RESEARCH

The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive

Chinese Characteristics
CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

This article re-examines the recent history of Chinese sociology from a sociological
viewpoint by adopting a perspective that transcends the official powerholders’
framework. It focuses on the period between 1978 and 2023, and offers a
descriptive analysis of the six features of socialist sociology with distinctive Chinese
characteristics under Xi Jinping’s regime. It also introduces the concept of
“cooperation to resist” and identifies the subfields of sociology that are at risk of
decline. The article contends that sociology in China has faced a crisis in the past
decade due to its increased utilisation as a tool to support the authoritarian vision
of China’s modernisation. Such a shift has constrained the discipline and limited
the scope of its inquiries, so that it increasingly focuses on politically safe subjects
and topics that avoid critical scrutiny. Consequently, such scholarship blurs the
boundaries between academic knowledge and propaganda, ultimately compromising
the quality of scholarly work in favour of political power.

Sociology in China made a putatively “successful” comeback from virtual extinction

to experiencing a robust reincarnation in 1979. To better understand the significance
of this rebirth, this article critically examines official Chinese sociology—specifically,
works published in major journals and books in Chinese—as an academic discipline
since its revival. The inquiry focuses on the process of knowledge development,
academic positioning, research content, research methodologies employed, and
discipline-building activities.1 The discussion is situated within the humanistic tradition
of C. Wright Mills’ The Sociological Imagination and Michael Dutton’s conceptualisation,

Cao Liqun ([email protected]) is Professor of Sociology and Criminology at Ontario Tech

University. He received his PhD in Sociology from the University of Cincinnati in Ohio. His research
interests include comparative studies, criminological theory, minority-majority relationship and policing.
Yan Fei ([email protected]) is an Associate in Research at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies
at Harvard University. He obtained his PhD in Sociology from the University of Oxford. His research
focuses on historical sociology, political sociology, contentious politics and social movements.
Nicholas P. Lovrich ([email protected]) is a Regents Professor Emeritus and a Claudius O. and Mary
W. Johnson Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Washington State University. He received
his PhD in Political Science and Public Administration from the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA). His research is in the areas of public administration and political sociology.
1
Yan Fei and Cao Liqun, “Situated Knowledge and Situated Action: The Rise of Chinese Sociology
Since 1978”, in Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, ed. Hua Shiping (Singapore: Palgrave-Macmillan
Press, 2022), pp. 263–83.

© China: An International Journal

CIJ Volume 22 Number 4 (November 2024): 1 –  21 1

2 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

inspired by Michel Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power, of China as a registered

society.2 It is argued that the present can best be understood in terms of the past and
a dynamic evaluation of the contemporary will reveal insights into an unknown future.
The authors argue that sociology in China since 2012 has largely failed to reflect core
enlightenment doctrines—such as constitutional government, human rights, progress,
tolerance of diversity, and the pursuit of knowledge obtained through reason and the
evidence of the human senses. If the current trajectory continues, sociology, as practised
and taught in China’s contemporary classrooms, will increasingly resemble a “Potemkin
village”, offering sociology in name only.
The article is divided into three parts. The first presents the remarkable historical
comeback of sociology since 1979. Secondly, it draws upon the situated knowledge
of contemporary sociological research to offer a substantive critique of the characteristics
of official sociology in China. Thirdly, the discussion details ideational regimentation,
which involves circumscribing the frontiers of discourse, information dissemination,
research and knowledge using regime-sanctioned ideological and cognitive concepts,3
and highlights its major implications. Fourthly and finally, feminist sociology—viewed
as a subversive force vis-à-vis the Party’s legitimacy—is used as a telling example of
an underdeveloped area of sociology, presenting a missed opportunity for Chinese
sociology to establish itself as a full-fledged academic discipline.

THE UPS AND DOWNS OF SOCIOLOGY IN CHINA

Today, sociology is fully institutionalised in China, but with distinctive Chinese
characteristics setting it apart from the global community of sociological scholarship.
A well-grounded understanding of the past provides a firm foundation for an informed
interpretation of the current state of the discipline. According to Yan and Cao, the
history of Chinese sociology can be divided roughly into four major periods: the onset
(1900–51), the long hiatus (1952–78), the reincarnation and great expansion (1979–
2012), and the full institutionalisation with distinctive Chinese characteristics (2012–the
present).4 This article focuses on the last two periods, but it is worthwhile to note the
main characteristics of the previous two.
Sociology arrived in China around 1900, early in its development as a discipline
worldwide, during a time when the need for unprecedented change, not only in
science/technology but also in social thought and ideology,5 became a matter of broad

2
C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Michael R.
Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China: From Patriarchy to “The People” (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan
Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
3
Romi Jain, “The Tightening Ideational Regimentation of China’s Higher Education System”, Economic
and Political Weekly 54, no. 30 (2019): 55–63.
4
Yan and Cao, “Situated Knowledge and Situated Action”.
5
Edmund S.K. Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 3

consensus among fin-de-siècle Chinese intellectuals. As an academic discipline, sociology

grew awkwardly (although in 1931 a non-governmental Chinese Sociological Society
was established) and lacked favour with various governments between 1900 and 1951.6
The primary focus of sociology was on the social problems of the lower echelons of
society.7 Sociological thinking was largely influenced by Marxian thought, but it also
included a mix of liberal, conservative and socialist thinking, providing the public
with a wide spectrum of ideologies.8 Before 1950, “outside the United States and
Great Britain, there were few countries which had as good a body of teachers and
advanced institutions studying sociology as China”.9
The second period, the long hiatus, began not long after the Communist Party
of China (CPC) assumed power following a prolonged violent revolution. In its
attempt to create a “new society” based on the Soviet model, the regime ordered the
closure of all sociology programmes in 1952.10 While the liberal use of the punishment
of death for “enemies” of the state was somewhat expected,11 the extent of mass
surveillance and monitoring of citizens’ private conduct constituted an unprecedented
form of ubiquitous social control.12 In this regard, Dutton’s theory of “registered
society”, inspired by Foucault’s disciplinary power theory, provides insight into the
underlying logic of totalitarian governance. Foucault examined how complete power
over society is exercised,13 viewing power as involving an “interaction of warring
parties, as the decentered networks of bodily, face-to-face confrontations, and ultimately
as the productive penetration and subjectivizing subjugation of a bodily opponent”.14
During the 1950s’ Stalinisation of China, “social problems” were declared non-existent,
and society, modelled on Soviet Marxism, was not subject to criticism. The CPC’s
active subjugation of citizens occurred through not only physical, but also disciplinary
and cognitive coercion whereby individuals, from one’s physical corpus to one’s
cognitive and affective processes, were meticulously archived in personal files (renshi

