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INHIBITION
in Cognition
Edited by
David S. Gorfein and
Colin MLMacLeod

DECADE
<>/BEHAVIOR/0

American Psychological Association

Washington, DC
Copyright © 2007 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved. Except as
permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be
reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, including, but not limited to, the
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prior written permission of the publisher.

Published by
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To order In the U.K., Europe, Africa, and the Middle East,

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The opinions and statements published are the responsibility of the authors, and such opinions
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Association.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Inhibition in cognition / edited by David S. Gorfein and Colin M. MacLeod.
p. cm. — (Decade of behavior)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-59147-930-7
ISBN-10: 1-59147-930-4
1. Cognition. 2. Inhibition. I. Gorfein, David S. II. MacLeod, Colin M.

BF323.148154 2007
153—dc22 2007002957

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A CIP record is available from the British Library.

Printed in the United States of America

First Edition
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Robert B. Zajonc
Visual Perception: The Influence ofH. W. Leibowitz
 Contents

Contributors xi

Series Foreword xiii

Preface xv

Acknowledgments xvii

Part I. Introduction 1

1. The Concept of Inhibition in Cognition 3

Colin M. MacLeod

Part II. Attention and Performance 25

2. Inhibition of Task Sets 27

Ulrich Mayr

3. Adventures in Inhibition: Plausibly, But Not Certifiably,

Inhibitory Processes 45
Dale Dagenbach, Thomas H. Carr, David Menzer,
Peter J. Duquette, Holly M. Chalk, Melinda Rupard, and
Robert S. E. Hurley

4. Mechanisms of Transfer-Inappropriate Processing 63

W. Trammell Neill

Part III. Memory and Language 79

5. Theoretical Issues in Inhibition: Insights From Research

on Human Memory 81
Michael C. Anderson and Benjamin J. Levy

6. Saying No to Inhibition: The Encoding and Use of Words 103

David S. Gorfein and Vincent R. Brown

7. Working Memory Capacity and Inhibition:

Cognitive and Social Consequences 125
Thomas S. Redick, Richard P. Heitz, and Randall W. Engle
x CONTENTS

Part IV. Development and Aging 143

8. Inhibitory Deficit Theory: Recent Developments
in a "New View" 145
Cindy Lustig, Lynn Hasher, and Rose T. Zacks
9. Aging and Inhibition Deficits: Where Are the Effects? 163
Deborah M. Burke and Gabrielle Osborne
10. Interference Processes in Fuzzy-Trace Theory:
Aging, Alzheimer's Disease, and Development 185
Valerie F. Reyna and Britain A. Mills

PartV. Pathology and Psychopathology 211

11. Inhibition, Facilitation, and Attentional Control in
Dementia of the Alzheimer's Type: The Role of Unifying
Principles in Cognitive Theory Development 213
Mark E. Faust and David A. Balota
12. Semantic Short-Term Memory Deficits and Resolution of
Interference: A Case for Inhibition? 239
A. Cris Hamilton and Randi C. Martin
13. Concepts of Inhibition and Developmental Psychopathology ... 259
Joel T. Nigg, Laurie Carr, Michelle Martel,
and John M. Henderson

Part VI. Network Models 279

14. Uses (and Abuses?) of Inhibition in Network Models 281
Daniel S. Levine and Vincent R. Brown

Part VII. Overview and Commentary 305

15. Is It Time to Inhibit Inhibition? Lessons From a
Decade of Research on the Place of Inhibitory Processes
in Cognition 307
Thomas H. Carr
Author Index 317
Subject Index 329
About the Editors 337
 Contributors
Michael C. Anderson, University of Oregon, Eugene
David A. Balota, Washington University, St. Louis, MO
Vincent R. Brown, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY
Deborah M. Burke, Pomona College, Claremont, CA
Laurie Carr, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Thomas H. Carr, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Holly M. Chalk, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC
Dale Dagenbach, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC
Peter J. Duquette, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC
Randall W. Engle, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta
Mark E. Faust, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
David S. Gorfein, University of Texas, Arlington
A. Cris Hamilton, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
Lynn Hasher, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Richard P. Heitz, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta
John M. Henderson, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland
Robert S. E. Hurley, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL
Daniel S. Levine, University of Texas, Arlington
Benjamin J. Levy, University of Oregon, Eugene
Cindy Lustig, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Colin M. MacLeod, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Michelle Martel, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Randi C. Martin, Rice University, Houston, TX
Ulrich Mayr, University of Oregon, Eugene
David Menzer, Weill Graduate School of Medical Sciences, Cornell
University, New York, NY
Britain A. Mills, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
W. Trammell Neill, State University of New York at Albany
Joel T. Nigg, Michigan State University, East Lansing
Gabrielle Osborne, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA
Thomas S. Redick, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta
Valerie F. Reyna, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
Melinda Rupard, North Carolina State University, Raleigh
Rose T. Zacks, Michigan State University, East Lansing
 Series Foreword
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 Preface

