Historical Society of Nigeria

AGAJA AND THE CONQUEST OF THE COASTAL AJA STATES 1724-30

Author(s): I. A. Akinjogbin
Source: Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1963), pp.
545-566
Published by: Historical Society of Nigeria
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856678
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 AGAJA AND THE CONQUEST OF THE COASTAL
AJA STATES 1724-30

by
I. A. Akinjogbin

since the last four hundred years, two related themes among
many others have prominently and consistently run through the
history of West Africa. The first is made up of European policies
and activities and the second is the African reaction to these. While
a great deal of attention has been paid to the former, the latter
has remained largely neglected. This was probably not unnatural.
While the colonial regime lasted, there was generally a greater inte-
rest in European than in African policies and activities. More than
that, the documents relevant to the pre-colonial periods are not
readily accessible. However the net result of the neglect is that
historical events in many parts of West Africa have not always been
correctly explained. For example, between 1650 and 1850, important
inland West African kingdoms extended their influences, mainly
through military conquests, to the coast. Historians have postulated
that those inland kingdoms waged their coastward wars because they
wanted to eliminate the "middlemen" so that they could trade
directly with the Europeans either in slaves or later in general pro-
duce. An often quoted example of the attitude is the conquest of
Aliada and Whydah kingdoms in 1724 and 1727 respectively by
Agaja, the king of Dahomey.1 In this paper, this theory of "war-
against-the-middlemen" will be examined as far as it relates to
Agaja's conquest of Aliada and Whydah in the third decade of the
18 th century.
On 30th March 1724, Agaja's army invaded the Aliada kingdom,
burned its capital, sacked the European establishments and carried
away, among other prizes, about eight thousand prisoners, and
many great guns and cannons.2 Three years later on 26th February

1 J. D. Fage: An Introduction to the History of West Africa (Cambridge 1956),

p.93 writes, "By the time of Agaja (1708-27) the rulers of Dahomey had
realised that their profits from the slave trade would be much greater if they
could sell their captives directly to the Europeans at the coast instead of to
the Middlemen of Ardra." The same opinion is expressed by C. W. Newbury:
The Western Slave Coast and its Rulers (Oxford 1961), p.23 and is generally
believed by most students of the history of Dahomey.
2 W. Smith: A New Voyage to Guinea (London 1744), pp. 17 1-1 89;
W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account of some parts of Guinea and the
( Note continued on next page)

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17271, Agaja again invaded the kingdom of Whydah where, as at
Aliada, he met with little or no resistance and which he overran in
five days. In human beings alone more than five thousand people
were killed and between ten and eleven thousand men taken prisoners.
The capital, Sähe, was burned and so were most of the European
trading houses, called factories, situated there. More than forty
Europeans were taken prisoners and kept for fifteen days before
being released. From then on and despite many efforts made later
by the vanquished to recover their territories, the whole of Whydah
and a large part of Aliada kingdoms remained effectively integrated
into Dahomey.
That the two kingdoms were so easily conquered should serve as
a warning against any general assumption that the slave trade per se,
the mere acquisition of firearms or the presence of the Europeans
constituted an element of strength for an African kingdom.2 Both
Aliada and Whydah had been trading in slaves from about the
beginning of the 17th century, both had acquired large quantities of
munitions and both had had European posts stationed among them
from about 1640' s onwards,3 but they had not been strengthened
thereby.
Indeed they seem to have been weakened and rendered incapable
of resistance when invasion came. For the Europeans who had
resided among them had forcibly installed native kings in order to
facilitate their own trade. All the three kings of Whydah between
1670 and 1708 were installed with European arms and support.4 One
of those three, Aisan, who came to the throne in 1703, was put there
by force by the English director before the townspeople knew that
their old king was dead.4 Such actions contravened the traditional
system in which the kings of Whydah were installed by the messen-
gers of the kings of Aliada after certain gifts had been made and

slave trade (London 1734), p.7; F.P. Mendes to V.F. Cezar de Meneses, 16th
July 1724 (Archivo Publico Bahiano, Ordens Regiais 19 doc. 56) I am grateful
to Möns P. Verger for all the Portuguese documents used in this paper.
i "Accounts and journals for Whydah", 28th Feb. and 21st Mar. 1727(T70/598);
Viceroy of Brazil (transmitting a letter from Whydah dated 4th Apr. 1727) to
King of Portugal, Bahia 18th June 1727 (APB. OR 22 doc. 58); A. Dalzel:
The History of Dahomey , an inland kingdom of Africa (London 1793),
p.27; W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account , pp.2-3, 14-17; W. Smith:
A New Voyage, p. 190. Smith says the invasion took place "about the begin-
ning of February", but Snelgrave is more accurate.
2 D. H. Jones in Journal of African History . Vol. I, no.2, p.314 seems to
imply that the slave trade helped the growth of these states.
3 H. A. Wyndham: The Atlantic and Slavery (London 1935) p.35; Henri
Labouret et Paul Rivet: La Royaume ďArdra et son evangelisation au XVIIe
Siècle (Paris 1929), pp. 16-20.
4 W. Bosman: A New and Accurate description of the Coast of Guinea (London
1705), pp.355-356; J. Barbot: A Description of the Coast of the North and
South Guinea (London 1732), p.323, p.453; P. Duffield to Royal African
Company 25th Aug, 7th Oct. 1703; John Carter to R.A.C. 26th Aug. 1703
(T70/13); Du Coulombier: "Relation envoyer ã la Compagnie Française..."
lOth August 1714 (Archives Nationales: C.6/25).

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certain rites performed. By thus successfully by-passing the trad-
itional system, the Europeans had encouraged the lawless elements
to disobey the traditional laws and at the same time had caused
resentment among the conservative elements in the kingdom.
In addition, the Europeans took native chiefs into their pay1 and
in that way transferred to them their own incessant quarrels. An Aja
chief who was in the pay of the Portuguese traders would automatic-
ally become the enemy of another Dahomian chief in the pay of the
English, the French or the Dutch traders whenever there was any
disagreement between the Portuguese and any of the other resident
Europeans. In the third decade of the 18th century, such quarrels
were incessant at Whydah.2 One result of the European settlement
in both Aliada and Whydah was therefore to create strong internal
dissensions and disagreements which not infrequently led to civil wars
and to the weakening of the internal administration.
The resultant chaos was not always limited to the boundaries of a
single kingdom but was widespread. In the last quarter of the 17th
century, the lawlessness arising from the breakdown of internal
order had impelled Oyo to invade and burn Aliada kingdom twice.
The first time was between 1680 and 16823 and the second time was in
1698.4 Sometimes too, European actions precipitated wars between
two states as when in April 1712 the Dutch seizure of a Portuguese
ship at the Aliada port of Jakin started a war between Aliada and
Whydah.5 On that occasion, the king of Aliada regarded the action
of the Dutch, who were based at Whydah, as having been taken with
the knowledge and consent of the king of Whydah. He therefore
promptly declared all the roads between the two kingdoms closed,
which was the first act of declaration of war. The war started in 1712
and went on actively until 17176, and inactively until 1724.
Thus the presence of the European in the Aja country not only
weakened internal administration but made inter-kingdom co-opera-
tion well nigh impossible. In the face of these disadvantages when
Agaja invaded Aliada and Wydah, the latter's European arms were
of no avail since neither single nor joint action against him was
possible. To complete this picture of the negative effect of the
European influence in Aja, it must also be borne in mind that the
Europeans refused to help their host government when the invaders

i For example a chief called Carter was in the pay of the English fort and
another chief called Assu in the pay of the French fort.
2 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Description , p.5; F.P. Mendes to Viceroy
of Brazil, 22nd May 1726 (APB. OR. 21 doc. 61).
3 J. Barbot: A Description of the Coast of the North and South Guinea (London
1732), pp.351-352:
4 W. Bosman: A New and Accurate Description , p.397.
5 Hilliardand Green to R.A.C., 5th Apr.l712(T70/5), 10th June 1712 (T70/2);
J. Blanev to R.A.C. 22nd Apr. 1714 (T70/5).
6 R. Mason, D. Welsh and W. Branston to R.A.C. , 10th December 1715
(T70/19).

