the 30 non-parliamentary applicants, the CEC rejected 11 for
insufficient signatures or failure to meet other requirements and dismissed 2 applications. 51 Parties
47
The PSDA improved the accuracy of the data by removing duplicates and entries of deceased voters; it contacted
citizens with deficiencies in their records, conducted on-site inspections, and informed citizens whose documents
were about to expire. Based on different legal grounds, it deregistered 956 citizens in the electoral period.
48
Some voters from Didube, Nadzaladevi, and Saburtalo districts of Tbilisi and Kutaisi informed the ODIHR EOM
that they had identified persons registered at their addresses who were not known to have resided there previously.
The PSDA received 259 requests to deregister such individuals. The authorities attributed such records in the UVL
to legal provisions allowing citizens to retain their previous registered residence for inclusion in voter lists.
49
While pre-electoral blocs are not provided for in the legislation, several political parties opted to include candidates
from other parties; these surrendered their original party membership. The CEC rejected the registration of four
candidates due to their affiliation with another party or discrepancies in their mandatory statements on party
affiliation submitted within the registration documentation.
50
Paragraph 15 of the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 25 states that “persons who are otherwise
eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as
education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation”. Guideline I. 1.1 c. iii the Code of Good Practice
states that “a length of residence requirement may be imposed on nationals solely for local or regional elections”.
Paragraph 7.5 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides that participating States “respect the right of
citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organisations”.
51
One party’s application was dismissed due to the cancellation of its registration by the National Agency of Public
Registry, and another was dismissed because of the termination of the party chairperson’s authority.
Georgia Page: 15
represented in parliament were exempt from collecting support signatures and therefore entitled to
a later registration deadline, and could retain their previous ordinal number on the ballot. By the 30
August deadline, ten parties represented in the parliament had applied for registration.
In total, the CEC registered 27 political parties as contestants, which could submit their candidate lists
by 26 September. By the 6 October deadline, the CEC registered 18 of the 19 candidate lists submitted. 52
While many political parties pledged to adhere to voluntary internal gender quotas, only 341 of the
1,184 parliamentary candidates (29 per cent) were women.
IX. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
The official 60-day campaign period, which started on 27 August, overlapped with the candidate
registration period for over a month, which led to disputes over the allocation of free airtime in the
media and varying financial reporting periods. 53 There is no campaign silence period; only broadcasting
campaign advertisements and campaigning inside and near polling stations on election day are banned.
The law provides for equitable campaign conditions, such as equal access to municipal venues and
poster locations. However, these provisions did not fully ensure equal access in practice, as in some
municipalities, opposition parties faced difficulties in obtaining poster locations. 54
In 2021, the Election Code was amended to strengthen the regulations of campaigning by public sector
employees, partially in line with previous ODIHR recommendations. However, campaign regulations
do not fully address the potential misuse of administrative resources, as restrictions do not apply to all
public officials and permit the adoption of certain measures intended to incentivize the electorate. 55
High-level officials were observed participating in the campaign, generally in favour of the ruling party,
providing an undue advantage of incumbency and blurring the line between party and state, contrary to
OSCE commitments and international good practice. 56 The implementation of state and municipal
projects during the campaign period is prohibited. In the months leading up to the campaign, the
government introduced financial incentives for a large number of citizens from diverse social
52
The rejected candidate list was deficient, and the submitters failed to rectify it, resulting in fewer candidates than
required.
53
Candidate registration concluded 20 days before election day, following the expiration of the legal period for
correcting deficiencies in submitted candidate lists. This occurred 40 days after the official campaign period began.
54
In 10 municipalities, the opposition initially reported that most public spaces for posting campaign materials were
occupied by the GD or that access to billboard space was limited, as it had already been rented out to GD. Paragraph
II. B. 1.3 of the 2016 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on Preventing and Responding to the
Misuse of Administrative Resources during Electoral Process (Joint Guidelines) provides that “[i]f public buildings
and facilities are permitted for campaign purposes, the legal framework should provide for equal opportunity and a
clear procedure for equitably allocating such resources to parties and candidates”.
55
The law prohibits campaigning during state or municipality-funded events, as well as by public sector employees
during working hours or in official capacity. It also forbids unequal access to state or municipal spaces for
contestants, the use of state-owned means during campaign, and holding meetings with public sector employees.
Provisions restricting campaigns do not apply to state trustees (regional governors) and mayors. In the 2018 Second
Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on Georgia, GRECO stated that it “considers the deletion of the
provision allowing for the unlimited campaigning by high-level public officials long overdue”.
56
The ODIHR EOM LTOs observed the mayors and deputy mayors of Dmanisi, Kharagauli, Keda, Kvareli, Ozurgeti,
Rustavi, Shuakhevi, Tbilisi, Zestaponi, and Zugdidi, engaging in the campaign. The mayor of Ambrolauri stated
that he took a leave of absence for the campaign period. Paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document
calls for “a clear separation between the State and political parties”. Paragraph II. B. 1.1 of the 2016 ODIHR and
Venice Commission Joint Guidelines stipulates that “the legal framework should provide effective mechanisms for
prohibiting public authorities from taking unfair advantages of their positions by holding official public events”.
Georgia Page: 16
groups. 57 While these actions were not in violation of the law, they raised concerns about the
government’s genuine commitment to preventing undue influence on voters through state resources. In
September, the parliament also enacted a law giving amnesty to a wide range of convicted individuals.58
Contestants, public officials, and state institutions should refrain from misusing administrative
resources for electoral purposes to ensure an equal playing field for electoral participants. In line with
previous ODIHR and GRECO recommendations, consideration should be given to the adoption of
further legislative and administrative measures to regulate the campaigning activities of high-level
public officials, including mayors, and to prevent the circumvention of existing regulations.
Contestants were generally able to campaign freely, and 18 candidate lists competed in a subdued
campaign. 59 However, persistent reports of intimidation, inducement, and pressure on voters, especially
on public sector employees and economically vulnerable groups, raised concerns about the ability of
some voters to freely form their opinions and cast their vote without fear, at odds with OSCE
commitments and international standards. 60 Some contestants employed highly divisive rhetoric and
imagery. 61 Additionally, isolated incidents of violence, cases of event disruptions, verbal abuse, and the
destruction of campaign materials reported by both ruling and opposition parties, negatively impacted
the campaign atmosphere. 62 Opposition parties often refrained from reporting election-related incidents
57
In February 2024, the Minister of Education announced a student internships programme for up to 3,000 students,
starting in September 2024. The same month, the government reduced interest rates for over 150,000 pensioners
who had taken loans before 2023. In April, the parliament increased pensions for law enforcement officers, and the
government waived tax liabilities for 145,000 tax payers incurred before 2021. In June 2024, the prime minister
announced the exemption of 1,855 individuals from COVID-19 penalty charges, totalling 5.6 million GEL.
58
According to official estimations, following its adoption, over 1,000 prisoners were supposed to be released from
penitentiary institutions; the law also impacted approximately 22,000 probationers, with 7,000 released from
probation immediately. The law provided complete or partial reduction of punishment for those serving prison
terms, probation and on parole on broad range of offences.
59
Among the 18 registered candidate lists, GD and the four major opposition lists campaigned most actively.
60
On 21 October, GD’s honorary chairman threatened members of “For Georgia” with “strict punishment” for their
political stances. Intimidation of voters was reported by opposition parties in at least 10 out of 64 observed
municipalities. ODIHR EOM interlocutors in 16 municipalities alleged pressure on public employees and those
dependent on social assistance to support the ruling party. On 18 October, the ombudsperson acknowledged
information about voter intimidation, including confiscations of ID documents, and called for prompt investigation;
similar cases were reported by ODIHR EOM LTOs. Citizen observers reported instances of vote buying both before
and on election day, as well as an increase in public sector job creation in the lead-up to the elections. Paragraph
7.7 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document requires campaigning to “be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere
in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely
presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting
their vote free of fear of retribution”. Paragraph 19 of the 1996 UNCHR General Comment 25 to the ICCPR
stipulates that “voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence,
compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference”.
61
GD billboards displayed unflattering images of opposition leaders depicted on a leash, and juxtaposed contrasting
visuals of a peaceful Georgia and war-torn areas in Ukraine, implying that electing any party other than GD could
lead to war in the country. The party also produced TV advertisements featuring slogans such as “No to War! No
to Agents!” – which used edited statements from opposition politicians to suggest their support for war; “No to
LGBT Propaganda!” – insinuating promiscuity within the LGBT community; and “No to Fake News Propaganda!”
– alleging that opposition-aligned journalists were spreading disinformation.
62
On 16 September, the leader of Ahali was pelted with stones while campaigning in Pankisi (Akhmeta municipality).
On 19 September, UNM activists were attacked while campaigning in Zugdidi, with UNM alleging GD affiliation,
which GD denies. On 6 October, an UNM campaign event in Gurjaani was attacked, allegedly by GD affiliates,
resulting in one member being hospitalized. On 12 October, a GD activist allegedly attempted to run over a “For
Georgia” party member; the case was reported to the police. On 22 October, the car of a UNM activist in Zugdidi
was attacked with stones. On 23 October, a “For Georgia” member was attacked by a group of people in Tbilisi.
On 4 September in Tskaltubo, a GD member died following a verbal assault by a UNM supporter. Party leaders
and activists from either Ahali, “For Georgia” or “Strong Georgia – Lelo” were assaulted during canvassing in
Dedoplistskaro, Gurjaani, Kareli, and Tbilisi. UNM offices in Batumi, Keda, Tbilisi, and Zestaponi were
vandalized, defaced, or robbed. In Chkhorotsku, a “For Georgia” member allegedly damaged a GD activist’s car.
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to the police, citing a perceived lack of willingness by authorities to investigate.
Authorities should proactively prevent voter intimidation, pressure on public employees, vote buying,
electoral violence and educate voters about their rights. If such incidents occur, they should be promptly
addressed to provide effective remedies and hold those responsible accountable.
Contestants engaged in traditional campaign methods and online campaigning, with activities remaining
relatively low-key throughout the campaign period. 63 Most political parties included socio-economic
issues in their platforms, but campaign messages were dominated by geopolitics. 64 The ruling party
openly expressed its intention to file a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court to deregister the UNM,
labelling its political stance as destructive and making public statements of banning key opposition
parties, contrary to the principle of democratic pluralism enshrined in OSCE commitments.65 The
president also took an active role in the campaign by publicly consulting the opposition on pre-electoral
coalitions and government composition, potentially acting outside of her mandate as a neutral arbitrator
between state institutions. 66 Additionally, the ruling party criticized various CSOs for what it assessed
as active campaigning in support of the opposition. 67
Party programmes lacked messaging specifically targeting women. Women candidates from “Strong
Georgia – Lelo” publicly addressed topics such as gender equality, gender quotas, and the pay gap,
whereas GD emphasized traditional family values. Women enjoyed limited visibility as candidates,
being featured as speakers at 20 of the 50 campaign events observed by ODIHR EOM and made up 42
per cent of attendees at observed rallies. In the broadcast media, the share of women political actors in
prime-time news was between 8 per cent (on Imedi) and 28 per cent (on TV Pirveli).
Authorities should take measures to promote gender equality in public and political life and ensure
equal opportunities for women in the campaign, setting specific, measurable, and clearly defined goals
and targets. Consideration should be given to the introduction of additional special measures to
encourage political parties to support female candidates.
Around 80 per cent of the population has internet access, with nearly all using social networks,
particularly Facebook, which ranks as the second most important source of information after
63
ODIHR EOM LTOs observed 50 campaign events in 20 municipalities, organized by 6 electoral contestants. Some
88 per cent of the campaign events were assessed as accessible for persons with disabilities. In the week preceding
the elections, some parties held final rallies, gathering tens of thousands of people. On 20 October, CSOs and
opposition parties organized a joint rally, expressing their support for EU integration, during which the president
addressed the participants. GD’s final rally, on 23 October, enjoyed sizable attendance from the regions; the ODIHR
EOM received a number of reports about public sector employees instructed or coerced to attend the rally.
64
The ruling party framed the elections as a choice between peace, represented by GD, and war, represented by its
opponents. Most opposition parties presented the elections as a referendum on Georgia’s geopolitical stance,
expressing fears that government policies may hinder accession to the EU, a constitutional goal, and have
subscribed to the “Georgian Charter”, proclaimed by the president in May 2024 with the declared aim of
immediately repealing “laws that contradict the European way”.
65
Paragraph 7.6 of the 1990 Copenhagen Document commits the participating States to “respect the right of
individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political parties […] and provide […] guarantees to
enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities”.
66
Article 49 of the Constitution states that the president is “the guarantor of the country’s unity and national
independence”. According to Article 56, the formation of the government is beyond the president’s mandate, as the
prime minister candidate is proposed to parliament by the party that won the most seats in the elections. A 2023
Constitutional Court decision described the president as “a politically neutral figure who does not hold political