Historians of psychology have often been struck by the enormous impact of

the Zeitgeist (the spirit of the times) on current research. It was therefore not
too surprising that when David S. Gorfein attended a professional meeting
shortly after editing a volume reviewing the role of suppression and inhibition
mechanisms in the processing of ambiguous words,1 his attention was immedi-
ately called to a recent review chapter on the role of inhibition in attention
and memory.2 A brief meeting with the senior author of that chapter, Colin
MacLeod, led to a swap of chapters and to the subsequent joint conclusion that
the ubiquity of the debate over inhibition across the field of cognition warranted
a more formal discussion of the topic. The last extensive presentations on
the subject—edited volumes by Dagenbach and Carr3 and by Dempster and
Brainerd4—had been published more than a decade before, and a great deal
of relevant research and theorizing had happened in the interim. We agreed
that cognitive psychology in general could benefit from bringing together lead-
ing researchers in the field to discuss the concept of cognitive inhibition and
what might (and might not) constitute evidence of its role in processing.
The timeliness of the discussion was confirmed by the enthusiastic re-
sponse to our call for a conference. We sought representatives of the breadth of
cognitive psychology—performance, memory, language, and decision making—
and of the applications of this research to normal aging, as well as pathology
and psychopathology. Almost all who were invited accepted our invitation,
which ultimately led to a thoroughgoing discussion by a group of influential
and dedicated scholars. Attendees from North America and Europe told us
that they were excited by the discussion and had been led to think much more
deeply about the place of inhibition in cognition.
The conference was held March 4 and 5, 2005, at the University of Texas
at Arlington. A significant part of the funding was provided by a grant from
the Board of Scientific Affairs of the American Psychological Association, gener-
ously supplemented by the University of Texas at Arlington. The Metroplex
Institute for Neural Dynamics provided additional funds to make possible a

Gorfein, D. S. (Ed.). (2001). On the consequences of meaning selection: Perspectives on resolving

lexical ambiguity. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
2
MacLeod, C. M., Dodd, M. C., Sheard, E. D., Wilson, D. E., & Bibi, U. (2003). In opposition to
inhibition. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 43, pp. 163-214).
San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
3
Dagenbach, D., & Carr, T. H. (Eds.). (1994). Inhibitory processes in attention, memory, and
language. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
4
Dempster, F. N., & Brainerd, C. J. (Eds.). (1995). Interference and inhibition in cognition. San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
 PREFACE

postconference workshop devoted to the utility of formal modeling, particularly

with reference to inhibitory constructs, in the explication of cognitive processes.
This volume is the result of the always stimulating—and sometimes
heated—discussion that the conference generated. It was a terrific conference,
the kind of focused, smaller conference where there is time for lots of discussion
between the formal talks and in the hallways and over dinners. As editors, we
are convinced that each of the authors of the chapters in this volume benefited
from the discussion and that the book both represents their individual research
programs and theorizing and simultaneously provides an overview of the ques-
tions addressed and the different perspectives offered. The authors also served
as the reviewers of the other chapters, so there was further discussion of the
concepts as the chapters were reviewed and edited. We believe that this volume
could readily form the basis for a graduate seminar in cognitive processes and
that it will be of considerable interest to investigators of cognitive skills and
processes and likely to researchers beyond cognition as well.
 Acknowledgments
In a volume such as this, it is difficult to do full justice to the contributions of
all those who helped make it possible. Foremost, of course, are our colleagues
the chapter authors, who first presented their ideas to a critical audience of
their peers. Later, they faced the difficult task of saying what they wanted to
say in a limited space in print and of responding to externally imposed dead-
lines. Many of the authors also served as reviewers for the work of their fellow
authors, always a challenging task. In addition to the author-reviewers, several
outside reviewers provided their helpful perspectives, including James Bartlett,
Karl-Heinz Bauml, James Erickson, and Susan Kemper. Our development
editor at the American Psychological Association (APA), Genevieve Gill, along
with two anonymous reviewers selected by APA, contributed important insights
as well. We also thank APA Books staff members Lansing Hays, senior acquisi-
tion editor, and Harriet Kaplan, production editor, for their work on this project.
The volume benefited immensely from the funding provided by APA's
Science Directorate to bring the authors together to discuss their views. Addi-
tional funding was provided by the University of Texas at Arlington (UTA).
The Office of Research and the College of Science contributed. Paul Paulus,
Dean of Science, helped in welcoming the guests to UTA. Harriett Amster
contributed by entertaining a busload of guests in her home. Daniel Levine
arranged for the Metroplex Institute of Neural Dynamics to provide supple-
mental funding for a workshop on the modeling of cognitive processes.
The editors especially acknowledge the many contributions of Denise
Arellano, a doctoral candidate at UTA, who took full charge of the logistics of
the meetings attended by the participants and our guests. Denise literally
made sure that even the buses ran on time, thereby freeing us to concentrate
fully on the many fruitful discussions that the gathering produced. We are
grateful to her.
Parti