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came, contrary to what has been supposed.1 They would in fact
have deserted the country had they not received private assurances
that their persons and their property would be safe if they remained
neutral.2
It was not, however, the weakness of these states alone that made
them a ready prey to Agaja. Agaja's victory was in a large part due
to his own great ability as a general. Very early in his reign he had
taken two steps which later helped his military policy. He instituted the
Agbadjigbeto which was something like war intelligence and public
information services combined.3 It was used for spying on other
countries and for spreading propaganda within Dahomey. Secondly,
he reconstituted the army and started a military training scheme for
Dahomian boys. In time these boys grew up into really disciplined
and trained soldiers, inured to hardship and perhaps somewhat
callous of human misery. When Snelgrave saw them in 1727 during
an early morning exercise, his comment was "this sight was well
worth seeing, even for us Europeans".4
These two steps helped to ease Agaja's conquest of the coastal
kingdoms. The Agbadjigbeto noted and reported on the political
situations in the two kingdoms and thus helped to determine the
opportune moments for attack. The army which conquered Aliada
and Whydah in 1724 and 1727 respectively were predominantly
trained in the new scheme. An additional advantage was that Agaja
himself was in the habit of following his army to battle, an action
that served to inspire his soldiers.
It has been suggested, on what at first sight appears to be a convinc-
ing evidence, that Agaja undertook the conquest of the coastal Aja
states in order to force his way to the coast and enjoy at first hand the
profits accruing from the slave trade.5 The main sources on which
this conclusion rests are the narrative of Snelgrave6 and Norris7 and
the surviving oral traditions of Dahomey.8 Snelgrave was a contempo-
rary witness, who in fact may have been implicated in the manoeuvres
that preceeded the invasion. He had been a constant slave trader to
West Africa since 1704 and to Whydah since 1713.9 He arrived at
Whydah a few days after Agaja's sack of the kingdom and he wrote
as if he was familiar both with Huffon, king of Whydah, and with the

i J. D. Fage: An Introduction , p.94.

2 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account „ pp. 12-1 3; 59-61 ; E. Dunglas:
"Histoire du Moyen Dahomey", in Etudes Dahoméennes , vol. XIX p. 152.
3 Le Hérissé: V Ancien Royaume du Dahomey (Paris 1911), pp. 64-65;
P. Hazoume: Le Pact du Sans au Dahomey (Paris 1937), pp. 19-20.
4 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Description , p.78.
5 J. D. Fage: An Introduction , p.93; C.W.Newbury: The Western Slave Coast
and its rulers (Oxford 1961), p.23.
6 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Description , pp. 5-6.
7 R. Norris: Memoirs of the Reign of Bossa Ahadee , King of Dahomey (London
1789), pp. XIII.
8 Le Hérissé: V Ancien Royaume, p. 296; E. Dunglas in E.D. , Vol. XIX, p. 149.
9 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account, pp.2-6.

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messengers of Agaja. His narrative has therefore been regarded as a
reliable contemporary documentary evidence. Similarly, Norris credi-
bly claimed to have known the eyewitnesses to the wars on both the
Dahomian and the Whydah sides of the struggle. He too had been a
slave trader of long standing when he wrote. On the surface there-
fore, his assertions also bear the mark of authenticity.
However, their evidence becomes less strong when it is remembered
that both were not disinterested witnesses. Although there was a gap of
fifty-five years between the publication of their narratives, both of
them wrote under strikingly similar circumstances, and in response
to similar pressures. We have already noticed that both were veteran
slave traders. At the time of writing, they both felt that their live-
lihood, the slave trade, was being threatened. When Snelgrave wrote,
Charles Lambe had just brought to St. James's palace, a message in
which Agaja, king of Dahomey, was said to have proposed the estab-
lishment of European plantations within his kingdom to replace the
European transportation of the Aja peoples1. Such a startling pro-
position threatened the economic interest of Snelgrave and of all the
slave traders like him, because it might suggest to the majority of the
British who were not slave traders that the Africans were being
carried away against their will, as indeed they were. If the impression
was allowed to go unchallenged, it might be particularly injurious to
the slave trade because the Whydah coast from which it emanated
was at that time, the greatest slave exporting area on the West Coast
of Africa.2 It was therefore the most important part of Snelgrave's
purpose to discredit the message by affirming that Agaja indeed
wanted very much to trade in slaves. This he did effectively if the
credence that has been given to his assertions ever since is any guide.
Snelgrave had another private axe to grind, which though not as
important as his main motive just stated, was still not unconnected
with his economic interests. In 1717, he came to Whydah on his usual
slave trading round.3 Unfortunately for him internal situations forced
Huffon, king of Whydah, to make strict trade and financial laws4
which adversely affected all the slave traders, Africans and Europeans,
and which left everybody dissatisfied and disgruntled. The traditional
chiefs ominously warned that if Huffon persisted, they "would take a
violent course with him".5 The Europeans, including Snelgrave,
dubbed Huffon a "monster of nature, appeared (sic) designed for a
public plague" and they too were looking or at least hoping for an
"extraordinary means to reduce him to reason."5 It was probably
from then onwards that Snelgrave, like most of the contemporary

1 J. Atkins: A Voyage to Guinea , Brasil and the West Indies (London 1735),
pp.121-122.
2 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account, pp. 2- 6
3 W. Baillie to Thomas Hanness, 3rd Feb. 1717 (T70/1475); Wm. Baillie to I /,
20th Feb. 1717 (T70/1474).
4 W. Baillie to Dawson, 26th Oct. 1717 (T70/1475); W.Baillie to Phipps and
Bleau, 15th Apr. 1717 (T70/1475); 10th May 1720 (T70/54).
5 William Baillie to Governor, Cape Coast Castle, 10th May 1720 (170/54).

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Europeans, harboured an inveterate dislike for the Whydah king. He
was therefore in no mood to sympathise with him when he and his
subjects were conquered by Agaja.
In the same way the desire to defend personal economic interests
greatly influenced Norris's account. When he wrote, the English
abolition movement was at its height. The abolitionists and the anti-
abolitionists were issuing pamphlets and books in support of their
points of view. Norris was an anti-abolitionist1 and his book on Da-
homey was principally a contribution to his cause. To strengthen the
case of the anti-abolitionists, he employed his knowledge of Dahomey
to argue, as Snelgrave had done, that the Dahomians loved slave
trading. That this was his major purpose will be clear when it is
recalled that he devoted the last section of his book to a detailed
argument on why the slave trade should not be abolished.
These personal economic motives obviously reduce the weight of
the traditional evidence. They would also explain the great inconsist-
encies in Snelgrave's narrative. He said categorically that the invasion
was caused by Huffon absolutely refusing to grant Agaja a safe
passage to the coast. Shortly after in the same narrative he also said
that on several occasions before the conquest, he had met at Whydah
one "Zunglar" (the same man as the French called Jongla) who was
Agaja's trade representative.2 This latter statement raises the question
that if Huffon had indeed absolutely refused a safe passage to Agaja,
Jongla could not have been stationed at Whydah as Agaja's represent-
ative. In other words, if Agaja's representative was allowed at Whydah
then it would not be consistent to say that the negotiations broke
down, making it necessary to force his way to the coast.
Snelgrave also said that he met one Buttenoe, Agaja's Dahomian
officer who spoke "very good English". In addition he saw a Portuguese
mulatto whom Agaja had bought at Popo.3 All these would suggest that
Agaja was far from being completely shut in from the coast. It would
seem indeed that as a result of Agaja's growing contact with the coast
before the conquest, he had collected these "linguists" in order to
facilitate his trade and other social contacts with the Europeans on
the coast.
The fact really was that when Agaja invaded Whydah, Dahomey
was not at all shut in from the coast and Agaja had no reason what-
soever to negotiate with Huffon for a through pass. Agaja's traders
had been known on the coast and particularly at Epe since 1714 at the
latest.4 At that date the Dahomians seem to have had an uninter-
rupted passage which, despite French pressure, the then king of
Aliada refused to close or in any way obstruct.4 Moreover, after the