power [and] plays the symbolic role of arbitrator between the branches of government”. The president informed the
ODIHR EOM that she had acted in line with Article 78, which mandates state bodies to take measures “to ensure
the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”.
67
Individual members of various CSOs publicly expressed their support for different opposition parties, including
through donations. GD asserted that the narrative of some CSOs echoed that of the opposition.
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television. 68 Apart from general legislative provisions on freedom of speech, campaigning on social
networks is not specifically regulated. In the run-up to elections, state institutions and watchdog
organizations raised concerns about the potential impact of disinformation on the electoral process.69
During the campaign, fact-checking organizations reported instances of coordinated disinformation.
These included anonymous social network accounts spreading fake news or manipulated content, at
times sexist or homophobic, aimed at discrediting leading opposition candidates, as well as false claims
that voting technologies could reveal voters’ choice. 70 There were no observed efforts by the authorities
to address these instances.
All contestants actively campaigned on social networks, with “Strong Georgia – Lelo”, “Coalition for
Change” and GD posting most frequently. 71 GD-affiliated posts received the highest engagement.
Campaign topics focused on the EU integration, the economy, and local issues. The three opposition
coalitions coordinated their messaging across party and leader accounts, often criticizing the
government. The tone on official accounts remained largely neutral, with limited instances of
derogatory and defamatory content. 72 GD’s social network content was less divisive than the party’s
other campaign communications. Major contestants also utilized paid online advertisements. 73
X. CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Campaign finance is regulated by the LPU and the Election Code, supplemented by ACB regulations.
While the 2023 legal amendments reduced the annual expenditure cap for political parties and
prohibited donations from legal entities, some prior ODIHR and Council of Europe’s Group of States
against Corruption’s (GRECO) recommendations remain unaddressed, including explicit regulations
on third-party campaigning, and legal provisions related to the publication of conclusions from interim
campaign finance report prior to election day. 74
A. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
Election campaigns can be financed from public or private funding. Political parties that surpass a one
68
According to the 2023 IRI Georgian Survey of Public Opinion, 53 per cent of respondents indicated social networks
as a source of information, with 91 per cent of those indicating Facebook as the key social media platform.
69
In September, the fact-checking and debunking platform Myth Detector reported the emergence of newly-created
Facebook pages targeting political parties. In August, Meta announced the removal of a coordinated inauthentic
behaviour network originating from the Russian Federation that targeted Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. On 15
October, the State Security Service issued a statement indicating that “groups linked to domestic political actors”
were planning to release AI-manipulated content online ahead of the elections to “spark unrest”.
70
See reports from the project FactCheck by GRASS on fake news, disinformation and manipulative content
disseminated during the electoral period, as well as reports from Myth Detector’s fact-checking. Both organizations
signed the International Fact-Checking Network Code of Principles and are partners to the Meta’s fact-checking
programme. On 9 November, ISFED reported 7 fake and 15 suspicious Facebook profiles that downplayed reports
on electoral violations and reinforced CEC’s narrative. The CEC denied any connection to those profiles and
characterized the report as a deliberate attempt to undermine the reputation of the election administration.
71
Between 20 September and 26 October, the ODIHR EOM conducted a qualitative quantitative monitoring of the
activities of over 60 electoral contestants and stakeholders on Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok.
72
GD circulated a video containing edited statements from opposition politicians implying their support for war.
73
By law, online advertisement is subject to disclosure in campaign finance reports. According to data from interim
reports, political parties spent 2.7 million GEL on online advertising, of which GD spent 820,000 GEL, “Strong
Georgia – Lelo” 788,000 GEL and Ahali 733,000 GEL. According to Meta Ad Library, the official Facebook
accounts of Ahali and GD spent the most on paid advertisement in last 30 days preceding elections (70,000 EUR
and 60,200 EUR, respectively). This was followed by the official Facebook account of “Strong Georgia – Lelo”,
which spent 45,900 EUR, UNM 32,200 EUR and Girchi – NPC 31,000 EUR.
74
Moreover, the ACB regulation on transparency of political finances from 23 August 2023 does not reflect the latest
legal amendments on prohibition of electoral blocs and donations from legal entities.
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per cent threshold in the most recent parliamentary elections receive annual public funding, proportional
to the number of votes they obtained. 75 Campaigns may also be financed from monetary or in-kind
donations from natural persons. Citizens can donate up to 60,000 GEL per year. 76 Donations from legal,
foreign, anonymous, publicly funded and religious entities, as well as cash donations, are prohibited.
The ruling party held a substantial financial advantage over its competitors. Since the 2020
parliamentary elections, it has received 41 per cent of the annual budget allocation for political parties.
In 2024, it also received the highest amount of donations, significantly surpassing those of other
contestants. 77 Several opposition parties reported limited campaign budgets, further constrained by a
lack of donations, which they attributed to the economic hardships faced by the electorate and concerns
about potential scrutiny from authorities. The ACB subjected approximately 75 per cent of all political
donations to investigation to verifying the financial capacities of the donors. 78
The 2022 and 2023 legal amendments reduced the annual expenditure cap of political parties from 0.1
per cent of the national GDP to 0.04 per cent, amounting to 32 million GEL for this year. According to
campaign finance reports, all contestants’ expenditures remained well below this limit. GD and Ahali
declared the highest campaign spending, 23.4 million and 10 million GEL, respectively.
B. DISCLOSURE AND OVERSIGHT
Since 2023, party and campaign finance oversight has shifted from the State Audit Office to the newly
established ACB. The ACB enjoys budgetary independence and substantially increased human
resources compared to the previous oversight institution. However, the institution is not a collegial
body; by law, it is represented solely by its head, who is vested with the authority to make decisions on
its behalf, and is appointed by the prime minister for a six-year term, under a procedure that does not
fully ensure the institution’s independence or safeguards it from potential political influence. 79
To fully guarantee the independence of the Anti-Corruption Bureau and its decisions from political
influence, the mechanism for the appointment procedure for the head of the institution should be revised
as well as the decision-making process of the Bureau.
Political parties are required to submit annual financial reports and respond to ex officio information
75
After the 2020 elections, the total annual allocation of 12.5 million GEL was distributed among 14 parties.
Following the 2021 amendments to the LPU, which deny state funding to any political party that fails to take up at
least half of the parliamentary mandates it won, and suspend funding for six months if half of its members do not
attend parliamentary sessions without valid reasons, two parties lost their right to receive state funding.
76
1 EUR equals approximately 3 GEL.
77
GD received 5.2 million GEL per year, followed by the UNM with 2.2 million GEL and the EG with 1.1 million
GEL. According to ACB data of 25 October, in 2024, GD fundraised 14.5 million GEL, followed by Ahali (9.5
million GEL), and “Strong Georgia – Lelo” (6.6 million GEL).
78
According to the ACB report, 1,190 donations given in 2024 to 16 political parties were being verified. In case of
the EG, “Generations for Georgia”, GD, the Christian-Conservative Party of Georgia, and People’s Party, the ACB
decided to verify all received donations.
79
The head of the ACB is selected for a six year-term by the prime minister from among candidates identified by a
commission comprised of different state agencies and a CSO representative. Venice Commission, in its 2023
Opinion on the Provisions of the Law on the Fight Against Corruption Concerning the Anti-Corruption Bureau,
recognised the competition element in the selection process, but found the composition of the commission,
dominated by members representing the political majority, “not sufficiently pluralistic”. Article 14 of the Council
of Europe Recommendation Rec(2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on common rules against
corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns, stipulates that “[s]tates should provide for
independent monitoring in respect of the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns”. Paragraph 277 of
the 2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation recommends that “[t]the
respective appointment procedure needs to be carefully drafted to avoid political influence over members”.
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requests from the ACB. 80 While the ACB lacks investigative powers, it can address violations reported
to it or identified through its own monitoring. 81 It has the authority to draw up a protocol of
administration violation triggering sanctions, which are subject to court approval. 82 The law provides
the ACB with a three-month deadline for administrative proceedings related to monitoring party finance
and campaign expenses, with a possibility of extension for the same period, and general administrative
proceedings apply. 83 This limits the effectiveness of this remedy. The ACB has not issued any sanctions
for campaign finance violations before election day, citing the complexity of financial scrutiny required.
This potentially left issues such as circumvention of donation limits and under-reporting of campaign
expenditures unresolved before the elections. 84 Several opposition parties informed ODIHR EOM of
the finances of their leaders being investigated by the ACB, finding the implementation of the oversight
discretionary. 85
To contribute to transparency and ensure equitable scrutiny of all political parties, the Anti-Corruption
Bureau should develop clear regulations outlining the procedures for and methodology of political
finance oversight.
Contestants must submit campaign finance reports to the ACB every three weeks once elections are
called, with final reports due within one month of the publication of the final results. 86 All contestants
timely submitted their interim finance reports, which the ACB promptly published online. 87 However,
reports varied in detail provided and were only made available as scanned documents, which hindered
external data analysis. 88 While not legally required, the ACB published conclusions on interim
campaign finance reports one day before the elections, although these offered very limited analysis of
contestants’ actual campaign finances. 89 Overall, the system of disclosure and limited actual oversight
did not contribute to the effectiveness of campaign finance.
80
The ACB can also receive notifications from legal entities and private persons. It informed the ODIHR EOM that
some CSOs have not responded to its reported openness to cooperate.
81
The ACB informed the ODIHR EOM that it verifies the accuracy of party reports by comparing them with data
from its six field monitors and media monitoring. The ACB also has the authority to interview individuals or
summon them before a magistrate to obtain information.
82
The law provides for expedited procedures during a pre-election period for examination of administrative offence
protocols submitted by the ACB and appealing the court ruling.
83
The law provides for a six-year limitation period for the imposition of liability for the offences related to the party
and campaign finance and accountability. Prior to these elections, the ACB received only one complaint concerning
political party finances, which remained under review by election day. It also received notifications from ComCom
regarding alleged donations of free airtime by broadcasters, also under consideration at that time.
84
During the campaign period, the ACB sanctioned five individual candidates for failure to provide their property
declarations, required by law.
85
Leading politicians of the Coalition for Change, “Strong Georgia – Lelo” and the UNM informed the ODIHR EOM
that their finances were being investigated by the ACB. According to Section 11.4 of the 2013 ODIHR Guidelines
for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections “[t]he parameters of the audit must be clearly defined and applied
uniformly to all reports, in order to prevent biased auditing in favor of or against a particular candidate or party”.
86
Parties that are eligible for state funding must also submit a report on funds used from the call of the elections until
election day within 12 days after the election.
87
The first interim report was submitted by all 27 political parties registered as electoral contestants, while the second
and third were submitted by all 18 political parties that registered their candidates lists, although the “Us” party
submitted the third interim report after the deadline. The interim campaign report template includes 19 forms
requiring disclosure of donations, membership fees, loans, staff remuneration, business trips and advertising
expenses, non-financial assets, and registers of real estate, vehicles, leased and rented properties.
88
Paragraph 258 of the Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation states that “[d]igitalizing information and
submitting it to the regulatory body in its digitalized, easily searchable and reusable form can facilitate oversight
and therefore minimize the need for paper-based procedures”.
89
According to the ACB report, the agency initiated 35 administrative proceedings related to political parties and
campaign finance in 2024. It also requested clarifications on interim campaign finance reports from Ahali, GD, SA,
“Strong Georgia – Lelo”, and UNM. Additionally, the report included information about the number of scrutinized
donations and decisions related to “subjects with a declared electoral goal”.
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Consideration could be given to developing a system of financial disclosure that ensures uniformity in
the reporting formats utilized by political parties and presents such data in an accessible and user-
friendly format, thereby strengthening mechanisms for public oversight.
The ACB interpreted the existing provisions on third-party campaigning in a manner that could
potentially infringe upon the right to freedom of expression while it did not apply this approach
consistently to all campaigns conducted by non-contestants. 90 During the campaign, the ACB
designated several entities and individuals as ‘subjects with a declared electoral goal’, finding that these
had conducted campaigns in line with opposition messages. 91 Such designation would subject the
affected organizations to the same financial regulations as political parties, including a ban on receiving
international funding for certain activities. 92 Subsequently, Transparency International Georgia (TI
Georgia) which was designated in such a way, suspended its election observation activities. On 1
October, the prime minister affirmed the lawfulness of these decisions but urged the ACB to reconsider
them and refrain from making such designations in the campaign period. On 2 October, the ACB
revoked all related decisions, citing “national interests”. 93 It also did not react to third-party
campaigning in favour of GD after the prime minister’s appeal. 94 Overall, the ACB and the court
exercised broad discretionary powers in reacting to suspected third-party campaigns, indicating political
influence.
To enhance transparency, legal provisions on third-party campaigning should be strengthened and