Introduction
 The Concept of Inhibition
in Cognition

Colin M. MacLeod

Everyone knows what inhibition is—and that creates a very real problem. The
idea is so ingrained that it is difficult to discuss it as a scientific concept without
contamination from existing world knowledge. Yet discussing it is exactly what
cognitive scientists have been attempting to do with renewed vigor in the recent
past, owing to at least three factors: the growth of cognitive neuroscience,
developments in cognitive modeling, and newly described cognitive phenomena.
Beginning with the phenomenon of negative priming (for reviews, see Fox,
1995; May, Kane, & Hasher, 1995; Tipper, 2001) and spurred by two influential
books that appeared in quick succession just over a decade ago (Dagenbach &
Carr, 1994; Dempster & Brainerd, 1995), interest in cognitive inhibition grew.
Of course, the desire to mesh cognition with neuroscience also has provided a
powerful impetus for understanding the place of inhibition in the current
conceptualization of mind and brain. This interest is well illustrated by the
inclusion of inhibition as one of only 16 core concepts in a recent effort to grapple
with concepts—free of empirical research findings—that are fundamental to
memory (Roediger, Dudai, & Fitzpatrick, in press).
This chapter is intended as a broad introduction to the concept of inhibition
in cognition and consequently to this book as a whole. For this reason, I take
no strong stand on the value of the concept (although I have expressed a
skeptical point of view elsewhere; see MacLeod, in press; MacLeod, Dodd,
Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003). In this chapter, the goal is to set out the issues
involved in the empirical study and theoretical understanding of the concept
of inhibition as it applies to the operation of cognition. So I begin with what
this chapter is and is not about. This chapter is not about the neural concept
of inhibition: It is accepted that neurons certainly can inhibit each other. This
chapter also is not about the physical-response concept of inhibition: It is

Preparation of this chapter was supported by Discovery Grant A7459 from the Natural Sciences
and Engineering Research Council of Canada. I greatly appreciate discussions with my colleagues
Ori Friedman and Steve Spencer and with my friend Kevin Dunbar about the research described
in the first part of the chapter. I also thank Nigel Gopie and Kathleen Hourihan for their careful,
helpful comments.
 COLIN M. MACLEOD

accepted that actions can be initiated and then cancelled (Logan & Cowan,
1984), although the extent to which these two domains of inhibition relate to
each other remains to be established. This chapter is about the concept of
cognitive inhibition—the idea that mental processes or representations can
be inhibited.

Cognitive and Neural Inhibition: Two Separate Worlds

There is one aspect of this preliminary framing that must be highlighted.
The unassailable evidence for the existence of neural inhibition should be
seen as in no way speaking to whether cognitive inhibition exists or, if it
exists, to the form or forms that it might take: These are simply different
levels of analysis that share a label, which may be responsible for more
confusion than clarity. Indeed, neural inhibition at the conceptual level is
likely not unitary. Cohen (1993), for example, distinguished four types of
neural inhibition, each composed of a variety of neural components. Should
all of these inform thinking about cognitive inhibition? Should there be four
kinds of cognitive inhibition? These questions are meant to illustrate one of
the problems in trying to draw a direct analogy between neural and cognitive
inhibition; they are not meant to suggest that such analysis should not be
undertaken or that it is doomed to fail. Rather, they are meant to encourage
more concerted efforts with respect to the evidentiary and/or logical arguments
for or against symmetry across levels of analysis.
With the goal of focusing attention on cognitive inhibition, I take one strong
stand here. I strongly disagree with the common view, as stated in one of the
most influential modern articles on cognitive inhibition, that

the existence of such inhibitory mechanisms in the functional architecture

of cognition seems both plausible and necessary: plausible because the sub-
strate on which that architecture operates—the brain—uses both excitatory
and inhibitory processes to perform neural computation, and necessary be-
cause computational analyses show that inhibitory mechanisms are critical
for maintaining stability in neuronal networks. (Anderson & Spellman,
1995, p. 68)

Trying to force these two levels of analysis to fit together so that they can
share a common term is unlikely to help advance understanding of either, a
point that was made a long time ago (Breese, 1899). Indeed, it is noteworthy
that even Anderson and Spellman (1995) chose to set aside one of the hallmark
features of neural inhibition—its brief duration—in their argument for a much
longer lasting cognitive inhibition, saying, "The strong assumption that cogni-
tive inhibition should follow the characteristics of individual neurons receiving
a single inhibitory input ... is likely to be far too simple" (p. 95).
To reiterate, then, this chapter is about the cognitive or mental concept
of inhibition, also variously called repression, suppression, or restraining (and
sometimes even blocking, although blocking appears to have a different mean-
ing for most investigators). For excellent histories of ideas concerning inhibi-
 THE CONCEPT OF INHIBITION IN COGNITION 5

