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Ethics & International Affairs
This page intentionally left blank
Joel H. Rosenthal
Christian Barry
Editors
⬁ This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the
requirements of the American National Standard for
Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.
15 14 13 12 11 10 09 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
First printing
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xv
PART ONE
CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION 1
1
In Defense of Realism
A Commentary on Just and Unjust Wars
David C. Hendrickson 3
2
The Slippery Slope to Preventive War
Neta C. Crawford 37
3
Reckoning with Past Wrongs
A Normative Framework
David A. Crocker 45
PART TWO
GROUNDS FOR INTERVENTION 65
4
Humanitarian Intervention
An Overview of the Ethical Issues
Michael J. Smith 67
5
The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention
Terry Nardin 85
v
vi Contents
6
Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?
The Crisis in Darfur and
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq
Alex J. Bellamy 103
7
Ecological Intervention
Prospects and Limits
Robyn Eckersley 131
PART THREE
GOVERNANCE, LAW, AND MEMBERSHIP 153
8
The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane 155
9
On the Alleged Conflict between
Democracy and International Law
Seyla Benhabib 185
10
‘‘Saving Amina’’: Global Justice for Women
and Intercultural Dialogue
Alison M. Jaggar 205
11
Who Should Get In?
The Ethics of Immigration Admissions
Joseph H. Carens 231
PART FOUR
GLOBAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE 251
12
Models of International Economic Justice
Ethan B. Kapstein 253
Contents vii
13
The Invisible Hand of the American Empire
Robert Wade 269
14
Accountability in International Development Aid
Leif Wenar 285
15
World Poverty and Human Rights
Thomas Pogge 307
16
Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?
Response to Pogge
Mathias Risse 317
17
Baselines for Determining Harm
Reply to Risse
Thomas Pogge 329
Contributors 335
Index 339
This page intentionally left blank
Preface
ix
x Preface
the fields of international relations and philosophy, it is safe to say that, with
their growing technical maturity, the range of included perspectives, their
responsiveness to real-world developments, and the willingness on the part of
political scientists and philosophers to borrow from, talk to, and collaborate
with one another, the field has made definite strides forward in recent years.3
International ethicists have also displayed a steady tendency toward special-
ization, endeavoring to add value and gain traction on an issue-by-issue basis.
Today, the field takes in debates about atmospheric justice, sovereign debt,
human rights trials, and, among others, the topics broached in these pages:
war and postwar reconciliation, intervention and its prospects, the boundless
question of how communities can best determine just principles of authority
and inclusion, and the ethics and politics of global inequality. Whereas the
previous editions of this book were structured in an open-ended manner, with
sections on ‘‘theory,’’ ‘‘culture,’’ and ‘‘issues,’’ the contents of this volume are
instead ordered by topic, recognizing and reflecting the increased maturity and
self-consciousness of the field. Needless to say, the contributions to theory and
awareness of culture are no less salient in the present edition than in the past,
but the context for them is now given as ‘‘topics in international ethics’’ rather
than, say, questions of whether there is even a role for ethics in international
affairs.
In making the selections of which conversations and contributions to include
in this new edition, the aim has certainly not been to generate the greatest ‘‘hits’’
of international ethics, nor the greatest ‘‘misses’’ of global public policy, as
if there had not been innumerable worthwhile contributions elsewhere in the
literature, or as if the chosen topics are those we regard as most pressing or
most deserving of wide discussion. Even though in the case of every contribu-
tion included here the discussion is ongoing rather than closed, the conversa-
tions should be taken as invitations to normative, empirical discussions and
studies of whichever international issues are uppermost in readers’ minds. The
aim in making the current selections was to serve the contemporary interna-
tional ethics classroom as efficiently as possible, as well as to invite and inform
other new readers in the field. We have thus compiled resources that we suspect
will be of special value in engaging and instructing a new generation of interna-
tional ethicists and informed members of world society.
We hope we have balanced these desires—to supply a volume fit for the
ethics classroom, and to reflect the growing maturity of the field—without mis-
representing or overdetermining the shape of the discussions from which the
selections presented here are drawn. Helpful here may be the fact that each of
the four sections offers a slightly different experience of the debate it confronts.