clarified, with their application grounded in clear, objective, and foreseeable criteria to ensure
consistency and avoid arbitrary enforcement that may infringe upon freedom of expression.
The establishment of a specialized oversight body for party and campaign finance was in line with
previous ODIHR and GRECO recommendations. However, the ACB’s selective and inconsistent
application of legal provisions raised concerns about political instrumentalization. Moreover, the
transparency and effectiveness of campaign finance oversight were further constrained by legislative
gaps, limited transparency of disclosed data, and procedural ambiguities and inconsistencies in the
ACB’s auditing processes.
90
Paragraph 256 of 2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation provides
that “[t]hird parties should be free to fundraise and express views on political issues as a means of free expression,
and their activity should not be unconditionally prohibited. However, it is important that some forms of regulation,
with comparable obligations and restrictions as apply to parties and party candidates, be extended to third parties
that are involved in the campaign, to ensure transparency and accountability”.
91
The law provides for entities not registered as contestants to campaign if they publicly declare an intention to gain
power, and bounds these ‘subjects with a declared electoral goal’ by campaign finance regulations. On 27 August,
the ACB designated as ‘subjects with a declared electoral goal’ the “Freedom Square” movement and the Eastern
European Centre for Multiparty Democracy, their director and 24 members. On 24 September, Transparency
International Georgia (TI Georgia) and its executive director, as well as the “Vote for Europe” movement, its
director, and board members, received the same designation. While the law defines “subjects with a declared
electoral goal” as those who openly declare their desire to come to power, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal broadly
interpreted this provision to extend to any campaign activities, including against a contestant.
92
The ACB informed the ODIHR EOM that TI could have continued to receive grants or other forms of financial
assistance from international donors for their daily activities as a non-governmental and monitoring organization.
93
GD representatives informed the ODIHR EOM that the given status could preclude these organizations from taking
part in election observation, and the ACB wanted to avoid the discreditation of the electoral process.
94
The civil society organization “United Neutral Georgia” actively campaigned against the main opposition parties,
using online videos and public statements to discourage support for them.
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XI. MEDIA
A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
The media landscape is diverse but highly polarized, reinforcing broader political power structures.95
Media outlets operate in a financially challenging environment with an insufficient advertising market,
and are largely dependent on political and business interests, contrary to international standards. 96 The
Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) and Adjara TV and Radio, funded from the state budget, have
limited audience, while commercial TV remains the main source of political information. Smaller,
primarily internet-based outlets, generally considered to provide more independent coverage, are reliant
on international grants, and therefore, potentially have their work impacted by the Law on Transparency
of Foreign Influence.
The safety of journalists remains a major concern with several recent assaults, acts of intimidation and
instances of pressure, including on election day. 97 Despite legal safeguards for civil defamation
procedures, many recent defamation claims by public officials have been decided against opposition-
affiliated media and journalists, undermining investigative journalism and further challenging a
financially fragile media environment. 98 Most ODIHR EOM interlocutors also reported significant
barriers in accessing public information, with respective court decisions pending for years. 99
The authorities should fulfil their duty to protect the safety of media staff through effective and timely
protective measures. State authorities should promptly investigate and bring to justice those involved
in attacks on, and ill-treatment of journalists and other media actors.
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Legal provisions mandate impartiality, fairness, and pluralism in broadcasting; however, these rely on
self-regulation. In contrast, provisions on free and paid advertising, as well as debates, fall under the
direct oversight of the Georgian National Communications (ComCom). The law mandates most
broadcasters, including the commercial ones, to provide a significant amount of free airtime to
contestants. 100 Contrary to a previous ODIHR recommendation, free airtime and participation in debates
95
The most watched TV stations include Imedi, Rustavi 2 and PosTV, perceived as affiliated with GD, and Mtavari
Channel, TV Pirveli and Formula, perceived as affiliated with the opposition.
96
General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, in paragraph 25, states that for the exercise of rights under Article 25 of the
Covenant, “a free press and other media able to comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and to
inform public opinion” is essential. See also the 2018 Joint declaration by UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR, which
stipulates that politicians and public officials should refrain from taking actions which undermine the independence
of the media, such as interfering politically in the operations of or taking commercial control over regulatory bodies
or commercial, community or public service media.
97
According to the CoE Safety of Journalists Platform alert of 30 October, at least 15 incidents involving 22
journalists and media workers facing verbal and physical assaults, insults, intimidation, and obstruction were
documented on election day. On 13 November, the Special Investigation Service informed about an investigation
into 50 incidents of potential illegal obstruction of journalists’ professional activities related to the elections.
98
According to the CSO Georgian Democracy Initiative, before the elections, there were 36 pending defamation
cases, mostly filed by public officials, primarily against Formula, Mtavari Channel and Pirveli TV. Since the
beginning of the year, Pirveli TV alone has been ordered by courts to pay a total amount of 45,565 GEL in damages.
99
On 22 November 2023, a decree issued by the speaker of the parliament restricted the access of accredited
journalists to the parliament. On 28 September 2024, the public defender called on the authorities to bring legislation
on the access to public information in line with international standards and to enforce its implementation.
100
Starting 50 days prior to the elections, public and community broadcasters were required to provide a total of five
minutes of free airtime per hour, distributed among qualified contestants, while commercial TV stations with
nationwide coverage had to offer a total of 7.5 minutes every three hours. Additionally, GPB, in accordance with
the law, provided a total of 5 minutes of free airtime per hour, distributed among 12 ‘non-qualified’ contestants,
along with up to 20 minutes of daily live coverage of campaign events per contestant.
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were only granted to qualified electoral subjects. 101 “For Georgia” sought to obtain free airtime on
additional legal grounds, but was rejected by ComCom and the courts. 102 Further, based on restrictive
provisions on campaigning that “serves the campaign goals of another election subject” and their narrow
interpretation, ComCom and the courts sanctioned six broadcasters and limited opposition parties’
ability to campaign in the media (also see Election Dispute Resolution). 103
The existing system for allocation of free airtime and participation in debates should be reviewed to
provide equal campaign opportunities for all contestants. Effective remedies for related violations
should be applied promptly during the campaign. Consideration could be given to amending the law to
prioritize compensation for lost airtime over financially sanctioning media outlets.
ComCom, a collegial body with five members, is vested with licensing and oversight of broadcast
media. It is responsible for adjudicating media-related complaints, which are subject to mandatory
judicial review, if violations of the Election Code are found. 104 During the campaign period, its meetings
were broadcast online, and administrative protocols and decisions were published on its website, though
sometimes with delays. Despite 2023 amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, which introduced a
competition commission to shortlist members following an open call, the law does not provide for
transparency of the commission’s selection. Furthermore, the government retains influence over the
appointment procedure for ComCom members, which does not ensure its independence. 105 ComCom
also has excessive sanctioning power, as in cases of a repeated violation of the Law on Broadcasting,
after imposing a fine, it may suspend broadcasters’ licenses. 106 While not applied in the electoral period,
the 2023 amendments extended ComCom’s authority by introducing enforcement measures on ‘hate
speech’, ‘incitement to terrorism’, and ‘obscenity’, with the stated aim of aligning the law with the EU
Audio-Visual Media Services Directive (AVSMD). 107
101
By law, political parties and electoral blocs that are in the parliament qualify for free airtime, if they are entitled to
public funding. The 2021 Joint Opinion of ODIHR and Venice Commission stipulates that, “where the State
allocates media space, the regulation concerned should provide that free airtime and print space be allocated to all
parties on a reasonable basis, consistent with the principle of equal treatment before the law”.
102
A broadcaster may recognize a political party as qualified if it receives at least four per cent support in four
“verified” public opinion polls. The law sets overly complex and unclear requirements for a public opinion poll to
be recognized as verified. After Formula was fined 5,000 GEL by court for granting “For Georgia” free airtime
without sufficiently verifying the polls, other stations refrained from granting the party free airtime on this ground.
The ComCom informed the ODIHR EOM that the broadcaster allocated free airtime to “For Georgia” but failed to
disclose the legal grounds for this decision, resulting in a violation of the legislation.
103
GPB, Adjara TV and Radio, Mtavari Channel, TV Pirveli, Formula and Silk Media were issued warnings, while
Citizens, EG and SA were fined 10,000 GEL respectively by the CEC and court for broadcasting free airtime after
these political parties announced to join another political party, before the formal candidate registration. The content
of these ads was considered to “serve the campaign goals of another election subject”. The ComCom informed
ODIHR that it applied the law uniformly across all broadcasters.
104
On 27 August, ComCom started quantitative monitoring of 55 TV stations, as well as quantitative and qualitative
monitoring of 7 TV stations, but did not publish any conclusions prior to election day.
105
The government retains the power to intervene through “considering the qualification requirements and selection
principles” before sending the shortlist to the president. Members are voted by a simple majority in parliament. The
2003 Joint declaration by UN, OSCE and OAS representatives states that “all public authorities which exercise
formal regulatory powers over the media should be protected against interference […] including by an appointments
process for members which is transparent, allows for public input and is not controlled by any particular political
party”.
106
See paragraph 34 of the General Comment 34 to the ICCPR which stipulates that restrictions to freedom of
expression “must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function;
they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected”.
107
While the AVMSD bans “incitement to violence or hatred” and “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”,
it does not address the concept of “obscenity”. The Law on Broadcasting ambiguously defines obscenity as “an
action that contradicts the ethical norms established in society and does not have socio-political, cultural,
educational, or scientific value”.
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To strengthen its independence, the appointment procedure for members of the Georgian National
Communications Commission should be revised.
By law, broadcasters are liable for the content of political advertising. 108 Following complaints by GD,
three TV stations were repeatedly fined for refusing to air particular GD campaign ads which, in their
reasoning, violated the law, including provisions on “hate speech”. 109 Prior requests by some TV
stations to ComCom for clarification were rejected on procedural grounds. Subsequently, the two
government-aligned TV stations monitored by the ODIHR EOM stopped airing any campaign
advertisements by opposition parties on 11 October. 110 Complaints filed by “Strong Georgia – Lelo”
and “Unity – to Save Georgia” were upheld in court and several government-aligned broadcasters were
fined. 111 However, as the law did not provide for expedited procedures, the violations were not
remedied, undermining equal opportunities for all contestants to campaign. 112
The media should be exempted from liability for disseminating unlawful statements made directly by
parties or candidates, whether in the context of live broadcasting or advertising, unless the statements
have been ruled unlawful by a court or the statements constitute direct incitement to violence.
C. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN
Between 18 September and 25 October, the ODIHR EOM conducted quantitative and qualitative
monitoring of six TV stations and two online media outlets. 113 The monitoring showed bias across all
monitored TV stations, with legal obligations for impartial news coverage unimplemented on
commercial television. In its coverage of all contestants, the public broadcaster GPB was mostly
positive or neutral in tone (89 per cent), but the majority of its campaign coverage was allocated to GD
(61 per cent). As representatives of most opposition parties declined participation in the only debate
aired on GPB, , no debate occurred between the ruling parties and major opposition.
Most TV stations dedicated the majority of campaign coverage in news to GD. The tone on commercial
TV reflected the publicly perceived party alignments of broadcasters. GPB, Formula, Imedi, Mtavari
Channel, Rustavi 2 and TV Pirveli devoted 61, 56, 82, 52, 80 and 51 per cent of their campaign news
coverage to GD, respectively. On Formula, 89 per cent of GD’s campaign was presented in a negative
tone, while 88 per cent of the campaign coverage of the “Coalition for Change” was positive. On Imedi,
89 per cent of the campaign coverage of “For Georgia” was in negative tone, while 80 of GD’s campaign
coverage was positive. On Mtavari Channel, 90 per cent of GD’s coverage was in negative tone, while
82 per cent of coverage of “Coalition for Change” was positive. On Rustavi 2, 66 per cent of the
coverage of “Unity – to Save Georgia” was in a negative tone, while 68 per cent of GD’s coverage was
positive. On TV Pirveli, 91 per cent of GD’s campaign coverage was negative, while 50, 54 and 56 of
the coverage of “Coalition for Change”, “Strong Georgia” and “Unity – to Save Georgia” was positive.
108
A 2021 Supreme Court Decision and the 2024 ComCom Guidelines require broadcasters to ensure that content is
in line with the Constitution and the law, including vague provisions on “incitement to aggression and chaos” and
“dangerous actions”. A 2009 Joint declaration by UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR stipulates that media should “be
exempted from liability for disseminating unlawful statements made directly by parties or candidates”.
109
Mtavari Channel, Pirveli TV and Formula were fined 15,000 GEL each for refusing ads portraying CSOs in the
context of “moral degradation”, and the choice between war and peace with pictures of war-torn Ukraine.
110
On 10 October, Imedi and PosTV announced that they would not air any ads by the “collective UNM” to “eliminate
the disbalance”.
111
Following complaints by “Strong Georgia”, Imedi and Rustavi 2 were fined for ceasing to air their paid ads, while
the party was not qualified for free airtime. “Strong Georgia’s” request for immediate enforcement was not granted.
Upon UNM complaints, Imedi, Rustavi 2, Maestro and Pos TV were fined for not airing their advertising.
112
See Paragraph 7.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, which provides for “unimpeded access to the media
on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral
process”. See also section I.2.3 of the Code of Good Practice which requires equality of opportunity.
113
GPB, Formula, Imedi, Mtavari Channel, TV Pirveli and Rustavi 2, as well as netgazeti.ge and tabula.ge.
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Overall, commercial media outlets monitored by the ODIHR EOM were instrumentalized for political
propaganda, undermining independent news production and amplifying divisive political rhetoric. The
lack of impartial analysis of party programmes and the refusal of senior political actors and prominent
parties to debate, challenged voters’ ability to make an informed choice.
XII. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES
Georgia has ratified the key international conventions on protecting minority rights. While the
Constitution grants full political rights and prohibits discrimination on national, ethnic, religious, or
linguistic grounds, there are limited legal provisions specifically addressing the rights of ethnic
minorities. 114 The formation of political parties that promote ethnic discord or have a regional character
is prohibited.
National minorities remain underrepresented in public and political life.115 Minorities constitute 13 per
cent of the population, with Azerbaijanis (6.3 per cent) and Armenians (4.5 per cent) being the largest
groups. However, in these elections, only some 5 per cent of the candidates were from minority
communities, and few held advantageous positions on candidate lists. 116 Campaign events featured
minimal outreach or messaging specifically directed at these communities, and the representation of
minority community members among speakers was low. In some instances, use of minority languages
was observed during campaign activities. 117 In at least one instance, alleged belonging to an ethnic
minority was used as a derogatory accusation. 118
The CEC took positive steps by preparing voter education and electoral materials, including ballot
papers, in Armenian and Azerbaijani languages. However, the law grants the CEC discretion over the
provision of materials in minority languages, resulting in inconsistencies in their availability.119
114
These include regulations of the 2015 Law on the Official Language providing for the right to access to public
information in minority languages, as well as for the use of minority languages in public institutions and during
official events; those rights are limited to the national minority areas. The Election Code provides for the use of the
minority languages in electoral processes in the municipalities compactly inhabited by national minorities. Number
of provisions concerning elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equality, also applicable to national
minorities, are enshrined in the Law on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, the Law on the State Language,
the Government Program 2025-2028, the National Strategy for the Protection of Human Rights in Georgia for 2022-