tion, the reader should consult S. Diamond, Balvin, and Diamond (1963) and
particularly the more recent treatment by Smith (1992). As a point of departure,
The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) lists four meanings for inhibition. The
first two relate to the societal or legal prohibition senses and so are not relevant
here. The remaining two relate to the physiological and psychological senses,
consistent with the admonishment (MacLeod, in press; MacLeod et al., 2003)
to keep these two senses distinct.
Focusing just on cognitive inhibition, the active ingredients appear to be
primarily two: mental withholding and reduced performance. The former is an
inference from the latter, reflecting a confusion that pervades the literature.
In cognition, inhibition is sometimes a measurable phenomenon, sometimes a
theory about the cause of that phenomenon, and often both. As always, it is a
bad idea to name a phenomenon using the label for one of the possible theories
that might explain it. This is not to claim that that theory is wrong, but to
urge avoidance of confusion. Inhibition may—or may not—play a key role in
explaining (aspects of) cognition: That is what this book is about, with the aim
of considering the variety of perspectives.

A Definition of Cognitive Inhibition

How might inhibition be defined from a cognitive standpoint? Given its strong
standing in the vernacular, the term often is not defined at all. To remedy that
common oversight, I propose the following definition: Cognitive inhibition is
the stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with or
without intention. The mental process so influenced might be selective attention
or memory retrieval or a host of other cognitive processes. Typically, this
influence would not be to eradicate or entirely prevent some process from
occurring but rather to slow it down or reduce its probability of taking place
(relative to some neutral baseline condition or situation). Inhibition could be
applied as an act of will, or it could be more automatic, perhaps as a by-product
of another cognitive process. Two other features might be considered relevant:
recovery and reactivity. In the present context, recovery means that inhibition
could be permanent or could be transitory, subject to (perhaps complete) lifting
under specified conditions. Reactivity means that inhibition may be applied to
the extent that it is required under the circumstances (i.e., it may not be all
or none), an idea that goes back to Wundt (1902) but one that if not embedded
in a formal theory may give too much flexibility to the concept.
Because inhibition is so rarely explicitly defined, my definition is certain
to be challenged, but at least it provides a starting point. Indeed, some of the
confusion apparent in the literature could be eliminated if each investigator
would explicitly define what he or she means by inhibition. My strong sense
is that this practice would quickly demonstrate that the term has a wide range
of meanings and that at the very least, some kind of framework for a theory
of inhibition is required. The definitions offered in chapters 6, 8, 9, and 14 of
this volume help to underscore this point. In this regard, attempts at offering
empirical criteria for the demonstration of inhibition (e.g., Anderson & Bjork,
 COLIN M. MACLEOD

1994) should certainly be encouraged, a point that is amplified later in this

chapter.

Cognitive Inhibition Beyond Cognition

The concept of cognitive inhibition in mainstream cognitive psychology is per-

meating all of the other traditional areas of psychological inquiry as well (e.g.,
developmental, social, clinical). This concept—sometimes it is more of a meta-
concept—is a powerful one and hence a seductive one. For this reason, it
is useful to illustrate this broader research perspective before homing in on
mainstream cognitive research. Certainly, the tasks and approaches developed
within cognitive psychology, as well as the theoretical principles to which those
tasks and approaches become linked, are influential not just in the study of
cognition but throughout the discipline. In the next sections I illustrate several
subareas, each with a single study, although numerous other published studies
could have been selected.

Developmental Psychology

O. Friedman and Leslie (2004) explained children's performance in the false

belief task as relying on a critical inhibitory process (for related ideas, see
Carlson & Moses, 2001; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991). In a
variation on the standard version of this task, children are told about a girl,
Sally, who sees two boxes, one red and one blue, and then sees a frog placed
under the red box. After Sally leaves the room, the children see the frog moved
under the blue box. The critical question asked of the children is where Sally
thinks the frog is or where Sally will look for the frog. Given that Sally did
not see the frog switch boxes, the correct answer is the red box (where the frog
initially was) and the incorrect answer is the blue box (where the frog now
actually is). Somewhere between ages 3 and 4, children shift from the incorrect
to the correct answer (for a review, see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001)—
from relying on what they themselves saw to taking the perspective of what
Sally knows.
O. Friedman and Leslie (2004) argued that the inhibition of competitors
is fundamental to the selection among alternative beliefs, akin to the selection-
by-inhibition explanation of negative priming in the attention literature (for
a review, see Tipper, 2001). They theorized that for children to succeed, the
most salient box—the blue one, because that is where the children know the
frog actually is—must be inhibited. What the 4-year-old can do that the 3-year-
old cannot is successfully apply the inhibition. 0. Friedman and Leslie went
on to provide an elegant test of their inhibition theory in a considerably more
complex version of the false belief task, but describing this would take us too
far afield. They concluded that "competent reasoning about beliefs depends on
the development of inhibitory control" (p. 552). This emphasis on inhibition in
understanding development is not unique to O. Friedman and Leslie (see, e.g.,
Bull & Scerif, 2001; A. Diamond, Kirkham, & Amso, 2002; Wilson & Kipp,
1998; see also chap. 13, this volume).
 THE CONCEPT OF INHIBITION IN COGNITION