1 "Report of the Lards of the Committee appointed for the Consideration of

all matters relating to trade and foreign plantations", 1789.
2 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account , pp. 56-61.
3 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account , pp. 56-61.
4 "Memo ires des négociations du sieur Bouchel à Ardres", 2nd January, 1715;
Du Coulombier à Messrs de la Compagnie, 16th Apr. 1715 (AN.C6/25).

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conquest of Allada in 1724, and the submission soon afterwards of
Jakin,1 whatever argument there might have been for Agaja's need
for a route to the sea entirely disappeared. For from 1724 onwards,
Agaja directly controlled two ports. One was Jakin, and the other
was Offra, which Soso, the king of Aliada between 1717 and 1724, 2
had started to rebuild.
If Snelgrave's evidence is not as conclusive as it seems, Norris's
evidence, resting, as it does, predominantly on Snelgrave for confir-
mation, is still less credible. Norris collected his own evidence largely
when he visited Abomey in 1772, forty years after Agaja had nomin-
ally agreed not to obstruct the slave trade if certain conditions were
observed,3 and thirty-two years after Tegbesu had made the slave
trade the basis of theDahomian economy.4 Moreover, in 1772, Daho-
mey was still enjoying the fruits of the short period of prosperity which
it ever had under the slave trade economy.5 Because of the official
policy and because of the prosperity then obtaining, Norris's infor-
mants could hardly be expected to say anything against the slave
trade and they may indeed have read the roots of their temporary
prosperity farther back to their illustrious ancestor Agaja, who gave
them the possession of the coast. But that does not mean that they
were correctly interpreting Agaja's original intention.
The above flaws in the traditional written sources notwithstanding,
the unwary might still be misled by certain ambiguous statements
which Agaja himself made to three European slave traders soon after
his conquest of Whydah. At different times between 1727 and 1728
the director of the Portuguese fort, Snelgrave and Delisle, the
lieutenant of the French fort, visited Agaja and tried to find out from
him his intentions towards the slave trade by asking him why he had
invaded the coastal kingdoms. To the Portuguese director, Agaja said
he wanted to be in direct contact with the Europeans, not only to trade
in slaves but also for other kinds of trade as well.6 To Snelgrave he
said he had been appointed by God to punish the Whydah for their
sins against both the Africans and the Europeans.7 To Delisle he said
that he did not think it moral that Africans should make profits out
of the Europeans.8 All these statements are capable of at least two

1 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account , pp.20-21.

2 "Conseil de direction", 27th July 1717 (An.C6/25), Tinker, Mabyn and
Humprey to R.A.C. , January 1724 (T70/7).
3 The agreement of 1730 between Agaja and the Europeans is treated below.
4 The policy of Tegbesu, king of Dahomey from 1740-1774 was to extend the
slave trade. Thomas Melville to African Committee, 30th Nov. 1754 (T70/
1523).
5 Guestard: "Memoire pour servir à l'intelligence du commerce de Juda..."
1750 (AN C6/25); R. Norris: Memoirs , pp. vii-ix; 84-112; David Mills to
R. Miles, 5th Feb. 1777 (T70/1534).
6 Viceroy of Brazil to king of Portugal, 18th June 1727, enclosing a letter Irom
the Portuguese director at Whydah dated 4th April 1727 (APBORdoc. 58).
7 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account , p.64.
8 Delisle: Extrait du Registre , 13th September 1728 (AN.C6/25).

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interpretations. To the receptive mind they might suggest that Agaja
was favourable to the slave trade and anxious to extend it. To some-
one not so committed to the slave trade, they could also mean that
Agaja intensely disliked the slave trade but was trying very hard not
to antagonise the Europeans with whom he hoped to have healthier
economic relations. What he told the Portuguese director could
mean that Agaja wanted other kinds of trade with the Europeans
than the slave trade. His reply to Snelgrave could mean that he in-
vaded Alladah and Whydah in order to punish the people for their
excessive slave trading activities. To Delisle he certainly meant to
convey that he would not allow indiscriminate slave trading.
The oral traditions which imply that Agaja invaded the coast in
order that he might have a direct trade contact with Europeans must
be used with caution. The establishment of the Agbadjigbeto by Agaja
soon after 1708 must limit the value of popular oral traditions on
such grave issues as war and peace. For it was part of the duties of the
Agbadjigbeto to render popular any enterprise on which the king had
decided. In such cases the reasons given out for a particular expedi-
tion might have no real bearing on the real political reasons behind
the king's action. Thus the general populace may have been told, and
they may have believed it, that Agaja was much poorer than Huffon
because the latter was able to trade with Europeans. In fact Agaja was
not poor at all. European residents who knew Huffon's court as well
as Agaja's tend to give the impression that the latter was more pros-
perous. Lambe who visited Agaja's court in 1724 found him a very
rich man who possessed gold plates and rich gowns, who had all
kinds of goods beyond measure and who gave away cowries (i.e. the
money of the time) "like dirt" and brandy "like water".1
It would seem fairly conclusive therefore that neither the often
quoted eighteenth century travellers' accounts nor the less known
diplomatic statements of Agaja nor yet the popular traditions of
Dahomey can lead us definitely to conclude that Agaja invaded
Aliada and Whydah to promote the slave trade.
Indeed, other neglected eighteenth century accounts would tend to
suggest that he was against the slave trade in principle. In November
1724, Bulfinch Lambe, the English prisoner who had been captured
and brought to Agaja's court the previous April, wrote to Jeremiah
Tinker, then the Director of the English fort at Whydah that:
"If any carpenter, smith or any sort of whiteman that is free
be willing to come here, he will find very good encouragement
and be much caressed and get money if he can be contented with
this life for a time."1
Lambe had been in Agaja's court for eight months when he wrote
this, he had become friendly with Agaja and had had several infor-
mal discussions with him on several aspects of the king's policy and