2030, and other state strategies and action plans.
115
The 2024 Fourth Opinion on Georgia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities states that “At the government level, persons belonging to national
minorities are still very rarely or not at all represented in central government bodies […] The representation of
national minorities in local councils of the municipalities where persons belonging to minorities live in substantial
numbers is disproportionately low […] with the exception of local councils of two municipalities”.
116
National minority representatives constituted 6 per cent of the candidates within the first 10 positions. No list was
led by an ethnic-minority candidate, and three lists included no minority representatives. The highest percentages
of national minority representatives appeared on the lists of the Party of Georgian Unity and Development (19 per
cent), “Our United Georgia” (16 per cent), and Tribuna (13 per cent), none of which passed the electoral threshold.
117
Of the campaign events observed by the EOM, Azerbaijani was used at an Ahali event in Mtskheta and a UNM one
in Kabali. Ahali, GD, and “Strong Georgia – Lelo” placed posters in Azerbaijani in Sagarejo. “For Georgia”
distributed campaign materials in Armenian in Akhalkalaki and “Strong Georgia – Lelo” in Azerbaijani in
Gardabani.
118
On 11 October, PosTV alleged that a “Strong Georgia – Lelo” leader was of Armenian descent; the public defender
deemed the broadcast discriminatory.
119
By law, voter lists for polling stations in areas with national minority populations must be posted in the respective
minority languages on the CEC website. However, the preparation of ballots in minority languages is contingent
on the necessity as assessed by the CEC. If ballots are produced in a minority language, logbooks and summary
protocols may, but are not required to, be provided in that language. Additionally, no provision mandates voter
education and information to be available in minority languages.
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Moreover, PEC members in areas with significant national minority populations were primarily trained
in Georgian, with the option to receive materials in their native languages. The user interface of the
electronic voting technologies was only available in Georgian, which limited the ability of PEC
members and voters from minority communities to fully understand and effectively operate the
devices. 120 National minorities constituted only two per cent of the DEC members. 121 Six elected MPs
represent national minority communities, none of whom are women.
To ensure equal access to information and ability to participate in the process, clear guidelines on the
provision of voter information and materials in minority languages should be established. The user
interface of the electronic voting technologies should be available in minority languages in areas
mandated to provide voter materials in those languages.
XIII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In 2022, some deadlines for election dispute resolution were extended, while deadlines for imposing
disciplinary liability were shortened, partly addressing previous ODIHR and Venice Commission
recommendations. Nevertheless, most deadlines for handling election disputes are lengthy and fail to
ensure a timely and efficient process to address electoral violations. 122 Procedures at the Court of Appeal
lack an expedited resolution for administrative offences, which left some appeals unresolved before
elections. 123 The law does not provide broad legal standing to all, contrary to international standards. It
only grants broad legal standing to contestants and observer organizations, while voters can only file
complaints on their registration or non-inclusion on the voter list. 124 Decisions made by an election
commission can be appealed to a higher commission, and then a district or city court, with the Court of
Appeals serving as the final instance.
To guarantee effective remedy, the electoral dispute resolution framework should be reviewed to
broaden the legal standing of voters, and adjust legal deadlines, allowing adequate time for the
preparation and adjudication of complaints and administrative offences while ensuring duly expedited
procedure, in line with international good practice.
Most complaints were handled by CEC or DEC chairpersons rather than the full commissions,
120
The 2023 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Report on Georgia states that “according
to the 2014 census, 44.5% of the ethnic Armenians and 73.9% of the ethnic Azerbaijani citizens had poor
competence in the state language”. Paragraph 1 of the 2017 Council of Europe (CoE) Recommendations on E-
voting stipulates that “[t]he voter interface of an e-voting system shall be easy to understand and use by all voters”.
121
According to the CEC, of the 1,241 DEC members, 24 are of Armenian and 1 was of Azerbaijani ethnicity.
122
The law grants two-day deadlines to appeal most DEC and CEC decisions and adjudicate appeals, while parties
have only one or two days, respectively, to appeal the ruling, and the Court of Appeal shall decide on the case
within two days. The law provides the election administration with ten-day deadlines to respond to applications for
drawing up administrative offence protocols and for court decisions on these protocols, compared to the two-day
deadline for ComCom and the court to address offences by broadcasters. The dismissal by a commission chair to
draw up a protocol can be appealed within two days; in case of misuse of administrative resources, the complainant
and the court have one day each to appeal and adjudicate. Guideline II.3.3.g of the Code of Good Practice suggests
“a time limit of three to five days at first instance (both for lodging appeals and making rulings)”.
123
For administrative offences, parties have 10 days to appeal a first-instance court ruling, and the Court of Appeal
has up to 30 days to decide. While the Court of Appeal generally ruled within 15 days, this limited “Strong Georgia”
and UNM’s opportunity to campaign on Imedi and Rustavi 2, as broadcasters refused to air opposition ads pending
a final court ruling.
124
Article 2.3(a) of the ICCPR states that “any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy”. Guideline II.3.3.f of the Code of Good Practice provides that “all candidates and all
voters registered in the constituency concerned must be entitled to appeal”.
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weakening their status as a collegial body, and negatively impacting transparency. 125 Prior to election
day, only 25 out of 231 complaints (11 per cent) lodged with the election administration were handled
in open sessions. 126 The CEC maintains an online database of complaints reviewed by election
commissions or adjudicated by courts, which was generally comprehensive. 127 However, courts and
administrative bodies did not publish judgments on challenged decisions and administrative offences,
citing a lack of human resources to redact personal data, despite the legal obligation for courts to do
so. 128
The majority of the 231 complaints filed with election commissions before election day concerned the
appointment and operation of PECs, mobile voter lists, alleged misuse of administrative resources, and
campaign violations. 129 While most were reviewed on merits, they were often dismissed as
unsubstantiated without adequate investigation. 130 The ComCom and the election administration
initiated proceedings into some 50 administrative offences, mostly for violations of airtime allocation
rules and the misuse of administrative resources; all such motions were upheld by the court. 131 In open
sessions, the Tbilisi City Court handled more than 50 election-related disputes, while the Tbilisi Court
of Appeals decided on 27 appeals and partially satisfied 2 of them. 132 The examination and adjudication
of cases by the administrative bodies and the court revealed both ambiguities in the legislation and
inconsistencies in its application (see also Media and Campaign Finance). 133 Some decisions and
judgments lacked sufficient substantiation, particularly where the legal interpretation was questionable,
125
Election commission chairpersons may deny the consideration of any complaint without it being reviewed by the
commission; the majority of complaints were dismissed following this procedure. Chairpersons also unilaterally
decide on drawing up protocols for administrative offences.
126
While the CEC examined 17 out of 40 pre-election complaints in open sessions, 183 out of 191 DEC decisions on
complaints were signed by the chairpersons only, indicating unilateral adoption of the decision.
127
The CEC did not publish six protocols of administrative offences against three political parties drawn up upon the
referral of information by ComCom for violations of the airtime rules, and the court rulings sanctioning the
contestants are not publicly available.
128
The Law on Common Courts mandates that all court decisions shall be published online and be depersonalised.
129
Of these, 15 complaints related to the appointment of PEC members, alleging links with or support to the ruling
party, while 83 were filed mostly by the UNM, mostly on the same day, in selected locations, concerning the late
opening of PECs and their operations. Some 110 complaints concerned alleged violations of campaign rules, and
misuse of administrative resources, among other issues, with 11 satisfied. In total, disciplinary measures were
requested in some 70 complaints, with 5 being satisfied. Some 140 complaints were filed by UNM, 5 by “Coalition
for Change”, and 1 by GD.
130
Many complaints at DEC level regarding the alleged misuse of administrative resources were dismissed solely
based on the denial or response of the alleged violator.
131
The law sets very short, one-day deadlines for adjudication of appeals and appealing the ruling related to alleged
misuse of administrative resources during the campaign, differing from the deadlines set for other election-related
complaints. However, the courts applied regular election-related deadlines to such appeals.
132
The courts dismissed complaints against CEC decisions on matters such as opening polling stations abroad, setting
remuneration for election commission members, and adjusting procedural deadlines. Among first-instance cases,
only motions from election commission chairs seeking sanctions for administrative offenses and one UNM appeal
against a DEC’s refusal to hold a mayor’s staff member accountable for misuse of administrative resources were
upheld, resulting in a warning; all other cases were dismissed. In one case involving airtime usage, the fine was
reduced, while in another, the Court of Appeal annulled the CEC’s refusal to register a contestant and instructed
the CEC to reconsider the matter.
133
The law contains conflicting provisions on eligibility for free airtime, broadcaster obligations to air political ads,
the ban on pre-electoral blocs, and restrictions on using airtime to “serve the campaigning goals of another electoral
subject”. This, combined with the discrepancy in the time frames for candidate registration and campaign period,
led to three opposition parties and six broadcasters being sanctioned by the CEC, ComCom, and courts for airing
ads against the ruling party, deemed to benefit a publicly announced coalition that lacked legal status. The election
administration did not follow the same reasoning in the alleged misuse of administrative resources by prospective
GD candidates, stating that restrictions apply only after candidate registration concludes.
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raising concerns over possible bias. 134
To further increase transparency and confidence in election dispute resolution, all disputes should be
handled by election commissions collegially and in open sessions, based on thorough consideration of
the substance of complaints. All judicial acts, decisions and protocols should be well substantiated and
based on sound interpretation of the law and promptly published online.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) launched investigations into 31 incidents (as of 25 October)
concerning election-related violence and property damage; however, no charges were filed. Throughout
the electoral period, trust in law-enforcement, the election administration, and the judiciary to
effectively and impartially adjudicate politically sensitive matters remained low. This, combined with
a prolonged lack of resolution of these matters and limited outreach to affected parties, discouraged
some victims from reporting their grievances. 135 Furthermore, restrictive deadlines, insufficient
investigation and adjudication of complaints, inconsistent application of the law, and a lack of
transparency collectively undermined the right to an effective remedy, at odds with the OSCE
commitments and international standards. 136
XIV. ELECTION OBSERVATION
The law provides for citizen and international election observation, as well as observation by
representatives of contestants. 137 In an inclusive manner, the CEC accredited 101 citizen observer
groups with 23,153 observers, as well as 76 international organizations and diplomatic representations
with 1,713 observers. Contributing to transparency, several citizen observer groups conducted long-
term observation activities, focusing on the assessment of the legal framework, pre-electoral
environment, misuse of administrative resources, and electoral dispute resolution. 138
While the observation scene was vibrant, many CSOs reported on the stigmatizing impact of the Law
on Transparency of Foreign Influence before and during the election period. This, coupled with potential
sanctions for non-compliance, hindered their ability to operate in an environment free from undue
pressure. Some organizations were also targeted by discrediting campaigning from state authorities and
134
For example, cases of alleged campaigning online by public officials and election administration members through
their personal social media accounts in support of the ruling party were dismissed based on the official’s accounts.
In similar cases against opposition supporters, sanctions were imposed.
135
In some publicly reported instances of damaging party property and campaign materials, MIA did not launch
inquiries, citing a lack of official criminal reports. These incidents, together with other cases, were discussed at the
Interagency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections (IATF), mandated to prevent and react to election-related
violations by public officials. By the election day, the IATF had nine meetings and mostly discussed issues reported
in media. Representatives of opposition parties provided limited information on incidents and did not attend the
meetings considering them ineffective.
136
Paragraph 5.10 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that everyone shall “have an effective means of
redress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect for fundamental rights”. See also the
2022 Concluding observations by the UN Human Rights Committee, which expressed concerns over “reports of
the persistent lack of independence and impartiality in the judiciary of the State party”.
137
Domestic non-profit organizations registered at least one year before election day, as well as foreign and
international organizations with statutes supporting election observation and/or human rights protection, may apply
for observer accreditation.
138
Among other organizations, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) assessed the
electoral legal framework, the work of the election administration and campaign finance, the Georgian Young
Lawyers Association (GYLA) focused on human rights, rule of law, and democratic governance, TI Georgia
monitored political finance, gender-related issues, and the Public Movement Multinational Georgia (PMMG)
advocated for the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority communities.
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the ruling party, which aimed to undermine public confidence in their credibility. 139 On election day,
several citizen observer groups reported instances of intimidation of their representatives and
interference of their work by polling personnel (see Election Day). The failure to safeguard the work of
election observers is at odds with Georgia’s OSCE commitments. 140
The December 2022, legal amendments introduced measures to prevent party-affiliated individuals
from serving as citizen observers. However, some political parties continued to register their affiliates
through citizen observer groups to increase their presence at polling stations. Reports from IEOM
observers indicated that such individuals frequently interfered in PEC operations and were involved in
the tracking of voters, often on behalf of the ruling party (see Election Day). 141 The misuse of citizen
observation for political purposes may have undermined the observers’ watchdog role and, in some
cases, contributed to an atmosphere of voter intimidation.
To ensure the integrity of election observation, authorities should guarantee that citizen observers can
operate free from pressure or intimidation and have unimpeded access to all relevant information.
To maintain a clear separation between partisan and non-partisan observation, observer status should
not be misused by political parties.
XV. ELECTION DAY
While procedurally election day was generally orderly administered, it was marked by a tense
environment due to widespread indications of pressure on voters, numerous reports of voters feeling
pressured, voter tracking primarily by ruling party structures and affiliates, overcrowding at many
polling stations, and frequent breaches of vote secrecy. Additionally, several incidents of physical
altercations and intimidation occurred. 142 Access to polling stations posed significant challenges for
voters with disabilities, as some 65 per cent of polling stations were difficult for wheelchair users to
access, and 38 per cent had unsuitable interior layouts.
A. OPENING AND VOTING
Most polling stations opened on time, with only a few delays noted due to organizational issues and
difficulties in setting up voter identification and vote counting devices (VIDs and VCDs). The opening
of polls was positively evaluated at 212 of the 223 polling stations observed, with prescribed procedures
139
On 24 September, the ACB designated TI Georgia as a ‘subject with a declared electoral goal’, following which
the organization suspended their election observation activities. These activities only resumed after the ACB
withdrew the designation on 2 October.
140
Paragraph 8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document states that “the participating States consider that
the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States”.
141
Two organizations with the highest numbers of individuals registered to observe, the International Observatory of
Advocates and Lawyers (2,491 observers) and Politics and Law Observer (2,654 observers), as well as Training
and Development Institute of Georgia (1,364 observers) were reported to have demonstrated affiliation with the
ruling party. By contrast, observers from Free Voice (1,610 observers), Monitoring Centre – Society (1,038
observer), Social Environment (206 observers) and American Support League (234 observers) appeared to be
associated with various opposition forces. While deploying considerable numbers of observers, similarly to
previous elections, these groups did not publish any reports on their findings.
142
Most notably, there were reports of UNM activists injured in altercations in Marneuli and Tbilisi, where one of the
UNM members required hospitalization. In Khobi, Tbilisi, Tsalenjikha, and Zugdidi, both opposition and ruling
party supporters initiated verbal and physical confrontations. Opposition parties reported the presence of alleged
criminal groups in the vicinity of polling stations in nine locations. During election day, the president and the public
defender called for a response from the law enforcement agencies. In one instance, IEOM observers faced direct