Social Psychology
A major question in social psychology is what causes a stereotype to come to
mind (activation) and to influence one's impression (application) when one
comes in contact with a member of the stereotype-relevant group. Kunda and
Spencer (2003) proposed that the activation of stereotypes is driven by three
goals. First is the goal of comprehension—simplifying and understanding the
situation. Second is the goal of self-enhancement—the nurturing of self-esteem.
Third is the goal of avoiding prejudice—either to see oneself as egalitarian or
to comply with egalitarian social norms. The comprehension and self-
enhancement goals function similarly: As the strength of the goal increases,
often the likelihood of stereotype activation and application increases as well.
The stereotype simplifies interpretation of the situation and maintains or even
enhances self-esteem.
What makes the Kunda and Spencer (2003) framework unique is the
emphasis on inhibition. They argued that it is also possible that a stronger
goal will lead to inhibiting the stereotype. So for comprehension, when informa-
tion about the specific individual is available, it may be better to inhibit the
stereotype and instead use the individuating information. For self-esteem, if
one is motivated to form a positive impression of an individual, it may be better
to inhibit the (negative) stereotype. In the case of the goal of avoiding prejudice,
the primary process may in fact be inhibitory, acting to suppress the negative
stereotypic information. Kunda and Spencer suggested that the application of
inhibition may be cognitively demanding and may become more likely to fail
as cognitive resource demands increase. Such an emphasis on inhibition in
understanding social processes is not unique to Kunda and Spencer (see, e.g.,
Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003; Forster, Liberman, & Higgins,
2005; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002; von Hippel & Gonsalkorale, 2005;
see also chap. 7, this volume).

Clinical and Personality Psychology

Many illustrations are possible in the domain of clinical and personality psy-
chology, but I describe only one. Wood, Mathews, and Dalgleish (2001) asked
subjects who were either high or low in trait anxiety to make decisions on each
trial about whether a single target word was or was not related to the sentence
that preceded it. Sentences were constructed in pairs, differing only in the
final word, an example being "At the party she had some punch/wine," where
the first of the two possible final words was a homograph. The task was to
determine whether the probe word fist was semantically related to the sentence.
The answer should have been no in both cases, but critically, fist is related to
the other sense of the homograph punch. Therefore, failure to suppress that
other sense would slow rejection of fist. The prediction was that such a failure
to inhibit would be more likely in high-anxiety subjects.
In their first experiment, Wood et al. (2001) found that all subjects were
faster to reject the probe fist in response to wine than to punch but that there
was no effect of anxiety level. This finding might seem to conflict with their
8 COLIN M. MACLEOD

prediction, but in their second experiment, when subjects were under higher
cognitive load because they had to rehearse a set of digits during task perfor-
mance, the pattern changed. Anxious subjects showed a pattern suggesting a
general impairment of inhibitory processing. Wood et al. concluded that
"anxiety-prone individuals have a deficit in tasks requiring the inhibition of
currently irrelevant meanings" but that this impairment "may be revealed only
when task-related control strategies are limited by mental load" (p. 176). This
emphasis on inhibition in understanding personality and abnormal behavior
is not unique to Wood et al. (see, e.g., Bohne, Keuthen, Tuschen-Caffier, &
Wilhelm, 2005; Dorahy, Middleton, & Irwin, 2005; Kuhl & Kazen, 1999; see
also chaps. 10, 11, and 13, this volume).

Behavioral Neuroscience

Colvin, Dunbar, and Grafman (2001) contrasted patients with frontal lobe
lesions with normal subjects performing a water jug task (Luchins, 1942). In
the version of the task that they used, subjects had to manipulate three jugs
with known capacities (A = 8 units, B = 5 units, C = 3 units) to reach a specified
goal state (A = 4 units, B = 4 units, C = 0 units). Patients, particularly those
with left dorsolateral prefrontal lesions, performed poorly, especially when
they had to make a counterintuitive move—one that resulted in a step back
from the goal state and therefore was not predicted by a simple means-end
analysis without planning. In particular, patients tended to prefer to go back
to an earlier state rather than to make a counterintuitive move. Colvin et al.
argued that intact functioning of the left dorsolateral prefrontal region is
necessary in part for "the inhibition of a response generated by an adopted
problem-solving strategy" (p. 1138). Of course, this emphasis on inhibition
in understanding behavior from a neuroscientific perspective is certainly not
unique to Colvin et al. (see, e.g., Amos, 2000; Durston et al., 2002; Gazzaley,
Cooney, Rissman, & D'Esposito, 2005) and is in fact very much in the Zeitgeist
in this domain.