1 W. Smith: A New Voyage , pp.171-189.

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intentions. He had on the basis of these discussions concluded that
Agaja wanted, as we would say nowadays, "technical co-operation"
with the European powers. It was this same Lambe who, some years
later, produced at St. James's Palace, Agaja's ambassador, whom he
called Prince Adomo Orinooko Tomo, who said that Agaja did not
want to trade in slaves for transportation but would rather see such
slaves used for plantation work in Dahomey.1 As we have noticed
this message caused Snelgrave to publish his own narrative. Snelgrave
sought to cast doubt on this message by impugning the identity of
the ambassador. But it is immaterial here whether the ambassador
was a genuine prince or a runaway slave. The point is that so con-
vinced was Lambe that Agaja did not want to trade in slaves that
he was audacious enough to cause to be repeated in St. James's court
the same kind of message that he had written to Tinker about
six years before. This is quite significant, for Lambe was the first
European of any standing with whom Agaja came into real personal
contact. The evidence suggests that Agaja expounded his ideas to
him at length and gave him such a good treatment as to encourage
him and others to come to Dahomey for other activities than the
slave trade.
Lambe' s evidence was corroborated by another European traveller
who implied that the feeling against the slave trade was fairly wide-
spread. William Smith whose work was published posthumously in
1744, visited Whydah in 1727. He later wrote:
"The discerning natives account it their greatest unhappiness
that they were ever visited by the Europeans. They say that we
Christians introduced the traffick of slaves and that before our
coming they lived in peace."2
The particular "discerning native" with whom Smith talked was a
contemporary of Agaja. He may indeed have been one of Agaja's
officers and may have been putting Agaja's ideas to the English naval
officer.
Agaja's own actions after the conquest of the coastal kingdoms
would seem to confirm these impressions. After his conquest of
Allada in 1724, he completely destroyed Offra,3 one of the two ports
of the vanquished kingdom and sought to close Jakin, as we shall
soon see. True there was a sudden increase in the number of slaves
available for export immediately after the conquest,4 but that prob-
ably was due to war displacements,5 for the supply soon dried up.
Agaja effectively shut the trade routes and rendered them unsafe.6

1 J. A. Atkins: A New Voyage to Guinea , pp. 121-127.

2 W. Smith: A New Voyage to Guinea , pp.266-267.
3 No attempt was made to re-open this port until 1776.
4 F. P. Mendes to V.F. Cezar de Meneses, 16th July 1724 (APB. OR 19 doc. 36).
5 W. Snelgrave: A New and Accurate Account, p.7U says that the displaced
Whydah sold themselves as slaves in order to prevent wretched death.
6 TinkerandHumphreytoR.A.C.,23rdFeb.l725(T70/7); Conseil de Marine ,
13th August 1728 (AN.C6/25).

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 Previous to the conquest the Europeans were in the habit of
threatening to evacuate Whydah and go to Jakin, and they had on
more than one occasion approached the king of Aliada for terms of
settlement.1 After the conquest, they did not approach Agaja, despite
the fact that the conditions in Whydah then were not very conducive
to the pursuit of trade. Such an attitude on the part of the Europeans
would be curious if indeed they believed that Agaja was in favour of
extending the slave trade. Equally significant is the fact that Agaja
did not approach any of the Europeans resident in Whydah to come
and settle at Offra, though he must have known through his spies that
they would have welcomed such an opportunity.
Similarly, after the conquest of Whydah, Agaja destroyed the
European factories at Sähe, the capital of Whydah, and thrice be-
sieged the forts at Igelefe (Whydah),2 as a result of which attacks the
French fort was twice burnt. He drove the Dutch clean out of Daho-
mey and of its immediate vicinity.3 He refused every plea put for-
ward by the Europeans that the conquered Whydah should be brought
back as subjects because they were good slave traders4 and he
forbade all the Dahomians to trade in slaves.5 Those who, in the
flush of victory, forgetfully disobeyed the order were seized and
executed.5
These were extraordinary steps to take if Agaja had wanted to
benefit from the slave trade. Far from showing that he was anxious
to benefit, they would tend to suggest that he was not at all in sym-
pathy with the slave trade, even if he had been forced by circum-
stances to take part in it. They would further suggest that part of his
motive when he invaded the coast was to stop by stages the slave trade
in the Aja country and substitute for it a general trade in agricul-
tural produce. By 1728, these implications of Agaja' s attitude were
quite clear to all the parties concerned in the slave trade, even though
Agaja continued to protest that he was a good friend of the Euro-
peans, as he most likely was. The Viceroy of Brazil, who was in a very
close contact with the events in the Aja country through the Brazilian
traders, wrote to the King of Portugal that he considered that as a
result of Agaja's conquest, the slave trade of Whydah was ruined and
would remain so for a long time.6 Snelgrave himself wrote that there

1 This was particularly common in the second decade of the 18th century, e.g.
"Mémoires des Négociations du sieur Bouchel à Ar d res", 2nd Jan. 1715; Du
Coulombier à Messrs de la Compagnie, 16th April 1715 (AN C.6/25).
2 "Accounts and Journals for Whydah", 21st Mar. 1727 (T70/598); Viceroy
of Brazil to king of Portugal, Bahia, 18th June 1727 (APB OR 22 doc 58);
"Accounts and Journals, C.C.C." 31st Dec. 1728 (T70/392).
3 "Enregistrement des rapports...", 3rd Feb. 1738 (Archives Departmentales,
Nantes. B. 4587); "Steinmarks declaration", 4th Dec. 1737(WIC); I owe this
reference to Dr Ivor Wilks of the University of Ghana.
4 "Accounts and Journals, Cape Coast Castle , 13th June 1729 (T70/392).
5 W. Smith: A New Voyage , pp.171-189; W. Snelgrave: A New Account ,
p.94.
0 Viceroy oí urazil to King ot Portugal, Bahia, 13th May 1 1 ly (AHU. codice
254 f. 61. 62).

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was "no prospect of trade reviving there [Whydah] again for many
years, or at least as long as the conqueror lives".1 The English Royal
African Company declared itself "concerned that the trade of Why-
dah is in such precarious circumstances",2 the French factor at Jakin
advocated that it was time to find an independent route to the Mahi
country whence the slaves came3 and the Dutch actually abandoned
Whydah for Jakin, to be driven away later by Agaja.
If Agaja had had his way therefore, the story of Dahomey, with its
notoriety for the slave trade, would have been completely different.
That he did not have his way was due partly to the reaction of the
Oyo authorities, and partly to the unwillingness of the European
slave traders to indulge in any other economic activity but the slave
trade. The successful invasion of Aliada by Dahomey had very
serious political implications far beyond the confines of the Aja
country. Before 1724, all the Aja states had been organised as if they
were members of a family. The ruler of Allada was regarded as the
'father' of all the other kings and his state took precedence over all
the others. The ruler of Whydah was like the 'elder' brother and the
ruler of Abomey, who was originally called the king of the Fon, was
regarded as the youngest in this family. No constitutional step was
valid until confirmed by the ruler of Aliada. The Kings of Whydah
were crowned by the authority of the King of Aliada and the ruler-
designate of Dahomey went to Aliada to have his title confirmed.
The arrangement was very similar to that existing in the Yoruba
country about the same time, in which the Ooni was the "father" and
the ruler of Oyo was one of his most important sons.
When therefore Agaja successfully invaded Aliada, he seems to
have "struck his father". The very idea seemed to contemporaries very
unnatural and morally repugnant. In political terms it meant that
Agaja had defied the traditional constitutional arrangement not only
of the Aja but of all the peoples surrounding the Aja country includ-
ing the Accra who were at that time sojourning at Little Popo,
modern Anecho, and Yoruba. If he was allowed to get away with it,
there was no knowing where he would stop or how many law breakers
of his type and ability would arise to cause confusion. Moreover,
because Allada was a tributary state to Oyo, the latter's interests were
directly involved.
For these reasons, Oyo felt bound to defend the vanquished. The
diplomatic discussions that went on between Dahomey and Oyo after
the conquest of Aliada is unknown. Whatever they were, seem to have
broken down. So on the 14th April 1726, the Oyo army invaded

1 W. Snelgrave: A New Account , p. 136, p. 156.

2 Court of Assistants to J. Brathwaite, R. Cruikshank and B. Peak, 14th Aug.
1729 (T70/54).
3 "Conseil ďe Marine", 13th Aug. 1728 (AN.C6/25).