The section on war gives a sense of how its interlocutors have stepped in to
confront the normative dimensions of new security challenges, such as the
demands of justice in ‘‘transitions,’’ particularly in the aftermath of war, and
Preface xi
poverty alleviation. The project of updating our normative and empirical tool
kit and vocabulary to respond to this changing global picture remains far from
complete. International ethicists must, and surely will, continue the process of
engaging the ethics of global business, global civil society, and global governance
alongside, but not independent of, considerations of just war and other such
topics that predate and still pervade the global village. Part of the mission of
international ethics moving forward will be to better grasp how the ‘‘interna-
tional’’ and the ‘‘global’’ are related.
Third, we should endorse the notion that monism—a single-minded, all-
or-nothing approach to ethics and international affairs—is simply inadequate.
Human judgment is known to be faulty and limited. New information often
changes our views: while ‘‘truth’’ may be our ultimate goal and guide, our
understanding of it may change over time. The first of Hans Morgenthau’s
‘‘Nine Rules of Diplomacy’’ has especially lasting value in light of the current
political climate in the United States. It reads simply: ‘‘Diplomacy must be
divested of the crusading spirit.’’4 Humility is required even in the face of con-
viction; international ethicists, for instance, must not be driven by the combat-
ive spirit often inherent in scholarly debates to let their professional convictions
override what we should all agree on: that perhaps we are wrong.
Another unifying theme in these essays is an abandonment of ideology in
favor of an enlightened realism that emphasizes pluralism. According to
‘‘enlightened realists,’’ conflict is neither fated nor random. Interests are neither
fixed nor self-defined. Decisions can be made according to reason, always
requiring the weighing of claims in light of evidence. Some of our authors might
prefer the label ‘‘realistic utopians.’’5 They would see their work as describing
the gap between what we ought to be doing and what we are doing. If we can
sketch out what is morally desirable, we then have an end or a goal by which
we can set the direction of our policies and gauge our results. To the extent that
a meeting of enlightened realists and realistic utopians offers a fair portrayal of
contemporary international ethics, it is an encouraging portrayal—certainly
more so than the earlier image of realists confronting idealists.
Finally, a discernible ‘‘weak universalism’’ threads through the work in this
volume. By ‘‘universalism’’ we mean a shared commitment to universal human
dignity and social justice. The modifier ‘‘weak’’ acknowledges the pluralistic
notion that shared principles of humanity will take different forms in different
circumstances. The essays that follow seek neither perfection nor homogeniza-
tion; rather, they pursue mutual understandings based on what is common in
human experience. Paradoxically, the most common aspect of human experi-
ence is difference itself. How we live with difference—especially in light of com-
mon problems—will continue to be one among the many pressing questions
faced by international ethicists.
It is in the spirit of mutual learning that we offer these essays for your consid-
eration. The inquiry is open and unfinished, as it should be. We urge you to
carry that inquiry on.
Preface xiii
NOTES
xv
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PART ONE
Is war always wrong? Or can the use of large-scale, organized violence some-
times be justified? Does it even make sense to apply moral principles to war?
What have theorists and philosophers had to say about the problem, and how
has the discussion developed in the course of history and in response to events?
What is a so-called just war? What does it mean to have a just cause? How likely
and imminent does an attack have to be to justify preemptive war? Does a
responsible government act to deter its enemies, or strike first to neutralize
potential threats? What justifies prevention? Is war a realm of necessity, or of
ethics? What is a just peace?
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 1
In Defense of Realism
A Commentary on Just and Unjust Wars
David C. Hendrickson
Just and Unjust Wars made its appearance in the wake of an unpopular and
unsuccessful war. It condemned that war, both the reasons for entering it and
the methods of waging it. Just and Unjust Wars also appeared at a time when
the principal military disposition governing America’s relations with its then-
great adversary seemed destined to persist indefinitely. While lamenting the
‘‘necessity’’ imposed by deterrence, Michael Walzer reluctantly approved of that
arrangement despite the fact that it rested on the threat to destroy millions of
noncombatants. ‘‘We threaten to do evil in order not to do it and the doing of
it would be so terrible that the threat seems in comparison to be morally defen-
sible.’’1 The moral condemnation of the unthinkable—nuclear war—was thus
balanced by the acceptance of the arrangement that constituted at the time the
limiting condition of all our lives.
Walzer’s work is directed against ‘‘realism,’’ against the view that presumably
denies the ‘‘moral reality’’ of war and its conduct. Realism, Walzer argues, con-
siders war to be ‘‘a world apart . . . where self-interest and necessity prevail.’’2
In this world, right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place. If war
belongs to the realm of necessity, it makes no more sense to pass moral judg-
ment on it than it would to pass moral judgment on catastrophes occurring in
nature. These catastrophes—a flood or an earthquake—may have awful conse-
quences, but they cannot pose moral dilemmas. They are neither just nor
unjust. Realism is considered to say the same of war.