Inhibition in Cognition

In the preceding section, the goal was to indicate the breadth and current
impact of the concept of inhibition as an explanatory element in traditionally
recognized subdomains of psychology other than cognition. Much of this impact
can be placed at the doorstep of cognition, in that the tasks and explanations
in these domains have often been modified from cognitive antecedents. Let us
turn now to cognition itself, where the growth of explanations involving inhibi-
tion has been dramatic in the past 25 to 30 years since research on negative
priming began to lead the charge.
All of the illustrations in the preceding section are instances where cogni-
tive inhibition has been proposed as a key mechanism in explaining observed
behavior. It is fair to say that the concept is by now ubiquitous, having been
applied to, among other cognitive activities, action, language, meaning, mem-
 THE CONCEPT OF INHIBITION IN COGNITION 9

ory, perception, responding, thought, and working memory. Without doubt, it

is a compelling idea, one that lends considerable power to theory—not to men-
tion the seductive draw of the neural analogy. It seems, in fact, that cognitive
inhibition has to exist: In James's (1890) words, "Inhibition is a vera causa, of
that there can be no doubt" (p. 67). Even more to the point is what Mercier
(quoted in Smith, 1992) said a couple of years earlier, in 1888: "If [inhibition]
did not exist it would be necessary to invent it" (p. 21).
In the early days of psychology, the concept of inhibition was prevalent
and influential (e.g., Breese, 1899; Pillsbury, 1908; Wundt, 1902). However, it
largely disappeared as a theoretical entity in the face of behaviorism and even
through the early growth of cognitive psychology, relegated to terms describing
empirical phenomena such as conditioned inhibition and proactive inhibition.
Then, about 30 years ago, it began to reappear with theoretical impact in
research on the phenomenon initially given several names (e.g., distractor
suppression) but ultimately called negative priming (Lowe, 1979; Neill, 1977;
Tipper, 1985). Wundt (1902) had argued that to attend to one of several simulta-
neous stimuli, the others had to be inhibited. This idea was revived to explain
negative priming, and a strong paradigm-theory linkage quickly developed.

Attention
In negative priming experiments, each trial typically involves two stimuli, one
to be attended and one to be ignored. If the ignored stimulus on one trial
becomes the target stimulus on the next trial, responding to it is slower than
would have been the case if the previous trial were completely unrelated. The
argument originally put forward by Neill (1977; for an updated view, see
chap. 4, this volume) and championed by Tipper (1985, 2001) was that the
ignored stimulus was inhibited to permit the target stimulus to control respond-
ing. Then, when that ignored stimulus itself became the target, the inhibition
just applied to it had to be overcome for it to control responding, and this
process took additional time.
This apparently simple task, with its intuitively appealing explanation,
was quickly followed in the attention literature by the phenomenon of inhibition
of return (Posner & Cohen, 1984). The prototypical procedure consists of three
outline boxes with subjects instructed to fixate on the center box and to move
only their attention (not their eyes) during the trial. Then one of the two
peripheral boxes brightens, drawing attention to that cued location despite the
cue not being informative. Shortly thereafter, a target appears. When the time
between cue and target is brief, target detection is faster at the cued location—
the intuitive pattern of automatic capturing of attention by the cue. However,
when the cue-target interval is longer than 300 milliseconds, detection is
slower at the cued location. As the term inhibition of return was intended to
suggest, attention may be inhibited from reorienting back to the cued location,
resulting in delayed or slower processing there (e.g., Rafal, Egly, & Rhodes,
1994; Reuter-Lorenz, Jha, & Rosenquist, 1996).
Much research has followed in which inhibition has been proposed to play
a key role in attentional processing (e.g., task switching in Allport, Styles, &
10 COLIN M. MACLEOD

Hsieh, 1994; visual marking in Watson & Humphreys, 1997; see also chaps.
2-4, this volume). The nature of that role, however, appears to be broad,
leading to the question of what these various forms of inhibition have in com-
mon. Are there common processes or at least a small set of crucial processes?
Such a limitation would seem to be important for the concept of attentional
inhibition to be coherent and parsimonious. Efforts have been made to address
this question. Thus, Rafal and Henik (1994) distinguished three inhibitory
processes. The first is inhibition of responding to signals at unattended loca-
tions, the kind of process involved in spatial versions of negative priming. The
second is endogenous inhibition of reflexes, more akin to stopping a prepotent
response. The third is reflexive inhibition of the detection of subsequent signals,
the kind of process involved in inhibition of return. The glue that links these
processes together as inhibition remains elusive, but that certainly does not
mean that such a linkage cannot or will not be accomplished as research
progresses.
Turning to the neural level, there is also evidence consistent with atten-
tional inhibition operating at intermediate levels of cortical processing, in visual
area V4 and in TEO (the posterior portion of the inferior temporal cortex).
Attention may work in a push—pull fashion to promote processing of what is
attended and to inhibit processing of what is unattended (for a review, see
Kastner & Pinsk, 2004). This push-pull idea is also familiar as center-surround
and goes by other names as well. The extent to which this idea relates directly
to cognitive inhibition must be clarified, but the connection is unquestion-
ably appealing.