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Dahomey.1 Agaja's recent victory over Aliada and the stock of fire-
arms which he had obtained thereby emboldened him to make a
stand and hope for an even chance against the Qyo cavalry.
The events proved that he had underrated the power of the Oyo.
The battle that followed was short and terrible. The Oyo army killed
a large number of the Dahomian soldiers and enslaved still a larger
number. Abomey was burnt and Agaja narrowly escaped to a forest
hideout situated north-west of Abomey, around the headwaters of
River Mono.2 Within a few days the Oyo were on their way back
home, having taught the upstarts the lesson of their lives. Contempo-
rary observers thought Agaja was finished and they confidently
asserted that he would never again be able to take other people's
territories. Although Agaja and his agents later gave out a version
of this engagement which gave Dahomey a tactical as well as a moral
victory over the Oyo, the Dahomian army never again thought it
prudent to face any Qyo army in an open combat. The mere mention
of Oyo after that caused all Dahomians to panic.3
After that war, Ojigi, the Alafin of Oyo, probably reckoned that
Agaja would then accept reasonable terms and desist from disturb-
ing the traditional system. However any such hope was soon dis-
pelled by Agaja's successful invasion of Whydah in February 1727,
hardly nine months after the Oyo army had withdrawn from
Dahomey. The invasion of Whydah demonstrated to the Oyo that
Agaja was absolutely bent on destroying the ancient system. This
left the Oyo with one of two choices, either to leave Agaja alone and
accept his victories, or to defend the traditional system to the end.
There was never much doubt on which side the Oyo would take,
since a continued respect for the traditional ways of life was its own
hope of enjoying tranquility. Moreover, all the princes of Aliada,
Werne, and Whydah, whose territories Agaja had appropriated,
sent messengers to the Alafin imploring him for help to regain
their patrimony from the illegal grasp of Agaja.4
After the ravage of the Oyo invasion of Dahomey in 1726, Agaja
himself had no reason to underrate the power of Oyo or to doubt
where its sympathy lay. However, he still hoped to bribe Ojigi off

i Director of the Portuguese fort to Viceroy of Brazil, 22nd May 1726 (APB
OR 21 doc. 61); W. Snelgrave: A New Account , pp. 55-59. E. Dunglas in
E.D. , vol. xix, p. 147, argues powerfully, without any evidence but the
words "ancient treaty", that this invasion took place in 1712. He further
argues that there could not have been an Oyo invasion between 1724 and
1727. The phrase may refer to the treaties that followed the Oyo invasions of
Allada in the 1680's and in 1698. And this firm date given by a Portuguese
eyewitness disposes of Dunglas's wrong date and false argument.
2 To boost up the morale of the Dahomians, Agaja or his agents claimed a
tactical victory over the Qyç in this battle. The original version of their
made-up story was told to Snelgrave in 1729. By the beginning of the 20th
century, this version had been replaced by others, which still have the same
purpose.
3 The fear of the Oyç continued m Dahomey until the end of the century.
4 W. Snelgrave: A New Account , pp. 121-122.

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or outwit him. He had already thought of two places to which he
would retreat if the Oyo again invaded Dahomey: one was to his
1726 hideout and the other was to the European forts on the coast
whither he thought the Oyo could not come because their national
oracle forbade them to see the ocean. He also planned to burn all
the available provisions so that the Oyo invaders would find it
impossible to stay long. Soon after the invasion of Whydah in 1727,
he sent presents to the Alafin Ojigi, whose messengers were in his
camp at Allada in the following April.1 The course and the content
of the negotiation between Agaja and the messengers are entirely
obscure, but Agaja seems to have prolonged it so as to ensure that
the setting in of the rains would make it impraticable for Oyo to
invade Dahomey until 1728 dry season, which would give him plenty
of time to prepare his flight well. Predictably therefore, the nego-
tiation between Dahomey and Oyo after the invasion of Whydah
broke down, mainly because the rulers of Oyo and Dahomey
recognised that they were committed to two fundamentally different
political systems.
Force was the only means of settling their differences. So between
1728 and 1730, Oyo invaded Dahomey three times, once annually
in 1728, 1729, and 1730.2 It is not necessary to go into the details of
the wars. It will be sufficient to note that the more Dahomey was
defiant, the more determined Oyo became to show Dahomey how
dangerous defiance could be. It must be recalled that Oyo was at the
height of its military glory in the 18th century, contrary to the popu-
lar misconception that it had started to decline by 1700. Because of
its power increased vehemence on the part of Oyo meant a great
deal of misery for Dahomey.
During the 1728 invasion, Agaja put into operation the plan which
he had conceived soon after his invasion of Whydah. He buried his
treasure, burned all the provisions and withdrew to his forest hideout.
When on the 22nd March 1728 the much dreaded Oyo army entered
Dahomey, they found an empty kingdom. Deprived of sufficient
victuals, they quickly withdrew and by the end of April Agaja was
back in his capital.
Such a tactic made the Oyo to decide on the permanent occupation
of Dahomey as their invasion of 1729 would tend to suggest. A large
Oyo host set out for Dahomey from about the beginning of January
1729 and reached Dahomey about the following March. The length

1 J. Bazilio to Viceroy of Brazil, 17th July 1731 (APB.OR 28 doc. 129);

W. Snelgrave: A New Account , p. 59.
2 Viceroy of Brazil to king of Portugal, 5th Apr. 1728 (APB. OR 24 f. 40);
Dupetitval à La Compagnie des Indes, 4th Oct. 1728 ( AN. C6/25); W.
Snelgrave: A New Account , p. 132; A Dalzel: History , pp.52-53; Viceroy of
Brazil to King of Portugal, 28th July 1729 (APB OR 25 f. 158); "Accounts and
Journals, Cape Coast Castle", 30th June 1729 (T70/395); W. Snelgrave:
A New Account , pp.122-123; "Copybook and Diaries for Whydah", 30th
Dec. 1729, 3rd, 9th-17th Jan., 9th and 25th Feb. 1730 (T70/ 1466). Snelgrave,
Dalzel and Norris are mixed up about the number of Oyo invasions.

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of time may have been partly due to the fact that there were several
non-combatants accompanying the cavalry. At the sight of them,
Agaja repeated his earlier tactics and fled, but he and his people were
hotly pursued. This time the Qyo army penetrated as far south as
Gome, the northern province of the old Whydah kingdom, which
lay much further south than any Oyo army had ever reached. Then,
instead of withdrawing as they were wont to do and as the Dahomians
had expected, the Oyo started building a town somewhere near
Abomey, and occasionally sallied forth to attack the Dahomians in
their forest hideouts.1 This went on until May, obviously much
longer than Agaja had planned for or expected. Consequently, the
Dahomians were greatly distressed. Not only were many of them
killed in the Oyo sallies, a large number also died of hunger. In its
own turn, the Oyo army did not find conditions easy, and they were
forced to leave Dahomey about May probably because of the
scarcity of provisions.
While the Oyo were invading Dahomey, the Europeans were
showing in no uncertain terms that rather than be forced to give up
the slave trade, they would seek by all means to embarass Agaja. So
in 1728 and 1729 while Qyo invasion entered Dahomey from the
north east, the Europeans encouraged the conquered Whydah to
re-occupy their lost territory, and supplied them with all they needed
for the purpose. As a result whenever the Qyo withdrew, Agaja
always had to fight his way back to the coast again.
During the Oyo invasion of 1728, Dupetitval, the director of the
French fort was the most active in encouraging the resettlement of
the Whydah. In reprisal when Agaja returned from his forest hide-
out, he drove away the old Whydah and laid seige to the forts. The
Europeans collected themselves in the French fort and offered a
stiff resistance. The first Dahomian attack on the French fort, which
took place on 1st May 1728, ended inconclusively after a whole day
of firing. The Dahomians then retired but came back two weeks later
to start a regular siege. The European defenders saw the situation
to be hopeless and evacuated the fort, leaving the Whydah defenders
alone. On the 31st May, the powder house of the fort blew up,
killing about three thousand of its Whydah defenders.2
Before the next invasion of the Oyo in 1729, Agaja tried to win the
French fort to his cause. He seemed to have been impressed by the
fact that they, of all the Europeans, first championed the cause of
the defeated Whydah. From that he seems to have concluded
that they must have been the bravest of the Europeans and very
trustworthy friends. He therefore calculated that they would be quite