intimidation and damage to their vehicle.
Georgia Page: 30
largely followed. Negative assessments were primarily related to PEC’s insufficient knowledge of the
procedures or the presence of unauthorized persons, including candidate representatives and citizen
observers, assisting in preparations for the opening.
In most cases, voting was assessed as procedurally well-organized. However, in 6 per cent of the 1,924
observations, which is a significant number, the process was assessed negatively, mainly due to
indications of voter pressure and intimidation, sometimes accompanied by tension, unrest and
overcrowding. While not against the law, party representatives, mostly from GD, video-recorded the
voting process at most polling stations. This, as observed, had an intimidating effect, as the cameras
were often directed at VIDs or polling booths, potentially compromising the secrecy of the vote. 143
Unknown individuals were observed tracking voters outside polling premises (10 per cent), frequently
within the prohibited 100-metre perimeter. Party representatives in polling stations were also reported
tracking voters in 7 per cent of the observations. This widespread perception of voter intimidation
conflicts with OSCE commitments and other international standards. 144 IEOM observers reported group
or family voting at 4 per cent of the polling stations. Observers received some credible reports on vote
buying. 145
Effective measures should be taken to ensure that citizens exercise their voting rights in an atmosphere
free from intimidation and pressure on election day, and the responsible authorities should address
such practices and promptly respond to reported cases.
Potential compromises to vote secrecy were observed in 24 per cent of observations due to how ballots
are inserted into ballot boxes, in 12 per cent due to how they marked their ballots, and in 7 per cent due
to inadequate polling station layouts. IEOM observers identified several factors contributing to these
breaches, including the proximity of PEC members, contestant representatives, or observers to ballot
boxes or polling booths (16 per cent of all observations), overcrowding (16 per cent), improper use of
sleeves or envelopes (9 per cent), marks bleeding through ballots (6 per cent), as well as the use of
cameras, which could disclose voters’ choices. These issues, compounded by rumours that VCDs could
be used to track voters’ choices, contributed to a perception among many voters that the secrecy of their
vote was violated.
Authorities should take all necessary measures to ensure vote secrecy, including by improving polling
station layouts and the design of the electoral materials. Election commissions should rigorously
implement procedural safeguards, prevent overcrowding and undue tracking of voters at polling
stations.
Additional serious procedural inconsistencies included voters’ fingers not consistently checked for ink
(7 per cent of all observations, including 10 per cent in polling stations using traditional voting method)
or not always being inked before voting (4 per cent of all polling stations). Voter identification devices
sometimes failed to read voters’ IDs, requiring manual data entry, which was also necessary for voters
using passports, making the process prone to human error and potential misuse. Several citizen observer
organizations reported obstruction by PEC members during observation of voter verification and raised
143
The CEC Decree No. 42/2012, which regulates the use of cameras in polling stations, prescribes that any recording
must be conducted from a specifically designated place, at least three metres from the object where possible,
ensuring that a ballot box is visible.
144
Paragraph 7.7 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document requires campaigning to “be conducted in a fair and free
atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates
from freely presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or
from casting their vote free of fear of retribution”. Paragraph 19 of the 1996 UNCHR General Comment 25 to the
ICCPR stipulates that “voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence,
compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference”.
145
In addition, the CEC reported that voting was cancelled at one polling station in Marneuli due to ballot box stuffing.
Georgia Page: 31
concerns that the layout hindered meaningful observation, as voter registrar tables were frequently
positioned to block clear view of the procedures.
To enhance the integrity of the voting process and strengthen public trust, the authorities should
reinforce transparency and improve the rigour and effectiveness of voter identification procedures. For
the use of voter identification devices, measures to minimize the manual entry of personal numbers at
polling stations should be explored.
VIDs and VCDs were fully operational in 99 and 98 per cent of applicable cases, with exceptions mainly
due to defective equipment and occasional synchronization issues between VIDs. 146 While almost all
PECs were familiar with handling of the devices, in 9 per cent of cases, not all voters received adequate
instructions on marking and casting ballots, which is an important measure to reduce invalid ballots and
ensure vote secrecy. At polling stations using the traditional voting method, this procedure to instruct
voters on the procedures was neglected by PEC registrars in 26 per cent of the observations. At 54 per
cent of the polling stations using devices, some voters did not fully understand how to cast their ballots.
Party representatives were present at 97 per cent of polling stations, and citizen observers in 89 per cent,
contributing to transparency. However, IEOM observers noted that in 28 per cent of cases, individuals
accredited as observers appeared to act on behalf of contestants, undermining their watchdog role. In 7
per cent of observations, unauthorized persons, mainly contestant representatives and citizen observers,
interfered in voter verification, provided instructions to voters, or assisted with ballot handling. Citizen
observers also reported incidents of pressure and threats from PEC members and party representatives.
In some cases, they were denied the right to file complaints with PECs, record their remarks in the PEC
logbook, and, in isolated instances, were expelled from polling stations.
B. COUNTING AND TABULATION
Polling stations generally closed on time. Preliminary results were established by VCDs at polling
stations using electronic devices, while official results were based on mandatory manual count at all
polling stations. 147 IEOM observers assessed the counting negatively at 24 of the 195 polling stations
observed, which is a high number, citing procedural errors and PECs’ insufficient understanding of the
procedures. Observed shortcomings included failing to follow the prescribed order in 50 cases,
neglecting to invalidate unused ballots in 40 cases, and not packing electoral materials before starting
the count according to procedures in 67 cases. In 28 cases, the choice on each ballot was not announced
aloud during counting.
During the manual count, ballot validity was not fully determined according to regulations in 23 cases
and was inconsistently applied in 21 cases, primarily at polling stations using VCDs. In 38 cases, minor
discrepancies were observed between VCD results and manual counts, mainly due to differing criteria
for ballot validity. 148 Observers noted difficulties in completing results protocols in 31 cases. Due to
counting errors, corrections or recounts were requested in 42 instances. Contestant representatives and
citizen observers were present at nearly all polling stations (188 and 176 observations, respectively).
However, interference by contestant representatives, local or state officials, or citizen observers was
observed in 27 instances. At 37 polling stations, the PECs did not publicly display a signed copy of the
146
According to the CEC, of the total of 15,000 devices deployed on election day, only 20 experienced serious
malfunctions, eventually being put out of operation; however, the voting process could continue without a need to
revert to the traditional ballot casting method in all polling stations.
147
After election day, the CEC informed that seven PECs had not correctly synchronized and consolidated results from
all VCDs which led to significant discrepancies between the results of the manual count and the data reflected in
the initial VCD results reports uploaded online.
148
These differences included accepting ballots with incorrect marks where voter intent was clear or invalidating
ballots with marks accidentally crossing the designated circles.
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results protocol, limiting transparency.
On election night, DECs were mandated to verify the correctness of PEC results protocols and, when
necessary, conduct recounts to address discrepancies. Although the handling of election materials in all
73 DECs observed was positively assessed, in 9 observations, the DECs did not consistently verify the
protocols, and in 5, DECs did not perform this procedure at all. While precinct results and copies of
protocols were promptly uploaded to the CEC website, other important data, such as voter turnout per
polling station and the number of invalid votes were not published in user-friendly formats. 149 The
tabulation of preliminary results was conducted at the CEC, without party representatives and observers.
Most DECs conducted the legally required district-level tabulation several days later, reducing
transparency.
In line with legal provisions, amendments to results protocols in cases of discrepancies should occur at
the DEC level and be conducted transparently, with the participation of party representatives and
observers. The CEC should promptly publish voter turnout data alongside preliminary results and the
number of invalid votes per polling station.
After the closing of the polls, the CEC posted partial results, received electronically from polling
stations with devices, and announced preliminary results based on results from 97 per cent of these
polling stations at 21:45.
XVI. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS
On election night, shortly after the preliminary results were released, all opposition parties that passed
the threshold, along with the president, rejected the results that indicated a victory of the ruling party.
They cited irregularities reported by citizen observers and party representatives both before and on
election day. 150 These included voter intimidation and impersonation, vote buying, breaches of vote
secrecy, and alleged interference in the process from the Russian Federation. The government dismissed
these claims and accused the opposition of intending to incite disorder. 151
Preliminary reports from key observer organizations, many of which were published the day after,
largely reflected their concerns about election-day based on the observations carried out by them. 152
ISFED stated that the official preliminary results aligned with its parallel vote tabulation (PVT) but
maintained that these results did not represent a genuine expression of the voters’ will due to serious
concerns about the process, and decided not to publish the PVT results. Also, two days after election
day, the “My Vote for EU” observer coalition, led by TI Georgia, asserted that the observed and alleged
violations were evidence of orchestrated electoral manipulation. Echoing these claims, on 31 October,
all opposition parties announced plans to renounce their parliamentary seats, form an inter-party
coalition with the president, and called for an international investigation into the electoral process. 153
Starting on 28 October, several rallies organised by opposition parties and civil society organisations
took place in Tbilisi and Batumi, reiterating these demands. Of serious concern, on 19 November, the
149
Using a double-entry procedure, data entry clerks at the CEC digitalized data from photos of results protocols sent
by the PECs after the manual count.
150
According to the CEC’s preliminary results, the GD won 54 per cent of votes, followed by Ahali with 11 per cent
of votes, UNM with 10 per cent, “Strong Georgia – Lelo” with 8.8 per cent and “For Georgia” with 7.7 per cent.
151
The prime minister stated that the opposition “lacked the dignity to accept its defeat”, while the speaker of the
parliament accused the opposition and CSOs of spreading disinformation about electoral violations.
152
These reports noted various procedural irregularities and shortcomings, though not assessed as systemic or
orchestrated, as well as isolated cases of major violations, such as vote buying, ballot box stuffing, intimidation of
voters, and multiple voting. See reports by ISFED, GYLA, TI Georgia’s “My Vote for EU”, and PMMG.
153
See the report by “My Vote for EU”.
Georgia Page: 33
police used excessive force to disperse a demonstration, which was condemned by CSOs and ODIHR
as well as other international organizations (see below for concerns about the handling of subsequent
demonstrations). 154
On 29 October, in accordance with the law, all DECs conducted a recount of results from 366 randomly
selected precincts. Some 91 per cent of the recounts confirmed the results initially reported by PECs,
while 32 cases required minor modifications to the results protocols. The CEC also issued several
statements denying allegations of manipulation, and, in some instances, reported intimidation or threats
against its members, including the chairperson. 155
On election day and in the immediate aftermath, DECs received 1,203 complaints from observers and
contestants, including 537 requests for recounts or invalidation of results, 466 requests for disciplinary
action against PEC members, and complaints about obstruction of observers’ and party representatives’
rights. 156 Most complaints were dismissed, with 170 fully or partially upheld, primarily concerning
disciplinary actions for polling staff. 157 Another 107 complaints were dismissed on technical grounds.
DECs reviewed most complaints on their merits within legal deadlines, in open sessions. However, the
handling of most complaints lacked substantive consideration, especially where multiple complaints
were examined in a single session. Some DECs restricted the right of complainants to be heard. 158
Sixty-six DEC decisions were appealed in district or city courts, all reviewed in public hearings. 159 Only
two appeals were granted, but both were eventually overturned by the Court of Appeal in favour of the
DECs. 160 All appeals filed by observers and contestants in the Court of Appeal were dismissed, without
the court providing legal or factual grounds. 161 In one instance, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal failed to
meet the legal two-day deadline for adjudication. 162 In most observed hearings, the substantive
154
ISFED, TI Georgia, and the Civil Society Foundation condemned the violations of freedoms of association and
expression during the protest. On 19 November, the Public Defender’s Office reported visiting 16 detainees and
two hospitalised individuals; ten were reportedly victims of police ill-treatment or excessive force. ODIHR
expressed concerns about the excessive use of force and urged authorities to engage in peaceful dialogue.
155
Among other things, CEC statements addressed allegations of electoral manipulation, including multiple voting
and widespread breaches of vote secrecy; the quality of ballot papers; instances of discrepancies observed between
results produced by VCDs and the official PEC results protocols; alleged irregularities unearthed through the
statistical examination of voter turnout or through the analysis of gender-related data of voters.
156
Many complaints cited failures in inking procedures, unsealed election materials (such as mobile ballot boxes and
PEC logbooks), or improper packaging of invalid ballots.
157
Following 27 requests, results from 12 mobile ballot boxes were invalidated, although these largely overlapped
with recounts conducted ex officio by DECs.
158
In all observed cases, DEC members were seemingly not provided with case materials in advance of the DEC
session and, in many instances, made their decisions on the spot following a brief presentation of the case.
159
The appeals were filed primarily regarding procedural irregularities, with some also addressing potential breaches
of vote secrecy and alleged irregularities in the voter lists uploaded to the voter identification devices.
160
Based on ISFED’s appeal, the Gori district court ordered a recount of invalid ballots in 15 polling stations, while
the Tetritskaro court, acting on GYLA’s appeal, found that the existing procedures did not ensure the secrecy of
the vote and invalidated the results of 30 polling stations where technology was used. In Tetritskaro, the court
proactively brought in a vote-counting device to review the voting process. While GYLA lodged similar complaints
in all district and city courts, all of its other appeals were dismissed, and the courts did not conduct similar
examination of evidence.
161
While first-instance courts must issue motivated rulings within one day, the Court of Appeal is not under such
obligation. The Kutaisi Court of Appeal consolidated several appeals lodged by GYLA and TI Georgia into a single
case; after a two-day hearing, all appeals were dismissed. Similarly, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal merged 25 appeals,
not all related to the same issues, and one from a DEC and dismissed all appeals lodged by citizen observers as
ungrounded, while granting the DEC’s appeal, following an almost 24-hour review. The Tbilisi Court of Appeals
left six appeals without consideration due to the violation of deadlines, and dismissed the other 14 appeals as
ungrounded.
162
The hearings on several appeals were initially scheduled for 6 November but were adjourned to the afternoon of 7
November, the final day for adjudication, and subsequently merged. The late start and voluminous nature of the
appeals resulted in a failure to meet the deadline.
Georgia Page: 34
examination of cases was limited. Following the summarization of results by DECs on 7 November,
GYLA, UNM and “Strong Georgia – Lelo” filed complaints with the CEC to invalidate the results due
to breaches of vote secrecy. These were dismissed by both the CEC and the court; the Court of Appeal
examined the case without oral hearing.
The CEC announced the final results on 16 November in a session disrupted by opposition members,
leading to a physical assault of the chairperson. Prior the announcement, all elected MPs from the
Coalition for Change, UNM and “Strong Georgia – Lelo” renounced their seats, while For Georgia
declared the newly elected parliament illegitimate. 163 Subsequently, GYLA, UNM, Strong Georgia, and
Gakharia for Georgia unsuccessfully challenged the final summary protocol in court, seeking its
cancellation and a re-run. On 19 November, the president and 30 opposition MPs filed two lawsuits
with the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the norms regulating the elections, and
the elections held under them, citing failure to ensure vote secrecy and universal suffrage. 164 These
lawsuits did not halt convening the first session of parliament and the announcement of recognition of
mandates. The inaugural session of the parliament on 25 November was attended solely by GD MPs.
Of the 150 elected candidates, only 34 are women (23 percent), marking a slight increase from the
previous composition, which was initially 21 percent and decreased to 19 percent over the term. Among
the 89 MPs who took their seats, 12 (13 per cent) are women. On 30 November, the president declared
the parliament illegitimate and claimed to be the sole “independent and legitimate institution” in the
country. The Constitutional Court eventually found the appeals from the President and the 30 opposition
MPs inadmissible on 3 December.
On 28 November, in response to EP statements on the elections, the government postponed EU