6
Lu Yuan, Chuancheng yu duanlie: Jubian zhong de Zhongguo shehuixue yu shehuixuejia (Continuation
and Rupture: Sociology and Sociologists amidst Monumental Change in China) (Shanghai: The Commercial
Press, 2019).
7
Ambrose Yeo-Chi King and Wang Tse-Sang, “The Development and Death of Chinese Academic
Sociology: A Chapter in the Sociology of Sociology”, Modern Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (1978): 37–59.
8
Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity.
9
William H. Newell, “Modern Chinese Sociologists”, Sociological Bulletin 1, no. 2 (1952): 89–94, esp.
89.
10
Chen Hon Fai, Chinese Sociology: State-building and the Institutionalization of Globally Circulated
Knowledge (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018); Hsiung Ping-Chun, “The Politics of Rebuilding Chinese
Sociology in 1980s”, Qualitative Inquiry 23, no. 1 (2007): 89–101.
11
Cao Liqun and Bill Hebenton, “Criminology in China: Taking Stock (Again)”, The Criminologist 42,
no. 2 (2018): 1–9.
12
Lu, Chuancheng yu duanlie (Continuation and Rupture).
13
Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
14
Jürgen Habermas, “Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again”, in Critiques
and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1994), pp. 79–108.
4 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

dang’an). These detailed dossiers followed a person wherever he/she went, resulting
in the creation of this “registered society”.15 Higher education without sociology was
confined to ideological indoctrination and technical training to serve the needs of a
planned economy.16
The reincarnation and great expansion (1979–2012). While Yan and Cao’s
division of periods has served their purpose well, it is possible, given that any historical
account is subject to controversy since a range of interpretations is implicit in the use
of historical materials, that a more detailed periodisation could be developed within
this era: (i) rebirth under Hu Yaobang/Zhao Ziyang (1979 to 1989); (ii) great expansion
under Jiang Zemin (1990 to 2002); and (iii) stability-maintenance under Hu Jintao
(2002 to 2012).
The political situation took a dramatic turn after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976.
The reform-minded faction of the CPC shifted the Party’s policy focus from class
struggle to the active pursuit of economic growth. To enlarge the CPC’s social base
and to save the national economy from collapse, Deng Xiaoping decided to incorporate
the intelligentsia into the ranks of the “ruling proletariat”, viewing them as intellectuals
or mental workers (naoli laodongzhe). Within this dramatically reconfigured political
context, a rebuilding of sociology was permitted. A new Chinese Sociological Association,
fully sponsored by the CPC, was established on 16 March 1979 with British-trained
sociologist Fei Xiaotong selected as its first president. It is worth noting that this
association is not a non-governmental organisation, but rather a peripheral organisation
fully funded and assiduously monitored by the CPC. The declared intention of the
Association was to develop sociology as another tool for the Party to serve the cause
of socialism.17
While sociology was once more an officially sanctioned enterprise, the CPC
remained cautious and sceptical about the emancipatory potential of the discipline’s
long-established penchant for critical thinking. To nip any threat in the bud, recruits
admitted to sociology programmes were selected from those who “had formally
undergone an intensive training in Marxism”.18 A strict political background reliability
check (zhengshen) was conducted for these newly minted scholars shortlisted to steer
the course for the sociology discipline, given their meticulous documentation of their
qualification as loyal followers of the communist cause.19 The first one-year training
programme in sociology was launched at Nankai University in 1980–81 (see Table 1).
The first department of sociology was established at Shanghai University in 1980.
Soon after, sociology programmes began to crop up throughout China.

15
Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China.
16
Li Hanlin et al., “Chinese Sociology, 1898–1986”, Social Forces 65, no. 3 (1987): 612–40; C. Edwin
Vaughan and Zhang Chunhou, “The Impact of Modernization on Higher Education in China”,
International Sociology 11, no. 2 (1996): 213–28.
17
Du Renzhi, “Fully Develop Sociological Research to Serve Socialism”, Chinese Sociology & Anthropology
13, no. 3 (1981): 41–51.
18
Li et al., “Chinese Sociology, 1898–1986”.
19
Lucie Cheng and Alvin So, “The Reestablishing of Sociology in the PRC: Toward the Signification
of Marxian Sociology”, Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 471–98.
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 5

When Fei Xiaotong accepted the challenge of rebuilding sociology, he was fully
aware that his role, as a non-CPC member, was contingent on compliance with CPC
aims. Accordingly, he posited that Marxism should be regarded as sociology’s guiding
theory and that Mao’s “field investigation” was its principal method.20 From 1979 to
1989, the Chinese intelligentsia experienced the “Second Liberation” during which
time it enjoyed much-needed breathing space and unprecedented freedom. Following
the June Fourth Massacre in 1989 and a brief period of greatly restricted freedom of
expression,21 CPC controls began to loosen again as China moved into the 1990s.
Economic reform-minded communists regained their prior traction and Chinese society
progressively moved into closer alignment with international norms concerning limited
academic freedom. A clearer separation between the Party and governmental
administration began to develop, and genuine liberalisation appeared to lie ahead.22
The dominant slogan of the time was “to integrate with the world” (yu shijie jiegui).
Some features of civil society were permitted to develop, and Jiang Zemin’s regime
(1992–2002) witnessed another period of relative tolerance. Talented and critical
scholars outside academic establishments, such as Deng Zhenglai (邓正来) and even
ex-convict Qiu Xinglong (邱兴隆), were recruited into the universities. However, it
was also observed that “thinkers fade away while scholars stand out” (sixiangjia danchu,
xuewenjia tuxian). Sociology emerged as a prominent academic discipline. One of Fei’s
successors, Zheng Hangsheng (郑杭生), a Marxist scholar (within the Chinese context),
insisted on confining sociology within a predetermined Marxist pattern of thought.
He believes that the main role of sociology is not societal critique, which he deemed
to be detrimental to the development of the discipline in China. Instead, he argues
that sociology should focus on contributing to socio-economic development and
documenting CPC achievements by collecting massive amounts of data and inventing,
whenever possible.23
The first cohort of undergraduate degrees in sociology was conferred in 1984 at
Shanghai University, and the first PhD degree was awarded in 1988 at Peking University
(see Table 1). By 2008, nearly 900 journal articles in sociology had been published,24
and the annual number has since increased with the emergence of additional publication
outlets. As of 2015, more than 6,000 professional sociologists were working in
universities and academies, maintaining numerous undergraduate programmes. In
2021, there were, on average, 45 PhD degrees granted for the three largest PhD
programmes in China (14 from Tsinghua University, 11 from Peking University and
20 from Fudan University). Nationwide, an estimated 120 to 180 sociology PhD

20
Yan and Cao, “Situated Knowledge and Situated Action”.
21
Rilly Chen and Yan Fei, “Dynamics of Multidimensional Interaction: The Beijing Upheaval of 1989
Revisited”, Contention 7, no. 2 (2019): 76–99.
22
Cao Liqun, “Returning to Normality: Anomie and Crime in China”, International Journal of Offender
Therapy and Comparative Criminology 51, no. 1 (2007): 40–51.
23
Zheng Hangsheng, Shehuixue gailun xinxiu (New Introduction to Sociology) (Beijing: Renmin University
Press, 1994).
24
Bian Yanjie and Zhang Lei, “Sociology in China”, Contexts 7, no. 3 (2008): 20–5.
6 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

degrees were awarded in 2021. In 2023, 41 PhD programmes were admitting new
PhD applicants. Sociology in China has thrived in many ways, surpassing its first
historical period and outperforming all other nations with the sole exception of the
United States. A timeline of major sociological events is presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
A Timeline of Major Events related to Sociology in China

Timeline Sociology
Around 1900 Missionary universities begin to offer sociology courses
1914 St. John’s University in Shanghai sets up a Department of Sociology
1931 The Chinese Sociological Society is established as a non-governmental organisation
1952 All sociology programmes are forced to cease operation
1979 The Chinese Sociological Association is established as a quasi-governmental entity
1980 Nankai University offers instructor training
Shanghai University sets up a Department of Sociology
1981 Shanghai University publishes the first professional journal, Chinese Journal of Sociology
1984 Shanghai University confers its first cohort of graduates with bachelor’s degrees in sociology
1986 The Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, publishes its journal Sociological
Studies
1988 Peking University confers its first PhD degree in sociology
2021 China grants an estimated 120 to 180 PhD degrees in sociology
2023 41 PhD programmes in sociology are recruiting students
Notes: Data compilation of the number of PhD degrees in sociology from the Annual Report on Degree-awarding
Institutions (Xuewei shouquandian niandu baogao). Since 2022, the Ministry of Education has required each university
to publish its annual report online, detailing the development and establishment of every degree programme. These
reports include student enrolment data and the number of graduates for the preceding year. The total number of PhD
degrees awarded in 2021 is estimated by the authors.