Just and Unjust Wars proceeds from the assumption, and conviction, that
neither the resort to war nor the conduct of war may escape moral judgment.
‘‘I am going to assume throughout,’’ Walzer declares at the outset of his study,
‘‘that we really do act within a moral world; that particular decisions really are
difficult, problematic, agonizing, and that this has to do with the structure of
that world; that language reflects the moral world and gives us access to it; and
finally that our understanding of the moral vocabulary is sufficiently common
3
4 Hendrickson
and stable so that shared judgments are possible.’’3 The just war Walzer intends
to ‘‘recapture’’ for political and moral theory is to displace a view of war identi-
fied, in the main, with realism.
The assumption that political realism can be reduced not simply to ‘‘moral
skepticism’’ but to a kind of moral atheism is often adopted by contemporary
writers on the ethics of statecraft. Curiously, self-proclaimed realists rarely say
this; it is the critics of ‘‘realism’’ who insist that the central core of the doc-
trine—deserving the most elaborate refutation—is that morality must be ban-
ished from the realm of international affairs. Walzer is not alone in taking this
version of realism as his point of departure, but there is a certain irony in his
decision to do so. For there are important respects in which Just and Unjust
Wars begins by rejecting realism and ends by accepting it—rejecting, that is, the
more extreme (or vulgar) claims that are often identified with realism while
accepting some classic realist precepts.
Such a thesis can only be advanced with reticence, for the central claims of
political realism are frequently subjected to wildly divergent interpretations.
Realism may be best characterized, we think, as indicative of a general disposi-
tion toward politics. It emphasizes the egocentricity of human beings, particu-
larly when they act in groups. It sees conflict as a never-ending feature of the
human condition, which can be mitigated in particular settings but never over-
come. It sees moral exhortation as something that is easily swept aside or dis-
torted when it is in the interest of political communities to do so. It insists that
politics neither follows nor reflects a simple rational scheme; that statecraft
must always proceed from a given situation which may gradually be altered but
which cannot suddenly be transformed either by an act of will or by an appeal
to reason; that attempts to transform society—particularly international soci-
ety—underrate the forces resistant to change and consequently the repressive
measures necessary to overcome resistance; and that whatever the professions
of those who wield power, the political actor seldom if ever acts for reasons as
disinterested as are invariably alleged. These are all empirical observations, and
though they certainly bear on the ethical questions raised by the conduct of
statecraft they do not constitute an ethical doctrine. Their chief implication is a
counsel against the adoption of ethical systems that demand too much abnega-
tion or sacrifice—systems that, as Montesquieu said, ‘‘convince everybody, but
change nobody.’’
The realist, then, is skeptical both of men and of the possibilities of political
action.4 His emphasis is on the limitations attending the conduct of statecraft.
As such, he is resistant to schemes of universal order and security. Instead, his
outlook tends toward particularism; he takes his bearings from existing diplo-
matic constellations. He tends to value order over justice, or at least to see order
as a fundamental condition of justice. His is an inherently conservative view of
politics in which prudence is given a central place.
In Defense of Realism 5
Although these are the general characteristics of realism, it does not follow
that those who share them—realists—will entertain the same views about pol-
icy. There is no straight line leading from these characteristic features of realism
to ‘‘good policy.’’ This is so even if we define good policy, as realists do, as
policy calculated to preserve the independence and well-being of the political
community. To be sure, realism prescribes prudence; it insists that the political
actor concern himself with the probable consequences of action. But prudence
cannot in itself provide the purposes for which political action is undertaken; it
cannot provide even the basis of a political ethic. Prudence places no restraints
on political action other than caution and circumspection; it sets no limits to
self-interest other than those limits imposed by the situation in which policy
must be conducted; it is compatible with any and all purposes holding out the
prospect of success. Before the statesman can be prudent, there must be some-
thing for him to be prudent about. Realism holds that he must be prudent
about the security and independence of the state.
The essential claim of realism may be better understood if we look at two
well-known formulations of the rights and duties of states, and ask whether
realism, properly understood, is incompatible with either. In his Spirit of the
Laws, Montesquieu held that ‘‘le droit des gens’’—variously translated as the
right or law of nations—‘‘is by nature founded on the principle that the various
nations should do to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and
in times of war the least ill possible, without harming their true interests.’’