accession negotiations until 2028 and rejected EU financial assistance until that date. This decision
sparked large-scale protests in Tbilisi and other major cities. The Speaker of Parliament and government
officials accused protesters of violent behaviour on various occasions. Some demonstrations led to
violent clashes, were forcibly suppressed, and resulted in numerous arrests, raising serious concerns
regarding compliance with OSCE commitments to freedom of assembly, as it was noted by several
CSOs, ODIHR and international organizations. 165
On 14 December, a 300-member electoral college comprised of GD and affiliated legislature members,

local, and regional councillors convened to elect a successor to President Zourabichvili as her term
neared expiration. Amid ongoing protests in Tbilisi and other cities, Mikheil Kavelashvili was declared
president as the sole candidate. President Zourabichvili, opposition parties, and several civil society
organisations refused to recognise the election’s legitimacy, with President Zourabichvili stating her
intent to remain in office until new parliamentary elections. On 16 December, the EU Foreign Affairs
Council discussed recent developments in Georgia, noting democratic backsliding and announcing
163
The Constitution mandates that the President convene the first meeting of the newly elected Parliament no later
than the tenth day following the official announcement of election results. Parliament attains full authority once the
mandates of at least 100 members are recognised. By law, the names of individuals whose election is contested
before the Constitutional Court or courts of general jurisdiction must be excluded from the parliamentary resolution
recognising the mandates of its members. By law, if the mandates of less than two-thirds of the members are
recognized, the plenary session of Parliament shall be terminated. The Chairman of the CEC shall convene the next
session of the newly elected Parliament within 10 days from the date when it becomes possible to submit for
recognition the mandates of enough elected members to constitute up to two-thirds of the Parliament's full
composition.
164
The applicants claimed that the Election Code and CEC regulations violate Articles 3 (Democracy), 24 (Electoral
Right), and 37 (Parliamentary Elections) of the Constitution, citing the non-opening of polling stations abroad in
certain locations and failures to ensure vote secrecy. The Constitutional Court merged the two lawsuits citing the
similarity of the requests.
165
See the statement by ODIHR which condemns use of excessive force by police during the protests, also Statement
by the OSCE Troika on the Situation in Georgia.
Georgia Page: 35
measures, including downgraded political contacts, suspension of funding, and impending visa
restrictions on Georgian diplomats and officials due to the crackdown on opposition protesters.
Following the elections, the MIA initiated 54 election-related investigations (as of 29 November),
charging three individuals in two criminal cases. 166 The Prosecutor’s Office opened six cases, including
five related to vote buying and one, at the CEC’s request, alleging large-scale electoral fraud. 167 The
Special Investigation Service has launched one criminal case into several incidents of possible illegal
interference with a journalist’s professional activity. However, none of the investigations had concluded
by the time the final results were announced, limiting the effectiveness of these actions and further
impacting trust in the handling of such matters.
Overall, the lack of a thorough review of election-day complaints and appeals by election commissions
and courts, the dismissal of appeals on technical grounds or for insufficient substantiation, and the
unduly short deadlines for filing appeals collectively undermined the right to due process and an
effective remedy. Moreover, insufficient efforts by the authorities to address widespread concerns
regarding the integrity of the electoral process failed to reduce political divisions and instead intensified
the political crisis.
To provide for public trust in the electoral process and the integrity of results, legislation and public
policy should ensure that public authorities operate independently, professionally, and efficiently, free
from influence by the government or ruling party. Reports of election-day related irregularities and
related complaints and appeals should be promptly and thoroughly addressed.
XVII. RECOMMENDATIONS
These recommendations as contained throughout the text are offered with a view to further enhance the
conduct of elections in Georgia and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE
commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. These
recommendations should be read in conjunction with past ODIHR recommendations that have not yet
been addressed. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of Georgia to further improve the electoral
process and to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports. 168
166
The cases pertain to incidents involving violence or threats of violence, property damage, undue influence on a
voter’s free will, violations of ballot secrecy, coercion, and incitement to suicide.
167
Four out of six cases concern possible offenses committed on the election day. Based on the CEC statement from
30 October, the Prosecution Service of Georgia has launched an investigation into the alleged falsification of the
Elections under Article 164³ of the Criminal Code following public statements and allegations by the President of
Georgia, representatives of political parties and other actors. According to the Prosecution Service, as part of the
investigation, voter verification machines used for the parliamentary elections were first sealed in the CEC
administrative building and information was retrieved from the verification devices with the direct involvement of
Smartmatic company to carry out forensic examination. Additionally, a forensic chemical examination of the
marking liquid used at the election precincts during the parliamentary elections has been commissioned. Political
actors, civil society representatives and the CEC employees were summoned to testify in the framework of the
investigation. No charges had been filed by the time of reporting.
168
The follow-up of prior recommendations is assessed by the ODIHR EOM as follows: recommendations 10 and 20
from the final report of the 2020 parliamentary elections, and recommendations 10 and 16 from the final report of
the 2021 local elections are fully implemented. Recommendation 15 from the final report of the 2018 presidential
election, and recommendations 3, 12, and 25 of the 2020 parliamentary elections, and recommendation 18 from the
final report of the 2021 local elections are mostly implemented. Recommendations 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 16, 17, 18,
21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 from the final report of the 2018 presidential election, recommendations 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 15, 17,
19, 21, 22, 24, 30 from the final report of the 2020 parliamentary elections, and recommendations, and 4, 5, 12, 13,
14, 15, 17, 19 from the final report of the 2021 local elections are partially implemented. See also the ODIHR
Electoral Recommendations Database.
Georgia Page: 36
A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Authorities should proactively prevent voter intimidation, pressure on public employees, vote buying,
electoral violence and educate voters about their rights. If such incidents occur, they should be
promptly addressed to provide effective remedies and hold those responsible accountable.
2. A comprehensive legislative reform should be undertaken to implement outstanding ODIHR