Memory
The employment of inhibition as an explanatory tool is no less prominent in
memory than it is in attention. This emphasis began with the work of Hasher
and Zacks (1988; see also chap. 8, this volume) focusing on the cognitive costs
associated with aging and bridging the attention-memory gap. Like Rafal and
Henik (1994), Hasher and Zacks described three components of inhibition, all
seen as influencing the optimal operation of working memory (via attention):
(a) control of the specific information that enters working memory, (b) control
of the information that is deleted from working memory, and (c) prevention of
possibly relevant but incorrect responses from being executed. Their argument,
based on an extended series of studies, is that older people do not execute these
functions as well as younger people because older people do not inhibit as well.
Their research program has made a concerted effort to characterize these
proposed processes, and their account has been influential (for review and
commentary, see Burke, 1997; McDowd, 1997; for other views, see chaps. 9
and 10, this volume). The Hasher and Zacks inhibition-based account of aging
has not been without critics, however: As Chariot and Feyereisen (2005) con-
cluded in their review concerning executive control and prefrontal cortex, "The
changes tied to cognitive aging in the domain of episodic memory cannot be
uniquely explained by a deficit in inhibition" (p. 349, my translation).
 THE CONCEPT OF INHIBITION IN COGNITION 11

Next to the work of Hasher and Zacks (1988), the most visible work arguing
for inhibitory processes in memory is that of Anderson and colleagues (Ander-
son, 2005; Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Spellman, 1995). Anderson
and Spellman (1995) had subjects learn an initial list of category-instance
word pairs and then practice half of the items in half of the categories. They
found that the unpracticed half of a category was actually more poorly remem-
bered than a corresponding half from a category in which no items were prac-
ticed. Moreover, not only were the unpracticed items less accessible from their
studied cues, they were also less accessible from independent semantically
related probes. It appeared that these unpracticed items had become generally
less accessible, a pattern consistent with their representations having been
inhibited.
Anderson and Green (2001) went on to develop a clever variation on this
paradigm that they referred to as the "think/no think" paradigm. After studying
a list of pairs, participants were asked to try not to think of a previously studied
word when provided with a cue that had been studied with that word. Having
tried not to think of a word resulted in poorer recall than in the control condition,
where studied pairs were neither thought of nor suppressed. Moreover, the
target word was also less likely to be recalled to a semantic cue that had not
been studied: It appeared that the target word itself, not just the studied pair,
was inhibited as a result of not thinking about it. This cue independence has
been seen by Anderson and Green as the strongest evidence of inhibition being
involved in memory.
There are many other illustrations of inhibitory accounts applied to mem-
ory phenomena. Anderson (2005) pointed to the related paradigm of directed
forgetting (for a review, see MacLeod, 1998), in which it has been argued
(Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993) that when the first half of a list is followed
by an instruction to forget, it is more poorly remembered than the second, to-
be-remembered half of the list because it has been inhibited. Similarly, when
subjects are provided with a partial set of members of a studied list to aid the
retrieval of the remainder, this typically hurts rather than helps performance—
the part-list cuing effect (Slamecka, 1968). Bauml and Asian (2006) argued
that this effect is, at least under certain conditions, due to inhibition of retrieval.
There are certainly plenty of other illustrations of memory phenomena held
to be at least in part attributable to inhibition (see, e.g., Brown, Zoccoli, &
Leahy, 2005; Racsmany & Conway, 2006; Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004).
In the memory literature, another way of examining inhibition has been
prominent—that of individual differences. Two different approaches have been
taken—that of Engle and his colleagues and that of N. P. Friedman, Miyake,
and their colleagues. Engle and his colleagues (Conway & Engle, 1994; Engle,
Conway, Tuholski, & Shisler, 1995; Kane & Engle, 2000) put forth a perspective
related to that of Hasher and Zacks (1988) in that it also emphasizes attentional
resources and working memory, although Engle's emphasis on general capacity
distinguishes his view from theirs. Conway and Engle (1994) argued that a
major source of individual differences in cognitive ability is the capacity of
working memory and that these individual differences result from variation
in attentional resources that in turn produce "differences in the ability to
12 COLIN M. MACLEOD