Alexander Hamilton’s formulation, at first glance, was similar. He did not advo-
cate ‘‘a policy absolutely selfish or interested in nations,’’ but insisted rather
that ‘‘a policy regulated by their own interest, as far as justice and good faith
permit, is, and ought to be, their prevailing policy.’’ Both these formulations
recognize the priority of what Vattel called ‘‘the duties to oneself’’ over ‘‘the
duties to others,’’ but qualify or limit the pursuit of such duties (or ‘‘national
interests’’) in different ways. Montesquieu is not normally considered a realist,
but the utilitarian character of his formulation, together with the primacy it
allows for the pursuit of national self-interest, closely resembles the way in
which most realists reason about ethics and statecraft.5
Hamilton’s formulation, ironically, is more restrictive than Montesquieu’s;
the counsel of this great American realist is, if taken literally, inconsistent with
‘‘realism.’’ States, he says, are to pursue their interests within the limits imposed
by justice and good faith. Realists, by contrast, have normally said that states
may break faith and employ unjust means when their survival and indepen-
dence are threatened. Publicists of the law of nations denied this exemption.
Though the right of self-preservation, according to Vattel, carried with it ‘‘the
right to whatever is necessary for that purpose . . . , these means must not be
unjust in themselves, or such as the natural law absolutely prohibits.’’ Those
who took the other side of this argument based the exemption on the old
6 Hendrickson
Roman doctrine of public safety—salus populi suprema lex est. Though the doc-
trine of necessity or of ‘‘public safety’’ is rightly identified with realism, it is
sometimes affirmed by personages not normally thought of as realists. Jefferson,
for instance, held that ‘‘[a] strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one
of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of neces-
sity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher
obligation.’’ Such is what all realists have believed; such is their distinctive
claim.6
If realism does not and cannot provide the answer to what constitutes ‘‘good
policy,’’ it does hold out an answer to one, and perhaps the most profound,
moral dilemma of statecraft: that of the means states may employ when their
security and independence are threatened. While realism recognizes the ‘‘moral
reality’’ of war, and thus the imperative that war’s conduct ought to be subject
to moral and legal constraints, it also recognizes that where the state’s indepen-
dence and continuity are in jeopardy, the statesman may—indeed, should—
take whatever measures are required to preserve such independence and
continuity. The ancient doctrine of ‘‘necessity’’ in statecraft is at once very old
and very contemporary. We have only recently escaped its oppressive grip, hav-
ing lived almost constantly with it from World War II until the end of the age
of deterrence, circa 1990. In this period, necessity not only formed the limiting
conditions of our lives but, in nuclear deterrence, seemed to express a near
permanent state of things.
The argument of necessity in statecraft is not to be taken literally. Clearly, at
the root of this view is not simply an explanation but a choice. The necessity
that is presumably imposed on the statesman is in the end a ‘‘moral necessity’’
enjoining him to do that which is necessary to preserve the state’s independence
and survival. What appears as a necessity does so because a moral choice has
already been made. The appeal to necessity is compatible with restraint on state
action as long as those restraints do not appear to jeopardize the independence
and survival of the political collective. The concept of necessity only constitutes
a permission to override moral and legal restraints in ‘‘extreme’’ situations
(‘‘when the safety of the state is in question’’); by evident implication, this
very limitation constitutes a recognition that such restraints are obligatory in
‘‘normal’’ circumstances. But whether restraints can be observed will depend
upon the immediate circumstances in which the statesman must act and not
upon abstract considerations (or upon a retrospective wisdom and detachment
the actor cannot have).
There is no difficulty in cataloguing the many abuses to which the appeal to
necessity, the heart of the doctrine of reason of state, has led in practice. These
abuses, moreover, are not accidental; they are built into the very character of
the doctrine and may be traced to the uncertainty that attends the concept of
the collective ‘‘self’’ as well as the nature of the society in which states must
In Defense of Realism 7
define the self and its necessities. For that society renders tenuous the distinc-
tion between security and survival. In collapsing this distinction, as states are
prone to do, the door is opened to all kinds of abuses. Still, it does not follow
that it is meaningless to speak of the self-preservation or survival of states. The
condition of necessity may, and does, arise. Reason of state declares that when
it does, all other considerations should be subordinated to the safety of the
state.