recommendations and further align the legal framework with OSCE commitments, international
standards, and good practice. This review should be completed well in advance of the next election
and through an inclusive and transparent consultative process.
3. Legislation that imposes limitations on the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedoms of

assembly and expression should be repealed. Any restrictions on such fundamental freedoms must
be exceptional, strictly proportionate to a legitimate aim, and imposed only to the extent necessary in
a democratic society.
4. To strengthen impartiality of election administration, the appointment process for election

commission members at all levels should be revised to prevent dominance by any single political
party. To enhance operational efficiency and prevent overcrowding, the number of commissioners,
particularly at the Precinct Election Commission level, should be adjusted to the actual needs.
5. To contribute to transparency and ensure equitable scrutiny of all political parties, the Anti-
Corruption Bureau should develop clear regulations outlining the procedures for and methodology
of political finance oversight.
6. The authorities should fulfil their duty to protect the safety of media staff through effective and timely
protective measures. State authorities should promptly investigate and bring to justice those involved
in attacks on, and ill-treatment of journalists and other media actors.
7. To further increase transparency and confidence in election dispute resolution, all disputes should be
handled by election commissions collegially and in open sessions, based on thorough consideration
of the substance of complaints. All judicial acts, decisions and protocols should be well substantiated
and based on sound interpretation of the law and promptly published online.
8. To ensure the integrity of election observation, authorities should guarantee that citizen observers
can operate free from pressure or intimidation and have unimpeded access to all relevant information.
To maintain a clear separation between partisan and non-partisan observation, observer status should
not be misused by political parties.
9. To provide for public trust in the electoral process and the integrity of results, legislation and public
policy should ensure that public authorities operate independently, professionally, and efficiently,
free from influence by the government or ruling party. Reports of election-day related irregularities
and related complaints and appeals should be promptly and thoroughly addressed.
10. Contestants, public officials, and state institutions should refrain from misusing administrative
resources for electoral purposes to ensure an equal playing field for electoral participants. In line with
previous ODIHR and GRECO recommendations, consideration should be given to the adoption of
further legislative and administrative measures to regulate the campaigning activities of high-level
public officials, including mayors, and to prevent the circumvention of existing regulations.
11. Authorities should take all necessary measures to ensure vote secrecy, including by improving polling
station layouts and the design of the electoral materials. Election commissions should rigorously
Georgia Page: 37
implement procedural safeguards, prevent overcrowding and undue tracking of voters at polling
stations.
12. In line with international standards and OSCE commitments, authorities should put in place effective
temporary special measures to eliminate discrimination against women in public and political life.
Given their proven effectiveness, the authorities should give particular consideration to re-
introducing the mandatory electoral gender quotas as well as the requirement that a woman
withdrawing from her mandate as Member of Parliament be replaced by the next woman candidate
on the same party list.
B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
Election Administration
13. To ensure stability and professional capacity of the election administration, the possibility to replace
members of District Election Commission and Precinct Election Commission should be limited
within a reasonable period of time prior to election day to allow for all members to undergo training.
14. In a coordinated effort, state and local authorities, along with all other relevant stakeholders, should
undertake necessary measures to ensure independent access for persons with various disabilities
throughout the entire election process, including the allocation of adequate premises for election
commissions and polling stations
Voting Technologies
15. To strengthen confidence in the use of election technologies, the law should explicitly provide for
independent third-party verification and certification of voter identification and vote-counting
devices. Relevant stakeholders should be granted meaningful opportunities to scrutinize all aspects
of the implementation process, including access to technical documentation, source code review,
device configuration, and auditing procedures.
Voter Registration
16. To ensure effective exercise of active suffrage by all eligible voters, the authorities should implement
appropriate legislative and administrative measures to ensure that all voters, including those lacking
valid identification documents or a registered address, are included in the voter lists.
17. Persons who are recognized by a court to lack legal capacity on the grounds of intellectual or
psychosocial disability and those who require inpatient care should be allowed to vote, in line with
international standards.
Electoral Campaign
18. Authorities should take measures to promote gender equality in public and political life and ensure
equal opportunities for women in the campaign, setting specific, measurable, and clearly defined
goals and targets. Consideration should be given to the introduction of additional special measures to
encourage political parties to support female candidates.
Campaign Finance
19. To fully guarantee the independence of the Anti-Corruption Bureau and its decisions from political
influence, the mechanism for the appointment procedure for the head of the institution should be
revised as well as the decision-making process of the Bureau.
Georgia Page: 38
20. Consideration could be given to developing a system of financial disclosure that ensures uniformity
in the reporting formats utilized by political parties and presents such data in an accessible and user-
friendly format, thereby strengthening mechanisms for public oversight.
21. To enhance transparency, legal provisions on third-party campaigning should be strengthened and
clarified, with their application grounded in clear, objective, and foreseeable criteria to ensure
consistency and avoid arbitrary enforcement that may infringe upon freedom of expression.
Media
22. To strengthen its independence, the appointment procedure for members of the Georgian National
Communications Commission should be revised.
23. The existing system for allocation of free airtime and participation in debates should be reviewed to
provide equal campaign opportunities for all contestants. Effective remedies for related violations
should be applied promptly during the campaign. Consideration could be given to amending the law
to prioritize compensation for lost airtime over financially sanctioning media outlets.
24. The media should be exempted from liability for disseminating unlawful statements made directly
by parties or candidates, whether in the context of live broadcasting or advertising, unless the
statements have been ruled unlawful by a court or the statements constitute direct incitement to
violence.
Participation of National Minorities
25. To ensure equal access to information and ability to participate in the process, clear guidelines on the
provision of voter information and materials in minority languages should be established. The user
interface of the electronic voting technologies should be available in minority languages in areas
mandated to provide voter materials in those languages.
Election Dispute Resolution
26. To guarantee effective remedy, the electoral dispute resolution framework should be reviewed to
broaden the legal standing of voters, and adjust legal deadlines, allowing adequate time for the
preparation and adjudication of complaints and administrative offences while ensuring duly
expedited procedure, in line with international good practice.
Election day
27. To enhance the integrity of the voting process and strengthen public trust, the authorities should
reinforce transparency and improve the rigour and effectiveness of voter identification procedures.
For the use of voter identification devices, measures to minimize the manual entry of personal
numbers at polling stations should be explored.
28. In line with legal provisions, amendments to results protocols in cases of discrepancies should occur
at the DEC level and be conducted transparently, with the participation of party representatives and
observers. The CEC should promptly publish voter turnout data alongside preliminary results and the
number of invalid votes per polling station.
Georgia Page: 39
ANNEX I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS 169
Total number of registered voters 3,508,294

Number of voters on the special voter list for voting abroad 95,910
Total number of votes cast (turnout) 2,111,834 (60.20 per cent)
Number of valid votes 2,076,779
Number of invalid votes 34,974 (1.66 per cent)
Candidate list (in order of appearance on the ballot) Votes Percentage Mandates
No. 3 Party of Georgian Unity and Development 3,892 0.19 --
No. 4 Coalition for Change 229,161 11.03 19
No. 5 Unity – National Movement 211,216 10.17 16
No. 6 European Democrats 7,955 0.38 --
No. 8 Alliance of Patriots of Georgia 50,599 2.44 --
No. 9 Strong Georgia – Lelo, For People, For Liberty! 182,922 8.81 14
No. 10 Georgian Labour Party 15,103 0.73 --
No. 12 Our United Georgia 1,845 0.09 --
No. 16 Change Georgia 12,528 0.60 --
No. 17 Georgia 2,780 0.13 --
No. 20 Free Georgia 4,145 0.20 --
No. 21 Tribuna 2,483 0.12 --
No. 23 Us 2,593 0.12 --
No. 25 Gakharia For Georgia 161,521 7.78 12
No. 26 Left Alliance 1,260 0.06 --
No. 27 Georgian Unity 4,500 0.22 --
No. 36 Girchi 62,223 3.00 --
No. 41 Georgian Dream 1,120,053 53.93 89
169
Based on the CEC Summary Protocol of the Results of the Elections to the Parliament of Georgia of 26 October
2024, adopted on 16 November 2024.
Georgia Page: 40
ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION

OBSERVATION MISSION
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Pascal Allizard Special Coordinator, MP France

Pia Kauma Head of Delegation, MP Finland
Harald Himmer MP Austria
Stefan Schennach MP Austria
Klemens Kofler MP Austria
Elisabeth Kittl MP Austria
Oleg Djachenko MP Belarus
Olgica Tolić Staff of Delegation Croatia
Mihael Zmajlović MP Croatia
Søren Søndergaard MP Denmark
Kris Jensen Skriver MP Denmark
Johannes Koskinen MP Finland
Jean-Luc Blouet Staff of Delegation France
Stéphanie Koltchanov OSCE PA Secretariat France
Daniela De Ridder MP Germany
Manfred Grund MP Germany
Stefan Keuter MP Germany
Tim Knoblau OSCE PA Secretariat Germany
Zoltán Bóna MP Hungary
Mauro Del Barba MP Italy
Anna Di Domenico OSCE PA Secretariat Italy
Roberto Montella OSCE PA Secretariat Italy
Catia Polidori MP Italy
Kairat Tastekeyev MP Kazakhstan
Igors Aizstrauts Staff of Delegation Latvia
Skaidrīte Ābrama MP Latvia
Claude Haagen MP Luxembourg
Fernand Etgen MP Luxembourg
Liz Braz MP Luxembourg
Marie-Pia Bisenius Staff of Delegation Luxembourg
Jevrosima Pejovć MP Montenegro
Farah Karimi MP Netherlands
Henrica (Rian) Vogels MP Netherlands
Siv Mossleth MP Norway
Jan Tore Sanner MP Norway
Barbara Bartuś MP Poland
Radosław Fogiel MP Poland
Marcin Mykietynski Staff of Delegation Poland
Katarzyna Ueberhan MP Poland
Paweł Zalewski MP Poland
Sherif Abdili OSCE PA Secretariat Serbia
Dimitrije Todorić OSCE PA Secretariat Serbia
Peder Björk MP Sweden
Johan Büser MP Sweden
Joar Forsell MP Sweden
Georgia Page: 41
Kadir Kasirga MP Sweden

Ulrik Nilsson MP Sweden
Carina Ödebrink MP Sweden
Jessica Rodén MP Sweden
Fredrik Svensson Staff of Delegation Sweden
Linnéa Wickman MP Sweden
Daniel Fässler MP Switzerland
Kamil Aydın MP Türkiye
Kemal Çelik MP Türkiye
Ecem Danık Gökçe Staff of Delegation Türkiye
Mykyta Poturaiev MP Ukraine
Serhii Yevtushok MP Ukraine
Kyle Parker Staff of Delegation United States
Bakhti Nishanov Staff of Delegation United States
Shannon Smirel Staff of Delegation United States
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Iulian Bulai Head of Delegation, MP Romania

Blerina Gjylameti MP Albania
Armen Gevorgyan MP Armenia
Reinhold Lopatka MP Austria
Katharina Pabel Venice Commission Austria
Michael Janssen Venice Commission Denmark
Anna-Kristiina Mikkonen MP Finland
Sylvie Affholder PACE Secretariat France
Bas Klein PACE Secretariat France
Olivier Bitz MP France
Carine Roller-Kaufman PACE Secretariat France
Claude Kern MP France
Didier Marie MP France
Andrej Hunko MP Germany
Frank Schwabe MP Germany
Georgios Stamatis MP Greece
Denise O’Hara MP Ireland
Simone Billi MP Italy
Aurora Floridia MP Italy
Fabio Pietrella MP Italy
Emanuelis Zingeris MP Lithuania
Yves Cruchten MP Luxemburg
Christophe Brico MP Monaco
Béatrice Fresko-Rolfo MP Monaco
Jone Blikra MP Norway
Linda Hofstad Helleland MP Norway
Ryszard Petru MP Poland
Edite Estrela MP Portugal
Bogdan Torcătoriu PACE Secretariat Romania
Antonio Gutiérrez MP Spain
Limones
Pablo Hispán MP Spain
Boriana Åberg MP Sweden
Georgia Page: 42
Pierre-Alain Fridez MP Switzerland

Namık Tan MP Türkiye
Oleksii Goncharenko MP Ukraine
Olena Khomenko MP Ukraine
Yevheniia Kravchuk MP Ukraine
Lord David Blencathra MP United Kingdom
Tara Blencathra Accompanying Person United Kingdom
European Parliament
Antonio López-Istúriz White Head of Delegation, MEP Spain

Marina Graser Lasic EP Secretariat Croatia
Fidias Panayiotou MEP Cyprus
Markéta Gregorová MEP Czechia
Nathalie Loiseau MEP France
Pierre Pimpie MEP France
Hans Neuhoff MEP Germany
Sven Simon MEP Germany
Cristina Castagnoli EP Secretariat Italy
Ieva Valutytė EP Secretariat Lithuania
Tessel Dian Joel Giele EP Policy Advisor Netherlands
Robert Golanski EP Policy Advisor Poland
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Faik Öztrak Head of Delegation, MP Türkiye

Svitlana Svyetova NATO PA Secretariat Belgium
Kristýna Haráková Staff of Delegation Czechia
Jarmila Levko MP Czechia
Carsten Bach MP Denmark
Henrik Bliddal NATO PA Secretariat Denmark
Valérie Geffroy NATO PA Secretariat France
Natalia Pouzyreff MP France
Pia Califano Staff of Delegation Italy
Simona Flavia Malpezzi MP Italy
Andrea Giorgio Orsini MP Italy
Alberto Losacco MP Italy
Paolo Marcheschi MP Italy
Adriano Paroli MP Italy
Matteo Richetti MP Italy
Sven Clement MP Luxembourg
Suzanne Nollen Staff of Delegation Netherlands
Jimme Nordkamp MP Netherlands
Marcin Bosacki MP Poland
Piotr Jan Woźniak MP Poland
Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska MP Poland
Ewa Kołodziej MP Poland
Krzysztof Mulawa MP Poland
Marcin Przydacz MP Poland
Georgia Page: 43
Jarosław Rusiecki MP Poland

Mirosław Suchoń MP Poland
Wadim Tyszkiewicz MP Poland
Andrzej Szewiński MP Poland
Artur Zaniewski Staff of Delegation Poland
Hugo Patrício Oliveira MP Portugal
Luís Piteiras Dias MP Portugal
Kerstin Lundgren MP Sweden
Hikmet Ilhan Iren Staff of Delegation Türkiye
Oğuz Üçüncü MP Türkiye
Nigel Alexander Dodds MP United Kingdom
Caroline Dinenage MP United Kingdom
Lord Mark Lancaster MP United Kingdom
Joe Brinker NATO PA Secretariat United States
ODIHR EOM Short-term Observers
Lusine Hakobyan Armenia

Alisa Hayrapetyan Armenia
Shogher Sahakyan Armenia
Katharina Stadler Austria
Emanuel Waldmüller Austria
Verena Wessely Austria
Joris Beckers Belgium
Tom De Munck Belgium
Roxane Henry Belgium
Isabel Leliaert Belgium
Axel Vandeputte Belgium
Ann-Sophie Vermeersch Belgium
Christine Cadieux Canada
Adamou Idrissa Hassan Canada
Joseph Landry Canada
Andres Lopez-Hoyos Canada
Liesl Mulholland Canada
Jan Blažek Czechia
Barbora Cardona Ševčíková Czechia
Juraj Fejer Czechia
Marek Fiebich Czechia
Pavel Hanosek Czechia
František Havlín Czechia
Julia Hawlanová Czechia
Sylva Horáková Czechia
Václav Hrabák Czechia
Kristýna Kabzanová Czechia
Vincenc Kopeček Czechia
Václav Kuželka Czechia
Ondřej Malý Czechia
Anna-Marie Peroutková Czechia
Petr Švepeš Czechia
Georgia Page: 44
Zuzana Tománková Czechia