During his tenure (2002–12) as President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
Hu Jintao was indecisive about the direction of China’s future, vacillating in his public
policy initiatives between strengthening ideological control and furthering economic
reform. For him, “stability” overrode all other considerations. Sociologists at Tsinghua
University were able to pioneer a new path for sociology within the framework of
“communist civilisation”.25 The internationalisation of higher education began during
this period. In general, sociology benefitted from the rapid economic development
after China became a member of World Trade Organization, and it became a lucrative
profession. Ideological control was stricter than it had been under Jiang Zemin but
only intermittently so, and occasional resistance was not met with overly punitive
consequences.
Institutionalisation with Chinese characteristics (2012 to the present). The
latest period of sociology began when Xi Jinping rose to the CPC leadership in
2012—clearly a watershed year in hindsight. This period can be divided into two

25
Aurore Merle, “Towards a Chinese Sociology for ‘Communist Civilisation’”, China Perspectives 2
(2004): 1–17.
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 7

distinctive periods: “taking the reins” (2012–18) and “assuming full control” (2018 to
the present). Many observers of Chinese political life believe that Deng Xiaoping’s
reform initiatives began to ebb significantly in 2012.26 Since then, the CPC has
embraced the notion of the “New Era [xin shidai] of Xi”. To the outside world, China
could be seen as the nation which in 2013 surpassed Japan as the second-largest
national economy. Inside China, Xi shifted the focus from prioritising economic
growth to emphasising political control, initiating his one-person trajectory towards
increased ideological control.27 Academic organisations were actively nudged into
serving as bureaucratic organs of the Party-state.28 The regime’s anti-corruption
campaign garnered popular support, although such campaigns did not differ greatly
from past political purges. Xi’s political enemies have been either systematically retired
or removed from positions of influence. By 2018, Xi was able to abolish term limits
for the presidency of the PRC, with no open resistance from the nearly 3,000 delegates
of the National People’s Congress.
The tightening of ideological control began immediately as Xi Jinping secured
the reins of governance. As a single-minded and mission-driven person, Xi has
demonstrated patience in gradually intensifying control, becoming in due course the
undisputed leader in all areas of public life. Maoist principles and practices—such as
the principle of “sticking to the Party’s unified leadership” (yiyuanhua lingdao)—have
been revived across all levels, in all walks of life, including universities. During the
reform years (1978–2012), the role of the CPC committees was to support the work
of presidents, deans and department chairs to run their academic programmes. In the
new era, presidents, deans and department chairs operate under the directives of CPC
committees at all levels. While the press enjoyed intermittent periods of limited freedom
from 1978 to 2012, control and scrutiny over the media and the content of publications
originating from all of academia, including sociology, have been significantly enhanced.29
In a speech at a symposium of experts in economics and the social sciences, Xi explicitly

26
Carl Minzner and Jeremy Wallace, “Is China’s Reform Era Over? Renewed State Controls in Politics
and the Economy May Unravel the Consensus That’s Kept China Sable for Decades”, Foreign Policy,
28 July 2015, at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/china-reform-era-xi-jinping-new-normal/> [8
August 2023].
27
Lance L.P. Gore, “Leninism for the 21st Century: Xi Jinping’s Ideological Party-building”, China: An
International Journal 21, no. 2 (2023): 8–25.
28
Pi Yijun, “Turning of Academic Organisations into Bureaucratic Organs”, Issues on Juvenile Crime
and Delinquency 181 (2012): 109–10.
29
Chen Hon Fai, Chinese Sociology; Yan Xiaojun, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control
over University Students in post-Deng China”, The China Quarterly 218 (2014): 493–513; Yuan Guiren,
“Gaoxiao jiaoshi bixu shouhao zhengzhi, falü, daode santiao dixian” (University Instructors Must Uphold
the Three Bottom Lines of Politics, Law and Ethics), Xinhua News Agency, 29 January 2015, at <http://
politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0129/c70731-26474982.html> [10 August 2023]; Jennifer Ruth and Xiao
Yu, “Academic Freedom and China: Every Instructor Walks on Thin Ice”, Academic Freedom around the
World 105, no. 4 (2019): 39–44.
8 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

emphasised the need to develop “socialist sociology with distinctive Chinese

characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi shehuixue).30

SITUATED KNOWLEDGE: “SOCIALIST SOCIOLOGY WITH

DISTINCTIVE CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS”
The following discussion of sociology must be qualified with two caveats. First, the
observations and commentaries pertain to sociological literature published within
China and written in Chinese. By contrast, sociological studies of China written in
English outside the country address a myriad of issues comparable to global sociological
concerns, encompassing every aspect of people’s “lived” experiences.31 Second, the
commentaries are related to sociological publications published in print (journals and
books). They are less relevant to the numerous alternative publications generated in
online and grassroots public spaces. These forums of expression are highly volatile,
often existing for only a few minutes to a few days before being officially deleted.32
Publications unfiltered by the CPC are classified as “unofficial sociology”, while those
publications that had passed the CPC censors are classified as “official sociology”.
The political context in which the discipline has evolved can be viewed as an
amalgamation of ancient Chinese despotic tendencies and a veneer of Confucian ideals,
governed through a Soviet-style dictatorship that employs communism as the ideological
foundation.33 This combination has resulted in a new variation of systematic pervasive
control epitomised by the “registered society” established during Mao’s era and the

30
“Xi Jinping: zai jingji shehui lingyu zhuanjia zuotanhui shang de jianghua” (Xi Jinping: Speech at the
Forum of Experts in Economic and Social Fields), Xinhua News Agency, 24 August 2020, at <http://
www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-08/24/c_1126407772.htm> [11 August 2023].
31
Michael Caster, The People’s Republic of the Disappeared: Stories from Inside China’s System for Enforced
Disappearances (New York: Safeguard Defenders, 2017); Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen: The
Struggle for Political Rights in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Gail Hershatter,
Women in China’s Long Twentieth Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007); Daniel
F. Vukovich, Illiberal China: The Ideological Challenge of the People’s Republic of China (Singapore: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2019); Zheng Tiantian, Violent Intimacy: Family Harmony, State Stability, and Intimate
Partner Violence in Post-Socialist China (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022); Jude Howell and Tim
Pringle, “Shades of Authoritarianism and State–Labour Relations in China”, British Journal of Labour
Relations 57, no. 2 (2019): 223–46; Zheng Wang, “‘State Feminism’? Gender and Socialist State Formation
in Maoist China”, Feminist Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 519–51; Pei Yuxin, Sik-ying Ho Petula and Ng
Man Lun, “Studies on Women’s Sexuality in China Since 1980: A Critical Review”, Journal of Sex
Research 44, no. 2 (2007): 202–12; Xu Jianhua, “Urbanization and Inevitable Migration: Crime and
Migrant Workers”, in The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Criminology, ed. Bill Hebenton, Ivan Y. Sun
and Cao Liqun (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 209–23; Tony Huiquan Zhang, “The Rise of the
Princelings in China: Career Advantages and Collective Elite Reproduction”, Journal of East Asian Studies
19, no. 2 (2019): 169–96.
32
Sebastian Veg and Edmund W. Cheng, “Revisiting the Public Sphere in 20th- and 21st-century
China”, The China Quarterly 246 (2021): 317–30.
33
Cao Liqun and Bill Hebenton, “China and ‘La questione criminale’ (‘The Criminal Question’):
Revolutionary and Reformist Periods”, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 52 (2018): 98–105.
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 9