1 The name of the town which they started to found is nowhere mentioned, but
it may have been Calmina (Kana).
2 "Conseil de Marine", 11th Aug. 1728 (AN.C6/25); E. Dunglas in E.D., Vol.
xix, p. 158; A Dalzel: History , pp.5 1-52; "Accounts and Journals, Cape
Coast Castle", 31st Dec. 1728 (T70/392). Both Dalzel and Dunglas mix
up this episode with another that happened later.

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reliable allies. In a highly diplomatic way, he set about winning
their friendship. The French director, Dupetitval, was not unwilling
to be friends with Agaja. He had been impressed by the capability
of Agaja's army and had come to the conclusion that French
interests would be best served by allying with the winning side. By a
mixture of threat, cajolery and lavish entertainment, Agaja secured
from Delisle, the lieutenant of the French fort sent to his court,
firm promises of French military and general assistance, if the Oyo
should come to invade Dahomey again.1
When the Oyo army came in 1729, the French did not perform
any of the promises they had given to Agaja. Instead the Europeans
again embarassed Agaja. Dupetitval was at first unwilling to help the
old Whydah who approached all the Europeans, but he was persua-
ded to offer help by Etienne Gallot, his second in command. It was
however Testefolle, the English director, who was the most active
in bringing the old Whydah back during this invasion. He had
watched with dismay the dwindling of the slave trade at Whydah
since 1727 and, like most resident Europeans, had come to the
conclusion that only the return of the Whydah could re-establish
the trade. He therefore gave all the encouragement he could. On the
23rd April 1729, Huffon, the King of Whydah and all the remants
of his subjects came back and resettled in their old homes. All the
European forts fired gun salutes in their honour, and gave presents
to their chiefs. Testefolle was so far carried away that he reported
gleefully to his employers in London that trade began to flourish
immediately the old Whydah came back.2
As in 1728, when the Oyo withdrew from Dahomey by the end of
May, Agaja again came down to reduce Whydah and punish the
Europeans. Dupetitval had been betrayed into the hands of the old
Whydah by the duplicity of Etienne Gallot by whom he was accused
of unfaithfulness to the old Whydah. He had therefore been seized
by the old Whydah who soon announced his death.3 It remained
Testefolle alone for Agaja to punish. For that purpose Agaja's army
encamped near the English fort.4 When challenged, they said they

1 "Conseil de Marine", 18th and 24th Aug. 1728, "Extrait du Registre des
delibrations de la direction generale des comptoires de Juda pour la Compa-
gnie des Indes du fort St. Louis Gregory", 26th Aug. - 4th Oct. 1728 (AN.
C6/25).
2 Chariot Testefolle to R.A.C., Whydah 30th Oct. 1729 (T70/7); "Memoire
de la Compagnie des Indes", 8th Nov. 1730 (AN.C6/25); A. Dalzel:
History , p.54; E. Dunglas in E.D. , Vol.xix, p. 158.
3 DalzeFs and Dunglas's accounts of the death of Dupetitval are substantially
different from that given by Gallot, who was a principal character in the
drama and who later confessed the villanous part he played in it. His account
has been adopted.
4 "Accounts and Journals, Cape Coast Castle , 28th Feb. 1730 (T70/395);
Governor and Council, Cape Coast Castle to R. A.C., 26th Dec. 1729(T70/7);
Court of Assistants to John Brathwaite, 31st Dec. 1730 (T70/54); A. Dalzel:
History , pp. 57-58.

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were only keeping their eyes on the old Whydah. Testefolle however
knew himself to be a wanted person for he had not only helped the
Whydah but had also uttered treasonable words by saying that he
would whip Agaja if he could secure him. He therefore sought to
escape from the fort, but he was caught, taken to Abomey and
sentenced to death by torture.1
Although Agaja was thus able both in 1728 and 1729 to extricate
himself from serious difficulties and re-occupy Whydah, he was
becoming effectively persuaded that his programme would be
impossible to carry through in the face of the combined opposition
from the Oyo and from the European traders. If he had any further
doubts the Oyo invasion of Dahomey in 1730 fully persuaded him.
Before their next invasion the Oyo tried to ensure their sources of
provision by making an alliance with the Mahi republics,2 situated
north of Abomey. This alliance also had the additional advantage
of depriving the Dahomians of places of refuge towards the north
of their territory. The Oyo set out very early in January 1730 or
perhaps late in December 1729, and reached Dahomey about the
end of February.3 As usual Agaja had sent his population away
and he himself had fled. His experience in the previous year how-
ever convinced him that both he and his subjects were no longer safe
from the Oyo ravages. The prospect for Agaja and his subjects was
therefore bleak. Three consecutive years of hiding and privation, of
voluntary burning by the Dahomians of their own property, and of
Oyo depradation, had rendered Dahomey very poor. No longer do
our sources speak of the gold plate and the rich garments of Agaja.
The routine was now becoming established that the Dahomians
built their houses in the rainy season only to set them on fire again
during the following dry season. What was still more discouraging
to the Dahomians was that the Oyo were not showing any signs of
relenting.
Agaja therefore decided to submit to the Oyo. He offered large
quantities of presents, rumoured to be goods worth six hundred
slaves4 to induce them to withdraw before the start of negotiations.
The Oyo knew Agaja too well by then to allow him to buy time, but
they accepted his presents and appeared to have withdrawn. Agaja
then came out of hiding and sent for his scattered subjects to come
and start the work of rebuilding Abomey. The Dahomians who had
been taking refuge around the European forts at Igelefe set out for

1 "Accounts and Journals, Cape Coast Castle", 28th Feb. 1730 (T70/395);
Governor and Council, Cape Coast Castle to R.A.C. , 26th Dec. 1729 (T70/7);
Court of Assistants to John Brathwaite,31stDec. 1730 (T70/54); A.Dalzel:
History , pp.57-58.
2 Mallis de la Mine to Premenil, 8th Jan 1732 (ADN. C 739).
3 "Copybook and Diaries for Whydah , 30th Dec. 1729; 3rd, 9th, 17th Jan.
and 25th Feb. 1730 (T70/1460).
4 Mallis de la Mine to Premenil, 8th Jan. 1732 (ADN C 739); "Copybook
and Diaries for Whydah", 9th and 20th Mar. 1730 (T70/1466).