Jan Udržal Czechia
Pavel Uhl Czechia
Tereza Virastová Czechia
Tomáš Vlach Czechia
Mahmoud Aladdin Denmark
Nana Sofia Hansen Denmark
Søren Hastrup Denmark
Thorkild Høyer Denmark
Merete Laubjerg Denmark
Lise Østergaard Denmark
Hanne Severinsen Denmark
Birthe Solevad Denmark
Søren Sønderstrup Denmark
Henrik Wittrup Denmark
Ehtel Halliste Estonia
Artur Kink Estonia
Kaie Kork Estonia
Anu Renser Estonia
Griselda Rosenberg Estonia
Jaana Karhilo Finland
Kati Mattsson Finland
Mikko Palonkorpi Finland
Aurora Saares Finland
Alexandre Billette France
Alice Bordaçarre France
Zoé de Nadai France
Alexis de Riverieulx de Varax France
Hubert-Félix Delattre France
Pascal Delumeau France
Louise Dumas France
Anaïs Fiault France
Camille Forite France
Domitille Gautier de Charnacé France
Marc Gruber France
Eric Hernault France
Maylis Huard de Verneuil France
Thibaud Kurtz France
Jean-Charles Lallemand France
Stéphanie Marsal France
Anne Maufrais France
Cyrille Montécot France
Mathilde Perrin France
Maiwenn Ratinet France
Pascale Trimbach France
Matthias Vazquez France
Julien Velcof France
Yvonne Bach Germany
Stefan Bitterle Germany
Mareike Bödefeld Germany
Helmar Böhnlein Germany
Georgia Page: 45
Reinhard Brysch Germany

Tina Debenham Germany
Stephan Fleig Germany
Walter Goepfert Germany
Mirco Grimm Germany
Johannes Hentschke Germany
Alexandra Huck Germany
Joachim Kaetzler Germany
Gudula Kilias Germany
Helmut Klawonn Germany
Karin Knöbelspies Germany
Daniel Kuehnhenrich Germany
Günter Lang-Lendorff Germany
Monika Lenhard Germany
Rodrigo Morales Schaack Germany
Susanne Neymeyer Germany
Cosima Peissker-Meyer Germany
Karin Pluberg Germany
Christine Radomsky Germany
Stephan Reitze Germany
Anne Rennschmid Germany
Kerstin Roeske Germany
Petra Ruth Germany
Oliver Scheel Germany
Jannika Schlitt Germany
Tillmann Schneider Germany
Jasmina Schroff Germany
Christine Smers Germany
Valerio Trabandt Germany
Anja van Eickels Germany
Dimitrios Kanakidis Greece
Győző Gábriel Hungary
Tamás Gebei Hungary
Anita Marton Hungary
Gudni Bragason Iceland
Estrid Brekkan Iceland
Kristján Haraldsson Johannessen Iceland
Les Allamby Ireland
Paul Anderson Ireland
Peter Ballagh Ireland
Mary Dowling Ireland
James McCarthy Ireland
Muireann O Briain Ireland
Teresa Reilly Ireland
Richard Wright Ireland
Andrea Manta Italy
Debora Pinzana Italy
Uran Akhmetov Kyrgyzstan
Aizada Damir Kyzy Kyrgyzstan
Ieva Ruņģe Latvia
Jurgita Banytė Lithuania
Georgia Page: 46
Dominyka Dautaraitė Lithuania

Konstantinas Dureiko Lithuania
Evaldas Galvanauskas Lithuania
Kristina Tamošaitytė Lithuania
Maria Bergervoet Netherlands
Ryan Jessurun Netherlands
Jannetje Klein Netherlands
Marlijn Lelieveld Netherlands
Tekke Panman Netherlands
Bregje Prins Netherlands
Sjoerd ten Wolde Netherlands
Sophie van de Meulengraaf Netherlands
Orrvar Dalby Norway
Hanne Hanson Norway
Marianne Lyseng Norway
Eldrid Røeine Norway
Adam Adamus Poland
Mateusz Bajek Poland
Elzbieta Ciesielska Poland
Paulina Czarnecka Poland
Anna Gawłowska Poland
Marcin Grabia Poland
Elzbieta Hryciuk Poland
Maciej Jakubik Poland
Justyna Jakubowska Poland
Mateusz Kamionka Poland
Paulina Łukawska Poland
Katarzyna Mazurek Poland
Sławomir Misiak Poland
Barbara Mrówka-Jasiecka Poland
Michał Ostasz Poland
Maria Pawłowska-Pławińska Poland
Malwina Piaskowska-Łacek Poland
Jakub Pieńkowski Poland
Hubert Płochocki Poland
Beata Podgórska Poland
Ewa Polak Poland
Michał Sarnicki Poland
Bogdan Sordyl Poland
Elżbieta Świdrowska Poland
Tomasz Szopa Poland
Bartłomiej Wanot Poland
Albert Wierzbicki Poland
Magdalena Wiśniewska Poland
João Dias Portugal
Lucia Dumitru Romania
Ivana Ruttkayová Slovakia
Radovan Višňovský Slovakia
María Algora Spain
David Delgado Spain
Guzmán García Spain
Georgia Page: 47
Martin Gurria Spain

Pablo Gutiérrez Vega Spain
Pedro Lacunza Spain
Natalia Sanmartín Spain
Sara-Sofia Agnemo Sweden
Tomas Andersen Sweden
Irina Bernebring Journiette Sweden
Ruth Bourke Berglund Sweden
Gunilla Davidsson Sweden
Karin Grahn Sweden
Bitte Hammargren Sweden
Helena Hansson Rydell Sweden
Corinne Johnson Sweden
Mats Nils Melin Sweden
Minna Nauclér Sweden
Ulf Ottosson Sweden
Marie Persson Sweden
Patrik Schröder Sweden
Erik Sidén Sweden
Anna Widmark Sweden
Marko Wramen Sweden
Julia Agosti Switzerland
Sibel Arslan Switzerland
Fabrizio Comandini Switzerland
Annette Keller Switzerland
Fiorenza Kuthan Switzerland
Valérie Nadrai Switzerland
Leila Rais Switzerland
Stephan Ziegler Switzerland
Özkan Güler Türkiye
Mustafa Şahin Türkiye
Nese Şahin Türkiye
Fiona Anderson United Kingdom
Richard Balmforth United Kingdom
Rebecca Bell United Kingdom
Bruce Bucknell United Kingdom
Harry Busz United Kingdom
Richard Cashman United Kingdom
Matthew Congreve United Kingdom
Patricia De'Ath United Kingdom
Hayley D'Souza United Kingdom
John Earls United Kingdom
George Edgar United Kingdom
Teresa Etim-Gorst United Kingdom
Leila Fitt United Kingdom
Charles Fitzherbert United Kingdom
Sarah Fradgley United Kingdom
Alex Fynn United Kingdom
Annabel Gaywood United Kingdom
Nirmala Gopal United Kingdom
Lara Griffith United Kingdom
Georgia Page: 48
Emma Harris United Kingdom

Matthew Hedges United Kingdom
Ioulianna Hionidou-Mooney United Kingdom
Cristina Hurduiala United Kingdom
James Jennion United Kingdom
Benjamin King-Beck United Kingdom
Frances Lasok United Kingdom
Alice Mazzola United Kingdom
Richard Meares United Kingdom
Nicholas Mellor United Kingdom
Paul Middlemiss United Kingdom
Sophie Newman United Kingdom
James Paver United Kingdom
Alhassan Pereira Ibrahim United Kingdom
Rebecca Radmore United Kingdom
Kiron Reid United Kingdom
Katherine Robinson United Kingdom
Sarah Rooney United Kingdom
Nicholas Rowland United Kingdom
Michael Sander United Kingdom
Gerard Scott United Kingdom
Alexander Scrivener United Kingdom
Heidi Smith United Kingdom
Valerie Solomon United Kingdom
Alex Spillius United Kingdom
David Turner United Kingdom
Paul Tzimas United Kingdom
Astrid Weinmann United Kingdom
Alexander White United Kingdom
Lesley Wilson United Kingdom
Alice Adams United States
Syeda Ali United States
Elizabeth Blackburn United States
Christopher Blair United States
Colin Blais United States
Joseph Brossart United States
Elizabeth Callahan United States
Cecilia Ciepiela-Kaelin United States
Henry Crawford United States
Aiesha Eleusizov United States
Julie Galbraith United States
Sarah Galt United States
Richard Gangwish United States
Dinka Gyurova United States
Juliet Hanna United States
Daniel Hughes United States
Adaure Iwuh United States
Gail Kalinich United States
David Kay United States
Elizabeth Kvitashvili United States
Daniel Liss United States
Georgia Page: 49
Lesia Lozowy United States

Michael Martz United States
James McHugh United States
Sarah Mills United States
Andrew Offenbacher United States
Chelsey O'Hare United States
Geraldine O'Mahony United States
William Ozkaptan United States
Lucy Pakhnyuk United States
Ken Palmer United States
Rachel Palmer United States
Robert Paulson United States
Urania Petit United States
Mary Phillips United States
Octavius Pinkard United States
Azita Ranjbar United States
Robert Reschke United States
Darius Roby United States
Elaine Sabourin United States
Melody Shekari United States
Steven Smith United States
Haris Sofradzija United States
William Spencer United States
Gligor Tashkovich United States
Grant Thieroff United States
Rob Thompson United States
Douglas Tremitiere United States
Jack Van Valkenburgh United States
Sharon Waxman United States
Marsha Weinerman United States
Daniel Yastishock United States
ODIHR EOM Long-Term Observers
Anja Fiedler Austria

Hannah Yolanda Scheller Austria
Ruslan Asadov Azerbaijan
Ahmad Jawid Noor Canada
Cynthia Wagner Canada
Dita Bičanovská Czechia
Miroslav Krčmář Czechia
Dorte Broen Denmark
Helena Laatio Finland
Pekka Vihervas Finland
Alexandre Benz France
Rodolphe Oberle France
Nadia Yakhlaf-Lallemand France
Judith Brand Germany
Ingo Buettner Germany
Alessandro Giongo Italy
Sean Hynes Ireland
Georgia Page: 50
Sabine Dwinger Netherlands

Cornelis Ros Netherlands
Camilla Michalsen Norway
Asgeir Rustad Norway
Maria-Magdalena Budkus Poland
Michał Grodzki Poland
Nicolas Heyum Sweden
Maud Johansson Sweden
Grégoire Duruz Switzerland
Anne-Cécile Leyvraz Switzerland
Scott Martin United Kingdom
Soraya Martinez United Kingdom
Christopher Beck United States
Degee Wilhelm United States
ODIHR EOM Core Team
Eoghan Murphy Ireland Head of Mission

Anna Melikyan Armenia
Marcela Mašková Czechia
Tarvi Martens Estonia
Elma Šehalić Germany
László Belágyi Hungary
Marcell Nagy Hungary
Mindaugas Mėčius Lithuania
Michał Ostańkowicz Poland
Daria Paprocka Poland
Saša Pokrajac Serbia
Andreas Roth Sweden
Firuza Garibshoeva Tajikistan
Kyle Bowers United States
ABOUT ODIHR
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is OSCE’s principal institution
to assist participating States “to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to
abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (…) to build, strengthen and protect
democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society” (1992 Helsinki Summit
Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.
ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland), was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris
Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed to
reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today, it employs over
150 staff.
ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election observation. Every year, it co-ordinates
and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE
region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards
for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth
insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, ODIHR helps
participating States to improve their electoral framework.
The Office’s democratization activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic
governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. ODIHR implements a number
of targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.
ODIHR also assists participating States’ in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This is
achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide
expertise in thematic areas, including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing the
human rights protection of trafficked people, human rights education and training, human rights
monitoring and reporting, and women’s human rights and security.
Within the field of tolerance and non-discrimination, ODIHR provides support to the participating
States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, anti-
Semitism and other forms of intolerance. ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and non-
discrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring,
reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as
educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.
ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on Roma and Sinti. It promotes
capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages the
participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.
All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE participating
States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.
More information is available on the ODIHR website (www.osce.org/odihr).

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Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

ODIHR Election Observation Mission

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 1

ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 1

elections. Priority recommendations include preventing voter intimidation, pressure on public

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Legislation that imposes limitations on the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedoms of

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

A comprehensive legislative reform should be undertaken to implement outstanding ODIHR

VI. VOTING TECHNOLOGIES

VII. VOTER RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION

VIII. CANDIDATE RIGHTS AND REGISTRATION

IX. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

to the police, citing a perceived lack of willingness by authorities to investigate.

A. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

B. DISCLOSURE AND OVERSIGHT

To enhance transparency, legal provisions on third-party campaigning should be strengthened and

C. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN

XII. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

XIII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

raising concerns over possible bias. 134

XIV. ELECTION OBSERVATION

XV. ELECTION DAY

A. OPENING AND VOTING

B. COUNTING AND TABULATION

results protocol, limiting transparency.

XVI. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS

On 28 November, in response to EP statements on the elections, the government postponed EU

On 14 December, a 300-member electoral college comprised of GD and affiliated legislature members,

2. A comprehensive legislative reform should be undertaken to implement outstanding ODIHR

3. Legislation that imposes limitations on the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedoms of

4. To strengthen impartiality of election administration, the appointment process for election

Participation of National Minorities

Election Dispute Resolution

ANNEX I: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS 169

Total number of registered voters 3,508,294

ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Pascal Allizard Special Coordinator, MP France

Kadir Kasirga MP Sweden

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Iulian Bulai Head of Delegation, MP Romania

Pierre-Alain Fridez MP Switzerland

Antonio López-Istúriz White Head of Delegation, MEP Spain

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Faik Öztrak Head of Delegation, MP Türkiye

Jarosław Rusiecki MP Poland

ODIHR EOM Short-term Observers

Lusine Hakobyan Armenia

Zuzana Tománková Czechia

Reinhard Brysch Germany

Dominyka Dautaraitė Lithuania

Martin Gurria Spain

Emma Harris United Kingdom

Lesia Lozowy United States

ODIHR EOM Long-Term Observers

Anja Fiedler Austria

Sabine Dwinger Netherlands

ODIHR EOM Core Team