rapid development of the cyber surveillance state under Xi.34 In-group trust and guanxi
(connections) have taken top priority over out-group trust.35
In this context, a “socialist sociology with distinctive Chinese characteristics” has
been proclaimed; this is characterised by six key features. First, under Xi, sociology,
like all academic disciplines, has regressed to the Mao era—i.e. in the attempt to
replicate Mao’s era without Mao himself. Like the law and punishment,36 it functions
as an instrument for social control that serves primarily the interest of the Party-state.
Specifically, under Xi, sociology is tasked with contributing to the realisation of the
“Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation, providing a platform for promoting Chinese
culture globally37 and suppressing certain memories domestically.38 Sociologists are
integrated into the top-down structure of political communication and must therefore
act as the vanguard of the communist regime; they function therefore as elements in
an ideological enterprise, enabling state supervision and control, and facilitating
indoctrination that perpetuates the Party rule.39
Second, knowledge production, considered as part of the ideological domain,
has been dominated by the Party-state rather than by independent individual scholars
or academic disciplines,40 resulting in an exercise of political intellectualism rather than
an objective pursuit of intellectual inquiry. Government projects are not aimed at
generating critical and reflexive research. Even in the area of anti-corruption, only
retrospective analyses are permitted. The purpose of sociological inquiry is to provide
nuts-and-bolts (political) knowledge for the governing body in a reaffirming way. For

34
Margaret Hu, “From the National Surveillance State to the Cybersurveillance State”, Annual Review
of Law and Social Science 13 (2017): 161–80; Shi Chen and Xu Jianhua, “Surveillance Cameras and
Resistance: A Case Study of a Middle School in China”, The British Journal of Criminology 64, no. 5
(September 2024): 1150–70; Tony Huiquan Zhang, Xu Jianhua and Liu Jinjin, “How Do Toothless
Tigers Bite? Extra-institutional Governance and Internet Censorship by Local Governments in China”,
The China Quarterly, online first (2024), at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741024000602>.
35
Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1992); Bian Yanjie, “The Prevalence and the Increasing Significance of Guanxi”, The China
Quarterly 235 (2018): 597–621.
36
Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China; Susan Trevaskes, “A Law unto Itself: Chinese Communist
Party Leadership and yifa zhiguo in the Xi Era”, Modern China 44 (2018): 347–73.
37
Jain, “The Tightening Ideational Regimentation of China’s Higher Education System”.
38
Jean-Philippe Béja, “Forbidden Memory, Unwritten History: The Difficulty of Structuring an
Opposition Movement in the PRC”, China Perspectives 4 (2007): 88–98.
39
Rogier J.E.H. Creemers and Susan Trevaskes, Law and the Party in China: Ideology and Organization
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Hao Zhidong and Guo Zhengyang, “Professors as
Intellectuals in China: Political Identities and Roles in a Provincial University”, The China Quarterly 228
(2016): 1039–60; Susan Trevaskes, “A Law unto Itself: Chinese Communist Party Leadership and Yifa
Zhiguo in the Xi Era”, Modern China 44, no. 4 (2018): 347–73; Ruth and Xiao, “Academic Freedom
and China: Every Instructor Walks on Thin Ice”.
40
Bill Hebenton and Susyan Jou, “Criminology in and on China: Discipline and Power”, Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice 26, no. 1 (2010): 7–19; Susyan Jou, Bill Hebenton and Cao Liqun,
“Development of Criminology in Modern China”, in The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Criminology,
ed. Cao Liqun, Ivan Y. Sun and Bill Hebenton (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 16–26.
10 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

example, no existing sociological journals have published any opposing or questioning

articles regarding the negative and morally questionable aspects of the zero-COVID
policy over the past three years. In addition, little reflexive and/or critical theory,
which for many of the world’s sociologists are the foundation of sociology,41 has been
produced by sociologists. As Mills argues, “sociological imagination” encourages
researchers to “not allow public issues as they are officially formulated…to determine
the problems that [they] take up for study”.42 The outwardly impressive presence of
sociologists at PRC universities masks the absolute lack of critical intellectual questioning
of public institutions and the continuance of dubious policies.
Third, there is a tendency in published articles to obfuscate rather than clarify
reality. Avid and uncritical sociologists often create highly abstract Chinese neologisms
for concepts already well-established in English. For example, social classes become
“social layers” and “social inequality” (shehui bu pingdeng) is replaced with “social
disparity” (shehui chaju). The concept of “rule of law” is substituted with “rule by
law”, and punishment is equated with justice. The severe exploitation of migrant
workers is euphemistically referred to as deriving “population dividends”.43 The
narratives about peasants who leave home to work in cities often focus on their
satisfaction in earning a higher income, omitting the suffering they endure in factories
and the discrimination they face from urban residents.
Fourth, in response to the call for “socialist sociology with distinctive Chinese
characteristics”, sociologists have reignited another round of fruitless bickering about
bentuhua or indigenisation of sociology, initially started in the 1930s by Wu Wenzao.44
The debate is largely one-sided in favour of methodological nationalism, and hardly
argues in defence of cosmopolitanism.45 Methodological nationalism assumes that
nation-states are the natural and necessary form of organising a successful modern
society. It tends to feed off the banal nationalism of everyday language and social
practices. By contrast, cosmopolitanism rejects the notion that a nation’s exclusionary
dimensions are permanent, unsurmountable or all-encompassing,46 advocating instead
for openness, inclusivity and self-determination.47 The indigenisation debate in China

41
Julian Go, “Unveiling Power, or Why Social Science’s Task is Explanation”, The British Journal of
Sociology (2023): 1–5, at <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.13056>.
42
Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 226.
43
Zhang Xinyi, Yan Fei and Chen Yulin, “A Floating Dream: Urban Upgrading, Population Control
and Migrant Children’s Education in Beijing”, Environment and Urbanization 33, no. 1 (2021): 11–30.
44
Wu Wenzao (吴文藻), a Chinese sociologist in the 1930s, was the leader of the “Chinese school of
sociology”.
45
For a balanced and rigorous debate on the issue from both sides, see Daniel Chernilo, “Beyond the
Nation? Or Back to It? Current Trends in the Sociology of Nations and Nationalism”, Sociology 54, no.
6 (2020): 1072–87.
46
Gerard Delanty and He Baogang, “Cosmopolitan Perspectives on European and Asian Transnationalism”,
International Sociology 23, no. 3 (2008): 323–44.
47
Francis T. Cullen, “Social Support as an Organizing Concept for Criminology: Presidential Address
to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences”, Justice Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1994): 527–59.
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 11

largely concluded by the 1930s and the current debate is seen as having little scientific
value and is considered a pseudo-problem.48
Fifth, the limited scope of academic freedom significantly influences what data
are collected, how they are assembled, and consequently how they are interpreted and
which interpretations are disseminated. Censorship is pervasive in survey research;
topics considered politically sensitive are prohibited and certain survey items are
removed. These omissions preclude the possibility of comparative studies and severely
reduce the comparability of cross-cultural studies.49 In addition, expressed opinions
under a totalitarian state are often inaccurate as people are alienated from the political
decision-making process and fear government persecution.50 Consequently, such
quantitative data are dubious and less reflective of true public sentiment. Uncritical
use of these data often results in what Mills characterised as “abstracted empiricism”51—
scholarship in which social reality is largely lost in a narrow focus on method and
measurement.
Sixth, many sociological areas of study are at risk of becoming extinct due to
both vertical (top-down) censorship and horizontal self-censorship. Limited studies
that were permitted from the previous periods have now become endangered, including
but not limited to studies related to feminist sociology, criminology, social movements
and political participation (see Table 2 for details). As governmental censorship
continues to intensify, the list of taboo topics will likely expand further: capital
punishment, civil society, constitutionalism, economic deprivation, ethnic minority
riots, homelessness, human rights, injustice, intimidation of dissidents, mistreatment
of criminal defendants and even lawyers, the petition system, press freedom, sexual
harassment, state crime, suppression of intellectuals, village voting, and the white paper
movement, etc.

