Foundationalism

Historical Development of Foundationalism

Foundationalism has a long history, as it has its roots in the works of philosophers such as
Aristotle in ancient philosophy, Aquinas in mediaeval philosophy, Descartes, Locke, Hume,
Reid, and Kant in modern philosophy, including such significant contemporaries as A.J.
Ayer, C.I. Lewis, and Roderick Chisholm (Foundationalism and the Structure of Epistemic
Warrant, N.D.).

According to Stiffler (1984), the foundation of foundationalism can be traced to Aristotle, as

evidenced in his remark on scientific knowledge in his posteriori analytics. Stiffler (1984)
explained Aristotle's claim that foundational knowledge is an immediate proposition or a
proposition that has no other prior to it (Stiffler, 1984, 16).

However, the idea of foundationalism became more pronounced in the modern period in the
works of philosophers like Descartes. Descartes famously attempted to establish indubitable
foundational beliefs using methodic doubt; he uses the methodic doubt to reach certain
knowledge of self-existence in the act of thinking, as evidenced in his statement "Cogito,
ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019).

Alston (1976b) emphasises how the origin of foundationalism can be traced back to
philosophers like Descartes, emphasising how Descartes made tenable his view as to the
origin of foundationalism. According to Alston (1976a), Descartes foundationalism is
evidenced in his Meditations, where he sets out to identify items (beliefs) that are in
themselves incorrigible and that could serve as the foundation for all other beliefs
(knowledge). This foundational knowledge must be something that there could not be any
doubt as to its grounding, an indubitable claim. This this items will then serve as the basis for
showing that other items are known as well (Alston 1976b, 181; Stiffler, 1984, 16).

Theaetetus Knowledge Claim

Although the history of foundationalism is often attributed to the works of Aristotle, with its
modern view and transformation of the thought about foundationalism found in the works of
Descartes, However, going by the current view of foundationalism as foundational
knowledge, which in itself remains incorrigible, it is possible to relate this idea to the work of
Plato in his “Theaetetus”. In Platos Theaetetus, he suggested that one can only assert that a
belief is knowledge if it can be justified and turns out to be true; succinctly put, knowledge is
nothing but justified through belief (Mabe, 2012).

This definition aligns with the foundationalist account of knowledge. The implication of
Plato's statement is that knowledge is only true if and only if it can be proven to be true,
while it is in itself true, not because it is justified as true, but because it is necessarily true
whether proven to be true or not.

Plato justified true belief, often referred to as JTB, following the following structure:
The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge (Ichikawa & Steup, 2017)
S knows that p iff

1. pis true;
2. believes that
3. is justified in believing that

This view of Plato has been believed by some philosophers to be a foundational account of
knowledge. The foundationalist interpretation is that one's beliefs must be justified by
reference to foundational beliefs that are themselves self-justified or evident.

Alston (1976b) proffered a solution to the debate when he divided foundationalism into two
types: "simple foundationalism" and "iterative foundationalism." The simple foundationalism
is the foundational belief that “a belief can be immediately justified without the subject
having to be aware of this fact,” while the iterative foundationalism is the belief that “the
subject of an immediately justified belief must be immediately justified in believing that he is
immediately justified.”

The "justified true belief" definition in Theaetetus may be seen as a form of simple
foundationalism, as it permits the justification of basic beliefs through indirect means. While
the modern view of Descartes can be classified as iterative foundationalism,

The foundationalist framework was shaped by these historical developments and became a
central topic in epistemological discussions.

Foundationalism as a Rescue Theory

Foundationalism is often seen as a rescue theory for the proposition of knowledge, providing
a structured framework for how knowledge can be grounded and justified. The core idea of
foundationalism is that knowledge is based on foundational beliefs, which serve as the
ultimate epistemic justification for all other beliefs. Foundational beliefs are typically thought
to be self-evident, incorrigible, or indubitable, providing a secure foundation for knowledge.
This view is a response to scepticism and epistemic challenges, as it aims to establish a firm
foundation on which knowledge can be built.
According to Alston (1976a), foundationalism provides a means to address sceptical
challenges and counterarguments, as if there were no foundationalism, “scepticism would
reign supreme." By positing certain foundational beliefs that are immune to doubt or
challenge, foundationalism offers a way to rescue our claims to knowledge from the threat of
skepticism. It allows us to have a starting point for knowledge that doesn't rely on an infinite
regress of justifications.

Furthermore, Alston (1976b) distinguishes between two types of foundationalism: "simple

foundationalism" and "iterative foundationalism." Both types seek to address the challenge of
knowledge justification, with simple foundationalism allowing for indirect justification of
basic beliefs and iterative foundationalism requiring direct, self-evident justification. This
distinction reflects the diversity of approaches within foundationalism and its flexibility as a
rescue theory for knowledge claims.

School of Thought: Arising from Foundationalism to Support Knowledge Claims

From the foundationalist perspective, various schools of thought and approaches have arisen
to support knowledge claims by building upon or modifying the foundationalist framework.
These schools of thought often share the foundationalist idea that some beliefs serve as the
foundation for knowledge, but they differ in how they understand and apply this concept. The
schools of thought include:

1. Coherentism: Coherentism is a school of thought that arises from foundationalism.

Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification that implies that “for a belief to be
justified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs, and for a system of beliefs to
be coherent, the beliefs that make up that system must “cohere” with one another”
(Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, n.d.).