inhibit or suppress irrelevant information" (p. 354). The impact of these differ-
ences should be evident in controlled tasks requiring attention but not in more
automatic tasks. Redick, Heitz, and Engle (chap. 7, this volume) have carried
forward this work.
N. P. Friedman, Miyake, and their colleagues (N. P. Friedman & Miyake,
2004; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000) have taken
the more psychometric approach of seeking patterns of correlations between
cognitive measures. Thus, when N. P. Friedman and Miyake (2004) directed
this approach to examining inhibition, they administered an extensive battery
of tasks, several of which were seen as markers for each of three key inhibitory
abilities: prepotent response inhibition (e.g., Stroop task, stop signal task),
resistance to distractor interference (e.g., Eriksen flanker task, word naming
with distraction), and resistance to proactive interference (e.g., Brown-
Peterson task, cued recall task). Via structural equation modeling, they found
the first two inhibitory abilities to be closely related but the third to be clearly
separate, suggesting to them that the overall "trait" of inhibition was not
unified. More recent work (N. P. Friedman et al., 2006) has suggested that,
unlike updating working memory, which is related to intelligence, inhibiting
prepotent responses (and shifting mental sets) is not.
Turning to the neural level, again multiple approaches have been taken.
Hamilton and Martin (2005; see also chap. 12, this volume) presented a case
study of a participant with left inferior frontal damage in which the pattern
of task dissociation across a series of inhibition tasks seemed incompatible
with a single shared neural substrate. Their work simultaneously supports
that of Miyake et al. (2000) and N. P. Friedman and Miyake (2004)—in showing
dissociations across proposed inhibitory abilities—and conflicts with it—in
showing dissociations within abilities that the Miyake group held to be single
abilities. Hamilton and Martin suggested that one fruitful direction to pursue
would be to consider that variations might hinge not on common brain areas
but rather on common patterns of neurotransmitters, such as dopamine and
norepinephrine, which may influence how different brain areas operate. The
puzzle of the diversity of brain areas involved in some ability might then be
resolved by the commonality in the neurotransmitters affecting these areas.
This is an intriguing idea, although it also highlights the fact that cognitive
neurotopology may be even more complicated than currently viewed.
Gazzaley et al. (2005) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to examine how aging affects what they saw as a goal-driven mechanism in
support of attention and memory that enhances and suppresses the processing
of sensory information. On each trial, participants watched two faces and two
scenes in random order and tried to remember one type of stimulus or the
other for a subsequent recognition test; the control was passive viewing without
the memory instruction. Like younger adults, older adults showed enhanced
cortical activity for task-relevant representations; unlike younger adults, older
adults were deficient in suppression of cortical activity for task-irrelevant repre-
sentations. Gazzaley et al. saw their results as indicating that the inhibitory
function was deficient in the older subjects but that the enhancement function
was unaffected by aging, which fits nicely with the Hasher and Zacks (1988)
theory (although Gazzaley et al. did note that their results could reflect excita-
 THE CONCEPT OF INHIBITION IN COGNITION 13

tion and inhibition or simply different levels of excitation, an issue that is at

present difficult to resolve in fMRI research).
Anderson et al. (2004), also using fMRI, investigated neural activity in
the Anderson and Green (2001) think/no think paradigm. They first reported
obtaining the same behavioral data pattern as reported by Anderson and
Green—poorer memory for no-think items both in response to their studied
cues and, importantly, in response to independent probes. Neural differences
were evident in reduced hippocampal activation and increased dorsolateral
prefrontal activation for the no-think items. They saw their results as support-
ing the existence of active cognitive inhibition at the neural level. Thus, there
have recently been a number of quite concerted efforts to demonstrate brain
parallels of cognitive inhibition in memory. This domain of research is likely to
be very influential in determining the role of inhibition in cognitive processing.

Beyond Attention and Memory

In the domain of intelligence, where presumably cognitive processes are assem-

bled and orchestrated, inhibition has also been proposed to be a fundamental
component. Dempster (1991) reviewed the relation between measures of intelli-
gence and of inhibition across a broad age range and concluded that "intelli-
gence cannot be understood without reference to inhibitory processes" (p. 157).
Although at odds with the conclusions of N. P. Friedman, Miyake, and their
colleagues (N. P. Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000), Dempster's
conclusion is consistent with the findings of Salthouse, Atkinson, and Berish
(2003) that in older adults, measures of inhibition correlated well with mea-
sures of fluid intelligence (although Salthouse et al. were not convinced that
inhibition represented a distinct executive control function).
There is no way to do justice to the breadth and diversity of cognitive
research invoking inhibition as an explanatory construct. So, like the preceding
discussion of research outside cognition, this survey has been only cursory, the
goal being to illustrate some of the key areas across cognition where inhibition
has played a central role in the explanation of empirical findings. That role
continues to grow. In the remainder of this chapter, the goal shifts to consider-
ation of the concept of inhibition as an explanatory entity in cognition and to
identifying some of the questions that must be addressed.

Four Conceptual Issues

The following section outlines in brief form four of the key issues related to
understanding cognitive inhibition as a theoretical construct: definition, rela-
tion to neural inhibition, relation to interference, and measurement and the
baseline problem.

Definition

When applied to cognition, the term inhibition definitely does not have a consis-
tent meaning. Many scholars have recognized this, as two recent quotes and
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