48
Xie Yu, “Zouchu Zhongguo shehuixue bentuhua taolun de wuqu” (Avoiding the Misleading Trap of
Sociology Localisation in China), Shehuixue yanjiu (Sociological Studies) 2 (2018): 1–13. While Xie Yu
believes that bentuhua is a non-issue, Zhao Dingxin, a retired professor of sociology from the University
of Chicago and currently a professor at Zhejiang University, posits that sociology is not a Western import
but rather it reflects indigenous thinking of the Chinese. See Zhao Dingxin, “Cong Meiguo shiyong
zhuyi shehui kexue dao Zhongguo tese shehui kexue: zhexue he fangfa lun jichu tanjiu” (From American
Pragmatic Social Sciences to Social Sciences with Chinese Characteristics: An Ontological and
Epistemological Reflection), Shehuixue yanjiu (Sociological Studies) 1 (2018): 17–40.
49
Zhuo Yue and Cao Liqun, “Civil Disputes Resolution in Contemporary China: Action vs. Intention”,
Crime, Law and Social Change 66, no. 5 (2016): 507–23.
50
Cao Liqun and Dai Mengyan, “Confidence in the Police: Where Does Taiwan Rank in the World?”,
Asian Journal of Criminology 1 (2006): 71–84.
51
Mills, The Sociological Imagination.
12 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

TABLE 2
A List of Endangered Subfields of Sociology in China

Subfields of Sociology Specific Topics

Feminist Sociology gender equality, LGBTQ2 (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and two spirit),
prostitution, sex industry, women’s rights
Criminology Anomie, constitutionalism, corruption, justice, legitimacy, police deviance, policy on
ascetic deviance, rule of law, state crime
Social Movements collective behaviour, contentious politics, political conflicts, ethnic riots, popular protest
Government Government–business collusion, government trust, interest groups, political capital,
political suppression, medical sociology, state–labour relationship
Political Participation civil society, civic engagement, civil rights, democracy, non-governmental organisations,
religious practice
Social Inequality class politics, disadvantaged social groups, income disparities, marginalised social groups,
rural-urban divide
Notes: Table 2 is a modified version based on a table developed by Yan Fei and Cao Liqun. While Yan and Cao
highlight the underdeveloped subfields of sociology, Table 2 highlights that the subfields are at risk of elimination in
the immediate future; see Yan Fei and Cao Liqun, “Situated Knowledge and Situated Action: The Rise of Chinese
Sociology Since 1978”, in Paradigm Shifts in Chinese Studies, ed. Shiping Hua (Singapore: Palgrave-Macmillan Press,
2022), pp. 263–83.

Reform-minded scholars view the new period with notable trepidation, considering it
a retrograde development and a new form of despotism that pretends to respect
expertise and openly disparages sociological knowledge.52 Before Xi’s era, the state
typically coaxed intellectuals into compliance with the Party-state dictates. However,
in the new era, the Xi regime has publicly clamped down on academics who dare to
deviate from the Party line.53
The governance power of the CPC is however certainly not monolithic. While
the phenomenon of “educated acquiescence”54—acceding to political compliance in
exchange for benefits and visibility in the state-sanctioned academic limelight—appears
to be widespread, the reality is more complex. Beneath this seeming acquiescence lies
a potential volcano of dissent, indicating that the intelligentsia, sociologists included,
are not entirely convinced of the Party’s goals.55 Many sociologists, with years of
training in the discipline, adopt a “cooperate to resist” approach towards their jobs
and their publications. They attempt to comply with the Party’s demands to keep

52
Xu Zhangrun, “Women dangxia de kongju yu qidai” (Our Contemporary Fear and Expectation),
Unirule Institute of Economics, at <http://unirule.cloud/index.php?c=article&id=4625> [18 September
2023].
53
Tom Phillips, “Chinese Universities Must Become Communist Strongholds, says Xi Jinping”, The
Guardian, 9 December 2016, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/china-universities-
must-become-communist-party-strongholds-says-xi-jinping> [10 August 2023]; Christian Shepherd,
“Chinese Academic Stopped from Teaching after Criticizing Party Leadership”, Financial Times, 25
March 2019, at <https://www.ft.com/content/8af0cfdc-4f11-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294> [11 August 2022].
54
Elizabeth J. Perry, “Educated Acquiescence: How Academia Sustains Authoritarianism in China”,
Theory and Society 49, no. 1 (2020): 1–22.
55
Hao and Guo, “Professors as Intellectuals in China”.
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 13

their jobs and get their articles published (see a case study by Wang and Liu56). The
“cooperate to resist” concept pertains to a strategy of public obedience coupled with
private resistance. This form of resistance is common in totalitarian regimes, where
open opposition is impossible and governments can never fully extinguish human
freedom. The concept is similar to Erika E.S. Evasdottir’s “obedient autonomy”
concept, which is “a self-directed control over change that takes effect only through
the concerted effort”.57 Moreover, a few sociologists, such as Guo Yuhua (郭于华),
Sun Liping (孙立平), Yu Jianrong (于建嵘) and Zheng Yefu (郑也夫), along with
legal scholars like Lao Dongyan (劳东燕), Xu Zhangrun (许章润) and Zhang Qianfan
(张千帆), have openly steered clear of making a Faustian bargain and work within
the “cracks” of virtual public spaces, which are characterised by their short-lived
presence or duration in cyberspace, always far removed from the official limelight.
Without legal protections and the support of civil society, these scholars, like some
of their administrators who are also intellectuals and are unable to resist ideological
encroachment, cannot function openly for long. Nevertheless, through considering
the courageous work being done in these cracks, the authors find both light and
continuing hope for the future of Chinese sociology.
Xi’s tightening grip on society, akin to Maoist totalitarianism, has intensified
melancholy among intellectuals. The global sociological community actively celebrates
diversity of thought, self-critical introspection, ongoing critical assessments of social
institutions, and the active exchange of insights across cultures and nations. The
concept of universal human rights holds genuine significance for them and demonstrating
through scientific inquiry how contemporary social institutions and orthodox thinking
often impede the realisation of those rights is a core element of Mills’ Sociological
Imagination. Xu and Liu, in their commentary on “public criminology” in China,
argue that the term connotes “neither public nor criminology” because criminology
in China is heavily influenced by the state and lacks both public engagement and
academic independence.58 Given the aforementioned six features of sociology, a similar
conclusion can be drawn about the field as a whole: sociology in China is on its way
to becoming “sociology” in name only.
Ironically, the current critique of sociology in China originates from the Western
Marxian tradition of sociology, spanning from C. Wright Mills to Edward W. Said,
and from Michel Foucault to Michael Dutton. These scholars consistently warn against
the often subtle power/knowledge nexus in the West. On the other hand, the blatant
collusion of power and knowledge, as well as propaganda and academic research, began

56
Wang Di and Liu Sida, “Performing Artivism: Feminists, Lawyers, and Online Legal Mobilization in
China”, Law & Social Inquiry 45, no. 3 (2020): 678–705.
57
Erika E.S. Evasdottir, Obedient Autonomy: Chinese Intellectuals and the Achievement of Orderly Life
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), p. x.
58
Xu Jianhua and Liu Weidi, “Public Criminology in China: Neither Public nor Criminology”, in
Routledge Handbook on Public Criminologies, eds. Kathryn Henne and Rita Shah (London: Routledge,
2020), pp. 152–62.
14 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

with the Soviet Union under Stalin and has since been inseparable in communist
states. Such power-centric scholarship, like its totalitarian form of governance, represents
an alternative mode of knowledge production that challenges the sociology of knowledge.
It also weakens the long Confucian tradition of remonstration, which emphasises
principled service and holds that it is morally wrong to point to a deer and claim it
is a horse. The viewpoint in this article is also supported by some courageous voices
within Chinese sociology; some of these voices are outside of Chinese government
control, such as Edmund Fung and Chen Kuan-Hsing59 who artfully articulate
sociologists’ concerns in China.

FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY IN CHINA: AN UNDERSTUDIED AREA

OF INQUIRY
Feminist sociology serves as a convincing example of the significant limitations in the
development of sociology during the reform years (1978–2012); today, under the
current regime, it faces the risk of extinction. Since the 1970s, feminist sociology has
established a significant presence in North America and Europe. Feminist views have,
in many respects, redefined long-standing debates about epistemology, the scientific
method, political dynamics and forms of human knowledge.60 Gender studies has
emerged as a speciality area of wide interest in the discipline of sociology. The “Sociology
of Sex and Gender” section of the American Sociological Association was re-established
in 1973, and the journal Gender and Society was launched in 1987. Within the
American Society of Criminology, the Division of Women and Crime was established
in 1983, and the journal Feminist Criminology was launched in 2006. A gender-based
view of knowledge and a “standpoint epistemology” that includes feminist ontology,
feminist pedagogy and feminist methodology are now common in North American
and European sociology.
In China, Confucianism has long defined women’s role as subservient.61
However, extensive contact with Western civilisation since the late Qing dynasty
prompted significant changes in the status of women. At the start of the 20th
century, Christian missionaries first introduced the idea of gender equality and led
the anti-foot-binding movement in the country. As the first wave of industrialisation
reached China, women began to work in factories in major coastal cities. In 1912,
the Republic of China abolished the practice of foot-binding for women—the
ultimate symbol of male oppression of women.

59
Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity; Chen Kuan-Hsing, Asia as Method: Toward
Deimperialization (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
60
Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory”,
Signs 7, no. 3 (1982): 515–44.
61
Susan L. Mann, Gender and Sexuality in Modern Chinese History (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 15

The Constitution of the Republic of China, adopted in 1947, granted universal

suffrage. After the communists assumed power in 1949, women appeared to enjoy a
more equal status.62 The CPC, through its organisation, the All-China Women’s
Federation, continued with the previous Nationalist government’s policy of abolishing
prostitution, deeming it a form of violence against women. In the 1950s, the CPC
forced all known prostitutes into labour camps for re-education. In 1958, the CPC
proudly declared to the world that prostitution had been eradicated nationwide,
claiming this achievement as a major symbol of communist China’s transformation
into a modern nation.63 Outside China, many scholars tend to associate “Chinese
women’s liberation” under the CPC with the Western feminist movement, partially
out of nostalgic fantasy. Some published articles and monographs reference a quote
attributed to Mao Zedong: Women can hold up half the sky, citing it as evidence of
Mao’s sympathy towards feminism. However, scholars found no evidence of such a
statement in their research of all published works by Mao.64 Revisiting Mao’s female
labour models and “Iron Girls” myths reveals that women’s stories were far more
complex than the Party-state’s claim that women had broken through all gender
boundaries in the workplace.65 In fact, traditional gender roles have remained widely
accepted by many Chinese women to this day.66
Sociological research indicates that progress on the status of women in China
has been very limited. While recognising improvements in employment and income
for rural and urban women during Mao’s era, researchers report that this progress
fell short of the promised revolution for gender equality.67 Since the introduction of
the market economy in 1978, female workers have faced significant discrimination
in hiring and layoffs. Similarly, wages in both state and non-state sectors have been
deteriorating, further lowering the economic status of women relative to men. Despotic
management practices in the private sector have worsened working conditions for
hundreds of thousands of women in south China.68 Similar disheartening stories from
rural China suggest that, while men lead the expansion of family businesses, women

62
Zheng, “‘State Feminism’?”.
63
Liang Bin and Cao Liqun, “China’s Policies toward Illegal Drugs and Prostitution in the New Era:
Struggle within the Global Context”, in Modern Chinese Legal Reform, ed. Li Xiaobing and Fang Qiang
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2013), pp. 189–212.
64
Zhong Xueping and Ren Ming, “Funü nengding banbiantian: yige you sizhong shuofa de gushi” (Four
Interpretations of the Slogan ‘Women Hold up Half the Sky’), Nankai xuebao (Nankai Journal), no. 4
(2009): 54–64.
65
Yang Wenqi and Yan Fei, “The Annihilation of Femininity in Mao’s China: Gender Inequality of
Sent-down Youth during the Cultural Revolution”, China Information 31, no. 1 (2017): 63–83.
66
William L. Parish and Sarah Busse, “Gender and Family”, in Chinese Urban Life under Reform, ed.
Tang Wenfang and William L. Parish (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 209–31.
67
Martin King Whyte, “Sexual Inequality under Socialism: The Chinese Case in Perspective”, in Class
and Social Stratification in Post-Revolution China, ed. James L. Watson (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1984), pp. 198–238.
68
Lee Ching Kwan, “Engendering the Worlds of Labor: Women Workers, Labor Markets, and Production
Politics in the South China Economic Miracle”, American Sociological Review 60, no. 3 (1995): 378–97.
16 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

are often left to bear the onerous burdens of agricultural production work. One study
noted that sexual harassment is a severely understudied subject in China; over the
past 50 years, over 5,320 papers in English but just 122 in Chinese have examined
this issue.69 Although formal regulations against sexual harassment in the workplace
exist, there are no published data on the number of cases filed and won by women
in court.
Even well-educated and self-employed female entrepreneurs can experience how
a cycle of violence is perpetuated.70 Studies reveal that domestic violence is a serious
issue, particularly in rural areas.71 Surprisingly, few ethnographic studies on intimate
partner violence have been conducted in China to date. Despite official claims
regarding the status of women, the entrenched male-dominant culture remains strong.
The release of Tan Weiwei’s 2021 song “Xiao Juan” brought the outcry of the Chinese
#MeToo movement to public awareness. In response, the Party-state, however, has
intensified its suppression of the movement, prohibiting discussions and barring
harassment survivors from posting on social media.72 Disturbing stories of domestic
violence have also frequently captured public attention,73 underscoring that women’s
emancipation and gender equality are still far from reality. Traditional Chinese
concepts of a well-ordered family, with women in subservient roles to the male head,
are strongly reflected in the CPC’s emphasis on monogamous, heterosexual families.74
This tradition was reaffirmed by Xi Jinping’s recent call for women to fulfil their
primary roles as “dutiful wives and virtuous mothers” in promoting family harmony
through “raising and educating the next generation, taking care of their husbands,
and supporting the elderly”.75