Suffice to say, according to the coherentist view of it, coherentists reject the idea of
foundational beliefs but argue that beliefs are justified by their relationships to other beliefs
within a coherent system. This approach allows for the interdependence of beliefs in
supporting knowledge claims.

2. Infinitism: Infinitism is another response to foundationalism. Infinitism has to do with

the idea of an infinite chain of justified beliefs. Instead of requiring foundational
beliefs (Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, n.d.), infinitists argue that knowledge
claims can be justified through an infinite regress of reasoning, with each belief being
justified by the next.
 3. **Foundherentism**: typically, foundehenretism is a theory of epistemic justification
that developed as a response to foundationalism and cohenrentism. Susan Haack is
acknowledged as the proponent of the argument, necessitating the need for a better
grounded theory. The Haack argument was founded on the basis that foundationalism
and coherentism don't exhaust the field (Internen Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 023).
Foundherentism combines the foundationalist idea of basic beliefs with the coherence
of beliefs in a network (Hasan & Fumerton, 2018). It suggests that knowledge is
derived from both foundational beliefs and the coherence of beliefs within the
network.

These schools of thought have emerged as alternative responses to the challenges of

foundationalism while still seeking to provide support for knowledge claims. They illustrate
the ongoing debate within epistemology about the nature of foundational beliefs and the
justification of knowledge.

Challenges to foundationalism

Foundationalism, while often seen as a rescue theory for epistemological challenges and
epistemic justification, also faces significant critiques and internal challenges that suggest it
may not be able to rescue itself from these problems. Foundationalism as a rescue theory has
encountered critiques over the years, such as the difficulty of encountering difficulties in its
own rescue. To explore the errors, flaws, and critiques directed at foundationalism,

Foundationalism as a Rescue Theory That Cannot Rescue Itself

Foundationalism, as a rescue theory, seeks to provide a secure foundation for knowledge

claims through foundational beliefs that are either self-evident, incorrigible, or indubitable
(Foundationalism and the Structure of Epistemic Warrant, N.D.). However, it faces a
significant challenge in justifying these foundational beliefs themselves. The "problem of the
criterion" questions how foundational beliefs can be justified without relying on further
beliefs, leading to a potential internal inconsistency within foundationalism.

Alston (1976a) highlights this issue by suggesting that foundationalism might struggle to
establish the epistemic warrant of its foundational beliefs. If foundational beliefs require
justification, then they are not truly foundational, which undermines the core tenet of
foundationalism.

Several errors, flaws, and critiques have been directed at foundationalism, further
highlighting its limitations as a rescue theory, and they include the following:

1. The Regress Problem: Foundationalism faces the regress problem, which questions
whether foundational beliefs can be justified without an infinite regress of beliefs. If
 basic beliefs require justification, they would lead to an infinite chain of justifications.
Sosa (1980) addresses this issue, emphasising the need for properly basic beliefs, but
this notion itself is a subject of debate.
2. Problem of Arbitrariness: Critics argue that foundationalism might lead to
arbitrariness in selecting foundational beliefs. In BonJour (1999), foundationalism
might not provide a principled way to determine which beliefs should be considered
foundational and which should not, leaving room for subjectivity and inconsistency.
3. Problem of Criterion: Problem of Criterion" assesses the questions on how
foundational beliefs themselves can be justified without relying on further beliefs.
This challenge has been discussed by BonJour (1999), who argues that
foundationalism faces difficulties in establishing a secure connection between
foundational beliefs and the external world.

1. Challenge of External World Scepticism: Foundationalism is criticised for its inability

to respond to external world scepticism effectively. The "problem of induction" and
the challenge of justifying beliefs about the external world without relying on circular
reasoning or other fallacies have been problematic for foundationalism.

1. Coherentism and Infinitism as Alternatives: Some critics argue that coherentism and
infinitism provide alternative approaches to addressing the challenges faced by
foundationalism (Internen Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2023). Coherentism suggests
that knowledge arises from the coherence of beliefs, bypassing the need for
foundational beliefs. Infinitism, on the other hand, accepts the possibility of an
infinite chain of justifications, offering an alternative to foundationalist positions
(Internen Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2023).

Conclusion

Foundationalism, as a theory of epistemic justification and a potential rescue theory for

knowledge claims, has a complex history dating back to ancient and modern philosophers
like Aristotle and Descartes. It seeks to provide a solid foundation for knowledge by positing
certain foundational beliefs that are immune to doubt or challenge. However, foundationalism
itself encounters significant challenges and critiques that cast doubt on its ability to rescue
itself from these problems. These challenges include the problem of justifying foundational
beliefs, the potential for regression problems, the issue of arbitrariness in selecting
foundational beliefs, and the challenge of responding to external world skepticism. These
critiques have led to the development of alternative epistemic theories like coherentism and
infinitism, reflecting the ongoing debate within epistemology. Thus, foundationalism remains
a subject of ongoing discussion and refinement within the field of epistemology.