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Abomey on 9th March 1730. But on the 20th they ran southwards
again in great panic.1 The cause of their quick and confused retreat
was that the Oyo had not totally withdrawn as had been believed.
As Agaja and his subjects came out of their forest hideouts,
skirmishes broke out between them and the Mahi, allies of the Oyo.
According to the accounts of the then director of the French fort,
who probably derived his information from the Dahomians, it was
the Mahi, who without being provoked, attacked the Dahomians who
therefore had to defend themselves.1 This may have been true. The
Mahi may have thought that with the Dahomians in distress, they
could secure a few slaves from among them for sale. On the other
hand, it may also have been that the Dahomians first attacked the
Mahi because the latter had concluded an alliance with the Oyo
invaders of Dahomey. Whoever really provoked the other, the skir-
mishes brought the Oyo cavalry back in defence of their allies, the
Mahi. The Oyo attack was so unexpected that it was with great
difficulty and with great luck that Agaja escaped.
In addition it is probable that although the Oyo agreed to with-
draw, they did not abandon the town which they had started to
found in 1729. Agaja therefore decided that for the time being it
would be unsafe for him to continue to live in Abomey. On 7th
April 1730, it was rumoured on the Coast that Agaja was removing
his capital to Aliada. On the 9th, the rumour was officially confirmed.
Agaja himself sent to inform the European directors of his intention
and asked for their representatives to accompany him from Abomey
as a sign that they would support him.2 All the European directors
excused themselves on one pretext or another,2 their real reason
being that none wanted to commit himself except to the winning
side.
The series of Oyo invasion in protest against the political methods
of Agaja and the stubborn unwillingness of the Europeans to give up
the slave trade thus rendered it completely impossible for Agaja to
carry through his programme of ending the slave trade in Aja
country.
His removal to Allada was an admission of his failure. The ques-
tion then was no longer whether the slave trade must stop in the Aja
country, but whether Dahomey itself would survive and how. The
removal to Aliada doubly placed Agaja in a weak position vis-a-vis
the Europeans. Firstly, to settle quickly at Aliada, he would need
a great deal of money and material which the Europeans could
easily supply him if he toed their line. Secondly Allada was nearer
the coast than Abomey and therefore not quite as safe from the
European attack as the latter had been. Because of all these dis-

1 Mallis de la Mine to Premenil, 8th Jan. 1732 (ADN C 739);

"Coovbook and Dairies for Whydah" 9th and 20th Mar. 1730 (T70/1466).
2 "Copybook and Diaries for Whydah", 9th and 20th Mar. 7th and 9th
Apr. 1730 (T70/1466).

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advantages, Agaja decided that it was imperative for him to compro-
mise with all his adversaries, the Oyo and the Europeans particu-
larly.
As soon as he was settled at Aliada, he asked Bazilio, the director
of the Portuguese fort, to help him make a lasting peace with the
Oyo.1 Bazilio agreed to the request and provided a large part of the
preliminary presents which were sent to Ojigi and his chiefs.1 The
details of the treaty that followed are obscure, but the results were
quite clear from the subsequent events. It will be remembered that
as from 1725 the defeated rulers of Aliada and Whydah were in the
habit of soliciting the help of the Oyo against Dahomey and the Oyo
invasions had been partly in response to their solicitations. After
1730, Oyo never again invaded Dahomey on their behalf and Agaja
was able to reduce the territory without any external intervention.
The Oyo only renewed their invasions of Dahomey in 17392 as a
result of Agaja's army having crossed lake Nokoue and the Werne
river in 1737 to attack Epe and Badagry. In 1729, Werne was very
much in the grips of Agaja and as we have noticed, its prince toge-
ther with the princes of Whydah and Allada, was seeking help at
Ojigi's court. In 1732, Werne was so far independent and immune
from Agaja's attack that Agaja's eldest son could take refuge there
with about four thousand deserters from the Dahomian army.3 The
only time between 1729 and 1732 when the Werne dynasty could have
been restored was in 1730, and it could only have become independent
through the intervention of Oyo. In 1730, as we have already noticed,
Agaja removed the capital to Aliada. It remained there until 17404
when he died and was only removed back to Abomey in 1743 by
Tegbesu.5
The main line of settlement in 1730 would therefore seem to be as
follows: Agaja was allowed to keep the whole of the kingdom of
Whydah and a substantial part of the Aliada kingdom but was not
allowed to return to Abomey. The Eastern boundary of the kingdom
was marked by lake Nokoue, the So and the Werne rivers and the whole
of Dahomey became a tributary state to Oyo. The Werne dynasty
was re-instated and the remnant of the Aja people were re-settled
in a new territory called Ajase Ipo, which became the kingdom of
Porto Novo in the 19th century. We may note in passing that the

1 Viceroy of Brazil to king of Portugal, 10th July 1730 (APB. OR 27 f. 140);

A. Dalzel: History , p.59; A.F.C. Ryder: "The Re-establishment of the Portu-
guese", in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria , Vol. 1, 1958, p. 164.
2 A. Dalzel: History ' pp. 71-74. Dalzel's dating is not quite accurate. Isaac
Gregory, the English director of Whydah fort did not reach Whydah until
March or April 1739.
3 W. Snelgrave: A New account , p. 149.
4 Viceroy of Brazil to king of Portugal, 18th May 1741 (APB. OR 38); Conseil
de direction à la compagnie des Indes, 18th Nov. 1753 (AN.C6/25). The
various dates formerly given as the end of Agaia's reign are inaccurate.
5 Levet à la Compagnie des Indes, 25th Feb. 1744 (AN Č6/25).

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kingdom of Porto Novo was founded in 1730 and not earlier as has
been supposed.1 Both Werne and Ajase Ipo lay outside, and were
independent of, Dahomey, but both were tributaries to Oyo. Places
like Epe and Badagry which lay outside the eastern boundary of
Dahomey became independent of it and enjoyed Oyo protection.
Werne and Ajase Ipo were left free to manage their internal adminis-
tration and to borrow as much of Oyo practices as they wished.
Significantly for the future, Dahomey was able to keep its army. As
a guarantee that Agaja would observe these agreements, one of his
sons, who later succeeded as Tegbesu, was given as a hostage to the
Oyo. The treaty itself was sealed by an exchange of royal marriages,
with Agaja sending his daughter to the Alafin Ojigi for a wife and
Ojigi returning the compliment.2
Coincidentally in 1730, while Agaja was being forced to compro-
mise with the forces opposing him, the Government of Cape Coast
Castle, the West African headquarters of the British Royal African
Company, was also considering ways of cutting their losses at
Whydah. They seem to have decided to make one final effort to
arrive at a settlement with Agaja. To increase the chances of success,
they dispatched John Brathwaite, who had been very successful in
dealing with the chiefs on the Gold Coast. Whether they knew it or
not, the time was opportune as Agaja was not unwilling to negotiate,
particularly on the slave trade. Brathwaite's plan was to persuade the
Whydah to return to their ancient kingdoms as subjects of Agaja,
and to persuade Agaja to accept them.3 Behind this plan lay the
thought that the slave trade would flourish better if the Whydah
who were generally believed by the Europeans to be expert slave
traders could live under the Dahomians, who could provide a strong
internal administration even though they were themselves very bad
slave traders. In addition to Brathwaite's plans, the directors of the
Royal African Company would have wanted him to make a separate
treaty with Huffon, the exiled king of Whydah, to the effect that if he
was brought back to his old kingdom, he would allow the Company's
ships to trade with the Portuguese for gold free of customs duties.4
The message to this effect however came too late as Brathwaite
had long reached Whydah when it was dispatched in London on
1st June 1730.
Brathwaite arrived at Whydah on 12th May 1730 and found the
Dahomian authorities too busy to give him an immediate attention.
The probability was that Agaja was at that time deeply immersed
in his negotiations with the Oyo. Towards the end of July, both sides

i De Çhenevert et Abbe Bulet: "Reflexions sur Juda, 1776" (AN. C6/27bis).

Following the oral traditions, A. Akindele and C. Aguessy have dated the
foundation at the end of the 17th century.
2 A. Dalzel: History , p.59; E. Dunglas in E.D., Vol. xix, pp. 146-147. Dunglas s
dating, as already noted, is inaccurate.
3 J. Brathwaite to R.A.C., 1st June 1730 (T70/7).
4 Court of Assistants to J. Brathwaite, 31st Dec. 1730 (170/54;.