69
Sun Yufan, “Haiwai xingsaorao yanjiu 50 nian 5,000 pian zongshu: weishenme Zhongguo meiren
yanjiu?” (A Review of 5,000 Articles on Sexual Harassment Research Conducted Overseas in the Past
50 Years: Why is No One Doing Research within China?), 7 May 2023, at <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/
Zh3V1w_OcKVpvsvCYVhlvg> [26 December 2023].
70
Zhang Dongling, “The ‘She Power’ That Was Not: A Contextual-Interfaces Analysis of Chinese
Women Micro-Entrepreneurs’ Experiences of Gender-Based Violence”, American Review of China Studies
22, no. 2 (2021): 1–29.
71
Wang Xiangxian, Fang Gang and Li Hongtao, “Gender-based Violence and Hegemonic Masculinity
in China: An Analysis Based on the Quantitative Research”, China Population and Development Studies
3 (2019): 84–97.
72
Qiu Geping and Cheng Hongming, “Gender and Power in the Ivory Tower: Sexual Harassment in
Graduate Supervision in China”, Journal of Gender Studies 32 (2024): 600–15.
73
Elsie Chen, “Her Abuse was a ‘Family Matter’ until It Went Live”, The New York Times, 15 November
2020, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/world/asia/china-women-domestic-abuse.html> [9 August
2023]; Wu Yitong et al., “Chinese Commentators Slam Official Findings in Jiangsu Chained Woman
Case”, Radio Free Asia, 24 February 2022, at <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/woman-
chained-02242022123530.html> [9 August 2023].
74
Mann, Gender and Sexuality in Modern Chinese History.
75
Zheng, Violent Intimacy, p. 7.
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 17

During periods of relatively lax censorship, termed the “good times”, research
on sexuality began to appear in Chinese sociological literature.76 These studies were
introductory and descriptive, reflecting a theme of resistance to social injustice. They
did not challenge the CPC’s official policy, but rather sought to raise awareness of
the ongoing inequality. As MacKinnon aptly observes, “sexuality is to feminism what
work is to Marxism: that which is most one’s own, yet most taken away”.77 Indeed,
the delicate topics of sexual orientation and gender identification have been largely
neglected by sociologists. Simultaneously, the thriving sex industry, which re-emerged
in contemporary China following economic reforms, has also escaped rigorous
sociological investigation. The Chinese government has enacted a series of laws banning
prostitution and third-party involvement in prostitution. These laws premise that
prostitution both humiliates and commodifies women, thereby undermining
advancement towards gender equality. However, Zheng has observed that while males
who engage in unauthorised migration are generally depicted as making rational, self-
serving economic decisions, female migrants are more likely to be lured or coerced
into prostitution due to limited economic opportunities, low levels of education and
a lack of social mobility. As a result, women are frequently cast as passive victims in
need of rescue and “rehabilitation”.78
Such differential framing of male and female behaviour reinforces the
marginalisation of women and undermines gender equality. Choi argues that the
victim’s perspective has displaced the blame for unsafe sex practices, which harm
public health, onto sex workers themselves. In reality, male clients resist the use of
condoms. The legal prohibition of prostitution prevents sex workers from negotiating
safe sex practices, thereby increasing their risk of exposure to HIV (human
immunodeficiency viruses) and sexually transmitted diseases.79 In other words, the
overmoralisation of prostitution does not halt the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases. By contrast, sociologists in other countries have tended to focus on the lived
experiences of women, listening carefully to the voices of sex workers themselves
rather than merely representing their voices, speculating on their behaviour or making
assumptions about their moral character.
Under state-derived feminism, human agency becomes the monopoly of the
Party-state. Changes regarding gender equality are directed entirely from above and
mobilised through the organisational channels of the All-China Women’s Federation.
The Party-state, through the Federation, defines the causes, methods and vision of
change and serves as the guardian and male protector of women’s rights and interests.

76
Luo Muyuan, Li Tangmei and Shi Junpeng, “Sociology of Homosexuality in Twenty-first-century
China”, International Sociology 37, no. 5 (2022): 569–81.
77
MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State”, esp. 515.
78
Zheng Tiantian, “Prostitution and Human Trafficking”, in The Routledge Handbook of Chinese
Criminology, ed. Cao Liqun, Ivan Y. Sun and Bill Hebenton (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 197–208.
79
Susanne Y.P. Choi, “State Control, Female Prostitution and HIV Prevention in China”, The China
Quarterly 205 (2011): 96–114.
18 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

Although women can be mobilised for change, they cannot act as their own agents of
change. Women’s various rights were “granted by the state”, and were not won by
women themselves.80 The moralisation of issues such as homosexual relations or
prostitution reflects a deeper tendency to adhere to a single version of what a family
should be, one in which patriarchal privilege and fealty are cardinal virtues. It has
further reinforced the boundaries limiting the possible gender roles of males and
females in general,81 and even students on university campuses,82 which, arguably,
have been the cradle for the avant-garde. Within this broader framework, the Party-
state has assumed the role of pater familias, reserving the right to dictate moral standards,
appropriate modes of personal sexual conduct, the number of children, religious
practice and much more.
Similar to their attempt to steer clear of examining topics associated with the
sex industry, sociologists in China have also largely avoided the related topics pertaining
to same-sex relationships and sexual identity.83 Scholarship on these themes is scarce,
even during the reform years before 2012.84 The Party-state tends to view issues such
as homosexuality and transgender identification as condemnable immorality. During
periods of relative openness, voices from the LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender
and queer) community could be heard, but life has been increasingly difficult for
sexual minorities since 2012.85 Under Xi’s leadership, the space for LGBTQ individuals
has significantly shrunk.86
The conundrum is, of course, not limited to the study of prostitution or human
sexuality. There is a general perception that the Chinese lack a rights-conscious
orientation to social life and political institutions.87 Under the omnipresent CPC,
human rights are not conceptualised as inherent privileges for all individuals; rather,
they are viewed as state-issued awards that can be altered at the state’s discretion. The
CPC has reinforced a patriarchal tradition that has spanned over 2,000 years—this
implies that any licence that one enjoys as a privilege from the authorities could be
withdrawn at their discretion. The work of feminist theorists foregrounds the recognition

80
Mann, Gender and Sexuality in Modern Chinese History.
81
Huang Lan-Ying and Cao Liqun, “Exploring Sexual Harassment in a Police Department in Taiwan”,
Policing 31 (2008): 324–40.
82
Qiu and Cheng, “Gender and Power in the Ivory Tower”.
83
Lin Kai and Wang Wenjin, “Changing Public Tolerance for Same-sex Sexual Behaviors in China
2010–2017: A Decomposition Analysis”, Archives of Sexual Behavior 50 (2021): 3433–45; Tony Huiquan
Zhang and Robert Brym, “Tolerance of Homosexuality in 88 Countries: Education, Political Freedom
and Liberalism”, Sociological Forum 34, no. 2 (2019): 501–21.
84
Luo, Li and Shi, “Sociology of Homosexuality in Twenty-first-century China”.
85
Gong Jing and Liu Tingting, “Decadence and Relational Freedom among China’s Gay Migrants:
Subverting Heteronormativity by ‘Lying Flat’”, China Information 36, no. 2 (2021): 200–20.
86
Nicole Hong and Wang Zixu, “With Rainbow Flags, 2 Students Test China’s Shrinking L.G.B.T.Q.
Space”, The New York Times, 3 June 2023, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/03/world/asia/rainbow-
flags-china-lgbtq.html> [11 August 2023].
87
Peter Lorentzen and Suzanne Scoggins, “Understanding China’s Rising Rights Consciousness”, The
China Quarterly 22 (2015): 638–57; Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China.
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 19

that power and influence should be inherent considerations in the study of gender
and gender equality.88 Ignoring these issues is, after all, both politically expedient and
calculated. The Chinese government’s recent call for female workers to return home
has intensified since the implementation of the new two-child policy in 2015. By
relegating women to domestic roles, society may be losing half of its intellectual
potential.89 Sociological research on feminism, which was under-researched before the
Xi Jinping era, is now viewed either as a menace from the decadent “West” or an
entirely foreign phenomenon.90