Walzer does not reject the argument of necessity. What he terms ‘‘supreme
emergency’’ serves, in principle, the same purpose as does the doctrine that has
always been closely identified with realism. It is the case that Walzer accepts
necessity only with great reluctance and unease. ‘‘I want to set radical limits to
the notion of necessity,’’ he insists on more than one occasion. More than this,
he makes an impressive and commendable effort to do so. Even so, in the end
he comes back to the conclusion others, mainly realists, have come back to. The
demands of necessity are not denied. ‘‘Can soldiers and statesmen override the
rights of innocent people for the sake of their own political community?’’ he
asks, and replies: ‘‘I am inclined to answer this question affirmatively, though
not without hesitation and worry.’’7
Nor does Walzer differ substantially from realism in the defense he gives on
behalf of supreme emergency or necessity. ‘‘The survival and freedom of politi-
cal communities—whose members share a way of life, developed by their ances-
tors, to be passed on to their children—are the highest values of international
society.’’8 This is said in reference to the threat posed by Nazism, but Walzer
acknowledges that lesser challenges, if they threaten the survival and freedom
of a political community, have similar moral consequences. At the same time,
he says that he is not sure that he can ‘‘account’’ for the ‘‘different and larger
prerogatives’’ of political communities since he does not believe ‘‘in ascribing
to communal life a kind of transcendence.’’9 But whether the political commu-
nity is invested with intrinsic worth and transcendent value or is seen instead
as being not the source but the indispensable condition of value (as liberal
democracies have done), the practical result is the same. As the indispensable
condition of value, certainly of those values identified with individual freedom,
the state is endowed with ‘‘a kind of transcendence,’’ to use Walzer’s expression,
that serves to justify the extreme measures which may be taken to preserve it.
Walzer, then, has a close affinity to realism with respect to both the value he
places on the political community and his willingness to justify the sacrifice of
innocents in the name of ‘‘supreme emergency.’’ Short of these extreme situa-
tions, however, he insists that the duty to avoid harm to the innocent in war is
of overriding importance and cannot be abridged by utilitarian calculation. The
realist need not differ in this, but he may do so, and, considering his regard for
the consequences of action, will likely do so. For most realists, measures in
violation of the war convention may be justified if they shorten the war and
8 Hendrickson
substantially decrease the total amount of human suffering. To state the argu-
ment in this form is not to show that utilitarian calculation is justified in every
particular instance, or even in most instances; the consequentialist may certainly
require a strong burden of proof—as we would do—to override the otherwise
obligatory rule. Still, the argument over the legitimacy of utilitarian calculation
in war displays the contrast between realism and a deontological ethic in an
acute form, as do the recent debates provoked by the fiftieth anniversary of the
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All those who, in the recent debates,
justified the bombing did so not on the basis that anything is permitted in
war—nobody but a barbarian can deny that the destruction of a city is, on its
face, a moral enormity—but by claiming that the use of atomic weaponry saved
hundreds of thousands of American and Japanese lives. Even if one accepts
Walzer’s judgment that such utilitarian calculations are ‘‘fantastic, godlike,
frightening, and horrendous’’10 —for they surely are—it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the refusal to have considered the consequences of not dropping
the bomb would have been, in the circumstances, equally ‘‘fantastic, godlike,
frightening, and horrendous.’’ It is difficult, moreover, to resist the conclusion
that dropping the first bomb at least did save many more lives than would have
been lost had this decision been refused. It did put an end, as Churchill said, to
‘‘the vast, indefinite butchery.’’ Walzer argues that the alternatives ought not to
have been what they were, because unconditional surrender was a war aim that
ought not to have been entertained. Even if this argument is in principle
granted, in the summer of 1945 the larger parameters of the policy of uncondi-
tional surrender would have been exceedingly difficult to change (though
assuredly the U.S. government was in the wrong in not making explicit before
Hiroshima its subsequent acceptance of the emperor’s role in the reconstruction
of Japanese life, just as it was grossly in the wrong in not allowing sufficient
time for Japanese reconsideration after the first bomb was dropped). If the
realist, by virtue of his consequentialist calculations, may fairly be charged with
a greater willingness to justify Hiroshima-like acts, the moralist remaining faith-
ful to absolute injunction (save when the heavens are really about to fall) is
stuck on the horns of a dilemma equally profound. Neither alternative, in truth,
is satisfactory or can be accepted without the gravest misgivings.
In part two of Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer presents a theory of aggression that
seeks to articulate the common moral perceptions governing the resort to force.
At the core of this theory is a ‘‘legalist paradigm’’ that he calls ‘‘our baseline,
our model, the fundamental structure for the moral comprehension of war.’’
The paradigm posits ‘‘an international society of independent states’’ whose
dominant values are ‘‘the survival and independence of the separate political
communities.’’ To intervene in the internal affairs of these states violates their
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