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seem to have been free enough to enter into negotiations. Brathwaite
himself did not go to Aliada, but concluded all the negotiations
through Edward Deane who was the substantive director of the
Whydah fort. Deane left Whydah for Aliada on 29th July and
returned on 22nd August, 1730.1
Once again, the details of the negotiation have not been passed
down. Brathwaite probably found the political situation in Daho-
mey quite different from that on the Gold Coast and was therefore
forced to leave political settlement alone. In any case Agaja seems
to have refused to allow him any say on what to do with the Whydah
and he sent his army to drive away those Whydah whom Brathwaite
and Deane had been encouraging to come and settle in anticipation
of the settlement to be reached.2
Brathwaite and Deane were therefore forced to confine their
negotiations to trade questions which Agaja appears to have
treated very fully. As usual, all we possess is the outline of the
agreement as can be inferred from subsequent events. It would
appear that Agaja offered not to oppose the trade any longer. For
from then on, the Europeans no longer complained that impedi-
ments were put on their trading activities even if they complain that
the trade was small. In return for this concession Agaja seems to
have demanded two conditions. The first was that the Europeans
should stop trading at the port of Jakin. This demand was probably
prompted either because the ruler of Jakin was not yet completely
loyal and Agaja wanted to deprive him of any means of obtaining
firearms or because Agaja wanted the slave trade carried on from
only one port so that he could the more easily control it. What is
clear is that the English factory at Jakin to which fresh goods were
sent on 16th August while Deane was still negotiating,3 started to be
evacuated on 25th August,3 three days after Deane had concluded
the negotiations. By the 17th September, all the unsold goods at the
English factory at Jakin had been completely removed to Igelefe.3
Secondly, Agaja would most certainly have demanded that certain
classes of goods, including all firearms and munition, must be sold
to himself alone.
Both Agaja and Deane appear to have been very satisfied with the
agreement reached. When Deane finally left Aliada for Igelefe on
22nd August, he was accompanied by a detachment of the Daho-
mian army.4 This not only showed that they were both pleased with
the negotiation, but also symbolised that henceforth Agaja would
befriend and protect the Europeans in his kingdom. All the other

i "Copybook and Diaries for Whydah", 29th July, 22nd Aug. 1730 (T70/1466);
"Accounts and Journals, Cape Coast Castle", May - December, 1730
(T70/396).
2 J. Brathwaite to R.A.C., 16th Aug. 1730 (T70/7).
3 "Copybook and Diaries for Whydah", 25th Aug. and 17th Sept. 1730
fnO/1466): J. Brathwaite to R.A.C.. 16th Aue. 1730 (T70/7Ì.
4 "Copybook and Diaries for Whydah", 22nd Aug. 1730 (T7Ò/1466).

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Europeans at Igelefe showed their satisfaction at the conclusion of
the negotiation, an attitude that would tend to suggest that the
treaty was regarded as applying not only to the English, but to all
the Europeans. The French and the Portuguese directors, together
with all their officers gathered at the English fort to celebrate the new
accord. Sixty-three gun salutes were fired, twenty-one each in honour
of the kings of England, France and Portugal. Healths were drunk
on a lavish scale and altogether the English fort alone spent about
£18 for the celebrations. The other forts could hardly have spent
less.1
With the conclusion of this treaty on 22nd August 1730, Dahomey
started its career as a slave trading kingdom, though it was not until
ten years afterwards that the trade was to be made the sole basis of
the economy of Dahomey. Six years earlier Agaja had set out to
destroy the slave trade in the Aja country, and the old Aja political
system in the process. Instead, after an initial success, he was forced
by insuperable odds to put his kingdom under Oyo which was still
governed according to the traditional beliefs, and to subscribe to the
slave trade.
What kind of man was this Agaja? Of all the kings of Dahomey
he was perhaps the most minutely described by the European writers
and the most admired. That of course does not mean that we know
as much of him as we would have liked. Yet taking the European
records with what the Dahomians down the ages have remembered
about him, his main characteristics are fairly clear. He was born
after the twins, Akaba and Ahangbe, and was therefore given the
name Dosu according to the traditional practice of Abomey.2 He
ascended the throne in 1708 3 after his brother Akaba. Why this
should be so has never been satisfactorily explained, for in the
normal course of events, any of the sons of Akaba ought to have
succeeded. All the explanations that have been put forward would
tend to suggest either that Akaba had no issues of his own or the
paternity of his supposed children were in doubt. The latter sug-
gestion is strengthened by the full meaning of the saying from which
the word Agaja was extracted which is "nobody burns a green tree
while it is still standing".4 Fully expanded that may mean that rather
than allow someone whose claim was doubtful to occupy the throne,
a full blooded prince, who was still available should be elected.
At the time the Europeans knew him he was already an ageing
man who could hardly have been less than fifty-five years.5 He was
middling in size, solidly built with spare shoulders and athletic

1 "Accounts and Journals, Cape Coast Castle", May - Dec. 1730 (T70/396).
2 In Dahomey Dosu is the name given to a child born alter twins. In Yoruba,
the corresponding name is Idowu.
3 This is the traditional date which has been accepted by all the authorities on
Dahomey. I have found no documentary evidence to support or contradict it.
4 Le Hense: L Ancien Royaume , pp. 15- 16
5 W. Snelgrave: A New Account , p.7.

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muscles. His bearing was majestic and his face was attractive
despite the fact that it was pitted with the scars of the small pox
from which he had suffered before he ascended the throne.1 A French
director thought Agaja's physical build-up was very much like that
of the celebrated French-writer Molière.2 All the Europeans who
went to his court, be they French, Portuguese or English, came back
with the most favourable impressions, and write highly in his praise.
No one could go through the documents of this period, tattered,
scattered and incomplete as they are, without being enormously
impressed by his personality. For from the European descriptions as
well as from what is known of Agaja's actions, particularly from
1724 onwards, Agaja emerges as a far-sighted man who knew his
own mind and was not easily deflected from his purpose except by
sound reason. He had a quick mind and knew how to wriggle out
of unfavourable positions.
He was open to constructive ideas and was eager to learn any new
methods that might be useful. He learnt the art of making leather
cartouch boxes for his powder from the Mali traders in his king-
dom3, the art of firing the great guns from Lambe3, of building fort-
resses from Delisle, of forming a guard of honour from Gallot and
tried to learn reading and writing from both his Portuguese mulatto
slave and Lambe.
He could be unexpectedly generous. He was magnanimous in
victory and endowed with a sense of humour which men of great
heart possess. He knew too how to create fear in his foes and respect
in his friends, as well as to boost the morale of his people in very
adverse circumstances. He may not have been the originator of the
plan to stop the slave trade in the Aja country but it was he, who in
his thirty-two years reign, finally attempted to complete the task
that the Wegbaja dynasty had set itself- to sweep away the old
political system in Aja and to stop the slave trade. Although he
succeeded in ending the old political organisation in Aja, he brought
on Dahomey a series of Oyo invasions and a stubborn resistance
from the European slave traders. In the end he submitted to the Oyo
the defenders of the traditional order, and was forced to make the
slave trade into a state enterprise in Dahomey.

1 W. Snelgrave: A New Account , p. 7.

2 "Extrait du Registre", 26th Aug. 1728 (AN. C6/25).
W. bnelgrave : A New and Accurate Account . pp. 171 -189. Not much is known
of the role of the Mali in the growth of Dahomey. Twenty-four of them
were said to have been in Agaja's camp in 1724.

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