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Chinese sociology re-emerged under the leadership of reform-minded Deng Xiaoping.
However, its revival was not a complete rebirth. While all CPC apparatchiks, from
top to bottom, acknowledged the need for economic reform, “integrating with the
world” in practice meant adopting the economic practices of other nations while resisting
substantive political behavioural or systemic changes. This selective borrowing of ideas
from the outside world mirrors the Westernisation Movement (circa 1861–95) of the
late Qing dynasty, when foreign technologies were adopted for practical use while
Chinese traditions remained the core, or “essence” (tiyong). The divide between
“application” and “essence” in this context refers to the integration of new technology
while maintaining the Qing dynasty’s political system—a recurring tension in preserving
the status quo. The current debate between indigenisation and Westernisation is merely
a modern expression of this resistance to systemic change.
Since its rebirth, empirical sociological research has experienced impressive growth
and notable methodological sophistication has taken root.91 However, sociological
insight into contemporary China has not advanced to a significant degree.92 Similarly,
critical sociology has remained “significantly underdeveloped”, even during the reform
years.93 Having assumed a subservient consultative rather than an emancipatory and
questioning role in relation to the Party-state, the officially sanctioned sociology has
largely lost its way in its fixation on empirical methodologies and conceptual arguments
confined within narrow boundaries. Thus, sociology during the reform era before Xi
was simultaneously prospering and underperforming as an academic discipline. Since
then, large quantities of sociological research articles have continued to be pumped

88
Coraline Jortay, Jennifer Bond and Liu Chang, “Legible and Thus Legitimate? Reading and Blurring
Gender in China, Today and Yesterday”, China Perspective 3 (2020): 5–8.
89
Zheng, Violent Intimacy.
90
Chaguan, “China’s Elites Think Feminism is a Foreign Plot”, The Economist, 16 June 2022.
91
Andrew Walder, “The Relevance of China’s Transformation for Contemporary Sociology”, Chinese
Sociological Review 44, no. 1 (2011): 8–13.
92
Zhou Xueguang and Pei Xiaomei, “Chinese Sociology in a Transitional Society”, Contemporary Sociology
26, no. 5 (1997): 569–72.
93
Bian and Zhang, “Sociology in China”.
20 CAO Liqun, YAN Fei and Nicholas P. LOVRICH

out. However, many of these published “feel good” policy articles are largely out of
sync with the lived reality of ordinary people.
Under Xi’s reign, “socialist sociology with distinctive Chinese characteristics”
has been at risk of returning to Orwellian-style governmental control.94 The Xi regime
and the CPC have issued repeated stern warnings against expressing doubts about the
central government’s policies (wangyi Zhongyang 妄议中央), and have prohibited
seven specific areas of “Western thinking” (qi bu jiang 七不讲) from being taught in
classrooms.95 In addition, select students monitor professors’ lectures and report any
deviations from the official Party line to the authorities.96 Good sociology universally
requires Verstehen—an epistemology that requires a self-critical and open-minded
viewpoint from scholars seeking to understand the lived reality of people.97 In the
internet and digital information era, nations should seek to maintain their geographic
boundaries, but sociology as an academic discipline should not be confined by
boundaries. The boundaries of sociological inquiry should be determined by sociologists
themselves, rather than by politicians wielding governmental powers.98
As a scientific discipline, sociology in China can and should be “extrapolated”—
it should examine social reality with few political restrictions and explore untested
options for societal action. It needs to return to its original humanitarian concerns
voiced in the 1930s, focusing on the disadvantaged, the socially disfavoured, the
marginalised, the accused and the incarcerated,99 as well as to investigate the denied,
the deterred, and the disenchanted in contemporary times. Chinese sociology, like
sociology elsewhere, has the potential to be emancipatory and transformative, offering
new theoretical insights into the experiential journey towards modernity. It should
help humanity achieve a state where individual happiness is found in the construction
of a good society100—one that is just, secure, fruitful and inclusive. However, the
analysis presented here leads the authors to draw a conclusion that the contemporary
telos of official Chinese sociology is a loyal subservient entity promoting the
perpetuation of Party-state rule. This type of sociology is sui generis rather than
universal in its ambition.

94
See “Zhongban guoban yinfa guanyu jiaqiang xinshidai faxue jiaoyu he faxue lilun yanjiu de yijian”
(Opinions on How to Strengthen Education of Law and Its Theory in the New Era, Issued by the
General Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the General Office of the
State Council), People’s Daily, 27 February 2023, at <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0227/c1001-
32631603.html> [11 August 2023].
95
Cao and Hebenton, “Criminology in China: Taking Stock (Again)”.
96
Ruth and Xiao, “Academic Freedom and China”.
97
Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949).
98
Andrew Abbott, “Varieties of Normative Inquiry: Moral Alternatives to Politicization in Sociology”,
American Sociologist 49, no. 2 (2018): 158–80.
99
Cao Liqun and Du Shaochen, “Yi guojihua shiye zuo Zhongguo yanjiu” (China Study in International
Perspective), Qinghua shehuixue pinglun (Tsinghua Sociological Review) 10 (2018): 1–12.
100
Robert N. Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011).
 The Making of a Sociology with Distinctive Chinese Characteristics 21

Equipped with new AI-assisted surveillance technologies, including “big data

mining”, “facial recognition”, individual citizen tracking and digital surveillance of
social media and the social credit system, the Party-state has vastly expanded its
control of people in the 21st century.101 The CPC is militarising society and infusing
it with patriotic fervour, reshaping the education system and reinforcing traditional
roles for women, and conditioning a new generation of youth to view the West as
a mortal enemy in the fight for China’s rise. Since Xi assumed power, xenophobia
has returned to national prominence, posing challenges to sociologists who wish to
achieve a universalistic ideal of offering an independent and often critical voice for
a cosmopolitan understanding of humanistic values. Many young Chinese academics
have fallen prey to their deteriorating informational ecosystem, becoming victims of
its circumscription. Increasingly severe print and online censorship, the rise of semi-
closed “WeChat Moments” as the main platform for news dissemination among
mainland Chinese,102 and the incessant production of “patriotic-cum-ideological
education” have made it difficult for intellectuals to perceive the outside world
accurately. However, so long as the flow of information is not completely cut off,
the authors remain sanguine that once the current suppressive political climate is
lifted, Chinese sociologists, like their global counterparts, will rise to live up to the
expectations of that “sociological imagination” that C. Wright Mills articulated to
fellow sociologists about “threescore years and five” ago.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank Tony Huiquan Zhang, Jihong Zhao and the two
anonymous reviewers for providing helpful suggestions and constructive comments
on earlier versions of the manuscript.

101
Javier C. Hernández, “Professors, Beware. In China, Student Spies Might be Watching”, The New
York Times, 1 November 2019, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/world/asia/china-student-
informers.html> [15 December 2022]; Zhang, Xu and Liu, “How do Toothless Tigers Bite? ”
102
Wu Huizhong and Ting Fu, “China Steps up Online Controls with New Rule for Bloggers”, The
Diplomat, 17 February 2021, at <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/china-steps-up-online-controls-with-
new-rule-for-bloggers> [18 December 2022].